performance review report performance review report3.5 safety occurrence assessment and reporting by...

An Assessment of Air Traffic Managementin Europe during the Calendar Year 2003

Performance Review Commission

Performance Review

Report

PRR 7

April 2004

Pe

rform

an

ce

Re

view

Re

po

rt - PR

R 7 - A

pril 2

00

4

For any further information please contact:

Performance Review Unit, 96 Rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium

Tel: + 32 2 729 3956Fax: + 32 2 729 9108

[email protected]://www.eurocontrol.int/prc

Performance Review

Report

Notice(Photo courtesy: British Airways and Air France)

The PRC has made every effort to ensure that the information and analysis contained in this documentare as accurate and complete as possible. Only information from quoted sources has been used andinformation relating to named parties has been checked with the parties concerned. Despite theseprecautions, should you find any errors or inconsistencies we would be grateful if you could please bringthem to the PRU’s attention.

The PRC’s website address is http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc.

The PRU’s e-mail address is [email protected].

Copyright notice and Disclaimer

© European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)

This document is published by the Performance Review Commission in the interest of the exchange ofinformation.

It may be copied in whole or in part providing that the copyright notice and disclaimer are included.The information contained in this document may not be modified without prior written permission from thePerformance Review Commission.

The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy ofEUROCONTROL, which makes no warranty, either implied or express, for the information contained inthis document, neither does it assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness orusefulness of this information.

Printed by EUROCONTROL, 96, rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium.

About the Performance Review CommissionThe Performance Review Commission (PRC) was established to provide advice to the Governing Bodies ofEUROCONTROL in order to ensure the effective management of the European Air Traffic ManagementSystem through a strong, transparent and independent performance review and target-setting system. Thissystem addresses all aspects of air traffic management including policy and planning, safety management atand around airports and in the airspace, as well as financial and economic aspects of services rendered.

The PRC was established by the Permanent Commission of EUROCONTROL in 1998, following adoptionof the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Institutional Strategy the previous year. This strategyprovided that “an independent Performance Review System covering all aspects of ATM in the ECAC areawill be established to put greater emphasis on performance and improved cost-effectiveness, in response toobjectives set at a political level”.

The PRC is composed of twelve independent members with senior managerial and technical experience ofaviation. They are nominated by the EUROCONTROL Member States and appointed by the ProvisionalCouncil. Nominees must have professional experience of air traffic management (planning, technical,operational or economic aspects), safety or economic regulation in one or more of the following areas:Government regulatory bodies, air navigation services, airports, aircraft operations and research anddevelopment.

The Commissioners who prepared this report are:

Mr Jozsef Bakos Mr Jovica Lazarevski Mr Adrian Serban

Mr Francisco Cal Pardo Mr Gregory Nanidis Mr Per Wallden

Mr Cees Gresnigt Mr Vittorio Pimpinelli Mr Keith Williams

Mr Philippe Jaquard Dr Johannes Reichmuth

The Performance Review Unit (PRU) supports the PRC and operates administratively under, butindependently of, the EUROCONTROL Agency.

The PRC can be contacted via the Performance Review Unit, Rue de la Fusée 96, B-1130 Brussels,Belgium. Tel: +32 2 729 3956. The PRU’s e-mail address is: [email protected]. The PRC can also becontacted through its website. The address is: http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc

PRC processes

The PRC reviews ATM performance issues on its own initiative, at the request of the deliberating bodies ofEUROCONTROL or of third parties. It prepares annual Performance Review Reports (PRR), benchmarkingreports on Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP), and ad hoc reports.

The PRC gathers relevant information, consults concerned parties, draws conclusions and submits its reportsand recommendations for decision to the Permanent Commission, through the Provisional Council. Thesereports are made available in printed and electronic form (http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc) and on requestfrom the PRU ([email protected]), after they have been seen by the Provisional Council, unless the lat-ter requests otherwise.

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................... I

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 ABOUT THIS REPORT ....................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................ 2 1.3 IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF PAST RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 2

2 TRAFFIC .............................................................................................................................................. 5 2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 TRAFFIC DEMAND ........................................................................................................................... 5 2.3 TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY..................................................................................................................... 6 2.4 TRAFFIC VARIABILITY..................................................................................................................... 7 2.5 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................. 8

3 SAFETY ................................................................................................................................................ 9 3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 9 3.2 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR FOR ATM SAFETY ....................................................................... 9 3.3 SAFETY REGULATION.................................................................................................................... 10 3.4 SAFETY MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................. 11 3.5 SAFETY OCCURRENCE ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING BY ANSPS.................................................. 12 3.6 SAFETY INFORMATION SHARING ................................................................................................... 12 3.7 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 13

4 CAPACITY AND DELAYS .............................................................................................................. 15 4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 15 4.2 AIR TRANSPORT DELAYS .............................................................................................................. 15 4.3 ATFM DELAYS ............................................................................................................................. 16 4.4 EN-ROUTE ATFM DELAYS............................................................................................................ 17 4.5 COST OF DELAYS........................................................................................................................... 20 4.6 CAPACITY/DEMAND BALANCING................................................................................................... 21 4.7 ATFM PERFORMANCE .................................................................................................................. 21 4.8 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 24

5 ATFM DELAYS AT AIRPORTS ..................................................................................................... 25 5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 25 5.2 ANALYSIS OF ARRIVAL ATFM DELAYS AT TOP 8 AIRPORTS.......................................................... 26 5.3 MANAGING FLOWS IN BAD WEATHER............................................................................................ 27 5.4 INAPPROPRIATE USE OF GROUND REGULATIONS............................................................................ 29 5.5 ATFM ISSUES AT GREEK AIRPORTS .............................................................................................. 30 5.6 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 30

6 COST-EFFECTIVENESS ................................................................................................................. 31 6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 31 6.2 REAL UNIT COSTS FOR EN-ROUTE ANS (EUROPEAN LEVEL) ......................................................... 31 6.3 REAL UNIT COSTS FOR EN-ROUTE ANS (STATE LEVEL)................................................................. 32 6.4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF EN-ROUTE ANS COSTS (PER STATE) ................................................ 35 6.5 ANSP COST-EFFECTIVENESS BENCHMARKING.............................................................................. 36 6.6 FORWARD-LOOKING PROJECTIONS (2002-2007) ........................................................................... 40 6.7 EUROCONTROL AGENCY COSTS............................................................................................... 40 6.8 MET COSTS .................................................................................................................................. 42 6.9 OTHER COSTS................................................................................................................................ 42 6.10 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 43

7 PERFORMANCE TARGETS........................................................................................................... 45 7.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 45 7.2 THE NEED FOR A BALANCED APPROACH TO ANS PERFORMANCE.................................................. 46 7.3 AN UPPER BOUND FOR ANS COSTS ............................................................................................... 47 7.4 SIGNIFICANT SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT........................................................................................ 48

7.5 BENEFITS OF CURBING THE LINEAR TREND.................................................................................... 49 7.6 A EUROPEAN COST-EFFECTIVENESS TARGET ................................................................................ 50 7.7 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 52

8 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT................................................................................................ 53 8.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 53 8.2 OUTLINE PROCESS TO STEER EUROPEAN ANS PERFORMANCE ...................................................... 53 8.3 COST-EFFECTIVENESS OBJECTIVES AND CHARGING REGIMES........................................................ 54 8.4 THE SES REGULATIONS ................................................................................................................ 56 8.5 REGULATORY/ CO-OPERATIVE POLICY MIX ................................................................................... 58 8.6 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 59

9 MET COSTS ....................................................................................................................................... 61 9.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 61 9.2 THE AERONAUTICAL MET COST BASE.......................................................................................... 61 9.3 MET COST ALLOCATION AND RECOVERY ..................................................................................... 62 9.4 EUROPEAN AERONAUTICAL MET COST DEVELOPMENT................................................................ 63 9.5 COMPARISON OF AERONAUTICAL MET CHARGES ........................................................................ 65 9.6 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................... 66

ANNEX I - IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF PAST RECOMMENDATIONS............................... 69

ANNEX II - EVOLUTION OF UNIT COSTS PER STATE .................................................................. 84

ANNEX III - GLOSSARY.......................................................................................................................... 87

