QUASI-CONTRACTS

G.R. No. L-23749 April 29, 1977   FAUSTINO CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,  vs. J. M. TUASON & COMPANY,

INC., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees. 

Appeal from the order dated August 13, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-

7751, Faustino Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., dismissing the complaint of appellant

Cruz for the recovery of improvements he has made on appellees' land and to compel appellees to convey to him

3,000 square meters of land on three grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; (2) the cause

of action of plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; and (3) the action of the plaintiff has already

prescribed.

Actually, a perusal of plaintiff-appellant's complaint below shows that he alleged two separate causes of action,

namely: (1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question

on the strength of an "informacion posesoria" ) plaintiff made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on

said land having an area of more or less 20 quinones and for which he also incurred expenses in the amount of

P7,781.74, and since defendants-appellees are being benefited by said improvements, he is entitled to

reimbursement from them of said amounts and (2) that in 1952, defendants availed of plaintiff's services as an

intermediary with the Deudors to work for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in the

Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and involving 50 quinones of land, of Which the 20 quinones aforementioned

form part, and notwithstanding his having performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement entered into

on March 16, 1963 between the Deudors and the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused to

convey to him the 3,000 square meters of land occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above) which said

defendants had promised to do "within ten years from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement", as

consideration for his services.

Within the Period allowed by the rules, the defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging three Identical

grounds: (1) As regards that improvements made by plaintiff, that the complaint states no cause of action, the

agreement regarding the same having been made by plaintiff with the Deudors and not with the defendants, hence

the theory of plaintiff based on Article 2142 of the Code on unjust enrichment is untenable; and (2) anent the

alleged agreement about plaintiffs services as intermediary in consideration of which, defendants promised to

convey to him 3,000 square meters of land, that the same is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, there

being nothing in writing about it, and, in any event, (3) that the action of plaintiff to compel such conveyance has

already prescribed.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, insisting that Article 2142 of the applicable to his case; that the Statute of Frauds

cannot be invoked by defendants, not only because Article 1403 of the Civil Code refers only to "sale of real

property or of an interest therein" and not to promises to convey real property like the one supposedly promised by

defendants to him, but also because, he, the plaintiff has already performed his part of the agreement, hence the

agreement has already been partly executed and not merely executory within the contemplation of the Statute;

and that his action has not prescribed for the reason that defendants had ten years to comply and only after the

said ten years did his cause of action accrue, that is, ten years after March 16, 1963, the date of the approval of the

compromise agreement, and his complaint was filed on January 24, 1964.

Ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court issued the herein impugned order of August 13, 1964:

In the motion, dated January 31, 1964, defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. prayed that the complaint against it be

dismissed on the ground that (1) the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provision of

the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the plaintiff's action, if any has already prescribed. In the other motion of February

11, 1964, defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. sought the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint on the ground that it

states no cause of action and on the Identical grounds stated in the motion to dismiss of defendant Gregorio

Araneta, Inc. The said motions are duly opposed by the plaintiff.

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From the allegations of the complaint, it appears that, by virtue of an agreement arrived at in 1948 by the plaintiff

and the Deudors, the former assisted the latter in clearing, improving, subdividing and selling the large tract of land

consisting of 50 quinones covered by the informacion posesoria in the name of the late Telesforo Deudor and

incurred expenses, which are valued approximately at P38,400.00 and P7,781.74, respectively; and, for the reasons

that said improvements are being used and enjoyed by the defendants, the plaintiff is seeking the reimbursement

for the services and expenses stated above from the defendants.

Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. claimed that, insofar as the plaintiffs claim for the reimbursement of the amounts

of P38,400.00 and P7,781.74 is concerned, it is not a privy to the plaintiff's agreement to assist the Deudors n

improving the 50 quinones. On the other hand, the plaintiff countered that, by holding and utilizing the

improvements introduced by him, the defendants are unjustly enriching and benefiting at the expense of the

plaintiff; and that said improvements constitute a lien or charge of the property itself

On the issue that the complaint insofar as it claims the reimbursement for the services rendered and expenses

incurred by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the Court is of the opinion that the same is well-founded. It is

found that the defendants are not parties to the supposed express contract entered into by and between the

plaintiff and the Deudors for the clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore in order that the

alleged improvement may be considered a lien or charge on the property, the same should have been made in

good faith and under the mistake as to the title. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the tract of land

supposedly improved by the plaintiff had been registered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessors-in-

interest of defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court

on July 31, 1956 in Case G. R. No. L-5079 entitled J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs. Geronimo Santiago, et al., Such being

the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and mistake as to the title of the land.

On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is applicable to the instant case. The allegation in par.

12 of the complaint states that the defendants promised and agreed to cede, transfer and convey unto the plaintiff

the 3,000 square meters of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered then. it is clear that the alleged

agreement involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of See. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code,

such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the party charged.

On the issue of statute of limitations, the Court holds that the plaintiff's action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. 11

of the complaint that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors to

enter to a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore, par. 13 and 14 of the

complaint alleged that the plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in conveying their respective proposals and

couter-proposals until the final settlement was effected on March 16, 1953 and approved by Court on April 11,

1953. In the present action, which was instituted on January 24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the

supposed agreement entered into between him and the defendants in 1952, which was already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Pp. 65-69, Rec. on Appeal,)

On August 22, 1964, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration dated August 20, 1964 as follows:

Plaintiff through undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully moves to reconsider its Order

bearing date of 13 August 1964, on the following grounds:

1. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR AS PLAINTIFF'S

CLAIM PAYMENT OF SERVICES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, IS CONCERNED;

II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS., THE SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED AND THE

STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE THERETO;

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A R G U M E N T

Plaintiff's complaint contains two (2) causes of action — the first being an action for sum of money in the amount of

P7,781.74 representing actual expenses and P38,400.00 as reasonable compensation for services in improving the

50 quinones now in the possession of defendants. The second cause of action deals with the 3,000 sq. ms. which

defendants have agreed to transfer into Plaintiff for services rendered in effecting the compromise between the

Deudors and defendants;

Under its order of August 3, 1964, this Honorable Court dismissed the claim for sum of money on the ground that

the complaint does not state a cause of action against defendants. We respectfully submit:

1. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR AS PLAINTIFF'S

CLAIM FOR PAYMENT OF SERVICES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES IS CONCERNED.

Said this Honorable Court (at p. 2, Order):

O R D E R

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue that the complaint, in so far as it claims the reimbursement for the services rendered and expenses

incurred by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the Court is of the opinion that the same is well-founded. It is

found that the defendants are not parties to the supposed express contract entered into by and between the

plaintiff and the Deudors for the clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore, in order that the

alleged improvement may he considered a lien or charge on the property, the same should have been made in

good faith and under the mistake as to title. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the tract of land

supposedly improved by the plaintiff had been registered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessors-in-

interest of defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court

on July 31, 1956 in case G. R. No. L-5079 entitled 'J M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs, Geronimo Santiago, et al.' Such being

the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and mistake as to the title of the land.

The position of this Honorable Court (supra) is that the complaint does not state a cause of action in so far as the

claim for services and expenses is concerned because the contract for the improvement of the properties was

solely between the Deudors and plaintiff, and defendants are not privies to it. Now, plaintiff's theory is that

defendants are nonetheless liable since they are utilizing and enjoying the benefit's of said improvements. Thus

under paragraph 16 of "he complaint, it is alleged:

(16) That the services and personal expenses of plaintiff mentioned in paragraph 7 hereof were rendered and in

fact paid by him to improve, as they in fact resulted in considerable improvement of the 50 quinones, and

defendants being now in possession of and utilizing said improvements should reimburse and pay plaintiff for such

services and expenses.

Plaintiff's cause of action is premised inter alia, on the theory of unjust enrichment under Article 2142 of the civil

Code:

ART. 2142. Certain lawful voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end

that no one shill be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

In like vein, Article 19 of the same Code enjoins that:

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ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give

every-one his due and observe honesty and good faith.

We respectfully draw the attention of this Honorable Court to the fact that ARTICLE 2142 (SUPRA) DEALS WITH

QUASI-CONTRACTS or situations WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION. Further,

as we can readily see from the title thereof (Title XVII), that the Same bears the designation 'EXTRA CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATIONS' or obligations which do not arise from contracts. While it is true that there was no agreement

between plaintiff and defendants herein for the improvement of the 50 quinones since the latter are presently

enjoying and utilizing the benefits brought about through plaintiff's labor and expenses, defendants should pay and

reimburse him therefor under the principle that 'no one may enrich himself at the expense of another.' In this

posture, the complaint states a cause of action against the defendants.

