Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind

Week Eight: Functionalism

Heil on Problems with Physicalism

• Heil on the traditional problems with physicalism, why it was usually rejected:– Epistemological asymmetry (Cartesian)

• Non-mental (Heil says “material”) states public and only known indirectly

• Mental states private and knowable directly

– Apparent ontological difference – mental states like colors seem different in kind from non-mental (Heil says “material”) states (Lockean)• Characteristics of conscious experiences are not

characteristics of material bodies – so then of what?

Secondary Qualities

• An account of colors, tastes, smells, sounds and tactile feels that apparently began with Galileo and was developed further by John Locke regards them as “powers” of objects (to cause sensations)

From http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/oldsite/tok/empiricism5.htm

Locke’s Account of Primary & Secondary Qualities

• “Primary qualities of bodies … such as are utterly inseparable from the body …; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, … it constantly keeps…, viz., solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.”

• “Secondary qualities of bodies .. are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c.”Locke’s Essay, Book II, Chapter 8, sections 9 & 10

The Origin of the Apparent Ontological Difference

• On the Lockean account, the ideas of primary qualities resemble the primary qualities in objects

• But the ideas of the secondary qualities in objects do not resemble the secondary qualities – they do not resemble powers or the primary qualities in virtue of which objects have powers to cause sensations

• We account for the characteristics of material objects, we might say, by separating those characteristics from others we place in the mind– But that means that these latter are separate and must be

accounted for separately• Separateness is source of Berkeley’s idealism

Heil on the Impetus for Physicalism

• What then is the impetus for physicalism, in the face of these traditional reasons for rejecting it?– Progress in physicalistic explanation• Heil: “the more scientists investigate the brain, the

more they uncover intimate, fine-grained connections between neurological and mental goings-on”– My 1st objection: Unsurprising – My 2nd objection: Dualists motivate limits on such account

– Simplicity

My Objections Against the Progress Argument

• First, it is unsurprising to anyone that “the more scientists investigate the brain, the more they uncover intimate, fine-grained connections between neurological and mental goings-on” – when you stub your toe it hurts and everyone agrees there are discoveries to me made about the physiology of that

• Second, it certainly does not follow that such progress is support against dualism

• Materialism has only been borne out in noncontroversial areas – e.g., in the biology of growth, or in the physics of the region of space-time with which we are familiar.

• We have the continuing controversies because there are obstacles to complete accounts – as with the traditional arguments against materialism

Heil on the Simplicity Argument Favoring Physicalism

• Heil argues that on grounds of “simplicity,” many philosophers and scientists are attracted to the identity theory, since “by far the simplest, most straightforward explanation of these connections is that minds are brains, mental states and processes are neurological states and processes” (PoM, p. 73)– “The idea that complex actions and reactions among the

ultimate constituents of the universe are uniformly physically explicable – except for those occurring in the brains of sentient creatures – seems incredible.”

– Physicalism “appears preferable to dualism on grounds of simplicity – assuming, of course, that it is possible somehow to account for central features of our mental lives without having to introduce nonmaterial substances.”

Smart’s Appeal to Simplicity

• Recall that Smart is example, since he appealed to simplicity in motivating physicalism:

Criticizing Heil on Simplicity (I)

– “The idea that complex actions and reactions among the ultimate constituents of the universe are uniformly physically explicable – except for those occurring in the brains of sentient creatures – seems incredible.”

• It’s hard to see why. Why should this seem any more incredible a priori – on its own – than that that complex actions and reactions among the constituents of the universe are uniformly explicable deterministically except for those occurring at the supermicroscopic level of reality, or than that complex actions and reactions among the constituents of the universe are uniformly explicable without reference to genomes except for those occurring in the very tiny biological portion of it?

Criticizing Heil on Simplicity (II)

– “[B]y far the simplest, most straightforward explanation of these connections is that minds are brains, mental states and processes are neurological states and processes”

• But it turns out that Heil does not really mean what he writes here. When he restates the claim, sort of, at the end of the paragraph, he adds a qualifier which robs it of any content – simplicity favors physicalism over dualism but only “assuming, of course, that it is possible somehow to account for central features of our mental lives without having to introduce nonmaterial substances.” Physicalism, that is, is favored unless a physicalistic explanation is false.

What to Take from Place & Smart

• The main thing to take away from Place and Smart is that those who were dissatisfied with the identity theory -- and either turned to behaviorism or dualism -- were dissatisfied for the wrong reasons.

• They were concerned with the fact that mental-type language does not translate into physical-type language, and used that as a reason to reject the identity theory.

The Strategy of Place & Smart

• What Place and Smart are out to show is that the failure of translation (of synonymy) does not by itself mean that the identity theory has to be false.

