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PORTUGAL: A NEW LOOK AT THEEXTREME RIGHTJosé Pedro ZúquetePublished online: 17 Jul 2007.

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PORTUGAL: A NEW LOOK AT THE

EXTREME RIGHT

Jose Pedro Zuquete

This article examines the recent emergence and increasing visibility in Portugal of an extreme

right party, the Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party), whose driving force is no

longer nostalgia for the ‘New State’ of Salazar but rather the rejection of modern trends such as

globalisation, immigration, and the overriding influence of supranational bodies like the European

Union. It looks at the structural conditions that have facilitated the National Renewal Party’s

emergence, and outlines the main features, themes, and values of the party’s ideological core. It

then focuses both on the conditions that might lead the party to achieve an electoral

breakthrough and the obstacles that can impede its development. It argues that the traditionally

perceived ‘marginalisation’ of the Portuguese extreme right, in a context of crisis and the

emergence of a political entrepreneur who could profit from it and supply a new alternative, may

come to an end.

Introduction

It is almost a truism to say that in the decades since the 1974 Portuguese revolution

that ousted Salazar’s successor Marcelo Caetano, an organised and successful extreme

right party has been next to non-existent in Portugal.1 In fact, since the ‘carnation

revolution’ Portugal has not witnessed the resurgence in electoral support for extreme

right parties that has dominated the political landscape of other Western European

nations. The post-revolution history of the extreme right in Portugal has been

characterised by the electoral failure of such short-lived political parties as the nostalgic

Independent Movement of National Reconstruction (MIRN), founded by former member of

Salazar regime General Kaulza de Arriaga, or the ultra-traditionalist Party of Christian

Democracy (PDC). On the whole these parties were too connected both ideologically and

spiritually to the old authoritarian regime to make any significant impact on the newly

born Portuguese democracy.

‘Playful or even far-fetched’ was how one scholar described the question of

‘continuity or renaissance’ of the ‘Radical Right’ in Portugal (Merkl 1993, 208). An

assessment of the current literature confirms this perception of the Portuguese extreme

right as a ‘marginalised’ (a commonly used term) force in Portugal’s political landscape.

Writing about the ‘marginalization of the extreme right’ in the country, Tom Gallagher

(1992, 243) stresses that the ‘Portuguese far right is possibly in a weaker state than [that] in

any other southern European country’. Antonio Costa Pinto (1995, 110) wrote about the

‘fragility’ of the Portuguese extreme right and, similarly, Thomas C. Davis (1998, 163)

argued that in Spain and Portugal, ‘parties originating on the far right have been

marginalized since the transition to democracy’, thus making the Iberian Peninsula a

geographic area of ‘retreat from the radical right’. Piero Ignazi (2003, 196) has recently

Representation, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2007ISSN 0034-4893 print/1749-4001 online/07/030179-20

� 2007 McDougall Trust, London DOI: 10.1080/00344890701463654

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reaffirmed this view in stating that specific historical conditions have ‘deprived the

Portuguese extreme right of any chance’. According to these authors several factors have

contributed to the non-development of a strong extreme right-wing presence in Portugal.

Gallagher (1992) sees in the soporific and traditionalist character of Salazar’s regime –

lacking the mobilisation and politicisation of the masses that characterised other

dictatorships – and the consequent suppression of the more dynamic and radical native

right-wing forces, an important explanation for the weakness of the extreme right after the

fall of the regime. Along the same line Pinto (1995) sees in the depoliticisation promoted

by Salazar a major factor for the absence of a relevant extreme right presence in the

country. Davis (1998) identifies no solid and durable popular distrust in representative

democracy or in the welfare state that could be exploited by an extreme right-wing force.

Finally, Ignazi (2003) asserts that, in the Portuguese case, both the considerable vitality and

the favourable light cast upon modern trends like globalisation serve to inoculate the

political system against a strong extreme right presence.

The reality of the Portuguese political system still seems at first glance to confirm the

accuracy of this ‘marginalisation thesis’. In the most recent legislative election (February

2005) the party located on the most extreme right of the political continuum – the Partido

Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party) – fared poorly accounting for only 0.16 per

cent of the total national vote.2 However, the groupuscular nature of and negligible

electoral support for the National Renewal Party should not together constitute a reason

for political and social analysts of the Portuguese reality to ignore it. Its political discourse

is no longer nostalgic but modern, in the sense of addressing new themes and challenges

to the ‘national community’. A closer look reveals an element of novelty in the party. Its

ideological core, its literature, its public behaviour and media tactics, all position the

National Renewal Party among the broader extreme right family of parties that have

gained considerable success in other Western European countries. Further, study into the

party’s trajectory of growth while it is still organising itself so shortly after its foundation

can provide important insights into the factors that may lead a party of the extreme right

to failure or to success. Indeed, a detailed study of party ideology and tactics could

advance cross-national research into the emergence and dynamics of extreme right party

politics (Mudde 2000, 183) and serve as an additional reason to study these parties not

primarily in terms of their size but in terms of the data they can offer to comparative

research. Until now there has been a correspondence between the ‘marginalisation thesis’

of the Portuguese extreme right and the political and social reality. What follows is an

attempt to ascertain whether the conditions and reasons that made the thesis possible will

hold for much longer.

A New Set of Structural Conditions

The rise of extreme right parties has been open to various ‘demand-side’ and

‘supply-side’ explanations (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005, 3–35). Evidently socio-economic

factors (‘demand-side’) might facilitate the rise of parties that thrive on popular

discontentment with and resentment towards the inability of mainstream parties to offer

credible solutions. In this section I will address relatively recent developments in

Portuguese society and economy that may serve to catalyse a growing crisis of public

confidence in the political system and the need for identity and self-defence against

perceived outside threats.

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Among the most common ‘demand-side’ perspectives on extreme right literature is

interpreting the rise of these parties as a consequence of postindustrial ‘non-material’

themes and demands that have scarcely been addressed by traditional parties. Though

these postindustrial developments have, at one pole of the political continuum, given rise

to green and left-libertarian parties, they have at the other pole produced a backlash in the

form of new right-wing parties that react against the disruptions and new challenges

created by rapidly evolving globalisation and societal changes in the form of weakened

traditional supportive networks (such as the church) and increased individualism and

liberalisation (Ignazi 1996). These changes have served as a springboard for the emergence

of new parties to address the ‘demands for identity (hence nationalism), for homogeneity

(hence xenophobia), and for order, hierarchy, and strong leadership (hence authoritarian-

ism)’ (Ignazi 2003, 202). It has been argued that the ‘insufficient postindustrialisation’ of

Portugal undercut the political opportunities for the rise of the extreme right (Kitschelt

1997, 56).