II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. THE SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED AND THE

STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE THERETO.

The Statute of Frauds is CLEARLY inapplicable to this case:

At page 2 of this Honorable Court's order dated 13 August 1964, the Court ruled as follows:

O R D E R

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is applicable to the instant Case, The allegation in

par. 12 of the complaint states that the defendants promised and agree to cede, transfer and convey unto the

plaintiff, 3,000 square meters of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered then. It is clear that the

alleged agreement involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil

Code, such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the party charged.

To bring this issue in sharper focus, shall reproduce not only paragraph 12 of the complaint but also the other

pertinent paragraphs therein contained. Paragraph 12 states thus:

C O M P L A I N T

xxx xxx xxx

12). That plaintiff conferred with the aforesaid representatives of defendants several times and on these occasions,

the latter promised and agreed to cede, transfer and convey unto plaintiff the 3,000 sq. ms. (now known as Lots 16-

B, 17 and 18) which plaintiff was then occupying and continues to occupy as of this writing, for and in consideration

of the following conditions:

(a) That plaintiff succeed in convincing the DEUDORS to enter into a compromise agreement and that such

agreement be actually entered into by and between the DEUDORS and defendant companies;

(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement, plaintiff shall be the owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but the

documents evidencing his title over this property shall be executed and delivered by defendants to plaintiff within

ten (10) years from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement;

(c) That plaintiff shall, without any monetary expense of his part, assist in clearing the 20 quinones of its occupants;

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13). That in order to effect a compromise between the parties. plaintiff not only as well acted as emissary of both

parties in conveying their respective proposals and counter- proposals until succeeded in convinzing the DEUDORS

to settle with defendants amicably. Thus, on March 16, 1953,a Compromise Agreement was entered into by and

between the DEUDORS and the defendant companies; and on April 11, 1953, this agreement was approved by this

Honorable Court;

14). That in order to comply with his other obligations under his agreement with defendant companies, plaintiff had

to confer with the occupants of the property, exposing himself to physical harm, convincing said occupants to leave

the premises and to refrain from resorting to physical violence in resisting defendants' demands to vacate;

That plaintiff further assisted defendants' employees in the actual demolition and transferof all the houses within

the perimeter of the 20 quinones until the end of 1955, when said area was totally cleared and the houses

transferred to another area designated by the defendants as 'Capt. Cruz Block' in Masambong, Quezon City. (Pars.

12, 13 and 14, Complaint; Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear then the agreement between the parties mentioned in paragraph 12 (supra) of the

complaint has already been fully EXECUTED ON ONE PART, namely by the plaintiff. Regarding the applicability of

the statute of frauds (Art. 1403, Civil Code), it has been uniformly held that the statute of frauds IS APPLICABLE

ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS BUT NOT WHERE THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN PARTLY EXECUTED:

SAME ACTION TO ENFORCE. — The statute of frauds has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to executory

and not to completed or contracts. Performance of the contracts takes it out of the operation of the statute. ...

The statute of the frauds is not applicable to contracts which are either totally or partially performed, on the theory

that there is a wide field for the commission of frauds in executory contracts which can only be prevented by

requiring them to be in writing, a facts which is reduced to a minimum in executed contracts because the intention

of the parties becomes apparent buy their execution and execution, in mots cases, concluded the right the

parties. ... The partial performance may be proved by either documentary or oral evidence. (At pp. 564-565,

Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed.; Emphasis supplied).

Authorities in support of the foregoing rule are legion. Thus Mr. Justice Moran in his 'Comments on the Rules of

Court', Vol. III, 1974 Ed., at p. 167, states:

2 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EITHER

TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY PERFORMED ARE WITHOUT THE STATUE. The statute of frauds is applicable only to

executory contracts. It is neither applicable to executed contracts nor to contracts partially performed. The reason

is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no

palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been enacted to prevent fraud. On the

other hand the commission of fraud in executed contracts is reduced to minimum in executed contracts because (1)

the intention of the parties is made apparent by the execution and (2) execution concludes, in most cases, the

rights of the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

Under paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint (supra) one can readily see that the plaintiff has fulfilled ALL his

obligation under the agreement between him defendants concerning the 3,000 sq. ms. over which the latter had

agreed to execute the proper documents of transfer. This fact is further projected in paragraph 15 of the complaint

where plaintiff states;

15). That in or about the middle of 1963, after all the conditions stated in paragraph 12 hereof had been fulfilled

and fully complied with, plaintiff demanded of said defendants that they execute the Deed of Conveyance in his

favor and deliver the title certificate in his name, over the 3,000 sq. ms. but defendants failed and refused and

continue to fail and refuse to heed his demands. (par. 15, complaint; Emphasis supplied).

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In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that this Honorable court erred in holding that the statute of frauds

is applicable to plaintiff's claim over the 3,000 sq. ms. There having been full performance of the contract on

plaintiff's part, the same takes this case out of the context of said statute.

Plaintiff's Cause of Action had NOT Prescribed:

With all due respect to this Honorable court, we also submit that the Court committed error in holding that this

action has prescribed:

O R D E R

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of the statute of limitations, the Court holds that the plaintiff's action has prescribed. It is alleged in

par. III of the complaint that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff to prevail upon the

Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore, pars. 13 and

14 of the complaint alleged that plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in conveying their respective proposals

and counter-proposals until the final settlement was affected on March 16, 1953 and approved by the Court on April

11, 1953. In the present actin, which was instituted on January 24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the

supposed agreement entered into between him and the defendants in 1952, which has already proscribed. (at p. 3,

Order).

The present action has not prescribed, especially when we consider carefully the terms of the agreement between

plaintiff and the defendants. First, we must draw the attention of this Honorable Court to the fact that this is an

action to compel defendants to execute a Deed of Conveyance over the 3,000 sq. ms. subject of their agreement. In

paragraph 12 of the complaint, the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties are spelled out.

Paragraph 12 (b) of the complaint states:

(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement, plaintiff shall be the owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but the

documents evidencing his title over this property shall be executed and delivered by defendants to plaintiff within

ten (10) years from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement. (Emphasis supplied).

The compromise agreement between defendants and the Deudors which was conclude through the efforts of

plaintiff, was signed on 16 March 1953. Therefore, the defendants had ten (10) years signed on 16 March 1953.

Therefore, the defendants had ten (10) years from said date within which to execute the deed of conveyance in

favor of plaintiff over the 3,000 sq. ms. As long as the 10 years period has not expired, plaintiff had no right to

compel defendants to execute the document and the latter were under no obligation to do so. Now, this 10-year

period elapsed on March 16, 1963. THEN and ONLY THEN does plaintiff's cause of action plaintiff on March 17, 1963.

Thus, under paragraph 15, of the complaint (supra) plaintiff made demands upon defendants for the execution of

the deed 'in or about the middle of 1963.

Since the contract now sought to be enforced was not reduced to writing, plaintiff's cause of action expires on

March 16, 1969 or six years from March 16, 1963 WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED (Art. 1145, Civil Code).

In this posture, we gain respectfully submit that this Honorable Court erred in holding that plaintiff's action has

prescribed.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that " Honorable Court reconsider its Order dated August 13, 1964; and issue

another order denying the motions to dismiss of defendants G. Araneta, Inc. and J. M. Tuason Co. Inc. for lack of

merit. (Pp. 70-85, Record on Appeal.)

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Defendants filed an opposition on the main ground that "the arguments adduced by the plaintiff are merely

reiterations of his arguments contained in his Rejoinder to Reply and Opposition, which have not only been refuted

in herein defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Reply but already passed upon by this Honorable Court."

On September 7, 1964, the trial court denied the motion for reconsiderations thus:

After considering the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of August 20, 1964 and it appearing that the grounds

relied upon in said motion are mere repetition of those already resolved and discussed by this Court in the order of

August 13, 1964, the instant motion is hereby denied and the findings and conclusions arrived at by the Court in its

order of August 13, 1964 are hereby reiterated and affirmed.

