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Table of Contents

Executive Surrn:nary 1

Introduction: Chinese Naval History 3

Chapter One: Strategy - Fulfilling National Missions 5The Evolution of a Naval Strategy 5PLA(N) Roles And Missions 7

Chapter Two: PLA(N) Structure and Leadership 12Organization 12Ad.t:niralWu Shengli. 13Future Leadership 14

Chapter Three: ProcurelTIent - China's Move t o Qua li ty Over Quantity 16Developing MultilTIission PlatforlTIS 17Anti-Access DeveloplTIents 26Low Cost, High. Yield InvestlTIents 28

Chapter Four: Personnel - Progress Towards a Professional Force 31China 's Personnel Push 31

Chapter Five: Training, Exercises , andJoint Operat ions 34Training and Exercises 34DevelopingJoint Operat ions 41

Outlook 43Continuing Modernization 44The Fu tu r e Force s 45

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Executive Summary

Over the past decade, the People's Republicof China (PRC) has carried out an impressivemilitary modernization effort, providing thePeople's Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N withconsiderable technological capabilities. Recognizing tha t i t takes more than technology tocreate a capable navy, China ha s also activelypursued the modernization of its doctrine, organization, and t raining with the ultimate goalof developing a professional force. While muchwork remains, trends in recent years indicatethe PLA(N) is beginning to operationalize itsmodern force, taking on new and more challenging missions.In response to expanding national interestsand revolutionary changes in warfare broughtabout by long-range precision weaponry, civil-ia n leadership in Beijing began to view thenavy as an increasingly critical component ofChina's national security structure. To supportBeijing's objectives regarding Taiwan, to denyan adversary access to the region during timesof crisis, and to protect China's vital se a linesof communication, naval power became thekey to China's security concerns. In the late1990s, Beijing embarked on a program to builda modern navy in a relatively short time.Since the late 1990s, the PLA(N) has purchased military hardware from abroad, bui ltincreasingly complex naval platforms in Chinaand made substantial upgrades to aging ships.

The bulk of these efforts has centered aroundthree areas:Anti-Surface Warfare: The PLA(N) hasmore than quadrupled the number of submarines capable offiring anti-ship cruise missiles(ASCM), installed missiles with longer rangesand more sophisticated guidance packageson its surface combatants, built over 50 highspeedASCM-carrying patrol craft, and devel-oped the world's only anti-ship ballistic missile.Naval Air Defense: Historically a weak areafor the PLA(N), its newest combatants nowfeature mid and long-range surface-to-air missiles, and the Luyang II DDG possesses a so-phisticated phased-array radar system similarto the western AEGIS radar .

Force Projec tion: China has increased itsunderway replenishment capability by 67percent, allowing greater sustainment of operations far from shore. China has also constructed a large amphibious ship (Yuzhao LPD) anda hospital ship (Anwei AH), which could beused either for humanitarian reliefmissions orsupport to amphibious combat. Finally, Chinais refurbishing an aircraft carrier bought fromUkraine and plans to build its own within thenext five to ten years.Over the past year, the PLA(N) conductedseveral operations that demonstrated increased

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confidence and proficiency with real worldmissions in th e Chinese littoral as well as in"distant seas." Perhaps t he mos t significantis th e deployment ofa series of Task Groups,consisting of two combatants and an oiler, toth e GulfofAden in order to protect Chineseshipping from piracy. Thi s marks the PLA(N),sfirst operational surface deployment beyondwaters adjacent to China. \!Vhile these

deployments ar e likely to last throughout2009, i t is important to note that none of theseoperations indicate a desire on th e part of th ePRC to develop a constant global presence.Beijing's ambition appears to remain focusedon t he Eas tAsian region, with an ability toprotect the PRC's mari time interests in distantseas when required.

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Introduction:

Chinese Naval HistoryFrolll the orce ain oute to the Cultural RevolutionA Long March Toward a Modern Navy

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Admiral ZhengHe

The voyages ofAdmiral Zheng He dur ing theMing Dynasty are discussed i n both Chineseand Western sources as th ehistorical antecedent ofChina'spresent day naval modernization. Chinese sources characterize Zheng's seven voyagesbetween 1405 to 1433 to South-east Asia and th e Indian Oceanas missions of trade , diplomacyand friendship, in contrast toth e Europeans who came lateras colonizers and conquerors.This historical legacy is oftencited as evidence that th e worldneed no t fear China's grow-ing maritime power. AdmiralZheng's fleets were composedofhuge ocean-going ships, fa rlarger, more numerous and technologically ad vanced than th e caravels of his contemporarySpanish and Portuguese explorers. Seen in thislight, Zheng's voyages represent a moment inhistory when China stood poised to becometh e world's dominant maritime power, yetdecided to turn away.Though th e voyages of Zheng He have recaptured popular attention in Asia and th e West,China has not always been a naval power. Thatis not to say that Chinese history is entirelydevoid of maritime tradition. As ear ly as th e 7thcentury, Chinese traders were an active part ofth e ' 'porcelain route," a maritime equivalent

of th e ancient Silk Road that stretched fromGuangzhou to th e Persian Gulf. Naval engage

ments also played importantroles in various dynastic histories. However, China did nothave a global naval traditionin th e mold of the Europeanpowers of th e 15 th to 19th centuries. The Qing Dynasty fellinto decline and proved unableto fend of f encroachment fromforeign powers in th e 19th andearly 20 th centuries during whatis today known i n Ch ina as th eCentury of Humiliation. Qingnaval weakness was highlightedduring th e Sino-japanese Warof 1894-1895,when a well-equipped but poorly trained

Chinese f leet was destroyed by theJapaneseat th e mouth of th e Yalu River in September1894.Naval operations played a minimal role duringChina's long civilwar and in its war againstJapan from 1937-1945, but soon after th eestablishment of the People's Republic, Beijingaddressed th e need for a maritime force ca pable of defending the country from potentialthreats. From its humble beginnings as a coastal defense force to the expanded capabilitiesand geographic scope of th e modern PLA(N),Chinese naval strategy has been driven by th ePRC's perception of its security threats.

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Chinese Revolution Propaganda Poster: "Chairman Mao waves me forward"Chairman Mao inspeering naval fast t o rpedo boa t t roops on Septernber 20 , 1958

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In the early years of the PRC's existence, China shaped its defense to contend with perceivedthreats that were predominantly continental,in particular from the Soviet Union, VietnaIn,India and the United States in Korea. Un-ti l recently, China lacked th e technical an dindustrial capacity to build a modern navy andlacked sufficient funds to purchase modernsystems from abroad. Mao's 1953 assertionregarding the need for "a strong navy for thepurpose offighting against imperialist aggression" was qualified with the statement that thenavy had to be bui lt in accordance with indust r ia l and fmancial realities. The Great LeapForward and the Cultural Revolution (both ofwhich subjugated scientific and industrial development to ideology), the military's budgetary focus on aircraft and nuclear weapons, andthe loss oftechnical assistance from the SovietUnion following the Sino-Soviet split, al lcontributed to th e difficulties t he PRC faced indeveloping a modern navy.

With the fading Soviet threat and the embracing of domestic modernization, China quicklydeveloped a thriving economy that relied oninternational trade and something forgottensince Zheng He: sea lines of communication.Additionally, the Chinese leadership CaIne tosee an increasingly independent Taiwan as athreat to their pride and authority; "reiningin" Taiwan would take a modern navy. Thecontinued legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rested largely on these twopillars-improving its citizens' lives throughsustained economic growth and protectingnational integrity. The PLA(N) thus beganto take a much larger role in defending thenation's key interests and saw proportionateincreases in prestige, power, and funding. Tounderstand how this empowered force nowfunctions, however, one must begin with aneXaInination of the PLA(N) that emerged fromthe civilwar-humbled and focused mainly onself-defense.

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Chapter One:

Strategy -Fulfilling National Missions

The Evolution o fa Naval StrategyFrom its inception in 1949 until the mid-1980s,th e PLA(N),s primary strategic concept wasone of "coastal defense." This strategy focusedth e PLA(N) on defending China's coast fromthe Soviet Pacific Fleet as a small componentofwhat would primarily be a land war. By1982, despite the lack of resources and continued focus on continental threats, PLA(N)Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing directedthe PLA(N),s naval research toward "offshoredefense."

Offshore defense is a regional strategy thatdoes no t advocate replicating U.S. or Soviet"blue-water" naval capabilities. Instead, it callsfor naval capabilities suited for China's specificregional maritime interests. While offshoredefense has often been generically describedas operations within China's 200 nautical mile(nm) Exclusive Economic Zone, Admiral Liudefined China's offshore areas as th e YellowSea, East China Sea, South China Sea, theseas around the Spratly Islands and Taiwan,the areas inside and outside th e Okinawa

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island chain as well as th e northern part of th ePacific Ocean. This includes areas outside ofthe "Fi rs t Island Chain" as wel l as the moretraditional coastal waters.

Admiral Liu's strategic vision paralleled th eCentral Military Commission (CMC)'s adoption of a new military strategy that focused onlocal wars on China's periphery instead of onebased on a m::9or nuclear confrontation withth e Soviet Union.