• The behaviorist thinks that the failure of translation means that mental-type language does not refer to any inner state but rather is used "expressively.”

• The dualist thinks that the two sorts of language refer to different things.

Failure of Translation and Failure of Identity

• But the identity theory rejects the presupposition -- that failure of translation means failure of identity.

• This rejection of the presupposition does not confirm the identity theory but rather removes an obstacle to accepting it.

• Still, Heil shows that given the traditional objections there is much, much more for the identity theorist to do.

From Behaviorism and Identity Theory to Functionalism

Cartesian Dualism

Logical Behaviorism

Identity Theory

Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?

Something different

There is no mind

Just your brain

Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?

Something beyond

Talk of experience – mental talk

generally – is just disguised

talk about behavior

Just physical aspects of your

brain

Cartesian Dualism

Logical Behaviorism

Identity Theory

Functional State Identity

Theory

Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?

Something different

There is no mind

Just your brain

Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?

Something beyond

Talk of experience – mental talk

generally – is just disguised

talk about behavior

Just physical aspects of your

brain

Cartesian Dualism

Logical Behaviorism

Identity Theory

Functional State Identity

Theory

Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?

Something different

There is no mind

Just your brain

Functionalism topic neutral

Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?

Something beyond

Talk of experience – mental talk

generally – is just disguised

talk about behavior

Just physical aspects of your

brain

Cartesian Dualism

Logical Behaviorism

Identity Theory

Functional State Identity

Theory

Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?

Something different

There is no mind

Just your brain

Functionalism topic neutral

Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?

Something beyond

Talk of experience – mental talk

generally – is just disguised

talk about behavior

Just physical aspects of your

brain

Topic neutral – mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to

other mental states

Three Insights Functionalists Take from Behaviorism and Identity Theory

• Insight 1: The functionalist will agree with the behaviorist that states of mind like pain have something to do with ways that an organism is stimulated – e.g., injury – and responds in light of the stimulation – e.g., wincing or crying out or reporting. But Putnam’s super-Spartans and Armstrong’s calculation example show that there’s more to it than that.

• Insight 2: The behaviorist gets wrong – and Identity Theory gets right – Absent Qualia and Spectrum Inversion cases.

• Insight 3: Behaviorism outdoes Identity Theory for organisms that are in pain but lack brains, since a behavioral criterion for pain seems to cover creatures both with and without brains.

Insight 1: Functionalism on Putnam’s Super-Spartans

• The Super-Spartans do not have any pain behavior, although they have pain.

• This is because they suppress the behavior.• This is a direct counterexample to the behavior’s

connection between pain and pain-behavior.• But the functionalist would argue that this example

suggests that the behaviorist is correct that pain is partly defined by its effects – just not necessarily its overt behavioral effects.

• The functionalist embraces mentalism and defines pain and other states by their hidden internal effects.

Mentalism• Recall that “mentalism” is the view that mental

words refer to hidden internal causes – whether they are states, processes or properties – which are “mental.”

• The logical behaviorist takes mentalism – the view that there are mental states, processes or properties – to entail dualism – the view that our mental words refer to nonphysical states, processes or properties.

• Identity theory and functionalism both reject the entailment.

Insight 1: Functionalism on Armstrong’s Calculation in the Head Example

• The functionalist would argue similarly concerning Armstrong’s example of a calculation in one’s head.

• Recall that part of what’s going on is a “current event” – something going on at the time of the calculation – that is, by hypothesis, not behavior, since it’s only “in the head.”

• A counterexample to behaviorism’s linking pain and behavior.• But the functionalist would argue that this example suggests

that the behaviorist is correct that pain is partly defined by its effects – just not necessarily its overt behavioral effects.

• The functionalist would use the case to argue for mentalism and for defining what’s in the head during the calculation by reference to hidden internal states and their effects.

Insight 2: The Spectrum Inversion Objection to Behaviorism

• The behaviorist says that a mental state is definable in terms of stimuli to the organism and behaviors.

• But an objection is that colors might be reversed, the whole spectrum inverted, without stimulus or behavior differences.

• The objection originates from a thought experiment in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Locke’s Inverted Spectrum Example

The normal perception of the flowers is in the NE and SW quadrants. The

inverted spectra cases are NW and SE.

“Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produces in another Man's, and vice versâ….”

Locke: No Behavioral Difference• “… For since this could never be known: because one Man's Mind could

not pass into another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing constantly the Idea, which he called Blue, and those that had the Texture of a Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same, with the Ideas in other Men's Minds.” (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 32, section 15)

“Yellow”“Yellow”

Insight 2: The Absent Qualia Objection to Behaviorism

• A similar objection to behaviorism: there might be someone behaving as you do, with the same stimuli but no feelings or appearances – i.e., qualia -- associated with the behavior.

