polarization of social studies in textbooks in pakistan

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Polarization of Social Studies in Textbooks in Pakistan December 2010

SAN Analysis

Polarization of Social Studies in Textbooks

in Pakistan

DECEMBER

2010

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SAN Analysis

Polarization of Social Studies in Textbooks in Pakistan

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Education is universally viewed as the penultimate social panacea, bridging the

information deficit gap between deferent segments of a nation state. Such ideas drive

the pervasive machine of educational reform, since educating its citizens is seen as a

cure-all for a nation's economic and moral woes. Politicians also use education as a

rallying cry, with curriculum design geared to guide a country into realms of

enlightenment. At the same time, education can also be used as a tool-kit to influence

minds and mould attitudes, sometimes in the form of a return to traditional values, or as

a pretext of 'saving the children from degenerate cultural influences'. In a polarized lens,

education policies may encourage social change or may conversely take the syllabus

'back to the basics' to recapture the past glories of bygone eras, in order to conserve

politically motivated status quos. These different rationales do not necessarily exist in

isolation, since such nuanced agendas may co exist with more banal educational

policies, driven by social, religious, and economic cross-purposes.

Unfortunately, educational reform based on narrow interpretations of dogma or the

perpetuation of unequal power relations can take many different unintended or

intended trajectories, radicalization being just one. If the presumption is accepted that

education can change a nation's ethos, then a distortion of educational policy should

logically have the ability to disrupt the thought processes of the students, especially in a

post colonial society. This is because post colonial societies and newly emergent states

usually struggle between a need to preserve a heritage which has often been a

motivating cause of their creation, and change from outside which is often seen as

imposition of a colonizer's thought processes (Saigol, 2009). This urgently felt need of

inculcating a sense of collective identity, to protect the fledgling nation state from forces

which are perceived to threaten that identity, often creates an acute insecurity. This

tension is usually acutely felt in educational discourse, curriculums, theories

and institutional practices in such states.

Social sciences are much more vulnerable to this pressure to create a particular

discourse than the so called hard sciences, which need a tangible result to prove or

discredit a hypothesis. Social sciences on the other hand can be based on a variety of

interpretive discourses, since they tend to be more subjective. At the same time they are

critical, since they are at the center of social conflicts and the expression of cultural

confrontations by competing groups and classes in society (ibid). As such, the group

whose knowledge becomes dominant has the ability to control the thought processes of

the others through an ascendant ideological state apparatus of education. Since society

is forever evolving, social knowledge is always open to flux, and can remain contested

and open to change or manipulation. Thus, depending upon the hegemony of a

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particular group, the educational tool-kit can change accordingly, and does evolve over

time to the different environmental forces 'tugging' it in particular directions.

Evolution of Pakistan's Curricula

Pakistan started out with a narrow technical base, and thus with the prevailing ideology

of development being the goal, a large number of technical institutes, for example the

Habib, Dawood and Government Polytechnic Institutes were established. These

institutions enjoyed many incentives like massive tax holidays (Saigol, 2003). This

development oriented worldview also found expression in the curriculum of the 1950s,

which tended to focus on nationalism perceived in futuristic and Modernist terms

(ibid). Rather than a tangible foe, the enemies were "ignorance, backwardness,

parochialism, corruption, black marketing, superstition and lack of industry" (The Sharif

Report on education, p.116). At the same time the focus was more outward looking as

well, since Pakistan was expected to compete on par with the comity of nations. This

was the vision of the government of the day:

"…But narrow nationalism in the modern world is not enough; and if we gave the child

only this, we would be doing him a disservice. Nations are a part of one another, and

none stands alone. Pakistan is in a particular position of having cultural, historical and

spiritual ties with the Middle East, Europe and North America. This rich heritage is

itself a national asset and provides an ideal starting point for teaching international

understanding and a realisation of our membership in a comity of nations.' (Speeches

and Statements of Field Marshall Mohd. Ayub Khan: Pakistan Publications, 1961, p. 61).

Ayub Khan was himself a proponent of such reform; this is illustrated by his comments

that 'when nationalism, in its extreme form, takes charge, human reasoning gets second

place' (Saigol, 1995, p. 243-347). This perception was conducive to producing a much

more forward looking curriculum than would appear later, emphasizing

multiculturalism ad recognizing the tempering effects of humanity on ideology.