However, in the last two decades in particular, Portugal has suffered a process of

structural transformation that seems to contradict this assumption. The country now has

one of the defining features of an advanced postindustrial society: a service industry that is

by far the biggest proportion of the economy (and getting closer to the EU average), while

the secondary industry has been decreasing lately and the primary sector has contracted

substantially (INE 2005). Further, as I have indicated, according to the literature on the

extreme right, parties on the left-libertarian end of the political spectrum are seen as one

of two viable answers to the postindustrial society (the other is the emerging parties on

the extreme right). In this manner, it is plausible to expect that these parties ‘appear in the

same general time period as [do] their antagonists [on the left]’ (Kitschelt 1997, 49). It is

thus relevant to note that Portugal has witnessed the rise of a left-libertarian party with

the foundation in 1999 of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc), which has met some electoral

success3 and committed, inter alia, to an ‘alternative’ vision of globalisation, multi-

culturalism, minority rights, and liberalisation of abortion and drugs. It vows to promote a

more ‘participatory citizenry’ and proclaims an unmistakably anti-system message. Though

Portugal is still clearly behind in terms of mass adoption of post-materialist values – and

with little significance as a predictor of vote choice at least at the turn of the millennium

(Freire 2003a, 348–49) – there has been a shift in the direction of post-materialism in the

country.

In tandem with this postindustrial development, the balance between immigration

and emigration reverted in favour of immigration in the mid-1990s, with Portugal being

for the first time in its history more a destination for immigrants (mostly from Brazil and

Eastern Europe, but also from Angola and Cape Verde, for example) than a country of

origin for emigrants (Barreto 2002; see also, Caradoso 2006). Official numbers show an

increase of the immigrant population from 1.7 per cent in 1995 to 4 per cent in 2002.4 The

need to create a specific government body to address immigrant and ethnic minority

issues thus increased, and the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities

(Alto Comissariado para a Imigracao e Minorias Etnicas, ACIME) was created in 1996. The

ACIME aimed, in the words of the current commissioner, at ‘making the State the biggest

ally of immigrant integration’ (ACIME 2005). Though there are no numbers for illegal

immigrants, the issue has already become a major concern for the Portuguese

government.5

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Further, particularly after the 1974 revolution, Portugal developed a comprehensive

welfare state that today provides services to a rapidly growing number of social security

beneficiaries and, after the creation in the mid-1990s of a Guaranteed Minimum Social

Income for people and families in need, poor foreign households. (Barreto 2002; Malheiros

2002). The decline in recent years of the birth rate and the rise of the elderly population –

in line with a wider European trend – has put at risk the financial viability of such a

comprehensive network of protection. The warnings of impending bankruptcy of the

welfare state are already being heard in Portugal.6

As we head to the completion of the first decade of the new century it seems

therefore that Portugal’s structural socio-economic conditions have evolved drastically

since the democratic transition and particularly the membership of the European Union in

1986. However, the current economic conjuncture of Portugal is one of crisis and the

catching-up process of the living standards in regard to other EU countries has stalled. The

increasing globalised economy, and such related dynamics as stiff competition from lower

wage countries and the outsourcing of jobs, has hit particularly hard the industry sector

and Portugal, which in the 1990s had one of the lowest European unemployment rates,

has registered one of the highest increases in the number of jobless in the Euro-zone; for

the first since Portugal became a EU member its jobless rate has climbed toward the EU

average (Eurostat 2006).

Therefore, the increase in the postindustrial nature of Portugal – characterised by

both a visible expansion of the service sector and the development of a comprehensive

welfare state – created a new structural framework that, under the impact of fluctuations

in the economy, may have the potential to open a ‘political opportunity structure’ that

could be exploited by new political entrepreneurs and outsiders. The persistence of

demand factors, of course, may facilitate the rise of the extreme right; but a major

determinant for its success lies in the strategy, ideology, and values appealing power of

the political entrepreneur interested in taking advantage of a favourable set of conditions

(Eatwell 2003; Ferguson and Abrams 2006; Ignazi 2003). In order to paint a fuller portrait of

the Portuguese situation, I now examine the alternative presented by and represented in

the National Renewal Party, which has all the features of a ‘modern’ – though late

compared to other Western European nations – product of and/or reaction to the new

social, economic, and cultural conditions of Portugal.

An Overview of the National Renewal Party

The origin of the Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) is similar to those of other

European extreme right-wing parties and resulted from the assemblage of different figures

and grouplets of the Portuguese ‘national camp’ (Camus 2001, 200) when the PNR’s

founding members took control of an older party and managed to legally change its

name, logo and statutes. At the time of its foundation in February 2000 the party

comprised mostly neo-fascists and nostalgics for Salazar’s ‘New State’. Indeed its very first

leader was a member of the former regime’s establishment. Since then, however, a process

of internal depuration has resulted in the progressive marginalisation of the ‘nostalgic’

faction – which is now clustered around the association Alianca Nacional7 (run by PNR’s

first president) – and the party has transformed itself into a counterpart to other ‘modern’

Western European extreme right organisations. This change of direction for the party –

and the concomitant mediatisation – has become particularly noteworthy since the

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election to the party presidency in June 2005 of founding member Jose Pinto-Coelho.

Under his leadership the PNR has increasingly focused onto the novel issues and demands

attending Portugal’s consolidation as a postindustrial society.

Ethnic Nationalism

The PNR’s literature, interviews, speeches, and public statements provide a detailed

look into the party’s ideological core and worldview. The trait that is most prominently

featured in the party’s ideology and that pervades all of its different facets is a nationalism

that emphasises and promotes the reclamation of the ethnic homogenisation of the

nation (Mudde 2000, 171). This ethnic nationalism is the source of the party’s rejection of

the contemporary Portuguese status quo, for the party presents itself as the ‘only’

homegrown force that ‘proposes Nationalism as a way of solving the problems of our

society’ (PNR 2005c). From the standpoint of the party immigration – many times grouped

with ‘invasion’ – is one of the greatest of such impending dangers to the national identity

and the party repeatedly warns the public against the ‘continued colonization of our

country’ and the danger that ‘in a few decades, the Portuguese could become a minority

within their own homeland’ (PNR 2005c). In this manner, the party contends that,

‘particularly since the nineties’, Portugal has been the victim of a ‘true invasion

representing a threat to the sovereignty, security, and future survival of the Portuguese

people’ (PNR 2005b).

