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PORTUGAL: A NEW LOOK AT THEEXTREME RIGHTJosé Pedro ZúquetePublished online: 17 Jul 2007.
To cite this article: José Pedro Zúquete (2007) PORTUGAL: A NEW LOOK AT THE EXTREME RIGHT,Representation, 43:3, 179-198, DOI: 10.1080/00344890701463654
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PORTUGAL: A NEW LOOK AT THE
EXTREME RIGHT
Jose Pedro Zuquete
This article examines the recent emergence and increasing visibility in Portugal of an extreme
right party, the Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party), whose driving force is no
longer nostalgia for the ‘New State’ of Salazar but rather the rejection of modern trends such as
globalisation, immigration, and the overriding influence of supranational bodies like the European
Union. It looks at the structural conditions that have facilitated the National Renewal Party’s
emergence, and outlines the main features, themes, and values of the party’s ideological core. It
then focuses both on the conditions that might lead the party to achieve an electoral
breakthrough and the obstacles that can impede its development. It argues that the traditionally
perceived ‘marginalisation’ of the Portuguese extreme right, in a context of crisis and the
emergence of a political entrepreneur who could profit from it and supply a new alternative, may
come to an end.
Introduction
It is almost a truism to say that in the decades since the 1974 Portuguese revolution
that ousted Salazar’s successor Marcelo Caetano, an organised and successful extreme
right party has been next to non-existent in Portugal.1 In fact, since the ‘carnation
revolution’ Portugal has not witnessed the resurgence in electoral support for extreme
right parties that has dominated the political landscape of other Western European
nations. The post-revolution history of the extreme right in Portugal has been
characterised by the electoral failure of such short-lived political parties as the nostalgic
Independent Movement of National Reconstruction (MIRN), founded by former member of
Salazar regime General Kaulza de Arriaga, or the ultra-traditionalist Party of Christian
Democracy (PDC). On the whole these parties were too connected both ideologically and
spiritually to the old authoritarian regime to make any significant impact on the newly
born Portuguese democracy.
‘Playful or even far-fetched’ was how one scholar described the question of
‘continuity or renaissance’ of the ‘Radical Right’ in Portugal (Merkl 1993, 208). An
assessment of the current literature confirms this perception of the Portuguese extreme
right as a ‘marginalised’ (a commonly used term) force in Portugal’s political landscape.
Writing about the ‘marginalization of the extreme right’ in the country, Tom Gallagher
(1992, 243) stresses that the ‘Portuguese far right is possibly in a weaker state than [that] in
any other southern European country’. Antonio Costa Pinto (1995, 110) wrote about the
‘fragility’ of the Portuguese extreme right and, similarly, Thomas C. Davis (1998, 163)
argued that in Spain and Portugal, ‘parties originating on the far right have been
marginalized since the transition to democracy’, thus making the Iberian Peninsula a
geographic area of ‘retreat from the radical right’. Piero Ignazi (2003, 196) has recently
Representation, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2007ISSN 0034-4893 print/1749-4001 online/07/030179-20
� 2007 McDougall Trust, London DOI: 10.1080/00344890701463654
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reaffirmed this view in stating that specific historical conditions have ‘deprived the
Portuguese extreme right of any chance’. According to these authors several factors have
contributed to the non-development of a strong extreme right-wing presence in Portugal.
Gallagher (1992) sees in the soporific and traditionalist character of Salazar’s regime –
lacking the mobilisation and politicisation of the masses that characterised other
dictatorships – and the consequent suppression of the more dynamic and radical native
right-wing forces, an important explanation for the weakness of the extreme right after the
fall of the regime. Along the same line Pinto (1995) sees in the depoliticisation promoted
by Salazar a major factor for the absence of a relevant extreme right presence in the
country. Davis (1998) identifies no solid and durable popular distrust in representative
democracy or in the welfare state that could be exploited by an extreme right-wing force.
Finally, Ignazi (2003) asserts that, in the Portuguese case, both the considerable vitality and
the favourable light cast upon modern trends like globalisation serve to inoculate the
political system against a strong extreme right presence.
The reality of the Portuguese political system still seems at first glance to confirm the
accuracy of this ‘marginalisation thesis’. In the most recent legislative election (February
2005) the party located on the most extreme right of the political continuum – the Partido
Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party) – fared poorly accounting for only 0.16 per
cent of the total national vote.2 However, the groupuscular nature of and negligible
electoral support for the National Renewal Party should not together constitute a reason
for political and social analysts of the Portuguese reality to ignore it. Its political discourse
is no longer nostalgic but modern, in the sense of addressing new themes and challenges
to the ‘national community’. A closer look reveals an element of novelty in the party. Its
ideological core, its literature, its public behaviour and media tactics, all position the
National Renewal Party among the broader extreme right family of parties that have
gained considerable success in other Western European countries. Further, study into the
party’s trajectory of growth while it is still organising itself so shortly after its foundation
can provide important insights into the factors that may lead a party of the extreme right
to failure or to success. Indeed, a detailed study of party ideology and tactics could
advance cross-national research into the emergence and dynamics of extreme right party
politics (Mudde 2000, 183) and serve as an additional reason to study these parties not
primarily in terms of their size but in terms of the data they can offer to comparative
research. Until now there has been a correspondence between the ‘marginalisation thesis’
of the Portuguese extreme right and the political and social reality. What follows is an
attempt to ascertain whether the conditions and reasons that made the thesis possible will
hold for much longer.
A New Set of Structural Conditions
The rise of extreme right parties has been open to various ‘demand-side’ and
‘supply-side’ explanations (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005, 3–35). Evidently socio-economic
factors (‘demand-side’) might facilitate the rise of parties that thrive on popular
discontentment with and resentment towards the inability of mainstream parties to offer
credible solutions. In this section I will address relatively recent developments in
Portuguese society and economy that may serve to catalyse a growing crisis of public
confidence in the political system and the need for identity and self-defence against
perceived outside threats.
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Among the most common ‘demand-side’ perspectives on extreme right literature is
interpreting the rise of these parties as a consequence of postindustrial ‘non-material’
themes and demands that have scarcely been addressed by traditional parties. Though
these postindustrial developments have, at one pole of the political continuum, given rise
to green and left-libertarian parties, they have at the other pole produced a backlash in the
form of new right-wing parties that react against the disruptions and new challenges
created by rapidly evolving globalisation and societal changes in the form of weakened
traditional supportive networks (such as the church) and increased individualism and
liberalisation (Ignazi 1996). These changes have served as a springboard for the emergence
of new parties to address the ‘demands for identity (hence nationalism), for homogeneity
(hence xenophobia), and for order, hierarchy, and strong leadership (hence authoritarian-
ism)’ (Ignazi 2003, 202). It has been argued that the ‘insufficient postindustrialisation’ of
Portugal undercut the political opportunities for the rise of the extreme right (Kitschelt
1997, 56).