ANNEX IV - REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 93

L I S T O F F I G U R E S

Figure 1: Key Performance Indicators in 2003 ................................................................................. i Figure 2: “European” airspace covered by this report....................................................................... i Figure 3: Air transport punctuality ...................................................................................................ii Figure 4: Breakdown of total ANS costs.........................................................................................iii Figure 5: Delay and cost targets ...................................................................................................... iv Figure 6: Matching individual objectives and European targets ......................................................v Figure 7: MET cost allocation to En-route and terminal charges (2001) ........................................vi Figure 8: “European” airspace covered by this report......................................................................1 Figure 9: Implementation of PRC recommendations .......................................................................3 Figure 10: Yearly, monthly traffic variations...................................................................................5 Figure 11: Growth of “low-cost” carriers.........................................................................................5 Figure 12: Key traffic indicators ......................................................................................................6 Figure 13: Traffic variations 2003 vs. 2002 .....................................................................................6 Figure 14: Density map ....................................................................................................................7 Figure 15: Seasonal and within week traffic variation .....................................................................8 Figure 16: Seasonal Traffic variation ...............................................................................................8 Figure 17: Implementation status of ESARR 2 as reported by States ............................................10 Figure 18: Implementation of safety management systems in ECAC (2002) ................................11 Figure 19: Air transport punctuality and primary delay causes......................................................15 Figure 20: ATFM delays and target (Summer) ..............................................................................16 Figure 21: ATFM delay distribution (2003)...................................................................................16 Figure 22: Key European traffic and delay data.............................................................................17 Figure 23: Proportion of summer en-route ATFM delays in European regions.............................17 Figure 24: Variation of summer en-route ATFM delays................................................................18 Figure 25: Highest ATFM delays (summer 2003) .........................................................................18 Figure 26: ACCs with significant changes in delay (summer 2002-2003) ....................................19 Figure 27: ATFM En-route delays due to combined and elementary sectors ................................20 Figure 28: Estimated ATFM delay costs (including reactionary) ..................................................20 Figure 29: Gap between demand and capacity ...............................................................................21 Figure 30: Over-deliveries and delays due to useless regulations..................................................22 Figure 31: Ground regulations generating < 10 minutes of delay/flight ........................................23 Figure 32: Ground regulations generating > 10 minutes of delay/flight ........................................23 Figure 33: Arrival airport ATFM delays ........................................................................................25 Figure 34: Breakdown of arrival ATFM delay causes (2003)........................................................26 Figure 35: Arrival capacity reductions in case of bad weather ......................................................27 Figure 36: Distribution of arrival ATFM delays ............................................................................28 Figure 37: Cancelled ATFM regulations due to weather ...............................................................28 Figure 38: Airports among Top 8 regulated on the same day due to weather................................29 Figure 39: Breakdown of ANS costs (approximate figures 2002) .................................................31 Figure 40: Unit costs per km (KPI), total costs and traffic.............................................................32 Figure 41: European en-route ANS costs .......................................................................................32 Figure 42: Unit costs per State .......................................................................................................33 Figure 43: Top 10 increases in unit costs expressed in Euros (2000-2002) ...................................33 Figure 44: Actual costs for 2002 compared to plans ......................................................................34 Figure 45: Top 5 improvements in unit costs (2000-2002) ............................................................34 Figure 46: Evolution of planned total costs, traffic and unit costs (2002-2004) ............................35 Figure 47: Results of econometric benchmarking model (year 2002) ...........................................36 Figure 48: ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness indicator (gate-to-gate, 2001) .......................................37 Figure 49: Summary of productivity results (2001) .......................................................................38 Figure 50: ATCO hourly employment costs with and without PPP adjustment (2001) ................39 Figure 51: Support cost ratio (gate-to-gate, 2001) .........................................................................39 Figure 52: Projected cost variations (2002-2007) ..........................................................................40 Figure 53: Evolution of EUROCONTROL Agency costs (Part I and IX) .....................................41 Figure 54: Breakdown of EUROCONTROL Agency costs (Parts I, II and IX) ............................41

Figure 55: Breakdown of EUROCONTROL costs per type of expenditure ..................................42 Figure 56: En-route MET costs between (1998-2004)...................................................................42 Figure 57: ATFM delays: KPI and target.......................................................................................47 Figure 58: Static and dynamic economic optima ...........................................................................47 Figure 59: En-route unit cost per km (KPI), total en-route costs and traffic..................................48 Figure 60: Trend in average delay and unit costs (left)-Traffic forecast (right).............................51 Figure 61: European delay and cost-effectiveness targets for en-route ANS.................................52 Figure 62: Matching individual objectives and European targets ..................................................54 Figure 63: Some options for charging regimes ..............................................................................55 Figure 64: MET cost allocation to En-route and terminal charges (2001) .....................................62 Figure 65: En-route MET costs as a proportion of en-route ANS costs (1998-2004)....................63 Figure 66: En-route MET costs and traffic (1998-2004)................................................................64 Figure 67: En-route MET costs (2002) and average annual growth rates (1998-2002).................64 Figure 68: Total (en-route + terminal) MET costs by State (2001)................................................65 Figure 69: MET charges per composite flight-hour (2001, gate-to-gate) ......................................66

European ATM Performance in 2003 – 31 States Traffic

IFR flights (General Air Traffic) increased +2.8% in 2003, after two consecutive years of decrease in 2001 and 2002. The growth trend is expected to resume from 2003 onwards.

GAT traffic IFR

Flights Distance

2003 8.47 M (+2.8%)

6 581 M Km (+4.4%)

3%

-2%

2%5%

7%6%2%

6% 4% 6% 5%6%5% 3%4% 4%3% 4%3%3%

0%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1419

90

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Year on year variation

2000 Forecast

2004 Forecast

( before 1997, estimation based on Euro 88 traffic variation)

Traff ic

million f lights per year

2002 8.24 M 6 293 M Km

Safety

No safety indicator in the absence of adequate safety data.

Intentionally left blank

Delays En-route ATFM delays have significantly decreased in summer 2003 (1.2 min/flight, -35%), met the agreed target (2.1 min/flight), and nearly reached the medium term optimum delay target (1 min/flight). This is a major achievement. Airport ATFM delays (bottom part of the graph) deserve special attention (46% of ATFM delays). Total ATFM delays Minutes Cost

2003 14.8 M €800 M

2.9

4.1

5.5

3.63.1

1.81.2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

En-route ATFM delay

En-route target

En-route optimum

Target: 2.1min/flight

Actual: 1.2min/flight

Summer

minutes per f light

Airport ATFM delay

source : EUROCONTROL 2002 18.0 M €1 000 M Cost-effectiveness

Costs were contained in 2002, but cost growth in 2001 combined with traffic stagnation in 2001-2002 resulted in real unit costs increasing by more than 6% from 2000 to 2002. Year 2004 costs are planned to be 10% above 2002. Thanks to traffic growth and to cost containment measures, unit costs in 2004 are expected to be slightly below the 2002 level, but still 4% above 2000 level. ANS costs Total En-route unit

cost 2004 Plan. Route: €5 469M 0.77 €2002/km

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

P

2004

P

€ 20

02/ k

m

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

280

Cost Per Km Total Costs (1990= index 100) Traff ic (1990=index 100)

All States in CRCO system Data source : EUROCONTROL/CRCO 2002 Route: €4 953M Terminal ~€1 300M

0.79 €2002/km

Figure 1: Key Performance Indicators in 2003

PRR 7 - Executive Summary i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction This seventh Performance Review Report (PRR 7) of EUROCONTROL independent Performance Review Commission (PRC) reviews the performance of European Air Navigation Services (ANS) in 2003.

This report addresses: Air Traffic demand; Three Key Performance Areas (KPA)

and associated indicators (see Figure 1): Safety; Delays, with specific emphasis on

airports; Cost-effectiveness;

Proposals towards European performance targets and associated performance management processes;

Costs of Aeronautical Meteorology (MET) services;

PRC recommendations.

Adoption of the Single European Sky (SES) regulations offers a vehicle to reinforce the performance orientation of European ATM. A strong and independent Performance Review System will be an important element towards the success of the SES.

Traffic After two years of decline, traffic in 2003 grew +2.8% on average (0.5% above the 2000 traffic level). This resulted from a contrasted situation across Europe.

Traffic growth is forecast to resume at an estimated 3-4% per annum (GAT IFR flights). The “low-cost” air carrier segment is increasing rapidly.

The PRC worked with interested parties to define and measure traffic complexity indicators. It will continue its efforts in this direction, in order to determine with confidence to what extent observed differences in performance metrics across ANSPs or ACCs originate from differences in traffic complexity and variability conditions.

EUROCONTROL

EUROCONTROL

Figure 2: “European” airspace covered by this report

Safety Many steps were taken in 2003 towards improving ATM safety. There remain, however, a number of shortcomings in regulation, management and performance review of ATM safety.

Although a system of safety performance indicators was defined by the SRC, a Key Performance Indicator for European ATM Safety does not exist yet, and should be developed as a matter of urgency. Until then, it is not possible to accurately determine the level of safety in Europe.

EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) are implemented late and/or partially in many States. Implementation of ESARR 2 should be enforced through transposition of Directive 2003/42/EC, which is due by July 2005. This directive should be complemented by SES implementing measures specifying reporting requirements, building on ESARR 2.

Undertaking ATM safety regulation at regional level may strike the right balance between the needs for coherence, efficiency and effectiveness, while retaining an understanding of individual issues. This would have to be done within a common European regulatory framework.

Safety management and resources are often inadequate in ANSPs. European facilitation

PRR 7 - Executive Summary ii

programmes are needed to raise the maturity of safety management to best practice levels.

A non-punitive environment is a prerequisite for improvements in safety management. Transposition of Directive 2003/42/EC will, to some extent, remove legal impediments to occurrence reporting.

Incident reporting systems rely on a small and variable number of human incident reports, which is not always adequate. This situation impedes safety management and performance improvement. Automated Safety Data Gathering (ASDG) should be implemented as soon as practicable.

