functionalism project
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
1/102
______________________________________________
CONTENTS
F
______________________________________________
DECLARATION________________________________________________ I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS________________________________________ II ABSTRACT__________________________________________________ III
INTRODUCTION: FUNCTIONALISM AND EMBODIED, EMBEDDED MIND__1
Functionalism, in a few words ____________________________________________ 2Embodied Cognition as Undermining Functionalism _______________________ 3Embodied and Embedded Cognition as Extended Functionalism ____________ 6Where do we go from here? ______________________________________________ 8
CHAPTER 1: FUNCTIONALISM IN DETAIL___________________________9
! The "ac#ground and the S$irit ________________________________________ 91.1.1 Behaviourism _____________________________________________________________ 101.1.2 Mind-body Identity Theory __________________________________________________ 111.1.3 Materialism ______________________________________________________________ 131.1.4 Anti-reduction and methodological autonomy ___________________________________ 13
!% ðods for defining functional roles _________________________________ 11.2.1 Turing Machines and Machine tables __________________________________________ 1!1.2.2 Le is! "amsey-sentence method o# #untionali$ation _______________________________ 1"
!' Commonsense (s! Em$irical functionalism ___________________________ 181.3.1 %ommonsense #unctionalism _________________________________________________ 18
1.3.2 &m'irical #unctionalism ____________________________________________________ 19!) The liberalism*chau(inism dilemma __________________________________ 21
1.4.1 The charge o# chauvinism ___________________________________________________ 211.4.2 (unctionalism and abstraction _______________________________________________ 21.4.3 (unctionalism and Multi'le "eali$ation ________________________________________ 2!
!+ Functionalism without multi$le reali ation and chau(inism? ___________ 28!- Sum u$ and Conclusions ____________________________________________ 33
CHAPTER 2: THE BOD#$DETAIL MODEL: SHAPIRO%S ARGUMENT______36
%! "od. &atters ________________________________________________________ 38%!% The "od./s 0ole in 1erce$tion _______________________________________ 39
2.2.1 A s)ill-based model o# 'erce'tion _____________________________________________ 22.2.2 *ensory substitution and 'lasticity ____________________________________________ !
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
2/102
%!' "od. Conce$ts ______________________________________________________ "2.3.1 %once'ts and Meta'hors ____________________________________________________ 82.3.2 Body and language ________________________________________________________ 82.3.3 Individual embodiment vs. social embeddedness _________________________________ !8
%!) 2ea#. &inds ________________________________________________________ 60%!+ Conclusions ________________________________________________________ 6
CHAPTER 3: E&TENDED FUNCTIONALISM_________________________"0
'! Extended com$utation _______________________________________________ "13.1.1 &+'loitative "e'resentation __________________________________________________ "23.1.2 ,ide com'utationalism _____________________________________________________ "3
'! % "allard et al!3 The com$utational role of (ision ________________________ "6'!' 4is$ositional beliefs and extended functionalism ______________________ "8'!) Extended Functionalism and the "od. ________________________________ 80
3.4.1 Body as a #unctional notion __________________________________________________ 82
3.4.2 The negotiable body _______________________________________________________ 83.4.3 Body and Mind a one-to-one match _________________________________________ 86
'!+ Status ______________________________________________________________ 8"
CONCLUSION_________________________________________________9
BIBLIOGRAPH#_______________________________________________96
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
3/102
______________________________________________
5NT0O4UCT5ON
FUNCT5ON625S& 6N4 E &"O45E4 , E &"E44E4
&5N4
______________________________________________
In recent years it has becom e close to orthodoxy in the p hilosophy of mind to
view the mind and cognition as essentially embodied and embedded. This
view has d eveloped as an opposition to a t endency within cognitive sci ence t o
view mind and cognition as a m atter of purely internal computation. So far
the focus has been on developing the theses within the embodied and
embedded framework and with less attention being given to how this
framework relates to the views that w ere prevalent i n the immediately
preceding philosophical debates on mind. An exception to this is Lawrence
Shapiro’s book “The Mind Incarnate” (2004). Here Shapiro argues, among
other things, that the embodied, embedded approach undermines a
functionalist program. In contrast and as a response t o Shapiro’s ar gument,
Andy Clark, in his article “Pressing the Flesh” (2006), claims that t he
embodied, embedded approach can be seen as a form of extended
functionalism.
My aim in this project will be to explore the logical space between
functionalism and the em bodied, embedded approach. In this I will focus on
the question of w hether t hese two positions ar e com patible or whether t he
embodied, embedded approach undermines functionalism, as suggested by
- 1 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
4/102
Shapiro. My answer t o the latter q uestion is g oing to be that t his i s n ot t he
case. However, before we get t o this result t here is a lot of g round to be
covered and a few philosophical obstacles that need to be pointed out and
overcome. In the remaining paragraphs o f t he Introduction I w ill introduce
the different positions, give an outline of the p ossible t ension between them
and develop and present the cen tral questions of t he p roject.
Functionalism, in a few words
In basic terms functionalism in philosophy of mind is the m etaphysical claim
that mental states ar e individuated in terms o f the effect the world has o n
them (input), the effect they have on each other ( internal interaction) and the
effect t hat t hey have on the world (output) (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson
2007).
To take a si mplied and standard example, consider the m ental state pain . A
functionalist account could charact erise pain as a state t hat i s o ften caused by
tissue d amage, that tends t o produce t he b elief that there i s s omething wrong
with the body and the d esire not t o be in this state, and in the absence of
stronger desires may cause moaning or even crying. According to
functionalism, a creature that h as so mething that p lays t his rol e is i n pain.
(Levin, 2004)
What i t is t hat occu pies t his rol e is o f less i mportance. The case is si milar i n
connection with other f unctional kinds. In this w ay, what is important about
something being a thermostat i s the way, it controls the temperature by
turning heating or cooling apparatus on or off. Such a device might be
constructed in different ways, however i f it plays t he appropriate role it is a
- 2 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
5/102
thermostat. In the sam e way, what is important about being a left w inger on a
hockey team is h ow this p osition is coordinated with the res t of t he t eam. It
seems r easonable t o say that what it is t o be a left w inger does not depend on
whether i t is Fernando or Pet er t hat p lays this p osition. Who plays the role
might affect the outcome of the m atch, of course, but it would not affect the
concept of what a left w inger is . In the same way whether a mental state i s a
thought, bel ief, d esire etc. depends not o n what i t i s that o ccupies the
functional r ole, rather it d epends exclusively on its relation to the bigger
system of other m ental states, sensory input and behaviour. In this w ay the
functional identication is n eutral to what kinds o f states t hat occupy the rol e.
As a result, mental states can be realized by many different kinds of states.
This i s w hat is cal led multiple real ization.
Different versions of functionalism have been developed since its rst
appearance in the 1960’s. Over t ime it has becom e a general approach to
distinguish between commonsense functionalism and empirical
functionalism. I w ill elaborate on this distinction and on functionalism in
general in the rst chapter: Functionalism in detail.
Embodied Cognition as Undermining Functionalism
The second chapter w ill concern Shapiro’s ar gument that f unctionalism is
undermined by research w ithin the ar ea of embodied cognition. According to
Shapiro, it is i n the sp irit of functionalism to characterise m ind in a w ay that
abstracts away from the hardware (the body), on which the mind is
implemented. The result is that the body is neutral in the sense that
“characteristics of bodies make no difference to the kind of mind one
possesses.”(Shapiro (2004) p . 175.) This k ind of bo dy neutrality implies t hat
- 3 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
6/102
similar m inds can exist in bodies w ith very distinct properties. However, this
assumption, according to Shapiro, is sh own to be false i n the light of recent
research in the area o f embodied cognitive science - research that shows t hat a
creature’s em bodiment i mposes con straints on what ki nd of p sychological
prole it can have. Shapiro takes h is p oint of d eparture by distinguishing
between three different lines of resear
that characteristics of bodies m ake a difference to the kind of mind one
possesses.
The rst area of r esearch is con cerned with the b ody’s r ole i n perception and
the sense in which characteristics an d specic actions of the body play a
signicant r ole in determining the nature of thought. Shap iro gives an
example o f this ki nd of thought concerning auditory perception. According to
Shapiro, our abi lity to locate a sound source d epends o n facts ab out our ear s.
One such fact is that we have exactly two ears and not one or m ore than two.
Another f act is t hat these ears ar e p laced on both side o f a head of a certain
size. One result i s t hat t here will be a certain time difference b etween the
sound received at each ear. To locate the source of a sound the human
auditory system incorporates these facts in its processing. According to
Shapiro, different setups of auditory sensory sy stems yi eld different setups of
the p rocessing involved in locating a so und source. Because t he body, in this
way, makes a “d ifference t o how an organism hears”, Shapiro suggests, that
the bo dy can not be n eutral to the kind of mind an organism can h ave (Shapiro
(2004) p. 189).
