PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,

et.al vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011,

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk thePhilippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with theterms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortenedone baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippinearchipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan IslandGround (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or legislators” assailthe constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending thatthe law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters,thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passageunder UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners have contended that thesepassage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic waters

HELD:

Petition

DISMISSED.

The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippine’s national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding thecountry’s maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognizeddelimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continentalshelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters intoarchipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to thewaters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth ordistance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exerciseof sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resourcestherein.

Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation regarding routeswithin the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, thePhilippines has no choice but to comply with the international law norms. ThePhilippines is subject to UNCLOS III, which grants innocent passage rights overthe territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations andconditions for their exercise, thus, the right of innocent passage, being acustomary international law, is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its sovereignty toforbid innocent passage, it shall risk retaliatory measures from the internationalcommunity. With compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, theCongress has avoided such conflict.Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOSIII through the R.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine internal waters to nuclearand maritime pollution hazard. As a matter of fact, if the Philippines did notcomply with the baselines law, it will find itself devoid of internationallyacceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones andcontinental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1)open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resourcesin the waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shallweaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritimespace. Such disaster was avoided through the R.A. 9522.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &183962) (14 October 2008)

Facts:

On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and thePresidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign theMemorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation thatcreates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRPgrants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain andancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the presentgeographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as wellas the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion inthe ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-ADalso described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as“associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. Itfurther provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to theexisting legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of aComprehensive Compact.Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabatosought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it withcomplete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information onmatters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to

have theCity of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued aTemporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formallysigning the MOA-AD.

Issues and Ruling:

1.W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms thatwould require new legislation and constitutionalamendments.

YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtuallyguarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legalframework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as itis inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to proposeconstitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers asChief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementingeven those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she maynot unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body wereassumed as a certainty.

2.

W/N there is a violation of the people’s right toinformation on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all itstransactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No.7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutionalimperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to beconsulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:

a.

EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions andresponsibilities of the PAPP, is replete withmechanics for continuing consultations on bothnational and local levels and for a principal forumfor consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of thePAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevantinformation, comments, advice, andrecommendations from peace partners andconcerned sectors of society;

b.

RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices toconduct consultations before any project or programcritical to the environment and human ecologyincluding those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality,is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterallyvests ownership of a vast territory to theBangsamoro people, which could pervasively an

ddrastically result to the diaspora or displacement of agreat number of inhabitants from their totalenvironment;c.RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,the observance of the free and prior informedconsent of the Indigenous CulturalCommunities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).

3.

W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failedto carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by whichthe MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and inexcess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates agross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform theduty enjoined.

4.

W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.

NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept underlyingthem, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between theGRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposesthat the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on itsway to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD statingthat the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legalframework will not be effective until that framework is amended, thesame does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in theMOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJEand the Central Government is, itself, a violation of theMemorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to thegovernment peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, itvirtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to theConstitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither theGRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to makesuch a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount toauthorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only inCongress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselvesthrough the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executivecan ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through anundue influence or interference with that process.

5.W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.

NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after itunconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of theMOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Carpio-Morales, J.

The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with thestate policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demandinformation, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes theduty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or anygovernment agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestraldomain claim by mere agreement or compromise.An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, theassociate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associationsrepresent a middle ground between integration and independence.The recognized sources of international law establish that the right toself-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internalself-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic,social, and cultural development within the framework of an existingstate. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateralsecession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then,under carefully defined circumstances.That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiationswith rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution doesnot mean that she has no such authority.The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power doesnot, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, butsimply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long asshe limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutionalact.Public statements of a state representative may be construed as aunilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the internationalcommunity, the state intended to be bound to that community by itsstatements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly,unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances

Bill of Rights

VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA

Facts:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) wasactivated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,AFP, with the mission of conducting

security operations within its area of responsibility andperipheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintainingpeace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic andpolitical development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peaceand order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, consideringthat their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their allegedfear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supplyofficer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

Issue:

WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures

Held:

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by themilitary manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se

, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of theirroutine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rightsagainst unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right againstunreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rightshave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures areprohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questionedcheckpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue itsmission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for thebenefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots todestabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of thestate to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual s right against awarrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in thesame manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpointsduring these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the pricewe pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

PEOPLE V. ESCAÑO MOVING VEHICLE 323 SCRA 754

November 10, 2010

FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpoints illegal?

HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search.

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioners contentions are:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law —

Respondents-prosecutors contentions

(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;

(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and

(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue:

Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally.

Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.

Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding ofthe existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal'sfinding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding ofthe existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial ofdue process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no

search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws.

CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

IBP VS. ZAMORA G.R. NO.141284, AUGUST 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.

VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without anyqualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment ofthe Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; CONSULTATION TO LGU REGARDING NATIONAL PROJECTS

 

G.R. No. 129546         December 13, 2005

Facts:    This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635. 

    At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. 

    The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.

    Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.

    A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.

Issue:    Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

Ruling:    The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

    Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.  

    Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the

Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in  Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.  

    Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations.  However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height  of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.

    Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.”  These include: 

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, …providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of

appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

    Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:         (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and         (2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.  

    Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal. 

   

PLAIN VIEW

Case Digest on People v. Valdez November 10, 2010

G.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS:  Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accused where they found

marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the house of the accused.  They uprooted

the plants and arrested the accused.  They asked the accused who owned the plants and the accused admitted that

they belonged to him.  The prosecution offered the plants and the admission of the accused as evidence.  The

accused claimed that the warrantless search was illegal while the police officers claimed that the plants were found in

plain view.

HELD:  The marijuana plants were not in plain view.  For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be

present:  (a)  there was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally

present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)  the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the

right to be where they were; (c)  the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d)  plain view justified seizure of

the evidence without further search.  In this case, the police officers located the plants before they arrested the

accused without a warrant.  Also, they were dispatched precisely to look for the marijuana plants.  The discovery was

not inadvertent.  The confession is also inadmissible.  In trying to elicit information from the accused, the police was

investigating him as a suspect.  At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Reyes Vs. Bagatsing  

Facts:   Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26,

1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy.

Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be

attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing

over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There

was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and

assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the

request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of

subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of

people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal

Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public

may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that

there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify

the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of

the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign

mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.  

Issue:   Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.  

Held:   Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that

the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so

as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the

permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and

present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.

Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between

citizens, and discussing public questions.  

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and

liberties of citizens.  

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown

that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The

validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.  

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should

inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it

were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.

Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise

whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It

is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the

standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

Warrantless Search and Arrest

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]

Facts:   The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three

suspicious looking persons at the corner of   Juan   Luna and   North Bay   Boulevard   in   Tondo,   Manila. A

surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men

looking from   side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified

themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unableto escape   because the other lawmen

surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38

caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them

and they were turned over to the   police headquarters   for investigation. An information was filed before the

RTC convicting the accused of   illegal possession   of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was

among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part,

Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead,

he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of

P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not

admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore   the fruit   of a

poisonous tree.

Issue:   Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held:   An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal   search and seizure   inadmissible in any proceeding for

any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides

arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal

knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has

escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined

while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.  

These   requirements   have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the

accused appellant was merely looking from   side to side   and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting

officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually

committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped

and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Arrest Without warrant

Case Digest on Posadas v. Ombudsman G.R. No. 131492 (September 29, 2000)November 10, 2010

FACTS:  Upon the request of the University Chancellor, the NBI sent agents to the university and tried to arrest two

members of a fraternity who were identified by two witnesses as responsible for the killing of a member of another

fraternity.

HELD:  The NBI agents had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were

probably guilty of the crime.  Their attempt to arrest them without a warrant was illegal.

Katz v. United States

Posted on   May 22, 2012     |   Criminal Law     |   Tags:     Criminal Law Case Brief

FACTS

Katz was arrested after FBI agents overheard him making illegal gambling bets while in a public phone

booth. The agents placed electronic listening and recording devices to the outside of the booth and only

heard and recorded Katz’s end of the conversations.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At trial, Katz objected to the introduction of evidence of the telephone conversation. However, the trial court

allowed the evidence. The appellate court upheld the conviction, holding that Katz’s Fourth Amendment

protection from unreasonable searches and seizures was not infringed upon because the agents never

physically entered the phone booth. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court.