However, in the last two decades in particular, Portugal has suffered a process of
structural transformation that seems to contradict this assumption. The country now has
one of the defining features of an advanced postindustrial society: a service industry that is
by far the biggest proportion of the economy (and getting closer to the EU average), while
the secondary industry has been decreasing lately and the primary sector has contracted
substantially (INE 2005). Further, as I have indicated, according to the literature on the
extreme right, parties on the left-libertarian end of the political spectrum are seen as one
of two viable answers to the postindustrial society (the other is the emerging parties on
the extreme right). In this manner, it is plausible to expect that these parties ‘appear in the
same general time period as [do] their antagonists [on the left]’ (Kitschelt 1997, 49). It is
thus relevant to note that Portugal has witnessed the rise of a left-libertarian party with
the foundation in 1999 of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc), which has met some electoral
success3 and committed, inter alia, to an ‘alternative’ vision of globalisation, multi-
culturalism, minority rights, and liberalisation of abortion and drugs. It vows to promote a
more ‘participatory citizenry’ and proclaims an unmistakably anti-system message. Though
Portugal is still clearly behind in terms of mass adoption of post-materialist values – and
with little significance as a predictor of vote choice at least at the turn of the millennium
(Freire 2003a, 348–49) – there has been a shift in the direction of post-materialism in the
country.
In tandem with this postindustrial development, the balance between immigration
and emigration reverted in favour of immigration in the mid-1990s, with Portugal being
for the first time in its history more a destination for immigrants (mostly from Brazil and
Eastern Europe, but also from Angola and Cape Verde, for example) than a country of
origin for emigrants (Barreto 2002; see also, Caradoso 2006). Official numbers show an
increase of the immigrant population from 1.7 per cent in 1995 to 4 per cent in 2002.4 The
need to create a specific government body to address immigrant and ethnic minority
issues thus increased, and the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities
(Alto Comissariado para a Imigracao e Minorias Etnicas, ACIME) was created in 1996. The
ACIME aimed, in the words of the current commissioner, at ‘making the State the biggest
ally of immigrant integration’ (ACIME 2005). Though there are no numbers for illegal
immigrants, the issue has already become a major concern for the Portuguese
government.5
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Further, particularly after the 1974 revolution, Portugal developed a comprehensive
welfare state that today provides services to a rapidly growing number of social security
beneficiaries and, after the creation in the mid-1990s of a Guaranteed Minimum Social
Income for people and families in need, poor foreign households. (Barreto 2002; Malheiros
2002). The decline in recent years of the birth rate and the rise of the elderly population –
in line with a wider European trend – has put at risk the financial viability of such a
comprehensive network of protection. The warnings of impending bankruptcy of the
welfare state are already being heard in Portugal.6
As we head to the completion of the first decade of the new century it seems
therefore that Portugal’s structural socio-economic conditions have evolved drastically
since the democratic transition and particularly the membership of the European Union in
1986. However, the current economic conjuncture of Portugal is one of crisis and the
catching-up process of the living standards in regard to other EU countries has stalled. The
increasing globalised economy, and such related dynamics as stiff competition from lower
wage countries and the outsourcing of jobs, has hit particularly hard the industry sector
and Portugal, which in the 1990s had one of the lowest European unemployment rates,
has registered one of the highest increases in the number of jobless in the Euro-zone; for
the first since Portugal became a EU member its jobless rate has climbed toward the EU
average (Eurostat 2006).
Therefore, the increase in the postindustrial nature of Portugal – characterised by
both a visible expansion of the service sector and the development of a comprehensive
welfare state – created a new structural framework that, under the impact of fluctuations
in the economy, may have the potential to open a ‘political opportunity structure’ that
could be exploited by new political entrepreneurs and outsiders. The persistence of
demand factors, of course, may facilitate the rise of the extreme right; but a major
determinant for its success lies in the strategy, ideology, and values appealing power of
the political entrepreneur interested in taking advantage of a favourable set of conditions
(Eatwell 2003; Ferguson and Abrams 2006; Ignazi 2003). In order to paint a fuller portrait of
the Portuguese situation, I now examine the alternative presented by and represented in
the National Renewal Party, which has all the features of a ‘modern’ – though late
compared to other Western European nations – product of and/or reaction to the new
social, economic, and cultural conditions of Portugal.
An Overview of the National Renewal Party
The origin of the Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) is similar to those of other
European extreme right-wing parties and resulted from the assemblage of different figures
and grouplets of the Portuguese ‘national camp’ (Camus 2001, 200) when the PNR’s
founding members took control of an older party and managed to legally change its
name, logo and statutes. At the time of its foundation in February 2000 the party
comprised mostly neo-fascists and nostalgics for Salazar’s ‘New State’. Indeed its very first
leader was a member of the former regime’s establishment. Since then, however, a process
of internal depuration has resulted in the progressive marginalisation of the ‘nostalgic’
faction – which is now clustered around the association Alianca Nacional7 (run by PNR’s
first president) – and the party has transformed itself into a counterpart to other ‘modern’
Western European extreme right organisations. This change of direction for the party –
and the concomitant mediatisation – has become particularly noteworthy since the
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election to the party presidency in June 2005 of founding member Jose Pinto-Coelho.
Under his leadership the PNR has increasingly focused onto the novel issues and demands
attending Portugal’s consolidation as a postindustrial society.
Ethnic Nationalism
The PNR’s literature, interviews, speeches, and public statements provide a detailed
look into the party’s ideological core and worldview. The trait that is most prominently
featured in the party’s ideology and that pervades all of its different facets is a nationalism
that emphasises and promotes the reclamation of the ethnic homogenisation of the
nation (Mudde 2000, 171). This ethnic nationalism is the source of the party’s rejection of
the contemporary Portuguese status quo, for the party presents itself as the ‘only’
homegrown force that ‘proposes Nationalism as a way of solving the problems of our
society’ (PNR 2005c). From the standpoint of the party immigration – many times grouped
with ‘invasion’ – is one of the greatest of such impending dangers to the national identity
and the party repeatedly warns the public against the ‘continued colonization of our
country’ and the danger that ‘in a few decades, the Portuguese could become a minority
within their own homeland’ (PNR 2005c). In this manner, the party contends that,
‘particularly since the nineties’, Portugal has been the victim of a ‘true invasion
representing a threat to the sovereignty, security, and future survival of the Portuguese
people’ (PNR 2005b).