The second direction that Shapiro refers to within the em bedded, embodied
research program concerns the way our concepts and the way in which we
conceive o f the world depend on details of our embodiment. The cent ral idea
- 4 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
7/102
is that or ganisms w ith different kinds of bodies “w ill conceive the world
differently and will think differently.” (Shapiro (2004) p .183) A s an example
Shapiro refers to the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on the role of
the body in structuring metaphors. The central idea of this w ork is t hat the
type o f our body plays a si gnicant role in structuring our basic con cepts an d
that t hese basic concepts in turn structure more abstract concepts and
metaphors. According to this research , basic co ncepts l ike ‘front’, ‘back’, ‘up
and ‘down’ are d irectly related to the sh ape an d type of our bo dies. Shapiro
takes t his to support the cl aim that the co ntent of mental states an d thereby
the p erspective t hat one has up on the world is dependent on the type of body
that one h as.
The third direction within the em bodied cognition research program, which
Shapiro takes t o undermine functionalism, is what he cal ls ext ended mind. 1
The m ain feature o f this vi ew is t hat the m ind and the b ody are so i ntimately
tied together that it does no t make sen se t o maintain the d ivision between the
two. Shapiro argues t hat if we g ive up this d ivision then, naturally, difference
in bodies w ill entail differences i n mind. (Shapiro (2004) p.183)
The w ork cited above sho ws, according to Shapiro, that a d ifference i n body—
even a difference in the ne details of e mbodiment – makes a d ifference in
mind. If the b ody is involved in our p sychological processes i n this intimate
way, this i ndicates, according to Shapiro, that it requires a h umanlike b ody to
have humanlike psychological c apacities. I w ill c all t his line of embodied
approach: the Body-detail model . According to this m odel, it is not enough to
recognise that the mind is intimately connected to abody; we also have to
1
This label originates from Clark and Chalmers (1997). Ho e!er" Clark and Chalmers intended thelabel for the !ie that the reali#ation of the mind is e$tended not onl% to the bod%" b&t also to the
'h%si al and so ial orld that s&rro&nds &s.
- -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
8/102
specify the characteristics o f t his b ody. In the sense that Sh apiro takes it as
being in the spirit of funct
the body-detail model of embedded, embodied cognition undermines
functionalism, according to Shapiro.
To get a better u nderstanding of S hapiro’s claim it i s useful t o notice that
Shapiro uses the term ‘body’ in a slightly different w ay to which it is
commonly used. Normally when we talk about bodies the term refers to the
entire co llection of all body parts su ch as f eet, muscles, entrails et c., including
the brain and central nervous system. Shapiro’s use of the term body is
intended to exclude the brain and the cen tral nervous system (Shapiro (2004)
pp. 70) 2. This use of the term body is helpful when we are dealing with
embodied and embedded approaches to mind, because these views take
themselves t o be opposing views t hat take t he b rain as t he sol e su bstrate of
mind. What proponents of embedded, embodied approaches want to
emphasise is exactly how our bod ies and environment – as op posed to only
our brain— are i ntimately linked to cognition. Because of this ad vantage I will
follow Shapiro’s u se of t he t erm ‘body’ throughout this t hesis.
Embodied and Embedded Cognition as Extended Functionalism
Contrary to proponents of the Body-detail model, Clark argues t hat there i s a
way in which the embodied approach can be seen as a f orm of extended
functionalism. This w ill be t he focus o f chapter 3. On this l ine o f thought, the
body’s contribution is just a
and environment that as a whole sometimes implements the functional prole
that co nstitutes mind and cognition. Whereas traditional functionalism2 *ha'iro (2++4) treats the ,&estion abo&t the relation bet een mind and bod% as distin t from the,&estion of the relation bet een mind and brain (o'.sit. 71)
- -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
9/102
analyses input, ou tput and states internal t o the individual, ext ended
functionalism includes n on-biological parts of the en vironment a s hat might
be called the 'material real
One of the examples of s uch an extended functionalist app roach could,
according to Clark (In Press), be t he following: in the p rocess of solving some
kinds of accounting problems, an accountant, call her Ada, uses a m ethod of
rapidly scanning columns on one page and copying certain numbers to a
piece of paper and then shifting her attention between the t wo papers. Using
this strategy, involving external p rops and the repeated shifting from one
page t o the o ther, the t ask is cut up into smaller an d less demanding tasks. In
this way the workload on Ada’s memory is signicantly reduced. Clark
suggests t hat this p rocess is be st analysed in “extended functionalist terms as
a set of p roblem-solving state t ransitions w hose i mplementation happens to
involve a distributed combination of biological m emory, motor actions,
external symbolic st orage and just-in-time perceptual access.” (Clark (In Press)
p.12)
Another e mbodied approach that, according to Clark, can be interpreted as a
form of extended functionalism is t he w ork of Ballard et al (1997). Their work
is based on experiments in which subjects were given the task of copying a
certain structure of coloured blocks. The subjects w ere placed in front of a
computer s creen with three cl early distinguishable zo nes: one a rea co ntaining
the original s tructure; a reserve area with blocks in different col ours that
could be picked up by clicking on the mouse, and an empty area where a
model of the original structure could be built. Ballard et al found that t he
subjects sol ved this p roblem with the h elp of repeated rapid saccades t o the
original - xating only on the p art of the o riginal necessary for the co mpletion
- 7 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
10/102
of the n ext part of the p rocess: for exam ple, picking up a b lock with a cert ain
colour. According to Ballard et al , this su ggests that t he subjects were only
storing smaller p ieces o f information about the colour or t he position of the
block, taking advantage of the fact that
retrieved by xating on the o riginal. Clark suggests t hat we should view this
as an extended functionalist approach because B allard et al’s t heory “analyses
a co gnitive t ask as a seq uence o f less i ntelligent sub-tasks, using recog nizable
computational and information-processing concepts, but applies those
concepts w ithin a lager o rganizational whole.” (Clark (in press). p. 11)
By acknowledging the body’s contribution as in this way a part of a bigger
system, extended functionalism leaves room for t he possibility that c reatures
with different kinds of bodies c an share s imilar m inds.
Where do we go from here?
An important task is to investigate how well dened the body-detail model
and the extended functionalist ap proach are as positions. Further, how
different ar e they and what i s the underlying difference that makes t hem
come to apparently opposite conclusions about t he relations between the
embodied, embedded approaches and functionalism? Is t here a possibility
that t he two positions could be reconciled? One possibility might be to
formulate f unctional roles i n terms o f specic ch aracteristics o f the b ody. That
is, to formulate a functional role so that on ly creatures w ith certain bodies an d
sensory systems will be able to play that rol e. This possibility is also
considered by both Clark and Shapiro (Clark (In Press) p.16) (Shapiro (2004)
p. 174). Would this be too m uch em bodiment for the functionalist to a dmit?
- -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
11/102
These q uestions w ill concerns t rough the t hesis, however, an obvious rst step
on our w ay to settle the question of the relation between the embodied,
embedded approaches and functionalism is to explore the position of
functionalism in further d etail. This w ill be t he t ask of the f ollowing chapter.
- 9 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
12/102
______________________________________________
C761TE0
FUNCT5ON625S& 5N 4ET652
______________________________________________
In this c hapter I will survey a ch art of the co mplex landscape o f functionalism.
Firstly, looking into the background and origin of the position will provide a n
insight into the i ntentions b ehind the p osition. This w ill also provide u s w ith
an idea of what ‘the sprit’ of f unctionalism might be considered to be.
Secondly, I will investigate the notion of functional role and the models for
giving such presented by proponents of functionalism. These models will
provide the background for u nderstanding the difference between the two
dominant versions of functionalism: commonsense functionalism and
empirical f unctionalism. Finally, I w ill discuss w hether f unctionalism in its
different ver sions can avoid the pitfalls o f bo th liberalism (attributing mental
states to systems that do not have them) and chauvinism (falsely denying
mental states to systems that in fact have them) 3. A special f ocus in this
connection will be the relation between functionalism and multiple
realization.
! The "ac#ground and the S$irit
In order t o get a feeling of what functionalism is an d to illuminate w hat ‘the
spirit of’ functionalism might be, it will be fruitful to look into how and on
3 /0iberalism and / ha&!inism as &sed b% lo k 19 +.