In line with the ethnic dimension of its nationalism, the party rejects the new

Portuguese Nationality Law, approved by parliament in February 2006, that facilitates the

acquisition of Portuguese nationality and reinforces ius soli, or citizenship by birthright

(ACIME 2006). PNR faithful hold that the sole criterion for citizenship should only be ius

sanguinis, conferred through blood ties, because ‘Portuguese are the children of

Portuguese’ and ‘Nationality is not bought [but] is inherited’ (PNR 2005e). In order to

effect a harmony between the state and the endangered ethnic community, the party

defends a policy of ‘internal homogenisation’ through the repatriation of immigrants

(Mudde 2000, 181). Thus, the ethnic argument is brought to its natural conclusion with the

party vowing to ‘stop the flow of immigrants to Portugal (with occasional exceptions)’,

break ties with the Schengen Agreement that allows the free flow of people within the EU,

and put in place ‘a humanitarian program of repatriating those immigrants who have

residence here’ (PNR 2005c).

At the same time the rights of the indigenous majority should be protected by the

state and should override the rights of the immigrant minorities, especially in university

enrolment (the party defends reducing the quota of immigrants) and in access to the job

market, with the party defending the principle of ‘national preference’, duplicating in this

way dynamics of welfare chauvinism characteristic of other nationalist movements in

Western Europe. This principle endorses ‘giving national citizens priority in filling jobs’ and

putting an end to ‘the unjust and absurd situation of seeing Portuguese without jobs or

having to immigrate, because a substantial number of jobs are occupied by foreigners’.

The party repeatedly denounces the ‘unfair competition of cheap labor from abroad’

which conflicts with the rights and needs of Portuguese workers at home (PNR 2005b). As

stated by PNR’s president in a public address, Portugal should not have ‘even one more

immigrant as long as there is a Portuguese without a job’. The troubles faced by the

welfare system are partly blamed on immigrants and ethnic minorities, who are ‘super-

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protected, all living [off of] our taxes’. The party leader further argued, ‘Those who defend

immigration said that it would solve the Social Security problems, but that is not the case

[for] as we all know, Social Security is bankrupt! Immigration brought instead social

insecurity’ (Coelho 2006b). One of the party’s arguments for the rejection of the new,

Socialist government-drafted Portuguese Immigration Law is the fact that immigrants,

‘notwithstanding the official propaganda’, bring no economic benefits, for the typical

immigrant is a ‘burden for the budget’ because he or she willingly works for low wages

while making a ‘minimal contribution’ to an overly generous, open-handed welfare system

(PNR 2006a). Further, the party targets foreign – and particularly Chinese-owned –

businesses, whom it accuses of ruining national production and benefiting from fiscal

incentives. The national priority should instead be the defence and protection (through

such measures as lowered taxes) of indigenous Portuguese businesses (Coelho 2006b).

Furthermore, party literature regularly associates immigration with law and order issues,

particularly increased public insecurity about violence, upward trends in organised crime,

and the ‘emergence of ethnic gangs of youths of African origin’ (PNR 2005b). The party has

repeatedly stated its solidarity with the law enforcement community, and especially the

police force that, ‘though they have to face increasing criminality, due to an uncontrolled

immigrant invasion’, lacks necessary ‘working conditions’ and benefits (PNR 2006c).

Against the System

As the PNR’s main focus is preserving the ‘ethnic’ identity of the community, its

discourse targets the internal and external forces that it perceives to be responsible for the

‘decadence’ plaguing the nation. This is the wellspring for the party’s anti-system nature,

its constant repudiation of Portugal’s mainstream parties, media, and cultural elites. These

disparate and diverse elements of Portuguese society are blended into what the party

deems as ‘the system’, a monolithic concept composed of ‘the established parties, the

media, the leftist cultural dictatorship, [and] the inhuman and multinational [forces] of

capitalism’ who thrive on using ‘lies and manipulation’ to keep the population complacent

(PNR 2005b). The PNR’s discourse is marked by a vehement rejection of the ‘parties and

politicians of the system’, whom the party accuses of being responsible for ‘the decadence

and destruction of Portugal’ (PNR 2005f) through their self-serving and corrupt actions and

policies. ‘From the center-right to the extreme-left! They all steal, they all share benefits

between themselves, they all profit from the budget [and] make fun of the people!’

(Coelho 2006b). All the putative evils afflicting the country are the ultimate fault of ‘the

system’, which acquires in this way an all-powerful and omnipresent characteristic. A

discourse of conspiracy is thus present throughout the party’s anti-system message. The

mainstream institutions of Portuguese society are portrayed as beholden to lobbies and

external forces whose reckless determination is ushering in the destruction of the

‘national’ identity of the country.

All of the threats besetting the community find its source in the dynamics of

globalisation, the ‘two-headed monster of savage capitalism and multiculturalism’ (Coelho

2006d). Fighting this is ‘the greatest goal of nationalists’, because ‘globalization destroys

nations, peoples, values, cultures, and seeks a uniform, bland, easily manipulated

humanity’ (Coelho 2006e). All social indicators – for example, the declining birthrate of the

nation (which, given rising immigration, is seen by the PNR as a most urgent issue) or

open-border policies – are not only linked but are interpreted in the light of the

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globalising forces’ final goal: the creation of a ‘New World Order’ (PNR 2005b). In order to

actively shape a ‘new world’, these globalising forces collude with national allies, all of

whom (in the discourse of the PNR) belong to the ‘system’. Thus, the common

denunciation of these parties’ policies and actions as ‘treason’: these perfidious bodies

participate in the ‘process of softening the resistance to globalization’ (PNR 2006a) and

thus threaten ‘Portugal’s continued existence as a nation’ (Coelho 2006c). The party also

connects the excesses of capitalism with the degradation of the environment, thus linking

a post-material concern to its defence against ‘the logic of profit’ (PNR 2005b).

Behind this New World Order are the interests of ‘suspicious’ organisations. As the

PNR’s president says, ‘It’s not easy to identify specific targets because the real drama of

globalization is that it is maintained by shadow governments, for example, the famous

Bildeberg group’. The American administration is also identified as ‘a key element, a

heavyweight’ in the construction of the coming world order (Coelho 2006e). The European

Union is equally seen as part of the globalising project of the ‘liquidation’ of nations, and is

derided as an ‘aberrant’, ‘anti-natural enterprise’ existing only to serve ‘obscure interests

and capitalist endings’ (Coelho 2006d). Europe, which ‘let itself be invaded and degraded’,

has become a ‘ticking-bomb’, and is ‘on the path to suicide’ (Coelho 2006e).