In line with the ethnic dimension of its nationalism, the party rejects the new
Portuguese Nationality Law, approved by parliament in February 2006, that facilitates the
acquisition of Portuguese nationality and reinforces ius soli, or citizenship by birthright
(ACIME 2006). PNR faithful hold that the sole criterion for citizenship should only be ius
sanguinis, conferred through blood ties, because ‘Portuguese are the children of
Portuguese’ and ‘Nationality is not bought [but] is inherited’ (PNR 2005e). In order to
effect a harmony between the state and the endangered ethnic community, the party
defends a policy of ‘internal homogenisation’ through the repatriation of immigrants
(Mudde 2000, 181). Thus, the ethnic argument is brought to its natural conclusion with the
party vowing to ‘stop the flow of immigrants to Portugal (with occasional exceptions)’,
break ties with the Schengen Agreement that allows the free flow of people within the EU,
and put in place ‘a humanitarian program of repatriating those immigrants who have
residence here’ (PNR 2005c).
At the same time the rights of the indigenous majority should be protected by the
state and should override the rights of the immigrant minorities, especially in university
enrolment (the party defends reducing the quota of immigrants) and in access to the job
market, with the party defending the principle of ‘national preference’, duplicating in this
way dynamics of welfare chauvinism characteristic of other nationalist movements in
Western Europe. This principle endorses ‘giving national citizens priority in filling jobs’ and
putting an end to ‘the unjust and absurd situation of seeing Portuguese without jobs or
having to immigrate, because a substantial number of jobs are occupied by foreigners’.
The party repeatedly denounces the ‘unfair competition of cheap labor from abroad’
which conflicts with the rights and needs of Portuguese workers at home (PNR 2005b). As
stated by PNR’s president in a public address, Portugal should not have ‘even one more
immigrant as long as there is a Portuguese without a job’. The troubles faced by the
welfare system are partly blamed on immigrants and ethnic minorities, who are ‘super-
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protected, all living [off of] our taxes’. The party leader further argued, ‘Those who defend
immigration said that it would solve the Social Security problems, but that is not the case
[for] as we all know, Social Security is bankrupt! Immigration brought instead social
insecurity’ (Coelho 2006b). One of the party’s arguments for the rejection of the new,
Socialist government-drafted Portuguese Immigration Law is the fact that immigrants,
‘notwithstanding the official propaganda’, bring no economic benefits, for the typical
immigrant is a ‘burden for the budget’ because he or she willingly works for low wages
while making a ‘minimal contribution’ to an overly generous, open-handed welfare system
(PNR 2006a). Further, the party targets foreign – and particularly Chinese-owned –
businesses, whom it accuses of ruining national production and benefiting from fiscal
incentives. The national priority should instead be the defence and protection (through
such measures as lowered taxes) of indigenous Portuguese businesses (Coelho 2006b).
Furthermore, party literature regularly associates immigration with law and order issues,
particularly increased public insecurity about violence, upward trends in organised crime,
and the ‘emergence of ethnic gangs of youths of African origin’ (PNR 2005b). The party has
repeatedly stated its solidarity with the law enforcement community, and especially the
police force that, ‘though they have to face increasing criminality, due to an uncontrolled
immigrant invasion’, lacks necessary ‘working conditions’ and benefits (PNR 2006c).
Against the System
As the PNR’s main focus is preserving the ‘ethnic’ identity of the community, its
discourse targets the internal and external forces that it perceives to be responsible for the
‘decadence’ plaguing the nation. This is the wellspring for the party’s anti-system nature,
its constant repudiation of Portugal’s mainstream parties, media, and cultural elites. These
disparate and diverse elements of Portuguese society are blended into what the party
deems as ‘the system’, a monolithic concept composed of ‘the established parties, the
media, the leftist cultural dictatorship, [and] the inhuman and multinational [forces] of
capitalism’ who thrive on using ‘lies and manipulation’ to keep the population complacent
(PNR 2005b). The PNR’s discourse is marked by a vehement rejection of the ‘parties and
politicians of the system’, whom the party accuses of being responsible for ‘the decadence
and destruction of Portugal’ (PNR 2005f) through their self-serving and corrupt actions and
policies. ‘From the center-right to the extreme-left! They all steal, they all share benefits
between themselves, they all profit from the budget [and] make fun of the people!’
(Coelho 2006b). All the putative evils afflicting the country are the ultimate fault of ‘the
system’, which acquires in this way an all-powerful and omnipresent characteristic. A
discourse of conspiracy is thus present throughout the party’s anti-system message. The
mainstream institutions of Portuguese society are portrayed as beholden to lobbies and
external forces whose reckless determination is ushering in the destruction of the
‘national’ identity of the country.
All of the threats besetting the community find its source in the dynamics of
globalisation, the ‘two-headed monster of savage capitalism and multiculturalism’ (Coelho
2006d). Fighting this is ‘the greatest goal of nationalists’, because ‘globalization destroys
nations, peoples, values, cultures, and seeks a uniform, bland, easily manipulated
humanity’ (Coelho 2006e). All social indicators – for example, the declining birthrate of the
nation (which, given rising immigration, is seen by the PNR as a most urgent issue) or
open-border policies – are not only linked but are interpreted in the light of the
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globalising forces’ final goal: the creation of a ‘New World Order’ (PNR 2005b). In order to
actively shape a ‘new world’, these globalising forces collude with national allies, all of
whom (in the discourse of the PNR) belong to the ‘system’. Thus, the common
denunciation of these parties’ policies and actions as ‘treason’: these perfidious bodies
participate in the ‘process of softening the resistance to globalization’ (PNR 2006a) and
thus threaten ‘Portugal’s continued existence as a nation’ (Coelho 2006c). The party also
connects the excesses of capitalism with the degradation of the environment, thus linking
a post-material concern to its defence against ‘the logic of profit’ (PNR 2005b).
Behind this New World Order are the interests of ‘suspicious’ organisations. As the
PNR’s president says, ‘It’s not easy to identify specific targets because the real drama of
globalization is that it is maintained by shadow governments, for example, the famous
Bildeberg group’. The American administration is also identified as ‘a key element, a
heavyweight’ in the construction of the coming world order (Coelho 2006e). The European
Union is equally seen as part of the globalising project of the ‘liquidation’ of nations, and is
derided as an ‘aberrant’, ‘anti-natural enterprise’ existing only to serve ‘obscure interests
and capitalist endings’ (Coelho 2006d). Europe, which ‘let itself be invaded and degraded’,
has become a ‘ticking-bomb’, and is ‘on the path to suicide’ (Coelho 2006e).