- 1+ -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
13/102
what foundations this theory w as d eveloped in the 1960’s. One major s ource
of inspiration available at t his time was the rst h esitant beginnings of
computer sci ence and its ea rly success. In particular, the distinction between
software and hardware, between function and structure inspired the
distinction between role and occupant found in functionalism. The relation
between software and hardware was viewed as a particularl
the relation between mind and body. An important source of inspiration from
computer s cience w as t he i nvention by Alan Turing of abstract and theoretical
machines d ened by functions characterizing the relations between input,
output and internal states o f t he machine. I w ill return to this i ssue in my
exposition of Hillary Putnam’s ear ly method for d ening the functional role
of mental terms. But rst let us h ave a look at the p hilosophical background
which functionalism can be seen as a react ion to. In this con text functionalism
can be seen as having developed out of d issatisfaction with the solutions
provided by the d ominating theories of mind at the t ime: Behaviourism and
The Mind-Body Identity Theory.
1.1.1 Behaviourism
Behaviourism, as a theory of m ind, is the thesis t hat m ental states can be
dened in terms of relations bet ween the input of stimuli and the output of
physical behaviour. If, for exam ple, I have a desire to drink a glass o f water,
this d esire can be d ened as h aving a set of dispositions t o act in a cert ain way- on e of these being the disposition to reach out for t he glass, if I get t he
opportunity. Notice t hat this i s a simpler ap proach than the o ne p resented by
functionalism where internal m ental s tates a re taken into consideration as
well. According to proponents of functionalism, the problem with
behaviourism is that it seems possibl
has t he right kind of behavioural dispositions t o the right kind of stimuli, but
- 11 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
14/102
without having the right kind of m ental state linked with these. Think of a
creature, m aybe extraterrestrial, w ho displays the particular behavioural
dispositions of having pain when receiving stimuli of tissue d amage, but who
is o nly pretending to be in pain – acting as i f in pain just to fool us eart hlings
(for examples of t his sort see Putnam (1963)). Behaviourism would falsely
attribute the mental property of having pain to such an actor. Accordingly,
behaviourism is considered by functionali
community today to be too liberal i n its ascr iption of m ental properties t o
creatures an d systems. In contrast, a functionalist account would not take the
actor to be in pain. The reason being that s uch a creature would lack the
proper i nternal r elations, for ex ample, it will not tend to believe that t here i s
something w rong w ith its body.
1.1.2 Mind-body Identity Theory
In contrast to behaviourism, the m ind-body identity theory is con sidered by
functionalists to be too chauvinistic in its ascription of m ental st ates. Theidentity theory claims t hat in the sam e w ay as w ater i s identical to H 2O and
temperature identical to mean molecular k inetic en ergy, so are mental states
identical to physical states. A very si mplied although much used example is
to identify the mental s tate pain with C-bre stimulation in the brain. 4
Identifying a mental state with a brain state, however, makes the theory
vulnerable to the accusation of being chauvinistic ( i.e. falsely denying systems
mental properties). This h as t he result that on ly creatures w ith brains can be
attributed mental states. In this l ight traditional research within AI, where t he
goal is t o develop an articial system with humanlike mental states, seems t o
be a non-starter. Further,
4 This is of a&se a !er% sim'lified identifi ation and the e$'ression C-fibre stim&lation is onl% to betaken as a stand-in for a more om'le$ brain state.
- 12 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
15/102
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
16/102
Shapiro (2004) p. 28 citing research of vo n Melchner, Pallas a nd Sur ( 2000))
Taking these as d ifferent realisations s how that mind, or at least some m ental
capacities, can be m ultiply realised. The m ind-body identity theory, according
to functionalists, has a problem accounting for t his f act.
Because f unctionalism can accommodate m ultiple re alization, proponents of
functionalism have argued, it is prima facie preferable to the mind-body
identity theory a s a t heory about the n ature o f mental states.
1.1.3 Materialism
What functionalists have i n mind when they speak of multiple realization is
that a mental kind can be realized by distinct physical kinds. In this sen se,
Functionalism is materialistic in spirit. Materialism is the view that,
fundamentally, all things t hat exi st are ' material' or p hysical. Arguing that t he
kind of states, which are m ost likely to be a ble t o carry out the f unctional roles
are p hysical states, David Lewis ( 1966) presents h is f unctionalist account as a nargument aga inst d ualism. However, strictly speaking, materialism is not
implied by functionalism. In fact, functionalism is compatible with some
kinds o f d ualism. Again, this i s b ecause t he functional descriptions i nvolved
are n eutral about the n ature o f the o ccupier o f the rol e ( This n eutrality will be
explained further i n section 1.2). The o nly kinds of dualism incompatible w ith
functionalism are p ositions l ike epiphenomenalism and parallelism that denycausal interactions f rom the mental t o the physical. Properties lacking ability
to affect the p hysical domain will not be su itable can didates f or occup ying a
functional role.
1.1.4 Anti-reduction and methodological autonomy
Characterizing the spirit of f unctionalism it i s also important t o note that
functionalism has been seen by many as bei ng able to provide a materialistic
- 14 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
17/102
account that i s n on-reductive. The general line of ar gument i s t hat becau se
psychological ki nds can be realized in diverse physical ki nds (multiple
realization) psychological kinds can not be reduced to physical kinds. This h as
led functionalist like Jerry Fodor ( 1974) to the conclusion that r egularities a t
the psychological level, although implemented on a physical level, cannot be
reduced to regularities on this underlying level. In this light, end orsing
functionalism can be seen as a w ay to ‘save’ the m ethodological autonomy of
psychology. Accordingly, psychology has i ts ow n level of description that is
above the details of neuroanatomy, physiology, chemistry and physics.
Psychology uncovers special laws which cannot be deduced from and thus
not reduced to the l aws of physics.
1.1.5 The s irit o! !unctionalism
In the light of t he dissatisfaction with the mind-body identity theory and
behaviourism, functionalism can be seen as an attempt to provide a
materialistic an d mechanistically inspired account of the mental that promises
the m ethodological autonomy of psychology and that at the same t ime avoids
the pitfalls of bot h liberalism and chauvinism. This seems to sum up the
intentions behind functionalism and thus g ives u s a picture of w hat can be
considered to be t he sp irit of f unctionalism. Now, we can begin to understand
Shapiro’s cl aim that it is i n the sp irit of functionalism to regard the m ind as “ a
programme t hat can be characterized in abstraction from the b rain/body that
realizes it” (Shapiro (2004) p. 175). Before we discuss whether this is
necessarily a con sequence of functionalism I will say a b it more abo ut how we
should understand functionalism and functional roles, and present som e
different versions o f the p osition.
!% ðods for defining functional roles
- 1 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
18/102
Over the years various different versions of functionalism have been
developed. The best way to get an overview of this is to start by looking
at the two main methods for d ening mental states in a functionalist way. The
rst method is set in terms of Turing Machines and machine tables. The
second is Lewis’ method for dening terms using Ramsey sentences.
1.2.1 Turing Machines and Machine tables
As noted, functionalism, in its early days was inspired by work within
computer science. Hillary Putnam (1960 and 1967) introduced the idea ofmodelling a functional theory of mind over Turing Machines. A Turing
Machine is a purely theoretical and abstract construction dened by two
different functions. Function 1: From input and states t o output. Function 2:
From input and states to other states. A machine of this kind can be
characterised in a m achine t able t hat, for e very possible co mbination of states
and input, lists the instructions for t hese functions. These instructions haveform of conditionals o f t he following kind: If t he machine is i n state S and
receive i nput I then it emits ou tput O.
A coke machine is an example of an ordinary machine that can be described
this w ay:
Coke Machine S1 S250 pence input Emit no output
Go to S2
Emit a Coke
Go to S11 pound input Emit a Coke Emit a Coke and 50 pence
Go to S1
Fig: 1 Machine table of coke machine (UK version of example from Block 1980)
- 1 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
19/102
This m achine t able sp ecies t hat if the co ke m achine i s i n S1 and receives an
input of 50 p ence t he machine emits n o output and goes to state S2. If the
machine, while in S2, receives an other 50 p ence t he m achine w ill emit a cok e
and return to state S1 and so on. I will not go through the w hole t able but I
think that the idea sh ould be cl ear f rom these con ditionals. One t hing to note
is that t he system’s response to input d epends on its internal s tate when
receiving the i nput.