Since th e 1980s, proponents of Liu's offshoredefense strategy have asserted that in orderto secure China's economic interests anddefend against foreign threats, China mustexpand th e bounds of its maritime capabilitiesbeyond coastal waters. Events of th e 1990s,including th e U.S.-led operations againstI raq and Serbia, U.S. intervention in th eTaiwan Strai t crisis of 1996 and th e ongoingmodernization ofbothJapan's an d Taiwan'snavies, highlighted to Chinese strategists bothth e weakness ofChina's maritime flank andChina's vulnerability to long-range precisionstrike weapons. Specifically, th e success ofU.S.

weapons combined with the willingness oftheUnited States to intervene in regional conflictsmade it clear to Beijing that China was no tprepared for th e realities ofmodern warfare.The CMC charged th e PLAwith developingth e ability to f ight "local wars under modernhigh-tech conditions." In order to do so, th ePLA introduced two key concepts to help guideits modernization: "informationization" and"non-contact warfare."

After more than 20 years of naval developmentunder offshore defense and the continued influence ofinformationization an d non-contactwarfare, many Chinese scholars an d PLA(N)strategists now advocate a new strategy for th e21't century, termed "distant sea defense." Thisnew strategy would not bound operations geographically, but rather be defined according toChina's maritime needs.

In addition to the continued protection ofmaritime interests, advocates of distant sea defense see a respected modern navy as a necessary component ofChina's rising internationalstatus.

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PLA(N) Roles and MissionsThe SaIne pressures that drove th e development of offshore defense also drove a re evaluation of th e traditional missions th ePLA(N) must be prepared to execute. Thenavy's missions ar e derived from the CCP'sMilitary Guiding Theory-strategic guidanceto th e military that outlines th e PLA's role inChina's national strategy. An element of theMilitary Guiding Theory is th e concept ofthe military's "historic missions," which ar edesigned to identify and safeguard China'snational interests. In 2004, Chinese PresidentHuJintao revised these historic missions inorder to address issues of expanding strategicinterest to China. Building on th e guidance se tdown by former PresidentJiang Zemin, Huemphasized the PLA's responsibility to protect "state sovereignty, security an d territorialintegrity" and to safeguard "the interests ofnational development above anything else." Inaddition, President Hu emphasized the needto develop capabilities to address a varietyofnon -traditional security threats to include"anti-terrorism, safeguarding stability, dealingwith sudden incidents.. . safeguarding peace"and other "diverse military tasks."

The Naval Role in the Cross-StraitProblelTIFo r t he pas t 15 years China 's naval development has been primari ly focused on improvingit s capabilities to deter Taiwan's moves towardindependence and to successfully reverse Taiwan's actions should deterrence fail. The PRCcontinues to view reunification with Taiwanas an unalterable long-term goal for reasonsinvolving historic claims, national pride,domestic stability, and geostrategic posture.China has not forgotten th e prominent roleth e United States played in th e three previousTaiwan Strait crises (1954-5, 1958 and 1996),and remains concerned the United States willintervene in any future crisis as well. Beijingperceives that the prospect of such interventionemboldens Taiwan pro-independence groups,

"Infonnationization" describes China's militaryeffort to incorporate modern technology into allaspects ofoperations. It recognizes that modern,long-range weapons require lst and accurate meansfor coordinating data over long distances. A militaryadept in informationized warfare would be able toeffectively control and coordinate forces with speedand precision, while inhibiting the enemy's abilityto do the same. Thus informationization includesmeans to protect one's own information, such asmodern command and control systems, as well asmeans to disrupt the information of the adversary,such as cyber attacks and electronic jamming. Thegreater coordination between multiple naval unitsand "smarter" weapons enabled by informationizat ion gives rise to a key element ofmodern warfarereferred to in the PLA as non-contact warfare."Non-contact warfare" involves employing platforms and weapons in precision strikes from outsideof an enemy's "defended zone," reducing the riskto friendly platforms. Similar to U.S. doctrine thatemphasizes parallel attacks against key nodes withinan enemy's system, Chinese writings on non-contactwarlre stress non-linear attacks against the entiretyof an enemy's operational and strategic depth, causing an opponent to lose the ability and will to resist.From a naval perspective, non-contact warfare isdemonstrated by the PLA(N),s development and acquisition oflong-range weapons to be launched fromships, submarines, aircraft, or shore-based platformsas well as the associated detection and targeting capabilities required to employ these weapons to theirfullest capacity."Distant sea defense"While coastal defense andto a certain extent offshore defense have either anexplicit or implied geographical limitation (that thePLA(N) would only operate a certain distance fromChina), distant sea defense has no such limitationsregarding distance from the mainland. The PLA(N)would be required to be able to defend China's maritime interests whether t hey were close to home or onthe other side of the world. This is not to say Chinawill develop a global navy like the United States, butthat the PLA(N) would be required to have a basicglobal reach to defend China's specific needs, such asthe anti-piracy patrols in the GulfofAden.

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Luyang II Class Guided-Missile Destroyer leading a formation

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potentially funits China's political and militaryoptions, an d raises th e risk of a Taiwan crisisescalating into a wider Sino-American conflict. China remains wary o fU.S. long- termintentions in the region and strongly prefers toavoid a crisis in which th e U.S. might move tobecome a guarantor of Taiwan independence.

For these reasons, China's modernizationefforts have principally focused on preparingfor a Taiwan conflict, with a large portiondirected at developing capabilities to deter,delay, and if necessary degrade potential U. S.military intervention. To thi s end, China hasbui lt or acquired a wide array of advancedplatforms including submarines, major surfacecombatants, missile patrol craft, maritimestrike aircraft, and land based systemsemploying new an d sophisticated anti-shipcruise missiles. China is also developing th eworld's first anti-ship ballistic missile, a systemspecifically designed to defeat U.S. carrierstrike groups.

Chinese leaders hope that simply possessingthese military capabilities will deter pro-independence moves, or should deterrence fail, thatthey will permit a range ofmilitary optionsthat can be tailored to th e specific situation.A military strategist at Beijing's Academy ofMilitary Sciences recently stated, "We canresolve a crisis ifwe ar e in a position to de ter." This focus on crisis resolution highlightsa strategic shift with respect to Taiwan thatoccurred as HuJintao gained power. The oldgoal of "compelling reunification" became oneof ' 'preventing independence," thus allowingfor much greater flexibility in dealing withTaiwan.

However, should a near-term Taiwan Straitcrisis occur where China feels it must resort tomilitary force, it ha s a wide range ofmilitaryoptions which would include significantPLA(N) involvement. These include largescale exercises and missile demonstrationssimilar to th e 1996 crisis, blockades ofTaiwan's ports, and amphibious assaults on

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some of Taiwan's offshore islands. The PLA(N)would also playa role in a caIIlpaign designedaround missile and a ir strikes on Taiwan withthe level ofnaval involvement dependent onthe scope and intensity of the campaign.

Moving Beyond TaiwanPresident HuJintao's 2004 expansion of th ePLA's "historic missions" opened up newavenues for th e navy. Two of th e professedmissions-safeguarding China's expandingnational interests and ensuring world peace -represented a significant acljustment to China'snational defense strategy and broadenedits definition of security to include newgeographic and functional areas beyond th ePLA's traditional territorial security missions.The emergence of these missions levied newrequirements on the PLA(N) to preparefor contingencies beyond the immediacy of

Taiwan, such as addressing China's economicdependence on sea lines of communication(SLOC). China's Defense White Paperschronicle this shift in concerns. The last twopapers in particular, describing China's viewsof security issues in 2006 and 2008, highlightmissions outside of the traditional sphere. The2008 Defense White Paper characterizes th ePLA as expanding its operational range andmission flexibility and becoming increasinglyinvolved in international security. The2008 paper also conveys China's intent togradually develop th e capabilities to operatecooperatively in the open ocean and contendwith non-traditional security threats, anaspiration exemplified by current PLA(N)participation in efforts to combat piracy inth e Gulf ofAden. Levying requirements onthe PLA(N) for military operations otherthan war will allow for greater international

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cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism,counternarcotics trafficking, disaster relief, andhumanitarian assistance.Protec t ingMarit im.e SovereigntyThe Chinese government claims sovereigntyover the majority of th e East and South ChinaSeas, citing such evidence as historicalmapsdating back to the Ming Dynas ty (1368 to1644). In addition, Chinese scholars point outthat prior to th e founding of th e PRC, China'snationalist government traced a dotted linein 1947 depicting its boundary in the SouthChina Sea which is often referred to as th e"cow's tongue" because of its shape.China also claims that its continental shelfnaturally extends into the Eas t and SouthChina Seas, giving it a legal r ight to extendedsea claims under th e 1982 United NationsConvention on th e Law of th e Sea (UNCLOS).Beijing uses this argument to bolster its claimto sovereignty over most of th e South China

This map details China's claims inthe South China Sea.