The succeeding state of insecurity in the 1960s and the 70s, culminated in Zia ul Haq's

efforts to reform the curriculum according to a particular worldview; this radically

altered the curriculum, particularly social sciences. Zia's educational policy of 1979

states that:

"'The highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to

reorganizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an

ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger

generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society

according to Islamic tenets' (Saigol, 1994).

Thus, curriculum revision committees were set into motion to marginalize what would

be conceived as disruptive forces of parochialism and religious diversion. The Afghan

jihad also precipitated a mindset in which the most militarized entities were most

useful, which shifted the emphasis towards a more martial ideology of an exclusionary

Sunni state much on the model of Iran as a Shia one (Zafar, 1986, p. 4-7). For example,

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the following example from a textbook of Pakistan Studies produced in 1986 shows the

levels of historical distortion:

'During the 12th Century the shape of Pakistan was more or less the same as it is today...

Under the Khiljis, Pakistan moved further south-ward to include a greater part of

Central India and the Deccan...In retrospect it may be said that during the 16th century

'Hindustan' disappeared and was completely absorbed in Pakistan" (Hoodbhoy,

1991). This inward looking view was also projected onto the hard sciences; in an official

conference called in Zia era papers were read on the harnessing of Djinns to create

alternative energy sources, chemical compositions of Djinns, measuring the temperature

of Hell, calculating the formula for savab (blessing), measuring the Angle of God, speed

of Heaven and so on' (National education policy, 1988). Self evidently, this polarized

thinking exerted greater effects on the social sciences, since as mentioned above; they

could be molded into different discourses all ostensibly based on historiography, but

actually representing a dogmatic breed of hagiography.

In the succeeding democratic governments, hardly any comprehensive educational

policy emerged; the 1998 educational policy demonstrated the largely continued

practices: 'Educational policy and particularly its ideological aspect enjoys the most vital

place in the socio-economic milieu and moral framework of a country...We are not a

country founded on its territorial, linguistic, ethnic or racial identity. The only

justification for our existence is our total commitment to Islam as our identity. Although

the previous educational policies did dilate on Islamic education and Pakistan Ideology

but those policies did not suggest how to translate the Islamic Ideology into our moral

profile and the educational system’ (Saigol, 2003). This is the thought process which still

continues to shape the curriculum, particularly the Social Studies ones throughout

Pakistan today.

Pakistan Studies

Evolving nation-states often struggle to resolve dynamic cultural influences by

incorporating social variables in nationalist paradigms, and then wording them within

the oft changing political perimeters of their official histories. This is sheer convenience;

history by consensus is difficult to arrive at, but history by decree is easier and

conveniently written. Slanted histories manipulate some chosen genre of national

identity, which is then utilized to arrive at some pre destined collective identity story of

the state (Saigol, 2006). In order to rationalize the sometimes biased history leaning

towards politically motivated causes, images of ancestral blood ties and historical and

ideological legacies are often invoked.

It is a reality that history is often valued and reproduced in service to the social order or

state, and historical events are appropriated and imbued with often diametrical

interpretations. This is made all the more difficult by the fact many lofty concepts of the

human world, among them democracy and justice, are hard to contextualize in a

universalist paradigm, and find multiple expressions in cultures around the world. This

is more marked in states which have emerged from turbulent and oppositional

trajectories of nationalism which claim ownership of particular views of the past, but are

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many times official versions of the historical record believed 'as fact' by sub-national

groups within the state. This official nationalized narrative and history may then depart

from objectivity, which often becomes the most affected variable. Thus, tensions are

manifest between official history narratives and the historical perspectives of sub

national or regional ethnic groups. It is all the more relevant in developing countries like

Pakistan where large numbers of people are illiterate or semi-literate.