ISSUE

Did the government violate Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights when its agents attached electronic listening

and recording devices to the outside of the phone booth?

ARGUMENT

Katz argued that the telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area and the FBI violated his right to

privacy by attaching the bugs to the phone booth. The government argued that it did not violate Katz’s right

to privacy because none of the agents invaded the booth before performing the search and/or seizure.

HOLDING

Yes, the government violated Katz’s right to privacy. Reversed.

RATIONALE

The Court stated that both parties had formulated the issue incorrectly. Instead of asking whether a

telephone booth can characterized as a “constitutionally protected area,” the proper question is whether

electronically listening to and recording Katz’s conversation violated his right to privacy.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy protects people, not places. Previous case

law held that in order for the right to privacy to be violated, the government had to infringe upon tangible

property. In Warden v. Hayden, another 1967 case, the Court discredited the “trespass doctrine,” which held

that property interests no longer controlled the government’s right to search and seizures.

In the instant case, the government contended that Katz’s use of a see-through booth meant that he was still

just as visible inside the booth as outside of it. However, the Court noted that Katz was not trying to get away

from the “intruding eye,” instead, he was fleeing the “uninvited ear.” His use of a glass phone booth with a

closed door did not publicize his conversation, only his appearance. The FBI agents did not have a warrant

and thus did not have to confine their investigation within the confines of a warrant. Even though the agents

restrained themselves and did not unnecessarily invade Katz’s privacy, they solely based their actions on

their belief that Katz would return to the same pay phone and the same time every day to make illegal

gambling bets. The Court reiterated that the U.S. Constitution requires the impartial judgment of a judicial

officer to stand between citizens and the police. Because searches conducted without judicial process are

per se unreasonable, this case was REVERSED.

Justice HARLAN concurred, stating that Fourth Amendment questions followed a two-part test: (1) whether

there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether the expectation is objectively

reasonable.

Justice BLACK dissented, noting that it was not the Court’s role to rewrite the Fourth Amendment to remove

the limitation to tangible property. He stated that a warrant cannot be obtained regarding a future

conversation, as the police would not be able to describe such a conversation in the warrant application.

Freedom of Expression

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ

vs.

RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC

G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the

conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June

2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played

before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a

man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the

second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.

However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs was

not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the

genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations

which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci

Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations”

issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel

fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press

freedom

On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the “acts,

issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)

respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of

public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it

warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11

June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

1. Standing to File Petition

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the present

case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in

violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen.

Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of

transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an

indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression

allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to

make informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution

commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out

narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four

categories of expression, namely:

pornography,

false or misleading advertisement,

advocacy of imminent lawless action, and

danger to national security.

All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-

based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression

means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on

public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition

of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it

burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of

the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject

content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit

specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior

restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the

presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By

definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because

of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected expression

that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading advertisement as

unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on

unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional.

Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Although

subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint

prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to

subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not

warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or

criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.

However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it

cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate

speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such

expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to

subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior

restraint on such expression can be justified.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing prior

restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless

action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present danger test.32 The expression restrained

must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and

duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation, or

impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible

pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from policies,

advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the

Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of

the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a

press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-

Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to

radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation

may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that

may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent

in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of

the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent

character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes

a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular

phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a

violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an opportunity

to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of

Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also

concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be established that the Garci

Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not

even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is

directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false

information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the

restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four

existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is

essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper

conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential

elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the

sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any

event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected

expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts

determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the

public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However,

there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security

and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a

matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters

of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a

complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent

punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping

Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for

protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint

on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for actual

violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does

not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to prior

restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes

unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of

whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive

evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on

whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of

invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of the

Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to observe

the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have not

explained how and why the observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and

pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of

the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to

criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of

the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or

endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television stations

constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat

is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes

radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have invested

substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of

their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion

In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. There

can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:

 Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.

 PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.

MTRCB alleged that respondents

1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review

2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations

ABS-CBN averred:

1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press

2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program

MTRCB affirmed the ruling

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper

Hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.

Held:

Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:

Xxx

b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials

The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS

*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.

Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc

It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it

The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986

1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies

2) Newsreels

In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels.

MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.

Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioner’s power of review.

Issue related to Consti law:

Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.”

Ratio:

It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x.”  Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.

Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the constitutionalprovision on freedom of speech and of the press.  However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.

If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom “TheInside Story” which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision onfreedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.

The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

Ayer Productions Vs. Capulong 160 SCRA 861G.R. No. L-82380April 29, 1988

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. 

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. 

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal. 

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. 

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. 

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. 

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. 

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

David vs. Macapagal Arroyo (May 6, 2006) Digest

Facts:

- Consists of 7 cases consolidated alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion

- On February 24, 2006 issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency saying that the Communist insurgents are in a systematic conspiracy to bring down the government with Magdalo Group and Gen. Lim and Marine Commander Ariel Querubin (clear and present danger); suppress terrorism and lawless violence

- Pursuant to the order, warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities may be done

- During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan

- At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue

- During the hearing, the Solicitor General narrated the events that led to the proclamation of the Decree: from the discovery of bomb in the PMA Reunion Arroyo was suppose to attend to factual documents seized from a Magdalo member detailing the military takeover of the government led by the Philippine Marines

- The petitioners did not contend the facts stated by the Solicitor General

Issue:

WON the implementation of PP 1017 is unconstitutional

- It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress/they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees

- It is a deception to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law

- It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly

Ratio Decidendi:

- Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

o There must be a war or other emergency.

o The delegation must be for a limited period only

o The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

o The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress

- The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees

- The President also cannot call the military to enact laws such as laws on family, corporate laws, obligations and contracts, etc.  Under the PP 1017, she can only call out the military to suppress lawless violence

- The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However, without legislation, she has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress

Decision:

- PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as far as the ‘calling out of the military’ to suppress lawless violence. However, the military cannot enforce other laws

- PP 1017 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL when it comes to promulgating Decrees. Only the 2 Houses of Congress can legislate laws

- Warrantless arrests and seizures conducted without proof that they are part of rebellion, lawless violence, and takeover is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

 

White Light Corporation vs. City of ManilaG.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009J. TingaFacts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled AnOrdinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes inHotels,

Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed acomplaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporaryrestraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the Ordinancebe declared invalid and unconstitutional.On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC.MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcingthe Ordinance.On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, theSupreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals.The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Localgovernment code and the Revised Manila charter.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of theOrdinance.Issue: Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate theuse of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, bythemselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yetthe desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsicalintrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlesslyrestrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patronswithout sufficient justification

FREEDOM OF RELIGION/FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 

Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband. 

Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. 

Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. 

Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. 

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L-25246 September 12 1974

FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since

1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop

provision which reads as follow “Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent

employees worker covered by this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)

subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which

prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization” Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant

union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was

resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could

achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this

prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional 

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of

any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of

utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in

any particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its

member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts

member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from

the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into.

Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which

is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.

Facts:

            Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the

Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal

certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to

certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently,

Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and

designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this

petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the

constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded

preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this

preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious

freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what

food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing

halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the

Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the

case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:

            Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the

separation of Church and State.

Held:

            No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was

accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed

this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the

religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims

what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of

issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation

of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the

case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

           

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the

community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the

seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a

society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the

affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and

religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to

deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product

as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by

assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and

promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and

ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the

market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do

not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

People v. HernandezFacts:

On January 21, 1992, at about 3:30 p.m., accused Lorenzo drove Eva to the ImmaculateConcepcion Academy to get Sharleen. He parked the car in the school's parking lot and Evaalighted to get Sharleen. Minutes later, Eva and Sharleen returned to the car. Sharleen took the backseat, behind the driver. While Eva was starting to board beside Sharleen, an unidentifiedman sit beside her and warned her not to shout. After 20 minutes, the car slowed down in frontof an iron gate and the man in the front seat and Sharleen got out of the car. After a couple of minutes, the man release the nanny to inform her employer of Sharleen's ransom. Eva called upher employer's house, recounted the incident and asked that she be picked up at PaternoStreet. Minutes later, Samson Cheng, Sharleen's uncle, fetched Eva and brought her back to theTan residence.

