Partnership for transparency fund

Philippines: Harnessing Multi-Stakeholder Efforts to Promote Transparency and Accountability in the Department of Agriculture – Region 7

Project Completion Assessment

Bruce Murray and Emma Murray

24 July 2012

Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS............................................................................................................ ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................................................... iii

I. KEY FACTS......................................................................................................................................................... 1

II. PROJECT OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................................1

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT AND THE APPROACH TAKEN...................................2

IV. SCORING OF THE PROJECT...............................................................................................................4

A. Relevance and Design.............................................................................................................................4

B. Efficiency and Effectiveness.................................................................................................................6

C. Impact and Sustainability....................................................................................................................10

D. Replicability.................................................................................................................................................14

V. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................................15

A. Overall Assessment................................................................................................................................15

B. Main Lessons.............................................................................................................................................16

ANNEX 1: MAPS OF REGION 7 IN THE PHILIPPINES...................................................................18

ANNEX 2: KEY FIELD ACTIVITIES OF THE EVALUATION MISSION....................................19

ANNEX 3: PHOTOS OF MISSION VISITS TO SOME PROJECT SITES...............................20

ANNEX 4: FINANCIAL DETAILS...................................................................................................................22

ANNEX 5: PROBLEMS REPORTED BY FIELD MONITORS IN BOHOL...............................24

ANNEX 6: PROBLEMS REPORTED BY FIELD MONITORS IN CEBU...................................25

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BB Barangay BagsakanBACO Bids and Awards Committee Observers BIDEF Bohol Integrated Development Foundation (PhilDHRRA's NGO Partner)CIS Community Irrigation SystemCOA Commission on AuditCSO Civil Society OrganizationDA Department of Agriculture DPWH Department of Public Works and HighwaysLEAD Livelihood Enhancement for Agriculture DevelopmentLGU Local Government UnitLPFI Lihok Pilipina Foundation, Inc. (PhilDHRRA's NGO Partner)MOA Memorandum of AgreementNABCOR National Agribusiness CorporationNegOrNet Negros Oriental Network of NGOs (PhilDHRRA's NGO Partner)NGO Nongovernment Organization NIA National Irrigation AdministrationPCA Project Completion Assessment PCR Project Completion ReportPFI Pagtambayayong Foundation, Inc. (PhilDHRRA's NGO Partner)PHF Post-Harvest FacilitiesPhilDHRRA Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural

AreasPO People's Organization PROCESS Bohol Participatory Research Organization of Communities and

Education Towards Struggle for Self Reliance (PhilDHRRA's NGO Partner)

PTF Partnership for Transparency FundRFU Regional Field UnitTUFA Tubod Fishemen's Association (PhilDHRRA's PO Partner)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2010 the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) approved a $30,194 grant to the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA) to finance a Project that aimed to reduce corruption by increasing transparency and accountability in the operations of the Department of Agriculture in Region 7, covering the four provinces of Cebu, Bohol, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor.

The Project had five objectives: (i) mobilizing civil society organizations to monitor the provision of services by the Department of Agriculture; (ii) monitoring the provision of farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities and farm inputs funded in the 2009 budget; (iii) conducting capacity building activities on the budget process; (iv) raising the awareness of stakeholders in using Commission on Audit reports as monitoring and advocacy tools; and (v) formulating proposals and action points for the Department of Agriculture to improve budget transparency and accountability in the provision of services. The Project performance was rated as Satisfactory based on:

Relevance and Design -- Partially Satisfactory: In reviewing the Project, PTF did a good job in seeking evidence that the Department of Agriculture supported the Project. However, during Project processing the scope of the Project changed. In the final design, there was a mismatch between the Project activities and the description of the corruption problem and a lack of indicators to show how, or if, the Project had an impact on reducing corruption. Prior to approving the grant, PTF should have looked more closely at the final Project design to ensure that there was a strong relationship between the Project activities and the description of the corruption problem.

Efficiency and Effectiveness -- Highly Satisfactory: PhilDHRRA implemented the Project efficiently and effectively. The Project was carried out in line with the specific objectives and activities in the approved Project Proposal. PhilDHRRA effectively mobilized civil society organizations to monitor 304 widely dispersed rural projects funded in the 2009 Department of Agriculture budget. This was a major accomplishment. PhilDHRRA developed a good relationship with the Department of Agriculture, which cooperated in the Project.

Impact and Sustainability -- Satisfactory: The monitoring found that 83% of the projects were in good or fair condition, 12% in poor condition and 5% either could not be located or the funds were diverted to other projects. On 24 May 2012 the Department of Agriculture submitted a comprehensive response to PhilDHRRA, based on additional field monitoring, clarifying most of the issues identified by the Field Monitors and expressing its appreciation for the field monitoring undertaken by PhilDHRRA. Plausible explanations were provided for most of the problem projects and some of the missing projects or project components were located. There were a small number of projects that were reported as not included in the Department of Agriculture’s records or had been financed by the 2010 rather than the 2009 budget. The Department of Agriculture stated that it would establish a Moniitoring Team within its operations group to strengthen its monitoring. This is a postive outcome of the Project. However, the Project did not generate any clear information that the improved transparency resulting from civil society monitoring reduced corruption although awareness of civil society’s presence could possibly reduce corruption in future projects. Corruption can occur at many points in the project cycle and it is unlikely that monitoring a project once after it has been completed will have a major effect in reducing corruption unless the

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existence of ghost projects is widespread. The Project found that there were few, if any, ghost projects. Sustainability of the Project is open to question unless additional financing materializes to support PhilDHRRA’s follow on activities in this area.

Replicability -- Satisfactory: Although the Project design did not conform to the over-riding objective of PTF to reduce corruption, the Project has many elements that support replicability: (i) PhilDHRRA is a large organization that operates throughout the Philippines; (ii) similar problems likely occur in other regions; (iii) PhilDHRRA has a proven ability to mobilize civil society to monitor large numbers of projects in rural areas; and (iv) an effective partnership was built with the Department of Agriculture, which has institutionalized a Monitoring Team and would welcome a follow on project. However, PTF should only be involved in a follow on projects if the design issues identified in this evaluation are addressed to provide a stronger focus on corruption.

Lessons for PTF

• Enhanced Project Screening to Ensure PTF Finances Well Defined Projects That Focus on Corruption: Project experience underlines the importance of good project screening. PTF should carefully screen project designs prior to approving grants to ensure that the inputs and outputs are consistent with the description of the corruption problem. There should be a plausible link from inputs and outputs to outcomes that will have an impact on reducing corruption and verifiable indicators identified that can be used to assess the progress achieved in reducing corruption. These should be summarized in a well-defined logical framework.

Continued Involvement Promotes Sustainability: If PTF is involved in a pilot project, as was the case for this Project, it must have sufficient funds to finance subsequent phases. Otherwise what was learned may be lost and the desired impacts are unlikely to be achieved or to be sustainable.

Importance of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): The Project experience underlines the importance of having a signed MOA that sets out the responsibilities of both the government agency and civil society.

Financial Audits: In the future PTF should consider whether PTF-financed audits should be undertaken of randomly selected projects to demonstrate to the PTF Board and the donors that the funds were used for the purposes intended.