There is considerable value in sharing lessons learnt from accidents and incidents. Furthermore, neither the SRC nor the PRC have access to adequate safety information to perform their performance review duties. SES implementing rules should make provision for safety information sharing and disclosure. EUROCONTROL and the European Commission should facilitate this information sharing.

In summary, SES implementing rules should include requirements for: • Information on safety occurrences and

their assessment, to be made available at European level, in particular to the PRC;

• Sharing of information and lessons learnt amongst the aviation community.

Delays Improvements in air transport punctuality observed in Figure 3 are to a significant extent linked with improvements in ATM-related delays shown in Figure 1.

ATM-related delays significantly decreased in summer 2003 (1.2 min/flight, -35%), met the agreed target (2.1 min/flight), and almost reached the medium term optimum delay target (1 min/flight). This is a major achievement, the credit for which is to be attributed to co-operation between the EUROCONTROL Agency and ANSPs regarding capacity and flow management.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

2000 2001 2002 2003

% o

f flig

hts

with

arri

val d

elay

> 1

5 m

in

Data source : EUROCONTROL/CODA & AEA

Figure 3: Air transport punctuality

This highlights the value of setting performance targets. It also shows that ambitious targets can be met under co-operative arrangements. Implementing rules of the Single European Sky should facilitate such co-operative arrangements.

Costs incurred by airspace users due to ATFM and associated reactionary delays are estimated at €400M for en-route delays in 2003, which is understood to be close to optimum, and at €400M for airport ATFM delays.

In order to preserve good performance in terms of delays, effective capacity needs to grow at an annual rate consistent with traffic forecasts. Capacity increases need to be carefully planned. They can arise from improved airspace management, better use of existing resources (combined sectors deserve special attention), more accurate flow management, and additional resources.

Ground regulations are ineffective in controlling flows when demand is close to capacity, and yet cause significant delays and reduce aircraft/airport operators’ flexibility. More accurate flow control would allow increased effective capacity and reduce unnecessary delays, while preserving safety.

More tactical ATFM measures need to complement ground regulations. Such measures are part of the ATFCM strategy, and are starting to be applied. Further research has begun under the “CAMES” project, and implementation should follow at an adequate pace. The Central Flow Management Unit has a crucial role to play

PRR 7 - Executive Summary iii

in developing ATFM strategies and in ensuring adequacy and consistency of flow management measures.

SES implementing rules should facilitate, and not impede, the evolution of ATFM towards more tactical and flexible flow management.

Airport ATFM delays In reviewing airport and terminal area performance issues, the PRC elected to focus first on airport ATFM delays at the top eight delay-generating airports (Amsterdam, Barcelona, Frankfurt, London Heathrow, Milan MXP, Rome FCO, Paris CDG and Zurich), which together handle 19% of the traffic and generate 69% of all ATFM arrival airport delays. More work is clearly needed on airport issues and the PRC will contribute its share.

The mismatch between the regulated and available capacity under bad weather is often significant. More detailed analysis will be needed to develop optimum flow management strategies for use in bad weather. Before this can be done, there are a number of questions that will need to be addressed: • Could weather forecasts be better-

integrated into ATM decision-making? • Does ATM use up-to-date MET

technology for weather forecasting? • Could airport weather forecasting be

more accurate, and if so, at what price? • What are the best options to deal with

uncertain weather conditions? • What are the best Collaborative

Decision Making (CDM) processes in deciding flow management measures?

When there is a slight excess in demand, tactical measures would appear to be best suited to regulate the demand.

Flow control into airports must be very accurate in order to maximise runway utilisation, while avoiding delays and eventual safety hazards due to excess demand. Optimum strategies will need to be developed for flow control into airports, using a combination of airport scheduling, ground regulations, en-route flow control and vectoring/holding at arrival.

Concerned parties should find solutions to high ATFM delays caused by Greek airports.

Cost-effectiveness ANS costs can be broken down into ATM/CNS (88%), MET (~6%), EUROCONTROL (~5%) and other costs (~1%), in particular regulatory costs. Cost-effectiveness should be under control for all ANS cost components.

MET6%

Payments to national

governments1%

EUROCONTROL5%

ATM/CNSs88%

Total ANS cost: €6 300Msource : EUROCONTROL/ACE2002

Figure 4: Breakdown of total ANS costs

Previous PRC reports have highlighted the need to improve ATM cost-effectiveness in Europe. En-route ANS unit costs are being contained overall after three years of relatively rapid increases (see Figure 1). This will need to continue and improve in a context of increasing traffic.

ATM/CNS costs represent the largest share of ANS costs (88%). Their evolution is very contrasted across States, with good cost control in some parts and worrying trends in others.

Forward-looking information is an essential element in managing the future performance of Air Navigation Services. SES implementing rules should make the provision of historic and forward-looking information mandatory and enforceable for ANS operating under monopoly.

Productivity and support costs were identified in PRR 6 as main areas of action to improve ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness. Benchmarking of support costs would be a very worthwhile effort to identify and foster best practices, and to characterise the effects of fragmentation.

PRR 7 - Executive Summary iv

The newly-created Standing Committee on Finance is expected to keep the EUROCONTROL budget under control. It should address the full EUROCONTROL cost-base in relation to service provided. To this effect, measures of output need to be developed to produce efficiency indicators.

Regulatory costs should also be kept under control, especially in the context of new Single European Sky requirements.

Performance targets Qualitative objectives were agreed at MATSE 6 (2000) for safety, capacity, and economic efficiency. The next step is their quantification and measurement: • The SRC’s work to define safety key

performance indicators and targets needs to progress as a matter of urgency;

• The agreed European en route delay target should remain;

• The PRC will give consideration to developing a target for airport delays;

• A European cost-effectiveness target should be agreed, which will focus attention and action.

Key performance areas are interdependent. Safety regulations will help to ensure that improvements in other Key Performance Areas do not adversely affect safety. Reliable safety indicators are needed to verify that this is actually the case.

European ANS costs have tended to grow in line with traffic. The PRC advocates that, as a minimum, ANS costs should grow slower than traffic over the medium-term.

The net present value of improving cost-effectiveness by 3% every year over a 10-year period would be massive, in the order of billions of Euro.

The PRC considers that an overall network target to reduce progressively the average “en-route ANS real unit cost” to 14% below the 2003 level in 2008, while meeting the European delay target, would serve as a challenging and achievable basis for co-operative planning (see Figure 5).

This European cost-effectiveness target should not be seen as, or directly translated into, individual objectives for each ANSP. The diversity of individual circumstances

(e.g. different traffic growth and/or investment cycles) requires a corresponding degree of diversity in individual objectives.

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

2003

P

2004

P

2005

P

2006

P

2007

P

2008

P

En-r

oute

cos

t per

Km

(€ 2

003)

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

En-r

oute

del

ay p

er fl

ight

(min

)

Unit cost target: -14%

En-route delay target 1 minute/flight

Figure 5: Delay and cost targets

Performance management It is important to set European ATM performance targets. It is even more important to ensure that performance targets are met, in a context of decentralised ANS provided under designation by States and mostly under monopoly. Performance management and related processes will be essential elements to ensure that individual objectives are consistent with European targets.

An adequate mix of regulatory and co-operative arrangements will need to be defined for regulation, service definition and provision (quantity, quality and cost of service), charging/funding, ANSP governance and performance review, in order to ensure that the actual performance of the European ANS system converges towards agreed European targets.

A first package of regulatory and co-operative arrangements is suggested: • ANSPs should publish own performance

objectives and corresponding business plans for their monopoly services, after consultation with airspace users and approval by their governing body. This should be part of SES implementing rules;

• States/National Supervisory Authorities (NSA) should have an explicit responsibility to ensure that the designated ANSPs’ performance is effectively managed. Common requirements for ANSP governance may have to be developed. The five governance principles presented in PRR 5 (Chapter 11) are relevant in this respect. Charging principles and

PRR 7 - Executive Summary v

incentives are also relevant, and several options are presented. Specific SES implementing rules should be developed and agreed;

• Actions of States, NSAs and ANSP governing bodies would need to be co-ordinated so as to ensure consistency and alignment with decisions at European level. The EUROCONTROL Agency has an important role to play in harmonising policies, aggregating individual plans, identifying and promoting best practices, assisting States in planning and implementation, etc. This is illustrated in Figure 6;

• Finally, independent oversight and review with right of access to critical information is needed at national level and European level.

Individual objectives

Business Plans

European consolidation & co-ordination

NSA/regulatory authorities

ANS providers

Member State EUROCONTROL OrganisationMember State EUROCONTROL Organisation

European targets

Single European SkyLegislative framework


Governance board

Figure 6: Matching individual objectives and European targets

Regulatory costs and ANSP costs for regulatory compliance should be carefully assessed when developing policies. The use of recognised organisations could help to keep those costs at appropriate levels.

MET costs Aviation is one of the few industries directly charged for MET services. In 2002, civil aviation paid some €380M for en-route and terminal MET services in Europe in 2002 (6% of ANS costs).

Although aeronautical MET costs have remained stable at European level between 1998 and 2002, significant variations were observed at national level. The share of MET costs within the total en-route ANS costs is expected to rise again between 2003 and 2004.