SO ORDERED. (Page 90, Rec. on Appeal.)

Under date of September 24, 1964, plaintiff filed his record on appeal.

In his brief, appellant poses and discusses the following assignments of error:

I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT APPELLANT'S CLAIM

OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. IS ALLEGEDLY UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS;

II. THAT THE COURT A QUO FURTHER COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT ON THE

GROUND THAT HIS CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. IS ALLEGEDLY BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; and

III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN

SO FAR AS APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AND FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN THE

IMPROVEMENT OF THE FIFTY (50) QUINONES IS CONCERNED.

We agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds was erroneously applied by the trial court. It is elementary that

the Statute refers to specific kinds of transactions and that it cannot apply to any that is not enumerated therein.

And the only agreements or contracts covered thereby are the following:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal

representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number, In the following cases an agreement

hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in

writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be

received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos,

unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them of such

things in action, or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry

is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms

of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient

memorandum:

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(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest

therein:

(f) a representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract. (Art. 1403, civil Code.)

In the instant case, what appellant is trying to enforce is the delivery to him of 3,000 square meters of land which

he claims defendants promised to do in consideration of his services as mediator or intermediary in effecting a

compromise of the civil action, Civil Case No. 135, between the defendants and the Deudors. In no sense may such

alleged contract be considered as being a "sale of real property or of any interest therein." Indeed, not all dealings

involving interest in real property come under the Statute.

Moreover, appellant's complaint clearly alleges that he has already fulfilled his part of the bargains to induce the

Deudors to amicably settle their differences with defendants as, in fact, on March 16, 1963, through his efforts, a

compromise agreement between these parties was approved by the court. In other words, the agreement in

question has already been partially consummated, and is no longer merely executory. And it is likewise a

fundamental principle governing the application of the Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely

executory on the part of both parties thereto.

We cannot, however, escape taking judicial notice, in relation to the compromise agreement relied upon by

appellant, that in several cases We have decided, We have declared the same rescinded and of no effect. In J. M.

Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bienvenido Sanvictores, 4 SCRA 123, the Court held:

It is also worthy of note that the compromise between Deudors and Tuason, upon which Sanvictores predicates his

right to buy the lot he occupies, has been validly rescinded and set aside, as recognized by this Court in its decision

in G.R. No. L-13768, Deudor vs. Tuason, promulgated on May 30, 1961.

We repeated this observation in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Teodosio Macalindong, 6 SCRA 938. Thus, viewed from

what would be the ultimate conclusion of appellant's case, We entertain grave doubts as to whether or not he can

successfully maintain his alleged cause of action against defendants, considering that the compromise agreement

that he invokes did not actually materialize and defendants have not benefited therefrom, not to mention the

undisputed fact that, as pointed out by appellees, appellant's other attempt to secure the same 3,000 square

meters via the judicial enforcement of the compromise agreement in which they were supposed to be reserved for

him has already been repudiated by the courts. (pp. 5-7. Brief of Appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc.)

As regards appellant's third assignment of error, We hold that the allegations in his complaint do not sufficiently

Appellants' reliance. on Article 2142 of Civil Code is misplaced. Said article provides:

Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no

one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

From the very language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed qauasi-contract cannot emerge as against

one party when the subject mater thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another party. Predicated

on the principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Article 2124

creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any actual agreement between the

parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract

with a third party, his cause of action should be against the latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor,

seek relief against the party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have

been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, "The act is voluntary.

because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it

arises from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The

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reason why the law creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a

person is able to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said

actor." (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and

more direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding the

improvements and expenditures made by him on the land of appellees. it Cannot be said, in the sense

contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant.

In the ultimate. therefore, Our holding above that appellant's first two assignments of error are well taken cannot

save the day for him. Aside from his having no cause of action against appellees, there is one plain error of

omission. We have found in the order of the trial court which is as good a ground as any other for Us to terminate

this case favorably to appellees. In said order Which We have quoted in full earlier in this opinion, the trial court

ruled that "the grounds relied upon in said motion are mere repetitions of those already resolved and discussed by

this Court in the order of August 13, 1964", an observation which We fully share. Virtually, therefore. appellant's

motion for reconsideration was ruled to be pro-forma. Indeed, a cursory reading of the record on appeal reveals

that appellant's motion for reconsideration above-quoted contained exactly the same arguments and manner of

discussion as his February 6, 1964 "Opposition to Motion to Dismiss" of defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. ((pp. 17-

25, Rec. on Appeal) as well as his February 17, 1964 "Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Defendant J. M. Tuason &

Co." (pp. 33-45, Rec. on Appeal and his February 29, 1964 "Rejoinder to Reply Oil Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co."

(pp. 52-64, Rec. on Appeal) We cannot see anything in said motion for reconsideration that is substantially different

from the above oppositions and rejoinder he had previously submitted and which the trial court had already

considered when it rendered its main order of dismissal. Consequently, appellant's motion for reconsideration did

not suspend his period for appeal. (Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890, 905-6.) And as this point was covered

by appellees' "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration" (pp. 8689), hence, within the frame of the issues below, it

is within the ambit of Our authority as the Supreme Court to consider the same here even if it is not discussed in

the briefs of the parties. (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance

Co., Ltd. [Resolution en banc of March 10, 1977 in G. R. No. L-25291).

Now, the impugned main order was issued on August 13, 1964, while the appeal was made on September 24, 1964

or 42 days later. Clearly, this is beyond the 30-day reglementary period for appeal. Hence, the subject order of

dismissal was already final and executory when appellant filed his appeal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Faustino Cruz in this case is dismissed. No costs.

 

 

G.R. No. 124267            January 31, 2003    NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF SAUDI ARABIA, petitioner, 

vs.

9

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

This case reiterates the doctrine that the 3-day notice rule on motion is mandatory and that a motion without notice

of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the running of the period to appeal.      A motion for

reconsideration which merely reiterates the arguments already disposed of in the decision or resolution sought to

be resolved is pro forma. The absence of a notice of hearing cannot be cured by a motion to set the motion for

hearing.

 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:                        

May the unrippled doctrine that a motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing is a useless piece of paper

with no legal effect1 be, under the facts of the case, relaxed?

Petitioner National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against respondent Philippine Banking

Corporation (PBC) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati on December 4, 1985 to recover "the duplication in

the payment of the proceeds of a letter of credit [NCBSA] has issued . . . brought about by the fact that both the

head office and the Makati branch of [PBC, the negotiating bank,] collected the proceeds of the letter of credit."2

On August 24, 1993, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision in favor of NCBSA.3 PBC received a copy of the decision

on September 3, 19934 and on the 12th day of the period of appeal or on September 15, 1993, it filed a Motion for

Reconsideration.5 The motion, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.6

On September 21, 1993, NCBSA filed a Manifestation pointing out that PBC's Motion for Reconsideration did not

contain any notice of hearing.7

On September 27, 1993, NCBSA filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the decision of the trial court.8 On even date,

PBC filed a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing9 alleging as follows:

xxx           xxx           xxx

2. The Motion for Reconsideration raised both questions of facts and law arising from the erroneous findings made

by the Honorable Court in the said Decision;

3. In order that defendant can fully amplify and expound on the issues raised on the said motions, there is a need to

set the Motion for Hearing.

xxx           xxx           xxx10

NCBSA opposed this motion vigorously, it praying that it be stricken off the records.11

By Order of February 1, 1994, the trial court struck from the records of the case PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of

its decision and granted NCBSA's Motion for Writ of Execution.12

PBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order of February 1, 1994, this time alleging that PBC's failure to

comply with the 3-day notice rule "was essentially an honest mistake or oversight of counsel."13 This motion was

just as vigorously opposed by NCBSA.14

By Order of March 2, 1994, the trial court denied PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of February 1, 1994,

finding that "[t]here are no compelling reasons to warrant a liberal construction of the rules on Motions."15

10

PBC assailed before the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari the trial court's March 2, 1994 Order.16

By Decision of February 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed PBC's Petition for Certiorari.17 On PBC's Motion

for Reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals, by Amended Decision of March 8, 1996, set aside its February

27, 1995 Decision and granted PBC's Petition for Certiorari and directed the trial court to resolve PBC's Motion for

Reconsideration (of the trial court's August 24, 1993 Decision).18

Justifying its setting aside of its February 27, 1995 Decision, the Court of Appeals held in its Amended Decision:

. . . [T]o deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground of failure to contain a notice of hearing is too

harsh an application of procedural rules especially so when petitioner has filed a motion to set the motion for

reconsideration for hearing and had furnished private respondent a copy of the motion, a fact which is not denied

by the latter.19

NCBSA thus comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised

Rules of Court20 is mandatory. The absence of a notice of hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a

decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.21 In the case at bar, it is not

disputed that PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the August 24, 1993 decision of the trial court did not contain the

requisite notice of hearing.

In an attempt to cure the defect, PBC filed on Motion to Set the "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing on

September 27, 1993, or 9 days after the period for filing the Notice of Appeal had expired.

The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of hearing, cannot be cured by a

belated filing of a notice of hearing.22 More so in the case at bar where the Motion to Set the "Motion for

Reconsideration" was filed after the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.

NCBSA thus calls for the strict application of our rules of procedure to avoid further delays in the disposition of the

case,23 which has remained pending for more than 17 years.

PBC, on the other hand, invokes a just and fair determination of the case.24

PBC's appeal for justice and fairness does not lie, however, there being nothing on record to show that it has been a

victim of injustice or unfairness. On the contrary, as found by the Court of Appeals in its original decision, PBC had

the opportunity to participate in the trial and present its defense and had actually made full use of the remedies

under our rules of procedure.25 More importantly, there was no oppressive exercise of judicial authority that would

call for the annulment of the trial court's resolutions.26

The finality of the decision of the trial court cannot be set aside purely on the basis of liberality for while it is true

that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will

and at random. Only for the most persuasive of reasons should the court allow a relaxation of its procedural

rules.27

PBC, however, has not advanced any persuasive or exceptional reason in failing to set its Motion for

Reconsideration of the trial court's decision for hearing. In fact, in its Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration" for

Hearing, PBC was completely silent on why it did not set the Motion for Reconsideration for hearing. It just alleged

that, as earlier quoted, "[i]n order that defendant can fully amplify and expound on the issues raised on said

11

motion, there is a need to set the Motion [for Reconsideration] for Hearing."28 This allegation conveys that, if there

was no need for PBC to "fully amplify and expound on the issues raised" in the Motion for Reconsideration, no

setting for hearing of said motion was needed. But as earlier stated, the requirement of notice in this kind of motion

is mandatory. The Motion for Reconsideration thus remained a mere scrap of paper which deserved no

consideration.

But assuming that PBC had presented exceptional reason or excuse for its failure to comply with the notice

requirement, the Motion for Reconsideration would be denied on the ground that it is pro forma.

In its Rejoinder29 to NCBSA's Reply to Comment to the petition at bar, PBC alleged that it was, in its Motion for

Reconsideration of the trial court's decision, raising "serious questions involving findings of fact and conclusions of

law by the trial court," thus "questioning the decision as being contrary to law and the evidence on record."30 A

reading of the records will show, however, that the same three issues raised by PBC during the trial — prescription,

laches and lack of double payment — are what are being raised in its Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of

the trial court.

PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision was thus "in substance . . . a reiteration of reasons and

arguments"31 raised before the trial court for the dismissal of NCBSA's complaint, which reasons and arguments

had already been considered and resolved against it on the merits by the trial court. The Motion for Reconsideration

was thus merely pro forma.

Technicality aside, en passant, on the merits of PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision, the

trial court did not err in brushing aside its main defense of prescription — that NCBSA's complaint is "based on the

quasi-contract of solutio indebiti,"32 hence, it prescribes in six years and, therefore, when NCBSA filed its complaint

nine years after the cause of action arose, it had prescribed.

Solutio indebiti applies where: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who

has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and

not through liberality or some other cause33 In the case at bar, PBC and NCBSA were bound by their contract, the

letter of credit, under which NCBSA obliged itself to pay PBC, subject to compliance by the latter with certain

conditions provided therein. As such, the cause of action was based on a contract, and the prescriptive period is

ten,34 not six years.

Even PBC's defense of laches is bereft of merit, the cause of action not having yet prescribed at the time NCBSA's

complaint was filed.

Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement

of actions at law.35

And as to PBC's allegation that the trial court erred in finding the existence of double payment, suffice it to state

that PBC, while denying that there was double payment, itself admitted having received a second set of payment

for the same amount covered by the letter of credit. Thus, in its petition for certiorari36 filed with the Court of

Appeals, it alleged, quoted verbatim:

The second set for the same amount, although it was received and credited to [PBC's] account with Chemical Bank

New York, were to be and subsequently transmitted to the account of Labroco (International,

Philippines) . . .37 (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 8, 1996 is SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the Philippine Banking Corporation as pro forma is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

12

 

G.R. No. 173227               January 20, 2009 SEBASTIAN SIGA-AN, Petitioner, vs.    ALICIA

VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N                CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

13

Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the

Decision,2 dated 16 December 2005, and Resolution,3 dated 19 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 71814, which affirmed in toto the Decision,4 dated 26 January 2001, of the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court,

Branch 255, in Civil Case No. LP-98-0068.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

On 30 March 1998, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a complaint5 for sum of money against petitioner Sebastian

Siga-an before the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-98-0068.

Respondent alleged that she was a businesswoman engaged in supplying office materials and equipments to the

Philippine Navy Office (PNO) located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, while petitioner was a military officer and

comptroller of the PNO from 1991 to 1996.

Respondent claimed that sometime in 1992, petitioner approached her inside the PNO and offered to loan her the

amount of P540,000.00. Since she needed capital for her business transactions with the PNO, she accepted

petitioner’s proposal. The loan agreement was not reduced in writing. Also, there was no stipulation as to the

payment of interest for the loan.6

On 31 August 1993, respondent issued a check worth P500,000.00 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan. On

31 October 1993, she issued another check in the amount of P200,000.00 to petitioner as payment of the remaining

balance of the loan. Petitioner told her that since she paid a total amount of P700,000.00 for theP540,000.00 worth

of loan, the excess amount of P160,000.00 would be applied as interest for the loan. Not satisfied with the amount

applied as interest, petitioner pestered her to pay additional interest. Petitioner threatened to block or disapprove

her transactions with the PNO if she would not comply with his demand. As all her transactions with the PNO were

subject to the approval of petitioner as comptroller of the PNO, and fearing that petitioner might block or unduly

influence the payment of her vouchers in the PNO, she conceded. Thus, she paid additional amounts in cash and

checks as interests for the loan. She asked petitioner for receipt for the payments but petitioner told her that it was

not necessary as there was mutual trust and confidence between them. According to her computation, the total

amount she paid to petitioner for the loan and interest accumulated toP1,200,000.00.7

Thereafter, respondent consulted a lawyer regarding the propriety of paying interest on the loan despite absence of

agreement to that effect. Her lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the loan because

there was no agreement between her and petitioner regarding payment of interest. Since she paid petitioner a total

amount of P1,200,000.00 for the P540,000.00 worth of loan, and upon being advised by her lawyer that she made

overpayment to petitioner, she sent a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of the excess amount

of P660,000.00. Petitioner, despite receipt of the demand letter, ignored her claim for reimbursement.8

Respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent (1) P660,000.00 plus legal

interest from the time of demand; (2) P300,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(4) an amount equivalent to 25% of P660,000.00 as attorney’s fees.9

In his answer10 to the complaint, petitioner denied that he offered a loan to respondent. He averred that in 1992,

respondent approached and asked him if he could grant her a loan, as she needed money to finance her business

venture with the PNO. At first, he was reluctant to deal with respondent, because the latter had a spotty record as a

supplier of the PNO. However, since respondent was an acquaintance of his officemate, he agreed to grant her a

loan. Respondent paid the loan in full.11

Subsequently, respondent again asked him to give her a loan. As respondent had been able to pay the previous

loan in full, he agreed to grant her another loan. Later, respondent requested him to restructure the payment of the

loan because she could not give full payment on the due date. He acceded to her request. Thereafter, respondent

pleaded for another restructuring of the payment of the loan. This time he rejected her plea. Thus, respondent

proposed to execute a promissory note wherein she would acknowledge her obligation to him, inclusive of interest,

14

and that she would issue several postdated checks to guarantee the payment of her obligation. Upon his approval

of respondent’s request for restructuring of the loan, respondent executed a promissory note dated 12 September

1994 wherein she admitted having borrowed an amount of P1,240,000.00, inclusive of interest, from petitioner and

that she would pay said amount in March 1995. Respondent also issued to him six postdated checks amounting

to P1,240,000.00 as guarantee of compliance with her obligation. Subsequently, he presented the six checks for

encashment but only one check was honored. He demanded that respondent settle her obligation, but the latter

failed to do so. Hence, he filed criminal cases for Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22)

against respondent. The cases were assigned to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (MeTC).12

Petitioner insisted that there was no overpayment because respondent admitted in the latter’s promissory note that

her monetary obligation as of 12 September 1994 amounted to P1,240,000.00 inclusive of interests. He argued that

respondent was already estopped from complaining that she should not have paid any interest, because she was

given several times to settle her obligation but failed to do so. He maintained that to rule in favor of respondent is

tantamount to concluding that the loan was given interest-free. Based on the foregoing averments, he asked the

RTC to dismiss respondent’s complaint.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 26 January 2001 holding that respondent made an overpayment of her

loan obligation to petitioner and that the latter should refund the excess amount to the former. It ratiocinated that

respondent’s obligation was only to pay the loaned amount of P540,000.00, and that the alleged interests due

should not be included in the computation of respondent’s total monetary debt because there was no agreement

between them regarding payment of interest. It concluded that since respondent made an excess payment to

petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00 through mistake, petitioner should return the said amount to respondent

pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti.13

The RTC also ruled that petitioner should pay moral damages for the sleepless nights and wounded feelings

experienced by respondent. Further, petitioner should pay exemplary damages by way of example or correction for

the public good, plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing evidence and in the light of the provisions of law and jurisprudence on the

matter, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

(1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P660,000.00 plus legal interest of 12% per annum computed

from 3 March 1998 until the amount is paid in full;

(2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount equivalent to 25% of P660,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(5) Ordering defendant to pay the costs of suit.14

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 16 December 2005, the appellate court promulgated its Decision

affirming in toto the RTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision [is]

AFFIRMED in toto.15

15

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but this was denied.16 Hence,

petitioner lodged the instant petition before us assigning the following errors:

I.

THE RTC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NO INTEREST WAS DUE TO PETITIONER;

II.

THE RTC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTIO INDEBITI.17

Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is referred to as monetary

interest. Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. This is called

compensatory interest.18 The right to interest arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay

or failure to pay the principal loan on which interest is demanded.19

Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest,20 specifically mandates that no interest shall be

due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of

monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the

agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for

the payment of monetary interest. Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in

writing is prohibited by law.21

It appears that petitioner and respondent did not agree on the payment of interest for the loan. Neither was there

convincing proof of written agreement between the two regarding the payment of interest. Respondent testified

that although she accepted petitioner’s offer of loan amounting to P540,000.00, there was, nonetheless, no verbal

or written agreement for her to pay interest on the loan.22

Petitioner presented a handwritten promissory note dated 12 September 199423 wherein respondent purportedly

admitted owing petitioner "capital and interest." Respondent, however, explained that it was petitioner who made a

promissory note and she was told to copy it in her own handwriting; that all her transactions with the PNO were

subject to the approval of petitioner as comptroller of the PNO; that petitioner threatened to disapprove her

transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest; that being unaware of the law on interest and fearing that

petitioner would make good of his threats if she would not obey his instruction to copy the promissory note, she

copied the promissory note in her own handwriting; and that such was the same promissory note presented by

petitioner as alleged proof of their written agreement on interest.24 Petitioner did not rebut the foregoing

testimony. It is evident that respondent did not really consent to the payment of interest for the loan and that she

was merely tricked and coerced by petitioner to pay interest. Hence, it cannot be gainfully said that such

promissory note pertains to an express stipulation of interest or written agreement of interest on the loan between

petitioner and respondent.

Petitioner, nevertheless, claims that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that he and respondent agreed on

the payment of 7% rate of interest on the loan; that the agreed 7% rate of interest was duly admitted by

respondent in her testimony in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases he filed against respondent; that despite such

judicial admission by respondent, the RTC and the Court of Appeals, citing Article 1956 of the Civil Code, still held

that no interest was due him since the agreement on interest was not reduced in writing; that the application of

Article 1956 of the Civil Code should not be absolute, and an exception to the application of such provision should

be made when the borrower admits that a specific rate of interest was agreed upon as in the present case; and that

it would be unfair to allow respondent to pay only the loan when the latter very well knew and even admitted in the

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that there was an agreed 7% rate of interest on the loan.25

16

We have carefully examined the RTC Decision and found that the RTC did not make a ruling therein that petitioner

and respondent agreed on the payment of interest at the rate of 7% for the loan. The RTC clearly stated that

although petitioner and respondent entered into a valid oral contract of loan amounting to P540,000.00, they,

nonetheless, never intended the payment of interest thereon.26 While the Court of Appeals mentioned in its

Decision that it concurred in the RTC’s ruling that petitioner and respondent agreed on a certain rate of interest as

regards the loan, we consider this as merely an inadvertence because, as earlier elucidated, both the RTC and the

Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is not entitled to the payment of interest on the loan. The rule is that factual

findings of the trial court deserve great weight and respect especially when affirmed by the appellate court.27 We

found no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of both courts.

Petitioner’s reliance on respondent’s alleged admission in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that they had agreed

on the payment of interest at the rate of 7% deserves scant consideration. In the said case, respondent merely

testified that after paying the total amount of loan, petitioner ordered her to pay interest.28 Respondent did not

categorically declare in the same case that she and respondent made an express stipulation in writing as regards

payment of interest at the rate of 7%. As earlier discussed, monetary interest is due only if there was

anexpress stipulation in writing for the payment of interest.

There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or

written, regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the

payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as

indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the

Civil Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the

obligation may be silent on this point.

All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of

contractual obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In other

words, the two instances apply only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.29 The case at bar

involves petitioner’s claim for monetary interest.

Further, said compensatory interest is not chargeable in the instant case because it was not duly proven that

respondent defaulted in paying the loan. Also, as earlier found, no interest was due on the loan because there was

no written agreement as regards payment of interest.

Apropos the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the principle of solutio indebiti does not apply to the

instant case. Thus, he cannot be compelled to return the alleged excess amount paid by respondent as interest.30

Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation

therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti shall be applied. Article 2154 of the Civil Code

explains the principle of solutio indebiti. Said provision provides that if something is received when there is no right

to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In such a case, a

creditor-debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who then

has the right to demand the return of payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive such

payment becomes obligated to return the same. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient

principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.31 The principle of solutio

indebitiapplies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no

duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not

through liberality or some other cause.32 We have held that the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of

erroneous payment of undue interest.33

It was duly established that respondent paid interest to petitioner. Respondent was under no duty to make such

payment because there was no express stipulation in writing to that effect. There was no binding relation between

17

petitioner and respondent as regards the payment of interest. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since petitioner

received something when there was no right to demand it, he has an obligation to return it.

We shall now determine the propriety of the monetary award and damages imposed by the RTC and the Court of

Appeals.

Records show that respondent received a loan amounting to P540,000.00 from petitioner.34 Respondent issued two

checks with a total worth of P700,000.00 in favor of petitioner as payment of the loan.35 These checks were

subsequently encashed by petitioner.36 Obviously, there was an excess of P160,000.00 in the payment for the

loan. Petitioner claims that the excess of P160,000.00 serves as interest on the loan to which he was entitled. Aside

from issuing the said two checks, respondent also paid cash in the total amount of P175,000.00 to petitioner as

interest.37 Although no receipts reflecting the same were presented because petitioner refused to issue such to

respondent, petitioner, nonetheless, admitted in his Reply-Affidavit38 in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that

respondent paid him a total amount of P175,000.00 cash in addition to the two checks. Section 26 Rule 130 of the

Rules of Evidence provides that the declaration of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against

him. Aside from the amounts of P160,000.00 and P175,000.00 paid as interest, no other proof of additional

payment as interest was presented by respondent. Since we have previously found that petitioner is not entitled to

payment of interest and that the principle of solutio indebiti applies to the instant case, petitioner should return to

respondent the excess amount of P160,000.00 and P175,000.00 or the total amount of P335,000.00. Accordingly,

the reimbursable amount to respondent fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be reduced

fromP660,000.00 to P335,000.00.

As earlier stated, petitioner filed five (5) criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

In the said cases, the MeTC found respondent guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing five dishonored

checks to petitioner. Nonetheless, respondent’s conviction therein does not affect our ruling in the instant case. The

two checks, subject matter of this case, totaling P700,000.00 which respondent claimed as payment of

the P540,000.00 worth of loan, were not among the five checks found to be dishonored or bounced in the five

criminal cases. Further, the MeTC found that respondent made an overpayment of the loan by reason of the interest

which the latter paid to petitioner.39

Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered if the party underwent physical

suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social

humiliation and similar injury. Respondent testified that she experienced sleepless nights and wounded feelings

when petitioner refused to return the amount paid as interest despite her repeated demands. Hence, the award of

moral damages is justified. However, its corresponding amount of P300,000.00, as fixed by the RTC and the Court

of Appeals, is exorbitant and should be equitably reduced. Article 2216 of the Civil Code instructs that assessment

of damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case. This discretion is

limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably excessive as to indicate that it was the

result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.40 To our mind, the amount of P150,000.00 as moral

damages is fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the injury suffered by respondent.

Article 2232 of the Civil Code states that in a quasi-contract, such as solutio indebiti, exemplary damages may be

imposed if the defendant acted in an oppressive manner. Petitioner acted oppressively when he pestered

respondent to pay interest and threatened to block her transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest. This

forced respondent to pay interest despite lack of agreement thereto. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is

appropriate. The amount of P50,000.00 imposed as exemplary damages by the RTC and the Court is fitting so as to

deter petitioner and other lenders from committing similar and other serious wrongdoings.41

Jurisprudence instructs that in awarding attorney’s fees, the trial court must state the factual, legal or equitable

justification for awarding the same.42 In the case under consideration, the RTC stated in its Decision that the award

of attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the amount paid as interest by respondent to petitioner is reasonable and

moderate considering the extent of work rendered by respondent’s lawyer in the instant case and the fact that it

dragged on for several years.43 Further, respondent testified that she agreed to compensate her lawyer handling

18

the instant case such amount.44 The award, therefore, of attorney’s fees and its amount equivalent to 25% of the

amount paid as interest by respondent to petitioner is proper.

Finally, the RTC and the Court of Appeals imposed a 12% rate of legal interest on the amount refundable to

respondent computed from 3 March 1998 until its full payment. This is erroneous.

We held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45 that when an obligation, not constituting a loan or

forbearance of money is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the rate of

6% per annum. We further declared that when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final

and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether it is a loan/forbearance of money or not, shall be 12% per annum

from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

In the present case, petitioner’s obligation arose from a quasi-contract of solutio indebiti and not from a loan or

forbearance of money. Thus, an interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded as well

as on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees, to be computed from the time of the extra-judicial demand

on 3 March 1998,46 up to the finality of this Decision. In addition, the interest shall become 12% per annum from

the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71814, dated 16 December 2005, is

hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the amount of P660,000.00 as refundable amount of

interest is reduced to THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P335,000.00); (2) the amount

ofP300,000.00 imposed as moral damages is reduced to ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00); (3)

an interest of 6% per annum is imposed on the P335,000.00, on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees

to be computed from the time of the extra-judicial demand on 3 March 1998 up to the finality of this Decision; and

(4) an interest of 12% per annum is also imposed from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction. Costs

against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

 

In the present case, petitioner’s obligation arose from a quasi-contract of

 

solutio indebiti and notfrom a loan or forbearance of money. Thus, an interest of 6% per annumshould be imposed

onthe amount to be refunded as well as on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees, to becomputed from

the time of the extra-judicial demand on 3 March 1998 up to the finality of this Decision. In addition, the interest

shall become 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction.

DELICT

19

G.R. No. 129282.  November 29, 2001         DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-

ECCI), petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br.

20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.

The Case 

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the

annulment of the order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for

reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-

214.

 

The Facts 

On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an

information for estafa[2] against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the

amount of P608,532.46.  Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of

petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,

Branch 20, a complaint[3] against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages

with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction.  In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil

case on the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same

facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme

Court Circular No. 28-91.[4]

On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order[5] dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214.  On January 21,

1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[6] of the order.

On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order[7] granting respondent’s motion for reconsideration, thereby

recalling the dismissal of the case.

Hence, this petition.[8]

 

The Issues 

The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff’s failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in the

complaint is a ground to dismiss the case;[9] and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the

criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.

 

The Court’s Ruling

On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91[10] of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be

attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.  This circular was revised on

February 8, 1994[11] by extending the requirement to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial

agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

20

Respondent Villegas’ failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint did not violate Circular

No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and

the Court of Appeals.[12] Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason that the

complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the circular.[13]

On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries.  The first is the social injury

produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and

the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated

through indemnity which is civil in nature.[14]

Thus, “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."[15] This is the law governing the recovery of

civil liability arising from the commission of an offense.  Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage

caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.[16]

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the

criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,

provides that:

“(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense

charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,

reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.” [Emphasis

supplied]

Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that –

“After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted

until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.” [Emphasis supplied]

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil

Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal

action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the

civil action prior to the criminal action.[17]

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34

and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. “The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action

for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.  This does not include recovery of civil liability

under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which

may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation.”[18]

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

“Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.  It shall proceed

independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.  In no case, however, may

the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.”

21

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became

effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their

passage.  There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.[19]

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud commited against

respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation

as to its filing.

The Fallo   WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.  The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February 21, 1997.

[20]                No costs.

  

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (sec. 1-3)

22

      Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for

the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil

action prior to the criminal action.

    The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts

presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make

such reservation.

    When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate,

or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees

therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

    Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding

filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

    Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

    No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any

cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

    (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil

action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

    Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based

on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the

complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the

offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so

alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount

awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment

    Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated

with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial

of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and

criminal actions.

    Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate

civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.chan

robles virtual law library

    If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in

whatever state it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is

rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the civil action, the same

may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal

action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically

reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness

presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The

consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

    During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be

instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

23

    The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action

based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the

act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

    Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of

the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed

independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may

the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

 

G.R. No. 165496             February 12, 2007  HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,  vs.   EUNG WON

CHOI, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N                CARPIO MORALES, J.:

24

Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 20041 and September 28,

20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National

Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having

been drawn against insufficient funds.

Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.

Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to

which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of

dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.4

By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer

and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.6

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the

dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

 

By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to

prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the

appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest.8

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of

the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on

the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied,

he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for the following reasons:

1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully comply with

Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give the assurance

that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records.

2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e.,

motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition thereto, and the Municipal

[sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the petition (Sec.

2, Rule 42, ibid.).

3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an uncertified and

illegible mere machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10

In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing his petition.

The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified, such as a petition for review before the

CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

25

Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,

verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true

and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon

"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned

pleading.12(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence, hence, he

chose to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct of my own

personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.

On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and

construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.

A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two

given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either one’s own

personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that

either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is

more than sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a

construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives

standing alone.15

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleader’s liking, but is dependent on

thesurrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal

knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.

As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein

the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the

court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not

have affirmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition16 before the CA

that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner)

was not present during the conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.

Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of

mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an

oath18to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and

correct and not merely speculative.19

This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and certification and enunciating that

obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter

disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 While the

requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule can only

be justified by the attending circumstances of the case.21

To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the

rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing

enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.

26

On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition – that the petition was not accompanied by copies of

certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e.,

Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC

February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) – petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial to his

appeal.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil

aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same

Demurrer.

Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated documents,

save for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.

The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true

copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22

A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or certified true copies attached

as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and the

March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003

RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner

later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.

While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order

was already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different order, however. It

was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to

his Reply to respondent’s Comment.

This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner

attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.

Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was

mandated to submit them in the required form.23

In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is

discernible thereunder and is well settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to

warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus

enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application

of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with

impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under

justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true

that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy

administration of justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)

As to the third reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition – failure to implead the People of the

Philippines as a party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he having

appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil

action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action

for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In

27

a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action.The

second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the

defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and

executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double

jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the

acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision

acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real

parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.28

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis

of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.29 At

that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the

civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.30

If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is

not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful

act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any.31

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not

carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only

preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)

the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was

acquitted.32

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in

the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the

court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a

disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court

may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil

aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the

same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not

follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the

demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an

acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect

of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on

the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may

arise did not exist.36

28

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.

Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder

representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however,

that the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are

factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court

to resolve the same.

Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when

the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when respondent orally

opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the

case continue.

Petitioner’s position is tenuous.

Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court

necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve.

One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law

is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the

initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.39

As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the

nature of the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the grant of the

demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity

in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption

against it.41

This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file

the demurrer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED

to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the

civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

 

G.R. No. 177960         January 29, 2009       JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,  vs.  PRETZY-LOU

SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N                Tinga, J.:

29

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25

April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong,

Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office,

Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence

resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the

information reads:

That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate

number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of

Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379

driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus

causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie

Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of

Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R.

Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned

and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for

leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by

petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene]

R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend

the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to

amend was considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested

its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to

Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is

criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless

imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the

Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the

prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and

circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence

that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.

x x x x

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as

charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution

30

never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would

have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who

was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that

a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the

allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The

alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical

certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged

damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect

and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to

establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries

to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the

expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say,

she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court

could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.

x x x x

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that the

swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the

accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked carefully into the

sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the

accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit

"7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into

the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out

together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the

truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was

this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

x x x x

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of

all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator

of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails

to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his

behalf.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby

acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and

ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case

was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to

observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as

well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the

case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of

31

every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by

the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated

by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC

gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The

RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment of

acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the

RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The

dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. The

case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the

order17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.

01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled

that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction

of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v.

Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical

injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the

fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding

penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses

involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00.

As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount

ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision

dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is

determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec.

36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the

Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It

reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,

felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for

reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-

level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could

not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information

alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

32

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to

the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004

charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical

injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have

been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears

from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense

was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend

the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed

to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating

circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which,

had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period

toprision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in

the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in

its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical

injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or

more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides

that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary

means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in

its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the

definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit

(dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision

correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months

and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the

law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application

thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had

already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over

criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the

amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It

explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the

jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the

MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan,

Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the

ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed

after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the

evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting

in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal

case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in

33

double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the

same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual

findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside

the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the

accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process,

thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its

discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and

in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that

the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on

facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by

the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of

Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil

liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on

the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the

case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the

acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that

the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based

upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed

extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the

civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce

evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil

liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet

adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence

for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to

evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence

on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter,

the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35

A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission

imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the

MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and

that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner

who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the

cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the

damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the

cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of

reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on

the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated

25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the

34

Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence

and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

QUASI-DELICT

February 2, 1924            G.R. No. L-19495           HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,  vs. FRANK

SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.

35

Palma and Leuterio for plaintiffs-appellants.                       Mariano Alisangco for defendant-appellant.

FACTS:     

The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the

business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to

another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs

from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford

automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having

reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s

license, but had some experience in driving. The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in

Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear

so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of about half kilometer, the car left

the road and went down a steep embankment. The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down

under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina, received serious

injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also suffered nervous

breakdown from which she has not fully recovered at the time of trial. The complaint was filed about a year and a

half after and alleges that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and

negligence of the chauffeur.

The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the defendant’s breach of the contract of carriage

and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further

found that the breach of contact was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in

damages.

ISSUE:       Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach                       of contract was not due to a

fortuitous event?

 

RULING:    Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the contract of

carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their

destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his

obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads: “No one shall be liable for

events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in

which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.”

As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an

essential element of a caso fortuito. In the present

case, this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to

adverse road conditions which could have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused

either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuitos

El Cano vs Hill

Facts: Defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, killed Agapito. He was apprehended

and charged appropriately before CFI. He acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of “lack of

intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” Thereupon, the parents of Agapito, filed a complaint for recovery of damages

against the defendant and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,

36

for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: first,

the civil action is barred by the acquittal of Reginald, and; second, the father cannot be held liable for the act of his

son because the latter is already married at the time of the commission, thus, is already emancipated.

 

Issues:

Whether or not quasi-delict is restricted to negligence and cannot apply to voluntary acts or omissions producing

injury ( or felony)

Whether or not a father may be held liable for the act of his emancipated child constituting quasi-delict

 

Held: No. To repeat the Barredo case, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,

whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from

criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ although it mentions the word

“negligence” but according to Justice Bocobo it must be construed according to “the spirit that giveth lift- rather

than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.” Criminal

prosecution and civil action are two different things. On the second issue (obsolete), Yes, the father may be held

liable. While it is true that marriage of a child emancipates him from the parental authority of his parents, what

matters really is whether or not such minor is completely emancipated as defined by law. In the case at bar, his

emancipation is only partial for as provided by law he can sue and be sued in court with the assistance of his

parents, he cannot manage his own properties without the approval of his parents, and third as in the facts, he

relies for subsistence from his parents.

 

 

 

Virata vs. Ochoa

81 SCRA 472

Facts: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Ave., Pasay City by a

passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victorio Ochoa. Borilla was prosecuted

37

for homicide through reckless imprudence. At the hearing of the criminal case the private prosecutor made a

reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver. Later the private prosecutor withdrew the

reservation and actively took part in the prosecution of the criminal case. Still later the heirs of Virata reserved their

right to institute a separate civil action. On July 19, 1976 the heirs of Virata commenced a civil action in the Court of

First Instance of Cavite for damages based oa(sic) on quasi-delict against the driver Borilla and the owner of the

jeepney Ochoa. On Sept. 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City rendered a decision acquitting

Borilla on the ground that he caused the injury by mere accident. On Jan. 31, 1977 the Court of First Instance of

Cavite, dismissed the civil action for damages upon motion of the defendants.

Held: “it is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised

Penal Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article

2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

x x x x x

“The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was

decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the

owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to be

enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 isquasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act, or omission, punishable by law are two different sources of

obligation.”

 

 

 

 G.R. No. 141986.  July 11, 2002                  NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V.

ORBESO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N          PANGANIBAN, J.:

Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment acquitting the accused based

on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or

38

from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended party?  Our short answer is: from the time the offended

party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a

consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the

February 17, 2000 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 133) in Criminal Case No. 96-

246.  The Order reads in full as follows:

“Opposition to Notice of Appeal being well-taken, as prayed for, the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of

Appeal are denied due course.”[3]

The foregoing Order effectively prevented petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of the criminal proceedings in

which the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The factual antecedents, as narrated by petitioner in its Memorandum,[4] are as follows:

“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246

acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were

present during such promulgation.

‘2.01.1 The private prosecutor represented the interests of the petitioner who was the private offended party in

Criminal Case No. 96-246.’

“2.02 On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment.

“2.03 On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the

Judgment.

‘2.03.1 Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29

November 1999, a Monday.’

“2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court

denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

“2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment.  On

the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.

“2.06 On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the

private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice

of Appeal x x x.”[5]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal[6] and Amended Notice of Appeal.[7] It

accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final,

39

because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period.  The

15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.

Hence, this Petition.[8]

The Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

“Whether the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or move for a reconsideration of, or

otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action should be reckoned from the date of

promulgation or from the date of such party’s actual receipt of a copy of such judgment considering that any party

appealing or challenging such judgment would necessarily need a copy thereof, which is in writing and which

clearly express the factual and legal bases thereof to be able to file an intelligent appeal or other challenge.”[9]

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

Preliminary Matter:

Mode of Review

Petitioner brought this case to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court.  The Petition seeks to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order of the RTC which, in effect, disallowed

petitioner’s appeal of its Judgment.

An ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) is “taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court

which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse

party.”[10] Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.

A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the

Supreme Court.  However, the questioned Order is not a “decision or final order” from which an appeal may be

taken.   The Rules of Court states explicitly:

“No appeal may be taken from:

x x x  x x x     x x x

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;”[11]

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy that petitioner should have used, in view of the

last paragraph of the same provision which states:

“In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an

appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”[12]

In turn, Rule 65, Section 1, provides:

“SEC. 1.  Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

40

excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and

praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and

granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”[13] (Italics supplied)

By availing itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the Petition merits an outright dismissal.

[14] Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90[15] (hereinafter “Circular”) is unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an

inappropriate mode of appeal thus:

“4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or

inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.”[16]

The same Circular provides that petitioner’s counsel has the duty of using the proper mode of review.

“e) Duty of counsel – It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order

promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of

fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to

follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in

compliance may well be fatal to his client’s cause.” [17]

This Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which

rule a petition should fall.  It has likewise warned lawyers to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed

by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.[18]

On this score alone, the Petition could have been given short shrift and outrightly dismissed.  Nevertheless, due to

the novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching effects, the Court will deal with the arguments raised by

petitioner and lay down the rule on this matter.  As an exception to Circular 2-90, it will treat the present

proceedings as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Main Issue:

Timeliness of Appeal

Petitioner contends that an appeal by the private offended party under the Rules of Criminal Procedure must be

made within 15 days from the time the appealing party receives a copy of the relevant judgment.  It cites Section 6,

Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice

of the judgment or order appealed from.  This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a

motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served

upon the accused or his counsel.” (Italics supplied)

The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for the reckoning period within which an

appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.

It is petitioner’s assertion that “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy of the judgment x x x

to intelligently examine and consider the judgment from which an appeal will be taken.”[19] Thus, it concludes that

the 15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted from the time the losing party actually receives a

copy of the decision or order.  Petitioner ratiocinates that it “could not be expected to capture or memorize all the

material details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof.”[20] It likewise poses the question: “why require

all proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of utilizing

these written [documents]?”[21]

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We clarify.  Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing

an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment.  In People v. Tamani,[22] the Court was confronted

with the question of when to count the period within which the accused must appeal the criminal

conviction.  Answered the Court:

“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the

decision was allegedly served on appellant’s counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word ‘promulgation’

in section 6 should be construed as referring to ‘judgment’, while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as referring

to ‘order’.”[23]

The interpretation in that case was very clear.  The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of

promulgation of the decision. Text writers[24] are in agreement with this interpretation.

In an earlier case,[25] this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:

“It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a notice to that effect

within fifteen days from the date the decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done

by the court either by announcing the judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the

judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.”[26]

Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in those

instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the

civil aspect only.  Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the

cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party.  We answer in the negative.

No Need to Reserve

Independent Civil Action

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving

independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones.  Thus, the civil actions

referred to in Articles 32,[27] 33,[28] 34[29] and 2176[30] of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and

independent” of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.  Here are some direct consequences of such

revision and omission:

1.  The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal

prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2.  The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not

extinguish the right to bring such action.

3.  The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.

Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil

liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.  In fact, even if a civil

action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party

may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such

remaining civil interest therein.[31] By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal

case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.

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And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime -- the

civil liability ex delicto.

Period for Perfecting an Appeal

Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure declares:

“Section 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the

judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended

from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has

been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.”

This provision is similar, though not identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules invoked by petitioner.  The

difference is that the former makes clear that promulgation refers to “judgment,” and notice refers to “final order

appealed from.”

Taken on its face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal, whether by the accused or by the

private offended party, must be counted from and understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation

of the judgment.  This provision mentions the presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in certain

instances, and/or the counsel or representative of the accused.  Petitioner is correct in observing that the private

offended party is not required to be present during the promulgation; in fact, the said party is not even mentioned

in the provision.

For clarity, the 2000 Rule on the promulgation of judgment is quoted in full hereunder: 

“Section 6. Promulgation of judgment – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused

and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment

may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the

province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

“If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the

executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon

request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to

accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial

court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for

bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

“The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and

counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in

absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known

address.

“In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the

promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his

last known address or thru his counsel.

“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall

lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen

(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court

to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he

proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)

days from notice.”[32]

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Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the Offended Party

Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is

not even required to be present during the proceedings.  Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of

the latter, it will be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party.  It is but logical to

begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its

promulgation to the accused.  It is only through notice to the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it

is only from that date that the complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case.  Till then, the

remedy of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.

We clarify also that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited to appeals of judgments

rendered by regional trial and inferior courts.  In higher courts, there is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6

Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.  In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a decision is

promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk of court, who then causes copies to be served

upon the parties or their counsels.[33] Hence, the presence of either party during promulgation is not required.

The period to appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, cannot be applied

equally to both accused-appellant and private offended party.  Further bolstering this argument is the second

sentence of this provision which mandates as follows:

“x x x. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or

reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his

counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.”[34] (Italics supplied)

The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the reglementary period of

appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence.  However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in

relation to the accused.  This conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the period to

appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the accused is given notice of the order

overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new trial.  Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the

appeal was taken by the accused, not by the private offended party.

Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those covering the

civil aspects of criminal judgments.  If these rules are not completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the

latter.  As correctly pointed out by petitioner, “[t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action

is, for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal cannot affect the criminal

aspect thereof.”[35] Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.

In People v. Santiago,[36] the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the

State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising

therefrom.  If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal

aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general.  As a rule,

only the solicitor general may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.  The private offended party or

complainant may not undertake such appeal.

However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.  As

such, the present appeal undertaken by the private offended party relating to the civil aspect of the criminal

judgment can no longer be considered a criminal action per se, wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or

omission punishable by law.  Instead, it becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.

Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to the Court of

Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction.  Thus, it should be properly

done by filing a notice of appeal.[37] An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of

44

the judgment or final order appealed from.[38] For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting

of the period to appeal from the “promulgation” of the judgment to the accused.

In sum, we hold that an offended party’s appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be

filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from.  To implement this holding, trial

courts are hereby directed to cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended

parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors.  This step will enable them to appeal the civil

aspects under the appropriate circumstances.

General Rule Not Applicable to the Present Case

Having laid down the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now determine its application to the

present controversy.  In short, was petitioner’s appeal timely filed?

If we were to follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January 31, 2000 was on time,

considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its counsel only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion

for Reconsideration filed on November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.

However, a peculiar circumstance in this case militates against this conclusion.  Here, the private prosecutor

himself was present during the promulgation of the Judgment.  This fact is undeniable, as petitioner itself admits his

presence in its Memorandum as follows:

“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial Court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246

acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were

present during such promulgation.”[39] (Italics supplied)

Further, private prosecutor[40] even signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29, 1999, a signature which in

unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he represents -- herein petitioner.

Having been present during the promulgation and having been furnished a copy of the judgment at the time,

private offended party was in effect actually notified of the Judgment, and from that time already had knowledge of

the need to appeal it.  Thus, the very raison d'être of this Decision is already satisfied: the filing of an appeal by the

said party, only after being notified of the Judgment.  As argued by respondent, “did not the public and private

prosecutors acquire notice of Judgment at its promulgation because of their presence?  Notice of the judgment may

not be defined in any other way x x x.”[41]

Petitioner stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party.  It harps on the fact that -- based on

constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential edicts -- judgments must be in writing and with the factual and

legal bases thereof clearly expressed.

Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the Judgment, for “the parties

would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof which] they can review or refer to from time to

time.”[42] To rule otherwise would supposedly deny them due process.

We clarify.  If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the period for appeal would

never have run.  True, no law requires the offended party to attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of

the decision on that date.  But fiction must yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was

already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a

timely appeal be filed.

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Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief statement of its intention to

elevate the trial court’s Decision to the CA.  There was no reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after

actually knowing the adverse Judgment during the promulgation.[43] Parties and their counsels are presumed to be

vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to

technicalities.

Appeal Not Part of Due Process

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.  It is merely a

procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law

authorizing its exercise.[44] Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with.[45] The failure of petitioner to

file a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus rendering the Judgment final and executory, is not a denial of

due process.  It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.

It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial

technicalities that can be discarded.[46] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[47] “The rationale

for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate.  These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of

appealed cases.  In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by

appellants with greater fidelity.  Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.”[48]

Neither has petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.  Anyone seeking exemption from the

application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally

meritorious instances warranting such deviation.[49]

A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed, for they are

indispensable interdictions against needless delay and for an orderly discharge of judicial business.[50] After

judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party.  Just as the losing party has the right

to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party also have the correlative right to enjoy the

finality of the resolution of the case.[51] This principle becomes even more essential in view of the fact that the

criminal aspect has already been adjudicated.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.            SO

ORDERED.

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