Lessons for PhilDHRRA

Project Definition and Design: Rather than monitoring such a large number of projects once, consideration could be given to monitoring a smaller number of projects more intensively with multiple visits during the project cycle (e.g., from the Bid Awards Committee through construction to completion and operation) and covering the activities of the National Agribusiness Corporation. This would require the involvement of Local Government Units from the outset in the project design, more training of field monitors and fine tuning the field monitoring instruments based on the experience gained under the Project.

Early Involvement of the Government Agencies: The implementing agencies should be involved at the beginning of the project so they can share how the government project implementation and funding allocation systems work, ensure the information on which the monitoring is based is up to date and accurate and establish mechanisms to resolve issues that may arise and to take action on the problems identified by field monitors.

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Selecting the Projects to Be Monitored: At the beginning of a project, agreement must be reached with the concerned government agency on the list of all projects funded in the budget. Then the subset to be monitored, consistent with available resources, should be selected randomly to ensure that there is no bias in the sample of projects monitored.

Greater Commission on Audit Involvement: Given its mandate, a more active role for the Commission on Audit should be considered for future projects.

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PROJECT COMPLETION ASSESSMENT

I. KEY FACTS

Project Name: Harnessing Multi-Stakeholder Efforts to Promote Transparency and Accountability in the Department of Agriculture – Region 7 (Subay Agri Project)

CSO Name: Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA)

Grant Amount: US$30,194.00Dates of Implementation: December 2010 to March 2012 PhilDHRRA Project Adviser: Caridad CorridorPhilDHRRA Project Coordinator: Sarah EnanoriahProject Completion Assessment Authors: Bruce Murray and Emma MurrayDate of Project Completion Assessment – July 24, 2012

II. PROJECT OVERVIEW

1. The Project was the first collaboration between the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA)1. The Project aimed to reduce opportunities for corruption by increasing transparency and accountability in the operations of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and its attached agency, the National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR)2, in the provision of support services in Region 7, covering the four provinces of Cebu, Bohol, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor (see Maps, Annex 1).

2. The analysis of the corruption problem in PhilDHRRA’s 17 August 2010 Project Proposal, which was approved by PTF, focused on scams in procurement and distribution of support inputs primarily involving NABCOR’s activities. It cited the following examples of corruption: (i) P7.58 million worth of "missing" vegetable seeds and planting materials under the Programang Gulayan Para sa Masa; (ii) overpayment of P3.4 million for seeds and seedlings purchased for distribution in Region IV and VII; (iii) purchase of 37,692 fruit trees seedlings for an overpriced amount of P3.09 million from a non-government organization (NGO); (iv) the P728-million 2004 fertilizer fund scam; (v) overpriced ice-making machines worth P455M; and (vi) P95.67M worth of outdated post-harvest facilities. The Project Proposal also stated that there were problems related to support services [e.g., farm-to-market roads (FMR)3, post-harvest facilities (PHF)] that were said to be completed and the funds spent but in practice were often not started or were inefficiently built. However, few details on the latter problems were provided. 1 PhilDHRRA is a non-profit national network of non-government organizations (NGOs) that seeks to build the capacity of its members to address agrarian reform and rural development. PhilDHRRA is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2 DA’s trading and marketing arm for the acquisition and distribution of farm outputs and inputs.3 The cost of incomplete farm-to-market roads was stated to be P5.19 billion.

3. The Project Proposal states that limited civil society organization (CSO) monitoring of the delivery of goods and services procured by DA contributed to concerns about transparency and accountability. Other factors that needed to be addressed so that CSOs could play a more active role included their limited knowledge of the DA budgeting process and the technical nature of Commission on Audit (COA) reports.

4. The grant agreement, signed on September 10, 2010, committed PTF to provide $30,194 and PhilDHRRA to provide the equivalent of $8,226 in counterpart support. The Project was expected to be implemented from December 2010 to November 2011. However, PhilDHRRA requested for an extension of the implementation period, which PTF granted. The Project was largely completed in January 2012 but the implementation was extended to March 2012 to hold a forum to disseminate the Project’s results. PhilDHRRA’s Project Completion Report (PCR) was submitted on 29 February 2012.

5. The Evaluation Mission to prepare this Project Completion Assessment (PCA) visited the Project area from 5 to 9 March 2012 to gather information necessary for the evaluation. The Mission interviewed key staff of PhilDHRRA, Field Monitors and concerned Government officials and travelled to selected project sites. The activities of the Evaluation Mission are shown in Annex 2 and pictures of projects visited are shown in Annex 3. Because of time and budget constraints, it was not possible to visit all four provinces in Region 7. Only projects in Cebu and Bohol were visited, although the Field Monitors in Negros Oriental and Siquijor were contacted by phone and E-mail. Prior to the Mission, background documents provided by PTF were reviewed, questions were formulated to structure the interviews and E-mails and texts were exchanged with PhilDHRRA to ensure that the field work would be undertaken in an efficient manner. The Mission went smoothly and the excellent cooperation of PhilDHRRA and the partner NGOs in supporting the work of the Mission is gratefully acknowledged. Overall the Mission validated the factual material included in PhilDHRRA’s PCR, which was comprehensive and provided a good base on which the evaluation of the Project could build.

6. The draft PCA was forwarded to PhilDHRRA and PTF on 24 April 2012 for review and comment and to correct factual errors. Comments were received and reflected as appropriate to finalize the PCA. All factual corrections were made. However, if there were differences of opinion or interpretation of agreed facts between the evaluators and PTF or PhilDHRRA, the evaluator’s opinions were reflected in the report. In June 2012, the Evaluation Team received a copy of the Department of Agriculture’s comprehensive response, dated 24 May, on the problems reported by PhilDHRRA’s field monitoring. Thereafter, the PCA was finalized.

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT AND THE APPROACH TAKEN

7. Figure 1 shows the Project’s five objectives and the activities related to each. PhilDHRRA brought together five NGOs4 and one people’s organization to undertake the field monitoring. The partners mobilized Field Monitors to monitor a total of 304 projects, 4 (i) Bohol: Bohol Integrated Development Foundation (BIDEF) and Participatory Research Organization of Communities and Education Towards Struggle for Self Reliance (PROCESS); (ii) Cebu: Lihok Pilipina Foundation, Inc. (LPFI) and Pagtambayayong Foundation, Inc. (PFI); (iii) the Negros Oriental Network of NGOs (NegOrNet); and (iv) Siquijor: Tubod Fishermen’s Association (TUFA).

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representing 34% of the 905 projects funded by the DA in 20095. To facilitate the Project, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between DA Region 7 and PhilDHRRA Visayas, dated February 22, 2011, which defined the roles and responsibilities of each party. The PhilDHRRA PCR detailed the field monitoring undertaken and the tabulation/coding/analysis of the results. Validation meetings were held with the DA from September until November 2011. The validation meetings with the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), the implementing agency for the communal irrigation projects, and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) were held in January 2012.

Figure 1: Project Objectives and ActivitiesNo. Specific Objective Activities1 Harness multi-sectoral efforts of non-government

organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations (POs), media and academe in monitoring the provision of support services of the DA

Initial meeting with potential partners (media, academe, NGOs, POs)Cooperation meeting with related agencies (i.e., DA-Regional Field Units (RFUs), NABCOR, COA)Creation of the core monitoring group

2 Monitoring the support services provided (i.e., farm-to-market road, post-harvest facilities, farm inputs)

Training of the core monitoring group in using the monitoring toolsField monitoring in Region 7

3 Conducting capacity building activities on the DA budget process

Conduct two public fora on the DA budget process, including dialogue with DA-RFU 7

4 Popularizing the COA reports and raise the awareness of multi-stakeholders in utilizing these reports as monitoring and advocacy tools

Develop “laymanized” COA reportsPublishing and disseminating information, education, and communication materials in print and online

5 Formulating proposals and action points for the DA to improve budget transparency and accountability in the provision of support services

Workshops with the core monitoring groupFeedback sharing with DA

Source: PhilDHRRA’s Project Proposal, 17 August 2010.