Putnam’s idea was that organisms with mental states can be described
analogues to Turing machines. 5 H ence, a m ental state i s eq uivalent to a Turing
machine st ate. In this co nnection, it is i mportant to notice t hat t he st ates i n a
Turing machine are functionally dened by the way they are connected to
each other in the way that the machine table describes. When we described
the coke m achine we did not have to say anything about what materials the
machine w as m ade of, only the relations b etween the internal states an d the
in- and output. N either did we sp ecify anything about the con struction of the
internal s tate of t his machine. What i t i s to be in these internal s tates is
specied implicitly in the rel ations b etween the st ates an d the p roduction of
output from input as i t is shown in the m achine table. Any system that has
internal states t hat interact in this w ay will have su ch states as S 1 a nd S2.
Putnam points out t hat an important feature of this account is that t he
physical realization of the sen se o rgans r esponsible f or t he v arious i nputs, and
of the motor o rgans i s sp ecied, but that t he ‘states’ themselves are sp ecied
only implicitly by the m achine t able (Putnam (1967)). This h as t he feature t hat
the theory says n othing about the nature of the occupier of t he role. The
n his arti le from 19 7 &tnam models his f&n tionalism o!er robabilisti 5&tomatons instead ofT&ring 6a hines. n robabilisti 5&tomatons transitions bet een states are defined in 'robabilitiesrather than being deterministi .
- 17 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
20/102
occupier co uld, in theory, be brain-states, silicon states, physical or ev en non-
physical states. Like software t he m ind can be run on many different kinds of
hardware.
A problem with Putnam’s m odel, however, is that a m achine s tate is a s tate of
the w hole system and consequently the m odel has difficulties accounting for
systems t hat are i n several internal states at the sam e t ime. (Levin 2004)
1.2.2 "e#is$ %amsey-sentence method o! !untionali&ation
Another way to see how functional denitions are supposed to work is
looking at L ewis’ (1972) m ethod for providing functional de nitions using
Ramsey sent ences. This m ethod has t he ad vantage o f being able to account for
systems w ith several simultaneous i nternal states. One co uld say that Lewis’
method denes a s ystem’s m ental state al l at once. (Levin 2004)
Take the exam ple of dening pain as a m ental state. In this case we have a
theory of m ental states ( an extremely simplied one) where pain is t he state
which tends to be cau sed by tissue d amage, causes worry and the em ission of
“Ouch“. Worry, in turn, causes brow wrinkling (Example from Block 1980).
If we re place t he m ental state terms pain and worry with variables (x and y)
and transform the t heory into an existentially quantied sentence w e get what
is called the Ramsay sentence of the t heory.
x, y (x is caused by t issue damage & causes the emission of “Ouch” & causes state
y & y causes brow wrinkling.)
- 1 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
21/102
This r eads: there are t wo states x a nd y such that x is caused by tissue d amage
and causes both the emission of “Ouch” and state y, which in turn causes
brow wrinkling.
Now we can d ene what it is to be in pain and worry in the following w ay:
Pain
An organism or system S is in pain = t
tissue dam age an d causes bot h t he emission of “Ouch”, and the s tate y, and the s tate y
causes br ow wrinkling and S is i n state x.
Worry
An organism or system S is worried = ther
tissue dam age an d causes bot h the em ission of “Ouch” and the st ate y, and the s tate y
causes br ow wrinkling and S is i n state y.
Notice t hat in the a bove d enitions t he mental state t erms ar e rep laced with
variables, while input and output remain specied. Again this says n othing
about the structure of t he involved mental states. Anything with an internal
state t hat plays t hese cau sal roles i s w orried and in pain.
!' Commonsense (s! Em$irical functionalism
Having the m ethods for dening the functional roles i n place t he n ext concern
is w hich k ind of theory w e should use as t he foundation for ou r denition of
these f unctional roles. There a re two main directions t hat functionalism has
taken on this q uestion. So-called commonsense f unctionalists t ake an a priori
approach, while empirical functionalists h old that we should take a p osteriori
- 19 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
22/102
empirical psychological theories as o ur p oint of departure. In what follows I
will give a m ore d etailed exposition of both these d irections.
1.3.1 'ommonsense !unctionalism
According to commonsense functionalists (e.g. Lewis (1972) and Armstrong
(1968)) ou r g uideline for d ening the appropriate functional roles for o ur
mental states is our common knowledge about the relations between
particular input, internal cau sal interaction and output. This knowledge
provides the background for what could be called a commonsense
psychology. Lewis (1972) suggests that we think of "common-sensepsychology as a term-introducing scientic theory, though one invented
before there was any such institut
256) According to Lewis we construe this theory out of ou r extensive
repertoire o f platitudes ab out mental states — as f or exam ple, 'headache is a
kind of p ain'— and other p latitudes ab out t he causal relations of m ental
states, sensory stimuli, and motor r esponses ( Loc ci t). We h ave already seen pain analysed in such a commonsensical way. It is common knowledge that
pain is cause d by tissue damage or d amage to the body; it is also general
knowledge t hat this cr eates a d esire t o escape t hat situation and so o n. This i s
similar t o the w ay that we d ene o rdinary terms l ike mousetrap , alarm clock or
ball pen in broad functional terms. A mousetrap is something that has the
functional role of catching mice; an alarm clock has the functional role ofkeeping and showing the time and making a loud noise at the right time an d
so o n. The functional role o f an alarm clock gives u s t he m eaning of what it is
to be an alarm clock. If something keeps and shows the time and makes a
loud noise at a certain set t ime it is an alarm clock. Likewise, an a priori
analysis of pai n nds t he com mon sense functional role ass ociated with pain
and this r ole g ives u s t he m eaning of the t erm ‘pain’.
- 2+ -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
23/102
1.3.2 (m irical !unctionalism
This variety of functionalism holds that, instead of being guided by
commonsense we should be gu ided by the ndings of the science of empirical
psychology (e.g. Putnam, Fodor). A typical way to express t his v iew is t hat
mental states are o ccupants o f functional roles an d that which functional role
determines w hich mental states t hat a subject is in, is a matter f or sc ience
(perhaps cognitive psychology or neuroscience) (Braddon-Mitchell and
Jackson (2007)). This yields a different ki
output than that which is open to commonsense functionalism.
Commonsense functionalism is r estricted to specifying input and output in
terms of w hat is externally observable an d common knowledge (e.g. inputs
that are characterised in terms of ob jects present cl ose to the subject, and
outputs in terms of bo dily movements). In contrast empirical functionalism
can use the knowledge that we acquire via experiments e.g. knowledge of
neural signalling. (Block (1980))
The t ypical description of em pirical functionalism replaces t he co mmonsense
functional r ole directly with the empirical f unctional r ole. H owever, as
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) points out, it seems that the
commonsense functional role m ust enter i nto the picture at some p oint. This
is because having only the neuroscientic facts about a person would not
suffice to give ordinary people with no knowledge of neuroscience any
knowledge about what that person thinks. They suggest that the
commonsense functional role, instead of having the role of xing the m eaning
of the mental terms, as it has according to commonsense functionalism,
employs t he function of xing the r eference o f these t erms.
- 21 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
24/102
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson distinguish between two general versions
where the commonsense role xes the reference. In the rst, the commonsense
role xes t he n ature o f the st ate t hat plays t he ro le, e.g. on neurophysiological
states. In the second version the commonsense role xes another more
detailed role t hat underpins t he co mmonsense r ole. In this cas e “ What settles
that a subject i s i n M [a certain mental s tate] i s t he internal f unctional r ole
which underpins the common sense functional role associated with M.”
(Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) P. 85) T he interesting role for sci ence
becomes to investigate which internal
functional roles. This l atter versi on is t he more sen sible way to go, according
to Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson. This bec omes obv ious w hen we r ealize t hat
the rst version contradicts t he w ay in which we d ened multiply realization.
If the functional r ole refers directly to the neural s tate we end up with
chauvinism, similar i n kind to that which the m ind-body identity theory has
been accused of. However, as we shall see in
more promising versions of empirical functionalism have been accused of
being chauvinistic.
!) The liberalism*chau(inism dilemma
Now that we h ave an overview of what functionalism is and different versions
of it, it is t ime t o ask ourselves h ow this p icture ts w ith the p icture t hat we
drew of the sp irit of functionalism, just a little w hile a go. Remember t hat one
of the essential reasons for endorsing functionalism was to avoid the
chauvinism of the mind-body identity theory. We have al ready seen t hat some
versions of empirical functionalism seem to have problems avoiding
chauvinism and providing us w ith the right kind of m ultiply realization. In
his ar ticle “Troubles w ith Functionalism” Block argues t hat the d ilemma for
- 22 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
25/102
functionalism is “t hat a ny physical description of inputs and outputs ….yields a
version of functionalism that i s i nevitably chauvinist or l iberal” (Block (1980)
p. 295). Let us t ake a look at why he t hinks t hat this i s t he ca se.
