Philosophical theories in LIS and social sciences

by Birger HjørlandVisiting professor in Latvia

October 11, 2006 10.00-11.30

2

Introduction

My basic argumentation will be the following.

--All research (and even all thinking) is always made from a point of view (or a theory, or background knowledge).--Such points of view are partly domain/discipline specific, but are to some degree possible to generalize. --The generalized points of view are basically ontological and epistemological assumptions. --Ontological views are world views, views of what exists---Epistemological views are views of what knowledge is and how it is obtained.

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Introduction

--Such views are important to know about and to relate to --In Library and Information Science (LIS) and in Communication Studies (CS) (as well as other ”metafields” are such views performing a double role: -- LIS/CS is always based on a particular point of view (this is about approaches or paradigms within LIS/CS). ---The information/communication that is studied is itself produced from points of view, which are important to uncover for LIS/CS researchers and practitioners and to communicate to the users of information and communication systems.

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Introduction. Example 1

Points of view (or ”approaches” or ”paradigms”) in Communication Studies (cf., Craig, 1999). http://www.colorado.edu/communication/meta-discourses/Bibliography/Craig%20(1999)/tables.html•Rhetorical approach•Semiotic approach•Phenomenological approach•Cybernetic approach•Socio-psychological approach•Socio-cultural approach•Critical approach

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Introduction. Example 2

Points of view (or ”approaches” or ”paradigms”) in Knowledge Organization (separate presentation by Hjørland Thursday)

1. Traditional approaches

2. Facet analytic approaches

3. Computer based approaches

4. Bibliometric approaches

5. User oriented and cognitive approaches

6. Domain analytic approaches

7. Other approaches

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Introduction

So my claim is that al of us, all the time, choose one approach or another, often we do not know the alternative approaches and believe that our approach is the only existing one.

The opposite claim is that we observe facts that are independent of our theories and pre-understanding. This view is usually termed ”positivism”

My claim is that ”positivism” is wrong. Many people, however tend to be ”positivist” whether or not they know that word or have considered the problem. Some people believe that positivism is correct in science, but not in human and social sciences.

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Introduction

This view, that our thinking is determined by our pre-understanding is also a psychological, cognitive theory named ”the theory theory”. Even children think like scientists and may change theories (cf., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1998).

So, a child is a little scientist, or a scientist is a big child. Ordinary people tends to stop questioning everything and believe that their current theories are the only true ones. Often are contacts with other cultures (anthropology) helpful to challenge our own beliefs.

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Introduction

One important implication, at least for human and social science, is that we should know about the history of our field and about different approaches and their philosophical basis.

This is not easy. It is hard to find qualified systematic discussions of basic approaches in many fields. Some fields have a stronger tradition for reflexivity and epistemology, but many have not.

Even where it exist and where systematic courses in the philosophy of science of that discipline is given to students, most people do not really relate to it.

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Overview of positions

The approaches we saw on slide 4 and 5 were specific approaches in two disciplines (or two interdisciplinary fields if you prefer). But some of them are related. For example is ”the cognitive view” in LIS related to ”the cybernetic view” in communication.

All views are based on certain (or implying) certain ontological and epistemological assumptions. It is possible to make an inventory of transdisciplinary philosophical positions. I have tried to make such a list with explanations and references in THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIFEBOAT: http://www.db.dk/jni/lifeboat/home.htm

http://www.db.dk/jni/lifeboat/home.htm

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Overview of positions

In the same lifeboat is a survey of various scientific, scholarly and other domains.

In each domain is an attempt to demonstrate the existence of the different philosophical positions presented in another part of the lifeboat.

My working hypothesis is thus that it is possible to identify the major philosophical positions in each and every domain of knowledge!

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”Escape positions”

It follows that this is important for you, that all of us have to choose and defend a position.

Some will say that they prefer to combine different positions, but that is itself a position (eclecticism) that must be defended.

A famous Danish professor in Computer Science defend a position ”antiphilosophy”. But that is also a philosophical position!

Other kinds of ”escape positions” include ”common sense”, epistemological anarchism, and forms of dogmatism, authoritanism, and opportunism.

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”Escape positions”

So, my claim is that one cannot escape defending one or another philosophical position.

Of course, in actual behavior, most researchers are not taking side, are not arguing for their position. They are often not even aware that conflicting views re at play in their research.

So, what I am saying is that if research is going to progress, we need philosophical clarification, why researchers ought to be conscious and explicit about their theoretical commitments.