8. Based on the financial report submitted by PhilDHRRA, the total Project cost was P1,532,078, equivalent to about $34,0466 of which P1,196,901 ($26,598) came from PTF and P335,177 ($7,448) from the counterpart contributions of PhilDHRRA and its partners. As was clear in the Project Proposal, most of the funds were used to finance the work of the Field Monitors, activities to disseminate their findings and the salaries of the Project Adviser and Project Coordinator. Together the honoraria for the Field Monitors7, Project Coordinator and Administration Officer accounted for about half of the total expenditures. As of January 2012, the actual cost was P161,848 ($3,596) less than the estimated cost. In response to PhilDHRRA’s request, PTF agreed that these funds could be used to finance the March 15, 2012 sharing session and a portion of the cost for the Evaluation Mission.

IV. SCORING OF THE PROJECT

5 PhilDHRRA chose to monitor the projects funded from the 2009 budget because they were likely to be completed when the field monitoring took place in 2011.6 An exchange rate of Peso45=US$1 was used.7 The Project Proposal approved by PTF mentions volunteer-teams for each province and goes on to say that “The monitors (and their respective NGOs/POs) may be motivated to participate in the project because they will stand to benefit from the results since monitoring will be done on support services to farmers. This will likely give them the motivation to actively participate in the advocacy.” However, the budget attached to the Project Proposal clearly indicates that the Field Monitors would be paid an honorarium, Peso300 per day of training, Peso150 per day for capacity building meetings and Peso12,000 per month during the monitoring. In addition the Field Monitors were paid for their travel costs.

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11. The scoring system used to evaluate the Project follows PTF’s Guidelines.8 Each of the following dimensions were scored on a 5-point scale9: (i) Relevance and Design; (ii) Efficiency and Effectiveness; (iii) Impact and Sustainability; and (iv) Replicability. The PTF Guidelines identify sub-criteria for each of these four dimensions of evaluation, which were used to structure the analysis. The various scores were added together using the weights10 specified by PTF to arrive at the overall assessment of the Project. The overall score of this Project is consistent with a Satisfactory Performance Rating, with a Highly Satisfactory rating for Efficiency and Effectiveness, Satisfactory ratings for Replicability and Impact and Sustainability and a Partially Satisfactory score for Relevance and Design. The details supporting these ratings follow.

A. Relevance and Design

12. Appropriateness of the objectives to the problems being addressed: The PTF Guidelines require that the corruption problem that a project is designed to address be defined as precisely as possible in the Project Proposal. The description of the corruption problem focused largely on corruption in NABCOR’s procurement and distribution of agriculture inputs, although it also stated that there were problems related to support services (e.g., farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities). The Project described in the PTF approved Project Proposal involved a one-time monitoring of the status of a large number of projects included in the 2009 DA budget. Despite the description of the corruption problem, the Project scope did not include the monitoring of DA or NABCOR Bid Award Committees. When queried why NABCOR was excluded from the scope of the Project, PhilDHRRA and DA explained that the procurement of farm inputs and equipment are handled at the national level while the focus of this Project was handled at the regional level.

13. The Project design changed substantially from the time it was first presented to PTF and the time that it was approved, a period of about a month. PhilDHRRA’s 29 July 2010 Concept Note focused on corruption in the procurement of farm inputs and equipment by NABCOR. It stated that “It is high time for CSOs to be vigilant in monitoring procurement and distribution practices … and ensure that the provisions outlined in the General Procurement Act (RA 9184) are diligently observed”. No mention was made of FMRs and the other DA activities. The type of Project described in the Concept Note was of interest to PTF as the activities would include monitoring the procurement process, an area of focus for many successful PTF supported projects in the Philippines. However, this activity was not included in in the Project Proposal dated 17 August 2010 that was approved by PTF. In the approved Project Proposal, although the description of the corruption problem remained the same as it had been in the Project Concept Note, the scope of the Project changed to involve one time monitoring of DA projects, as described in Para 7 and Figure 1 and excluded any activities related to NABCOR. Prior to approving the Project, PTF did a good job in requiring PhilDHRRA to provide evidence that DA supported the Project11. However, PTF did not fully understand the significance of the changes in scope and detailed activities of the Project

8 PTF Impact Evaluation Scoring Framework Revised Concept Note. January 20129 1 = Unsatisfactory Performance; 2 = Partially Satisfactory Performance; 3 = Satisfactory Performance; 4 = Highly Satisfactory Performance; 5 = Exceptional Performance.10 Relevance and Design (15%); Efficiency and Effectiveness (20%); Impact and Sustainability (45%); Replicability (20%).11 This resulted in two letters of support for the Project from DA to PTF and the initiation of the process that led to the signing of the MOA.

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as far as PTF’s mandate was concerned. There was a mismatch between the corruption problem described in the approved Project Proposal and the Project design.

14. Measurability of indicators to Track Project Achievements: The measurability of impact is an important element of project design. The methodology employed and activities undertaken in this Project are indirect ways of addressing corruption and transparency. Field monitoring is a way to check whether the projects were implemented in the agriculture sector of Region 7 and to verify the quality of the completed projects. Such monitoring helps to improve transparency and accountability by making DA, NIA and DPWH aware that some CSOs are watching12. However, The Evaluation Team was not able to develop a methodology to measure and quantify the impact of the extensive project monitoring on reducing corruption. This reflects the lack of a logical framework in the Project Proposal that clearly links inputs to outputs, outcomes and the ultimate objective of reducing corruption, and the associated verifiable indicators. This is not an unusual finding. The evaluation offices of the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Inter-American Development Bank have consistently reported the weaknesses of monitoring and evaluation systems and logical frameworks. All of these organizations have considerably more expertise and financial resources than do PhilDHRRA and PTF. Figure 2 summarizes the Evaluation Team’s views on how corruption might infect projects at various stages of the project cycle. The activities funded under the Project are relevant to only a small proportion of the areas where corruption may take place throughout the project cycle.

Figure 2: Corruption and the Project CycleStage of the Project Cycle Types of Fraud and Corruption

Identification and Design Inappropriate influence on project identification and selection, project, formulation, needs assessment and technical specifications designed to favor some bidders.

Prequalification Inappropriate influence on shortlisting bidders either by disqualifying qualified firms to reduce competition, or qualifying unqualified bidders, well connected firms and/or firms fraudulently claim that they fulfill the pre-qualification criteria.

Tendering and Bidding Inappropriate factors influence the selection of the winning bidder. Collusion among bidders results in an artificially high price. Lowest priced bidder is disqualified on dubious grounds. Bribes to government officials result in the winning bidder being inappropriately selected. The price of the winning bid includes bribes/kickbacks to well-connected parties. Lack of transparency results in bids awards that are in excess of market prices or to firms that provide shoddy products.