1.4.1 The charge o! chauvinism
We’ll start by considering Block’s ch allenge to commonsense functionalism.
Block o bserves t hat commonsense functionalists
“tend to specify inputs and outputs in the manner of
behaviourists: outputs in terms of movements of arms and legs,sound emitted and the like; inputs in terms of l ight and sound
falling on the eyes and ears….Such descriptions are blatantly
species-specic. Humans have ar ms and legs, but snakes d o not-
and whether or not snakes have mentality, one can easily
imagine snakelike creatures t hat do . Indeed, one can imagine
creatures w ith all manner o f input-output devices, e.g., creaturesthat communicate and manipulate by emitting strong magnetic
elds “( Block (1980) p. 294).
On this account Block holds that the general version of commonsense
functionalism leads to a k ind of chauvinism: human body chauvinism. In this
sense, Block is su ggesting that be cause t he identication of m ental states i slimited by the fact that the input and outputs ar e sp ecies-specic, we d o not
get t he kind of m ultiple realization the functionalists w ere o riginally looking
for.
Turning to the question of empirical functionalism Block’s charge of
chauvinism is a charge o f internal organization chauvinism. Remember t hatempirical functionalism is con cerned with the functional organization of the
- 23 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
26/102
internal cognitive mechanisms an d processes as ar e t he o bjectives o f empirical
psychology such a s input and outputs of the cent ral nervous system described
in neurophysiological terms (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007)). Now,
Block invites us t o imagine that we meet some Martians an d nd that in a
commonsense functional way they are very much like us. However, in the
empirical functional way w e d iffer signicantly.
“When we get to know Martians, we nd them about as
different from us as hu mans we know. We develop extensive
cultural and commercial intercourse with them. We study each
other's science and philosophy journals, go to each other's
movies, read each other's no vels, etc. Then Martian and Earthian
psychologists com pare notes, only to nd that i n underlying
psychology, Martians and Earthians are very different… Now
imagine that what Martian and Earthian psychologists nd
when they compare notes is that Martians and Earthians d iffer
as i f they were the en d products of maximally different design
choices (compatible with rough Functional equ ivalence in
adults). Should we reject ou r assumption that M artians can
enjoy our lms, believe their o wn apparent s cientic results,
etc.?…..[T]here m ay be m any ways o f lling in the d escription of
the Martian-human differences in which it would be re asonable
to suppose there simply is no fact of the matter, or even to
suppose t hat the Martians do not d eserve mental ascriptions.
But surely there are many ways o f lling in the description of
the M artian-Earthian difference I sketched on which i t would be
perfectly clear t hat even if Martians be have differently from us
on subtle psychological experiments, they nonetheless think
- 24 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
27/102
desire en joy, etc. To suppose ot herwise would be crude h uman
chauvinism.” ( Block (1980) pp. 291-93)
The con sequence o f identifying mental states on the b asis of theories of neural
inputs and outputs as we humans have t hem seem to be that only creatures
with neurons or w ith the r ight kind of neu ral set up can have m ental states
like ours. This is w hat you might call a n europhysiological chauvinism (term
from Braddon-Mitchel and Jackson (2007)).
1.4.2 )unctionalism and abstraction
One way for both commonsense and empirical functionalists to avoid the
charge of chauvinism is to characterise i nputs an d outputs in more ab stract
ways. I f, in our example w ith the cok e m achine instead of cokes, 50 cen t coins
and 1 pound coins, we had characterized these as output 1, Input 1 and Input
2, then every machine that had some inputs and outputs standing in the same
functional relation as t hat of ou r coke machine w ill have the sam e internalstates as this (Braddon-Mitchell an d Jackson (2007)). In regard to mental
states, any creature or sys tem which had inputs an d outputs an d similar
internal f unctional relations would be functionally isomorphic to you and
have the same mental states as yo u. This would guarantee that systems
without brains or w ith different bod ies ar e not excluded from the realm of
psychological subjects f rom the o utset. That is, it would ensure t he p ossibilityof the kind of multiple realization with which Putnam and others were
concerned in arguing against the mind-body identity theory. However,
according to Block, the problem with such a characterisation is t hat i t is t oo
liberal. Block invites u s t o imagine that w e set up all people in China in a
network linked via radio communication that communicates with a body
somewhere in the world. This system is set up in such a way that it is
- 2 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
28/102
commonsense functionally equivalent to a human brain and body. Would
such a sys tem have m ental states? Commonsense functionalists would have to
say that it has. In the case o f empirical functionalism, if someone a rranged the
economy of Bolivia in such a way that i t had similar r elations o f internal
states, input and output as a h uman being, we would have to say that it has
mental states ( Block 1980). Block argues t hat s ince t hese would be absurd
assumptions, these v ersions of functionalism would be u ntenable. Block h olds
that i t is o ur i ntuition that t his k ind of system would lack qualitative mental
states. That is, there w ould not be so mething “it is l ike” to be t hese sy stems.
However, one might object that what is involved in the exam ple seems to be
outside the reach of our i ntuitions. It is p ossible that i f w e really understood
the complex functional story of the Bolivian economy when organized this
way or t he China brain, the thought that it has m ental states m ight not be
absurd. At least i t seems reasonable to say that because of our lack in
knowledge of this ki nd our intuitions i n this case can only be very vague.
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) present an alternative o ption for functionalists to
avoid the pitfall of chauvinism. I w ill give an exposition of t his i n a short
while; however there is on e t hing that we n eed to shed light on rst and that
is t he rel ation between functionalism and multiple real ization.
1.4.3 )unctionalism and Multi le %eali&ation
Often multiple realization is m entioned in the same breath as f unctionalism,
and as w e have seen multiple realization plays a major r ole in the general
debate concerning chauvinism versus liberalism. But what exac tly is the
logical relation between these t wo notions? D oes f unctionalism entail multiple
realization? A nd does m ultiple real ization entail functionalism?
- 2 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
29/102
Let us st art with the second question. The sh ort answer i s: No. It is p ossible
for s omething to be m ultiple real izable ev en though it is n ot individuated in
terms of functional role. Standard examples ar e g eometrical kinds l ike squ are ,
cube, sphere an d circle (Mandik (2007)). What makes s omething a cu be is that
it is a hexahedron with six equal squares as f aces. This i s an intrinsic p roperty.
Something can be a c ube w ithout having any causal relations to anything else.
A cube is a geometrical, not a functional kind. Further, cubes can have
different physical properties, be real ized in different materials l ike f oam, stone
or w ood. It can also have different s izes o f squares, be solid or h ollow and
have d ifferent masses. In this w ay cube seem s t o be m ultiply realizable. If we
had an account on which mental states w ere individuated in terms of intrinsic
properties, these could still be multiple realized. It m ay be that m ultiple
realization of mental s tates, if true, gi ves us a good reason to prefer
functionalism to mind-body identity theory, but it does not support
functionalism denitively.
Even more i nteresting for our cu rrent d iscussion is t he second question of
whether w e can have f unctionalism without multiple realization. The idea of
functional ki nds being multiple realizable seems to be general. Take for
example the functional kind of mouse trap. Mouse traps come in al sorts of
shapes, materials and make ups. The same seem to be the case with
corkscrew, watch and left winger. Taking mental kinds to be functional kinds
in a similar w ay, functionalists h ave argued that m ental states l ike pain or
hunger can likewise b e realized in different p hysical structures e.g. in brain
states in mammals, electronic states in extremely complex (and not yet
developed) computers or i n some kind of plasma in extraterrestrial creatures.
However, even though multiple realizability seems to be a p roperty shared by
- 27 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
30/102
many functional kinds, this d oes n ot necess arily show that all functional kinds
are multiple realizable. A ccording to Shapiro, “ad option of a functional
perspective toward the mind does not entail that
the mind is multiply realizable.” ((Shapiro 2004), p. 22). This is the case,
according to Shapiro, becau se it is possible to have a description of a
functional role t hat ap plies o nly, as a matter o f necessi ty, to a single p hysical
kind. One o f his exam ples i nvolves t he d rill bit of a m achine d esigned to drill
in extremely hard minerals. Drill bit is an example of an ordinary functional
kind. What is s ignicant to being of t he k ind dril l bit is t o have t he ca pacity to
drill a hole when rotated in to a surface. However, Shapiro invites u s to
consider that “if diamond are t he o nly substance t hat in fact are h ard enough
to drill through very hard surfaces, then dril l bit picks o ut a p hysical kind no
less t han it refers t o a f unctional kind”(Shapiro ( 2004) p.21).