Thus, the PNR’s exceptionalism is a recurrent topic in the party discourse, which is

highly polarised between the party of the ‘nation’ and the ‘politicians of the system’ whose

‘only function is to serve foreign interests and anti-national lobbies’ (PNR 2005f). ‘We, and

only we’, the Leader proclaims, ‘courageously assume the struggle for national sovereignty

and for the rights of the Portuguese’ (Coelho 2006c). The party positions itself in the camp

of the ‘nationalisms’, which are ‘on the rise’ against their biggest enemy, the ‘owners of the

system and of the logic that reigns in Portugal, Europe, and the West’, the masters of

globalisation (Coelho 2006d). Using a common expression of French nationalist Jean-Marie

Le Pen, the PNR’s president vows to ‘say out loud what the people think in silence’ (Coelho

2006c). The survival of the nation thus hinges upon awakening the rest of the people, who

are repeatedly manipulated and lied to by the ‘system’ and the media about the evils that

afflict the country. The only solution is for the Portuguese to drop the role of placid

onlookers amid the ‘collective death’ of their nation, and join forces with the only outpost

of national resistance, the PNR (2006e).

In order to reinforce its legitimacy as the only national alternative in Portuguese

politics, the party has begun to develop a symbolic dimension, particularly through the

employment of political rituals similar to those that have been developed by other

European nationalist movements. The party has organised rallies and parades on 1

December to celebrate the restoration in 1640 of Portuguese independence after 60 years

of Spanish rule. The PNR’s leader has repeatedly compared the self-serving Portuguese

elites to the one of the most vilified figures of Portuguese history, Miguel de Vasconcelos,

who was killed for being a collaborator during the Spanish dominion. ‘We need to get rid

of the new ‘‘Migueis de Vasconcelos’’’, he said at one of the December First rallies, and

added that the country needed ‘a new Restoration of national independence’ (Coelho

2006f). Further, the party has begun annual May Day celebrations (in defence of the

Portuguese workers), and has consecrated 10 June (that marks the death of the poet who

immortalized Portugal’s voyages of discovery, Luıs Vaz de Camoest) as the ‘National

festival’ to be celebrated every year with a grand speech by the Leader as the culmination

of the event (PNR 2006d).

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Though the party has only recently initiated such performances, it aims gradually to

reinforce the internal solidarity of the group and legitimate its role as the guardian of the

national identity that is becoming dangerously debased.

Decline of Tradition and Morality

A major indicator of the decadence into which the nation continues to sink – and

given special emphasis in party literature – is the decay of traditional and moral values that

has been prompted by the cultural liberalisation that Portugal has undergone since the

last decades of the twentieth century. Such topics as the ‘defence’ of the traditional family,

the combat against the perceived advance of a ‘gay agenda’ in the country, and working

for the most restrictive abortion laws are explored in the guiding light of the party’s

‘superior’ ethical values against the onslaught of the disruptive libertarian forces. The

party’s traditionalist ideology is built around the axiomatic belief that the weakening of

the traditional family is not a historical accident but rather the result of an elaborated plan

from global ‘lobbies’ who, ‘by destroying the values of personal belonging [both] to family

and to community [and] replacing them with individualism, these globalizers (both those

who are Marxists and those who are liberal-capitalists), will more easily uproot citizens

from their cultures [and] globalize the world’ (PNR 2005b).

In order to reverse this downward spiral of decadence and debasement in which the

nation appears to be caught, the party proposes pro-birth policies and incentives to

heterosexual families, because ‘our country will only have a future through a homogenous,

young, and numerous people’ (PNR 2005b). Related to this undermining of the family is

the extreme left’s ‘culture of death’, to which the established parties acquiesce. Against the

continuing efforts to liberalise the country’s law on abortion, the PNR defends a ‘culture of

life’ and promotes the strictest abortion laws (PNR 2006g). Another sign of the

‘degeneration’ of traditional values and norms – and a pervasive theme in the party’s

literature – is the increasing power of the ‘gay lobby’. The party’s president frames the

combat against this as ‘a true war of civilizations and mentalities’. With the support of the

‘parties of the system’, the gay lifestyle and culture wear away the ‘roots of society and its

values’, weaken the people’s ‘consciousness’, and contravene normal societal conventions

(Coelho 2006d).

Media Strategies

The role played by the media in the rise and development of anti-system parties has

been the subject of a growing literature. The ‘mediatisation thesis’ argues that media

coverage has the potential to play a twofold role: it can lead either to the legitimation or

to the delegitimation of new political forces, and it many times does both (Eatwell 2002).

In the Portuguese case, the media (at least in these early stages) has shown a strong

hostility toward this political newcomer. This is in line with the collateral model of media–

politics interaction, in which the media assume the role of gatekeepers of the system and

defenders of the status quo against perceived radical threats. Therefore, the general tone

of the media’s reporting is geared toward emphasising the ‘extremist’ and ‘dangerous’

nature of the party. The media’s narrative establishes parallels between the PNR and both

fascism and Nazism. The close association with the party of a neo-Nazi organisation called

Frente Nacional (National Front), whose members are often present at PNR rallies, only

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fuels a characterisation of the party in which the media barely distinguishes between the

two and focuses on those elements that display ‘fascist-like’ behaviour (the Roman salute,

for example).8

Like other anti-system parties in Europe, the PNR has adopted a key set of media

strategies and has displayed a communicational hyper-activism in order to gain media

access and attention, advance the propagation of its message and, eventually, to control

the nation’s political agenda. The media-geared orientation of the party has become

increasingly noticeable with the creation of a press office that regularly distributes news

releases. The fact that the mainstream media is clearly hostile to the PNR is used to the

party’s favour: the media-led demonisation only ‘confirms’ the party’s discourse that the

media is in league with the ‘system’ and, consequently, persecutes the only ‘national

resistance’ to its goals. This solidifies the party’s cultivated self-image, primarily within its

own constituency, of being an outsider silenced and ostracised by established parties and

their ‘lackeys in the media’ (PNR 2006e), yet constituting the only true alternative to the

establishment. At the same time that it attacks the media, the PNR has learned how to play

by the rules of the game, and engages in the creation of media events centred on political

rallies that accompany the news cycle. In this manner the PNR exploits to its favour news

items – such as those related to law and order or immigration issues – that the media

covers extensively. When in June 2005 the media reported on (and greatly exaggerated) a

gang raid on a popular beach by suburban Luso-African youths, the party’s rally

denouncing immigration and the ‘concomitant’ increase in criminality gained national

coverage and increased the PNR’s visibility (Publico, 19 June 2005; Publico, 9 June 2006).