This paper examines oppositional interpretations of history which could lead to a

polarized world view in a selection of books from the Pakistan Studies curriculum, a

required course for all students in the country. These are examples of textbooks used to

illustrate the appropriation and application of historiography to create and reinforce a

national philosophy or ideology, and also to resolve issues of state building and identity

formation. Selective history distorts and disconnects historical moments from context,

and biography is transformed into hagiography by juxtaposing social sciences on

narrow nationalist interpretations and ethnically or religiously driven political

mandates. Ideology is a driver of historiography in secondary level social studies

textbooks to highest levels of education; the influence of Islamization is all pervasive, an

indoctrination strategy institutionalized during the reign of General Zia-ul Haq.

All students in Pakistan are required to not only take courses of Pakistan Studies, but

must also pass standardized tests based on that curriculum. Pakistan Studies is a

compulsory subject in all secondary schools and colleges, with numerous textbooks

published for the starting grades to the bachelor’s level. This curriculum tends to be a

composite of patriotic discourses, justification of the Two-Nation theory and

hagiographies of Muslim heroes. The rubric of these textbooks requires extensive

learning by rote to pass, leaving aside little room for objective interpretation. According

to students interviewed at local colleges, many are cynical about the quality of the

administered course, and classes were reportedly scheduled in late afternoons

(Interviews with students). Hardly any students choose to attend, utilizing their time for

studying 'important classes such as Math or Urdu or English (ibid). Also, it seems there

is hardly any additional hierarchical interpretive discourse which builds upon previous

ones grade wise, which makes the learning process boring.

Textbooks in Pakistan must first be approved by the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of

Education in Islamabad after which they are published by the provincial textbook

boards located at Jamshoro in Sindh, Quetta in Balochistan, Lahore in Panjab, and

Peshawar in the KPK. The social studies curriculum in Pakistan, as both product and

propagator of the 'Ideology of Pakistan,' is driven by a set of directives.

It was during the time General Zia-ul Haq's reign that history and geography, which

was separate and distinct subject, were amalgamated together as Pakistan Studies,

which was made a compulsory subject for all students from the ninth grade through the

first year of college, including engineering and medical schools. Curriculum changes,

institutionalized during Zia's Islamization campaign, also made Islamiyat compulsory.

Special editing committees were set up to systematically sift existing textbooks for

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identification and removal of content deemed unsuitable. The University Grants

Commission (UGC) issued a directive in 1983 that textbook writers were:

"To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or

geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion. To get

students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with

slogans. To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan—the creation of a

completely Islamized State" (University Grants Commission directive, 1983). This

polemic historiography is apparent in many aspects in both Indian and Pakistan, which

treat common historical interactions quite differently. Since this type of history was the

political need of the day, prominent Pakistani historians were co opted to propagate this

ideologically grounded historiography. I.H. Qureshi, K.K. Aziz and A.H. Dani are

Pakistan's preeminent historians who have tended to ground their arguments in a

particular world view. Qureshi and Dani were patronized by both Ayub Khan and Zia-

ul Haq. They were instrumental in constructing a past for their new nation that would

set it apart from the Indus valley Civilization. The issue was not just the defense of

partition, or independence from Pakistan's vantage point, but a different reading of the

past involving, among other things, the relegation of a diverse but vibrant composite-

cultural and intellectual legacy to the backdoor. Pre determined goals and an impartial

study of history do not get well together, since if the study of a nation's social studies

curriculum varies according to "the creation, preservation, or merely the

"understanding' of the twentieth-century 'nation' and its culture, then . . . what each

syllabus will then encompass over time and space is. . . pre-determined by such

objectives" (Powel, 1996, p. 96). These objectives have driven curriculum building so

much that 'ideology has . . . made a myth of history in the portrayal of ... national

heroes’ (ibid, p. 219). In Pakistan "(perceived) nation-building agendas. . . take a priority

over disinterested academic study, history becomes a medium for transmitting goals for

the future” (ibid, p. 221).

The long term effects of a slanted reading of history were recognized early on. Pervez

Hoodbhoy and A.H. Nayyar prophesied a blowback at the time through an article,

'Rewriting the History of Pakistan' in 1985. They commented upon a radicalization

process "the full impact of which will probably be felt by the turn of the century, when

the present generation of school children attains maturity" (Hoodbhoy, 1985, p. 164).