Sea, including th e Paracel and Spratly Islands,as well as most of th e East China Se a extending t o the Okinawa Trough. The 200 nmExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) permittedunder UNCLOS results in overlapping claimsfor many states in th e region and thereforemaritime disputes continue between China andat least five of its neighbors. Because China'sclaims also extend beyond its EEZ, most countries do no t recognize these claims and viewthem as excessive.China's strategic interests in the Eas t andSouth China Seas include preserving access toextensive fishing resources and securing accessto potentially vast deposits of oil and naturalgas. While Beijing prefers to use diplomacyand economic influence to protect maritimesovereignty, this is also a key mission for th ePLA(N), which regularly patrols in most ofChina's claimed territory. These areas arealso patrolled by four separate civil maritimeorganizations that function independentlywithin the Chinese government. These entitiesare responsible for various aspects oflawenforcement and peacetime coastal defensewithin China's claimed EEZ, and collectivelyoperate an extensive array ofboats, ships,helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.Se a Lane ProtectionPerhaps even more critical to China's continued economic growth than defendingsea-based resources is th e protection of itsSLOCs. It is along these strategic routes thatthe overwhelming m ~ o r i t y ofChina's foreigntrade-over 90 percent by volume and over 80percent byvalue- is transported. Due to itsstrong economic growth, the PRC became ane t crude oil importer in 1993, a dependencywhich continues to grow. Over th e next 15years, China's demand for foreign oil is expected to grow steadily while its domestic supplywill stagnate, requiring an ever-increasing reliance on foreign imports for its crude oil needs.China's continued economic development and

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modernization, which are deemed essentialto ensure th e stability of th e CCP's one-partyrule, have made protecting these SLOCs a keymission ofthe PLA(N).

China's continued prosperity depends uponth e steady flow of resources and materialfrom foreign suppliers. Any disruption ofkeychokepoints or disturbance along any oftheSLOCs has th e potential to affect China'seconomy. SLOC protection, however, is no tjust a matter of deploying ships to chokepointsto ensure that they remain open, bu t requiresth e capability to sustain a maritime presencein strategic locations in order to respond topotential incidents. When Hu first called forthis capability in his 2004 expansion ofthehistoric missions, concerns over th e MalaccaStrait dominated discussion of SLOC security.Hu described this as China's "MalaccaDilemma," highlighting that approximately 90percent ofChina's imported crude oi l transitsthis vital strait. Today, however, China's

SLOC security concerns extend to even moredistant waters.

The PLA(N)'s counter-piracy operations inth e GulfofAden demonstrate the intentionofChina 's leadership to ensure th e security ofChina's SLOCs. Based par t ly on the impact ofregional piracy on Chinese shipping and partlyon Beijing's desire to be seen as a responsiblestakeholder in ensuring maritime security, th ecounter-piracy deployments are par t o fa widerinternational effort to protect shipping duringtransits through the strategic sea lane of th eGulf ofAden into th e Indian Ocean. China'sparticipation serves several purposes: fIrst, itis in line with th e mission requirements of th ePLA(N) to protect the PRe's strategic interests; second, it provides th e opportunity for th ePLA(N) to develop an d refine the operationalcapabilities it needs for "distant seas" operations; an d third, it enhances China's image as aresponsible member of th e global community.

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Chapter Two:

PLA(N) Structure and LeadershipAffiffiX:?t=rtff.~ ....n;lJ]

OrganizationThe Central Military Commiss ion (CMC) sitsat t he top of China's national command structure. Chaired by PRC President HuJintao,this group oversees and sets policy for China'sarmed forces. The CMC consists of the headsof each of the General Departments of thePLA, the commande r of each of th e armedservices, an d other selected officers.

Immediately below th e CMC a re the fourGeneral Departments ofthe PLA: GeneralStaff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and theGeneral Armament Department.

The PLA(N) Headquarters in Beijing issubordinate to the General Staf f Departmentand consists offour first-level departmentswhich provide critical support to the operational fleets. The Headquarters Departmentoversees overall PLA(N) operations, training,communications, and intelligence; th e PoliticalDepartment is responsible for al l political workincluding discipline, officer assignments, propaganda , and security; th e Logistics Department handles construction offacilities, technica l support to naval vessels, fuel, health care,finance, transportation, and other critical areasrelated to supply; and th e Armament Department provides technical support to al l PLA(N)

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equipment and weapons systems from conceptdevelopment to retirement.

The PLA(N) has three geographically-orientedfleets to direct its day-to-day operations. TheNorth Sea Beet , headquartered in Qingdao, isresponsible for th e Bohai, Yellow Sea, and thenorthern port ion of th e East China Sea. TheEast Sea Beet, headquartered in Ningbo, cov-ers the majority of the Eas t China Sea and th eTaiwan Strait. The South Sea Beet , headquartered in Zhanjiang, is responsible for th e SouthChina Sea.

AdlTliral Wu Shengli:Building a Powerful NavyDuring a me eting of th e PLA Navy PartyCommittee in late 2006, President HuJintaocalled for a "powerful" and "combat ready"navy. It is th e jo b of current PLA(N) Commander and CMC member, Admiral \!\TuShengli, to build such a force.

ADM \!\Tu shares President Hu's concerns fordeveloping a navy that can address China'ssecurity requirements for th e 21 st century. \!\Tuhas been the most vocal and successful advocate of a greatly expanded mission for th ePLA(N) since Admiral Liu in th e 1980s.

At the 2004 National People's Congress,then-South Sea Beet Commander \!\Tucalled for th e creation of a special "maritime exploration" research group, possiblyto support China's disputed maritimeclaims in the South China Sea.

In a 2007 article published in anofficial CCP journal, \!\Tu and thenPLA(N) Political Commissar ADMHu Yanlin wrote that "the ocean isth e large passageway for internationalinteractions and th e sustainable strategicresource reservoir for humans. In orderto protect .. . resource development.. .scientific tests, to maintain th e safety of

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PLA(N) Deputy CommanderVice Admiral Ding Yiping

North Se a Beet senior officers whose careersurvived the aftermath of a submarine disasterin 2003 in which the entire crew perished. Hispromotion to Navy Chief ofStaff and DeputyPLA(N) Commander in 2006 occurred at th esame time as ADM WU's promotion to PLA(N)

Commander. Since his arrival at PLA(N) HQ,VADM Ding has been mentioned in officialChinese press as becoming "one of the mos timportant commanders ofimportant navaloperations."

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Chapter Three:

Procurement - China's NIove toQuality Over Quantity

Luyang II Class GuidedMissile Destroyer andJiangwei II Class Frigate

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The PLA(N) surface force is one of the largestin th e world, and its capabilities are growing ata remarkable rate. In the past decade, the focusof China's naval procurement has shifted fromlarge numbers of low-capability, single-missionplatforms to a smaller force of highly capable,multimission systems. In the 1990s, the PLA(N)began to acquire a variety of advanced aircraft,submarines an d surface ships, as well as associated modern weapons, sensors and combatsystems. Using a combination of imported

technology, reverse engineering, an d indigenousdevelopment, the PRC rapidly narrowed thetechnology and capability gapsbetween thePLA(N) and modern navies. Despite continuing challenges in some aspects of command,control, an d communications, toclay's PLA(N)shows increased competency when operat-ing farther f rom shore and in all of th e m::9orwarfare areas----in stark contrast to a decadeago when the PLA(N) was a moderately capableanti-surface coastal defense force with marginal

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anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-submarinewarfare (ASW) capabilities. Likewise, th e PLANavy Air Force (pLANAF) is significantly ex-panding its capabilities to allow China to projectair power farther from shore, eventually in acarrier-based capacity. China is undertaking aprogram to both operationaJize an incompleteformer Soviet Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier(likely as a training platform) and build an indig-enous carrier tojoin th e fleet between 2015 and2020. The PLA(N) of the near future will bea well-rounded,multimission force capable ofregularly operating beyond its local geographicregion in th e \!\estern Pacific.

Developing MultiITl.ission PlatforITl.sOver th e past 10 years, th e PLA(N) ha s undertaken a comprehensive modernization campaign, paying particular attention to developing anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities,both in surface and submarine development.The surface force has also invested in developing a credible AAW capability in order to severdependence on land-based air defense andenable missions in more dis tant seas. WhileASW has not received th e same level of effort,noteworthy steps have been made. Overall,China is making significant progress in transforming its navy from a coastal defense force

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The Old and the New

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Platfonn Tota l NlunherDiesel Attack Submarines 53Nuclear Attack Submarines 6Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines 3Destroyers 26Frigates 48Amphibious Ships 58Coastal Patrol (Missile) 80+

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with moderate anti-surface capability to one withtrue multimission potential.PLA(N) Surface ForceChina's naval surface force currently consistsof an eclectic mix of modern and legacyplatforms, utilizing a variety of weapons, sensors,and overlapping capabilities. During its rapidtechnological advancement, the PLA(N) hasimported "proven" high-capability platforms fromabroad (primarily Russia), while concurrentlyproducing advanced indigenous platformsusing both imported and domestic engineering,weapons andsensors. Theforce strength in2009 consists ofapproximately26 destroyers, 48frigates, more than80 missile-armedpatrol craft, 58amphibious ships,40 mine warfareships, 50 m ~ o r auxiliaries, and over 250 minorauxiliaries and service/ support craft.In recent years, the most notable upgrade to thePLA(N) surface force has been its shipboardarea-air-defense (AAD) capability. Only a decadeago, the longest-range shipborne surface-to-airmissile (SAM) was the Crotale-based HHQ-7( ~ 7 n m ) . Currently the PLA(N) operates new shipswith four different SAMs with varying degreesof AAD capability. These include the Sovremen-nyy I I I I and Luyang I class destroyers (DDGs)with the Russian SA-N-7 ( ~ 1 2 - 2 0 n m ) , theLuzhou DDG with the Russian SA-N-20/RIF-M( ~ 8 0 n m ) , the Luyang II DDG with ChineseHHQ-9 ( ~ 5 5 n m ) , and the]iangkai I I class frigate(FFG) with the new vertically-launchedHHQ-16 ( ~ 2 0 - 4 0 n m ) . These SAM systems are linkedon their respective platforms with advancedair-surveillance systems, including the RussianTombstone and Top Plate and Chinese DragonEye phased-array radar.