[2]

Sharleen's father, received a call from one of the kidnappers demanding a 10Mransom. They haggled in the amount and reached no agreement. The police then left Tan'shouse.

[3]

Thereafter, several phone calls were made by the kidnappers to the Tan family. Jacintoasked for a lower ransom in the amount of 409,000 wherein the kidnappers agreed andinstructed Jacinto to leave the money in a garbage can in front of the Town and Country Lodgein Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. Jacinto complied and then returned to his house to await the call of the kidnappers on Sharleen's release. A week later,the kidnappers again called up the Tanresidence. They informed Jacinto that they had released Sharleen and left her at the PerpetualHelp Hospital in España, Manila. Jacinto rushed to the hospital and found Sharleen who wasextremely traumatized by the incident. Jacinto himself suffered from nervous breakdown.

[5]

An intensive manhunt was launched to capture the kidnappers of Sharleen. CIS Chief Inspector Major Ruben Zacarias organized two (2) teams to conduct the hunt. The teamcomposed of SPO3 Gregorio Cuachon and SPO1 Danilo T. Salas and headed by Inspector Warlito Platon was directed to verify the information that Sharleen was hidden by accusedAlfredo Tumaneng in a house at #15 Kennedy Street, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City. OfficersCuachon and Salas conducted a discreet surveillance of the area and were able to verify theinformation. They also found out that accused Tumaneng had left the safehouse and hastransferred to Mayupis, Malabon, Metro Manila.Seven (7) suspects were identified by the CIS. Five of them, namely, Hernandez,Tumaneng, Lorenzo, Jacob and Famodulan, were captured by the CIS operatives. Each executedan extrajudicial confession which became the basis of the criminal charge against them.Upon arraignment, the five accused pleaded not guilty. During pendency of the trial,accused Hernandez and Jacob escaped from detention. They were tried in absentia.Appellant Tumaneng and Lorenzo contends that their warrantless arrest was illegal and their extrajudicial confession were obtained without the benefit of a competent and independentcounsel of their own choice.

On the other hand, appellant Famodulan contends that he was not positively identified asone of the conspirators and he was arrested and investigated in violation f his constitutionalrights.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrests were illegal

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrantand under circumstances other than justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantlessarrests violated the Constitution but such was cured by the failure of the appellants to move for the quashing of the information before the arraignment.In the case at bar, by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial, appellantswaived their right to challenge the legality of their arrest.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION/BILL OF ATTAINDER

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. 

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior tofiling of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty forfurnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. 

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) 

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. 

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was

acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.  

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. 

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. 

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT. 

Eminent Domain

Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be

expropriated are the petitioners'' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.

HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives.

BAIL

 

 

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE,

G.R. No. 189122

Petitioner,THE COURT OF APPEALSand PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

 

THE FACTS 

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste wasconvicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide andsentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of 

 prision mayor 

asminimum to 12 years and one day of 

reclusion temporal 

as maximum.

[11]

 He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.

[12]

 Pending appeal, he filed anurgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and healthcondition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.

[13]

 It invoked the bedrockprinciple in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during thecourse of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

[15]

 Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’stheory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is

more than six years but not morethan 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 areabsent, bail

must

be granted to an appellant pending appeal. 

THE ISSUE

 Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bailshould automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the thirdparagraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5.

Bail, when discretionary 

. —

Upon conviction by theRegional Trial Court of an offense not punishable bydeath,

reclusion perpetua

, or life imprisonment, admission to bail isdiscretionary

. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by thetrial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has nottransmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decisionof the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offensefrom non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed withand resolved by the appellate court. 

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonmentexceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bailshall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice tothe accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

 

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitualdelinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by thecircumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without avalid justification;

 

 (c) That he committed the offense while under probation,parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate theprobability of flight if released on bail; or  (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

 The appellate court may,

motu proprio

or on motion of any party,review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverseparty in either case. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural andsubstantive rules.petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted withgrave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should havegranted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the thirdparagraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.RULINGWe disagree. 

1.

pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense notpunishable by death,

reclusion perpetua

, or life imprisonment, admission to bail isexpressly declared to be

discretionary

.Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law,is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of rightwhen the offense charged is not punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional TrialCourt of an offense not punishable death,

reclusion perpetua

or lifeimprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly,

if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonmentexceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,

except whenany of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5,Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied 

.