Nayyar and Hoodbhoy identified the following themes prevalent in the variety of

UGC's directives emanating at the time. The dominant recurring theme was the

'Ideology of Pakistan,' as the force as well as its reason of existence, while textbooks

published in Zia's times portrayed M.A.jinnah as a religious man who sought the

creation of a theocratic state. Ulema were cited as champions of the Pakistan Movement,

and emphasis was laid on ritualistic Islam, which would rise above communal

antagonisms. Nayyar and Hoodbhoy explain, "The 'recasting' of Pakistani history [has

been] used to 'endow the nation with a historic destiny'" (ibid, p. 176).

A glaring example is treatment meted out to the conquest of Sindh in 712 by an Arab

army under the leadership of Muhammad-bin-Qasim. Pakistan Studies portray him as

the initial Islamizing agent, who brought a hitherto lawless Indian subcontinent with

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the civilizing culture of Islamic heritage. On the other hand, many Indian textbooks

consider that Arabs to have had a minimal impact on the history of the subcontinent.

For example, in Medieval India: A History Textbook for Class XI, Satish Chandra treats

the "Arab invasion of Sind (sic) as a localized affair" (Chandra, 1990).

In contrast in the Pakistani Social Studies for Class VI, published by the Sindh Textbook

Board, the Arab invasion is portrayed as the first glimpse of Pakistan, culminating with

the unfurling of the independence movement. The textbook states that "The Muslims

knew that the people of South Asia were infidels and they kept thousands of idols in

their temples." The invading Arab army is portrayed as a savior; "The non-Brahmans

who were tired of the cruelties of Raja Dahir, joined hands with Muhammad-bin-Qasim

because of his good treatment." This may very well have been the case, but the historical

narrative describes the whole event in absolutist terms:

"The conquest of Sindh opened a new chapter in the history of South Asia. Muslims had

ever lasting effects on their existence in the region. For the first time the people of Sindh

were introduced to Islam, its political system and way of the government. The people

here had seen only the atrocities of the Hindu Rajas. (....] The people of Sindh were so

much impressed by the benevolence of Muslims that they regarded Muhammad-bin-

Qasim as their savior. (…] Muhammad-bin-Qasim stayed in Sindh for over three years.

On his departure from Sindh, the local people were overwhelmed with grief." This

polemic altogether misses the point that prior to the 712 invasion, Arab armies had

attacked Sindh sixteen times without success, which does indicate the somewhat

entrenched nature of local rule in the area. It is also evident that historians in both India

and Pakistan have utilized altogether conflicting viewpoints about a historical reference

point to widen the cognitive bridge, which may have helped to gain a rational

understanding of history of South Asia.

Historiography and hagiography are frequently utilized to glorify the two early

champions of Islam, Muhammad-bin-Qasim and Sultan Mahmud of the Ghaznavi

dynasty in eastern Afghanistan, the culmination of which was the sacking of the

Somnath Temple in 1025.The chronological historical narrative in Pakistani textbooks

generally elides through the Mughal dynasty, gaining renewed vigor with the reign of

Aurangzeb in the late seventeenth century (Rosser, 2003). There is usually little

treatment meted out to the flailing Mughal dynasty, with much of the emphasis shifting

on the rebellion of 1857, referred by British historians as the Sepoy Mutiny, but glorified

by Indians and Pakistanis as the First War of Liberation.

There is generally a mention of Hindu-Muslim conflicts during Aurangzeb's era 1658-

1707, some elaboration of the military victories against the British of Tipu Sultan 1782-

1799, which lay the stage for the mutiny of 1857 (ibid). In most Pakistani textbooks the

Delhi Sultanate gets little treatment, as nearly five hundred years between Mahmud

Ghaznavi's multiple invasions and the establishment of Babar's Mughal dynasty in 1526

are collapsed (ibid). Muhammad-bin-Qasim is lauded as a warrior liberating the

Brahmin-weary Sindhis while Mahmud Ghaznavi is the crusader for the one true

religion. Our World, for Class IV, describes Mahmud's invasions into India:

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"There was a temple in India during those times, Somnath; the biggest idol/statue in

that temple was also called Somnath. This temple had so much treasure in it that no

royal treasure could even come near it. All the Hindu rajas used to get together in this

temple and think about ways to fight the Muslims. After covering the desert of

Rajputana, Mahmud came right in front of Somnath temple. Hindus got panicky. AH of

them tried to do their best but couldn’t succeed. The fort was conquered. The priests

begged him not to destroy the Somnath idol but he said that he wanted to be

remembered as Mahmud who destroyed the idol and not the one who sold it. He blew

the idol into pieces. This success was a source of happiness for the whole Muslim world"

(Our World, for Class TV, Directorate of Education Punjab, New Curriculum).