Thus, the PNR’s exceptionalism is a recurrent topic in the party discourse, which is
highly polarised between the party of the ‘nation’ and the ‘politicians of the system’ whose
‘only function is to serve foreign interests and anti-national lobbies’ (PNR 2005f). ‘We, and
only we’, the Leader proclaims, ‘courageously assume the struggle for national sovereignty
and for the rights of the Portuguese’ (Coelho 2006c). The party positions itself in the camp
of the ‘nationalisms’, which are ‘on the rise’ against their biggest enemy, the ‘owners of the
system and of the logic that reigns in Portugal, Europe, and the West’, the masters of
globalisation (Coelho 2006d). Using a common expression of French nationalist Jean-Marie
Le Pen, the PNR’s president vows to ‘say out loud what the people think in silence’ (Coelho
2006c). The survival of the nation thus hinges upon awakening the rest of the people, who
are repeatedly manipulated and lied to by the ‘system’ and the media about the evils that
afflict the country. The only solution is for the Portuguese to drop the role of placid
onlookers amid the ‘collective death’ of their nation, and join forces with the only outpost
of national resistance, the PNR (2006e).
In order to reinforce its legitimacy as the only national alternative in Portuguese
politics, the party has begun to develop a symbolic dimension, particularly through the
employment of political rituals similar to those that have been developed by other
European nationalist movements. The party has organised rallies and parades on 1
December to celebrate the restoration in 1640 of Portuguese independence after 60 years
of Spanish rule. The PNR’s leader has repeatedly compared the self-serving Portuguese
elites to the one of the most vilified figures of Portuguese history, Miguel de Vasconcelos,
who was killed for being a collaborator during the Spanish dominion. ‘We need to get rid
of the new ‘‘Migueis de Vasconcelos’’’, he said at one of the December First rallies, and
added that the country needed ‘a new Restoration of national independence’ (Coelho
2006f). Further, the party has begun annual May Day celebrations (in defence of the
Portuguese workers), and has consecrated 10 June (that marks the death of the poet who
immortalized Portugal’s voyages of discovery, Luıs Vaz de Camoest) as the ‘National
festival’ to be celebrated every year with a grand speech by the Leader as the culmination
of the event (PNR 2006d).
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Though the party has only recently initiated such performances, it aims gradually to
reinforce the internal solidarity of the group and legitimate its role as the guardian of the
national identity that is becoming dangerously debased.
Decline of Tradition and Morality
A major indicator of the decadence into which the nation continues to sink – and
given special emphasis in party literature – is the decay of traditional and moral values that
has been prompted by the cultural liberalisation that Portugal has undergone since the
last decades of the twentieth century. Such topics as the ‘defence’ of the traditional family,
the combat against the perceived advance of a ‘gay agenda’ in the country, and working
for the most restrictive abortion laws are explored in the guiding light of the party’s
‘superior’ ethical values against the onslaught of the disruptive libertarian forces. The
party’s traditionalist ideology is built around the axiomatic belief that the weakening of
the traditional family is not a historical accident but rather the result of an elaborated plan
from global ‘lobbies’ who, ‘by destroying the values of personal belonging [both] to family
and to community [and] replacing them with individualism, these globalizers (both those
who are Marxists and those who are liberal-capitalists), will more easily uproot citizens
from their cultures [and] globalize the world’ (PNR 2005b).
In order to reverse this downward spiral of decadence and debasement in which the
nation appears to be caught, the party proposes pro-birth policies and incentives to
heterosexual families, because ‘our country will only have a future through a homogenous,
young, and numerous people’ (PNR 2005b). Related to this undermining of the family is
the extreme left’s ‘culture of death’, to which the established parties acquiesce. Against the
continuing efforts to liberalise the country’s law on abortion, the PNR defends a ‘culture of
life’ and promotes the strictest abortion laws (PNR 2006g). Another sign of the
‘degeneration’ of traditional values and norms – and a pervasive theme in the party’s
literature – is the increasing power of the ‘gay lobby’. The party’s president frames the
combat against this as ‘a true war of civilizations and mentalities’. With the support of the
‘parties of the system’, the gay lifestyle and culture wear away the ‘roots of society and its
values’, weaken the people’s ‘consciousness’, and contravene normal societal conventions
(Coelho 2006d).
Media Strategies
The role played by the media in the rise and development of anti-system parties has
been the subject of a growing literature. The ‘mediatisation thesis’ argues that media
coverage has the potential to play a twofold role: it can lead either to the legitimation or
to the delegitimation of new political forces, and it many times does both (Eatwell 2002).
In the Portuguese case, the media (at least in these early stages) has shown a strong
hostility toward this political newcomer. This is in line with the collateral model of media–
politics interaction, in which the media assume the role of gatekeepers of the system and
defenders of the status quo against perceived radical threats. Therefore, the general tone
of the media’s reporting is geared toward emphasising the ‘extremist’ and ‘dangerous’
nature of the party. The media’s narrative establishes parallels between the PNR and both
fascism and Nazism. The close association with the party of a neo-Nazi organisation called
Frente Nacional (National Front), whose members are often present at PNR rallies, only
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fuels a characterisation of the party in which the media barely distinguishes between the
two and focuses on those elements that display ‘fascist-like’ behaviour (the Roman salute,
for example).8
Like other anti-system parties in Europe, the PNR has adopted a key set of media
strategies and has displayed a communicational hyper-activism in order to gain media
access and attention, advance the propagation of its message and, eventually, to control
the nation’s political agenda. The media-geared orientation of the party has become
increasingly noticeable with the creation of a press office that regularly distributes news
releases. The fact that the mainstream media is clearly hostile to the PNR is used to the
party’s favour: the media-led demonisation only ‘confirms’ the party’s discourse that the
media is in league with the ‘system’ and, consequently, persecutes the only ‘national
resistance’ to its goals. This solidifies the party’s cultivated self-image, primarily within its
own constituency, of being an outsider silenced and ostracised by established parties and
their ‘lackeys in the media’ (PNR 2006e), yet constituting the only true alternative to the
establishment. At the same time that it attacks the media, the PNR has learned how to play
by the rules of the game, and engages in the creation of media events centred on political
rallies that accompany the news cycle. In this manner the PNR exploits to its favour news
items – such as those related to law and order or immigration issues – that the media
covers extensively. When in June 2005 the media reported on (and greatly exaggerated) a
gang raid on a popular beach by suburban Luso-African youths, the party’s rally
denouncing immigration and the ‘concomitant’ increase in criminality gained national
coverage and increased the PNR’s visibility (Publico, 19 June 2005; Publico, 9 June 2006).