[25]

 (emphasis supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present,the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a morestringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumeratedcircumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appealshould be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretionstage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the thirdparagraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellatecourt will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in

resolving the application for bailpending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s casefalls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court mayconsider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;

[27]

on the basis thereof, itmay either allow or disallow bail.

 

a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automaticallyresult in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the lessstringent sound discretion approach.

 However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.”

[28]

 Choice occurs where,between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “morethan one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decisionmaker.”

[29]

On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.

[30]

 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating thattribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instanceswhere the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding sixyears, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “

upon conviction bythe Regional Trial Court

of an offense not punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua

, or lifeimprisonment,

admission to bail is

 

discretionary

.” The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They weremodified in 1988 to read as follows: Sec. 3.

Bail, a matter of right; exception

. — All persons in custody,shall

before final conviction

be entitled to bail as a matter of right, exceptthose charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at thetime of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishableby

reclusion perpetua

, when evidence of guilt is strong. Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to futureas well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court

en banc 

lays downthe following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, towit: 2)

When an accused is charged with a capital offense or anoffense which under the law at the time of its commission and at thetime of the application for bail is punishable by

reclusion perpetua

andis out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same ruleset forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied

; Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 datedAugust 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows: SECTION 5.

Bail, when discretionary 

. —

Upon conviction by theRegional Trial Court of an offense not punishable bydeath,

reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment, the court, onapplication, may admit the accused to bail.

 

denial of bail pending appeal

is “

a matter of wise discretion

.” Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishableby

reclusion perpetua

when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,

beforeconviction

, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizanceas may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.

From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised withgrave caution and only for strong reasons.

WHEREFORE

, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED

G.R. No. 189754               October 24, 2012

LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, Petitioners, vs.SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1

elated May 19, 2009 and Resolution2 dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan v. lion. Rizalina T Capco-Urnali, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito Bautista, and Jimmy Alcantara, which granted the

petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. TheCA Decision reversed and set aside the Order3 dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, but only insofar as it pertains to the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners Lito Bautista (Bautista) and Jimmy Alcantara (Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.

The antecedents are as follows:

On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2) informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officer[s] of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.

Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric singer- actress in connection with an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong she’s supposedly looking into the item that we’ve written and most probably would take some legal action.

x x x

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.

Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman daw namin siyang

sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part raw siguro yun ng aming trabaho.

Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on her.

x x x

Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s desperately trying to sing even if she truly can’t, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw kayo ng tatlong araw sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month ago, in connection with one of those political campaigns of your husband.

x x x

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a vice, condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others, have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARYANG SUPPORTER NI KIKO!

FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in Sampaloc, Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools in Paniqui, Tarlac).

x x x

Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with some business associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.

So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sharon para mabigyan ito ng instructions para kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.

She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at nagtext pang "You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me, I’ll be fine."

Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth si Pettizou. Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang mga derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan.

Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how come Sharon seems not to approve of her?

"She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya," our caller opines.

Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.

"In public," our source goes on tartly, "pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa na lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko."

My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead most of the time.

Yung text message niyang "You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me," hindi ba’t she was being redundant?

Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet again. Jesus, she looks 6’11 crosswise!

x x x

Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang mega-brat, mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s brain dead most of the time.

x x x

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a vice, condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case ensued.6

Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit7 alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were published therein, and subject of the two informations. According to respondent, in April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about an article dated March 27, 2001, featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column Usapang Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang

Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, mega-brat, mega-sungit, and brain dead, which were the subject

of Criminal Case No. MC02-4875.8 Another article, with the same title and similar text, also featured on the same date, appeared on page 6 of Saksi Ngayon, in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio.9 Moreover, respondent averred that on April 24, 2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up articles, one appeared in his column Usapang Censored, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!, stating that she bad-mouthed one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter kulit-kulit (annoyingly persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-important), and other derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the latter bobo (stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and that she was a dishonest person with questionable credibility, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4872.10 Another article, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio,11 with the headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said issue.12 Respondent added that Ampoloquio’s articles impugned her character as a woman and wife, as they depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband. According to Ampoloquio, respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win (as Senator) because that would mean losing hold over him, and that she would treat him like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on) privately, but she appeared to be a loving wife to him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag contributed millions to her husband’s campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the campaign and was one of the volunteers of her husband’s Kilos Ko Movement, being the first cousin of one Atty. Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husband’s partner in Franco Pangilinan Law Office); however, it was Atty. Ringler who asked Tayag to resign from the movement due to difficulty in dealing with her.