This view may be termed ”standpoint epistemology” which is actually a feminist position, I feel related to.

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My position

If all of us have to defend a position, I should of course also be able to do so. My position is influenced by American pragmatism (especially John Dewey), by Russian Activity Theory (especially A. N. Leontyev), by Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigms and others. I term my position ”pragmatic realism”. I do not believe this is an eclectic theory although I am influenced by different philosophers not normally seen as belonging to one school of thought.

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My position

The question is, of course, whether I can defend a coherent view? I believe nobody today is able to do so, including myself, so this is my chosen point of departure, which I believe is the most fruitful one. (Developing a philosophical view is only one aspect of being a researcher in a specific field).

The question is how one is able to provide arguments about the fruitfulness of one’s view (and the negative consequences of alternative views). I shall try to do so. In my next lecture I shall discuss the concept of information and see how information may be approached from my chosen perspective.

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Basic positions

In The epistemological lifeboat there is currently 32 positions mentioned. I shall here present four positions which I believe are the basic positions.

•Rationalism•Empiricism

---•Historicism •Pragmatism

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Basic positions

Rationalism and empiricism are the classical positions. Some people believe they are the only ones! They developed as competing views from the scientific revolution consummated by Newton. Together, rationalism and empiricism constitute the two main tendencies of European philosophy in the period between scholasticism and Kant. Empiricism is connected to British thinking, Rationalism to Continental thought. In the 20th Century may logical positivism be seen as an (unsuccessful) attempt to combine those two views (ending about 1962 when Thomas Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).

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Basic positions

When thinking about positions, I believe it is important not just to consider them as interesting positions in the history of ideas, but as living competing challenges about how we should carry out our work and our research.

You should ask: ”What difference does it make if perspective X is applied in the current problem?” If no important difference is implied, the perspective is not important to consider, and you should not waste your time on in.

So, no philosophy for the sake of philosophy. What matters is to make useful research, useful thinking and useful work.

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Rationalism

One meaning of the word rationalism is that reason, as opposed to irrationalism or authoritanism, plays (or should play) a dominant role in our attempt to gain knowledge.

As such is rationalism not different from the other positions, I am going to present. In other words this sense of the word rationalism do I consider common ground in all the positions I feel that it is important to discuss.

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Rationalism

In a more narrow sense is rationalism the epistemological doctrine that reason as opposed to experience (empiricism) is the most important source of knowledge. This view takes reason to be a distinct faculty of knowledge distinguished from, in particular, sense experience. To employ reason is to grasp self-evident truths or to deduce additional conclusions from them. This is a much stronger version of rationalism which asserts that the intellectual grasp of self-evident truths and the deduction of ones that are not self-evident is the major source of knowledge beyond even the slightest doubt.

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Rationalism

Clearly is this last view much more controversial. If it can be easily dismissed, and if it is not taken serious in modern research, it would not be an important position to discuss.

So, when introducing it to you, I have committed myself to demonstrate that this position is not just of historical interest but important for research in LIS, in communication studies, and in all other domains. (Whether or not this is true does not depend on my abilities alone, other philosophers and theoretically minded researchers may contribute as well).

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Rationalism

Wulff, Pedersen & Rosenberg (1990) is a text about the philosophy of medical science. In my opinion, however, it fails to provide arguments for rationalism in medicine. All examples of rationalism are dismissed as armchair and useless research. But the implication may then be that the book presents a paradox: Why introduce a discussion of a position if it is obviously obsolete?

In my opinion rationalist tendencies in modern medicine may be uncovered, e.g. in models of illness.

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Rationalism

Today we all agree that scientific disciplines are based on empirical research. If we define empiricism as the point of view that empirical research is important, then there is not much to say against it, and not much room for a rationalism defined as armchair research. So, in order to be relevant, the debate between rationalism and empiricism (and other philosophies) must be based on other kinds of arguments.

Rationalism must be understood as opposed to a empiricism as a particular ideal on how to make investigations. We will return to that when we have introduced empiricism.

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Empiricism

In all its forms, empiricism stresses the fundamental role of experience. As a doctrine in epistemology it holds that all knowledge is ultimately based on experience. Likewise an empirical theory of meaning or of thought holds that the meaning of words or our concepts are derivative from experience. Because not all knowledge stems directly from experience empiricism assumes a stratified form, in which the lowest level issues directly from experience, and higher levels are based on lower levels. It has most commonly been thought by empiricists that beliefs at the lowest level simply ‘read off’ what is presented in experience. 