Notice, however, that w hether o r n ot d iamonds, in this cas e, are the only
substance h ard enough for t he d rilling job is an empirical question. Thus, it
concerns t he n omological possibility of dril l bit being m ultiple realizable. T his
is d istinct from the question of the metaphysical possibility of drill b it being
multiple real izable. Even if diamonds t urns o ut to be t he only substance t hat
can realize the special ki nd of d rill bit i n our w orld and in all the possible
worlds t hat share o ur l aws of na ture, this d oes n ot e xclude t here b eing other
possible worlds w here other p hysical kinds can do the job as w ell. The fact
that t he functionalist descri ption of the functional r ole is n eutral, at least to
some extent, abou t the nature of the realization, seem to ensure the
metaphysical possibility of a k ind being multiple real izable. However, as w e
have s een Shapiro argue, this is no t the cas e w hen we ar e con cerned with the
nomological possibility. The situation is similar when we consider the
question in relation to mental states.
- 2 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
31/102
To sum up: a functionalist approach does e ntail multiple r ealization when we
are co ncerned with the metaphysical possibility; however, this i s n ot t he case
when the question comes to the nomological possibility of multiple
realization.
It i s t he nomological possibility of m ultiple realization that con cerns B echtel
and Mundale in the article “Multiple Realizability Revisited” (1999) I n this
article they develop a suggestion as to how we can have a functionalist
approach that does n ot involve multiple real ization or entail chauvinism.
!+ Functionalism without multi$le reali ation and chau(inism?
We have now seen that in a certain sense functionalism without multiple
realization is a possibility. As w e can formulate a functional role for drill b it
that exclusively can be occupied by diamonds, so we could formulate a
functional role for p ain that could only be occupied by humans. However, in
our p revious d iscussion of the liberalism-chauvinism dilemma we saw that
this seemed to steer u s straight i nto chauvinism. In the article “Multiple
Realizability Revisited”, (1999) Bechtel and Mundale suggest, a way forward
for denying multiple realization of m ental s tates, but n evertheless keep a
functionalist approach that has t he ad vantage o f not being chauvinistic.
The key feature o f this accou nt is t heir ar gument discrediting the cl aim that
mental states are m ultiple realizable in the way suggested by functionalism.
An exposition of this ar gument will essentially provide an insight in how they
think that i t i s p ossible to reject m ultiple realization and at t he same time
avoid chauvinism.
- 29 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
32/102
According to Bechtel and Mundale the prima facie case for multiple
realization stems from a misguided understanding of w hat a brain state is.
When Putnam advances his argument against the mind-body identity theory
his main claim is that it seems implausible that we would nd the same
physical-chemical state i n the a ll different species t hat s hare t he a bility to have
psychological states like pain or hunger (see above quote p. 13 ). The
conception of a brain state as p hysical-chemical states h as been taken as a
general po int of d eparture for m ost p hilosophical discussions of multiple
realization. However, according to Bechtel and Mundale this n otion of brain
state is n ot s hared by researchers i n the neurosciences. The closest we get t o
something that c ould count as b rain states i n the neurosciences, are areas o f
activity in different p arts of t he brain. This i s a notion of brai n state that i s
much more abstract and coarse-grained than the one found in the
philosophical arguments. Bechtel and Mundale accuse the philosophers for
failing to note that “the same degree of variability is tolerated by
neuroscientists in identifying types of n eural p rocesses t hat t hey accept i n
identifying psychological types” ( Bechtel and Mundale ( 1999) p. 202)
Bechtel and Mundale point to the fact that i t is o nly on a very abstract level
that humans an d octopuses can be considered to share a psychological state
like h unger. In this cas e, hunger could be ch aracterized as som ething that is
caused by lack o f food, causes d iscomfort and food-seeking behaviour and so
on. However, if we look at hunger i n these d ifferent species w ith the aim of
asserting the individual differences, we see t hat t here are d ifferences i n, for
example, what kind of food that is soug ht, how it is done etc. The usual
practice, in identifying psychological s tates, involves abstracting away from
- 3+ -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
33/102
such details. On similar lines neuroscientists abstract aw ay from details on
physical and chemical levels.
In fact, neuroscience is more functionalistic than it h as traditionally been
thought to be, according to Bechtel and Mundale. They point to the fact that
the n eurosciences b oth in their t ools an d project rely heavily on considerations
of behaviour an d psychological function. This h as t he result that i t is p ossible
to identify brain states across sp ecies and thereby, according to Bechtel and
Mundale, the con sequence o f making multiple r ealization less likely.
To give a simple example of this approach in neuroscience Bechtel and
Mundale refer t o Ferrier’s (1886) comparative investigations based on weak
current s timulation of br ain areas o f, among others, dogs, rats, rabbits a nd
monkeys. Figure 2 shows t he areas on the left hemispheres of monkey (left)
and dog (right) where motor response was educed when stimulated.
Fig. 2
Illustration from Ferrier 1886, reprinted in Bechtel and Mundale 1999
Each number refers to a different kind of motor response e.g. Number 1:
Opposite hind limb is adv anced as in walking, Number 5: Extension forward
of the o pposite arm (as i f reaching or t ouching something in front)
- 31 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
34/102
Although Ferrier’s research is o f ol der d ate it i s illustrative of t he approach
that is al so present in today’s r esearch in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology.Although contemporary research employs further developed techniques s uch
as si ngle cel l recording, it shares t he p oint of departure i n the a ssumption that
we can compare across species and its dependence on psychological or
behavioural function. When it comes to resea
as p osition emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) has been developed. Here the dependence on psychological
function is eve n more ev ident, because i t relies o n the co gnitive tasks t hat the
subjects ar e asked to p erform in the exp eriments w hile scanned.
According to Bechtel and Mundale, what we sho uld learn from all this is t hat
the way we ask questions in the neurosciences is constructed in a way that
makes m ultiple realization less l ikely.
“…neuroscientists employ behaviour an d psychological function in
setting the context f or i dentity of brai n states, with the result t hat t hey
identify areas and processes in brains across sp ecies, as well as in
different brains within the same species. Not surprisingly,
psychologists employ similar contexts for identifying psychological
states, resulting in a one-to-one mapping between brain states and
psychological states” ( Bechtel and Mundale ( 1999). p.203)
In short, functional cr iteria are relevant i n identifying both psychological
states an d brain states, according to Bechtel and Mundale.
- 32 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
35/102
Multiple realization of psychological states i s a bout judging similarity and
difference: rstly, similarity of psychological states an d secondly, difference o f
physical realizations. The standard arguments for m ultiple realization have
used a coarse-grained criterion when judging the sam eness o f psychological
states an d a ne-grained criterion when discriminating between brain states.
Bechtel and Mundale’s claim is that if we ch oose the sam e grains of analysis
for b oth psychological and neuroscientic i nvestigations t hen the plausibility
of multiple real ization disappears.
“One can adopt a rel atively coarse-grain, equating psychological states
over d ifferent individuals or ac ross species. If one em ploys the sam e
grain, though, one will equate activities i n brain areas a cross sp ecies,
and one-to-one mapping is preserved…Conversely, one can adopt a
very ne-grain, and differentiate psychological states between
individuals, or even in the sam e individuals ov er t ime. If one si milarly
adopts a ne-grain in analysing the brain, then one is likely to map
psychological differences on to brain differences, and brain differences
onto psychological differences.” (Bechtel and Mundale ( 1999) p. 202)
Which level of g rain that i s appropriate in judging these similarities and
differences d epends o n the context of inquiry. If, for exam ple, one takes an
evolutionary perspective a coarse-grained analysis would be appropriate.
(Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 203) However, according to Bechtel and
Mundale, on neither o f t hese different l evels of ab straction is it l ikely that
psychological states are multiply realized. On the coarse-grained approach
realizations i n form of br ain states w ill be similar a cross sp ecies a nd on the
ne-grained approach w e d o n ot share p sychological states.
- 33 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
36/102
Finally, how does t his ap proach avoid chauvinism? Taking a coarse-grained
approach to both psychological states an d brain states m akes i t po ssible to
ascribe psychological states t o cats, dogs, rat, rabbits an d possibly many other
species and not only to humans. But what about computers and
extraterrestrials com posed of d ifferent types of c omponents? Well, we m ight
nd that t hese t hings are a lternative realizations, but according to Bechtel and
Mundale, this i s n ot obvious an d maybe it is n ot even likely. Computers t hat
have psychological abilities are l ikely to be v ery different from the co mputers
that have b een invented up till now. Bechtel and Mundale su ggest that it at
least seems possible that such computers would have ar eas t hat could be
identied as being responsible for processing different s ensory inputs or
motor ou tput. According to Bechtel and Mundale, ”this m ight provide a b asis
for a common taxonomy of the physical processing states u nderlying the
psychological function” (Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 204). The situation I
imagine w ould be si milar i n the case o f extraterrestrials.