When a local mayor decided in May 2006 to finance the arrival and fixation of families of

immigrants from Brazil in order to combat the depopulation of the town – an event that

garnered serious media attention – the PNR organised there a rally to denounce the

‘immigrant invasion’ accelerating the ‘substitution of our people for other peoples’ (Correio

da Manha, 12 May 2006). The party was also able to gain coverage in both the print and

electronic media by associating itself with a protest organised by the police against the

government (Jornal de Notıcias, 7 June 2006). Though the media cast the PNR in a negative

light the party nevertheless seized each opportunity to exploit free media publicity and

thus attract a broader public attention.

The media-savvy PNR has exploited the penchant of the media, and especially

though by no means exclusively the tabloid media, for controversy and sensationalism.

Adopting a strategy that is common in the style of Le Pen (Souchard et al. 1997, 169), the

PNR has used this in its favour. For example, its president caused a stir by declaring that

the presence of a naturalised Brazilian player on the Portuguese national team was

‘scandalous’ (O Jogo, 10 June 2006), a declaration that became part of the news cycle. The

party was also able to generate controversy by launching a campaign to stop the

broadcast of a national TV programme it accused of glamorising homosexual behaviour

(Diario de Notıcias, 11 September 2005).

A golden media opportunity for the party arose in the beginning of 2007, during the

campaign for the referendum to liberalise abortion laws. The party not only qualified for

free air time on radio and television, but also managed to associate itself with the

campaign of mainstream civic groups for the ‘no’ side. The presence of the PNR at a much

publicised pro-life march in Lisbon became part of the media narrative, especially the fact

that the party was relegated by the organisers to the back of the march. Accordingly, the

statement of protest by PNR’s president – who said that ‘in Portugal the nationalists are

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discriminated against’ – appeared in the Portuguese News Agency LUSA and other major

news outlets (Publico, 29 January 2007; Correio da Manha, 29 January 2007). Finally a major

media breakthrough came in the spring of 2007 with the erection by the party of a large

anti-immigration billboard in one of the busiest avenues of Lisbon. Depicting an image of

PNR’s leader and captioned ‘No more immigration’ and ‘Portugal to the Portuguese’, this

billboard sent shock waves through the entire political system: all parties in parliament

repudiated its message, and some raised doubts about the party’s ‘legality’. The billboard

also attracted wide coverage by the media in a way that the party had never before seen.

In the wake of the controversy, PNR’s leader gave a press conference at which he stated

the party’s goal of having parliamentary representation by 2009 (Coelho 2007). The

controversy around the billboard placed the PNR firmly in the public eye and gave the

party the kind of publicity that it could only dream of just a few months before. In the light

of these new developments, the extensive media coverage of the PNR’s campaign for the

July 2007 Lisbon mayoral elections, came as slight surprise. The PNR candidate and

president gave interviews, held debates, and spread the party’s message across

mainstream media organizations (see, for example, PNR Lisboa 2007).

While the overall portrayal of the party by the media (both reporters and pundits) is

negative, research into these movements has shown that any kind of media coverage

provides advantages to ‘contentious political figures’ by enhancing their visibility and

‘producing some kind of public legitimation’ (Stewart et al. 2003, 236). In this case, the

attention given by the media to the new political force – and potentially contentious

issues such as the increase in crime and immigration – can end up reinforcing the

legitimacy of the new political force as ‘one more voice’ in the political spectrum of the

country. The PNR, still a minuscule force in Portuguese politics (particularly in elections),

has successfully gained visibility and made efforts to connect with a broader public. I will

now turn to the conditions and factors that may inhibit or favour the party’s development,

profiting from the country’s structural transformation and the rise of new issues, and in

this way broadening its electorate beyond the core.

National Renewal Party: Breakthrough or Breakdown?

I will start by addressing the conditions – based both on the party’s own dynamics

and on attitudinal behavioural mass public trends – that may be conducive to the PNR’s

growth and success. The patterns of extreme right voting in Western Europe have shown

that those parties featuring favourable characteristics – such as a highly organised

structure, a strong and charismatic leadership and a high level of militancy – have much

greater chances of success than those parties lacking such features (Lubbers et al. 2002,

371). The PNR has recently made a considerable effort to bolster its organisational

strength. The party approved statutes that provide it with a clear hierarchical structure

gravitating around the National Political Commission, led by the president, and with a

clear emphasis on internal party discipline with penalties that may lead to the expulsion of

those who ‘publicly defend opinions contrary to the principles and program of the party’

or ‘foment intrigues and polemics with other militants’ (PNR 2005d). Further, party locals

are completely subjected to the party discipline, and any positions or initiatives that

contradict the party line are forbidden (PNR 2006b). At the same time, and related to the

goal of expanding the militant cadre the party launched a youth organisation, Juventude

Nacionalista (Nationalist Youth) which is directly dependent upon the National Political

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Commission, which nominates and dismisses the body’s coordinators (PNR 2005a).

According to the PNR’s leader, the Nationalist Youth does not have any ‘political

ideological’ autonomy: propaganda and recruitment are its main functions (Coelho 2005a).

As stated by one of its leaders, the Youth organisation gives priority to ‘work at the level of

schools and universities in order to obtain the trust of the young and recruit as many

militants as possible’ (Silva 2006). The party’s high school student recruitment campaign

came to the public’s attention after a police report, delivered to the minister of the interior,

was made public in a newspaper article: it described the ‘unprecedented’ activism of the

extreme right in high schools across the country (Expresso, 29 July 2006). During the media

frenzy that followed, even Portugal’s President Anıbal Cavaco Silva felt the need to state

the he had ‘enough trust in Portuguese youth’ to believe that they would follow racist

ideas (LUSA, 29 July 2006).

The Nationalist Youth has become particularly active by making its presence felt at

parades to celebrate national holidays, in street protests against media discrimination, and

through the organisation of sport events and conferences (JN 2006a). Both the PNR and its

youth section have become particularly active online by establishing highly developed

websites that serve as tools for communication (with press releases, speeches, doctrinaire

documents, and photo archives), recruitment and fundraising. The Portuguese nationalists

have also been very involved in the blogosphere, in video-sharing websites like YouTube,

and in such internet forums as the Forum Nacional (National Forum), which serves as a true

medium for the promotion of party activities (both local and national sections). The PNR

also pays increasing attention to international networking. Affiliated with the European

National Front, the Party sends delegates to the gatherings of such parties as the French

National Front (PNR 2006i) and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). The

PNR’s president delivered a speech to the 2006 NPD’s Congress (PNR 2006h) and at Le

Pen’s 2007 presidential convention in Lille (PNR 2007).