As there is no apparent justification for linking aeronautical MET costs to en-route traffic levels, it is important that aeronautical MET costs are effectively managed and not simply adjusted to traffic increases.

In some States, national MET costs allocated to civil aviation would appear to be disproportionately high compared to other MET users. In view of the growing importance of MET services to other industries and the general public, there is a need to ensure that aeronautical users are not asked to pay for MET services they do not require or that are not properly allocated to them. Instead, MET services should make the most effective use of the existing national and international aeronautical MET infrastructure to avoid duplication of services.

Decisions concerning the national MET infrastructure are often taken without aeronautical user consultation and irrespective of user requirements. There is a need to move towards a more customer-focused relationship, including more effective consultation meetings.

Disclosure of relevant information and transparency is crucial in order to build confidence, to enable justified and cost-reflective MET charges, to avoid user discrimination and make any cross-subsidisation transparent.

SES regulations apply to aeronautical MET services, as they are part of ANS. SES implementing rules should include requirements, e.g. consultation, transparent charging schemes and accounts.

PRR 7 - Executive Summary vi

Separate reporting and consultation requirements should be developed for MET. More detailed information on MET cost allocation mechanisms, MET cost drivers, operational MET data, MET outputs, and planned investments that are likely to affect the level of aeronautical MET charges would encourage performance improvements by enabling users to understand and question the MET costs they have to pay. The implementation of transparent accounting systems which allocate the costs in accordance with operational boundaries and product categories would be an important step forward.

Within Europe, there are wide variations in the MET infrastructure, the way it is managed and operated, and in the services rendered to aviation. There are also variations in charges levied, which would appear to relate to efficiency and/or cost allocation issues. Figure 7 shows wide variations in en-route/terminal cost allocation practices.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Den

mar

k

FYR

OM

Ger

man

y

Hun

gary

Irela

nd

Italy

Mal

ta

Net

herla

nds

Por

tuga

l

Slo

veni

a

Spa

in +

Can

aria

s

Turk

ey

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Rom

ania

Sw

eden

Slo

vak

Rep

.

Bel

gium

-Lux

.

Fran

ce

Aus

tria

Mol

dova

Sw

itzer

land

Cze

ch R

ep.

Bul

garia

Latv

ia

Nor

way

Lith

uani

a

Est

onia

Finl

and

Terminal MET Costs 2001 En-route MET Costs 2001 Source: ACE 2001 Figure 7: MET cost allocation to En-route

and terminal charges (2001)

PRC recommendations The Provisional Council is invited:

a. to note the PRC’s seventh Performance Review Report (PRR 7) and to submit it to the Commission;

b. to request the European Community to incorporate precise common requirements related to safety in Single European Sky implementing rules concerning: • Information on safety occurrences and

their assessment, to be made available at European level, in particular to the PRC;

• Sharing of information and lessons learnt amongst the aviation community;

c. to request the Director General to facilitate and coordinate maximum cooperation with ANSPs and airspace users in order that ATM capacity grows at a rate consistent with traffic forecasts;

d. to agree that a European cost-effectiveness target should be set as a matter of priority;

e. to request the Director General to develop proposals for processes and working arrangements to ensure consistency of individual performance objectives and European targets, in consultation with States and interested parties, and to report back to the Provisional Council in 2004;

f. to request the European Community to include requirements for ANSPs to publish, after consultation with airspace users and approval by their governing body, own performance objectives and corresponding business plans for their monopoly services, according to standards to be specified in Single European Sky implementing rules.

PRR 7 - Introduction 1

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 About this report

1.1.1 This seventh Performance Review Report (PRR 7) of EUROCONTROL’s independent Performance Review Commission (PRC) reviews the performance of European Air Navigation Services (ANS) in 2003. It addresses:

Air Traffic demand in Chapter 2; Three Key Performance Areas (KPA):

Safety in Chapter 3; Delays in Chapter 4, with specific emphasis on airports in Chapter 5; Cost-effectiveness in Chapter 6;

Proposals towards European Performance targets in Chapter 7 and considerations on associated performance management processes in Chapter 8;

Costs of Aeronautical Meteorology (MET) services in Chapter 9; PRC recommendations (in Executive Summary).

1.1.2 Unless otherwise indicated, this report refers to ANS performance in the Flight Information Regions (FIR) under the responsibility of the 31 EUROCONTROL Member States in 2003 (see glossary for details). This airspace, shown in Figure 8, is hereafter referred to as “Europe”.

EUROCONTROL

EUROCONTROL

Figure 8: “European” airspace covered by this report

1.1.3 The PRC attaches great importance to having open and ongoing consultation with all sectors of the aviation community. PRR 7 has been discussed in open forum with all interested parties at a consultation meeting held on 1 March 2004. Proposals towards performance targets were the subject of additional specific consultations. The outcomes were taken into account when developing recommendations to the Provisional Council (April 2004).


1.2 Institutional and legislative developments

1.2.1 Important milestones for European ANS include: • the adoption of four Single European Sky (SES) regulations: “Framework” [Ref. 1],

“Service provision” [Ref. 2], “Airspace” [Ref. 3] and “Interoperability [Ref. 4]; • the accession of the European Community to EUROCONTROL and; • the forthcoming ratification of the EUROCONTROL revised Convention [Ref. 5].

1.2.2 Both the revised Convention and the SES aim to improve ANS performance. In 2000, Transport Ministers approved qualitative objectives in the ATM 2000+ Strategy [Ref. 6]. These objectives must be quantified and achieved. A European delay target is already adopted and being met.

1.2.3 Air Navigation Services in Europe are provided by a network of ANS providers designated by States. It is important to ensure that the performance of this network is close to optimal. This report develops conclusions towards an adequate mix of legal instruments, especially SES implementation measures, and co-operative arrangements, in particular through EUROCONTROL, so that ANS performance effectively improves in this new legislative and institutional framework.

1.2.4 Performance Review is an important element in this direction. Its role is confirmed and reinforced in the SES.

1.3 Implementation Status of past recommendations

1.3.1 At its 17th Session (July 2003), the Provisional Council “asked the PRC to track the follow-up of the implementation of its [the PRC’s] recommendations, and report the results systematically to the Provisional Council”. This section summarises progress in this respect. Annex I contains a detailed list of the PRC recommendations made to date, corresponding decisions, and PRC commentary.

1.3.2 In conformity with its mandate, the PRC has been seeking to define relevant performance parameters, to ensure access to essential data, to analyse it, to propose performance targets, and to review progress over time. It also compares performance across providers to determine and foster best practices where appropriate. • Safety: Although some States collect and use safety data very effectively, this

remains the exception. Despite the SRC's best endeavours, data at the European level are still inadequate, no meaningful conclusions can be made on the safety of the ATM system as a whole, and it has not been possible to set a target. PRR 7 proposes that enforcement measures are necessary in this vital area.

• Capacity & Delays: From the outset, high-quality data were available which enabled a European delay target and associated capacity plans to be developed. Consequently, efforts could be focused on the most important issues and delays brought under control. This shows what concerted European action can achieve.

• Cost-effectiveness: Adequate data are becoming available as a result of the adoption of Information Disclosure requirements. PRR 7 presents proposals towards a European cost-effectiveness target.

• Other KPAs: Further work is underway on Flight-efficiency. Work on other KPAs will follow.

1.3.3 The PRC’s comments on the implementation of its previous recommendations given in Annex I are summarised in Figure 9.


PRC summary comment on the implementation of its recommendations

Capacity & Delays Adoption of the ECAC delay target in 2001 and the active involvement of ANSPs and the Agency in related capacity management programmes resulted in ambitious targets being set and met. Capacity should continue to be managed so as to avoid recurrence of high delays.

Airspace Progress has been made in airspace matters. The PRC, therefore, has made no recommendations on this subject since 2000. Nevertheless, progress in top down airspace design has been slow. Airspace design and implementation of Reduced Vertical Separation (RVSM) played a significant role in the recent capacity and delay improvements. A civil-military action plan is being developed, but implementation of Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) is incomplete and behind schedule in a number of States. A plan for the dynamic management of airspace has started. However, the airspace situation is still not optimal.

Safety Implementation of PC decisions relating to safety is not satisfactory. The lack of commitment by States and ANSPs to the implementation of ESARRs indicates that some form of enforcement may be needed. Despite numerous decisions, safety data collected from States still do not allow meaningful conclusions to be derived at European level in terms of actual safety achievement and trends (SRC Conclusion). Systematic detection of all safety occurrences is implemented in a few ANSPs only. The non-punitive environment prerequisite is fulfilled in a few States only. Adoption of the Directive 2003/42/EC is expected to improve both occurrence reporting and a non-punitive environment when transposed into national laws. Only part of ESARR 2 has been transposed into the Directive.

ATM The EUROCONTROL Agency tracks the implementation of Convergence and Implementation Plans (ECIP, LCIP). The accountability of all parties concerned (States, ANSPs, Airports and Agency) for obtaining overall ATM system performance enhancements that result from EUROCONTROL programmes still needs to be clarified. Implementation of the EU Single European Sky regulation on interoperability is expected to improve the situation.

ATM Governance The Provisional Council has noted the PRC’s five ATM governance principles, which are crucial for improving European ATM performance. However, these principles have not been implemented widely.