• Define absent qualia states to be mental states which (1) have the same causes and effects as states which appear or feel a certain way but (2) lack appearances or feelings entirely.

• Are absent qualia states possible? The behaviorist must say that they are not even conceivable, and that seems wrong.

• Descartes uses this related example: – “But then were I perchance to look out my window and observe men

crossing the square, I would ordinarily say I see the men themselves just as I say I see the wax. But what do I see aside from hats and clothes, which could conceal automata?” (Meditation Two; Donald Cress translation, p. 68.)

The Functionalist’s Lesson from Insight 2

• The functionalist ordinarily says the behaviorist cannot deal with spectrum inversion or absent qualia objections, although the identity theorist can.

• By contrast, the functionalist claims to be able to deal with them by showing that they are impossible, although not in a way the behaviorist can explain.

• The functionalist says that the existence of spectrum inversion or absent qualia would lead to skepticism – i.e., it would mean we could not know whether our mental states have looks, feels, etc., or which they have – but since we do know, they are not possible.

Insight 3: The Problem of Chauvinism

• The behaviorist can raise a reverse point to the Absent Qualia Objection against the identity theorist: What about organisms in pain (for example) but without brains?

• In such cases, it seems as if a behavioral criterion might force itself upon us, since we need something to cover both creatures with brains and creatures without brains when we ascribe pain.

• A behavioral criterion might seem to be what we want – at least it doesn’t have the problem of covering only creatures with brains.

Octopi Pain

• Consider octopi.• Octopi evolved vision apparatus independently of the course of

evolution that gave it to humans and human ancestors.• So we might suppose for the sake of argument that octopi have

evolved pain machinery independently too, and that instead of evolving the same physiological structures have evolved different machinery for pain.

• But an identity theory of the sort we looked at last week rules out this possibility, because it asserts:

Pain = A type of brain state

• But what we are imagining with the octopi is a case where pain exists in the absence of this type of brain state.

The Problem for the Type Identity Theorist

• A type identity theorist is an identity theorist who claims that some types of mental state are identical to some types of brain state.

• We are imagining with the octopi a case where a type of mental state – pain – exists in the absence of any type of brain state.

• The type identity theorist must say that this is not possible.• But it’s unclear why we should rule out such a possibility ahead

of time, independently of empirical investigation.• It seems premature to embrace an account of pain that forces

an answer ahead of time, independently of empirical study, to the question of whether there could be octopi pain.

An Identity Theorist’s Response

• What about the proposal that(1) Pain = Type β of brain state

but that it is also the case that (2) Pain = Type Ω of octopus state,

• where we suppose that octopi don’t have brains, or at least don’t have the brain machinery which in us is correlated with pain?

• Can’t the identity theorist be ecumenical about pain, non-chauvinistic, allowing that octopi have their pains, too, so long as their pains are physical like human pains are?

An Identity Theorist’s Response Rejected

• The answer is no, at least not if it means endorsing both (1) and (2):

(1) Pain = Type β of brain state(2) Pain = Type Ω of octopus state.

• That’s because identity is transitive – that is, from (1) and (2), it follows that:

(3) Type β of brain state = Type Ω of octopus state

• But for the sake of argument, I am supposing as an initial premise that (3) is false, that octopi do not have the brain machinery that we have for pain.

• If they do, then (1) and (2) could both be true.

Putnam’s Comment on a More General Problem about Octopus Sensation

• In “The Nature of Mental States,” Hilary Putnam asserts that the identity theory “becomes still more ambitious when we realize that the brain-state theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of course, concerned to maintain that every psychological state is a brain state. Thus if we can find even one psychological predicate which can clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say ‘hungry’), but whose physico-chemical ‘correlate’ is different in the two cases, the brain-state theory has collapsed.”

Multiple Realizability

• Whatever we say about pain, we want to say that it is “multiply realizable”

• That is, it can be realized in creatures of very different physical natures

• We can give a physicalist account of pain only if we can find a physical property that all creatures with pain have in common

• The behaviorist says that this is unnecessary – but behaviorism has problems of its own

Functionalism and Multiple Realizability

• The functionalist can handle the problem without having the behaviorist’s difficulties

• The functionalist also says pain can be character- ized abstractly enough that its existence does not require any specific physical properties

• The functionalist says that the pain is whatever is caused by certain external conditions (e.g., injury) & whatever causes certain behavior (“I’m in pain,” etc.) and certain other internal mental states (e.g., the desire to be rid of it).

Functional Properties and Realizations

• On this way of talking, pain is a mental state or a mental property that is realized by material states or properties of the brain without being a material state or a material property itself

• The clearest way to see: it is compatible with being a pain that it be realized dualistically

• Thus being a pain cannot just be a material state or property, even if it’s always realized materialistically – the realization is contingent