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Empiricism versus rationalism

Empiricism must be seen as an ideal in which data or observations ”speak for themselves”, opposed to rationalism in which observations are seen as meaningless unless we already have concepts and ideas on how to select and understand our observations.

Rationalism, then, is an ideal in which we develop logical models about a domain prior to empirical investigations. Empiricism is mostly the ideal of induction and ”bottom-up information processing” while rationalism is mostly the ideal of deduction and ”top-down information processing”.

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Empiricism versus rationalism

Induction is usually described as moving from the specific to the general, while deduction begins with the general and ends with the specific; arguments based on experience or observation are best expressed inductively, while arguments based on laws, rules, or other widely accepted principles are best expressed deductively. So, if a medical researcher is collecting statistics on medical symptoms in patients and applying statistics the collected data, then he is close to the empiricist ideal. If another medical researcher is making models of ´what kinds of errors may occur in one of our anatomical systems, then he is close to the rationalist ideal of science.

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Empiricism versus rationalism

Empiricism and rationalism (and other epistemologies) are ideals, that can never be met 100% They are simply logical impossible, and they have had, probably for centuries, strong arguments against each other. The empiricist says: ”All knowledge comes from experience” The rationalist replies: ”Where do you know that from?” The empiricist now have two opportunities 1) To argue that this is empirical knowledge (which can easily be rejected) or 2) to argue that this is given ”a priory”, in which case he has proven the rationalist right. As we have seen is is not either a good position to claim that research can be done without empirical support.

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Empiricism versus rationalism

Even if empiricism and rationalism are absurd positions in their full consequences, they are important ideals, which is possible to trace in all domains.

There is no reason, however, that the same person cannot sometimes use more empiricist inspired approaches and sometimes more rationalist inspired approaches.

William James (1890) associated empiricism and rationalism with psychological personality types, but this is less important in our context.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

Historicism is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition. It is intended as a critique of the normative, allegedly anti-historical, epistemologies of Enlightenment thought (rationalism and empiricism). Among the significant theorists associated with historicism are Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm Dilthey, and G. W. H. Hegel. It is also opposed to mainstream cognitive science and cognitivism in not regarding human beings as having universal cognitive characteristics, but to regard cognitive functions as historically and culturally specific and situated.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

The individualistic account for the cognitive system provided by both empiricism and rationalism is seen as narrow-mindedness because they do not include the signification of the role of tradition and social communities for learning and conceptual development.

Historicism have influenced hermeneutical and phenomenological thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer. It has also influenced pragmatism as well as Marxist and critical positions. Its actual importance is implied by, for example, Ereshefsky (2000), who argues that historicism is necessary to provide taxonomies in the biological sciences.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

Heidegger distinguishes three modes of people's involvement with their surroundings: 1) an everyday mode of practical activity 2) a reflective problem-solving mode 3) a theoretical mode. In picking up a hammer to nail something, hermeneutic understanding is already at work. Pre-understanding can be put into words, but hereby is the original hermeneutical relation between person and world reified. Knowledge is always perspectival and situated. There is no escape to an absolute view without presuppositions. Human knowledge is always an interpretative clarification of the world, not a pure, interest-free theory.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

It is a mistake to believe that methods can construct a platform above the knower's historical situation. One can, however, become aware of one's own prejudgments through an interaction with others and with documents.

Kuhn (1962, 1970) questions the traditional conception of scientific progress as a gradual, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on rationally chosen experimental frameworks. Instead, he argues that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

A shift in the paradigm alters the fundamental concepts underlying research and inspires new standards of evidence, new research techniques, and new pathways of theory and experiment that are radically incommensurable with the old ones.

Feyerabend, Lakatos and Laudan have stressed the historical incorrectness of Kuhn’s notion that normal science is characterized by a period of the sole existence of one dominating paradigm. Instead they maintain that every major period in the history of science is characterized by the co-existence of competing paradigms.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

According to Mallery; Hurwitz & Duffy (1992) the notion of a paradigm-centered scientific community is analogous to Gadamer's notion of a linguistically encoded social tradition. In this way hermeneutics challenge the positivist view that science can cumulate objective facts. Observations are always made on the background of theoretical assumptions: they are theory dependent.

While Kuhn emphasized how our ontologies are implied by our theories and paradigms, he nevertheless emphasized that we cannot freely invent arbitrary structures: “nature cannot be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes.