EUROCONTROL Route Charges System

There has been no independent review of charging principles. The enlarged Committee has been entrusted to implement PC decisions related to the Route Charges System.

Economic Performance Adoption of Information Disclosure requirements and the active participation of ANSPs have resulted in suitable data becoming available, in a better understanding of ATM cost-effectiveness and the yearly publication of ATM cost-effectiveness reports (ACE). There remains however much to be done to improve the economic performance.

ATFM The ATFCM Strategy satisfactorily addresses PRC recommendations towards more tactical ATFM. However, the speed and degree of implementation could vary, depending on the commitment of stakeholders and States. This seems to be a major risk to the ATFCM Strategy.

US/Europe Cost-effectiveness Comparison ANSPs have participated actively in benchmarking projects undertaken by the PRC. This resulted in substantial progress not only for performance review, but also for performance management, user consultations and social dialogue, and has shown that there is considerable room to improve European productivity.

Figure 9: Implementation of PRC recommendations


PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

PRR 7 - Traffic 5

2 TRAFFIC

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 This chapter characterises the demand placed on the European ATM system in terms of IFR flights for General Air Traffic (GAT) in Europe. It also identifies traffic complexity and variability, which are known to influence ATM performance.

2.2 Traffic demand

2.2.1 After two years of decline, traffic in 2003 grew +2.8% on average (0.5% above the 2000 traffic level), as shown in Figure 10. Passenger demand for scheduled airlines in Europe grew slightly less (+2%1).

2.2.2 Traffic growth was interrupted in April and May, following the outbreak of the 2nd Iraq war and SARS (see Figure 10, right).

3%

-2%

2%5%

7%6%2%

6% 4% 6% 5%6%5% 3%4% 4%3% 4%3%3%

0%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010


2000 Forecast

2004 Forecast

source : EUROCONTROL

( before 1997, estimation based on Euro 88 traffic variation)

Traffic


0% 1% 2%3% 3% 3% 3%6% 6% 4% 2%2%

18

19

20

2122

23

24

25

26

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May Jun

Jul

Aug Sep Oct

Nov

Dec

2003/2002 2000 20012002 2003


thousands daily f lights

Figure 10: Yearly, monthly traffic variations

0 %

1 %

2 %

3 %

4 %

5 %

6 %

7 %

Jan-91

Jul-91

Jan-92

Jul-92

Jan-93

Jul-93

Jan-94

Jul-94

Jan-95

Jul-95

Jan-96

Jul- 96

Jan -97

Jul- 97

Jan -98

Jul- 98

Jan -99

Jul- 99

Jan -00

Jul- 00

Jan-01

Jul-01

Jan-02

Jul-02

Jan-03

© Eurocontrol 2003/STATFORGrowth of Low-Cost Carriers in the CRCO88 region

proportion of all IFR flights

2.2.3 Traffic growth is expected to resume at 3-4% per annum from 2004 onwards, albeit at levels some 15% below those forecast in 2000.

2.2.4 There were 75% more flights by “low-cost” carriers in Jan-August 2003 than in the same period in 20022 (see Figure 11). The share of the “low-cost” carrier segment, although relatively small, is growing fast. This trend is likely to continue, as “low-cost” carriers have placed major aircraft orders.

Figure 11: Growth of “low-cost” carriers

1 Traffic measured in Revenue Passenger Kilometres, source IATA 2 Source: EUROCONTROL/STATFOR/Doc 43

PRR 7 - Traffic 6

2.2.5 This growth is likely to change traffic patterns, and therefore traffic demand in specific ACCs and sectors. There are, as yet, no visible changes in the average weight factor.

2.2.6 Key traffic indicators are given in Figure 12 below.

Year 2003 Actual Variation 2002/2003

Forecast Index 100 in 1990

IFR flights3 8.47M +2.8% +2.2% 160 IFR flight hours4 11.7M +3.3% N/A N/A Distance flown5 (Km) 6 581M +4.4% N/A 1846 Total Service units5 85.0 M +4.9% N/A 188 6

Data source: EUROCONTROL/CFMU&CRCO

Figure 12: Key traffic indicators

2.2.7 Traffic variations 2002/2003 are contrasted, as shown in Figure 13.

YER

LVOVKIEV KHAR

ODESSIMF

RIGA

TALL

VIL

-42%

CAN

LIS

SEV

MAD

BCN

BORD

BRSTREMS

MAASLON

WARS

BRAT

BUDP

BUCST

PRAG

VIENPAR

AIX

ROM BRIN

ATH

IST

VARSOF

ZAGPAD LJUB

MIL

GENZUR

MUN

KARLBERL

ANK

NIC

MAK

MALT

SHA

SCOT

STAVTAMP

OSLO

MLMOCOPN

STOK

TRON

BODOROV

SUND

TIR

SKO

KISH

+26%

+17%

+13%

+9%

+11%

+11%

+7%

+7%

+11%

+11%

+9%

+8% +7%

+7%

+7%

+6%

+6%

+6%

+5%

+5%

+5%

+5%+5%

+5%

+4%

+4%

+4%

+4%+3%

+3%

+3%

+3%

+2%

+2%

+2%

+2%

+1%

+1%

+0%

+0%

+0%

+3%

-1%

-2%

-3%

-2%

-2%-4%

-5% -10%

-72%

+9%

Lower Airspace

-2%

-2%

-1%

+0%

+0%

+1%

+4%

PAL

BORD

MAN

DUB

LON

BRST PAR

BRU

AMST

DUSS

BREM

BERL

COPN

FRANK

MUN

GENAIX

ZUR VIENREMS

MIL PAD

+16%

cipa7.cdr29.10.98

Traffic variation 2003 vs 2002

Increase between 5 and 10%Increase between 0-5%

EUROCONTROL

+0%

Figure 13: Traffic variations 2003 vs. 20027

2.3 Traffic complexity

2.3.1 Traffic complexity is generally considered to influence ATM performance. Interpretation of performance metrics in this report needs therefore to take account of traffic complexity. It is relevant to measure complexity in order to determine to what extent differences in performance metrics across ANSPs can be explained by different complexity conditions. Preliminary results using econometric techniques are given in section 6.4.

2.3.2 While no single composite traffic complexity indicator exists at this stage, several traffic-related factors have been identified as influencing traffic complexity. Detailed definitions for these indicators can be found in the EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre’s Note 20/03 [Ref. 7] and values for year 2001 in section 7.3 of the ACE 2001 report [Ref. 8].

3 CFMU Area (see glossary). 4 EUROCONTROL Member States (see glossary). 5 States participating in the Route Charges System in 2003, excluding Santa Maria (see glossary). 6 States participating in the Route Charges System in 1988 (see glossary). 7 Traffic growth in Norway is distorted by the addition of helicopter flights.

PRR 7 - Traffic 7

• Traffic density. The “adjusted density” indicator measures traffic density corrected by a concentration index. It accounts for concentration of traffic in some parts of the airspace due, for example, to temporary segregated areas. Figure 14 shows a density map with main traffic patterns.

• Conflict density. Conflicts influence controller workload and traffic complexity. The “proximate pairs” indicator was found to be correlated with “adjusted density”. The latter is therefore used, as it is simpler to measure.

• Vertical movement. Vertical movements contribute to controller workload and influence traffic complexity. Average vertical movement ranges from 3% of the standard descent rate (300ft/NM) in Sofia to 103% in Düsseldorf.

Figure 14: Density map

2.3.3 The PRC will further develop complexity indicators in close liaison with interested parties.

2.4 Traffic variability

2.4.1 Traffic variability was demonstrated to influence ATM performance in a recent US-Europe ACC comparison [Ref. 9]. Basically, three types of traffic variability can be considered: • Hourly traffic variability; • Within-week traffic variability; • Seasonal traffic variability.

2.4.2 Traffic variability (see Figure 15) can be a significant source of allocative inefficiency if resources are not managed adequately.

PRR 7 - Traffic 8

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

180%

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52w eek

Palma

Athinai

Barcelona

Reims

Stockholm

Maastricht


variation from average w eek

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT SUNday

Palma

AthinaiBarcelona

Reims

Stockholm

Maastricht


variation from average summer day

Figure 15: Seasonal and within week traffic variation

2.4.3 Figure 16 shows seasonal traffic variability measured as the ratio of traffic in the peak week to the weekly average traffic.

Peak week vs Average week

cipa7.cdr29.10.98

[+31 to +40%]

[+21 to +30%]

Figure 16: Seasonal Traffic variation

2.5 Conclusions

2.5.1 After two years of decline, traffic in 2003 grew +2.8% on average (0.5% above the 2000 traffic level). This resulted from a contrasted situation across Europe.

2.5.2 Traffic growth is forecast to resume at an estimated 3-4% per annum (GAT IFR flights). The “low-cost” air carrier segment is increasing rapidly.

2.5.3 The PRC worked with interested parties to define and measure traffic complexity indicators. It will continue its efforts in this direction, in order to determine with confidence to what extent observed differences in performance metrics across ANSPs or ACCs originate from differences in traffic complexity and variability conditions.