When a local mayor decided in May 2006 to finance the arrival and fixation of families of
immigrants from Brazil in order to combat the depopulation of the town – an event that
garnered serious media attention – the PNR organised there a rally to denounce the
‘immigrant invasion’ accelerating the ‘substitution of our people for other peoples’ (Correio
da Manha, 12 May 2006). The party was also able to gain coverage in both the print and
electronic media by associating itself with a protest organised by the police against the
government (Jornal de Notıcias, 7 June 2006). Though the media cast the PNR in a negative
light the party nevertheless seized each opportunity to exploit free media publicity and
thus attract a broader public attention.
The media-savvy PNR has exploited the penchant of the media, and especially
though by no means exclusively the tabloid media, for controversy and sensationalism.
Adopting a strategy that is common in the style of Le Pen (Souchard et al. 1997, 169), the
PNR has used this in its favour. For example, its president caused a stir by declaring that
the presence of a naturalised Brazilian player on the Portuguese national team was
‘scandalous’ (O Jogo, 10 June 2006), a declaration that became part of the news cycle. The
party was also able to generate controversy by launching a campaign to stop the
broadcast of a national TV programme it accused of glamorising homosexual behaviour
(Diario de Notıcias, 11 September 2005).
A golden media opportunity for the party arose in the beginning of 2007, during the
campaign for the referendum to liberalise abortion laws. The party not only qualified for
free air time on radio and television, but also managed to associate itself with the
campaign of mainstream civic groups for the ‘no’ side. The presence of the PNR at a much
publicised pro-life march in Lisbon became part of the media narrative, especially the fact
that the party was relegated by the organisers to the back of the march. Accordingly, the
statement of protest by PNR’s president – who said that ‘in Portugal the nationalists are
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discriminated against’ – appeared in the Portuguese News Agency LUSA and other major
news outlets (Publico, 29 January 2007; Correio da Manha, 29 January 2007). Finally a major
media breakthrough came in the spring of 2007 with the erection by the party of a large
anti-immigration billboard in one of the busiest avenues of Lisbon. Depicting an image of
PNR’s leader and captioned ‘No more immigration’ and ‘Portugal to the Portuguese’, this
billboard sent shock waves through the entire political system: all parties in parliament
repudiated its message, and some raised doubts about the party’s ‘legality’. The billboard
also attracted wide coverage by the media in a way that the party had never before seen.
In the wake of the controversy, PNR’s leader gave a press conference at which he stated
the party’s goal of having parliamentary representation by 2009 (Coelho 2007). The
controversy around the billboard placed the PNR firmly in the public eye and gave the
party the kind of publicity that it could only dream of just a few months before. In the light
of these new developments, the extensive media coverage of the PNR’s campaign for the
July 2007 Lisbon mayoral elections, came as slight surprise. The PNR candidate and
president gave interviews, held debates, and spread the party’s message across
mainstream media organizations (see, for example, PNR Lisboa 2007).
While the overall portrayal of the party by the media (both reporters and pundits) is
negative, research into these movements has shown that any kind of media coverage
provides advantages to ‘contentious political figures’ by enhancing their visibility and
‘producing some kind of public legitimation’ (Stewart et al. 2003, 236). In this case, the
attention given by the media to the new political force – and potentially contentious
issues such as the increase in crime and immigration – can end up reinforcing the
legitimacy of the new political force as ‘one more voice’ in the political spectrum of the
country. The PNR, still a minuscule force in Portuguese politics (particularly in elections),
has successfully gained visibility and made efforts to connect with a broader public. I will
now turn to the conditions and factors that may inhibit or favour the party’s development,
profiting from the country’s structural transformation and the rise of new issues, and in
this way broadening its electorate beyond the core.
National Renewal Party: Breakthrough or Breakdown?
I will start by addressing the conditions – based both on the party’s own dynamics
and on attitudinal behavioural mass public trends – that may be conducive to the PNR’s
growth and success. The patterns of extreme right voting in Western Europe have shown
that those parties featuring favourable characteristics – such as a highly organised
structure, a strong and charismatic leadership and a high level of militancy – have much
greater chances of success than those parties lacking such features (Lubbers et al. 2002,
371). The PNR has recently made a considerable effort to bolster its organisational
strength. The party approved statutes that provide it with a clear hierarchical structure
gravitating around the National Political Commission, led by the president, and with a
clear emphasis on internal party discipline with penalties that may lead to the expulsion of
those who ‘publicly defend opinions contrary to the principles and program of the party’
or ‘foment intrigues and polemics with other militants’ (PNR 2005d). Further, party locals
are completely subjected to the party discipline, and any positions or initiatives that
contradict the party line are forbidden (PNR 2006b). At the same time, and related to the
goal of expanding the militant cadre the party launched a youth organisation, Juventude
Nacionalista (Nationalist Youth) which is directly dependent upon the National Political
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Commission, which nominates and dismisses the body’s coordinators (PNR 2005a).
According to the PNR’s leader, the Nationalist Youth does not have any ‘political
ideological’ autonomy: propaganda and recruitment are its main functions (Coelho 2005a).
As stated by one of its leaders, the Youth organisation gives priority to ‘work at the level of
schools and universities in order to obtain the trust of the young and recruit as many
militants as possible’ (Silva 2006). The party’s high school student recruitment campaign
came to the public’s attention after a police report, delivered to the minister of the interior,
was made public in a newspaper article: it described the ‘unprecedented’ activism of the
extreme right in high schools across the country (Expresso, 29 July 2006). During the media
frenzy that followed, even Portugal’s President Anıbal Cavaco Silva felt the need to state
the he had ‘enough trust in Portuguese youth’ to believe that they would follow racist
ideas (LUSA, 29 July 2006).
The Nationalist Youth has become particularly active by making its presence felt at
parades to celebrate national holidays, in street protests against media discrimination, and
through the organisation of sport events and conferences (JN 2006a). Both the PNR and its
youth section have become particularly active online by establishing highly developed
websites that serve as tools for communication (with press releases, speeches, doctrinaire
documents, and photo archives), recruitment and fundraising. The Portuguese nationalists
have also been very involved in the blogosphere, in video-sharing websites like YouTube,
and in such internet forums as the Forum Nacional (National Forum), which serves as a true
medium for the promotion of party activities (both local and national sections). The PNR
also pays increasing attention to international networking. Affiliated with the European
National Front, the Party sends delegates to the gatherings of such parties as the French
National Front (PNR 2006i) and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). The
PNR’s president delivered a speech to the 2006 NPD’s Congress (PNR 2006h) and at Le
Pen’s 2007 presidential convention in Lille (PNR 2007).