Implementation Collaboration in fraudulent practices. Bribery and corruption result in ghost projects, shoddy construction because of cheating on the quantity and/or quality of materials and/or poor construction supervision or diversion of material to ineligible beneficiaries.

Operations and Maintenance

Solicitation of bribes for the award of maintenance contracts, shoddy maintenance and/or theft of materials.

Source: The Evaluation Team’s adaptation of Appendix 7 of the Sector Assistance Program Evaluation of Asian Development Bank Assistance to Philippines Power Sector. 2005. Page 100.

15. The Evaluation Team recognizes that even if monitoring and evaluation activities financed by the Project are not, by themselves, sufficient to achieve the ultimate goal of

12 DA, NIA and DPWH cooperated in clarifying projects to be monitored and contributing their technical skills in gauging the status of the projects implemented.

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PTF-supported projects, they are valuable tools in their own right that can: (i) help identify problems and their causes; (ii) suggest possible solutions to problems; (iii) raise questions about assumptions and strategy; and, (iv) contribute to improving transparency and accountability.

16. In view of above observations, particularly the mismatch between the Project activities and the description of the corruption problem in the agriculture sector and the lack of verifiable/quantifiable indicators to show how the Project will have an impact on reducing corruption, Relevance and Design was rated as 2 or Partially Relevant. PTF should have more rigorously screened the PhilDHRRA Project Proposal to ensure that there was a stronger relationship between the Project Design and the description of the corruption problem. With the benefit of hindsight, the Project Design and the rationale for pursuing it were only indirectly related to PTF’s over-riding objective of reducing corruption.

B. Efficiency and Effectiveness

17. Efficiency and Effectiveness were analyzed by assessing project implementation and whether the Project, as described in the approved Project Proposal, was delivered in a reasonably efficient and effective manner. The outputs related to each of the five specific objectives were produced largely as stated in the Project Proposal. In other words, PhilDHRRA did what it promised to do in accomplishing the specific objectives in the approved Project Proposal.

18. Objective 1: “To harness multi-sectoral efforts (NGOs, POs, media, academe) in monitoring the provision of support services of the DA.” Meetings with CSO partners and the related agencies were held largely as planned, except NABCOR was not involved in the Project activities. PhilDHRRA mobilized five NGOs and one people’s organization to monitor a large number of widely disbursed projects. PhilDHRRA also succeeded in developing working arrangements with the DA, NIA, DPWH, and COA. Consistent with the two letters of support DA wrote to PTF in August and September 2010, DA gave considerable cooperation for the Project and involved their senior staff at both the regional and the provincial levels.

19. PTF’s experience shows that successful implementation of anti-corruption projects depends heavily on the active support of the relevant government agency. The evidence shows that although there were some areas of tension and disagreement, PhilDHRRA interacted constructively with DA. Factors that led to the constructive engagement included: (i) the high priority given to anti-corruption efforts by the Aquino government; (ii) the signing of a formal MOA between PHILDHRRA and DA13; and (iii) a willingness of PhilDHRRA to undertake additional monitoring to validate results when DA representatives questioned some of the findings at the first forum. There were, however, some instances where greater coordination was needed with Local Government Units (LGUs). This is because the LGUs were significantly involved in the bidding and overseeing the implementation of the projects. For some projects, LGU staff helped the

13 During the very early stages of the Project, PhilDHRRA had difficulty engaging with Government agencies, arranging meetings and collecting information on what projects to monitor. However, after the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between PhilDHRRA and the DA-Region 7 on 11 January 2011, this problem was resolved. This experience underlines the importance of having a formal MOA at the beginning of such a project and that PTF was correct in encouraging that such a document be produced.

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Field Monitors to locate the projects, although their role was not envisioned in the Project design.

20. PhilDHRRA engaged very constructively with other CSOs to undertake the field monitoring. It was a major accomplishment to mobilize the Field Monitors necessary to monitor such a large number of widely scattered projects in four island provinces. While harnessing multi-sectoral efforts and bringing civil society and implementing agencies together is useful, it is only a first step to finding a systematic way of reducing corruption and assuring the efficient and effective delivery of agricultural support services to the farmers. Much more needs to be done beyond monitoring completed projects once to achieve that goal. Involving the implementing agencies in the planning stage for the Project could also have enlightened PhilDHRRA on how the government system works, the roles of the various agencies, the steps from the approval of the projects in the budget through the Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) to the award of the contracts, construction and implementation, what support PhilDHRRA could expect from the various agencies and LGUs and how civil society could best engage at each stage of the project cycle to reduce the opportunities for corruption. During the project planning phase it is important to ensure that the government records on which the monitoring will be based are complete and up to date. If that is not the case, problems will be encountered during project implementation, as was the case for this Project.

21. There was no participation from the media or academe in the Project, but this did not detract the monitoring. According to PhilDHRRA, some media people were invited to the first presentation but it resulted in a less than relaxed atmosphere as all participants were cautious about their words, fearful of making inaccurate statements at that stage that might be reported by the media.

22. Objective 2: “To conduct monitoring of support services provision (i.e. farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities, farm inputs) in Region 7.” To achieve this objective, PhilDDHRRA developed field-monitoring instruments and trained the Field Monitors. As reported by PhilDHRRA in its PCR, a total of 304 projects in Region 7 were monitored, which represented 34% of the 905 projects implemented in Central Visayas funded by the 2009 DA Budget. The number of projects monitored by type was as follows:

117 Farm to Market Road (FMR) Projects; 77 Communal Irrigation Systems (CIS) Projects; 23 Barangay Bagsakan (BB) Projects; 47 Dryers and other Post Harvest Facilities Projects; and 40 Livelihood Enhancement for Agricultural Development (LEAD) Projects.

23. As planned, projects were monitored in four provinces, Cebu, Bohol, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor,14 between March 15, 2011 and June 30, 2011. The Field Monitors used a common monitoring tool, conducted interviews with beneficiaries in the project areas, inspected the facilities and took pictures. PhilDHRRA tabulated, analyzed and reported on the monitoring results. Based on the documents reviewed and the interviews with the Field Monitors, PhilDHRRA and DA staff, the Evaluation Mission validated the field monitoring activities. Monitoring such a large number of projects represents a significant achievement, particularly given the fact that the projects were scattered over a large area and were sometimes difficult to reach.

14 See maps in Annex 1.

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24. FMR, CIS, BB and Post Harvest projects are visible projects that could be monitored based largely on their appearance. However, monitoring LEAD projects required more diligence on the part of the Field Monitors. They tracked the transfer of non-interest loans to beneficiaries named in the list given by the DA and probed whether the named borrowers, which were mostly community groups, actually received the loans and used the money as intended.

25. The Evaluation Mission confirmed that, as was reported in PhilDHRRA’s PCR, there was general agreement that the Field Monitors did not receive enough training to familiarize themselves with the monitoring tools. PhilDHRRA also recognizes that the field monitoring tools could be further improved based on the experience gained under the Project. The Field Monitors in Cebu and Bohol received a one-day orientation from DPWH and NIA staff. The PhilDHRRA Project Coordinator introduced Field Monitors from Negros Oriental and Siquijor to the monitoring tool. The Field Monitors said that they were given only about 15 days to do the monitoring, which they found too short because the projects are not close to each other. The Field Monitors appeared to the Evaluation Mission to be well educated, experienced in field activities, highly motivated and could articulate their ideas and findings well. These personal assets contributed to the quality of their monitoring.