Successful extreme right parties are also prone to have a charismatic figure ‘capable

of setting the political and programmatic direction’ (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 9) and who

can ‘prevent and control internal factionalism’ (Ignazi 2003, 203), or at least a leader who

personally becomes the embodiment of the party, thus providing a clear identification

with specific policies to help the voter (Eatwell 2002, 19). Empirical research has shown the

importance of ‘strong, charismatic leaders’ in the electoral fortunes of the extreme right

(Carter 2005, 99). Together with such reinforcement of internal cohesion and group

activism, signs are emerging of a dynamic that promotes the leader as the personification

of the PNR. A graphic designer still of a young age (in his 40s), Pinto-Coelho has slowly

been the subject of a process of the ‘production of charisma’ that is visible both in the

focus given to him in the PNR’s website, and in the manner in which he has become the

‘face’ of the party in the media and at public events.

The leader seems to be aware of this development, for he has declared that,

‘although no one is born charismatic’, in this initial stage of the party ‘I know that I am the

most consensual person, [and even] the only one who has the right requisites [to lead the

party] … I’m not a despot, on the contrary, I am the visible and uncontested face of a

team’ (Coelho 2006e). The attention given by the party to its organisation and public

visibility can, if maintained, enhance its capacity to mobilise support outside the core. The

success of the party will depend both upon its own strategies (such as jettisoning any

relationship with the neo-Nazi National Front) and upon the deepening of a set of

attitudinal behavioural mass public features present in Portuguese society.

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A major factor in the success of extreme right groups is the extent to which there is

a correlation between the anti-system nature and message of the insurgent party and the

general sentiment of the population regarding the political system. Trends of ‘declining

system trust’ (Eatwell 2002, 21) and of ‘mounting crisis of confidence in the democratic

and representative institutions’ (Ignazi 2003, 204) due to the mainstream parties’ failure to

deliver in economic, social and larger cultural matters have the potential to increase the

chances of success of an extreme right party. A long-term look at the sentiment of the

overall population towards the political system and its representative institutions shows a

persistent decline in the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works at the

national level. The Portuguese level of satisfaction is well below the EU average, and is the

lowest in any of the old member states (Eurobarometer 65 2006). Further, the last decade

has witnessed a decline – in line with a general EU trend – in national confidence in such

representative institutions as the government and parliament; levels of popular trust in the

judicial system and in the established political parties are below the EU average

(Eurobarometer 64 2005). Studies have confirmed a general ‘malaise’ in attitudes towards

the functioning of Portuguese democracy (Freire 2003b, 153) that, although it does not

seem to undermine the ‘legitimacy’ of the regime, has a negative impact upon political

activism and civic engagement (Magalhaes 2005, 988). Other attitudinal data show,

however, that political participation is in line with European trends – with a clear exception

regarding both media usage (which is significantly lower than in other EU member states)

and low levels of participation by women (the gender gap remains strong and it may be

increasing; Baum 2007, Ch. 5).

Tied to this increase in anti-system attitudes is the twin development of a fairly

gloomy outlook regarding the phenomenon of globalisation and a backlash against the

European Union. Among all the EU members, Portugal is on the whole one of the most

pessimistic: the ‘views about the future appear to be particularly dark’, especially among

the young, who exhibit a heightened sense of ‘insecurity’ and focus on globalisation’s

negative impact, specifically in terms of the socio-economic effects of job precariousness,

open borders, and the ‘invasion of Asian products’ (Eurobarometer Qualitative Study 2006,

27). In addition, Portugal has witnessed a significant decrease in support among its

population for membership in the European Union, and a significant drop in the number

of people who feel that the country has benefited from being a member – despite the fact

that a ‘majority of Portuguese still thinks that the benefits of EU membership outweigh its

costs’ (Eurobarometer 65 2006, 15–27). It should be also pointed out that this

dissatisfaction could be due more to conjunctural (poor economic performance, high

unemployment) rather than structural reasons (Eurobarometer 66 2006, 49).

The steady decline of trust in mainstream politics, coupled with increased fear and

anxiety about a rapidly changing and globalising world – aggravated in times of economic

crisis and unemployment – may originate new lines of conflict, arising from novel and

salient issues and thus serve as an auspicious scenario for an extreme right party

committed to the ‘self-defence’ of the threatened national community.

Since the 1990s, issues of national identity, security, traditional norms and,

particularly, immigration have gained a new relevance in the political arena, due to the

activism of the CDS (Centro Democratico Social – Social Democratic Centre), a mainstream

conservative party that promoted tough anti-crime policies and strict immigration laws,

especially in times of joblessness and economic crisis.9 At the same time the more intense

media spotlight on the issue of immigration has been accompanied by alarms made by a

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few public intellectual figures about a potential engulfing flood of immigration toward

Europe and Portugal.10 These developments have the potential to enhance what has been

called the ‘breakthrough factors’ of extreme right parties (Ignazi 2003). As in other

European countries, the problem does not stem from the unfettered debate about the

new issues brought by social change itself, but from its (mostly unintended) consequences

on the party system. This is especially true when a party hovering around the margins is

ready to take advantage of the perceived ineffective or ‘soft’ solutions proposed by the

mainstream parties. The rightward approach brought by a conservative party (ideological

radicalisation of the debate) coupled with the political debate around relatively new

topics, particularly immigration (politicisation of new issues), may parallel the rise of a new

constituency worried about these issues and dissatisfied with the mainstream answer (as

being too centrist or moderate – unresponsive), and opting for a new alternative to the

established parties (polarisation of the system favouring new actors). Recent research has

in fact shown that there are increasing signs of the rise in Portugal of a new constituency,

thus suggesting voter dealignment dynamics. One of the main reasons given for the

decline in electoral turnout has been the increasing gap between the supply (by political

parties) and demand, with a decrease in identification with the mainstream parties (Freire

2003b, 153). This development, as I have indicated earlier, has been paralleled by the rise

of a new political entrepreneur on the left, in the form of a left-libertarian party, which can

constitute evidence that the opening of the political system has already begun, though

this question is outside of the scope of this article. Regarding the new issue of immigration

in Portugal, surveys have shown that a sizable majority of the public opposes the

continuing influx of immigrants, though people seem to be tolerant towards giving

immigrants the same rights enjoyed by native Portuguese (UCP 2002), and immigration

appears to be the least of the public’s major concerns (Eurobarometer 64 2005). In one of

the latest EU-wide surveys Sweden and Portugal were the countries where there was a

higher percentage of people thinking that immigrants ‘contribute a lot to their country’

(Eurobarometer 66 2006, 13). Analysis from the European Values Studies surveys indicates

that Portugal (together with other southern European traditional countries of emigration

which are now countries of immigration) demonstrates among its population relatively

high levels of solidarity with immigrant groups, but also revealed that the Portuguese

(together with the Italians and Spanish) were more prone to discriminate in favour of its

own nationals in the job market (Vala et al. 2003, 391–422). Research has demonstrated a

correlation between high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and the existence of

entrepreneurial, extreme right-wing parties, and thus suggests the key role these parties

play in fuelling hostility towards immigrants (Williams 2006, 63–67). As I have showed, the

PNR has since 2005 undoubtedly increased its dimension as an entrepreneurial agent.