The development of a sea-based AAD capabilityis critical to the PLA(N)'s aspirations of operating in "distant seas." I t allows PLA(N) combatants to operate outside of shore-based ai r defensemore confidently, with long range SAMs capableof engaging air targets outside of air-to-surfaceweapons range. I t also increases the efficiencyof the surface force by allowing a single ship tofocus on a ir defense for an entire group.In addition, the PLA(N) has upgraded its abilityto engage surface ships through the acquisitionof advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)

and over-thehorizon targeting(OTH-T) systems.Four Sovremen-nyy I1IIDDGscarry t he SSN-22 Sunburn( ~ 1 3 0 n m ) , whilethe Luyang IIDDG is fittedwith th e newly de

veloped YJ-62 (-120nm) and most other combatants carry the YJ -8A ASCM ( ~ 6 5 n m ) . The useof shipboard helicopters, the Mineral-ME radar,and datalinks give the PLA(N) an improvingcapability to carry ou t OTH-T operations.Although the PLA(N) surface fleet has only amoderate ASW capability, it has improved in re cent years with the addit ion ofmodern towed-array sonar and embarked helicopters. The smaller"submarine chaser" patrol craft that Chinaoperated in large numbers during the 1970s and1980s are no-longer emphasized, and most havebeen phased ou t in favor of more capable frigates, helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.At the same t ime the PLA(N) has bui lt up itslong-range capability, it has also reinforced itscoastal defense and near-littoral strengths withthe introduction ofthe highly-capable Houbeiclass guided-missile patrol craft (PTG) in 2004.The Houbei utilizes a wave-piercing catamaran

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Kuznetsov CV Hull 2 undergoingrenovation a t Dalian

China's Carr ier PrograrrlBeijing recognizes the role a modern navy plays in a nation's international status. China is the only permanent U.N. Security Council member without an aircraft carrier, while other nations such as India, Thailand,and Brazil operate carriers. Though aircraft carriers are viewed in the U.S. as instruments offorce projection,Chinese military and government representatives have stated aircraft carriers are necessary for protectingChina's maritime territorial integrity. In particular, aircraft carriers would allow the PLA(N) to opera te moresecurely outside the envelope of Chinese land-based air defenses.Beginning in early 2006, PRC -owned media has reported statements from high-level officials on China'sintent to build aircraft carriers. At the March 2009 National People's Congress, former PLA(N) PoliticalComm is sar Admiral Hu Vanlin stated that China is capable ofbu ilding aircraft carriers and that increasingsecurity demands require their acquisition. Press statements by China's mili tary and defense-industrial establishment also indicate that research and development for carrier construction is underway.In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet Ku;::,netsou class aircraft carrier, which has been undergoing renovation since 2002 at Dalian Shipyard. This carrier is expected to become operational in the 2010to 2012 timeframe, and will like ly be used to develop bas ic proficiencies in carr ier operat ions. Though theconstruction of an indigenous aircraft carrier has yet to be publicly announced, the PRC will likely have anoperational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015.China continues to show interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters, and Russian press reporting from 2006 indicated China wanted to purchase up to 50 aircraft. Recent press, however, suggests thattalks between the two countries have stalled because ofChina's insistence on purchasing an initial batch ofonly a few aircraft. Despite these reports, it is too soon to dismiss a contract for the aircraft as China is clearlyinterested in pursuing a carrier aviation program. Some press indicates that China obtained one Su-33 fromUkraine earlier this decade. If the reports are true, it is possible that China could apply that technology to itsown carrier aircraft program.

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hullform, probably based on a commercial fastferry design, and water jet propulsion to attainconsiderably better seakeeping, speed, and mission flexibility than the older Gsa and Houkumissile boats that they replaced. The relativelylow construction, operating, and crew costs ofthe Houbeis have allowed China to build wellover 50 to date, with more under construction.Furthermore, the Houbei's ability to patrolcoastal and littoral waters and react at shortnotice allows the PLA(N)'s larger combatantsto focus on offshore defense and out-of-areamissions without leaving a security gap alongChina's coastline. Houbeis are equipped withfour YJ -8A ASCM ( ~ 5 0 n m ) , a 30mm Gatlinggun, and possibly a man-portable ai r defensesystem (MANPAD). They can exceed 50 knotsand cruise in rougher seas than similarly-sizedmonohull patrol craft.

The number ofChina's amphibious ships hasremained steady in recent years, bu t during thelast decade a program was initiated to replacemost of the vintage Yuliang LSM and LST 511class ships with newer, more capable uni t s -including the Yuting II class LST and Yunshuclass LSM-----which have better seakeeping,longer endurance, better reliability, and largerloadouts. In 2007 China commissioned itsfirst Yuzhao class amphibious transport dock(LPD), signaling a developing capability forexpeditionarywarfare and over-the-horizonamphibious assault.

China is significantlyupgrading its fleet ofocean-going auxiliaries in support of longerrange operations. A decade ago the PRC hadonly a small number of ocean-going auxiliaries, most ofwhich were research ships. \!Vithforces operating farther from shore in recentyears, the PLA(N) added two new Fucm classreplenishment oilers-one ofwhich joined theanti-piracy deployments to th e Horn ofMrica.Several other large auxiliaries have recentlybeen added to support specific and growingmissions of importance to China: the AnweiAH (humanitarian relief), the Danyao AF(island resupply), the Yuan Wang 5&6 AGM(satellite and rocket launch telemetry), andth e Dalao ASR (advanced submarine rescue).In addition, a number of specialized researchand survey ships have entered service recently,including the PLA(N),s first SmallWaterplaneArea Twin Hull (SWATH) hullform.

PLA(N) Subm.arine ForceSince the mid-1990s, the PRC has emphasizedthe submarine force as one of the primarythrusts of its military modernization effort.The PLA(N) envisions a more lethal forceequipped with advancedweapons and sensors,capable of sustained long-duration patrols andable to avoid detection by opposing forces.Beijing believes that such a force would providea powerful conventional and strategic deterrentin both peacetime and war.

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Th e different platforms in the submarineforce reflect th e various missions envisionedby th e PLA(N). Diesel-electric submarines

As PLA(N) strategy and capabilities havechanged, Chinese submarine procurementha s focused on smaller numbers ofmodern,high-capability boats. In keeping with theoverarching PLA(N) strategy of the t ime, the1980s submarine force featured a relativelyhigh number oflow-technology platforms. Nowthere ar e fewer submarines in th e PLA(N)inventory than there were at any point in th e1980s. Currently, the submarine force consists of six nuclear attack submarines, threenuclear ballistic missile submarines, and 53diesel attack submarines. Over the nex t 10 to15 years, primarily due to the introduction ofnew diesel-electric and air independent power(AlP) submarines, th e force is expected toincrease incrementally in size to approximately75 submarines.

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are regularly used for patrols along major sealanes within China's regional seas and into th ePhilippine Sea. In wartime, these platformscan also be prepositioned along crit ical SLOCsin order to interdict opposing forces. China'snewer SSBNs ar e designed to provide th e PRCwith a credible second-strike capability. Dueto superior endurance and increased speedcapabilities over diesel-electric submarines,China 's small SSN force will most likely beused for long-range Intelligence, Surveil-lance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and ASuWin th eapproaches to China's regional seas. Othermissions, including protection for both China'sfledgling SSBN force as well as support to an yfuture aircraft carriers are possible, althoughthe expected small force size would presumablyrestrict th e number of submarines that couldbe assigned those missions. The most capableSSNs ar e likely to be used for patrol operationsoflonger duration and distances in th e Pacifican d possibly Indian Oceans.