Another widely circulated textbook also glosses over economic motives for the

invasions in favour of ideological ones; the author mentions that Mahmud 'left the

greatest monument of all: the gift of Islam' (Hussain, 1981-83, p. 26). In contrast, as

defensive posturing, there is a tendency in Indian textbooks to treat Mahmud Ghaznavi

purely as a plunderer. Satish Chandra states that Mahmud's 'love of plunder went side

by side with the defense of Islam (Chandra, 1990, p. 205). In the following passage from

Romila Thapar, Mahmud's religious motivations are considered by coincidence:

"[Mahmud] had heard that there was much gold and jewelry kept in the big temples in

India, so he destroyed the temples and took away the gold and jewelry. . . . Destroying

temples had another advantage. He could claim, as he did, that he had obtained

religious merit by destroying images" (Thapar, 1988, p. 25-26).

The Mughal Emperor Akbar is often seen as harmful to the ultimate interests of

Muslims in the subcontinent, even though Western treatments represent Akbar's reign

as 'a high peak of cultural assimilation and religious harmony' (Powel, 1996, p.

205). Mubarak Ali has shown that Akbar has been systematically eliminated from most

textbooks in Pakistan in order to "divert attention away from his 'misplaced' policies”

(Khan, 1992). Discussions of Akbar are given short shrift, such as in Social Studies for

Class VI (Punjab Text Book Board, 1996), in which his name is simply listed, but events

of his life not elaborated. In Pakistan Studies for Class IX-X (Punjab Text Book Board,

1997), Akbar's name is not even listed among the Muslim rulers of India. In Pakistan

Studies for secondary classes (ibid), he is not mentioned in the text along with other

famous Islamic figures, a list that includes Mahmud Ghaznavi, Babur, Humayun, Shah

Jahan, and Aurangzeb. Typically, in Pakistan Studies written by Rabbani and Sayyid

(Rabbani & Monawwar, 1992), Akbar is mentioned only while discussing Shaikh

Ahmad Sirhindi, who according to Mubarak Ali, 'is projected as a hero challenging

Akbar's religious policy and restoring Islamic values in India' (Qureshi, 1978). This

perspective is typical of many Pakistani historiographies which derive their inspiration

from I. H. Qureshi's epic interpretation of Mughal history 'The Muslim Community of

the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent' (Qureshi, 1977). In a book about Akbar he writes:

"It can be seriously contented if he possessed wisdom of the highest order. If he had, he

would not have sought to weaken Islam and the Muslim community of the

Subcontinent. At least he would have refrained from interfering with the established

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principles of Islam. Even Vincent Smith, who narrates Akbar's aberrations from Islam

with relish, concludes that 'the whole scheme was the outcome of ridiculous vanity, a

monstrous growth of unrestrained autocracy. .. 'How can it then be asserted that Akbar

possessed wisdom in the highest degree?" (Qureshi, 1978, p. 155).

Many Pakistani historians interpret Akbar as dubiously Islamic, whereas his grandson,

Aurangzeb is credited with saving Indian Islam from being swallowed up by misguided

imperatives of Akbar. According to Zafar, "[Aurangzeb] reversed the policies of Akbar

and made a genuine effort to give the State an Islamic orientation. Under Aurangzeb the

Pakistan spirit gathered in strength" (Zafar, 1986, p. 7).

J. Husain defends Aurangzeb against his critics while pointing to the sharply divergent

historical interpretations of this controversial figure:

"Because of Aurangzeb's religious fervor, historians tend to judge him according to their

own religious leanings. Hindu and Christian historians often present Aurangzeb's

religious policies as the main cause of the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, while

some Muslim historians try to completely ignore the negative effects of these policies”

(Husain, 1997, p. 105).