Thus, given the party’s efforts to enhance its organisation and leadership, and to increase

its appeal and visibility, coupled with current attitudinal trends, the politicisation of novel

issues and voter dealignment dynamics may serve as an indication that the current

negligible status of the native extreme right could change in the near future.

There are manifold restraining factors on an extreme right party’s capacity to exert

any considerable impact in the Portuguese political system. The party faces an institutional

structure of opportunities (Norris 2005, 253–72) that could hinder further development. The

Portuguese constitution of 1976 forbids any political movements that are loosely defined

as ‘military or para-military organizations or racist organizations or those professing a

fascist ideology’ and an ordinary law approved in the post-revolutionary period specifically

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defined such as ‘having the methods of the fascist regimes such as bellicosity, violence as a

political tool, colonialism, racism, corporativism or the exaltation of personalities

connected with those regimes’.11 In this manner the Portuguese democratic system

characterises itself as a ‘defensive democracy’ (Pedahzur 2004, 112) that takes a belligerent

approach in order to protect itself from extremist threats. While taking a scathing and

contemptuous attitude vis-a-vis parliamentary politics, and deriding the ‘palaver’ of

parliament and its members who are ‘most of the time’ occupied with trivial and futile

matters (PNR 2005b), the PNR has always stated its allegiance to the Portuguese

Constitution. Though the Constitution is ‘absurd and outdated’ and imbued with a

‘Marxist’ philosophy, PNR’s president states that, as it is the law that is in effect, the party

therefore ‘respects it and observes it’ (Coelho 2006d). Moreover, in moments where its

legality was put in doubt by politicians, legal scholars or by the media12 – particularly due

to the informal association with groups or persons who openly show allegiance to a fascist

and neo-Nazi ideology – the party has put itself under the aegis of the Portuguese

Constitutional Court, which has approved its statutes and activities (PNR 2006e, 2006f).

However, there is an element of precariousness in the legal status of the party and,

particularly if its discourse veers excessively towards a path of radicalisation, all the legal

and judiciary pressures available to a militant democracy could accelerate and overwhelm

it, leading to its extinction.

A nation’s choice of electoral system has also been considered a major determinant

in whether and where an extreme right party could arise (Norris 2005, 105–26), normally

favoured by a proportional system with a low electoral threshold. Although Portugal uses

proportional representation, it is based on the d’Hondt method, which is less proportional

than other methods, and thus it mostly favours larger parties but also encourages

coalitions over smaller parties, which since 1975 have found it hard to obtain seats in the

Assembly of the Republic (CNE). Thus for it to have an electoral breakthrough, the PNR

would have to either experience an enormous rise in electoral support (from where it

stands now) or to form a coalition with other parties.13 It is likely that the party would be

the target of a cordon sanitaire (Eatwell 2004, 3) and labelled as a ‘non-respectable’

coalition partner by the moderate right, with the creation of such a buffer zone becoming

a de facto denial of access to the representative arena. Though this development would

reinforce the party’s discourse of victimisation against a ‘corrupt’ system, the ‘forced’

absence from the Assembly of the Republic would in practice deepen its nature as a pariah

party and complicate its further institutionalisation. It should be added though that often

the major breakthrough comes in second-order elections or in local elections (in suburbs

or villages with high levels of immigrant population and unemployment). The electoral

surge of the National Front in the town of Dreux in 1983 is a case in point. At the same

time it should be noted that, from the standpoint of the party system, the possibility

remains that potential novel constituencies may be subsumed by more pro-system parties

on the right such as the already mentioned CDS and the PND (Partido da Nova Democracia

– Party of New Democracy), founded in 2003 by a former President of CDS, and accused by

the Portuguese Nationalists of partaking the same pro-immigration and pro-globalisation

message of the other parties (JN 2006b). This dynamic of ‘absorption’ of more right-wing

constituencies has believed to have occurred both in the post-revolutionary period and in

the 1990s (Ignazi 2003, 196; Pinto 1995, 124).

Alongside these inauspicious institutional and party system conditions there are

other inhibitor factors at a cultural level that may help to avert an extreme right

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breakthrough. Though more than 30 years have passed since the revolution that

overthrew the last remnants of Salazar’s New State, the stigmatisation in the collective

mind towards any movement that may remotely invoke that period of Portuguese history

– aggravated by the constant labelling of the PNR as ‘neo-fascist’ or ‘fascist’ by the

mainstream media and the cultural elites – may yet be resilient enough for the party to be

perceived as lacking the necessary democratic credentials and, thereby, being dismissed as

a valid voice or alternative in the Portuguese democratic system. In this way the historical

memory of the nation puts the party on the path to delegitimation. Moreover, the

government agency in charge of ethic minorities and immigrant issues (ACIME) displays a

strong cultural and educational activism aimed at both enforcing a ‘positive’ public view of

immigration and inoculating it against the message of the extreme right. The influence of

the Catholic subculture in Portugal – with an inclusive and ecumenical discourse – may

prove to be a solid force against any political discourses of exclusion and intolerance on

immigration. The Church has already come out in support of an Immigration Law that is

‘sensitive’ to the needs and demands of the immigrants and based on ‘solidarity’, and that

rejects any nationalist leanings, because of Portugal’s own historical status as a ‘country of

immigrants’.14 At the same time, it should be pointed out that the Church’s emphasis on

traditional ethical values and rejection of libertarian agendas could make it an unintended

ally with the anti-libertarian thrust of the party. The left subculture has also gained a

considerable foothold in Portugal, and its activism and mobilisation – both at a party and a

civic level – have increased, regularly targeting the PNR’s ideology and activities. The Left-

Libertarian Left Bloc, anti-racist groups like SOS Racism, and pro-gay rights groups such as

Opus Gay and ILGA have been particularly active in the denunciation of discrimination,

and have paid close scrutiny to the activities of the Portuguese extreme right. Every year

since 2000, these groups have held a ‘party of diversity’ where ethnic, cultural and sexual

diversity is promoted. In fact a purportedly ‘bipartisan’ civic group called ‘Parem o PNR’

(Stop the PNR) formed in April 2007, in the wake of the PNR’s increasing activism, and

vowed to serve as the public watchdog against the party (Parem o PNR 2007). If the

existence of strong Catholic and left subcultures, and their associated networks, is not a

sufficient condition per se to impede the development of ‘nativist’ politics (Veugelers and

Chiarini 2002, 95) they represent, particularly in terms of cultural combat, a further

obstacle to the Portuguese extreme right.