PRR 7 - Safety 9

3 SAFETY

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Many steps were taken in 2003 towards improving ATM safety. Principal among these were: • the adoption of the EUROCONTROL Strategic Safety Action Plan, which stemmed

from the High-Level Action Group for ATM Safety (AGAS) [Ref. 10]; • the adoption of the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions; • the adoption of the European Directive on Occurrence Reporting in Civil Aviation

(2003/42/EC) [Ref. 11]; • the mandatory application of ESARR 3 (Use of Safety Management Systems by

ATM Service Providers) from July 2003 [Ref. 12].

3.1.2 The PRC welcomes these steps. There remain, however, a number of shortcomings in safety regulation, safety management, and performance review: • Inadequate safety occurrence data and absence of a Key Performance Indicator for

European ATM Safety. • European Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) are being implemented late

and/or partially in many States. • There are wide variations in safety management systems and resources in ANSPs,

ranging from very good to inadequate. • Contrary to aircraft operations, there is no established process whereby ANSPs share

safety-related information and experience at least within Europe. • Both the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) and the PRC do not have access to

adequate information to carry out their Performance review duties as far as safety is concerned.

3.1.3 This chapter concentrates on these five issues. Readers may refer to documents published by the EUROCONTROL Agency [Ref. 10] and the SRC [Ref. 13] for details on regulation, management and performance of safety at European level.

3.2 Key Performance Indicator for ATM Safety

3.2.1 Some ANSPs publish safety indicators in their annual reports, and even on a monthly basis8. The SRC also publishes numerous ECAC-wide data. However, despite repeated PRC recommendations and Provisional Council decisions (see “Safety” in Annex I), there is still no Europe-wide key safety performance indicator.

3.2.2 The absence of a safety Key Performance Indicator has several drawbacks: • it is not clear whether ATM safety as a whole is improving or deteriorating in Europe,

and performance review is hampered;

8 E.g. UK NATS

PRR 7 - Safety 10

• one cannot check if the safety objective9 agreed by Transport Ministers as part of the ATM 2000+ strategy is being fully met;

• the absence of a key safety indicator impedes safety management; • it is essential to verify that safety is maintained or increased when improving

performance in other Key Performance Areas (see chapter 8). This cannot be done in the absence of a safety key performance indicator.

3.2.3 A Key performance indicator for European ATM safety should therefore be developed as a matter of urgency.

3.3 Safety regulation ESARR 2 (REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OCCURRENCES IN ATM)

3.3.1 ESARR 2 requires Member States to implement national reporting and assessment schemes, and to submit annual reports to EUROCONTROL on national safety occurrences.

3.3.2 All phases of ESARR 2 became applicable to EUROCONTROL Member States from 1 January 2002. However, according to their own declarations, several States had not complied with this fundamental requirement one year after the deadline, as shown in Figure 17. Furthermore, the ESARR Implementation Monitoring and Support Programme has found that actual implementation is sometimes even less advanced.

18

3030

12

2324

2827

20

13

687

5

17

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1/1/1999 1/1/2000 1/1/2001 1/1/2002 1/1/2003

Phase 1Phase 2Phase 3

Due

DueDue

31 EUROCONTROL Member States

Data source : SRC

ESARR 2 Phases Phase 1: Due by 1 Jan 2000 Reporting of accidents and incidents-near collisions Phase 2: Due by 1 Jan 2001 Reporting of incidents with a potential to become collisions or near collision. Phase 3: Due by 1 Jan 2002. Reporting of ATM specific occurrences having an impact on the ability to provide safe ATM

Figure 17: Implementation status of ESARR 2 as reported by States

3.3.3 It is important to ensure that safety regulations are implemented: • Publication of the list of non-compliant States by the SRC in November 2004 will be

a first step in this direction. • Transposition of Directive 2003/42/EC [Ref. 11] will make requirements concerning

occurrence reporting enforceable from July 2005 in the European Economic Area (EEA)10 and Switzerland. However, some requirements contained in ESARR 2 are not covered, and transposition into national legislation may be late, incomplete or even non-existent in EUROCONTROL States not bound by European Union (EU) legislation.

9 ATM 2000+ safety objective: “to improve safety levels by ensuring that the number of ATM-induced

accidents and serious or risk-bearing incidents do not increase and, where possible, decrease.” 10 See glossary

PRR 7 - Safety 11

ESARR 3 (USE OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BY ATM SERVICE PROVIDERS)

3.3.4 ESARR 3 [Ref. 12] became mandatory for all EUROCONTROL Member States from July 2003. This is an important regulatory requirement to ensure implementation of safety management systems. It would appear, however, that not many ANSPs have devoted the necessary effort and resources to implementing ESARR 3. It should be transposed into EU legislation as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 4 of the SES “Service provision” regulation [Ref. 2].

SAFETY REGULATION RESOURCES

3.3.5 Surveys conducted by the PRC in 2002 [Ref. 14], by the EUROCONTROL Agency and by the SRC [Ref. 13] in 2003 all conclude that many States have inadequate resources allocated to safety regulatory functions. There is a need for strong safety regulation, and hence for adequate resources.

3.3.6 However, safety regulation must be effective, efficient and coherent among Member States. Both effectiveness and efficiency would imply a minimum size for the regulator. Coherence implies that regulation is based on common regulatory principles.

3.3.7 Undertaking ATM safety regulation at regional level may strike the right balance between the need for coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, while retaining an understanding of individual issues. This would have to be done within a common European regulatory framework.

3.4 Safety management

3.4.1 A survey conducted in 2002-2003 on behalf of the EUROCONTROL Agency examined the level of maturity of safety management systems in most ECAC States. The survey was based on assessments by national regulators and service providers. There are wide variations in the maturity of safety management systems as observed in January 2003, ranging from very good to inadequate (see Figure 18). In some cases, there is a substantial difference between the self-assessment of the Regulator and that of the ANSP.

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

States

Mat

urity

Sco

re

ANSPRegulator

Comparison of Self Assessment Maturity Scores from ANSPs and regulators

Mature Arrangements

Early Stages of Implementation


Figure 18: Implementation of safety management systems in ECAC (2002)

3.4.2 These findings confirm information in the PRC safety survey published in 2002 [Ref. 14]. Results of the ESARR Implementation Monitoring and Support Programme would indicate that resources devoted to safety management in ANSPs are often inadequate.

PRR 7 - Safety 12

Obviously, an effective safety management system requires dedicated resources and strong managerial commitment.

3.4.3 Maturity of safety management systems is high or very high in a few ANSPs, typically those above the green line in Figure 18. Identification and spreading of best practices, especially for ANSPs below the red line, could bring about major improvements. European facilitation programmes should be reinforced.

3.5 Safety occurrence assessment and reporting by ANSPs

3.5.1 The SRC’s annual report [Ref. 13] shows an increase in the number of safety occurrence reports. However, only a fraction of all occurrences are reported11. Of this fraction, only part is investigated (14% in 2002, down from 18% in 200112). Furthermore, incident reporting is often inconsistent year on year. Any conclusions drawn from the present incident reporting system are therefore likely to be unreliable.

3.5.2 This situation is detrimental to safety management and performance improvement. If incidents are not analysed, then safety issues are not known precisely and effective accident prevention measures cannot be taken.

3.5.3 The PRC’s safety survey found two issues which contribute to this poor reporting rate: • Legal impediments to occurrence reporting exist in many States; • A “punitive” ATM culture exists in many, but not all States. This prevents safety

occurrence reporting for fear of being blamed or punished.

3.5.4 The adoption of Directive 2003/42/EC [Ref. 11] on occurrence reporting and its transposition into national laws will help remove legal impediments. However, further EU legislation may be required.

3.5.5 Once legal impediments are to a large extent removed, major improvements in safety occurrence reporting and assessment can be expected, provided best practices are spread throughout Europe and a non-punitive culture is established in every State. The EUROCONTROL Agency has an assistance and facilitation role to play here.

3.5.6 This expectation of major progress is based on experience in some States/ANSPs, where all safety occurrences are automatically screened, analysed and acted upon in a non-punitive environment (e.g. Denmark, France, Germany, Maastricht UAC, Slovakia, United Kingdom). Resource requirements are found to be commensurate with safety benefits in those ANSPs. Associated tools and processes are being developed and standardised by EUROCONTROL under the project “Automated Safety Data Gathering” (ASDG).

3.6 Safety information sharing

3.6.1 There is considerable value in sharing lessons learnt from accidents and incidents among ANSPs, regulators and airspace users. The eleventh Air Navigation Conference of ICAO (September 2003) “encouraged States to share information on ATM accidents and incidents”13.

3.6.2 The Directive 2003/42/EC [Ref. 11] sets the legal grounds for mandatory reporting, storage, exchange and dissemination of ATM safety information, based on confidentiality

11 As can be seen from experience in ANSPs who systematically examine all losses of separation

detected by automated tools. 12 Source: SRC annual report 2003. 13 ANCONF 11, recommendation 2/3

PRR 7 - Safety 13

and a no-blame culture. This should be implemented and enforced where necessary in the interests of safety.

3.6.3 Moreover, all detected and/or reported safety occurrences should be analysed and the causes, conclusions and lessons learnt should be shared within the ANS community. ESARR2 requirements concerning the derivation of safety recommendations and corrective actions should be met.