Standard Pakistan Studies textbooks rarely include chapters that discuss the cultures

and histories of Balochis or Pathans or Sindhis in comprehensive detail, a fact which the

sub nationalities in Pakistan have tended to resent. Balochis have affinities with and

draw their historical identities from Iran and Central Asia, not from South Asia. Both

the ancestors of Sindhis and Balochis arrived in this area in the ancient pre-Islamic

period, and are thus denied prominent places in the curricula which in many cases start

with the advent of Islam in South Asia. An irrational paradigm implemented since the

days of One Unit assumes that denial of cultural differences in the country will bridge

the gap between sub national identities. Religion has also been used as a tool to bridge

this identity gap (Ziring, 1997).

Islam was used as a leveling force to tie the Sindhis, the Pathans, the Balochis tribes, and

initially the Bengalis together with the dominant Punjabis in attempts to forge a national

identity that could overarch regional and ethnic loyalties (Alam, 20 April 2001).

However, this did not entirely succeed. "The Balouch . . . have become conscious of their

particularist identity in the face of perceived threats to national and cultural

characteristics” (Mahmud, 1993, p. 120). As Feroz Ahmed in his book 'Ethnicity and

politics in Pakistan', wrote:

"The state and its ideologues have steadfastly refused to recognize the fact that these

regions are not merely chunks of territory with different names but areas which were

historically inhabited by peoples who had different languages and cultures, and even

states of their own. This official and intellectual denial has, no doubt, contributed to the

progressive deterioration of inter-group relations, weakened societies' cohesiveness, and

undermined the state's capacity to forge security and sustain development" (Husain,

1981).

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The softening effect of centuries of mysticism which was an extremely powerful social

force in south Asia has also tended to be overlooked. "Sufi tradition has been outside the

power of kings. Sufism is extremely powerful and traditional wisdom springs from it. It

has saved this nation from extreme ideological confusion. Yet, we don't find different

Islams in our textbooks. However, the Sufi tradition is deeply embedded in the

culture—it is what designs the psyche of the people, the true intellectual and spiritual

foundations of the people. Transplants from outside and above do find some place in

the intellectual and environmental framework and they do disturb and confuse. But

deep down still it is the Sufi tradition, philosophy, and belief system which dictates their

lives. Sufis don't really actively convert, people are attracted to them—there is no fixed

set way of Sufism. The historical reality of the land is now at loggerheads with the

structural political reality created by the establishment and dictated from above. I have

no doubt who will win. History cannot be stopped—the inexorable source of history is

relentless, it can't be stopped" (ibid, p. 34).

In place of the tolerant Sufi tradition, a literalist, stricter version of religious ideology

was propagated. Dr Mohammed Sarwar states in his Pakistan Studies book: "At present

a particular segment, in the guise of modernization and progressive activity, has taken

the unholy task of damaging our cultural heritage. Certain elements aim at the

promotion of cultures with the intention to enhance regionalism and provincialism and

thereby damage national integration" (Sarwar, 1997). The Sarwar textbook further states

'It is in the interest of national solidarity that such aspects of culture should be promoted

as reflecting affinity among the people of the provinces’ (ibid). This is reductionist's

discourse which denies the existence of different cultural variations, and instead focuses

on producing a polemic essentialism. This polemic discourse is not uncommon across

the Indo-Pakistan divide. The famous Indian historian R.C. Majumdar for example,

bases the premise for his history on the argument that religion was an essential element

in the composition of India's past, and that Hindus and Muslims had always constituted

separate communities (Majumdar, 1960). Majumdar emphasizes the sharp divide that

characterized inter-religious relationships: "A fundamental and basic difference between

the two communities was apparent even to the casual observer. Religious and social

ideas and institutions counted for more in men's lives in those days than anything else;

and in these two respects the two differed as poles asunder [....] It is a strange

phenomenon that although the Muslims and Hindus had lived together in Bengal for

nearly six hundred years, the average people of each community knew so little of the

other's traditions” (ibid).