At this point one could ask whether this is not exactly what we took as
standard cases o f m ultiple realization? That i s, for ex ample, realizations i n
silicon-based systems. An alternative way of r eading Bechtel and Mundale’s
point about the n otion of brain states i n the n eurosciences i s t hat this n otion in
itself i s a functional n otion that act ually permits m ultiple realization in the
standard terms. So the important i ssue here is perhaps not, as we rst
thought, about w hether or not t he account d iscredits the plausibility of
multiple realization. The really important thing to recognize is that
neuroscience is m ore functionalistic i n its o utset than rst expected and that
the cen tral issue i s ab out choosing level of grain for one’s an alysis ap propriate
for t he co ntext of inquiry.
- 34 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
37/102
!- Sum u$ and Conclusions
My aim in this chapter has been to provide t he t ools for eval uating whether an
embedded and embodied approach is indeed compatible with functionalism.To sum up, the d evelopment of functionalism was connected to dissatisfaction
with the solutions provided by behaviourism and the mind-body identity
theory. Behaviourism was t oo liberal in its at tribution of mental states, whereas
the mind-body identity theory was viewed as chau vinistic. From this we
concluded that what might be thought of as t he sp irit of functionalism was t o
develop a theory that avoided these extremities, and at the same t ime kept amaterialistic approach. In order to get a better understanding of what i s
involved in dening a functional role we looked at two different m ethods of
functionalization: The m achine m ethod and the Ramsey se ntence m ethod. Both
methods p roviding denitions of functional roles t hat avoid the u se of mental
state terms an d which are neutral about the physical structure of t he mental
states. Using different sources a p riori or a p osteriori psychology yields d ifferentversions of functionalism: commonsense functionalism and empirical
functionalism respectively. However, both versions h ave been accused of being
either too liberal o r too chauvinistic. In my discussion of t he liberalism-
chauvinism dilemma on the charge of liberalism I argued, w ith Braddon-
Mitchell and Jackson, that Block’s exam ples i nvolving the Chinese brain and
the reor ganized economy of Bolivia is outside the reach of ou r intuition and,accordingly, that it seems t o be at least an open question whether or n ot such a
brain would indeed have mental states. Thus, one way to turn for the
functionalist seems t o be t owards m ore a bstract characterizations o f inputs an d
outputs. Another way out of this d ilemma, is t o recognise t he i mportant insight
delivered by Bechtel and Mundale, that the original debate on functionalism
and multiple realization has been cast i n different l evels of ab straction for
- 3 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
38/102
psychological s tates and brain states –- coarse-grained and ne-grained
respectively. If we a re w illing to acknowledge that t he notion of brain state i s
itself a f unctional notion in the w ay that Bechtel and Mundale argu e, this cou ld
be a way out of the dilemma. Bechtel and Mundale also offer us another
observation worth keeping in mind: which level of gr ain that is ap propriate i s
determined by the con text of inquiry. Judgements of s ameness an d difference
are al ways r elative to one’s r easons for wanting to make t he com parison in the
rst place.
Could we use our new found distinction between a coarse-grained and ne-
grained analysis to track down the distinction between commonsense
functionalism and empirical functionalism?
To a rst approximation this w ould seem to be the cas e in the sense t hat there
seems be m ore g rounds for a m ore d etailed analysis working from the ou tset of
scientic psychology than from commonsense p sychology. However, it is worth
noticing that even scientic p sychological analysis can be m ore o r less coarse o r
ne-grained depending on the context of i nquiry. Making a coarse-grained
analysis as op posed to a ne-grained analysis, in Bechtel and Mundale u se of
the terms, is just t o focus o n the commonalities as o ppose to the differences
between individuals. In this light, Bechtel and Mundale classify
characterisations of mental states at the level of scientic information-
processing psychology as gen erally coarse-grained. Accordingly, in some cases
the a nalysis i n which an empirical functionalism can take i ts p oint of departure
can be ch aracterised as coa rse-grained. I n this way, it seems coarse-grained and
ne-grained is not a m atter of all or no thing, but a co ntinuum. Although, the
distinction does not completely track the distinction between commonsense
and empirical functionalism it will be useful to keep in mind in the following
- 3 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
39/102
discussions of the body-detail model and Extended Functionalism and our
further investigations into the relation between embodied cognition and
functionalism.
- 37 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
40/102
______________________________________________
C761TE0 %
T7E "O48 *4ET652 &O4E2 3 S76150O /S 609U&ENT
______________________________________________
Shapiro argues t hat research within embodied, embedded cognitive sciencesconicts with the spirit of f unctionalism. According to Shapiro, it c onicts
with the b ody neutral functionalist model of mind that is ass ociated with the
claim that “characteristics of bodies m ake n o difference t o the k ind of mind
one possesses” (Shapiro (2004) p. 175). In his book “The Mind Incarnate”,
Shapiro depicts t hese b ody-neutral views as w hat he cal ls n aturalistic versi ons
of Gilbert Ryle’s dogma of the ghost in the machine, which despite theirnaturalistic p oint of d eparture hold that m ind is au tonomously residing in
and contained by the brain and the body. In “The Mind Incarnate” these
views are rep resented by what he cal ls t he seperability thesis ( henceforth ST).
ST is construed as t he v iew that the m ind is independent of the body in the
sense that the very same mind can exist in many different ki nds of bod ies
with different properties an d that, as a result, the q uestion of understandingmind can be separated from the qu estion of understanding body. As Shap iro
formulates it, ST views the mind as a “fairly self-contained organ, like a
stomach or a kidney, whose p roperties an d operations can be understood
without having to attend much to the an atomical and physiological properties
of the res t of the b ody”(Shapiro (2004) preface x ). ST is t hus t he m etaphysical
claim that identical minds can exist in different kinds of bod ies an d the
- 3 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
41/102
epistemological claim that we can understand mind without attending to the
facts of the b ody. As even classical functionalist accounts can allow that minds
cannot be understood without having an understanding of bodies and the
world (the ep istemological claim) my focus w ill be o n the metaphysical claim
of ST.
In opposition to ST, Shapiro interprets research in embedded, embodied
cognitive science as sup porting what he calls the embodied mind thesis
(henceforth EMT). EMT is t he t hesis t hat “minds p rofoundly reect the b odies
in which they are con tained” ( Shapiro (2004). p. 167.) According to this t hesis,
a cr eature w ith a h umanlike m ind will have a hu manlike body; and a cr eature
with dolphin mind will have a d olphin body and so on. In fact, EMT claims
“only humanlike bodies w ill have h umanlike minds”. (Shapiro (2004) p. 182
my italics).
The following scenario makes t he opposite thesis cl ear: imagine that we, via
radio, get i n contact with some cr eatures f rom another s olar s ystem. We t alk
and interact with them in much the same way as we did with the Martians in
the earlier example from Block. On this basis we assume that they have
something very much like a hu man mind. As we have only encountered our
new friends over t he radio, we have never seen a picture or video of them.
What kind of body would such creatures have? Proponents of ST would say
that we could not know this. As far as we know our new friends could be
spherical and judge distance with the h elp of sonar. Proponents of EM T on
the other hand would expect these creatures to have a b ody very much like
the hu man body (Shapiro (2004) p. 166).
The /uman Mind and the /uman Body
- 39 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
42/102
Before w e turn to the re search presented by Shapiro in favour of EMT, there
are a f ew important points worth noting about the n otions of the h uman mind
and body employed by Shapiro. The rst is that Shapiro’s argument is
concerned with entire minds and not just states. A human mind in the way
Shapiro uses t he term refers t o a collection of cognitive ca pacities su ch as f or
example, memory, per ception and use of language (Shapiro (2004) p .69).
Combined with EMT, this means that creatures with dolphin bodies cannot
have humanlike minds, but it does not imply that we cannot share mental
states l ike for exam ple, hunger o r p ain. However, whether t his is the case
depends, according to EMT, on whether they have body properties that are
sufficiently similar t o the r elevant properties of human bodies.
To understand the claim of EMT it is also important to be familiar w ith
Shapiro’s no tion of what it means to have a h uman body. Shapiro states that
when he talks abo ut human bodies he “w ill usually have in mind facts about
our gross morphology. Human beings walk upright on two legs, have two
forward-facing eyes i n their h ead, and are b ilaterally symmetrical. Our ear s
are on the sides of our heads, and we have ve ngers on each hand” (Shapiro
(2004) p. 71). In this w ay, EMT states t hat for a c reature t o have a human mind
it must share the gross morphology that is generally shared among human
beings.