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Historicism (with hermeneutics)

On the contrary . . .the history of developed science shows that nature will not indefinitely be confined in any set which scientists have constructed so far” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 263).

The world provides “resistance” to our conceptualizations in the form of anomalies, i.e., situations in which it becomes clear that something is wrong with the structures given to the world by our concepts.

In this way may Kuhn’s view be interpreted as (pragmatic) realism, although he is often interpreted as antirealist.

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The pragmatic view

Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition founded by three American philosophers: Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey. All three of the founding pragmatists combined a naturalistic, Darwinian view of human beings with a distrust of the problems which philosophy had inherited from Descartes, Hume and Kant. They hoped to save philosophy from metaphysical idealism.

The pragmatic view of knowledge implies that specific theories or findings will help achieve certain goals and support some values, while at the same time counteract other goals and values.

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The pragmatic view

In other words: The final criterion of what is valid knowledge is evaluated from the goals that this knowledge is able to support. The pragmatic theory of truth implies that what is true is in the end determined by considering the consequences of a given claim.

The most important pragmatic principle is always to consider what differences it makes for practice whether or not a given theory is regarded as true. Also concepts should be constructed in ways which allow them to assist us in achieve the goals implied by using those concepts.

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The pragmatic view

We may say that the pragmatic method is concerned with the uncovering of goals, interests, values and consequences. This focus is different from the focus of neutral observation or deduction and it is also different from historical and hermeneutical analysis. Pragmatism is thus an epistemology which differ from both empiricism, rationalism and historicism.

One example of the pragmatic view is feminist epistemology. Feminist epistemologists are producing conceptions of knowledge that emphases socially responsible epistemic agency.. This can be seen as a specific case of the pragmatic epistemology emphasizing goals and values and regarding social aspects of knowledge. 

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The pragmatic view

The pragmatic view of knowledge is of special importance to Library and Information Science (LIS) and Communication Studies (CS) because these fields are connected to the societal role of LIS institutions and media, whether they are scientific or commercial or public libraries serving democracy and enlightenment.

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The pragmatic view

"The epistemological point of departure in this study can be summarized in a few points.

1. Man is primarily an actor, living and acting in a bio-physical, a socio-cultural and a subjective world.

2. Living and acting in the three worlds constitutes the a priori of human knowledge.

3. Since living and acting constitutes the a priori of knowledge, knowledge is constructed in such a way that an application of well constructed knowledge will directly or indirectly serve living and acting.

4. When knowledge becomes part of an acting system, it functions as an internal action determinant.

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The pragmatic view

5. There is a continuous interaction between knowledge and action so that knowledge is created in and through action and so that experiences that the actor acquires through action influences subsequent action.

6. Value-knowledge, factual knowledge, and procedural knowledge are three types of knowledge connected to the three types of internal action determinants. Having value-knowledge means knowing what fulfils the criteria of good values. Having factual knowledge means having true beliefs about the three worlds in which one is living. Having procedural knowledge means knowing how to carry out a specific act or act sequence.

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The pragmatic view

7. Knowledge can be unarticulated or articulated. Unarticulated knowledge is, for instance, tacit knowledge, familiarity, knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge can be articulated in everyday language, science and art." (based on Sarvimäki, 1988, page 58-59)

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The pragmatic view

Pragmatism is future oriented. In determining the meaning of concepts, for example, pragmatists not just ask how a term has been understood in the past and how it is used now.

For example, the concept of documents may in the past have been defined from the premises of the print culture, but when we in LIS and CS uses this concept we should think about its function in the digital culture: What work can that concept do for us in developing theories and practices for future work in the digital environment?

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The basic approaches summarized

The following slide provides a simplified overview of what kind of data are regarded relevant and non-relevant by the basic epistemological views. This should provide a good grasp of what is at play.

The different values associated with those positions are, in my opinion, always at play in all domains. Although I find that pragmatism is generally the best position is is obvious that each epistemological view has its own favorite domains and that questions regarding values are not as important in chemistry as in social studies.

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Simplified relevance criteria in four epistemological schools

Empiricism Rationalism Historicism Pragmatism

Relevant: Observations, sense-data. Induction from collections of observational data. Intersubjectively controlled data. Non-relevant: Speculations, knowledge transmitted from authorities. "Book knowledge" ("reading nature, not books"). Data about the observers' assumptions and pre-understanding. 

Relevant: Pure thinking, logic, mathematical models, computer modeling, systems of axioms, definitions and theorems.   