Important political milestones of Pakistan's history also tend to get sifted in Pakistan's

polemic curriculum discourse. In social studies textbooks there is generally no mention

of important court cases, such as Tamizuddin's legal challenge to the first coup, or the

mass Movement to Restore Democracy (MRD) at the end of Zia's reign. With little

discussion of civil society, Pakistani textbooks often substitute historical analyses for

polemics about an idealized Islamic nation. Since there is no consensus on the actual

form of an Islamic state, contradictions inherent in the textbooks can cause confusion

leading to hostile expressions of religious fundamentalism and can result in

radicalization of students based on a polarized world view. Zia institutionalized a kind

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of paranoia about parading Islamic symbols, which were seen as essential for the

survival of the nation-state. Unfortunately some of the strategies that Zia appropriated

and propagated were based on narrow, medieval interpretations of Islam, which

resulted in gender-biased attitudes and policies and militarized exhortations to take up

arms for the sake of jihad. This stricter adherence to external expressions of religion

were done to placate conservative forces, which started exerting social control and

influencing social norms, much of this process driven by curriculum revision. This is

notwithstanding the fact that even though the role of certain religious minorities,

especially the Hindus in East Pakistan, had not been praiseworthy, a newly emerging

tolerant and syncretic Pakistan had ensured full protection to their rights under the

Constitution. In fact, the Hindu Community enjoyed a highly privileged position in East

Pakistan by virtue of essentially exerting a monopoly over the economy and the media.

Allen McGrath, in his book ‘The Destruction of Democracy in Pakistan,’ 1998, analyses

the efforts at constitution making in the first decade after independence before Sikandar

Mirza dissolved the National Assembly. He highlights the productive role of D.N. Dutt,

a Hindu from East Pakistan, in constitution making in Pakistan. However, there is little

mention of any syncretic efforts of minorities of Pakistan in most Pakistan Studies

textbooks. Most of these books generally take the view that General Zia-ul Haq was

someone who 'took concrete steps in the direction of Islamization.' Such attitudes are

rampant: "During the period under Zia's regime, social life developed a leaning towards

simplicity. Due respect and reverence to religious people was accorded. The

government patronized the religious institutions and liberally donated funds."

Many textbooks claim that there is a 'network of conspiracies and intrigues ' which is

threatening the Muslim world in the guise of elimination of militancy and

fundamentalism.' This defensive posturing intensified under the guidance of Zia, when

Pakistan took credit for the fall of the Soviet Union and ostensibly laid the foundation

for Islamic revolutions to 'flourish'. One book states: " The Western world has full

perception of this phenomena, [which] accounts for the development of reactionary

trends in that civilization….The Muslim world has full capabilities to face the Western

challenges provided Muslims are equipped with self-awareness and channelise their

collective efforts for the well being of the Muslim Ummah. All evidences substantiate

Muslim optimism indicating that the next century will glorify Islamic revolution with

Pakistan performing a pivotal role."

Conclusion

While many apologists more or less correctly point out that there is no inherent material

in the social studies text books that explicitly glorifies the violent form of jihad , the

effect of a polarized historiography on immature minds cannot be ignored away.

Contextualizing the shaping of attitudes from this process, one can induce why this

polarized process is dangerous and has the ability to radicalize students in a society.

This can be explained from observation of ideologues and instigators of extremist

movements, who tend to rely on “black-or-white” or “all-or-none” thinking to direct the

radicalization process (Mandel, 2002). A cognitive divide of social perceptions is created

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between elements supportive of extremism and the 'others', namely, people outside

one’s one social and ideological group or “in-group” (Tajfel, 1981). Violence toward the

'out' group can thus be facilitated by thinking of its members as being justifiably

excluded from the moral considerations one would impact on members of one’s own

group, making violence morally sanctionable .This can also be done by resort to a higher

legal sanction than mere law, which can bring divine sanction and ideology into play.

The perception that a shunned social category is outside the boundaries of the in

group's sphere of morality can free individuals to become morally disengaged in their

behavioural interactions with members of that shunned social category (Bandura, 1990).