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The PLA(N) is currently transitioning fromolder, less reliable attack submarines like th eRomeo SS , Ming SS and Han SSN to th emore modern Kilo SS , Yuan SS, Shang SSNand th e Type 095 SSN. These more advancedplatforms include larger weapons loadouts,better weaponry, improved quieting, and moreadvanced computer processing. The Song SS,Yuan SS, and Shang SSN a re the PLA(N),snewest indigenous submarines, and the firstto be designed to employ th e YJ-82 ASCM inaddition to the traditional weapons loadout oftorpedoes and mines. The Yuan SS, China 'smost advanced diesel submarine, possiblyincorporates quieting technology from th eRussian-designed Kilo. Itmay also be fittedwith an AlP system, which enables a diese lsubmarine to operate for significantly longerperiods of time without surfacing to rechargeits batteries. China is further expanding itscurrent force ofnuclear attack submarines byadding five advanced Type 095 SSNs to th ecurrent inventory ofSSN s in th e coming years.China is also developing a near-continuousat-sea strategic deterrent with theJin SSBNprogram. TheJin class is being buil t as a follow-on to China's first generation Xia SSBN.The more advancedJin SSBN will carry th enewJL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBM) ( ~ 4 , O O O n m ) . TheJL-2 SLBM has anincreased range over th e Xia'sJL-l SLBM an d

is capable of reaching the continental UnitedStates from Chinese littorals. TheJin SSBNwith theJL-2 SLBM gives th e PLA Navy itsfirst credible second-strike nuclear capability.People's Liberation ArIllY Navy AirForce (PLANAF)The PLANAF provides the Chinese Navy withits own air capability independent from th ePeople's Liberation Army Ai r Force (PLAAF).Originally designed to provide air cover fornavy ships at sea, this role has begun to receiveless emphasis with the advent ofnewer navycombatants with more capable air defense syst ems. Now th e PLANAF's role has expandedto cover maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), maritime strike, logistical support,and even airborne early warning. VVith th eexception of a handful of shipborne helicopters, th e PLANAF remains a land-based force;however, the impending acquisition of anaircraft carrier promises an even larger role forth e force in th e future.HelicoptersThe PLANAF operates three main helicopterplatforms: th e Z-9C, th e Z-8, and the RussianKa-28 Helix. The Z-9C is th e PRC's primarynaval helicopter, used chiefly for ASWandsearch and rescue (SAR) operations. The Z-9Ccan also be fitted with surface search radarto detect surface ships far beyond the range

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PLANAF Airfields and Ranges

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operates eight Ka-28s of f of the Sovremennyyand Luyang DDGs for ASW and SAR roles.

Fixed-wing AircraftThe PLANAF has made great strides in fixedwing aviation over the last two decades, no tonly significantly upgrading the quality of itsfighters, but also expanding the types of aircraft it operates. This force was founded uponhigh technology imports, primarily but no texclusively from Russia, bu t recent years have

The Z-8 is a Chinese-licensed copy oftheFrench SA-321 Super Fre1on. The Z-8 isa medium l ift helicopter performing trooptransport, AS\!\!, ASu\!\!, minesweeping, andminelaying missions. The Z-8 is significantlylarger than the KA-28 and the Z-9C, providing a greater cargo capacity, bu t also limitingits ability to deploy on PLA(N) combatants.

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of shipboard radar systems, and can engagesurface ships with the ET-52 torpedo. TheZ-9C is a licensed copy of the French AS 365Dauphin, and although early models wereassembled with imported components, by the1990s over 70 percent of the Z-9C was produced with Chinese components. There arenow approximately ten active Z-9Cs in thePLANAF inventory.Although the Z-9C remains the principalPLANAF helicopter, the Ka-28 Helix isalso used extensively, as highlighted by itsrole as the shipborne helicopter support forthe Horn of Africa anti-piracy deployment.China acquired th e Helix, the export variantof Russia's Ka-27, in conjunction with thepurchase of the Sovremennyy class destroyers.\!Vhile slower than the Z-9C, it can carrynearly double the cargo load. The PLANAF

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PLANAFJH-7 aircraft on approach to landingseen significant gains in domestic productionand competitiveness.The PLANAF's fighter inventory is comprisedof the indigenousJ-8 interceptor and the highlysuccessful Su-30 Flanker. Both the PLAAFand PLANAF use various types of Flankers,which were acquired between 1992 and 2002.Of particular note is the PLANAF's Su-30MK2. In 2002, China purchased 24 of theseaircraft, which feature both an extended rangeand maritime radar systems. This allows theMK2 to strike enemy ships at long distances,while stillmaintaining a robust air-to-air capability. TheJ -8 interceptor is a more limited,bu t still effective all-weather air-to-air combataircraft. Built in China, i t was originally basedon Russian designs bu t has since undergonesignificant upgrades. Like th e Flanker, Chinaoperates severalversions of this aircraft. TheJ-8 is perhaps best known in the West as theaircraft that collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3reconnaissance aircraft in 2001.For maritime strike, the PLANAFprimarily relies on variants of its H-6. The H-6 is alicensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badgermedium je t bomber, maritime versions ofwhich can employ advanced ASCMs againstsurface targets. Some H-6s have been modified as tankers or drone launchers, increasing the PLANAF 's flexibility and range. ThePLANAF also employs variants oftheJH-7,

an indigenously produced tandem-seat fighter!bomber, for maritime strike. Updated versionsoftheJH-7 feature a more capable radar andadditional weapons capacity, enhancing itsmaritime strike capabilities.In addition to combat aircraft, the PLANAFis expanding its inventory offixed-wingMaritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), AirborneEarly Warning (AEW) and AEW and Control(AEW&C) aircraft. China has achievedsignificant new capabilities by modifyingseveral existing airframes. The Y-8, a Chineselicensed version ofthe ex-Soviet An-12 Cub,forms th e basic airframe for several specialvariants. The Y-8X is the primary ChineseMPA, and AEWand AEW&C aircraft havealso been based on this basic airframe. TheAEW and AEW&C aircraft feature varioustypes of radar designed for both a ir andsurface detection and tracking. Based on themuch larger Russian-made IL-76 transport,the PLAAF's KJ-2000 Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) aircraft is similarin capability to the Y-8 AEW&C variants. Allof these aircraft playa key role in providinga clear picture of surface and ai r contactsin the maritime environment. As the navypushes farther from the coast, long-rangeaircraft capable of extended on-station timesto ac t as the eyes and ears of the fleet becomeincreasingly important.

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Anti-Access DeveloplTlentsMuch o fChina's military modernizationeffort has been driven by Taiwan contingencyplanning. In order to deter or counter thirdparty intervention, in th e mid-late 1990s Chinabegan fielding a comprehensive command,control, communications, computers,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(C4ISR) capability (the most visible part ofwhich is th e expanded Chinese space program)and began to focus on modern submarines.China also engaged in a large-scale expansionof its cruise an d ballistic missile capabilitiesacross th e board, building large numbersof short range ballistic missiles capable oftargeting Taiwan. Alongside the expansion ofits anti-ship cruise missile inventory, Chinaalso initiated ground-breaking research intotargeting an aircraft carrier with a ballisticmissile.Anti-Ship Ballistic MissilesThe PRC has been conducting advancedresearch into an anti-ship ballistic missile(ASBM) program since th e 1990s. This ASBMmay be a variant of the DF-2l Medium RangeBallistic Missile (MRBM), with the capabilityto perform a mid-course ballistic correctionmaneuver to update the target's location, andthen guide a Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle(MaRV) to th e target. An ASBM's long range,high-reentry speed (Mach 10-12), radicalmaneuvers, and munitions designed to attackaircraft carrier sub-systems combine to createa complex threat.

New DF-21 variant on TEL with nosecap

Research in th e 1990s examined th e multipleproblems associated with detecting, tracking,targeting, and finally hitting an aircraft carrierwith a ballistic missile. This research examinedvarious systems that may be required: satellitereconnaissance, over-the-horizon radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (DAV), relay satellites,a C4ISR fusion center to merge all the oceansurveillance data, and finally a missile capableof performing a large terminal maneuver anddelivering a guided MaRV payload.Chinese studies suggested a missi le able toconduct a mid-course boost maneuver, whichcould change the missile's ballistic trajectory,would be able to successfully engage a maneuvering target at long range. Research furthernoted how-if the maneuver were guided bya target update-such a change in tr

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missile defenses. Researchers considered thataircraft carrier sub-systems, such as catapults, arresting wires, topside electronics, andelevators, would be vulnerable to "missionkill" strikes by sub-munitions deployed froman ASBM, and that the aircraft carrier's deckitself could be penetrated by a ballistic missilearriving at high speed.Chinese papers have described hypotheticalengagements between the U.S . Navy and anASBM version of th e DF-21 MRBM, variantsofwhich have been in service with th e PLASecond Artillery since th e 1990s. The originalvariants of this missile were canister mountedand transported on a mobile erector launcher (MEL), but more modern variants aremounted on highly mobile transporter erectorlauncher (TEL), and feature an extended nosecap that could deliver a MaRV payload.Anti-Ship Cruise MissilesThe PLA(N) continues to increase itsmaritime strike capability through domesticASCM research and development programs,

and through th e acquisition of advancedforeign ASCMs and launch platforms.Missile designs are focused on increasing themissile's range and employment flexibility inaddition to improving its ability to penetrateship defensive systems. ASCMs are deployedon multiple launch platforms: surfacecombatants, submarines, aircraft and coastaldefense sites, and provide the PLA(N) with amultilayeredmaritime strike capability.The extended reach of PLA(N) ASCMs isillustrated bythe acquisition of the formidableSS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler fromRussia and th e recently fielded domesticallydeveloped YJ-62 and YJ-83. Prior to theseadvances, th e subsonic YJ-8A had th e longestrange of any ASCM in the PLA(N) inventoryat ~ 6 5 n m . A new version of this missile, theYJ-83, has been introduced with an increasedrange of ~ 9 5 n m . \!Vith a range of ~ 1 5 O n m ,th e YJ-62 further increases the reach of th ePLA(N). This subsonic, sea-skimming missile isdesigned to sink or disable medium to large sizeships. These domestic ASCM developments

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-The C602 c an b e land or ship-launched

China continues to focus on developing ASCMcapabilities with th e emphasis on faster, longerrange and more flexible missiles with improvedelectronic systems and terminal evasionmaneuvers. Future ASCMs are expectedto continue to advance seeker capabilitiesincluding th e expanded use ofmillimeter waveseekers and th e possible use of coherent radarseekers that allow enhanced countermeasurediscrimination. The continuing developmentofASCMs with improved design features suchas supersonic speed, evasive maneuvers, andadvanced terminal seekers will present ongoingchallenges to navies throughout the region.