3.6.4 Furthermore, both the SRC and the PRC do not have access to adequate safety information to perform their performance review duties. Relevant safety reports and information should be available to the SRC, the PRC and the EUROCONTROL Agency.

3.6.5 SES implementing rules should include requirements for Information on safety occurrences and their assessment, to be made available at European level, in particular to the PRC, and for sharing of information and lessons learnt amongst the aviation community

3.7 Conclusions

3.7.1 Many steps were taken in 2003 towards improving ATM safety. There remain, however, a number of shortcomings in regulation, management, and performance review of ATM safety.

3.7.2 Although a system of safety performance indicators was defined by the SRC, a Key Performance Indicator for European ATM Safety does not exist yet, and should be developed as a matter of urgency. Until then, it is not possible to accurately determine the level of safety in Europe.

3.7.3 EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) are implemented late and/or partially in many States. Implementation of ESARR 2 should be enforced through transposition of Directive 2003/42/EC, which is due by July 2005. This directive should be complemented by SES implementing measures specifying reporting requirements, building on ESARR 2.

3.7.4 Undertaking ATM safety regulation at regional level may strike the right balance between the needs for coherence, efficiency and effectiveness, while retaining an understanding of individual issues. This would have to be done within a common European regulatory framework.

3.7.5 Safety management and resources are often inadequate in ANSPs. European facilitation programmes are needed to raise the maturity of safety management to best practice levels.

3.7.6 A non-punitive environment is a prerequisite for improvements in safety management. Transposition of Directive 2003/42/EC will, to a large extent, remove legal impediments to occurrence reporting.

3.7.7 Incident reporting systems rely on a small and variable number of human incident reports, which is not always adequate. This situation impedes safety management and performance improvement. Automated Safety Data Gathering (ASDG) should be implemented as soon as practicable.

3.7.8 There is considerable value in sharing lessons learnt from accidents and incidents. Furthermore, neither the SRC nor the PRC have access to adequate safety information to perform their performance review duties. SES implementing rules should make provision for safety information sharing and disclosure. EUROCONTROL and the European Commission should facilitate this information sharing.

PRR 7 - Safety 14

3.7.9 In summary, SES implementing rules should include requirements for: • Information on safety occurrences and their assessment, to be made available at

European level, in particular to the PRC; • Sharing of information and lessons learnt amongst the aviation community;

PRR 7 - Capacity & Delays 15

4 CAPACITY AND DELAYS

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 This chapter examines ATM capacity and delays as follows: • ATM delays in the wider context of air transport delays in section 4.2 (measuring

delays in relation to time tables); • Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) delays in section 4.3, with more details on

delays arising from en-route flow restrictions in section 4.4, and from airport restrictions in chapter 5 (measuring delays in relation to flight plans);

• Cost of delays to airspace users in section 4.5; • Capacity-demand balancing in section 4.6; • ATFM performance in section 4.7.

4.2 Air Transport delays

4.2.1 Punctuality, i.e. adherence to the published timetable, is important to passengers14, airlines and airports15. Figure 19 (left) shows the steady improvement of air transport punctuality in recent years. The decrease in ATM-related delays (ATFM) both in absolute terms and in proportion (Figure 19, right) contributed significantly to this improvement.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

2000 2001 2002 2003

% o

f flig

hts

with

arr

ival

del

ay >

15

min

Data source : EUROCONTROL/CODA & AEA

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Prop

ortio

n of

prim

ary

dela

y

ATFM Security Airline Airport Weather

Data source: EUROCONTROL/CODA & AEA

Figure 19: Air transport punctuality and primary delay causes

4.2.2 EUROCONTROL’s Central Office of Delay Analysis (CODA) has started to provide information on delays in different phases of flight16. The PRC needs to develop an understanding before such information is used for performance review purposes.

14 Reliance on schedules, avoidance of personal and/or professional inconvenience arising from delayed

flights. 15 Maintaining schedules is a key product of airlines and airports. 16 Updated information can be found on the CODA web site: http://www.eurocontrol.int/eCoda/portal/.

25 airlines provided “OOOI” information (see glossary) in December 2003, which satisfies earlier PRC recommendations (see Annex I, items 30 and 35).


4.3 ATFM delays

4.3.1 The remainder of this chapter focuses on ATM delays, and more specifically on ATFM delays. Unless noted otherwise, all information is based on CFMU data. ATFM delays are imposed on a flight before departure due to flow restrictions (ground regulations) requested by en-route centres (en-route ATFM delays) or by the origin/destination airport (airport ATFM delays). ATFM delays are allocated according to the point of congestion. However, irrespective of where the ATFM delay originates, its impact is felt at departure.

4.3.2 As shown in Figure 20, en-route ATM-related delays have significantly improved in summer 200317 (1.2 min/flight, -35%), met the agreed target (2.1 min/flight), and nearly reached the medium term optimum delay target (1 min/flight), with traffic growing +2.2%. This is a major achievement, the credit for which is to be attributed to co-operation between EUROCONTROL and ANSPs regarding capacity and flow management.

2.9

4.1

5.5

3.63.1

1.81.2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

En-route ATFM delay

En-route target

En-route optimum



Summer

minutes per f light

Airport ATFM delay


Figure 20: ATFM delays and target (Summer)

4.3.3 Airport ATFM delays increased in proportion (46% of all ATFM delays in 2003), and have not improved significantly in absolute value since 1997 (see Figure 20).

4.3.4 The distribution of ATFM delay duration continued to improve for en-route but not for airports, as shown in Figure 21. Only 0.3% of flights suffered ATFM delays higher than 60 minutes, but these represented ~9% of en-route delays, and ~18% of airport delays.

0

1

2

3

4

5

1-15min 16-30 min 31-45 min 46-60 min >60 mindelay duration

2002 2003million minutes of en-route delay


0

1

2

3

4

5

1-15min 16-30 min 31-45 min 46-60 min >60 mindelay duration

2002 2003million minutes of airport delay

source : EUROCONTROL Figure 21: ATFM delay distribution (2003)

17 Focus is on summer as the delay target is set for the summer period.


4.3.5 Figure 22 shows key European traffic and delay data. Detailed information can be found in the ATFM summary 2003 [Ref. 15].

FULL YEAR

Year

Average Daily Traffic

Traffic Volume (km)

index*

ATFM delays > 15min

Total ATFM delays (min)

Total ATFM delays index

Enroute ATFM delays

(min)

Airport ATFM delays

(min)

Enroute (min/flight)

Total delay (min/flight)

Target total (min/flight)

1997 19 662 100 7% 20.9M 100 15.5M 5.4M 2.9 3.7 None1998 20 685 107 9% 27.4M 131 21.6M 5.7M 4.1 5.0 3.51999 22 062 116 12% 43.3M 207 36.3M 7.0M 5.5 6.3 None2000 23 068 122 9% 31.8M 152 24.4M 7.4M 3.6 4.5 3.52001 22 995 123 8% 27.6M 132 20.8M 6.8M 3.1 3.9 3.52002 22 567 121 6% 18.0M 86 11.9M 6.0M 1.8 2.5 3.22003 23 197 126 4% 14.8M 71 8.0M 6.8M 1.2 1.8 2.8

*For States participating in the EUROCONTROL Route Charges System in 1997

SUMMER

Average ATFM Delay per FlightATFM delaysTraffic

Data source: EUROCONTROL/CFMU,CRCO

Figure 22: Key European traffic and delay data

4.4 En-route ATFM delays REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 23: Proportion of summer en-route ATFM delays in European regions

4.4.1 Figure 23 shows a breakdown of en-route ATFM delays by “European regions18” in summer 2003. For the first time in four years, there were no major critical delay areas. London had been the most critical area in 2002 (50%), and “Area North”19 and “Area South” in 2000-2001. Suboptimum performance in one region is sufficient to miss the European delay target.

18 “European regions” are defined by the PRC for analysis purposes only 19 See definition in glossary


4.4.2 Figure 24 shows that delay improvements in 2003 are mostly linked to major improvements in London20. Delays in the rest of Europe (i.e. excluding London) increased by 11% (there was no major increase of delay if French strikes are excluded) with traffic growth of +2.2% in summer.

0

1

2

3

4

5Ar

ea N

orth

Lond

on

Area

Sout

h

Fran

ceW

est

Ger

man

yEa

st&L

ow

Paris

Iber

ian

CEA

TS

Oth

ers

Region

Summer 2000

Summer 2001

Summer 2002

Summer 2003

million minutes of en-route delay

souce : EUROCONTROL

Figure 24: Variation of summer en-route ATFM delays

4.4.3 This achievement results from a contrasted performance across the rest of Europe. Delays (Summer 2003) improved markedly in the Iberian Peninsula (-65%), Greece (-86%), “Central Mediterranean” (-65%) and North Europe (-45%). There were some notable increases in delay in “Paris” (+82%), “France West” (+126%) and “CEATS” (+124%).

ACC LEVEL

4.4.4 As can be seen in Figure 25 (left), ten ACCs exceeded 0.3 minute of ATFM en-route delay per flight, a value which corresponds to an even share of the en-route optimum delay.