Low priority is given to empirical data because such data must be organized in accordance with principles which cannot come from experience.

Relevant: Background knowledge about pre-understanding, theories, conceptions, contexts , historical developments and evolutionary perspectives. Low priority is given to decontextualized data of which the meanings cannot be interpreted. Intersubjectively controlled data are often seen as trivia. 

Relevant: Information about goals and values and consequences both involving the researcher and the object of research (subject and object).

Low priority (or outright suspicion) is given to claimed value free or neutral information. For example, feminist epistemology is suspicious about the neutrality of information produced in a male dominated society.

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The basic approaches summarized

Each position has its own ideal on how to define terms. Empiricism prefers operational definitions or definitions related to attributes that can be sensed or measured. Rationalism prefers definition by species and genus based on essential properties.

Historicism prefer definitions according to contextual understanding. Traditions and social communities play important roles for the forming of concepts. Pragmatism is future oriented and ask: What kind of understanding is best for the purpose it is going to support?

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The basic approaches summarized

Perhaps a warning should be given. Although pragmatism recommends to consider value, goals and consequences, it should not be taken as a defense for a political manipulation of research. Such as thing is ugly and destroying for scientific research.

Researchers should always seek the truth, no matter its political consequences. The pragmatic view is, however, that no isolated observation or logical deduction is ever enough. Our observations and deductions are parts of our acts and should be understood as such.

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The basic approaches applied to classification

Empiricism: Classification provided by statistical generalizations (e.g. factor analysis) based in “similarity”.

Examples: Classifications of mental illness in psychiatry (DSMIV) kinds of intelligence in psychology based

In LIS: Documents clustered on the basis of some kind of similarity, e.g. common terms in traditional IR or bibliographical coupling.

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The basic approaches applied to classification

Rationalism: Classification based on logical, universal divisions.

Examples: Frame based systems in Artificial Intelligence. Chomsky’s analysis of the deep structure in language.

In LIS: Facet analysis built on logical divisions and “eternal and unchangeable categories”

Examples: Ranganathan, Bliss II

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The basic approaches applied to classification

Historicism: Classification based on historical or evolutionary development. Examples: Biological taxonomies based on evolutionary theory.

In LIS: Systems based on the study of the development of knowledge and knowledge producing communities (the social division of (scientific) labour). Examples: Wallerstein (1996) (See also Hjørland, 2000c). The feature of the DDC that it distributes subjects by discipline.

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The basic approaches applied to classification

Pragmatism: Classifications based on specific values, policies and goals, e.g. feminist epistemology.

In LIS: Systems based on “cultural warrant” or “critical classification”. Examples: The French encyclopaedists, the Marxists, Classifications serving feminist collections.

(Considerations of the democratic values when designing classifications and other forms of KO for public libraries)

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Epistemologies and LIS / CS

In LIS and CS the study of epistemologies have a double role. Whenever encyslopedias or media or whatever is to be used it is important to consider the kind of ideals and values it reflects. It is important for professionals within those fields to be able to recommend and mediate documents based on an understanding of their ”bias”.

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References

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication theory, 9(2), 119- 161.

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References

Gopnik,A. & Meltzoff, A.N. (1998). Words, Thoughts, Theories. Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press.

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References

Hjørland, B. (2000c). Review of Wallerstein et al. (1996). Open the Social Sciences, report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. I: Knowledge Organization, 27(4), 238-241

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References

Hjørland, B. (2005). Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science. Journal of Documentation, 61(1), 130-155. Available at: http://www.db.dk/bh/Empiricism_p.130-155%2071705.pdf

http://www.db.dk/bh/Empiricism_p.130-155%2071705.pdf

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References

Hjørland, B. & Nicolaisen, J. (2005-). (Eds.). Epistemological Lifeboat. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science for Information Scientists.

http://www.db.dk/jni/lifeboat/home.htm

http://www.db.dk/jni/lifeboat/home.htm

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References

Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

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References

Mallery, J. C.; Hurwitz, R. & Duffy, G. (1992). Hermeneutics. IN: Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 1-2. 2nd ed. Ed. by S.C. Shapiro (Vol 1, pp. 596-611). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

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References

Sarvimäki, A. (1988). Knowledge in interactive practice disciplines: An analysis of knowledge in education and health care. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Education. 

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References

Wallerstein, I. (1996). Open the Social Sciences, report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

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References

Wulff, H. R., Pedersen, S. A. & Rosenberg, R. (1990). Philosophy of Medicine. An Introduction. 2.ed. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.