Unlllanned Aerial VehiclesChina is developing DAVs that have th epotential to bring multimission capabilities to

Low Cost, High Yield InvestlTlentsWhile China ha s placed considerable effort inacquiring and developing advanced systemslike those described above, Beijing recognizesthese are complex an d expensive programs.China is also actively pursuing programswhich are much lower in price, bu t still highlyeffective.

have been supplemented with th e SS-N-27( ~ 1 2 0 n m ) an d th e SS-N-22 ( ~ 1 3 0 n m ) .

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Along with extended ranges, th e PLA(N) ha slikely increased missile employment flexibilityas well. The C602, and perhaps others, usesan inertial navigation system integrated withGlobal Positioning System (GPS) updates.These improved navigation capabilities allow amissile to fly a pre-programmed, indirect flightpath to a target. This in turn allows for th epossibility oflaunching multiple missiles in acoordinated attack, arriving at targets simultaneously and from different angles. Multiplemissiles approaching the targe t a t the samet ime from different directions increase th e likelihood of penetrating a ship's defensive systems.The ability to engage targets at long rangesbrings substantial advantages, but employinglong range ASCMs requires effective over th ehorizon (OTH) targeting. China may be planning to use OTH radar, satellites, and DAVsto detect targets and relay th e information toth e missile launch operators. ASCM terminalseekers should be capable of homing into atarget once th e missile seeker ha s identified th etarget in flight.

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Harpy VAV on d is playat the 2007 Paris Air Show

the maritime environment. In recent years,Chinese officials have openly touted thebenefits ofUAVs, such as low manufacturingcosts, lack of personnel casualties, and inherent"stealth-like" characteristics. Of note are theCH-3 (which has reportedly been fielded withoperational units) an d China's unmannedcombat aerial vehicle (UCAV) concepts.Not only can the CH-3 provide real timevideo for various intelligence purposes, it isbeing advertised with the ability to carry ou tstrike missions with two on-board anti-tankmissiles. The UCAV concepts reportedly beingdeveloped can not only perform intelligencegathering and strike missions, but an air-to-aircapability is also noted as a primary mission.Overall, China is openly highlighting th eimportance ofUAVs in modern warfare andis allocating resources to develop multimissioncandidates for this role.China ha s reportedly purchased the Israelimade Harpy UCAV. Harpys are "fire andforget" weapons designed to loiter in a patrolarea, detect enemy radar and engage targetsin any weather condition. After identifying aradar emitter, th e Harpy executes an almostvertical dive and detonates just above th e target. The small, relatively inexpensive and independently operated air vehicles have th e abilityto stay in the a ir for extended periods of time

and can be launched from trucks or potentiallyfrom surface ships.Nava l MinesMining operations ca n be a relatively low-cost,high-value force multiplier. China has learnedthe importance ofmine warfare from severaldecades of observation. Libya'smine-laying inthe Red Seain 1984, which damaged II commercialvessels; Iran's Arabian Gulfminingduring th e "Tanker Wars," which damagedUSS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS in 1988; andPersian Gulfmining in 1991, which damagedUSS TRIPOLI and USS PRINCETON-these incidents serve as reminders that mining operations remain an extremely effectiveoperational form ofwarfare that can causedifficulties for even th e most advanced navies.The PLA(N) has moved from an obsolete mineinventory consisting primarily ofpre-WWIImines to a robust and modern inventoryincluding moored, bottom, drifting, rocketpropelled and intelligent mines. The PLA(N)'smore advanced mines feature microprocessorsfor better targeting and integrated sensors toresist sweeping. The mines can be l aid by submarines (primarily for covert mining of enemyports), surface ships, aircraft, and fishing an dmerchant vessels.

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Although the PLA(N) considers its mine coun-termeasure (MCM) capabilities to be rela-tively advanced, including continued practicein complex,joint environments and duringEmission Controlled (EMCON) conditionsand nighttime sweeping operations, China stillrecognizes mines could be a m::9or difficultyfor its future naval operations. The PLA(N)has recently launched a new minesweeper,th e Woehi MHS, and may be developing anindigenously produced version of th e PlutoPlus Mine Neutralization Vehicle (MNV)with magnetic and acoustic sweep gear. Thisindicates th e PLA(N) is maturing into a morecapable naval force by improving its capability

to protect its waters from mines, in addition toclearing minefields Chinese forces may havesown during a conflict.As with many other naval platforms, compo-nents and weapons systems, th e PRC is ex-panding its domestic research and developmentfor underwater weapons, moving away frompast reliance on imported systems and technol-ogy. In addition, th e PLA(N) has reportedlydeveloped a maintenance inspection programfor th e upkeep of existing mine stockpiles. Thisis a necessary evolution to ensure that the moreadvanced mines using microprocessors andbatteries are operational when needed.

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Chapter Four:

Personnel - Progress Towards aProfessional ForceA

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Chinese sai lors man the ra il s aboard Luhu class destroyer ~ n g d a o (DD 113).

To operate and maintain its growing array ofadvanced platforms, th e PLA(N) needs a highlytrained force of officers and sailors. In recentyears, the PLA(N) has begun robust recruiting,retention, and training campaigns to reducereliance on conscripts and raise the qualityof its personnel. In addition to improving theraw talent entering the armed forces, China isdeveloping a non-commissioned officer (NCO)corps in order to capture technical knowledgeand improve the retention of enlisted sailors.China is making noteworthy progress inthese areas, and its ability to continue thismomentum will be a significant factor in th elong term operational effectiveness of th ePLA(N).

China 's Personnel PushPrior to 1999, poorly educated volunteer conscripts, primarily from rural areas, made up themajority ofPLA(N) personnel. In 1999, a re vised Military Service Law changed the servicetime of these conscripts from four years to twoand increased the length oftime NCOs couldserve from 16 to 30 years. The PLA(N) also extended themaximum age of service for NCOsup to 55. These changes were implemented fortwo reasons: to deal with the fruition of th e na tion's one-child policy and to develop a dedicated NCO corps similar to western militaries. \l\li.th the implementation of the one-childpolicy in 1979, parents of conscripts had a difficult time coping with four years of separation

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1999 Military Service LawGrade DesignationsNCO Grade Rank Years in Rank Total TiIne in ServiceGrade 1 3 years 1-3 yearsJuniorLevel Grade 2 3 years 4-6 years

Grade 3 4 years 7-10 yearsIntermediate Level Grade 4 4 years 11-14 yearsGrade 5 5 years 15-19 yearsSenior Level Grade 6 9 years 20-30 years

Most NCOs are Grade 1 or 2 40% of al l PLA(N) personnel ar eNCOs

NCOs account for 65-80% ofenlisted personnel aboard ships

32

f rom the ir only child. Since 1999, the PLA(N)has decreased th e nUInbers of conscripts and in creased th e nUInber of NCOs t o approxiInately40 percent of al l PLA(N) personnel.

To become an NCO, conscripts must completeindividual applications and be recommended,evaluated, and approved by their unit. Furtheradvancement is based on a series of academicand physical tests. \!Vith force modernizationproviding more modern and complex systemsand equipment, NCOs a re t ak ing on an expanded role, performing jobs previously doneby conscripts and officers. NCOs now accountfor between 65 to 80 percent of all enlistedpersonnel on board ships and serve as squadleaders, mess officers, conscript trainers, andtechnical experts.

In addition to changes in th e enlisted corps, th ePLA(N) is downsizing its officer corps in orderto create a higher caliber force. PLA(N) officers are expected to lead and to demonstrateoperational skill and professional, political, andtechnical knowledge in a complex, modernenvironment. To realize these expectations,the PLA(N) has expanded such programsas National Defense Scholarship Program,similar to th e U.S. Reserve Officer TrainingCorps (ROTC), increased technical training atPLA(N) naval academies, nurtured th e development of training and education in the fleet,and focused on increasing th e nUInber ofhigherdegrees (Masters and Doctorates) within theofficer corps.

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Recruitment pos ter in Beijing: "A nationwithout a defense cannot exist , peoplewithout a :military cannot be secure."

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With the changingdynamics of the approximately 290,000PLA(N) personnel,issues associated withmanning, quality oflife, education, recruitment, and retentionwill continue to bea significant area of

concern for th e PLA(N). The PLA(N) has responded by reevaluating old policies, redefining th e role ofthe NCO, and looking for newmethods to recruit and retain quality personnel. The PLA(N) can be expected to continueto emphasize personnel improvements, focus-ing on education, training, reorganization, andultimately, higher standards of performance inorder to ensure its ability to operate as a modern and effective force.

favorable impressions of th e navy. In 2007,the PLA(N) issued new uniforms to all ranks,attempting to create a more modern image.Understanding the increasing competitionfrom the civilian sector in a growing economy,

th e PLA(N) has alsoincreased pay, subsidies,and allowances andhas begun to addressquality of life issues inattempts to recruit andretain more qualifiedpersormel.