26. Since in the project design the Field Monitors would only visit the projects once, PhilDHRRA had no way of independently verifying that action was successfully taken to correct the reported problems. However, PhilDHRRA made the effort to get a response from the DA on the problems found by the field monitors, which drew a positive reaction from DA to commit to form a monitoring team for their projects. This is a promising development in which civil society could monitor the different layers of project implementation with the aim of reducing corruption.

27. Objective 3: “To conduct capacity building activities on the DA budget process.” The Project Proposal stated that there would be two public fora to explain the DA budget process and identify possibilities for civil society participation in the DA budget cycle. The details of the two fora are provided in the PhilDHRRA’s PCR. The first forum, held on 1 July 2011, was to familiarize participants15 with the DA budget process and to enhance their understanding of the 2009 and 2012 DA Budgets. The output of the first forum was the identification of ways for civil society participation in the DA budget cycle.

The second forum, which a PTF representative attended, was held on 19 January 201216. The results of the validated field monitoring were shared at this fora. In prepared remarks, a senior DA representative commented positively on the engagement of civil society to monitor the projects. This session identified some actions which should be pursued in the future: (i) continue the monitoring of ongoing DA projects; (ii) conduct research on a bigger program at the national level or the DA head office; (iii) continue the monitoring of agricultural support services focusing on the impact of assistance on the life of target beneficiaries; and (iv) mainstream the efforts at the local level by partnering with the communities.

15 Attended by 49 participants (27 civil society; 2 from DA Head Office; 9 from DA Region 7, 2 from the Regional Agricultural and Fishery Council and 2 from DPWH). 16 Attended by 39 participants from the civil society, the government (1 from the Cebu Provincial Agriculture Office and 18 from DA Region 7) and PTF.

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28. Although the outputs were achieved as planned for these fora, there was no clear path for the outputs to be translated into outcomes and impacts. It is not clear how or whether the various groups represented in these discussions would use the knowledge gained on the DA budget process in the future to increase transparency. Also, at the time of the second fora there was no clear mechanism to ensure that DA would take action to correct the problems identified by the Field Monitors. Concrete plans to address the issues enumerated in the recommendations were left for future planning and the possibility of a follow on project.

29. Objective 4: “To popularize the COA reports and raise the awareness of multi-stakeholders in utilizing these reports as monitoring and advocacy tools.” As planned, a primer on COA’s 2009 report on DA Region 7 was prepared and handouts on the budgeting process were included in the kits distributed to the participants of the two fora. Although these outputs were produced as planned, efforts to popularize the use of COA reports ended at this point and there was no follow up or active engagement with COA. There is no evidence to show that as a result of this Project activity, there is greater use of COA reports as a monitoring and advocacy tool.

30. Objective 5: “To formulate proposals and action points for consideration by the DA to improve budget transparency and accountability in the provision of support services.” As stated in the Project Proposal two workshops were held to share the field monitoring feedback with DA. There were inaccuracies in the original list of projects to be monitored. Partly because of this, there were tensions when DA officials attended PhilDHRRA’s first presentation on the results of the field monitoring. PhilDHRRA and DA handled this situation well. The project list was revised and additional monitoring was undertaken jointly by the Field Monitors and DA staff to validate the contested results17. A very constructive engagement occurred during the second meeting when the validated results of the field monitoring were presented to DA officials, who expressed their appreciation of this undertaking. The DA provided verbal reasons to explain the problems for some projects, particularly FMRs. However, more detailed explanations needed to come from the implementing bodies, which were mostly the LGUs. The Project Design did not provide for active engagement with LGUs. The second forum developed some recommendations that were formally submitted to the DA Director of Region 7 in March 2012.

31. General Implementation and Finances: Overall the implementation process was reasonably smooth and efficient and was consistent with what was described in the Project Proposal. PhilDHRRA submitted the required progress reports to PTF that identified activities undertaken, planned activities and progress made/problems encountered and made good use of pictures during the monitoring and for these reports. While there was a minor delay in completing the Project, this was not serious and had no material effect on the results achieved. Much of the delay was on the front end related to factors like employing the Project Coordinator, the signing of the MOA, the busy schedule of the officials of implementing agencies, and the Christmas break. In terms of finances, PhilDHRRA reported actual costs were lower than the estimated costs as of January 2012 because some expense items were shared by some participants such as transportation costs and meals. The Field Monitors expressed some frustration about the

17 The projects visited jointly were: 3 FMR projects in Cebu (2 in Minglanilla; 1 in San Fernando); 1 FMR project in Canlaon City, Negros Oriental; 1 FMR project in Canlusong, Valencia, Bohol; 2 CIS projects in Bohol and 1 in Lusaran, Cebu City.

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limited budget allocated for field monitoring, which did not include contingencies for difficult locations, bad weather conditions, and incorrect addresses. PTF approved PhilDHRRA’s request to finance the March 15, 2012 dissemination seminar, an activity that was not envisioned in the Project Proposal. However, it was consistent with the broad objectives of the Project. PTF exercised appropriate flexibility in approving this request.

32. The handling of finances by PTF’s partner NGOs, in this case PhilDHRRA, is based largely on trust and gauging the logical size of the amounts. The financial details are included in Annex 4 as submitted by PhilDHRRA. The amounts specified for items on expenses appear reasonable to the Evaluation Team and the honoraria were based on certain standards. PhilDHRRA informed the Evaluation Mission that for relatively small grants like this one, audits are generally not requested by donor organizations. In the future PTF should consider whether PTF-financed audits should be undertaken for a small number of randomly selected projects to demonstrate to the PTF Board and the donors that the funds were used for the purposes intended. Such audits would also allow PTF to be more knowledgeable about actual costs.

33. Project implementation was carried out in line with the objectives and activities described in the approved Project Proposal. Although some difficulties were experienced during implementation, the efforts made to resolve them were successful and contributed to the completion of the Project within budget and only a few months later than the original schedule. Based on the findings of the Evaluation Team the Efficiency and Effectiveness of project implementation is rated as a 4 or Highly Satisfactory.

C. Impact and Sustainability

34. The key dimension of the evaluation, to which PTF assigns a 45% weight in the total scoring, is whether the project outcomes had the desired impact on reducing corruption and whether those impacts will be sustainable. PhilDHRRA established good relationships with DA, NIA, and DPWH, tested field instruments, demonstrated that it has very strong capability in mobilizing CSO monitors, learned about the DA budget process and COA reports and modified, tested and applied the field instruments. The monitoring of over 300 widely scattered DA projects in four provinces, and reporting the results, is a significant output, something that PhilDHRRA and its partner CSOs can be justifiably proud of. As is shown in Figure 3, FMR and CIS projects dominated the number of projects monitored, together accounting for 193 or 64% of the 304 monitored. The largest number of projects were located in Bohol (128), followed by Cebu (84), Negros Occidental (68), and Siquijor (24). Figure 3 shows that 252 or 83% of the 304 projects monitored were in fair or good condition, 37 (12%) were in poor condition and 15 (5%) either could not be located or the funds were diverted to other purposes. Proportionately more projects were found to be in poor condition or could not be located in Cebu than in the other provinces. Problems were more likely to be reported for FMR and PHF projects than for the other types of projects. The Evaluation Mission summarized the problems reported by the Field Monitors for projects in Bohol (Annex 5) and Cebu (Annex 6).

