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Review of General Psychology1997, Vol. 1, No. 3,235-255 Copyright 1997 by the Educational Publishing FoundationI089-2680/97/S3.00

Pursuing Unity in a Fragmented Psychology: Problem s and P rospectsStephen C. Yanchar and Brent D. Slife

Brig ham Young UniversityMany psychologists are concerned that disciplinary fragmentation is precluding theaccumulation of knowledge and catalyzing the dissolution of institutionalized psychol-ogy. Herein the authors review prominently discussed causes of fragmentation and thesolutions thus far tendered. Their review suggests that fragmentation pervades thediscipline at many levels and that numerous, competing solutions to the problem offragmentation have failed to promote unity. The authors suggest that 3 key questionsmust be answered before a tenable unification strategy can be formulated. Answers tothese questions will provide a common starting point for discussing the problems andprospects of unification and for evaluating specific unification strategies.

Psychology is a manifold discipline. It iscomposed of numerous subdisciplines withvaried philosophical groundings and method-ological orientations. As a science, psychologyoffers no univocal definition of what itsphenom ena are (Giorgi, 1985a) and no univocalcorpus of psychological knowledge (Staats,1981). The subject matter, which is vaguelydefined at best, changes from subdiscipline tosubdiscipline. On the whole, psychology ap-pears to be more a congeries of loosely relatedstudy areas than a coherent, unified, evolvingscience (Koch , 19 81; 1993). This state of affairs,which is troubling to many, has been termedfragmentation (Bower, 1993).Herein we review the literature of fragmenta-tion, coalescing discussion about the nature andimportance of this issue, the levels at which itoccurs, and proposed solutions at each of theselevels. It is imp ortant to note at the outset that nosingle solution to the problem of fragmentationwill emerge from this discussion. It is our

thesisbased on this reviewthat the proposedsolutions to fragmentation are as fragmented asthe discipline they are attempting to unify. As aresult, current unification efforts have failed toreverse trends toward fragmentation. Ratherthan prescribe a specific approach to unity, andadd one more possibly fragmented opinion tothe lot, we suggest that three key questions mustStephen C. Yanchar and Brent D. Slife, Department ofPsychology, Brigham Young University.Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-

dressed to Stephen C. Yanchar, who is now at theDepartment of Psychology, Morningside College, 1501Morningside Avenue, Sioux City, Iowa 51106.

be answered before a tenable unification strat-egy can be formulated. Answers to thesequestions will provide a common starting pointfor discussing the problems and prospects ofunification and for evaluating specific unifica-tion strategies.Fragmentat ion in Psychology

Historians of psychology are not surprised bythe discipline's fragmentation. Since at least1879scientific psychology's commonly ac-cepted date of inceptiondifferent aspects ofhuman existence have been upheld as theappropriate psychological subject matter. Forexam ple, Leahey (1992) maintained that psychol-ogy was founded in at least three different wa ys:first, by thinkers like Wundt, Ebbinghaus, andTitchener who studied consciousness; second,by thinkers like Freud and Jung who studied theunconscious; and third, by thinkers like Spencer,Galton, and James w ho studied adaptation. Eachof these domains seemed central to psychologyin general, but they tended to focus on differentaspects of human experience. Further, these fociemployed different, sometimes incompatible,theories and methods. For ex ample, the intrapsy-chic forces described by Freud make radicallydifferent assumptions than the explanationsentertained by adaptation researchers (Rychlak,1981), who investigated topics such as organicevolution (Spencer, 1897) and eugenics (Galton,1869/1925). Similarly, the psychoanalytic casestudy method developed by Freud was notsuitable for the kind of research performed byadaptation psychologists. Rather, psychologists

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236 YANCHAR AND SLIFEof adaptation used methods ostensibly able toexamine the functional relationship betweenorganism and environment. This disunity evi-dent in early psychology often resulted inunabashed partisanship and a breakdown ofcommunication, with, for example, psycholo-gists like E. B. Titchener arguing that his schoolof introspection!sm was the only legitimatescientific approach (Danziger, 1990).

Disunity continued in the divergent schoolsthat proliferated in the early part of the twentiethcentury. For instance, Heidbreder (1933) re-ported that despite a generally overarchingcommitment to scientific method, early psychol-ogy was already divided into brass-instrument,structural, functional, behavioral, gestalt, andpsychoanalytic schools. Similarly, Danziger(1990) has shown that early psychology wasdivided along many theoretical, m ethodological,and even sociological lines. Such early fragmen-tation, according to Danziger, resulted fromcontrasting opinions over the appropriate inves-tigative method, the appropriate subject matterfor psychological inquiry, the appropriate kindof research subject, the appropriate level ofanalysis (idiographic vs. nomothetic), and theappropriate use of basic research. Moreover,Danziger contended that the social, political,and academic atmosphere unique to particulartimes and locations largely determined the waypsychology was conceptualized. Thus, ap-proaches to psychology changed from era to eraand location to location, with each changeincreasing the discipline's overall disunity(Sarason, 1989). Similar historical analyseshave revealed that psychologists have differedover what psychology is, what its methodologyshould be, and how findings should be evaluated(Gardner, 19 92; Kendler, 1983; Koch, 1981;Viney, 1989). In short, historians generallyagree that psychology has been , from the outset,an amalgam of loosely related study areas.Though psychology was "officially" considereda single scholarly and scientific discipline, it wasin actuality neither singular nor unified.

Contemporary psychology continues to becomposed of diverse discourse communitiesthat do not make substantial connection with thediscipline as a whole. These diverse communi-ties of psychologists, which have proliferated inrapid succession, increasingly work under differ-ent, often conflicting, conceptions of science(Hoshmand & Martin, 1994). Because each

conception of science includes its own set ofrules for good scientific conduct and knowledgeevaluation, there is little or no common groundon which to evaluate knowledge claims andpotential contributions to the broad discipline.The numbers of journals dedicated to limitedareas of scholarly interest (Maclntyre, 1985),the proliferation of professional societies, andthe balkanization of theAm erican PsychologicalAssociation (APA) into 51 separate divisions(most of which cater to groups with limitedinterests) point to the divergence and expansive-ness of discourse communites in psychology. Tnsome cases, psychologists appear to be moreinterested in contributing to a subdiscipline orspecialty than to psychology as a whole(Maclntyre, 1985; Staats, 1983). In this way,fragmentation has been, and continues to be, asmuch a part of psychology as any of itspragmatic definitional characteristics such as"the study of behavior" or "the study ofcognition." Indeed, there seems to be noevidence that psychology is united by anyexplicit conception or theoretical framework.

On the other hand, some argue that psychol-ogy is unified by im plicit concep tions. Althoughthese implicit conceptions use va rious labels anddescriptive termsfor example, positivism (Slife& Williams, 1997), mechanism (Sarbin, 1986),efficient causation (Rychlak, 1988a), modern-ism (Polkinghorne, 1990), or linear time (Slife,1993)they all point to the natural scienceheritage of psychology's method and world-view. These conceptions are woven so tightlyinto the ethos of mainstream psychology thatthey are hardly considered conceptions at all;rather, they are considered intuitive, obvious,and unassailable aspects of rational investiga-tion. Nonetheless, an increasing number ofpsychologists reject the notion that psychologyis , or should be, united by such an implicitscientific framework. In fact, a growing numberof psych ologists call for flexibility in theorizingand research, advocating various forms ofmethodological pluralism or nontraditionalmodes of inquiry (e.g., Giorgi, 1970; Hosh-mand, 1989; Howard, 1983; Polkinghorne,1983; Tart, 1983). These theorists argue that theassumptions of the natural science worldview(e.g., determinism, objectivism, materialism) donot apply to the meaningful world of humanaction, and that alternative theoretical assump-tions (e.g., agency, intentionality, spirituality)


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would better inform a meaningful humanscience. Their call for alternative theoreticalassumptions and modes of inquiry increasinglyinnervates the mainstream literature, and pro-vides a fundamental divergence from the moretraditional forms of psychological research andpractice. This kind of divergence, which callsinto question the very project of a scientificpsychology, suggests theoretical fragmentationof the highest order occurring at the deepestLevel of understanding.

Significance of the Problemof Fragmentat ionProblems stemming from this fragmentationhave been discussed for decades (Coleman,Cola, & Webster, 1994), with perhaps the firstformal acknowledgement of fragmentation ap-pearing in Kantor's (1922) article on thereconciliation of introspectionist and objectivistpsychology. Indeed, noted historians of sciencehave viewed fragmentation as characteristic of apreparadigmatic (Kuhn, 1962; Leahey, 1992) oreven a "would be" (Toulmin, 1972) scientificdiscipline. Within psychology, fragmentationhas historically been viewed as a core problem

(e.g., Cronbach, 1957; Fowler, 1990; Heid-breder, 1933; Kantor, 1922; Koch, 1976; Staats,1983). Though a few psychologists do not viewfragmentation as especially problematic (Bower,1993; Green, 1992; Kukla, 1992; McNally,1992; Sternberg, 1992; Viney, 1995), most viewfragmentation as a tempo rary stage that is at bestnecessary to the growth of a more unifieddiscipline. Thus, fragmentation is viewed not asan end in itself, but as a necessary means tosome other, more desirable, end state.W hy, then, is fragmentation so undesirable, atleast as an end state? Two principal issues arisein the literature. The first concerns scientificrationality and holds that psychology as sciencecannot be rational if it is fragmented (Staats,1983, 1991). This is so, because a fragmenteddiscipline does not have common standards ofevaluation (Staats, 1983); rather, each discoursecommunity within the discipline adopts indig-enous rules for the adjudication of knowledgeclaims. This, in turn, creates confusion aspsychologists within a particular discourse

community are unable to evaluate researchproduced in other discourse com munities (Hosh-mand & Martin, 1994). As a result, comm unities

make no contribution to the discipline as awhole. There is little or no accumulation inknowledge, and little occurs in the way ofgenuine scientific progress (Koch, 1981; Staats,1981, 1983, 1991). Staats nicely characterizedthis state of affairs when h e said the following:

It has been proposed (Staats, 1967) that our science ispresently characterized by separatism, a feature that hasa pervasive effect and that constitutes an obstacle toscientific progress. The concept of separatism describesour science as split into unorganized bits and pieces,along many dimensions. Divisions exist on the basis oftheory, method, and the types of findings that areaccepted, as well as on the basis of student training,organizational bodies such as divisions, journals, andindividual strivings. Our field is constructed of smallislands of knowledge organized in ways that make noconnection with the many other existing islands ofknowledge (1981, p. 239).

From this perspective, then, contemporarypsychology courts irrationality for two reasons:First, psychology as a discipline possesses nostandard basis for deciding what is rational (i.e.,what is rational knowledge, rational methodol-ogy, rational theory construction, and so forth).Second, this lack of rationality precludessystematicity and order in the accumulation ofknowledge: Psychology possesses no coherent,unified body of knowledge.The second concern regarding fragmentationhas to do with the long-term health of psychol-ogy as an independent discipline. Many contendthat trends toward fragmentation will eventuallyresult in the dissolution of psychology (e.g.,Gardner, 1992; Scott, 1991; Slife & Williams,1997; Spence, 1987; Williams, 1993). Suchdissolution occurs as communities of scientistsbreak away from psychology proper and mergewith other scholarly disciplines. For example,Spence (1987) ha s stated

In my worst nightmares I foresee a decimation ofinstitutional psychology as we know it. Humanexperimental psychologists desert to the emergingdiscipline of cognitive science; physiological psycho lo-gists go happily to departments of biology andneuroscience; industrial/organizational psychologistsare snapped up by business schools; and psychopatholo-gists find their home in medical schools, (p. 1053)Accompanying this mounting concern overpsychology's fragmentation has been a call toaction. For example, som e theoretical psycholo-gists have formed a scholarly society devotedentirely to resolving the problem of fragmenta-tion (Staats, 1985a); and several symposia and


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papers presented at annual Am erican Psych ologi-cal Association conferences in the past severaldecades have treated fragmentation as a majorpoint of discussion. A pivotal issue of debate inthese discussions of fragmentation has been thecause or causes of psychology's fragmentation.It is to this issue that w e now turn.What Causes Psycho logy ' s F ragmen ta t i on?

Although disciplinary fragmentation is widelyrecognized, psychologists disagree on exactlyhow the fragmentation comes about and at whatlevel it occurs. Our review reveals five promi-nently discussed causes of fragmentation: (a) theprofessional reward structure of psychology, (b)science-practice bifurcation, (c) theoretical di-versity, (d) linguistic diversity, and (e) method-ological diversity. Herein we describe how eachproposed cause impacts the discipline, and howeach has been addressed by proponents ofunification.Professional Reward Structure

Many commentators point to psychology'sprofessional reward structure when discussingcauses of fragmentation. This structure entailsscholarly recognition (Eifert, 1985), a rewardsystem for innovative thinking (Staats, 1983,1987a), and the overproduction of research withnarrow appeal (Maher, 1985; Staats, 1987a).M aher statedfragmentation occurs because it has been reinforced.Recognition, rank, prizes, pay, etc.all of the rewardsthat are available to psych ologis ts. . . have beensystematically given for being "innovative," for doinga "n ew " kind of research, on a "ne w" problem, with anew technique. (1985 , p. 17)

Many commentators suggest that the disciplineprovides support for divergent thinking and littleor no support for work that builds on extanttheory and research (Staats, 1987a). Journalssupport divergent thinking by placing a pre-mium on original work rather than confirmatorystudies and replicatory work in general (Eifert,1985). Grant money is also largely awarded toresearchers who are interested in novelty anddiscovery rather than analysis and integration(Kunkel, 1985).Furthermore, it is argued that graduatestudents are trained by psychologists who instillsuch values. Students are taught to look for a

small niche in which to conduct their ownresearch and to pursue innovative ways ofexplaining subject matter (Maclntyre, 1985). Asthis occurs, student interests and knowledgebases become increasingly parochial (Altrnan,1987; Krantz, 1987; Kunkel, 1985), as does therelatively limited niche within which studentsperform research (Airman, 1987). Journalstarget narrow study areas, and journal editorsand reviewers ex perience difficulty in adjudicat-ing work produced in discourse communitiesother than their own (Hoshmand & Martin,1994). Scholarly journals then proliferate andbecome increasingly local in their interests. Asone author stated:Given the emphasis on publications for faculty, it isalso not surprising that we continue to publish "littlestudies" or that we continue to support the developmentof increasingly numerous and highly specific refereedjournals. I picked up five new journals (vol. 1, issue 1)at the convention this year.. .. Basically, what we havehere is an excessive need Lo com mun icate differencesand uniqueness, in order to get published, promoted orpatients. (Maclntyre, 1985, p. 20)

As a result, little communication occursamong the discourse communities of psychol-ogy, and as Hoshmand and Martin (1994) haveargued, only rules and standards within acommunity are used. A rift is then created, aswork produced by one community cannot befairly evaluated by scientists in other communi-ties (Hoshmand & Martin, 1994). Indeed,research communities can be so unrelated, andin fact so irrelevant to one another, that nomeaningful integration or conciliation betweenthem seems possible (Wertheimer, 1987). Insuch cases, there appears to be no hope forintegration. The best psychology could hope for,in this case, would be a "minimally organizedlist" of study areas (W ertheimer, 1987, p. 22).

Other psychologists, however, contend justthe oppositethat creativity and innovation arediscouraged by the reward system currently inplace, and that more conservative research,which explores established lines of research, isin actuality rewarded (e.g., Sternberg, 1996).These psychologists advocate creativity andinnovation in psychology, arguing that stagna-tion and insularity would result from a strictadherence to replicatory and integrative work(e.g., Altman, 1987; Rychlak, 1988b). Indeed,according to these thinkers, creativity andinnovation are essential to scientific progress.


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Any solution to fragmentation that occurs at theexpense of such creativity is a remedy thatwould do more harm than good. Rychlak, forexamp le, stated1 could never support an effort to unify psychologyunder one theoretical outlook. Such unification wouldbe deadly.... To have contrasting or conflictingtheoretical positions on the nature of some perfectlyobservable, empirically traceable event or behavior isnot a sign of disunity. Since knowledge progresses,which means it changes, we must have alternativeformulations. (1988b, p. 13)

Thus the literature on professional rewardstructures lacks a clear explication of theproblem: Do unchecked creativity and innova-tion promote fragmentation? And are creativeand innovative ideas strongly rewarded? Or arecreativity and innovation generally ignored byfunding agencies, even though they are essentialto the progress of psychological science?Psychologists from both sides of the issue haveproposed solutions to fragmentation, but noconcrete answer to these questions has emerged.Proposed Solutions to the ProblematicReward Structure

Psychologists who oppose the rewarding ofcreativity and innovation offer a four-foldsolution. First, it has been suggested thatpsychologists must be made aware of thefragmentation that ensues from uncheckedoriginality and proliferation (Kunkel, 1985;Staats, 1987a). Second, it has been suggestedthat the professional reward system, whichencourages creativity and proliferation, shouldbe abandoned (Eifert, 1985; M aclntyre, 1985;Maher, 1985; Wachtel, 1985). Third, it has beensuggested that integrative work, which attemptsto relate disparate psychological theories andresearch programs, should be encouraged asmuch as possible (Eifert, 1985; Maclntyre,1985; Staats, 1983; Wachtel, 1985; Wittig,1985). In fact, Eifert (1985) ca lled for a jour nalthat would be completely devoted to the projectof integrating diverse psychological knowledge.Fourth, it has been suggested that promotion andtenure need not be based entirely on the quantityof publicationsparticularly publications thatfoster novel lines of thought (Wachtel, 1985;Wittig, 1985). In fact, Wachtel (1985) suggestedthat psychology departments should judgecandidates for teaching jobs on the basis of no

more than three publications. This, according toWachtel, would communicate to psychologiststhat quality rather quantity matters most ingenuine scholarship, and that unchecked prolif-eration is not welcome. According to Wachteland others, the extent to which fragmentationabates in the future will depend on the extent towhich psychologists pursue integrative theoriz-ing, and the extent to which integrative theoristsare supported with funding and other resources.On the other hand, Robert Sternberg (1996),who views creativity as essential (and thusworthy of reward), argued that creativity shouldbe carefully examined by members of grantproposal panels. Such panels, he believes,should focus on long-term innovation and theadvancement of science, rather than short-termpayoff. Moreover, the history and philosophy ofscience should be studied so that psychologistsdo not fall prey to the same faddishness that hascharacterized science of the past. Sternberg'sadmonitions are strong, but attempt to provideanswers to the fundamental questions faced bypsychologists, such as whether psychologyshould still look to creative and innovativetheorizing, or whether psychology should lookaway from creativity and toward integration andreplication.Is creativity essential to scientific pro gress , asSternberg, Rychlak, and others contend? Atsome level, this question has to be answered inthe affirmative by any discipline that a ttempts toadvance knowledge. However, some authors(mentioned above) argue that unchecked creativ-ity and innovation hinders scientific progress bydisallowing continuity among research pro-grams. Solutions profferedsuch as abandon-ment of the professional reward system and thepromotion of integrative workcould reversethe fragmentation, but are questioned on thebasis that they would also foreclose on progressand innovation. Thus, disagreement over theimportance and role of creativity in scienceobstructs the formation of a single approach tounification at the level of professional rewardstructure.Science-Practice Bifurcation

The relationship between science and practicehas long been tenuous (Barlow, Hayes &Nelson, 1984; Fowler, 1990). For example, thedisparity between the psychology of conscious-


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ness (Wundt, 1910/1969) and the psychology ofthe unconscious (Freud, 1900/1968) was partlybased on a distinction between experimentalquestions concerning sensation, perception, andaction on the one hand (Altman, 1987; Leahey,1992) and clinical questions concerning thenature of psychopathology and appropriatepsychotherapeutic interventions on the other(Freud 1905/1962; Rychlak, 1981). Althoughthe two, science and practice, surely overlap attimes, they also exhibit clear ideological andmethodological differences that seem to pre-clude reconciliation (Leahey, 1992). Evidenceof these differences can be seen in the currentemp hasis on professionalization, for exam ple, inrecent trends toward clinical training (PsyD)programs that focus on psychotherapy practi-cum rather than research, and in the formation ofthe American Psychological Society, devoted tomore scientific concerns.

Even in psychology's early years the distinc-tion between science and practice did not restcomfortably against the backdrop of a tolerantdiscipline. In fact, as Altman (1987) reported,there were several open conflicts betweenpractitioners and experimental psychologistsduring the early years of theAPA. Such conflictsresulted in the formation of separate profes-sional organizations on several occasions. Ap-plied psychologists, for example, collectivelyabandoned the APA in both 1917 and 1938, andit was not until after World War II that the APAwas organized in such a way that it catered toboth experimentalist and practitioner concerns(Altman, 1987). This was also the time of theBoulder conference (Raimy, 1950), sponsoredjointly by the National Institute of MentalHealth and the American Psychological Associa-tion, that attempted to develop a tenablescientist-practitioner integration for psychol-ogy. Participants at this conference concludedthat clinical psychology lacked dependableknowledge, and that research findings needed toplay a larger role in the development of clinicalapplications (Raimy, 1950; see also Barlow,Haye s, & Nelson, 1984). Thus w as born a modelfor clinical psychology aimed at promoting thescientific status of psychotherapeutic interven-tions and treatment efficacy.

However, the existence of a national organiza-tion (APA) and its advocacy of the scientist-practitioner model has not precluded tensionbetween practitioners and scientists (Hoshmand

& Polkinghorne, 1992). As several psycholo-gists have observed, the ideal of the Bouldermodel has not been realized on a large scale(Barlow, 1980; Belar & Perry, 1992; Cahill,1994). In fact, it appears that few clinicalpsychologists publish empirical research, andthat few clinical psychologists select interven-tions based on psychotherapy outcome data(Cahill, 1994). Indeed, it appears that the tensionbetween practitioners and scientists has onlyincreased (Leahey, 1992). Although concernregarding the lack of integration betweenscience and practice has often been expressed(Barlow, 1981; Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson, 1984;Fowler, 1990; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne,1992; Howard, 1985, 1986; Sexton, 1990;Strupp, 19 81; Wanda, 1993), the demand forviable theories and p olicies that bridge scientificresearch and practice has not been satisfactorilymet (Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992). Tenta-tive advice, such as viewing the relationbetween science and practice hierarchicallywith science at the foundation of professionalpractice (Fowler, 1990)has appeared to promptlittle melioration. Instead, increased profession-alization has worked to fragment the disciplineinto two distinct partsapplied and scientificwhile underwriting an approach to scholarshipthat is in the estimation of many, uninspiring(e.g., Bevan & Kessel, 1994).Proposed Solutions to theScience-Practice Bifurcation

As Leahey (1992) stated, this tension betweenscience and practice is likely to place terrificstrain on the discipline as a whole. Basicresearch, without the possibility of practicalapplication, appears to many as irrelevant(James, 1892; Leahey, 1992). At the same time,clinical practice without an empirical baseappears to many as nonscientific and of dubiouscredibility. Though some psychologists areuncertain whether traditional scientific researchcan facilitate clinical practice (som e argue that itcannot; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992),research is generally considered essential injustifying the practical implementation of thera-peutic techniques (Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson,1984). Thus, m any have argued that a concilia-tory relationship between research and practiceis pivotal, not only for practice to be in somesense justified, but also for the discipline to have


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PURSUING UNITY 241unity in its overall aims. Scientific researchshould contribute to practice, and practiceshould be informed, at least in part, by researchfindings (e.g., Barlow, Haye s, & Nelson, 1984).Other psychologists have called for a recon-ciliation between research and practice (Allport,1981; Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson, 1984; Fowler,1990; Hoshm and & M artin, 19 95; Hoshmand &Polkinghom e, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1991). How -ever, these psychologists have argued that twoconflicting types of research knowledge areavailable to the practitioner: knowledge derivedthrough scientific investigation, and knowledgederived through practical experience. To useeither kind of knowledge without the other,according to these theorists, is to base practiceon an incomplete know ledge base (Hoshmand &Martin, 1995; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne,1992; Polkinghorne, 1991). On this basis, som ehave asserted that the implementation of bothscientific and practical types of knowledge isnecessary for successful clinical practice. Andonly through a synthesis of these two types ofknowledge can clinical practice be legitimatelyscientific.

Is a synthesis of scientific knowledge andpractical understanding possible? Many areconvinced that it is, though such a synthesiswould dem and that clinical research m ethods betailored to fit the unique clinical context. Forexample, Hoshmand and Polkinghorne (1992)argue that science can inform practice when it"grant[s] the methodological extensions appro-priate for research in the human domain" (p.60). Others argue that careful case-study m ethod-ology and the use of small-iV experimentaldesigns would greatly enhance clinical researchefforts (e.g., Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson, 1984;Barlow & Hersen, 1984; Bergin & Strupp,1970). Practical insight derived through clinicalexperience, coupled with an appropriate clinicalmethodology, could allow science and practiceto develop mutually and cooperatively, ratherthan antagonistically.

Such a conceptualization of the scientist-practitioner model might come closest toproviding unity in the aims of psychologists,both scientific and applied (Barlow, Hayes, &Nelson, 1984; Hoshmand & Martin, 1995;Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992). To thepresent, however, this conceptualization has notbeen generally e ndorsed by the mainstream, noris it clear that all of its ideological precepts have

withstood scrutiny (cf. Yanchar & Kristensen,1996a).

Diverse Theoretical PositionsIt is now widely acknowledged that psychol-ogy harbors at least two broad theories of humannature and its investigation. The differencebetween the two is well documented by Kimb le,whose study of epistemic values in psychologysuggests the existence of scientific an d humanis-tic cultures. Kimble (1984) separated psycholo-gists on the basis of their opinions regardingphilosophical issues such as determinism vs.indeterminism, scientific values vs. humanvalues, objectivism vs. intuitionism, and element-ism vs . holism. Respondents who scored high oncommitments such as objectivism and scientificvalues were considered to be members of thescientific culture, whereas respondents whoscored high on commitments such as intuition-ism and human values were considered to bemembers of the humanistic culture. Kimble'sstudy suggested a substantial trend toward thehumanistic study of psychology, manifesting in"liberalized" investigations not permissable 40years ago in the scientific culture (i.e., investiga-tions of mental imagery, voluntary behavior,self-awareness, and so forth). Furthermore,Kimble was not optimistic that a reconciliationbetween these two cultures was possible. Henoted that the fundamental issue"a concernfor a subject matter for its own sake versus 'manas the measure of all things' " (K imble, 1984, p.839)has been debated for millenia withoutresolution.

Many authors have agreed with Kimble'sanalysis, affirming the existence of a dichoto-mous discipline. For example, Furedy andFuredy (1982) drew a distinction between theSocratic and Sophistic styles of teaching (anddoing) psychologya distinction that closelymirrors K imb le's differentiation of scientific andhum anistic cultures. Furedy and Fure dy's follow-ing assessment of the situation also mirrors thatof Kimble: "[our] purpose has been to identifythe conflicts rather than recommend how theyshould be resolved. We recognize that anysignificant change in the educational system [ofpsychology] is unlikely" (1982, p. 18). In fact,many of these authors have argued that a divorcebetween scientific-style and humanistic-stylepsychology is inevitable (Eysenck, 1987; Fish-


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man, 1987; Fraley & Vargas, 1986; Giorgi,1985b; Kendler, 1987; Staats, 1987a).This schism between scientific and humanis-tic values is not unique to psychology. Since atleast the early twentieth century, philosophershave been dubious of science's privileged status,questioning the notion that scientific inquiryoffers unique access to the ultimate nature ofreality (e.g., Hesse, 1980; James, 1902/1929;Kuhn, 1962; Polanyi, 1964; Toulmin, 1953).Many thinkers have rejected the traditional viewof science because it precludes flexibility inthinking and thus the development of systems ofinquiry based on humanistic (or even spiritualis-tic) concerns (Cushman, 1993; Fowers, 1993;Giorgi, 1970; Howard, 1983; Polkinghome,1983; Tart, 19 83). A philosophy of science thatoffers a new perspective on the nature ofrigorous, systematic inquiry has been promul-gated by these humanistic-style thinkers (Faul-coner & Williams, 1985; Packer, 1985; Polking-hom e, 1983; Rychlak, 1988a; Slife & W illiams,1995; Tart, 1983) and appears to underwrite aconception of psychology compatible with theassumptions of the so-called humanistic culture.This culture has shifted thinking away fromtraditional conceptions of science, and hasallowed for a substantial humanistic philosophyof science to emerge.

On the other hand, many argue that thetheoretical fragmentation facing psychology ismore complex than a mere science-versus-humanism schism (Fishman, 1986; Robinson,1986; Rychlak, 1988a; 1993; Staats, 1987a). Forthese psychologists, fragmentation occurs at thelevel of subject matter, theory development, andphilosophy of science. For instance, Staats's(1987a) reflections on Kimble's two cultureshave prompted him to suggest that each of thesetwo cultures are themselves fragmented. T hat is,within each of these cultures are incompatiblephilosophical commitments that preclude aunified approach to science. Thus, according toStaats, a two-cultures characterization of psy-chology is not accurate, nor is it likely thatunification strategies based on a simple two-cultures characterization will be successful.Many psychologists share Staats's concernand view psychology's fragmentation as morecomplex than a disagreement over scientific andhumanistic values. For example, Robinson(1986) has suggested that psychology quascience has separated into three distinct parts:

natural science, mental science, and socialscience. Robinson has wondered whether psy-chology should be considered a science in thefirst place, and argues that perhaps psycholo-gists should look in other directions as theyattempt to develop a unified sch olarly discipline.Similarly, Fishman (1986) has performed aconceptual factor analysis of the discipline andfound three fundamental dimensions, which hereferred to as the experimental paradigm, thetechnological paradigm, and the hermeneuticparadigm. These dimensions, according toFishman, come bound to assumptions aboutpsychological phenomena and thereby functionas theoretical lenses through which research isperformed.

Rychlak (1993) has argued that there are fourtheoretical groundings that inform psychologi-cal theory: physikos, bios, socius, and logos. Thephysikos entails the explanatory style of physi-cal science, which renders accounts of inani-mate events based on natural forces or energicprocesses such as gravity, constancy, or conser-vation. According to Rychlak, traditional behav-iorist and cognitivist explanations take place atthe level of the physikos. The biosalsoendem ic to traditional science represents expla-nations given at the level of the "physicalsubstance of animate organisms" (p. 936). It isat the level of the bios that genetics and organicsystems, as well as natural teleologies, areexplanatory (Churchland, 1993; Rogers, 1961;cf. Slife & Williams, 1995). The socius entailsexplanations that take root in group relationsand social influences, manifesting most plainlyin radically social accounts that view individualsas instances of a larger social structure (e.g.,Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1979). And finally, thelogos represents explanations that take place atthe level of mental processes, manifesting mostplainly in teleological (e.g., Rychlak, 1988a)and mentalistic accounts (Giorgi, 1970; Kelly,1955; Piaget, 1970). In presenting this four-foldconceptualization, Rychlak offered an overarch-ing theoretical framework that subsumes scien-tific and humanistic conceptions, as well asother diverse explanatory systems (e.g., socialconstructionism, constructivism, phenomenol-ogy).

From our view, Rychlak's framework accu-rately reflects the state of the literature ontheoretical fragmentationthat there has beenno single theoretical vantage from which to


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perform scientific investigation. Though psych o-logical explanations have traditionally remainedwithin this framework, there has been little or nocoherence across theoretical groundings. Thislack of coherence has been manifested plainly inthe struggle between theoretical positions, suchas introspectionism, functionalism, psychoanaly-sis, behaviorism, gestaltism, cognitivism, andhumanism. Though many of these theoreticalpositions o ccur at the same explanatory levelfor example, the constructs of psychoanalysisand the common-denom inator laws of behavior-ism both occur at the level of the physikosthese positions have been, and continue to be,mutually incom patible (Rychlak, 198 1; Slife &Williams, 1995).Proposed Solutionsto Theoretical Fragmentation

Perhaps the most vocal proponent of unifica-tion in psychology is Arthur Staats. Staats(1983) has developed a philosophy and methodtermed unified p ositivism that is devoted ex-pressly to the project of relating and unifying thevarious subdisciplines of psychology. AlthoughStaats's work has implications for all levels ofpsychology, unified positivism is properly con-sidered under the rubric of theoretical fragmen-tation, because, according to Staats, it is at thelevel of theory that unification must first occur.Staats (1987a, 1991) has argued that oncetheoretical unity is secured, other types of unitywill fall into line. For example, if we view overtresponses to environmental contingencies as theproper unit of psychological analysis, then wewill have predecided methodological behavior-ism as the appropriate investigative tool forpsychological research.Bridging is central to Staats' unified positiv-ism (Staats, 1981). Bridging is a processwhereby disparate bodies of psychologicalknowledge can be integrated into a coherentwhole, or at least connected in a theoreticallymeaningful, rather than merely an eclectic,manner. Bridging generally requires a detailedanalysis of the similarities and differencesevident in the various bodies of psychologicalknowledge. Once underlying themes and prin-ciples that cut across these bodies are identified,different theories and bodies of knowledge canbe brought under one philosophical framework(Staats, 1987a). This bridging work is vital,

according to Staats, because much psychologi-cal knowledge is m erely redundant that is, thesame fundamental phenomena are describedusing different terms (with perhaps subtlydifferent meanings). Staats said

There are many elements of knowledge in psychologythat are actually the same and must be seen to be so.They are perceived as different, however, for superfi-cial reasons that no one considers. With the provision ofa set of unifying goals, unification of such differentgoals could be readily made. (1987a, p . 36)According to Staats (1987a, 1991), bridgingshould be conduc ted at the level of citations andreferencing, research reviews, theory, metalevelrules for theory and research, methodology and

subject matter. The first aim of bridging,however, would be to discover the similarities,and perhaps the redundancies, evident psycho-logical theory and research. In the case ofcitations and referencing, this work would entailthe development of guidelines for psychologiststo follow in their publications. Bridging workwould then attempt to organize psychology'sdiverse and scattered literatures through cross-referencing. According to Staats (1987a), manyapparent differences could be collapsed byorganizing the vast array of psychologicalliterature into a coherent (and nonredundant)body of knowledge. Staats argued that withoutsuch an organization, particularly at the level ofcitation and referencing, there is no hope thatpsychology will ever achieve coherence. Thisbridging through similarity would also need tooccur at the level of theory, as theoreticalorientations are examined for similarity and forpoints where integration could occur. Differ-ences between theories might also be under-stood through bridging. Such understandingscould be useful in the merging of diversetheoretical positionsperhaps by suggestingwhat aspects of a theory could not be retained ifintegration were to take place.

The second aim of bridging would be tomerge the theories and bodies of knowledge thatare found to be similar. For Staats (1981), thesesimilarities are numerous enough to warrant alarge scale examination and integration of themajor databases of psychology. From Staats'sperspective, this integration would ultimatelyresult in a comprehensive theoretical frameworkthat accommodates all psychological theory andresearch. Integration would take place in thereferencing of research literature, in the theore ti-


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cal direction of research programs, and in theoverarching rules of knowledge evaluation.Rychlak (1988b, 1989, 1993), on the otherhand, has argued that attempts to integrate thediverse theoretical bases of psychology woulddo more harm than good, because bridgingtheories proposed up to now have been funda-mentally underwritten by one theoretical ideabehaviorism (RychJak, 1988b). That is, accord-ing to Rychlak, extant bridging theories attemptto integrate the diverse data bases of psychologyby bringing them all within the framework ofbehaviorism (cf. S taats, 1987a, 19 87b). Fragm en-tation is thus solved through hegemony. Rychlakresponds that there should be flexibility intheorizing. Psychologists should be able toselect from different theoretical groundings, andstill be able to adhere to the rules of science.Psychologists should be able to develop anhypothesis based on any theoretical grounding,and be able to test it scientifically.

Rychlak argued, in contrast to Staats, thatunification in psychology is best served by (a)demanding that psychologists declare theirtheoretical grounding at the outset of a researchprogram; (b) confining the researcher's explana-tions to that grounding throughout the durationof the research; and (c) submitting all experimen-tal hypotheses to the scientific method forvalidation, irrespective of their theoreticalgrounding. In this way, psychologists would beable to select from one of four differenttheoretical groundings (i.e., physikos, bios,socius, logos) in developing empirical hypoth-eses. This means that different theoreticalgroundings would need to be tolerated andrespected throughout psychology (Rychlak, 1980,1988b, 1989, 1993). However, all hypotheseswould eventually be tested in the same wa y: viathe scientific method. Psychology would then beunified by virtue of its allegiance to the scientificmethod, despite the various theoretical ground-ings available to psycho logists.

Others have argued that psychology cannot bea coherent science until some agreement isestablished regarding the fundamental subjectmatter of psychology (Faulconer & Williams,1985, 1990; Giorgi, 1970; Manicas & Secord,1983; Messer, 1988; Yanchar & Kristensen,1996b). These theorists agree with SigmundKoch (1959), who warned that psychologistsadopted the scientific method without carefullyconsidering the nature of their subject matter,

and thus failed to explicate what that subjectmatter should rightfully be. According to Kochand others, some fundamental theoretical start-ing point for psychological inquiryincludingassumptions regarding the subject matter ofpsychologymust be established before theoryand research can be brought under a coherentframework. Stated another way, these theoristshold that the questions (and subject matter) ofpsychology should be established at the outset.Implicit here is the notion that some subjectmatter would also be excluded from psychologi-cal inquiry, or at least reformulated in such away that it squared with the theoretical startingpoint adopted. Subject matter that was notconsonant with this starting point, and thuswhich w ould lead the discipline astray, would beleft to other scholarly or scientific pursuits.

In conclusion, then, psychology encompassesenormous theoretical fragmentation, from mate-rialism to spiritualism. This fragmentation isalso taking place at several levels: philosophiesof science (e.g., natural science vs. humanscience), theoretical positions (e.g., behavior-ism, cognitivism), and even conceptions withintheoretical positions (e.g., competing views ofproblem solving within cognitive psychology).Unfortunately, however, responses to this multi-level fragmentation have been as numerous asthe fragments themselves. Bridging theories,overarching frameworks, and theoretical start-ing points have all been asserted by variousadvocates of unification, but no single proposalfor theoretical unification has received consen-sual support.Diverse Theoretical Languages

Idiosyncratic theoretical languages accom-pany the diverse theoretical positions of psychol-ogy (Staats, 1983). These are the languages thatpsychologists use to describe, and perhapsexplain, psychological phenomen a. Because anytheoretical position will be accompanied by anindigenous theoretical language, and becausethese languages have rapidly proliferated, at-tempts to communicate within the disciplineoften fail, or result in equivocation (Miller,1985; Staats, 1983). That is, attempts tocommunicate are often foiled by the lack of acommon vocabulary for discussing psychologi-cal phenomena. For example, as Staats hasnoted, the same phenomena sometimes go by


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different names, and different (perhaps subtlydifferent) meanings can be embedded withineach of these names. According to Miller(1985), this equivocation engenders a state ofaffairs where theories and facts offered by onegroup of researchers are not meaningful to othergroups of researchers: The groups do not speakthe same theoretical language (see also Kuhn,1962; Gholson & Barker, 1983). Some haveeven argued that competing theoretical lan-guages are incommensurable, thereby suggest-ing that there is no basis, in principle, for thetranslation, comparison, and evaluation of theselanguages (e.g., Koch, 1976; Kuhn, 1962;Wertheimer, 1987).If psychologists cannot communicate acrosstheoretical (or linguistic) lines, then psychologyoperates in a state of absolute relativism wherethere can be no common rationality or logicgoverning the accrual of knowledge. In thisstate, psychologists are unable to evaluate anyknowledge claims other than their own, anddiscourse communities become increasinglyinsular, unable to make any theoretical connec-tion with the discipline as a whole. Under suchrelativism, the discipline becomes a fragmentedconglomeration of discourse communities that

are related in name only. In light of these direimplications, several comm entators suggest thatclaims of incommensurability must be carefullyexamined before they are taken seriously (e.g.,Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Manicas & Secord,1983). Careful examination of this sort seemsimportant, particularly when some argue that theincommensurability thesis is self-refuting, andthat it cannot provide a tenable account oftheoretical language use (Gholson, & Barker,1983; Staats, 1983) or scientific practice (David-son, 1 984; Harris, 1992; Siegel, 1987).Proposed Solutionsto Linguistic Fragmentation

Among theorists who address the theoreticallanguages of psychology there is little agree-ment. Some hold that a neutral observationlanguage for psychological research applica-tions could be established (Greenwood, 1991;Hoshmand & Martin, 1994; Kitnble, 1994;Miller, 19 85). A neutral observation lang uagewould presumably allow for all psychologicalresearchers to communicate their results in astandard and unbiased way. Such a language

would require the use of rigorous operationism(Greenwood, 1991) as well as a "formalnotation with precise and unambiguous defini-tions of all but a handful of primitive terms"(Miller, 1985; p. 43). A neutral observationlanguage would thus amount to a sense-datumlanguage that reduces all meaningful statementsto logical constructs based on immediateexperience (e.g., Russell, 1956). However, thislanguage (originally proposed by analyticalphilosophers in the early part of this century)has never been successfully formulated (Popper,1965). In fact, many view such an observationalsystem as unobtainable because no theory-free,one-to-one correspondence between scientificterms and objects is possible (e.g., Leahey,1980; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992; Pop-per, 1965 ;Quine , 1960; W illiams, 1990a).

Other psychologists have agreed with thecritics of the neutral observation language, buthave been vague as to suitable alternativesolutions (Bevan, 1 991 ; G iorgi, 1985a; Gosling,1986). Gosling (1986), for example, seemsaware of the problems that result from incom-mensurability, but offers no way of addressingsuch problems. It is of course helpful to pointout that such work needs to be done. However,little has been done to develop the kind ofprinciples advocated by Gosling. Similarly,Giorgi (1985a) argued that it is incumbent uponpsychologists to develop "new linguistic re-sources for describing psychological reality" (p.51). But again, little in the way of actualsolutions have been offered. Therefore, p sycholo-gists increasingly appear to view theoreticallanguage as pivotal to the project of unification,yet little work attempting to facilitate thetranslation and comparison of theoretical lan-guages has been accomp lished.Diverse Methods

Two beliefs have h istorically informed psycho-logical research: (a) that a single method forapprehending truth should be used in answeringpsychological questions (Danziger, 1990), and(b) that the appropriate method for psychologi-cal investigation is, in all cases, some variant ofthe natural scientific method (Hoshmand, 1989;Koch, 1959, 19 81; Robinson, 1986; Williams,1990b). Traditionally, scientists, including psy-chological scientists, have viewed the scientificmethod as the sole arbiter of truth: Empirical


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corroboration of theories and models, andultimately full verification of theoretical state-ments about the physical w orld, are secured onlythrough the careful application of this method.This scientific approach to knowledge hasgenerally been referred to as foundationalism(Hoshmand & Martin, 1994) because thescientific method ostensibly provides the single,veridical foundation for all knowledge.However, scientific foundationalism has beencalled into question by philosophers of sciencewho reason that there can be no privilegedaccess to reality (Feyerabend, 1975; Putnam,1981; Rorty, 1979). Because no one methodprovides such privileged access, it is important

that multiple methods be used, each of whichcan presumably describe important and uniqueaspects of phenomena (Feyerabend, 1975; M c-Closky, 1986; Rorty, 1981). Foundationalism inpsychology has been similarly called into byquestion by methodological pluralists who haveviewed psychological inquiry as the asking ofquestions, and who have argued that not allquestions can be profitably answered using thesame method (Hoshmand & Martin, 1994;Howard, 1983; Koch, 1959, 1981; Minke, 1987;Polkinghorne, 1983).More particularly, methodological pluralistshave contended that not all psychologicalquestions can or should be answered using thetraditional scientific method. Indeed, they assertthat many questions do not lend themselves toscientific investigation whatsoever. Consider,for example, William James (1902/1929) fa-mous questionWhat is the nature of religiousexperience? that he answered through a quasi-phenomenological method. Many pluralistictheorists applaud the proliferation of differentdiscourse communities and diverse theoreticallanguages, each informed by its own uniquemethodological com mitmen ts. A principal advo-cate of methodological pluralism in psychologyhas stated it this way:

There is no one m ethod which is the correct method forconducting hum an science research. The point of viewtaken . . . is pluralistic in regard to methods and logics.There are various systems of inquiry that the researchercan use. Instead of trying to adapt on e toolwhether itbe statistical induction or existential-phenomenologicaldescription or something else the researcher must tryto select die research system that is appropriate foranswering the particular questions he or she isaddressing. (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 280)

Perhaps more importantly, however, it hasbeen argued that methodological pluralismwould allow for more comprehensive under-standings of psychological phenomena. Manycontend that the use of a single investigativemethod fails to provide a full account ofpsychological life. This is because all methodspresumably come attuned to certain aspects ofreality, while being blind to other aspects ofreality (Howard, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1983;Slife & Williams, 1995). For example, aqualitative method, which captures people'sphenomenological experience, cannot providedetailed information regarding the biologicalcorrelates of such experience. At least twodistinct types of method would be required toprovide an account that incorporated bothphenomenology and biology. In this sense,scientists who use a methodological pluralismcould provide a more com prehensive account ofpsychological phenomena by using a set ofdiverse m ethods that provide m ultiple profiles ofpsychological life. A more comprehensive ac-count could presumably be rendered as differentprofiles were combined into a coherent picturethat did not omit crucial details. Therefore, thevalue of methodological pluralismindeed, thegenuine strength of methodological pluralismlies in its ability to provide such diverse profilesof psychological life, and to join them into anintegrated whole (Polkinghorne, 1983; see also,Bryman, 1984;Denzin, 1978).

The problem is that such multiple methodsare thought to be inherently fragmented. Forexam ple, Staats has observed:The .. . separations between psychology's methodsconstitutes problems. How are studies using behavioralprinciples and behavioral methods of study to berelated to personality test studies? How are longitudinalstudies to be justified in a behavioristic psychologybased on studies of animal learning? and vice versa . . .there are many questions such as these diat need to beaddressed in the process of unification. (1991, p. 906)

Thus, the problem associated with method-ological pluralism relates to the problem ofknowledge itself: If qualitatively different knowl-edge claims are produced by different methods,then how can such knowledge claims beevaluated by a single epistemological standard?Moreover, how shall such knowledge be inte-grated into a coherent whole? The problem ofknowledge, as explicated here, is the historicproblem of fragmentation itself. Because dis-


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course communities historically adopted uniquemethodological and epistemological approaches,the kinds of knowledge they produced were nottaken seriously by members of other discoursecommunities; each community produced itsown kind of knowledge and rejected that ofothers (Danziger, 1990). This sort of method-ological fragmentation, then, has had profoundimpact on the discipline, ultimately precludingthe development of a coherent body of psychol-ogy knowledge.Proposed Solutionsto Methodological Fragmentation

Many argue that psychology can remainunified only if psychologists adhere to the rulesof empirical science. Subscribers to this viewuphold the traditional scientific conception ofpsychology, in which the scientific method, aswell as an implicit commitment to naturalism(Schneider, 1992), is expected to unite thediscipline. Psychology could be unified, in thissense, because all psychological knowledgewould be derived in the same way and have thesame status: empirical facts, derived throughpublically observable, scientific experiments(e.g., Kimble, 1995; Kunkel, 1992; Observer,1971, 1982; Rychlak, 1989; Smith, 1994). Onetheorist has even argued that psychology willeventually be unified by cognitive science(Baars, 1985a; 1985b), though several othercom men tators adamantly reject this claim (Bech-tel, 1988; Berkowitz & Devine, 1989; Leahey,1992; Staats, 1985b). Another theorist arguesthat psychology can be unified through the useof psychometric procedures (Anastasi, 1992),procedures that have long been a majorstronghold of scientific psychology. In anyevent, a dominant theme in this literature is thatpsychology can be unified only through a strongcommitment to scientific method. Of course, asingle theoretico-methodological commitmentsuch as this would preclude the possibility of amethodological pluralism as well as the fragmen-tation that methodological pluralism tends tofoster. With a single method (and worldview) inplace, psychologists could be united in their aimto produce naturalistic explanations of psycho-logical phenomena through rigorous scientificinquiry.Interestingly, many psychologists in thefragmentation literature have not been quick to

endorse this solution to the problem of fragmen-tation (e.g., Giorgi, 1985b). These psychologistshold that a methodologically plural disciplinecould be, in some sense, coherent. How ever, anindigenous epistemology, which evaluates di-verse kinds of psychological know ledge, wou ldfirst need to be established (Hoshmand &Martin, 1994; Koch, 1959; Lichtenstein, 1980;Manicas & Secord, 1983). An indigenousepistemology would offer a metalevel set ofrules for evaluating all knowledge claims,eventually allowing for the accumulation, andperhaps integration, of data collected withdifferent m ethods (Polking horne, 1983). Asopposed to the unity-through-science position,methodological pluralism containing an indig-enous epistemology would aim to provide ageneral set of nondogmatic rules that govern theevaluation and accumulation of knowledge. Ofcourse it remains to be seen how different (andnondogm atic) such an indigenous epistemologywould be from the unity-through-science per-spective. However, the establishment of such anindigenous epistemology wo uld greatly increasethe likelihood that the discipline remain unified,despite the proliferation of theoretical andmethodological orientations. All knowledgeclaims, irrespective of their origin, would beevaluated by a single set of rules.

Can such an indigenous epistemology beestablished? Many methodologists are confidentthat an epistemology that governs the evaluationand accumulation of knowledge from suchdiverse sources is possible (Fishman, 1987;Giorgi, 1985b; Hoshmand & Martin, 1994,1995; Polkinghorne, 1983; Staats, 1991). How-ever, work in this direction has not evidencedstrong advances. In fact, some argue that thiswork will never be brought to fruition (e.g.,Koch, 1993; Sugarman, 1992; Wertheimer,1987). Others contend that the development ofan indigenous epistemology will not be possiblewithout more fundamental and, in some cases,extratheoretical, considerations (e.g., Yanchar &Kristensen, 1996b).A final approach to methodological unitycomes from theorists wh o advocate pragm atismin some form or other (Fishman, 1990; Hosh-mand & Martin, 1994; Osbeck, 1993; Sugar-man, 1992; Tolman, 1989; Viney, 1989, 1993,1995; Viney, King & King, 1992). Hoshmandand Martin (1994) and Fishman (1990), forexample, affirm the methodological pluralist


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24 8 YANCHAR AND SLIFE

position, arguing that appropriate matches be-tween methods and applications might bedeveloped through a pragmatic appraisal of theresearch context. Specifically, Hoshmand andMartin (1994) proposed that historico-descrip-tive examination of the research programs ofpsychology both past and present might illumi-nate the strengths and weaknesses of certainmethods or approaches, and thereby helpresearchers to "select the conceptual andmethodological tools most fitting with the taskat hand" (p. 176). The establishment of anindigenous epistemology is particularly promis-ing to many in this literature, after an evaluationof the research practices of successful psycholo-gists. Such an epistemology might provide unityin psychology by suggesting how methods canbe used in different contexts, and how resultantknowledge claims should be evaluated.

Sugarman (1992), on the other hand, arguedthat no indigenous or superordinate epistemol-ogy is possible. To pursue a superordinateepistemology is to invoke an infinite regress ofcriteria selection regarding the establishment ofrules for evaluation. That is, any set of criteriafor evaluating knowledge claims must itself beselected, and that selection process requirescriteria regarding good criteria for knowledgeevaluation. However criteria for goodness mustthemselves be selected, leading to an infiniteregress. For Sugarman, the answer to psycholo-gy's methodological trouble lies in Rorty's(1979) pragmatic alternative to traditional real-ism and foundationalism. Sugarman (via Rorty)argued that psychology need not look tosuperordinate epistemologies that entail criteriafor metaphysical certitude. Indeed, on Sugar-m an's (and Rorty's) account, no such metaphysi-cal certitude is possible. Psychologists shouldinstead be concerned w ith the pursuit of rules foraction that are (borrowing a line from WilliamJames) "good for us to believe" (Sugarman,1992, p. 35). These rules are based on consensusrather than certainty. Sugarman wrote, "In thislight, 'knowledge' is regarded as beliefs thathave reached a level of consensus and justifica-tion on practical grounds where further justifica-tion is not ob liged" (p. 35). Thus for Sugarman,psychology should establish consensual agree-ment regarding ways to advance the discipline,and view this agreement as a set of pragmaticrules that lead us prosperously through psycho-logical investigations.

Other pragmatist-type theorists look toWilliam James (and Jamesian pragmatism) forguidance regarding the direction of the disci-pline (Tolman, 1989; Viney, 1989, 1993; Vineyet al., 1992). These theorists eschew any type ofunity that demands psychologists adhere to onedominant view of psychological inquiry. In-stead, they endorse the Jamesian notion ofplurality, where alternatives are always takenseriously an d finality in our investigations is notforthcoming. For example, Viney et al. (1992)attempted to stay within the Jamesian traditionwhen they argued that pluralism is good forpsychology, particularly because it allows for agenuinely scientific approach (where intellec-tual freedom and discovery are possible),moderation (where toleration and flexibility arepossible), and a respect for the moral dimen-sions of life. Indeed, this kind of approachseems consistent with this statement fromJames:

The wisest critic is an alterable being, subject to betterinsight on the morrow, and right at any moment, only"up to date" and "on the whole". When larger rangesof truth open, it is surely best to be able to openourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previouspretensions. (1902/1929, p. 326)The difficulty with this pragmatic po sition is thatthese authors do not provide specific advice forachieving unity in psychology. These authorssuggest that some type of unity is possible, butthey do not state exactly what kind of unity thediscipline should pursue. Essentially, they holdthat the answers to these questions are, inJamesian fashion, found in our actual experi-ence. This means that answers will come fromthe practical experience of practicing psycholo-gists. In this sense, the pragm atic exam ination ofthe research practices of psychologistslikeHoshmand and Martin (1994) suggestedmight provide valuable insights to the eventualdirection of the discipline. Although rigiddisciplinary unity may never be possible, Viney(quoting McDermott, 1967, p. xxvi) assertedthat psychology might at least be able to achieve"confidence without arrogance, intelligibilitywithout certitude, direction without totality."

F r o m W h er e?Our review of psychology's fragmentationreveals a discipline that has never been unifiedin any substantial way. Even among the major


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figures of early psychology, such as Wundt,Titchener, Freud, and Jam es, there was consider-able disagreement about the fundamental natureand direction of the discipline, as well asdisagreement about the appropriate means ofpsychological investigation (Danziger, 1990).This fragmentation, if anything, has increasedover time. That is, the original fragmentation oftheory and method has continued, while otherdimensions of disunity have emerged. Oneparticularly important (and recent) dimension isthe increasing disagreem ent about p sychology'smodel of science, both inside the discipline(Danziger, 1990; Hoshmand & Martin, 1995;Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992; Manicas &Secord, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1983; cf. Kimble,1995) and outside the discipline (e.g., Hesse,1980; Putnam, 1981; Suppe, 1974; Taylor,1973). This movement away from a singularconception of psychology qua traditional sci-ence has resulted in the proliferation of idiosyn-cratic discourse communities that adopt not onlytheir own methods but also their own evaluativestandards. This proliferation is, or at least show ssigns of, breaking down the rational accumula-tion of psychological knowledge (Hoshmand &Martin, 1994; Yanchar & Kristensen, 1996a)and may even tually lead to the dissolution of thediscipline (e.g., Spence, 1987),

For this reason, fragmentation is a momen-tous concern to most psychologists. Even thosewho view fragmentation as a healthy first steprecognize that some form of unity shouldeventually be the endpoint (e.g., Sternberg,1992). Evidence of this concern in both sensescan be seen in the vast number of psychologistswho com men t on the issue of fragmentation, andin the varied and sundry proposals for thediscipline's unification. Taken together, thesecommentaries and proposals suggest that thediscipline is fragmented at many levels, and thatattempts to reverse the fragmentation mustinclude more than mere attempts to bridgeinconsistencies in the empirical data.

Finally, our review suggests that any attemptat unity has to occur at various levels (research,practice, theory, language, method). Unfortu-nately, disagreements about the proper kind ofunity at each of these levels also precludesunification efforts. Indeed, proposals for unifica-tion seem as varied and incompatible as thediverse discourse communities they are in-tended to integrate. The rigid, restrictive types

of unitywhere all psychologists study thesame subject matter in the same wayhavenever been universally endorsed. Moreover,these types of unity are increasingly met withdisfavor, whereas even the less restrictive typesof unity (e.g., Ryc hlak's com plemen tarity frame-work) have also failed to obtain consensualagreement. This fragmentation of the "solu-tions" to fragmentation attests to the deeplyrooted nature of the problem. How is psychol-ogy to be unified when theorists cannot agre e onthe fundamental organization of the discipline,on the accrual and evaluation of psychologicalknowledge, and on the goals toward whichpsychologists should strive?

To Where?We conclude, therefore, that the root cause offragmentationwhatever it may behas alsoprecluded a consensus regarding solutions topsychology's fragmentation. Given the diversityin theoretical approaches to psychology, as wellas to unification, we suggest that a carefulexamination of the nature and direction ofpsychology must precede the development ofspecific unification strategies. Just as Koch

warned in 1959, psychologists must come tosome agreement regarding the subject matterthey will investigate and how those investiga-tions will be conducted. Moreover, it seemsclear, as several commentators have noted(Darden, 1988; Giorgi, 19 88; Staats, 1991 ), thatthe use of science and empirical data will notprovide a univocal solution to the problem offragmentation. This is because empirical scienceis itself a theoretical and methodological strat-egy affirmed by some and rejected by others.Only those who affirm this methodologicalstrategy would take seriously its prescriptionsfor unity.The examination we call for involves aquestioning of the theoretical and methodologi-cal commitments that inform psychologicalinvestigation of all types. Based on our surveyof the literature, we suggest that three questionsguide this foundational examination. First, itseem s impe rative that the question of incomm en-surability be resolved. As stated above, manytheorists argue that the competing discourse

communities of psychology (and their attendanttheoretical languages) are incommensurable. Inmaking this claim, theorists assume that there


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can be no basis, in principle, for the comparisonand evaluation of competing knowledge claims.If the discourse communities of psychologyexist under a state of incommensurability, thenthe discipline is foredoomed to irrevocablefragmentation, because the inability to makecomparisons and contrasts violates the unifica-tion project at the outset. Without an ability tomake comparisons and contrasts, psychologistscannot evaluate or integrate competing concep-tions of know ledge and practice. For this reason,a critical examination of incommensurabilityseems a crucial first step in approaching unity.As mentioned above, commentators outside thediscipline (Davidson, 1984; Harris, 1992; Sie-gel, 1987) as well as inside the discipline(Gholson & Barker, 1983; Staats, 1983) havemarshaled preliminary evidence against theincomm ensurability thesis, suggesting that com-parison and evaluation can be possible.

If comparison and evaluation are feasible,then the discipline faces a second question:What is the nature of this commensurability?That is, what is the basis for such comparisonand evaluation? How can incompatible posi-tions be compared so that they are recognized asincompatible? Understanding the nature of thiscommensurability would be key, because itwould provide a more formal basis for thecomparison and evaluation of all sorts of beliefsand knowledge claimsboth within and acrossdiscourse communities. Even radically differentbeliefs and knowledge claims could be com-pared once a full explication of this commensu-rability had been provided. Indeed, it is thiscommensurability that would make radicaldifference apparent in the first place . Perhaps theonly serious attempt to secure a basis forcommensurability has thus far been made byanalytical philosophers and scientific positivistsin the early part of this century. As stated above,these thinkers attempted to provide commensu-rability through a neutral observation language,a language that was expected to represent realityin an objective, accurate, and logically validway. As many philosophers have rejoined,however, such a neutral observation languagehas never been successfully formulated (e.g.,Quine, 1960). Moreover, as Kimble has re-ported, a substantial movement away from thistraditional model of science has catalyzed abifurcation between scientific and humanisticcultures in psychology. From our perspective,

commensurability would come not throughobjectivitythat is, through the use of a neutralobservation language and objective data collec-tionbut through a penetrating analysis thatprovides a basis for the comparison, contrast,and evaluation of intellectual positions such asscientism and humanism. In this sense, compari-son and communication, not intersubjectiveagreement over objectivity, would be a coreconcern (cf. Taylor, 1973).

If such a penetrating analysis can be per-formed, and a satisfactory basis for comparisoncan be ob tained, then the discipline faces a thirdquestion: What does this commensurabiliyimply about the eventual direction of psychol-ogy? Specifically, what does this basis ofcomparison say about how unification should bepursued? Answers to these questions warrantconsiderable deliberation, because they morethan any others will influence the future courseof the discipline. However, the answers pro-vided here need not foreclose on theoretical orintellectual diversity (Giorgi, 1985b; Rychlak,1988b, 1993; Tolman, 1989). For example, if wetook Rychlak's (1993) notion of complementar-ity seriouslyrecognizing four mutually irreduc-ible levels of explanation; bios, physikos, socius,an d logosthen psychologists could selectfrom at least four different theoretical ground-ings as they formulated hypotheses and con-ducted research. In this case, the theoreticalstatus of the phenomenon under investigation(selected by researchers and theorists them-selves) could be acknowledged and takenseriously by interested parties throughout thediscipline, including journal editors and review-ers. In this sense, answers to this third questionwou ld not need to preclude lines of investigationor avenues of theorizing. An answer to this thirdquestion would merely allow the lines andavenues to be compared and united underdisciplinary auspices.

With these three fundamental questions an-swered, a common framework from which toview fragmentation and to evaluate specificunification strategies would be p rovided. With acommon starting point for unification secured,more specific issues, such as the appropriatenessof the current reward structure, the relationshipbetween science and practice, and the use ofmethodological pluralism, could be produc-tively discussed. We cannot predict the outcomeof this theoretical discussion. However, an


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PURSUING UNITY 251atmosphere for th is conversat ion must beprovided wherein theoret ical posi t ions can beunderstood not only in l ight of their ownfundamental assumptions, but a lso in l ight oftheir re la tedness to the fundamental assump-tions of other theoret ical posi t ions. A star t ingpoint for unif icat ion in psychology demands justth is k ind of analysisan analysis that suggestswh ere ideas com e from (their h is torical s i tuated-ness) , what the ideas mean in terms of pract icalhuman exper ience , and where the ideas u l t i -mately lead the discipl ine (as well as humanbeings in general) . I t is through this comparisonand con t ras t , and the accompanying d ia logue ,that a unif icat ion s tra tegy can productively befo rmula ted .

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