In order to attract and recruit more qualifiedpersormel, the PLA(N) pursues availablemedia and educational opportunities to create

study rooms at navaltraining and supportbases. Study roomsare often equippedwith computers,libraries, politicallectures, military newspapers, and internet ac-cess. Ad-hoc and on the job training has beenexpanded with a push toward th e redundancyof specific skill sets within a unit. ProfessionalMilitary Education (PME) is pushed at bothth e officer and NCO grades.

Education and training ofpersormel within thePLA(N) is also increasing. Conscripts who jointh e PLA(N) are now only given basic trainingbefore reporting to their specific unit, whiletraining and education of NCOs has expandedto take advantageof the longer NCOservice periods. Neweducation and training programs includeonline, short-term,and on-the-job train-ing opportunities aswell as improvementsin NCO academiesand support training bases. Sailorshave access to new

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Chapter Five:Training, Exercises, andJoint

Operations

34

Over th e last several years, more complex andrealistic scenarios in individual unit trainingand integrated, multiplatform exercises haveenhanced the PLA(N)'s ability to successfullytackle th e complexities ofmodern warfare.Additionally, th e PLA(N) is placing greateremphasis on long range surface an d submarinepatrols, which allow expanded opportunitiesto practice the technical an d tactical skills thatwill be required in modern wartime operatingenvironments.

At th e same time, China has highlighted th eimportance of developing a true joint capability--labeled IntegratedJoint Operat ions- andha s begun developing th e appropriate doctrine. In 2004, a major step was taken with th eelevation of the commanders ofthe navy, ai rforce, an d Second Artillery to ful l membershipin th e CMC, where previously only th e armyconsistently had full representation. Empha-sis onjointness has been noted in exercises,professional education, an d logistical planning,yet significant challenges still exist. Progresscontinues to be hampered by a decades-olddomination ofthe Chinese military by thearmy, which remains at many levels.

Training and ExercisesOver th e last eightyears PLA(N) training ha sbecome increasingly complex and realistic.Historically, PLA(N) training was heavilyinfluenced by the annua l conscription cycle,

with m::9or training stand-downs occurring inlate-November an d lasting through theearly part of the new year. The current training cycle still follows this basic pattern, but asth e PLA(N) depends less on conscripts andevolves into a professional force, th e fleetsare able to conductmore sophisticated training early in th e year and maintain a higherstate of readiness throughout the year. ThePLA(N) training year begins in earnest following th e annual Lunar New Year holiday inlate-january/early February. During this earlyphase of the training year, the pr imary focus ison flotilla integration and basic warfare skillsincluding gunnery, navigation, and formationtraining. As the year advances, basic skillstraining transitions to multidiscipline warfaretraining, to include a focus on anti-air, surface,and submarine warfare. Training and exercisesduring this t ime of year may include opposingforce and multiple task force operations or integrated training among air units, surface ships,and submarines. By mid-year, PLA(N) unitsin each of th e three m::9or fleets will conductat least one major fleet-level exercise featuringsimulated or live-fire weapon launches, andone m::9or fleet-level amphibious exercise.At the c limax ofthe training year in l ate summer or ear ly fall, coordinated training andexercises featuring multiple aircraft, surfacecombatants, and submarines a t t he fleet levelare common. During th e last quarter of th e

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Phase 1: NovelTlberSpring Festival Basic in-port and at-seatraining

.,; Gunnery againstland targets, lectures,regulation study

.,; Starting to changeespecially with incresasein NCO ratio

.,; More advance d traini ngnow being done beforeSpring Festival

Phase 2: March-June ForTIlal tllultivessel

training";Workwith PLANAF";Warfare-area type training

Phase 3:June -Oc tobe r Task Force level training, culTIlinatingwithexercise

vtf5*JtApiM

Annual Training Cycleyear, training is occasionally conducted atth e multifleet level and features multiple taskforces or opposing force demonstrations.Multifleet training typically includes multiplelive-fire weapon launches. Late summer oftenbrings multiservice orjoint amphibious trainin g along th e PRC coastline, in particularalong th e Nanjing and Guangzhou MilitaryRegions. In addition to naval forces, theseexercises commonly feature units from thePLA, PLAAF, an d occasionally the SecondArtillery.

The 2009 Outline [o r Military Training andEvaluation emphasizes realistic training conditions, training in electromagnetic andjointoperating environments and integrating new,advanced technologies in to the force structure.The relative lack of realism and quality ofPLA t raining has been a concern ofChinesemilitary planners for a number of years. As aresult, th e military is heavily emphasizing th edevelopment of tactical training curricula andexercise scenarios resembling actual combatconditions as closely as possible.

Increasing complexity in PLA(N) exercisesis measured through a variety ofmeans, toinclude scale and frequency of training, as wellas th e diversity of tasks accomplished duringeach training evolution. For example, manyhigh profile exercise evolutions that occur earlyin the t ra ining year feature cross-platform(air, surface, and sub), multidiscipline warfaretraining v ice the more traditional individualunit, single discipline warfare focus of th e past.Often t imes these exercises occur with littlepreparation and unfold over a short periodof time. The diversification oftasks is furthercomplicated by th e conditions under which th etraining is conducted, such as low visibility andpoor weather conditions, night versus daytimetraining, and operations featuring hostileelectronic warfare conditions.

The PLA(N) and PLAAF routinely incorporate "opposing forces play" into exercises and,in some cases, design training that compelsofficers to make quick decisions and deviatefrom scripted exercise plans. Surface, submarine, and aviation units are increasingly

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Marines in ranks during a training demonstrat ion

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emphasizing "long-range navigation trainingin unfamiliar sea areas." The intent is no t onlyto enhance operator tactical proficiency inwar-fighting skills, bu t also to gain famil iar itywith th e rigors oflong-duration operations inunfamiliar environmental conditions.

Surface, submarine and aviation trainingincreasingly emphasizes the completion ofmultiple objectives during single underwayperiods or sorties, likely in an effort t o not onlyexpand training diversity and complexity, butalso maximize training while limiting wearon th e platform. As part of integrated opposed force play, exercises stress th e use of th ePLA(N),s newest anti-ship cruise missiles byships and submarines, and the use oftorpedoes by helicopters, ships, and submarines.Operations by ships and helicopters are beinggradually integrated into ASW training, andfrequently include evasion training for th e target submarine. Submarines practice a varietyof operations, including surveillance, approachand attack, an d th e use ofvarious environmental features to reduce their detection by ASW

forces. PLAAF and PLANAF training hasemphasized greater diversity in skills and theimplementation of improved tactics to accommodate new technologies. Aviation trainingincludes practicing tactical combat capabilities,airborne intercept control as well as th e useof datalinks and electronic attack. Moreover,th e PLAAF and PLANAF have opened moreadvanced training centers and are increasinglyusing modern combat and operations simulators to augment training for both operators andtechnical personnel. To support better coordination and integration of force operations fromshore, more realistic command post exercisesare being undertaken to improve officer planning and decision-making skills.

Over the las t te n years , the PLA(N) has helda series of exercises featuring coordinatedwarfare and campaign level training. Many ofthese exercises include the development andtesting of new operational and tactical concepts ' such as surface ship formation strikesagainst large enemy formations, submarinemine laying an d concealed attacks, long-range

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A Luda I Class destroyer and two J iangwei II Class fr iga tes perform underwayreplenishmentwith a Fuchi Class replenishment oiler.

ASuWattacks by PLANAF maritiIne strikeaircraft, andjoint blockade and multiser-vice amphibious training. \!Vhile professionalmilitary education and classroom trainingconstitute a significant portion of a typicalPLA(N) sailor's development and professionalization, at-sea training and exercises form th emain pillar from which his skills are advancedand further developed. PLA(N) training andexercises ar e categorized by five m::9or types:inspection, demonstration, research, tactical,and campaign.

Inspect ion Exercises - Designed toinspect unit-level command and politicalcharacter, identifY problem areas, incorporate lessons learned, an d make appropriatechanges to training and combat readiness.

Detnonstrat ion Exercises - Intended todemonstrate tactical concepts, organizational

and command methods, and combat activities for observers to follow and implement.

Research Exercises - Designed to test andevaluate new weapons an d technical equipment under tactical and mobile situations;research and investigate combat and trainingmethods under modern conditions; conducttheoretical evaluation ofnew organizationalstructures for military forces; evaluate rules,regulations, and teaching materials; andexamine the practicality of combat preparations. One of the most recent research exercises took place inJuly 2008 and featuredaircraft attacking naval ships in an electronicjamming environment.

TacticalExercises - Intended to improveth e command and organizational capabilityof commanders and to improve th e combatcapability of combat units, and are usually

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JJ~ JtX

ChinaThe vast majorityof Pl A (N)oper.JIJOns haveoccurredIn coastal areas and nearmajor oases

C JC Jo

PLA(N) Training and Patrol Areas

0cI 2008: 4 PLA (N)Warships t r 3 n s ~ TsugaruStrait following vlsillo Vladivostok

LocalAroasexpanding area ofInterestMajor PLA (H) Bases

38

scenario specific. Tactical exercises focus onproviding detailed instruction in th e basictactical principles an d methods necessary forsuccessful at-sea operations. Tactical training forms th e foundation for more advancedcampaign-level training later in the trainingyear.