Another layer of contextualization to the radicalization potential of such polemic driven

curricula also needs to be added; there is a commonly observed tendency to conceive

such curricula in terms solely of ideology. . This recourse to colonial binaries is as

retrogressive as radicalization itself, and even resembles the social cognitive division

process mentioned as above. Creating an enlightened in-group to differentiate from a

backward, radicalized out-group without factoring in several variables is in itself a form

of radicalization, inasmuch it inculcates a black or white thought process. Such

explanations serve to obfuscate the issues rather than clarify them. These rigid

categories which classify people as savage, barbaric or pre-modern fail as explanations

since they become tautologies: they committed the act because they are barbaric; they

are barbaric because they committed the act. This blanket reliance upon psychological

and ideological explanations to classify people as belonging to a certain type, or

assumed inherent proclivity to commit heinous acts becomes essentialist. Such

explanations also tend to obliterate history, and confuse the material reality that

explains history particularly as being a continuum of dynamics which gradually shape a

society's worldview. This has to be the case, otherwise the tautological definitions

would have to rely on some form of biological determinism, thereby rendering such

categories deeply racist and suspect.

Since the elite have abandoned the public education system, relying instead on a mainly

English-speaking private sector, a wider divergence of educational discourses has

become all the more evident. While all schools are bound to follow similar syllabi in

subjects such as Pakistan Studies, even then a number of private schools now encourage

objectivity and creative thinking among students, which is done by reliance on histories

more open to interpretation. This stratification of Pakistan's educational infrastructure

has created significant divergences of worldviews which are representative of their

curriculum design, no matter by design or by default. Madrassah students tend to

gravitate more toward jihad, a weltanschauung arguably created by their educational

discourse and its emphasis on strict ritualism, and no margin for objective thinking.

Public school or Urdu-medium students are comparably more tolerant, but still have

imbibed radical ideas as illustrated by Christine fair in her seminal works. The private

sector educated elite children have more leeway for objective thinking, but tend to relate

little with the two more mainstream student streams (Rahman, 25 October 2003).

This trend of polarization springing from dynamics of education also effectively

contributes to a widening social divide, which the extremist project exploits by

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manipulating a social and opinion leadership vacuum. Thus, this has the tendency to

promote a 'class war mentality' in which a culturally ‘centrist’ class is increasingly being

wedged in between an indifferent secular elite and an activist ultra-right, which may

force this centre to choose sides. Since the elites do not identify with this centre either,

the radicals are the more natural partner due to being more accessible. As Denoeux puts

it: “when one focuses on their fundamental convictions, their most cherished values,

and the kind of society and political order they aspire to create, moderates have far

more in common with radicals than they do with Western-style democracies” (which is

what the secular elite essentially promote) (Denoeux, 2002).

What then is the way forward? Essentially, with regard to public sector education

syllabi, the focus should be on revising textbooks with the aim of reverting to the

content used prior to Zia’s Islamization during the 1980s. Secularization is another

matter; however, since it is a controversial topic and may not be totally desirable in

Pakistan till the centrist position of the society is defined. Education needs to be de-

linked from dissemination of specific ideologies, and should go back to stressing

emphasis on moral philosophy as was evident in the 1950s. Rote learning and

regurgitation of this syllabus in examinations needs to be discouraged. Textbooks need

to be revised according to some internationally accepted educational standards, and

need not be construed in absolutist terms. Local histories should be recognized not as a

dividing but as a unifying force, which can promote inter cultural harmony by fostering

understanding of each other. It is as much a purpose of education to raise more answers

from questions that it tries to answer itself; educational revision committees should not

try to create intellectual black or white zone of regimented thinking. It is imperative that

curriculums inculcate the capacity to "think critically, to analyze, to compare and

contrast, to evaluate, to judge and to synthesize. As in the hard sciences, children in the

social sciences should also learn to ask the questions: why and how and who and what.

How did it happen? Why did it happen? Who was responsible for it? Was it right or

wrong? Who was affected? In what ways? What possibly could/should have been done

and so on. Instead of bombarding children with a vast array of unrelated 'facts' and bits

of information, the reasons, causes and dynamics of all phenomena should be

provided." This is all the more relevant in social studies curriculum, which have tended

to shape the worldviews of generations. The Social Studies curricula in Pakistan need to

undergo an urgent transformative process of making them more objective so that they

can stimulate intellect as well as counter radicalization tendencies.