Successful extreme right parties are also prone to have a charismatic figure ‘capable
of setting the political and programmatic direction’ (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 9) and who
can ‘prevent and control internal factionalism’ (Ignazi 2003, 203), or at least a leader who
personally becomes the embodiment of the party, thus providing a clear identification
with specific policies to help the voter (Eatwell 2002, 19). Empirical research has shown the
importance of ‘strong, charismatic leaders’ in the electoral fortunes of the extreme right
(Carter 2005, 99). Together with such reinforcement of internal cohesion and group
activism, signs are emerging of a dynamic that promotes the leader as the personification
of the PNR. A graphic designer still of a young age (in his 40s), Pinto-Coelho has slowly
been the subject of a process of the ‘production of charisma’ that is visible both in the
focus given to him in the PNR’s website, and in the manner in which he has become the
‘face’ of the party in the media and at public events.
The leader seems to be aware of this development, for he has declared that,
‘although no one is born charismatic’, in this initial stage of the party ‘I know that I am the
most consensual person, [and even] the only one who has the right requisites [to lead the
party] … I’m not a despot, on the contrary, I am the visible and uncontested face of a
team’ (Coelho 2006e). The attention given by the party to its organisation and public
visibility can, if maintained, enhance its capacity to mobilise support outside the core. The
success of the party will depend both upon its own strategies (such as jettisoning any
relationship with the neo-Nazi National Front) and upon the deepening of a set of
attitudinal behavioural mass public features present in Portuguese society.
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A major factor in the success of extreme right groups is the extent to which there is
a correlation between the anti-system nature and message of the insurgent party and the
general sentiment of the population regarding the political system. Trends of ‘declining
system trust’ (Eatwell 2002, 21) and of ‘mounting crisis of confidence in the democratic
and representative institutions’ (Ignazi 2003, 204) due to the mainstream parties’ failure to
deliver in economic, social and larger cultural matters have the potential to increase the
chances of success of an extreme right party. A long-term look at the sentiment of the
overall population towards the political system and its representative institutions shows a
persistent decline in the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works at the
national level. The Portuguese level of satisfaction is well below the EU average, and is the
lowest in any of the old member states (Eurobarometer 65 2006). Further, the last decade
has witnessed a decline – in line with a general EU trend – in national confidence in such
representative institutions as the government and parliament; levels of popular trust in the
judicial system and in the established political parties are below the EU average
(Eurobarometer 64 2005). Studies have confirmed a general ‘malaise’ in attitudes towards
the functioning of Portuguese democracy (Freire 2003b, 153) that, although it does not
seem to undermine the ‘legitimacy’ of the regime, has a negative impact upon political
activism and civic engagement (Magalhaes 2005, 988). Other attitudinal data show,
however, that political participation is in line with European trends – with a clear exception
regarding both media usage (which is significantly lower than in other EU member states)
and low levels of participation by women (the gender gap remains strong and it may be
increasing; Baum 2007, Ch. 5).
Tied to this increase in anti-system attitudes is the twin development of a fairly
gloomy outlook regarding the phenomenon of globalisation and a backlash against the
European Union. Among all the EU members, Portugal is on the whole one of the most
pessimistic: the ‘views about the future appear to be particularly dark’, especially among
the young, who exhibit a heightened sense of ‘insecurity’ and focus on globalisation’s
negative impact, specifically in terms of the socio-economic effects of job precariousness,
open borders, and the ‘invasion of Asian products’ (Eurobarometer Qualitative Study 2006,
27). In addition, Portugal has witnessed a significant decrease in support among its
population for membership in the European Union, and a significant drop in the number
of people who feel that the country has benefited from being a member – despite the fact
that a ‘majority of Portuguese still thinks that the benefits of EU membership outweigh its
costs’ (Eurobarometer 65 2006, 15–27). It should be also pointed out that this
dissatisfaction could be due more to conjunctural (poor economic performance, high
unemployment) rather than structural reasons (Eurobarometer 66 2006, 49).
The steady decline of trust in mainstream politics, coupled with increased fear and
anxiety about a rapidly changing and globalising world – aggravated in times of economic
crisis and unemployment – may originate new lines of conflict, arising from novel and
salient issues and thus serve as an auspicious scenario for an extreme right party
committed to the ‘self-defence’ of the threatened national community.
Since the 1990s, issues of national identity, security, traditional norms and,
particularly, immigration have gained a new relevance in the political arena, due to the
activism of the CDS (Centro Democratico Social – Social Democratic Centre), a mainstream
conservative party that promoted tough anti-crime policies and strict immigration laws,
especially in times of joblessness and economic crisis.9 At the same time the more intense
media spotlight on the issue of immigration has been accompanied by alarms made by a
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few public intellectual figures about a potential engulfing flood of immigration toward
Europe and Portugal.10 These developments have the potential to enhance what has been
called the ‘breakthrough factors’ of extreme right parties (Ignazi 2003). As in other
European countries, the problem does not stem from the unfettered debate about the
new issues brought by social change itself, but from its (mostly unintended) consequences
on the party system. This is especially true when a party hovering around the margins is
ready to take advantage of the perceived ineffective or ‘soft’ solutions proposed by the
mainstream parties. The rightward approach brought by a conservative party (ideological
radicalisation of the debate) coupled with the political debate around relatively new
topics, particularly immigration (politicisation of new issues), may parallel the rise of a new
constituency worried about these issues and dissatisfied with the mainstream answer (as
being too centrist or moderate – unresponsive), and opting for a new alternative to the
established parties (polarisation of the system favouring new actors). Recent research has
in fact shown that there are increasing signs of the rise in Portugal of a new constituency,
thus suggesting voter dealignment dynamics. One of the main reasons given for the
decline in electoral turnout has been the increasing gap between the supply (by political
parties) and demand, with a decrease in identification with the mainstream parties (Freire
2003b, 153). This development, as I have indicated earlier, has been paralleled by the rise
of a new political entrepreneur on the left, in the form of a left-libertarian party, which can
constitute evidence that the opening of the political system has already begun, though
this question is outside of the scope of this article. Regarding the new issue of immigration
in Portugal, surveys have shown that a sizable majority of the public opposes the
continuing influx of immigrants, though people seem to be tolerant towards giving
immigrants the same rights enjoyed by native Portuguese (UCP 2002), and immigration
appears to be the least of the public’s major concerns (Eurobarometer 64 2005). In one of
the latest EU-wide surveys Sweden and Portugal were the countries where there was a
higher percentage of people thinking that immigrants ‘contribute a lot to their country’
(Eurobarometer 66 2006, 13). Analysis from the European Values Studies surveys indicates
that Portugal (together with other southern European traditional countries of emigration
which are now countries of immigration) demonstrates among its population relatively
high levels of solidarity with immigrant groups, but also revealed that the Portuguese
(together with the Italians and Spanish) were more prone to discriminate in favour of its
own nationals in the job market (Vala et al. 2003, 391–422). Research has demonstrated a
correlation between high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and the existence of
entrepreneurial, extreme right-wing parties, and thus suggests the key role these parties
play in fuelling hostility towards immigrants (Williams 2006, 63–67). As I have showed, the
PNR has since 2005 undoubtedly increased its dimension as an entrepreneurial agent.