%! "od. &atters
Shapiro argues ag ainst ST, referring to research in the eld of em bodied
cognition. Shapiro presents t hree lines o f research that h e takes t o support
EMT. From the introduction we have already had a taste of what these
involve, but here I will presen t the i ssues i n further d etail.
- 4+ -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
43/102
5. Perception and thought: the i diosyncratic asp ects of the b ody play
a u nique an d ineliminable r ole in perception, such that body form
and structure d etermines t ype o f mind
. Conception and content: “The content of the mind – the manner
in which the mind conceptualizes t he world – is a function of
body type.” (Shapiro (2004) p.183)
C. The division of mind and body: the mind is realized throughout
the bod y, making the d ivision between mind and body impossible
to maintain; therefore b ody type d etermines type of mind
I will present these t hree claims an d the res earch that Shapiro offers i n their
support under t he following headings: I) The Body’s Role in Perception, II)
Body Concepts and III) Leaky Minds. Along the way I will give some
concerns questioning whether t hese results suffice to support t he strong
claims of A,B,C and EMT.
%!% The "od./s 0ole in 1erce$tion
According to Shapiro, the b ody plays a signicant and indispensable rol e in
perception. In the introduction we have already encountered Shapiro’s
example on auditory perception, where the size of the head and the
placement of the ears matters for d etermining the location of a sou nd source.
Another example is vision. Shapiro considers our depth perception.
According to Shapiro, our abi lities t o move o ur bo dies i n certain ways an d the
particular ch aracteristics of our eyes m ake a n essential difference t o our vi sual
processi ng.
- 41 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
44/102
Shapiro points to t he fact that we h uman beings have t wo eyes that are p laced
with a cer tain difference bet ween them. When seeing objects in front of you,
each of your eyes projects sl ightly different coordinates o f these o bjects t o the
respective retinas. From the difference in coordinates your brain then
calculates t he rel ative d istance o f the o bjects.
“The sq uirrel looks cl oser than the t ree, which in turn looks cl oser than
the fence, because the retinal i mage of t he squirrel app ears on the
temple si des of each retinas w hereas t he image of the fence ap pears on
the n asal sides of each retina, with the t ree’s i mage n estled between the
two”(Shapiro (2004) p. 187).
According to Shapiro, what is i mportant, in this case, is t hat the p rocessing of
the b rain is tted to receive t he information from exactly two eyes – no more
and no less. In the light of t his, visual proce ssing in a spider m ust be
remarkably different from that of humans (most spiders have ei ght eyes, some
6. But there are sp iders w ith no eyes, 4 a nd up to even 12 eyes). Accordingly, if
we imagine that we could exchange the brain of a spider with a human brain,
the p rocessing done by the h uman brain would not be ap t for provi ding depth
perception. (Shapiro has an analogy of using a su bmarine i nstruction book for
ying an airplane. And as h e points out “this w ill almost certainly shorten
your ight”.) Shapiro takes this to indicate that “H uman vision needs a
human body” (Shapiro (2004) p.189).
Shapiro nds additional support for the above statement in work by
Churchland, Ramachandran and Sejnowski (1994) on the issue of parallax. If
you move your head or bod y in order to take a look around, you will notice
that t he things that ar e closest to you, will appear t o move whereas t he
- 42 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
45/102
background continues to appear stable (This
These movements, according to Shapiro, are not just an aid to depth
perception but indispensable parts of the visual p rocessing. According to
Shapiro, the p icture i s si milar w hen we t urn to our ot her p erceptual abilities.
Shapiro takes t his to sho w that the body d oes no t merely inuence our mental
properties (this would seem to be a trivial observation), bu t that its
characteristics p lay an indispensable role i n our m ental operations:
“..the point I draw from my comments about eyes and ears goes
beyond the obvious claim that perceptual processes are tailored to
body structures. The point is deeper—that psychological processes
incomplete w ithout the b ody’s con tribution” (Shapiro (2004) p.190)
Shapiro further s uggests t hat
“this m eans t hat a description of various p erceptual capacities can not
maintain body neutrality, and it also means that an organism with a
nonhuman body will have nonhuman visual and auditory
psychologies.” (Shapiro (2004) p. 190)
Does t his m ean that, for exam ple, people w ith only one eye or bad eyesight
have n on-human visual psychologies? I believe t hat this is the way w e should
interpret the ab ove s tatement from Shapiro. To call it non-human may b e a bit
drastic, but Shapiro’s conclusion seems to imply that people w ith this ki nd of
visual embodiment will have a d ifferent kind of perceptual psychology than
what is standard among human beings. I think that this is likely to be true,
but the question is what conclusions we should
- 43 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
46/102
(more on this later p . 47 ). Shapiro takes t he a bove res earch to show that the
body plays such a specic and important role in perception that it
charact eristics d etermining for ou r p ercep tual capacities. The resu lt, according
to Shapiro, supports EMT in the sense t hat it shows that we can not separate
mind from body, and that organisms w ith bodies of a p articular t ype w ill have
a matching mind.
2.2.1 A s*ill-based model o! erce tion
According to Shapiro (Forthcoming), we learn a similar l esson from Alva
Noë’s acco unt of perception. According to this v iew perception constitutively
depends on the body and its relations to the surrounding environment. To be
more precise, perception, according to Noë, occurs when an organism has
implicit knowledge o f how movements of its body or bo dy parts will affect the
ow of se nsory stimulation that i t r eceives, what N oë calls sensorimotor
contingencies. For example, take m y experience of a coff ee cu p on the t able in
front of me. According to the sensorimotor accou nt, this exp erience i s p artly
constituted by my implicit knowledge o f how the stimulation would change if
I, for e xample, moved my head to the r ight and thus looked at the cup from a
different angle. Along the sam e l ines, my experience al so depends p artially on
my knowledge of how stimuli would change if I were to reach out and grab a
hold of t he cup. What is important in this con text is that the sensorimotor
contingencies would be different for a creature with a different body.
Accordingly, reaching out for the coffee cup would be associated with a
different set of sensorimotor contingencies f or a cr eature w ith wings instead
of hands. Because, according to Noë, sensorimotor contingencies are
constitutive of exp erience, differences in these make differences to what
experience on e h as. Hence N oë’s conclusion: “only a cr eature w ith a b ody like
ours can have exp erience l ike ours” (Shapiro Forthcoming citing Noë p. 19).
To what extent does p erception on this account depend on the d etails of our
- 44 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
47/102
embodiment? Noë and O’Regan (2001) have an example of the kind of
characteristics that can make a d ifference t o experience:
The human eye has a blind spot of 5-7 degrees in its eld of vision. This
corresponds t o the p lace w here t he o ptic n erve goes t hrough the eyeb all and
connects w ith the b rain. The res ult is t hat small objects b ecome i nvisible w hen
in this eld. Usually we d o not notice t he b lind spot and as su ch it is n ot a p art
of our conscious visual experience. However, according to Noë an d O’Regan,
even though we do not experience the blind spot as such, it does make a
difference to the p henomenology of our visual experiences and is part of what
constitutes them. How can this be? According to Noë and O’Regan the
presence o f the b lind spot produces certain sensorimotor contingencies. Take
the ex perience o f watching a bird ying in the d istance. If there w as t o be n o
change in the sen sation when the b ird enters t he b lind eld, “then the b rain
would have to conclude that the object was not being seen, but was being
hallucinated.” (Noë and O’Regan (2001) p . 951) The brain gains i nformation
from the f act that there i s a b lind spot in the f ollowing way:
“Monitoring the way the sensor y stimulation from the retina changes
when the ey e m oves t o displace an object in the v icinity of t he b lind
spot, is, for t he brain, another w ay of g aining information about t he
object.” ( Noë an d O’Regan (2001) p. 951)
Accordingly, experience o f watching the b ird y in the d istance i s, according
to Noë an d O’Regan, partly constituted by my implicit knowledge of how the
ow of stimuli is linked with my bodily actions.Now, if we were to imagine a
creature t hat instead of having one b lind spot on each eye h ad two such blind
- 4 -
-
8/9/2019 Functionalism Project
48/102
spots, this cr eature w ould associate t he ex perience o f watching a bird in the
distance w ith other sensorimotor contingencies.
This i llustrates t hat, according to the sensorimotor acco unt, even differences i n
smaller details of one’s body and sensory system will make a d ifference t o the
experience – even such details as t he way our retinal image changes w hen
moving our eyes. The differences that a re provided by the differences in
sensorimotor con tingences m ake a difference on a sub-personal level in the
information received an