After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her undated Complaint-Affidavit.13

On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence.14In their Demurrer to Evidence,15 which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice.

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The trial court opined, among others, that since the prosecution did not submit its Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, the averments therein thus became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as conspirators of the crime charged; and that during the direct examination on July 27, 2004 and cross-examination on August 1, 2006, respondent neither identified them, nor was there any mention about their actual participation.

As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit17 dated May 29, 2008, with the attached Comment (to Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's Demurrer to Evidence)18 dated March 24, 2008, stating that during the pendency of the trial court's resolution on the petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the prosecution intended to file its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail, upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said Comment was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the State Prosecutor handling the case.19 Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the prosecution prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 25, 2008.

In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit, with the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of the court records.

On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent's Comment to form part of the records of the case).

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar as it pertains to the grant of petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:

I.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BARRED BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING PETITONERS' DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not been denied due process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, on the basis that the prosecution failed to prove that they acted in conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author of the questioned articles. They added that what the prosecution proved was merely their designations as Editor and Associate Editor of the publication Bandera, but not the fact that they had either control over the articles to be published or actually edited the subject articles.

Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important reasons to justify their invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She avers that the acquittal of petitioners does not preclude their further prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she points out that contrary to petitioners’ contention, the principle of double jeopardy does not attach in cases where the court's judgment acquitting the accused or dismissing the case is void, either for having disregarded the State's right to due process or for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.

Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, this did not give the trial court any reason to deprive the prosecution of its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence itself, which was a

clear violation of the due process requirement. By reason of the foregoing, respondent insists that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right against double jeopardy.

The petition is impressed with merit.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the

Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.20 The OSG is the law office of the Government.21

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane,22 it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II.23 In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan,24 the Court again upheld this guiding principle.

Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,25 wherein the Court had the occasion to bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.26

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.27

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Respondent lacked the personality or legal standing to question the trial court’s order because it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA.28 Thus, the CA should have denied the petition outright.

Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees with the CA’s ruling reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners.

Under Section 23,29 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer

be appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.30

Anent the prosecution’s claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the CA, the prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the prosecution had actively participated in the trial and already rested its case, and upon petitioners' filing of their Demurrer to Evidence, was given the opportunity to file its Comment or Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its Comment thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that the word "may" was used in Section 23 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that if leave of court is granted, and the accused has filed the Demurrer to Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, the prosecution "may" oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a similar period from its receipt.1âwphi1In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a Comment or Opposition by respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional requirement, and that in fact the trial court may even proceed with the resolution of the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence even without the prosecution's Comment.

One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that can be held liable for libel. It provides:

ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.31

From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible for the same, all other persons who participated in its publication are liable, including the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, who shall be equally responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as

if he were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.

In Fermin v. People,32 therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. She also averred that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. The Court struck down her erroneous theory and ruled that therein petitioner, who was not only the Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but also its President and Chairperson, could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of the libelous article.

Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,33 therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National Editor of Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and one who does typesetting, editing, and layout of the page, claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the subject articles which will hold them liable for the crime of libel and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking this argument, the Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control over the publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is because it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles or publication definitely will not prosper.

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 was already elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,34 to wit:

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons who in any

way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers.35

Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof. Indeed, as aptly concluded by the court a quo:

The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an editor of a publication in which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same shall be responsible for the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that, without their nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be published.

Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they exercise, newspaper editors and associate editors are as much critical part in the publication of any defamatory material as the writer or author thereof.36

Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the

wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, should be reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163586               January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.5

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information.8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.10

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared

that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.13

Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.

The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court’s Uy ruling under its March 20,

2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed."17

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.19 But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate

investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CITIZENSHIP

CO vs. HRETFacts:

 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue: 

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

  Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court

an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements