political culture, social capital and...
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Political Culture, Social Capital and Democracy
Stephen Fisher
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc
I Political Culture
I Social Capital
I Evidence for the effects of Political Culture and Social Capitalon Democracy
I Conclusion
Political Culture Defined
Political Culture refers to the pattern of beliefs and assumptionsordinary people have towards the world, as these pertain topolitics. (Tepperman)
I Not the same as ideology, but more diffuse and less goaldirected.
I Relatively stable over time and reproduced by politicalsocialization.
Long thought to be important for the functioning of states.
I E.g. Gibbon thought the main reason for fall of the Romanempire was a decline in civic virtue.
Typology of Political Culture fromThe Civic Culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) I
I Political culture is made up of cognitive, affective andevaluative orientations towards the political system.
I Three basic kinds of political cultureI Parochial: No cognitive orientations toward the political
systemI Subject: Cognitive orientations toward the output aspects of
the systemI Participant: Cognitive orientations toward both the input and
output aspects of the system
I These cultures are congruent with traditional, authoritarianand democratic systems respectively.
I Congruence is indicated by positive affective and evaluativeorientations in the appropriate areas:
I there is a scale from alienation, through apathy to allegiance.
I The Civic Culture is an allegiant participant political culture.
Typology of Political Culture fromThe Civic Culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) II
I Pioneering work in cross-national survey research on fivecountries characterized them as:
I Italy: AlienatedI Mexico: Alienated and AspirationI Germany: Political detachment and subject competenceI US: Participant Civic CultureI Britain: Deferential Civic Culture
I Falls short of making a claim that political culture causesdemocratic stability, but says . . .
I “A stable and effective democratic government . . . dependsupon the orientations that people have to the politicalprocess—upon the political culture.”
American Exceptionalism
Almond and Verba’s results concur with a tradition pointing to aexistence of a particularly democratic political culture in the US.Other examples include:Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America)
- Democracy in America is successful because of a participatoryculture and a belief in equality.
Seymour Martin Lipset (Continental Divide, 1963)
I Canadian culture is more statist, deferential to leaders,collectivist and conservative
I US is more independent, distrustful of government,individualistic, liberal and progressive.
I Reasons for the difference are historicalI American Revolution led to a migration of British loyalists
northward and a divergence in political history.
Trends in Political Culture
Norris (Critical Citizens, 1999) argues that there has beendeclining trust in government and people are less satisfied with theway democracy works in their country in developed countries inrecent decades.
But people still think that democracy is the best form ofgovernment.
And Norris (2011) argues that there is really no systematic trend insatisfaction with democracy
People less likely to think politicians care: Dalton (2014)An Example: Do Politicians Care?
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 20150
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Canada
USA
W. Germany Sweden
Source: ANES, GES, Sofres, and CES.
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/daltonpresentation.pdf
Declining confidence in parliaments in affluent societies:Dalton and Welzel (2014)
Changes in Trust in Parliament in Affluent Democracies (WVS)
Australia
Belgium Canada
Denmark
France
W. Germany
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Dutch
Norway Sweden
UK
USA
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Con
fiden
ce -
- Tim
e 2
(cir
ca 2
010)
Confidence -- Time 1 (circa 1980)
Source: WVS 1981 and wave 6 (2010) or 5 (2005).
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/daltonpresentation.pdf
Political trust matters in party because it affects policy supportacross various domains (Hetherington and Husser, AJPS, 2012)
Correlates of political culture; back to Norris
Norris argues that institutional confidence is influenced by,
I extent of political rights and civil liberties
I electoral system
I centralization of the state
I economic development
I being a supporter of the governing party
I some socio-demographic characteristics
Dalton and Welzel (2014) The Civic Culture Transformed:From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens
Does civic culture underpin civic participation?John et al. (Pol Stud, 2011) consider whether different forms ofcivic participation are linked to the kinds of social attitudesexpected by civic culture theory.
The following table shows that:
I People who lobby their politicians (individually or collectively)are less trusting of institutions and less likely to think those intheir neighbourhood would act to solve a social problem (lowneighbourhood social norms).
I Fondness for and identification with your neighbourhoodincreases participation.
I i.e. you are more likely to do something about a local problemif you care about your neighbourhood and think yourneighbours and local government are unlikely to do anythingabout it.
I This is somewhat at odds with civic culture theory but makessense.
Social CapitalConcept goes back to Coleman and Bourdieu.According to Putnam (Bowling Alone), Social Capital . . .
I is defined as “The features of social life—networks, norms,and trust—that enable participants to act together moreeffectively to pursue shared objectives.”
I is an important factor influencing the quality of democracy,economic performance, health, etc.
I comes in different varietiesI Bonding: within groupsI Bridging: between groups
I is not always a good thinge.g. power elites have high levels of social capital
I is measured by a mixture ofI public engagement (e.g. voting, political action)I inter-personal association (e.g. socializing, volunteering)I inter-personal trust
I Note that there is an important debate as to whether trust issupposed to flow from associational membership. The reversecausal direction seems more plausible though.
Trends in Social Capital
Putnam argues that social capital has been declining in the USmainly due to the demise of the peculiarly civic war-timegeneration, but also TV and some other factors.
Andersen et al. (ASR, 2006) consider time spent in civicassociation activity (e.g. community, political, church or tradeunion meetings).
I Stable or increasing in Canada, NL and UK.
I Decreasing among US women but not US men, even aftercontrolling for social characteristics and time in otheractivities.
I Maybe due to decline in state support.
I Casts doubt on the generational replacement argument forsocial capital decline in US.
Declining trust in individuals and institutions in the US:Paxton (APSR, 1999)
Based on data from 1974 to 1994
No trend in levels of social interaction in the US: Paxton(APSR, 1999)
Based on data from 1974 to 1994
Age, Period and Cohort effects on Social Capital in theUS: Schwadel and Stout (2012) I
1. “informal association with neighbors declined across periodswhile informal association with friends outside of theneighborhood increased across birth cohorts
2. formal association was comparatively stable with theexception of relatively high levels of formal association amongthe early 1920s and early 1930s birth cohorts
3. trust declined considerably across both periods and cohorts,though the oldest cohorts are less trusting than those born inthe 1920s through the 1940s”
So a complex pattern, and not the systematic decline acrosscohorts suggested by Putnam.
Nonetheless still some worrying trends for social capital theorists.
Figure 1: Estimated Age, Period and Cohort Effects on Frequency of Evenings With Neighbors, Frequency of Evenings With Friends Outside the Neighborhood and Frequency of Evenings With Relatives
3.03.23.43.63.84.04.24.44.64.85.0
20-2
425
-29
30-3
435
-39
40-4
445
-49
50-5
455
-59
60-6
465
-69
70-7
475
-79
80+
Even
ings W
ith
(a) Age
neighbors
friends
relatives
3.03.23.43.63.84.04.24.44.64.85.0
1972
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
1991
-95
1996
-00
2001
-05
2006
-10
Even
ings W
ith
(b) Period
neighbors
friends
relatives
3.03.23.43.63.84.04.24.44.64.85.0
1892
1897
1902
1907
1912
1917
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
Even
ings W
ith
(c) Cohort
neighbors
friends
relatives
Note: Figure graphs results in Table 1. Height of each chart equivalent to 1.0 standard deviations in the measure of evenings with neighbors, 1.3 standard deviations in the measure of evenings with friends, and 1.2 standard deviations in the measure of evenings with relatives.
242 Social Forces 91(1)
at Radcliffe Science Library, B
odleian Library on August 29, 2012
http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/D
ownloaded from
Figure 2: Estimated Age, Period and Cohort Effects on View That People Are Helpful, People Are Fair and People Can Be Trusted
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
20-2
425
-29
30-3
435
-39
40-4
445
-49
50-5
455
-59
60-6
465
-69
70-7
475
-79
80+
Prob
abilit
y
(a) Age
peoplehelpful
people fair
people canbe trusted
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
1972
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
1991
-95
1996
-00
2001
-05
2006
-10
Prob
abilit
y
(b) Period
peoplehelpful
people fair
people canbe trusted
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
1892
1897
1902
1907
1912
1917
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
Prob
abilit
y
(c) Cohort
peoplehelpful
people fair
people canbe trusted
Note: Figure graphs results in Table 2.
246 Social Forces 91(1)
at Radcliffe Science Library, B
odleian Library on August 29, 2012
http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/D
ownloaded from
International Trends in Social Capital
(Cabinet Office PIU/Strategy Unit report, late 1990s)
I Declining: US; Australia.
I Stable or ambiguous: UK (high); NL; Sweden; France (low).
I Increasing: Japan; Germany (from low base).
Hall (BJPS, 1999) shows that in Britain while there has been nodecline in associational membership there has been a decline intrust since the 1950s.
Group membership: quality not quantity
I Skocpol (2003) and Putnam (2002) argue that importantchange is from membership of democratic organizations tocheque book membership.
I Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (AnRevPolSci 2005) argue thatmembership of voluntary organisations is a poor foundationfor good citizenship because:
I People join homogeneous groupsI Civic participation does not lead to political participationI Not all groups promote democratic valuesI Groups don’t teach what good citizens need to know:
democracy is messy, inefficient and conflict-ridden
Effects of Political Culture and Social Capital
General Hypothesis: Culture/social capital influences politicaland social outcomes, especially the quality of democracy,governance, or economic performance.
Those who believe in the importance of culture/social capital donot all agree on what aspects of culture are relevant and whatoutcomes they influence and how.
General Problem: Which is the correct causal direction?
Some want to argue both ways
e.g. culture influences growth and growth influences culture.
Effects on Democracy: Muller and Seligson (APSR, 1994)
Muller and Seligson develop a more complex model that issummarized by the figure below.
Note the temporal ordering and that the absence of an arrowmeans there was insufficient evidence for an association. So mainconclusions are:
I Support for gradual reform (as opposed to the status-quo orrevolution) is correlated with the level of democracy, i.e.political culture is relevant
I The democratic stability has an impact on inter-personal trust
I Otherwise no evidence for association between culture anddemocracy in either direction. (Fig 4).
Effects of Social Capital on Democracy: PaxtonPaxton (ASR, 2002) finds evidence from her cross-lagged panelstudy that social capital influences the quality of democracy anddemocracy influences social capital.
Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit I
Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit II
Central Argument:
1. Trendless fluctuations in system support (not decline)
2. Satisfaction with democratic performance generally lower thandemocratic aspirations (the Democratic Deficit)
3. Gap is due to:I growing public expecations (from education)I negative media coverageI falling government performance
4. but it is ameliorated by income and social trust
5. the democratic deficit reduces political participation (contraryto John et al. (2011)) and voluntary law compliance (i.e.more alienation than radicalisation).
6. democratic aspirations increase democratisation
Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit III
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Remarks on Norris (2011) Democratic Deficit
I Table 11.3 uses temporal ordering but does not control forprior levels of democracy
I The dependent variable is referred to as ‘democractization’but is a measure of the average level of democracy between1995-2008, rather than a measure of change
I So the correlations could be due to endogeneity problems
Dalton and Welzel (2014): Assertive not allegiant cultureimproves democracy
Note different dependent variable from Norris and no economiccontrols in Lagged DV model
Satisfaction with Democracy in rich countries I504
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Left/Right
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Redistribution
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European Integration
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Social Lifestyle
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Immigration
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Environmental Protection
Figure 5. Satisfaction with democracy as conditional relationship between policy distances and interest in politics.Notes: Black lines represent predicted values. Grey lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
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Source: Stecker and Tausendpfund, EJPR 2016.
Level of interest matters more than degree of representation.
Satisfaction with Democracy in rich countries IIReher shows that as well as policy matching voters’ preferences(policy representation), people also care about whether elites(politicians and the media) are talking about what the voters careabout (priority congruence).
coefficients from all 27 countries. Although we cannot strictly compare the coefficients andtheir standard errors across countries, this figure provides a first indication of how thestrength of the congruence-satisfaction link varies and whether this is related to the qualityand age of democracy. We see that priority congruence and satisfaction are positivelyassociated in most countries; the negative coefficients in Romania and Latvia are insignifi-cant (cf. Appendix B). The fitted lines suggest that the relationship is stronger at higherlevels of democracy and governance and at increasing length of democratic rule, providingtentative support for the hypotheses.
Explaining cross-national variation with multilevel regression analysis
For a more rigorous test of the relationships indicated in Figure 1, I construct random-slopemultilevel ordered logistic regression models (Table 1), which estimate the cross-nationalvariance of the intercept as well as of the coefficient of priority congruence across countries.Since the effect of priority congruence on satisfaction might vary with the average satis-faction level, I also estimate the covariance of the two random components.
First, I estimate the relationship between priority congruence and democratic satisfac-tion across the EU countries without including any interaction terms. The results in Table 1indicate that, across the EU, priority congruence has a positive and significant (p < 0.0005)effect on satisfaction with democracy (model 1). All control variables, except age, also havesignificant coefficients. Figure 2 illustrates that the predicted probabilities of being very orfairly satisfied increase with higher congruence, whereas the probabilities of being fairly orvery dissatisfied decrease. The underlying histogram indicates the distribution of prioritycongruence.
The variance estimate of the slope of priority congruence in model 1 suggests that theeffect of congruence on satisfaction varies quite substantially across countries. The average
Figure 1. Relationship between the quality and age of democracy and the effect of priority congruence onsatisfaction with democracy.Notes: The effects of priority congruence are log-odds coefficients from within-country ordered logisticregressions (cf. Appendix B).
168 STEFANIE REHER
© 2014 European Consortium for Political Research
Source: Reher, EJPR 2014.
Both policy congruence and perceptions of responsiveness higher inolder better quality democracies.
Conclusion
I Political Culture is about attitudes and orientations towardsthe political system
I Social Capital is about social interaction and trust
I They are different but there is evidence that Social Capitalaffects Political Culture
I There is debate about whether (the positive aspects) of bothare declining
I There are claims that (certain kinds of) each lead to betterquality democracy, but they are difficult to test rigorously