Catnpaign Exercises - Larger-scale exercises with a specific campaign association(e.g. offshore island seizure, anti-ship campaign), designed to improve th e commandand organization of commanders and th eoperational capability of combat units.Campaign exercises a re the highest formof operational unit training, and generallybuild upon th e basic foundation providedby tactical training throughout the trainingyear. The largest of these exercises, suchas SPIRIT 2002 an d EAST SEA 6, are

covered by Chinese press, an d port ions areoften observed by senior members oftheCMG

Through th e early 2000s, major PLA(N)exercises were generally conducted at or nearth e end of a "training quarter" (i.e. April, August, and November) of the traditional training cycle. However, th e PLA(N) ha s recentlyconducted fleet-level and occasional multifleetlevel exercises on a more regular basis, oftentimes early in the training quarter. This shiftdemonstrates th e growing capability of th ePLA(N) and a general improvement in overallreadiness and year-round combat proficiency.

Modern Chinese exercises also frequently feature operations in a "complex electromagneticenvironment" (CEME). Training in a CEMEis viewed as a critical element in the conduct

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ofmodern, "informationized" warfare. GSDdirectives specifically call for increased focuson electronic warfare, information dominance,and use of advanced electronic systems. In anattempt to improve th e realism and complexityof training over th e last several years, PLA(N)training and major exercises have included agreater number of "live" or "hostile" electronicenvironments. In addition, PLA(N) ships, submarines, and occasionally aviation units exercise and t ra in in simulated nuclear, biological,and chemical environments.

Alongside tactical training that increasinglyattempts to simulate th e conditions of realcombat, much greater emphasis is also beingplaced on training in simulated wartime logistics support. Such training includes th e dispatch of salvage and rescue forces to conductre scue of crews, vessel towing, and th e salvageand repair of ships and submarines simulatingbatt le damage. Exercises simulating in-portand underway resupply, refueling, medical support, and weapons loading are also conductedregularly among submarine an d surface units.

.-.;..

PLA(N) submarines train with helicopters

Such training is consistentwith recent years'military command directives that emphasizeth e need to improve th e capabilities of shorebased infrastructure an d naval auxiliary unitsto support ships, submarines, and helicoptersin wartime operations.

Classroom training and th e use of shore-basedsimulators also form a critical component ofth e PLA Navy's training and exercise curriculum. The PLA(N) has at least one vesseltraining center in each of th e three fleets.Vessel training centers are responsible forproviding both theoretical and practical trainin g at the unit or formation level, includinginstruction on basic concepts such as damagecontrol, logistics, and navigation, as well asmore advanced subjects such as large-scaleformation training. The vessel training centersalso provide refresher training for units returnin g from major overhaul or maintenance. Thecourse of instruction builds upon conceptslearned in previous sessions, and becomes increasingly more complex as th e unit advancesto the nex t subject. The vessel training centershave enabled PLA(N) units to maintain higherlevels of readiness and to main tain generalproficiency year-round, and have become animportant component ofthe PLA(N),s trainingan d exercise regimen .Like th e vessel training centers, shore-basedsimulators playa critical role in maintainingunit readiness an d proficiency at the commandstaff, fleet, and flotilla-level. Simulators arelocated in each ofthe three fleets, the largestbeing th e Combat Simulation Center a t t heNaI!,jing Naval Command College. Advancedshore-based simulators provide training in avariety of tact ical areas such as navigation,formation maneuvering, fire control an dradar operations, weapons employment, an dadvanced C4ISR operations. Computerizedsimulators also provide advanced trainingin multidiscipline (i.e. AAW, ASuW, ASW)combined arms (air, surface, and submarine)

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operations as well as opposing force training.PLA(N) personnel frequently utilize classroomsinmlators while ships are undergoingmaintenance or overhaul, or early in the unit'sreadiness cycle.Greater confidence in tactical proficiencylevels, enabled by these developments in training methods and procedures, has increased theChinese military's willingness to participatein bilateral and multilateral exercises. In 2005forces from the PLA, PLAAF, and PLA(N)hosted Russian military forces in PEACEMISSION 05. In turn, Russia hosted PEACEMISSION 07, which represented th e first timePRC forces exercised in a foreign country, andChina hosted a third iteration of the exerciseinJuly 2009. Such cooperation is not limited toRussia; in 2007 PLA(N) warships participatedin Pakistani sponsored AMAN 07 and Singapore sponsored IMDEX 07, the first multilateral exercises for the PLA(N). The PLA(N) alsoparticipated in AMAN 09 in Pakistan. PLA(N)ships routinely conduct bilateral search andrescue exercises with foreign warships duringvisits to foreign por ts o r visits by foreign ships toChinese ports.

PLA(N) Naval PatrolsWhile th e PLA(N) has been conducting long-range naval surface and submarine patrols sinceat least the early 1980s, trends over the last fewyears suggest a greater emphasis on establishinga more routine patrol presence both within andoutside of China's regional waters. Likewise,long-range patrols are emphasizing greaterrealism and complexity in operations thatinclude tactical training while underway. Overthe last few years, the PLA(N) has conductedsurface deployments to th e Sea o fJapan , SouthChina Sea, Philippine Sea, Eastern Pacificand, for the first time in China's modern navalhistory, deployed tasks groups made up of twocombatants and a naval auxiliary to the GulfofAden to support anti-piracy operations.During routine patrols, PLA(N) ship groups

Joint service image f rom thePLA 2008 calendar

are undertaking more complex training andare conducting real-world operations thatinclude deep water ASW, joint steamingnavigation under various conditions, underwayreplenishment and anti-piracy operationsagainst small boats.

When compared to the historical levels of thelast two decades, the number of submarinepatrols over the last few years has more thantripled. Submarine patrols, like the long-rangesurface combatant patrols, are emphasizingfamiliarity with navigation of new sea areasamong other military and securitymissions.While regional seas remain a key area ofconcentration for these patrols, submarines aremore regularly venturing into the PhilippineSea and Western Pacific. The widely reporteduse of the Osumi Strai t nearJapan by a patrolling PLA(N) diesel submarine returning fromthe Philippine Sea in 2003 and operations bynuclear and diesel-powered submarines nearOkinawa in 2004 and 2006 reveal efforts of thePLA(N) submarine force to establish familiarity with navigation routes that may be of use inwartime.

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DevelopingJoint OperationsIn modern wars, it is critical for individualmilitary services to work as a c oh es iv e team.This often requires considerable changes inthought, doctrine, military culture, and equipment; however, such changes a ll ow a militaryto coordinate and leverage th e strengths an dcapabilities of each service into a functioningwhole that is greater than the sum of its parts.A significant part ofthe modernization of China's military has been th e development ofwhatth e PLA calls IntegratedJoint Operations. Unti l recently, "jointness" in th e PLAmeant thatdifferent services operated toward a commongoal in ajoint or combined campaign, but theiroperationswere separatedby time and space.However, years of studying U.S. military operations and observations ofmodern warfarein general have convinced the PLA's leadershipof th e need for greater integration between theservices to include enhancedjoint operations atthe tactical level.Important doctrinal publications, such asth e PLA National Defense University PressScience ofCampaigns, are placing a higherpriority onjoint warfare. The 2004,2006,and 2008 Defense White Papers highlight the

importance of IntegratedJoint Operations,statingjoint operations are the basic form ofmodern warfare and bring the operationalstrengths of different services into full play.The PLA's General StaffDepartment ha spromoted the 2009 Outline for MilitaryTraining and Evaluation as the new s ta rt ingpoint for the adoption of IntegratedJointOperations. In addition to doctrine, a numberof th e PLA Professional Military Education(PME) institutions are increasing the level ofJoint PME within the Chinese military. InNovember 2006, th e command academies ofthe army, air force, navy, Second Artillery, andNarYing Military Region signed a cooperativeagreement to accelerate th e development andeducation ofjoint commanders. According toofficial PLA press, at least a few seniormilitaryofficers and a small number ofmid-gradeofficers in China have attended the academiesof sister services, although it is unlikely thispractice is as widespread as it is in the U.S.military.

Despite a rhetorical, doctrinal, and academiccommitment to th e development of IntegratedJoint Operations, the PLA appears to be making only sporadic progress at the operational

PLAArrny,Air Forceand Navyparticipat:ein a joint:parade.

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level. In terms of tactical training, officialPLA press has published a number of articleson j oint training exercises that have includedphotographs of army attack helicopters flyingai r cover for navy ships in support of amphibious landing exercises as well as discussion ofarmy, air force, and militia elements operating in t he same command post during a irdefense training. According to one article, ai rforce and navy personnel operated togetherto provide logistics an d targeting supportduring an ai r force over water strike trainingexercise. In addition to th e long standing amphibious warfare focused EAST SEA-seriesconducted in th e Nanjing Military Regionduring th e summer months, in 2006 the PLAimplemented an annua l live fire exercise se-ries entit led LIANHE (joint) with subsequentexercises taking place in 2007 and 2008.The exercises focused on sea crossings andamphibious landings and were led by forcesfrom theJinan Military Region with elementsfrom th e army, navy, and ai r force. Pressreports also claim that succe