35. The Project did a good job in generating the promised outputs. But these positive achievements are more in the nature of outputs, rather than outcomes that are expected to lead to a direct and clear impact on reducing corruption. There is no verifiable evidence that these outputs resulted in outcomes that had a clear impact on achieving

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the overall goal of reducing opportunities for corruption. This finding should not be surprising, given that the Project Design did not describe how the inputs and outputs would be translated into outcomes that would have an impact on reducing corruption.

Figure 3: Summary of Projects Monitored By ProvinceCebu Bohol Negros

OrientalSiquijor Grand

TotalFarm-to-Market Roads (FMR)Total number monitored 19 80 13 4 116Found in relatively bad condition/not completed 5 4 5 1 15

Not found/not yet implemented/diverted to other location

6 2 - -8

Communal Irrigation Systems (CIS)Total number monitored 24 25 25 3 77Found not functioning well 2 4 2 1 9Not found/diverted to other location - - 1 - 1

Barangay Bagsakan (Community trading)Total number monitored 4 3 8 7 22Found with inappropriate location/other problems 1 1 2 - 4

Not found - - - - -Livelihood Program (LEAD)Total number monitored 26 4 7 3 40Found not functioning well 3 1 - - 4Not found 1 - - - 1Post-Harvest Facilities (PHF)Total number monitored 11 16 15 7 49Found not functioning well 4 1 - - 5Not found/diverted to other location 4 1 - - 5

Grand TotalTotal number monitored 84 128 68 24 304Found not functioning well/ not completed 15 11 9 2 37

Not found/diverted to other location 11 3 1 - 15

Source: PhilDHRRA PCR

36. PhilDHRRA officially delivered a report18 on the results of the field monitoring to DA on 9 March 2012. PhilDHRRA sent two E-mails on 23 March and 10 April and a letter on 11 May 2012 requesting a response from DA. On 24 May 2012, DA forwarded a comprehensive reply to PHILDHRRA providing its official comments on the results of the field monitoring. The detailed comments can be summarized as follows:

18 The report was attached to PhilDHRRA’s letter dated 5 March 2012.

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Barangay Bagsakan : Responses were given to issues related to the slow or non-release of working capital, mismanagement or organizational problems of some BBs and the fact that some BBs appeared to be functioning as sari sari stores rather than for the purposes intended. DA’s field monitoring in April provided a basis to strengthen its monitoring activities and to provide guidance for the BBs with problems.

Post Harvest Facilities : The DA response addressed issues related to some facilities not being used for the purposes intended and defective facilities (e.g. flatbed dryers). The latter appeared to reflect heavy use by farmers and a lack of maintenance. DA noted that operations, maintenance and replacement of worn out parts are, as per its guidelines, the responsibility of the recipients.

Projects Not Found During the Monitoring : The missing projects (e.g., two tents; one tractor; moisture meters; 4 post harvest facilities/equipment) were addressed on a case-by-case basis in the DA’s response. In some cases the projects were deferred from 2009 to 2010, in one case (the tractor) the project was cancelled because the original group because they could not provide the required equity and the tents were located. DA reported that its records showed that it had not implemented a corm mill in Argao in Cebu. A detailed response was given for the location of 10 moisture meters.

LEAD Projects : The issues identified under for the LEAD Projects were discussed under two headings – the diversion of funds from the purposes intended and the fact that some associations were non-functional. DA advised that in some cases farmers made changes because of market realities. Because of that finding DA will change its guidelines to empower farmers in such cases. DA also concurred that some associations were non-functional and advised that its Institutional Development Services Group is coordinating to identify the non-functional groups and to provide support in some cases and to provide enhanced capacity building and training in the future.

Farm to Market Roads : Two of the 117 FMRs were not implemented because, as per COA guidelines, of the non-liquidation of previous funds transferred to the LGU. The site of one FMR was moved, after approval by DA, at the request of the Barangay Chairman. Of the three FMRs that could not be located, two have been completed and implemented by DPWH. DA replied that based on its records, they had not implemented a FMR project in Tabunan, San Fernando Cebu.

37. It is clear that DA put considerable effort into preparing the reply to PhilDHRRA, including undertaking additional fieldwork for the problem projects. The reply stated “The DA RFU7 has been very grateful to the PhilDHRRA for the field monitoring conducted. The analysis of findings of their monitoring chronicle the status of the projects in the field as implemented by this agency, except however that there are some observations19 which will be more appreciated once elaborated.” Since the Project Design did not provide for the Field Monitors to return to the projects, PhilDHRAA did not have the means to independently verify the details in the response of DA. It is clear that DA seriously considered the findings and recommendations of the Field Monitors. Of particular importance, the reply stated that DA plans to institutionalize a Monitoring Team within its operations group to strengthen DA’s monitoring. If the Monitoring Team is successfully established, it will contribute to ensuring that some of the benefits of the process begun by the Project are sustainable. Consistent with the PCR

19 These observations are those summarized in the preceding paragraph.

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recommendations, DA will update its records, strengthen its coordination with NIA, DPWH and LGUs and conduct a pre-monitoring conference to clearing define the expected outputs of the monitoring and the roles of all parties involved and to reconcile records before monitoring begins.

38. Despite the positive results of the field monitoring and DA’s response, based on the evidence available, there is no clear evidence that the Project contributed directly to reducing corruption. The available evidence is indirect and based on a hypothesis that CSO monitoring increases transparency, which contributes to creating an environment in which corruption is less likely to happen. DA’s response indicated that the number of problem projects and ghost projects was less than the 5% reported by the Field Monitors. After detailed investigations, DA reported that its records did not cover 2 projects, that some others were financed from the 2010 budget rather than the 2009 budget and, on the surface, plausible explanations were provided for most the other problem projects. While many of the problems reported in Annexes 5 and 6 are related to poor construction, which may or may not be related to corruption, a few of the problems raise isses that may be more directly related to corruption (e.g., projects that could not be located after the validation missions with DA staff; apparent mistargetting of some LEAD beneficiaries). DA provided a credible explanation for most of the contested results. However, PhilDHRRA could not verify the the DA statements by further field monitoring, as the Project funds were exhausted, or by analysing the DA budget and expenditure data to fully account for the contested expenditures, an exercise that was not included in the scope of the Project20. The Project represents a useful initial phase that could be strengthened to enable PhilDHRRA to contribute to building an environment that is transparent and less prone to corruption.

39. The overriding lesson of the Project is that a more careful design is needed to have an impact on reducing corruption. While the Project may have been a useful first step, sustained activity and a different approach would be needed to contribute to achieving the overall goal of reducing corruption. Going forward the link between project activities and making changes that will lead to less corruption needs to be strengthened. An alternative approach would have been to monitor a smaller number of projects more intensively throughout the project cycle, from bidding and contract award, through implementation to completion, including post completion monitoring for problem projects.