Thus, given the party’s efforts to enhance its organisation and leadership, and to increase
its appeal and visibility, coupled with current attitudinal trends, the politicisation of novel
issues and voter dealignment dynamics may serve as an indication that the current
negligible status of the native extreme right could change in the near future.
There are manifold restraining factors on an extreme right party’s capacity to exert
any considerable impact in the Portuguese political system. The party faces an institutional
structure of opportunities (Norris 2005, 253–72) that could hinder further development. The
Portuguese constitution of 1976 forbids any political movements that are loosely defined
as ‘military or para-military organizations or racist organizations or those professing a
fascist ideology’ and an ordinary law approved in the post-revolutionary period specifically
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defined such as ‘having the methods of the fascist regimes such as bellicosity, violence as a
political tool, colonialism, racism, corporativism or the exaltation of personalities
connected with those regimes’.11 In this manner the Portuguese democratic system
characterises itself as a ‘defensive democracy’ (Pedahzur 2004, 112) that takes a belligerent
approach in order to protect itself from extremist threats. While taking a scathing and
contemptuous attitude vis-a-vis parliamentary politics, and deriding the ‘palaver’ of
parliament and its members who are ‘most of the time’ occupied with trivial and futile
matters (PNR 2005b), the PNR has always stated its allegiance to the Portuguese
Constitution. Though the Constitution is ‘absurd and outdated’ and imbued with a
‘Marxist’ philosophy, PNR’s president states that, as it is the law that is in effect, the party
therefore ‘respects it and observes it’ (Coelho 2006d). Moreover, in moments where its
legality was put in doubt by politicians, legal scholars or by the media12 – particularly due
to the informal association with groups or persons who openly show allegiance to a fascist
and neo-Nazi ideology – the party has put itself under the aegis of the Portuguese
Constitutional Court, which has approved its statutes and activities (PNR 2006e, 2006f).
However, there is an element of precariousness in the legal status of the party and,
particularly if its discourse veers excessively towards a path of radicalisation, all the legal
and judiciary pressures available to a militant democracy could accelerate and overwhelm
it, leading to its extinction.
A nation’s choice of electoral system has also been considered a major determinant
in whether and where an extreme right party could arise (Norris 2005, 105–26), normally
favoured by a proportional system with a low electoral threshold. Although Portugal uses
proportional representation, it is based on the d’Hondt method, which is less proportional
than other methods, and thus it mostly favours larger parties but also encourages
coalitions over smaller parties, which since 1975 have found it hard to obtain seats in the
Assembly of the Republic (CNE). Thus for it to have an electoral breakthrough, the PNR
would have to either experience an enormous rise in electoral support (from where it
stands now) or to form a coalition with other parties.13 It is likely that the party would be
the target of a cordon sanitaire (Eatwell 2004, 3) and labelled as a ‘non-respectable’
coalition partner by the moderate right, with the creation of such a buffer zone becoming
a de facto denial of access to the representative arena. Though this development would
reinforce the party’s discourse of victimisation against a ‘corrupt’ system, the ‘forced’
absence from the Assembly of the Republic would in practice deepen its nature as a pariah
party and complicate its further institutionalisation. It should be added though that often
the major breakthrough comes in second-order elections or in local elections (in suburbs
or villages with high levels of immigrant population and unemployment). The electoral
surge of the National Front in the town of Dreux in 1983 is a case in point. At the same
time it should be noted that, from the standpoint of the party system, the possibility
remains that potential novel constituencies may be subsumed by more pro-system parties
on the right such as the already mentioned CDS and the PND (Partido da Nova Democracia
– Party of New Democracy), founded in 2003 by a former President of CDS, and accused by
the Portuguese Nationalists of partaking the same pro-immigration and pro-globalisation
message of the other parties (JN 2006b). This dynamic of ‘absorption’ of more right-wing
constituencies has believed to have occurred both in the post-revolutionary period and in
the 1990s (Ignazi 2003, 196; Pinto 1995, 124).
Alongside these inauspicious institutional and party system conditions there are
other inhibitor factors at a cultural level that may help to avert an extreme right
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breakthrough. Though more than 30 years have passed since the revolution that
overthrew the last remnants of Salazar’s New State, the stigmatisation in the collective
mind towards any movement that may remotely invoke that period of Portuguese history
– aggravated by the constant labelling of the PNR as ‘neo-fascist’ or ‘fascist’ by the
mainstream media and the cultural elites – may yet be resilient enough for the party to be
perceived as lacking the necessary democratic credentials and, thereby, being dismissed as
a valid voice or alternative in the Portuguese democratic system. In this way the historical
memory of the nation puts the party on the path to delegitimation. Moreover, the
government agency in charge of ethic minorities and immigrant issues (ACIME) displays a
strong cultural and educational activism aimed at both enforcing a ‘positive’ public view of
immigration and inoculating it against the message of the extreme right. The influence of
the Catholic subculture in Portugal – with an inclusive and ecumenical discourse – may
prove to be a solid force against any political discourses of exclusion and intolerance on
immigration. The Church has already come out in support of an Immigration Law that is
‘sensitive’ to the needs and demands of the immigrants and based on ‘solidarity’, and that
rejects any nationalist leanings, because of Portugal’s own historical status as a ‘country of
immigrants’.14 At the same time, it should be pointed out that the Church’s emphasis on
traditional ethical values and rejection of libertarian agendas could make it an unintended
ally with the anti-libertarian thrust of the party. The left subculture has also gained a
considerable foothold in Portugal, and its activism and mobilisation – both at a party and a
civic level – have increased, regularly targeting the PNR’s ideology and activities. The Left-
Libertarian Left Bloc, anti-racist groups like SOS Racism, and pro-gay rights groups such as
Opus Gay and ILGA have been particularly active in the denunciation of discrimination,
and have paid close scrutiny to the activities of the Portuguese extreme right. Every year
since 2000, these groups have held a ‘party of diversity’ where ethnic, cultural and sexual
diversity is promoted. In fact a purportedly ‘bipartisan’ civic group called ‘Parem o PNR’
(Stop the PNR) formed in April 2007, in the wake of the PNR’s increasing activism, and
vowed to serve as the public watchdog against the party (Parem o PNR 2007). If the
existence of strong Catholic and left subcultures, and their associated networks, is not a
sufficient condition per se to impede the development of ‘nativist’ politics (Veugelers and
Chiarini 2002, 95) they represent, particularly in terms of cultural combat, a further
obstacle to the Portuguese extreme right.