Conclusion

The factors that may facilitate either a breakthrough or a breakdown of the PNR are

part of a fluid and evolving socio-economic and cultural context; thus any prediction

regarding the outcome could prove to be too much of an overreach. Yet, this article – with

the hopeful spirit of making a contribution to comparative research into the European

extreme right – has intended to acknowledge the emergence in contemporary Portugal of

a ‘new’ extreme right movement that both has adapted to the novel challenges and

demands posed by modernity and globalisation, and is invested in a quest to ‘protect’ the

ethnic fabric of the nation against social disruption and cultural rootlessness. The

structural transformation of the country, the development of new attitudinal mass public

trends, and the emergence and organisational enhancement of a political entrepreneur

offering an anti-system alternative anchored in a demand for a radical and systemic

transformation of the country should, however, altogether constitute a sober warning

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regarding hitherto-accepted views of the Portuguese extreme right. The ‘marginalisation

thesis’ still seems to hold on the surface. But this article has aspired to identify and reveal

deep dynamics that, beneath the surface, are pointing toward what may eventually

become a new reality that will require a revised or entirely new thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Michael Baum, Roger Eatwell and the two anonymous

reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

NOTES

1. Myriad terms have been used to describe the family of the parties – typically located on

the right – that have gained some electoral preponderance in the last two decades. As

there is not a commonly accepted definition for these parties, the terminology is diverse

and includes such epithets as ‘populist’, ‘neo-populist’, ‘radical right’, and ‘extreme right’.

The issue of categorisation of these parties is beyond the scope of this article; thus I side

with the consensus and brand these parties as ‘extreme right’. On this issue see Eatwell

(2004).

2. From the Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (National Elections Commission) website (http://

eleicoes.cne.pt).

3. Read the founding manifesto of the party here: http://www.bloco.org/pdf/comecardenovo.

pdf. In the last legislative election of February 2005 the party obtained 6.35 per cent,

electing eight members of parliament. From the Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (National

Elections Commission) website (http://eleicoes.cne.pt).

4. These numbers are from the December 2005 report Estatısticas da Imigracao, published

by the Alto Comissariado para a Imigracao e Minorias Etnicas. In 2003 the total immigrant

population accounted for 368.729 of the total population (http://www.acime.gov.pt/

docs/GEE/Estatisticas_GEE_2005.pdf).

5. The government announced that the combat against illegal immigration would be a major

priority during the 2007 six month Portugese Presidency of the European Union. See ‘Costa

diz que combate a imigracao ilegal e prioridade’, Diario de Notıcias, 12 July 2006.

6. Socialist Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos said in a TV programme in early

2006 that at current levels of income and expenditure, Portugal’s pension fund may be

unable to meet payouts in 10 years. Read ‘Ministro desdramatiza Teixeira dos Santos’,

Diario de Notıcias, 11 January 2006. The current socialist government has already set out

new reforms of the pensions system aimed at cutting costs. Read ‘Portugal plans

pension reforms; childless, single-child couples will be penalized’, Financial Times, 15 May

2006.

7. This association is markedly nostalgic, stating that the ‘art of governance’ of Salazar

should be applied to modern times, and preaching what they call a ‘democratic

Salazarism’. Its programme is ultra-Catholic and characterised by the defence of a

‘specific’ Portuguese nationalism that, unlike that of other nationalists, is ‘universal’ and

‘anti-racist’. Its mentor, former PNR president Antonio da Cruz Rodrigues, regularly attacks

the new ‘ethnic-racial’ direction of the party, accusing the new leadership of anti-

Catholicism and racism (see http://nacionalismo-de-futuro.blogspot.com).

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8. For example, in the weekly magazine Visao the party is described as ‘neo-fascist, of

Salazarist inspiration and corporative doctrine. Though organizations that defend fascism

are forbidden by the constitution, the [PNR’s] discourse leaves no room for doubt’. In

Visao, ‘O novo PNR’, 15 June 2006. Public television RTP1 has broadcast a programme

titled A Extrema-direita existe? [Does the extreme-right exist?] on 6 June 2006 that makes

minimal distinction between the PNR and the National Front, skin-heads, or white

supremacist movements. As another example of this association between the two, see

‘Dirigente da Frente Nacional e militante do PNR sob termo de residencia’, Publico, 8 June

2006.

9. The CDS governed in a coalition with the major centre-right Portuguese party (PSD –

Partido Social Democrata – Social Democratic Party) from 2002 to 2005 and different

perspectives on issues such as abortion and immigration caused tension within the

coalition. See ‘Portas diz que o ‘‘PSD nao desejava listas conjuntas’’’, Portugal Diario, 2

May 2005.

10. For example, see the debate about immigration on the public channel RTP1, in the

programme Pros e Contras, 15 December 2003. Portuguese essayist and philosopher

Eduardo Lourenco has stated in an interview that ‘Africa, in order to survive, if allowed,

would transfer itself to Europe … Europe must convince itself that it is surrounded …’ See

‘A Europa esta cercada pela imigracao’, O Diabo, 20 June 2006.

11. The Constitution forbids these movements in its Article 46, under the heading ‘Freedom

of Association’. The ordinary law was approved during the second constitutional

government in 1978.

12. See ‘Extrema-direita procura dinheiro no Irao’, Expresso, 17 June 2006, where the constitu-

tionality of the PNR was questioned and legal scholars supported its illegalisation. The

issue emerged again in the spring of 2007 during the anti-immigration billboard episode.

There were calls to ban the PNR by law, and the General Public Prosecution Office vowed

to follow closely the activities of the party (Publico, 29 March 2007).

13. Efforts have been underway for some time, by the two main parties (PS and PSD), to reform

the electoral system in a majoritarian direction, which would inevitably harm the ability of

smaller parties to influence governmental decision-making (see, for example, Diario de

Noticias, 31 October 2006).

14. See ‘Igreja atenta a nova lei da imigracao’, 14 June 2006, available online at http://www.

agencia.ecclesia.pt/noticia.asp?noticiaid533921.

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