40. The Evaluation Team is only aware of one rigorous impact evaluation that attempted to assess the success of strategies to reduce corruption in rural infrastructure, specifically rural roads21. Several approaches to reduce corruption were employed in over 600 village road projects in Indonesia. Engineers independently estimated the prices and quantities of all inputs used in each road, which were then compared with estimates in villages’ official expenditure reports. The analysis found that announcing an increased probability of a government audit, from a baseline of 4% to 100%, reduced theft from the project by about 8% of expenditures. It was concluded that these audits, or at least the threat of them, were a cost effective way of reducing corruption. In contrast, it was found that increasing grass-roots participation in the monitoring process reduced theft of villagers’ wages, but that was largely offset by corresponding increases in theft of

20 For example, for the few projects that were not included in DA’s records or were financed from the 2010 budget, third party verification of whether the funds in the 2009 budget were expensed or whether there are unliquidated advances would have been helpful to fully resolve the issues in a transparent way.21 Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Benjamin A. Olken. NBER. November 2004

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materials. This study implies that grass roots monitoring may be more effective in reducing theft when community members have substantial private stakes in the outcome, but less effective for public goods. Although the Project made some efforts to popularize CAO reports, COA’s direct role in the Project was very minor. Further, there is no verifiable evidence that the training provided on the COA reports and DA budget process was used for subsequent COA or DA budget inquiries or monitoring by civil society. The implication of the Indonesian experience is that for future projects consideration should be given to greater COA involvement.

41. A second possible approach to addressing corruption in the agriculture sector would be to design a project that addresses NABCOR’s activities since, as was described in PhilDHRRA’s original Concept Note. The approach would likely involve developing a MOA with NABCOR at the national level, developing market based prices for the major commodities procured by NABCOR, monitoring the BAC for transparency and unit prices compared to market based benchmarks, and then monitoring the actual volume delivered under the contracts, its quality and the distribution of the goods procured to the target beneficiaries.

42. The documentation indicates that PhilDHRRA has gained good experience under this Project, that DA supported the Project, prepared a detailed response to the report of the field monitoring and plans to institutionalize a Monitoring Team and that DA would welcome expanding the scope of the activities to cover all projects in Region 7 in the future. The March 2012 seminar further disseminated the Project findings. These are positive findings regarding sustainability. However, sustainability is uncertain at the moment because of the need for PhilDHRRA to mobilize funds to finance the cost of the next phase. The source of such funding is uncertain. One lesson for PTF is that if it is involved in a pilot project, as was the case for this Project, it must have sufficient funds to finance subsequent phases. Otherwise what was learned may be lost and the desired impacts are unlikely to be achieved or to be sustainable.

43. Based on the findings of the Evaluation Mission, Impact and Sustainability are rated as a 3, or Satisfactory. Despite the successful field monitoring and DA’s detailed response to the findings of the Field Monitors, there is no clear evidence that the Project had any direct impact on reducing corruption, largely because of weaknesses in the Project Design. Also, there are concerns about the availability of financing for the subsequent phases of the project.

D. Replicability

44. The Project has many components that could be replicated for a similar future project: (i) PhilDHRRA is a large NGO that operates throughout the Philippines; (ii) similar problems likely occur in other regions; (iii) PhilDHRRA has a proven ability to mobilize CSOs to monitor large numbers of projects in rural areas; and (iv) DA’s active cooperation for the Project and its desire for a larger, follow on project. Replicability would be desirable and appropriate for PhilDHRRA and DA in the context of greater transparency and accountability and ensuring that rural residents benefit from DA funded projects. While these are laudable objectives, PTF’s overriding objective is to make an impact on reducing opportunities for corruption. Replication of the Project would only be appropriate for PTF to support if the design issues identified in this PCA are addressed

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to ensure that any follow on project is more tightly focused on reducing corruption. Based on the findings of the Evaluation Mission, Replicability was rated as 3.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Overall Assessment

45. The Project was a useful first attempt that could be built on to strengthen PhilDHRRA’s efforts to contribute to building an environment that is transparent and less prone to corruption. The monitoring showed that 83% of the 300 plus projects monitored were delivered with minimal problems reported. The Field Monitors identified problems in slightly less than 20% of the projects. However, it is not clear how, or whether, corruption contributed to those problems. While corruption may have been involved in some projects, there is no evidence that was, in fact, the case. DA’s detailed response suggests that the problems were related to other factors (e.g., transfer of funds to other projects; inaccurate records regarding the location of some projects and the timing of the actual implementation; the need for more detailed monitoring that located some of the “missing” items). DA welcomed the Project and is institutionalizing a Monitoring Team, indicating that there is a demand in the government for this sort of interaction with civil society. The staff in the implementing agencies were made aware that CSOs were checking on what they were doing and that they might have to explain if major issues were identified by the CSO monitoring.

46. The overall assessment of the Project is given in Figure 4. Based on the findings summarized in the PCA, the overall score is 3.05. Based on PTF’s rating methodology this is rounded to 3, which means that the Project is rated as Satisfactory. PhilDHRRA did a good job on delivering the activities promised in the Project Proposal, which was approved by PTF, efficiently and effectively. The Project experience underlines the ability of PhilDHRRA to mobilize an impressive amount of CSO monitoring for a large number of projects spread out over a wide geographic area. DA actively cooperated during the implementation of the Project and prepared a detailed response to the report setting out the findings and recommendations of the Field Monitors. Despite the impressive delivery of the promised monitoring by PhilDHRRA, the Project’s impact on reducing corruption, which is likely to be weak at this stage, is not clear and cannot be assessed. In the opinion of the Evaluation Team the major factor contributing to this rating was the weakness in the Project Design.

Figure 4: Overall Assessment of the ProjectCategory Weight Rating Weighted RatingRelevance and Design 15% 2 0.3Efficiency and Effectiveness 20% 4 0.8

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Impact and Sustainability 45% 3 1.35

Replicability 20% 3 0.6Overall Score 100% 3.05 or 3Source: Evaluation Team

B. Main Lessons

47. The major lessons learned from the evaluation of this Project are summarized below for PTF and PhilDHRRA.

1. Lessons for PTF

• Enhanced Project Screening to Ensure PTF Finances Well Defined Projects That Focus on Corruption: Project experience underlines the importance of good project screening. PTF should carefully screen project designs prior to approving grants to ensure that the inputs and outputs are consistent with the description of the corruption problem. There should be a plausible link from inputs and outputs to outcomes that will have an impact on reducing corruption and verifiable indicators identified that can be used to assess the progress achieved in reducing corruption. These should be summarized in a well-defined logical framework.

Continued Involvement Promotes Sustainability: If PTF is involved in a pilot project, as was the case for this Project, it must have sufficient funds to finance subsequent phases. Otherwise what was learned may be lost and the desired impacts are unlikely to be achieved or to be sustainable.

Importance of the Memorandum of Agreement (MAO): The Project experience underlines the importance of having a signed MOA that sets out the responsibilities of both the government agency and civil society.

Financial Audits: In the future PTF should consider whether PTF-financed audits should be undertaken of randomly selected projects to demonstrate to the PTF Board and the donors that the funds were used for the purposes intended.

2. Lessons for PhilDHRRA

Project Definition and Design: Rather than monitoring such a large number of projects once, consideration could be given to monitoring a smaller number of projects more intensively with multiple visits during the project cycle (e.g., from the Bid Awards Committee through construction to completion and operation) and covering the activities of the National Agribusiness Corporation. This would require the involvement of Local Government Units from the outset in the project design, more training of field monitors and fine tuning the field monitoring instruments based on the experience gained under the Project.

Early Involvement of the Government Agencies: The implementing agencies should be involved at the beginning of the project so they can share how the government project implementation and funding allocation systems work, ensure the information on which the monitoring is based is up to date and accurate and establish mechanisms to resolve issues that may arise and to take action on the problems identified by field monitors.

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Selecting the Projects to Be Monitored: At the beginning of a project, agreement must be reached with the concerned government agency on the list of all projects funded in the budget. Then the subset to be monitored, consistent with available resources, should be selected randomly to ensure that there is no bias in the sample of projects monitored.

Greater Commission on Audit Involvement: Given its mandate, a more active role for the Commission on Audit should be considered for future.

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ANNEX 1: MAPS OF REGION 7 IN THE PHILIPPINES

Map of the Philippines Showing Region 7

Map of the Four Provinces

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ANNEX 2: KEY FIELD ACTIVITIES OF THE EVALUATION MISSION

Cebu City:

March 5

March 8

March 9

Bohol:

March 6

March 7

In the morning, interviewed PhilDHRRA representatives, Ms. Caring Corridor, Ms. Luchie Blanco and Ms. Sarah Enanoria, and the Field Monitors assigned to Cebu projects. There were three Field Monitors present, two from Lihok Pilipina Foundation, Inc. (LPFI) and one from Pagtambayayong Foundation Inc (PFI).

In the afternoon, interviewed Ms. Angel Enriquez, the Regional Assistant Director of the DA and two of her principal staff.

In the morning, interviewed Engineer Rosita Lumpas, Assistant to the Chief Division for Operations, (DPWH 7) and held a wrap up meeting in the afternoon with PhilDRRA.

In the morning, field visits to FMR and CIS projects (Dawis)

Field visits to CIS projects (Barangay Lusaran and Adlawon), a LEAD project (Barangay Guba) and a BB project (Talisay)

In the morning, interviewed the Bohol Field Monitors led by the Executive Director of PROCESS-Bohol together with three of Field Monitors from the same office and three from BIDEF.

Field visits covering CIS and FMR projects (Maribujoc).

Field visit to FMR, BB and two PHF projects (Barangay Consumbol). Visited FMR and CIS projects (Barangay Oy)

In the afternoon, interviewed Project Manager Eugene Cahilis and five of his senior staff from DA Bohol. That was follwed be an interview with Engineer Diodado Rosales, Officer in Charge, Regional Director for NIA

Region-7, also known as

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ANNEX 3: PHOTOS OF MISSION VISITS TO SOME PROJECT SITES

Visits to Projects in Bohol

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Visits to Projects in Cebu

21

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ANNEX 4: FINANCIAL DETAILS

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ANNEX 5: PROBLEMS REPORTED BY FIELD MONITORS IN BOHOL

A. Barangay Bagsakan (4)

1. In Barangay San Vicente, of the Peso50,000 amount for the purchase of goods only Peso16,000 has been utilized. The counterpart building needs repair and improvement to safeguard the equipment properly.

2. In Barangay Cansumbol, the facility is fully operational but it functions like a sari-sari store. Currently managed by the Maligmat Family per agreement with BLGU. Its signage indicates a Maligmat Store. The BLGU is receiving a fixed rate share per month from the store.

B. Communal Irrigation System (25)

1. Shallow Tube Well (1 Deep Well) in Barangay Oy, Loboc was in bad condition. No water comes out from it.

2. Out of the 25 projects surveyed, 4 were found in bad condition and 1 was not yet started.

C. Farm-to-Market Roads (80)

1. 19 FMRs were found to be in fair condition with minor defects such as cracks and potholes.

2. 4 FMRs were found to be in bad condition due to presence of heavy depressions and muddy portions.

3. 2 FMRs in Barangay Candasig and Sagasa in Balilihan were not yet implemented when the monitoring was conducted because the project funds were not yet downloaded to the LGU. Validation of the FMR in Canlusong, Valencia was conducted on December 27, 2011. It was verified that the funds were utilized for concreting a road connected to the existing road at irregular intervals.

4. Of the 80 visited, only 4% were in bad condition.

D. LEAD Projects (3)

1. In Limocon, Valencia, only the president and the treasurer of the Limocon Women’s Association were able to implement the Hog Raising Project. Other members were able to borrow Php1,000 each without interest for any purposes.

E. Post harvest Facilities (9)

1. The 9 projects were reported functional

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ANNEX 6: PROBLEMS REPORTED BY FIELD MONITORS IN CEBU

A. Barangay Bagsakan (4)

1. In Looc, Talisay City, it was observed that the site of the facility is not suitable as it is located in the middle of a rice field and therefore it might not be accessible.

B. Communal irrigation System (24)

1. Nineteen of the CIS Projects visited were found in good condition. 2. The Shallow Tube Well (Deep Well) in Lusaran, Cebu City is non functional

because the pipes are too short and could not reach the source of water.3. Small Farm Reservoirs in Adlawon, Cebu City and Canactol, Dumanjug are still

under construction. Construction is not continuous in Adlawon as the National Irrigation Administration had a hard time finding a good source of water.

C. Farm-to-Market Road (19)

1. FMR in Tubod, Dalaguete: portions of the road were not yet completed when monitored.

2. 2 FMRs in Bunga, Toledo and Manlapay, Dumanjug were still under construction. According to the records of the Department of Public Works and Highways, these projects were reported as completed.

3. 3 FMRs were founds to be damaged. Those in the municipalities of Naga and Moalboal were in bad condition. Heavy depressions, severe cracks and potholes were observed. In Naga, the damage was caused by heavy trucks hauling loads of stones from the quarry.

4. 3 FMRs in the municipalities of San Fernando and Minglanilla were not found during the monitoring.

5. FMRs Projects (Road Rehabilitation/Concreting): 2 in Barangay Tunghaan (Lower and Sitio Ma.) Respondo), Minglanilla, were not found in the site based on the “location” indicated in the DA document because the implementation of these projects were transferred/diverted to Upper Tunghaan as per the validation conducted on November 24, 2011. During the validation, it was observed that the place has no existing farms which may defeat the purpose of the project

6. No FMR Project (Rehab/Concreting) was seen or visible in Barangay Magsico to Barangay Tabionan, San Fernando (0.4 km.). According to Prudencio Dacalos, former barangay captain of Barangay Tabionan, there was no road rehabilitation/concreting done. The existing rough road was constructed in the 1990s under Provincial Government funding. During the validation with DPWH conducted on November 28, 2011, it was found that the project was transferred to Barangay Balungag for Road Opening to serve as a short cut to the drop off market of farmers and buyers

D. LEAD Program (26)

1. At the association in Tangki, Naga it was found that some members who availed of the livelihood Program were staff of the Provincial Office. However, loans were also distributed to the members.

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2. The Association in Alaska Mambaling, Cebu City availed of the Program but during the monitoring as per information from the BLGU, the association no longer exist and that the President is not a resident in the community.

E. Post Harvest and Farm Production Facilities (11)

1. 2 out of the 11 facilities were found during the monitoring: The Shredding Machine in Maguikay, Mandaue City and the Power Sprayer in Dakit, Barili were functional.

2. For 4 post harvest facilities in Danao, according to Mr. Mario Gorre, the Municipal Agriculture Officer, the two Hermatic Components are due for delivery while the Village Corn Processing is also due for construction. The cause of the delay in the construction of was a lack of budget for labor, which is the counterpart of the LGU.

3. The following Post Harvest Facilities were not found during the monitoring: (a) for the LGU in Mandaue City a Moisture Meter, Portable Bag Sewer and 10 units of Canvass Tents all; and (b) Portable Corn Mill in Argao.

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