Conclusion
The factors that may facilitate either a breakthrough or a breakdown of the PNR are
part of a fluid and evolving socio-economic and cultural context; thus any prediction
regarding the outcome could prove to be too much of an overreach. Yet, this article – with
the hopeful spirit of making a contribution to comparative research into the European
extreme right – has intended to acknowledge the emergence in contemporary Portugal of
a ‘new’ extreme right movement that both has adapted to the novel challenges and
demands posed by modernity and globalisation, and is invested in a quest to ‘protect’ the
ethnic fabric of the nation against social disruption and cultural rootlessness. The
structural transformation of the country, the development of new attitudinal mass public
trends, and the emergence and organisational enhancement of a political entrepreneur
offering an anti-system alternative anchored in a demand for a radical and systemic
transformation of the country should, however, altogether constitute a sober warning
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regarding hitherto-accepted views of the Portuguese extreme right. The ‘marginalisation
thesis’ still seems to hold on the surface. But this article has aspired to identify and reveal
deep dynamics that, beneath the surface, are pointing toward what may eventually
become a new reality that will require a revised or entirely new thesis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Michael Baum, Roger Eatwell and the two anonymous
reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
NOTES
1. Myriad terms have been used to describe the family of the parties – typically located on
the right – that have gained some electoral preponderance in the last two decades. As
there is not a commonly accepted definition for these parties, the terminology is diverse
and includes such epithets as ‘populist’, ‘neo-populist’, ‘radical right’, and ‘extreme right’.
The issue of categorisation of these parties is beyond the scope of this article; thus I side
with the consensus and brand these parties as ‘extreme right’. On this issue see Eatwell
(2004).
2. From the Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (National Elections Commission) website (http://
eleicoes.cne.pt).
3. Read the founding manifesto of the party here: http://www.bloco.org/pdf/comecardenovo.
pdf. In the last legislative election of February 2005 the party obtained 6.35 per cent,
electing eight members of parliament. From the Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (National
Elections Commission) website (http://eleicoes.cne.pt).
4. These numbers are from the December 2005 report Estatısticas da Imigracao, published
by the Alto Comissariado para a Imigracao e Minorias Etnicas. In 2003 the total immigrant
population accounted for 368.729 of the total population (http://www.acime.gov.pt/
docs/GEE/Estatisticas_GEE_2005.pdf).
5. The government announced that the combat against illegal immigration would be a major
priority during the 2007 six month Portugese Presidency of the European Union. See ‘Costa
diz que combate a imigracao ilegal e prioridade’, Diario de Notıcias, 12 July 2006.
6. Socialist Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos said in a TV programme in early
2006 that at current levels of income and expenditure, Portugal’s pension fund may be
unable to meet payouts in 10 years. Read ‘Ministro desdramatiza Teixeira dos Santos’,
Diario de Notıcias, 11 January 2006. The current socialist government has already set out
new reforms of the pensions system aimed at cutting costs. Read ‘Portugal plans
pension reforms; childless, single-child couples will be penalized’, Financial Times, 15 May
2006.
7. This association is markedly nostalgic, stating that the ‘art of governance’ of Salazar
should be applied to modern times, and preaching what they call a ‘democratic
Salazarism’. Its programme is ultra-Catholic and characterised by the defence of a
‘specific’ Portuguese nationalism that, unlike that of other nationalists, is ‘universal’ and
‘anti-racist’. Its mentor, former PNR president Antonio da Cruz Rodrigues, regularly attacks
the new ‘ethnic-racial’ direction of the party, accusing the new leadership of anti-
Catholicism and racism (see http://nacionalismo-de-futuro.blogspot.com).
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8. For example, in the weekly magazine Visao the party is described as ‘neo-fascist, of
Salazarist inspiration and corporative doctrine. Though organizations that defend fascism
are forbidden by the constitution, the [PNR’s] discourse leaves no room for doubt’. In
Visao, ‘O novo PNR’, 15 June 2006. Public television RTP1 has broadcast a programme
titled A Extrema-direita existe? [Does the extreme-right exist?] on 6 June 2006 that makes
minimal distinction between the PNR and the National Front, skin-heads, or white
supremacist movements. As another example of this association between the two, see
‘Dirigente da Frente Nacional e militante do PNR sob termo de residencia’, Publico, 8 June
2006.
9. The CDS governed in a coalition with the major centre-right Portuguese party (PSD –
Partido Social Democrata – Social Democratic Party) from 2002 to 2005 and different
perspectives on issues such as abortion and immigration caused tension within the
coalition. See ‘Portas diz que o ‘‘PSD nao desejava listas conjuntas’’’, Portugal Diario, 2
May 2005.
10. For example, see the debate about immigration on the public channel RTP1, in the
programme Pros e Contras, 15 December 2003. Portuguese essayist and philosopher
Eduardo Lourenco has stated in an interview that ‘Africa, in order to survive, if allowed,
would transfer itself to Europe … Europe must convince itself that it is surrounded …’ See
‘A Europa esta cercada pela imigracao’, O Diabo, 20 June 2006.
11. The Constitution forbids these movements in its Article 46, under the heading ‘Freedom
of Association’. The ordinary law was approved during the second constitutional
government in 1978.
12. See ‘Extrema-direita procura dinheiro no Irao’, Expresso, 17 June 2006, where the constitu-
tionality of the PNR was questioned and legal scholars supported its illegalisation. The
issue emerged again in the spring of 2007 during the anti-immigration billboard episode.
There were calls to ban the PNR by law, and the General Public Prosecution Office vowed
to follow closely the activities of the party (Publico, 29 March 2007).
13. Efforts have been underway for some time, by the two main parties (PS and PSD), to reform
the electoral system in a majoritarian direction, which would inevitably harm the ability of
smaller parties to influence governmental decision-making (see, for example, Diario de
Noticias, 31 October 2006).
14. See ‘Igreja atenta a nova lei da imigracao’, 14 June 2006, available online at http://www.
agencia.ecclesia.pt/noticia.asp?noticiaid533921.
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Jose Pedro Zuquete is with the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies,
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