0.0

0.3

0.6

0.9

1.2

Zuric

hBo

rdea

u xLo

ndo n

AC

CR

e im

sD

u sse

l do r

fM

a ast

richt

Prah

aM

i l ano

Pari s

Brat

i sla

vaPa

d ova

Ge n

eva

Mar

seil le

AC

CM

a dri d

Bres

t

min

utes

per

flig

ht

Summer en-route delay per f light


0

50

100

150

Zuric

hBo

rdea

uxLo

ndon

AC

CR

e im

sD

usse

l dor

fM

aast

r i cht

Pra h

aM

il ano

P ari s

B ra t

i sl a

vaPa

dova

Gen

eva

Mar

s eil le

AC

CM

adrid

B re s

t

Nb of days w ith enroute delay > 1 min in 2003


Figure 25: Highest ATFM delays (summer 2003)

4.4.5 There is a close relationship between the average delay per minute and the number of days that an ACC caused an average delay per flight higher than 1 minute. It seems that the number of days with en-route delay higher than 1 minute per flight is a robust and simple indicator to manage performance at ACC level.

20 From 2001 to 2003, traffic in London ACC increased by 2% and delays decreased by 51%.


SIGNIFICANT DELAY VARIATIONS AT ACC LEVEL

4.4.6 Figure 26 shows significant delay variations at ACC level21.

SUMMER Traffic (‘000)

Traffic variation

En-route delay variation

(‘000 minutes)

Avg. en-route delay per flight (minutes)

2003 2003/2002 2003-2002 2002 2003 London 951 2% -2 760 4.0 1.1 Zurich 369 -3% -242 1.9 1.3

Madrid 430 3% -110 0.5 0.3 Athens 240 3% -95 0.5 0.1

Barcelona 360 7% -93 0.3 0.1 Frankfurt 443 -3% -75 0.4 0.2 Bordeaux 395 1% +226 0.5 1.1

Düsseldorf 248 -1% +200 0.2 1.0 Paris 605 1% +154 0.3 0.6

Reims 401 4% +147 0.7 1.0 Padua 319 8% +94 0.2 0.5 Praha 249 17% +84 0.3 0.6 Milan 322 4% +76 0.4 0.6

Bratislava 142 10% +73 0.0 0.5 Data source: EUROCONTROL/PRU

Figure 26: ACCs with significant changes in delay (summer 2002-2003)

4.4.7 Major improvements in London can mainly be attributed to: • Recovery from temporary disruptions due to transfer to new location and system in

2002; • Transfer of blocks of airspace from London ACC to Manchester and Scottish ACCs; • Better airspace utilisation in the North Sea area due to a new airspace structure and

route classification.

4.4.8 Praha, Padua and Bratislava ACCs absorbed high traffic increases with relatively small delay increases, which are noteworthy achievements. Delays in Düsseldorf were linked to its consolidation into Frankfurt ACC in December 2002.

4.4.9 ATC strikes in France from April to June (some 10 days in total) caused 430 000 minutes of delay22 and at least 19 000 flight cancellations23 in Europe.

OUTSTANDING ISSUE

4.4.10 Many structural capacity issues have been addressed in 2003. However, Figure 27 shows that nearly half of en-route ATFM delays occurred in combined24 sectors in 200325. This tends to indicates that the availability and allocation of ATCO resources are still not optimal.

21 Selection criteria: highest absolute en-route delay variation from 2002 to 2003. 22 Corresponding delay costs can be estimated at some €25M. 23 The interval of confidence is ± 15%. 24 Elementary sectors are normally combined when traffic is low. However, it is also used when there

are insufficient ATCOs to open all elementary sectors. 25 The comparison is made between 2001 and 2003, because the UK situation in 2002 creates an

unusually high contribution of combined sectors to total ATFM En-route delay.


0

1

2

3

4

5

Summer 2001 Summer 2003

Elementary Sectors

Combined Sectors


Top 25 most penalising en-route delay sectors

million minutes of en-route delay

Figure 27: ATFM En-route delays due to combined and elementary sectors

4.5 Cost of delays

4.5.1 It is important to understand the economic implications of delays in deciding trade-offs with other Key Performance Areas, such as Cost-effectiveness and Flight-efficiency. The PRC has commissioned a study [Ref.16] to update, refine and complement existing delay cost estimates26 [Ref. 17].

4.5.2 The study provides refined estimates for delay costs and identifies the following main drivers: • Aircraft capacity (the more seats, the higher the cost of delay tends to be); • Delay duration (the longer the delay, the higher the marginal cost). The revised cost

estimate for ground delays longer than 15 minutes is €7127 per minute on average, including reactionary delays, but excluding any “strategic” costs linked to schedule padding, etc.

• Phase of flight (Airborne delays are more expensive than ground delays); • Time of day (delays in the morning tend to propagate as reactionary delays for a

longer period).

4.5.3 Figure 28 shows revised estimates of costs incurred by airspace users due to ATFM delays and associated reactionary delays, but excluding “strategic” costs arising from schedule padding. They are consistent with earlier estimates28.

ATFM Delays > 15 minutes Costs of ATFM delays

Year Total ATFM

Delays (Minutes) En route Airport Total En-route Airport Total

2001 27.6 M 16.2 M 5.7 M 21.9 M €1 150M €400M €1 550M 2002 18.0 M 9.0 M 4.9 M 13.9 M €650M €350M €1 000M 2003 14.8 M 5.7 M 5.5 M 11.2 M €400M €400M €800M

Figure 28: Estimated ATFM delay costs (including reactionary)

26 The cost of delays incurred by airlines arises from six main sources: fuel burnt, maintenance costs,

crew salaries and expenses, handling agent penalties, airport charges and the costs of passenger delays (compensation and rebooking, loss of revenue and market share).

27 The revised delay costs are computed for passenger flights, i.e. some 75% of all flights in Europe. The estimate cost of ground delay is €83 per minute on average for an aircraft of 140 seats. In order to account for other traffic (freight, military and general aviation), an approximate figure of 15% is added, which reduces the average estimated cost of ground delay to €71 per minute.

28 PRR 6 indicated €700-1000M for en-route in 2002; new estimates are slightly lower (€650M).


4.6 Capacity/demand balancing

4.6.1 Since 1997, traffic volume (km) has increased by 26% and the en-route delay per flight in summer has decreased by 59%. This corresponds to a substantial increase in effective capacity29 of 46% in six years (6.5% per annum on average). Figure 29 shows that the gap between traffic and effective capacity has been reduced thanks to a combination of capacity increase and traffic downturn.

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

Effective Capacity

Traff ic volume (km)

Figure 29: Gap between demand and capacity

4.6.2 Considering that the gap between capacity and traffic has been almost closed, effective capacity now needs to grow at an annual rate consistent with EUROCONTROL traffic forecasts. This requires careful medium term capacity planning: • tailored to individual conditions (ANSP status, traffic forecast); • including flexibility to cope with unexpected events and forecast errors; • taking safety and cost-effectiveness objectives into account (see Chapter 7).

4.6.3 Increasing capacity does not necessarily imply new recruitment and investments: • The ACE 2001 Report [Ref. 8] tends to indicate that there are spare resources in

many parts of Europe, even in the core area. • Capacity could also be enhanced by improving flow management, airspace

management and interoperability [Ref. 9].

4.7 ATFM performance PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR ATFM

4.7.1 Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is meant to cap actual traffic below declared capacity without imposing unnecessary delays. ATFM performance can therefore be assessed using two indicators: over-deliveries (when actual traffic exceeds capacity) and unnecessary delays.

4.7.2 The principal ATFM measure applied in Europe is “ground regulations”, whereby aircraft are held on the ground and released according to a first-planned-first-served criterion for the most penalising regulation. This generates “ATFM delays”.

4.7.3 The PRC’s assessment of ATFM performance presently focuses on ground regulations. The intention is to extend analysis to other flow control measures, and to interactions between ATFM and airport performance.

29 See glossary


4.7.4 The indicator for over-delivery is measured as the proportion of regulated hours when actual demand exceeds 110% of declared capacity. This indicator reaches relatively high values, as shown in Figure 30 (left). As a consequence, ATC units generally understate their declared capacity in order to avoid overloads and preserve safety.

4.7.5 At the same time, a substantial proportion of delays are due to useless regulations when there is no excess demand, as shown in Figure 30 (right). Unnecessary ATFM delays due to lost slots and cancelled regulations should be added, but are excluded here as they are not measured precisely30.

% Regulated hours with actual Demand/Capacity > 110 %

10,8%10,0%

0%

2%

4%6%

8%

10%

12%

2002 2003source : EUROCONTROL/CFM U

% ATFM Delays due to useless regulations (no excess Demand)

6,9%

8,7%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2002 2003source : EUROCONTROL/CFM U

Figure 30: Over-deliveries and delays due to useless regulations

EFFECTIVENESS OF ATFM GROUND REGULATIONS

4.7.6 It is important to understand why European ATFM both exceeds and does not fully use capacity.

4.7.7 Ground regulations imposed when demand is close to capacity31 do not have much impact on actual traffic flow, and yet generate unnecessary delays, as illustrated in Figure 31. Ideally, actual demand should not exceed capacity (The red line should be at 0 for demand/capacity>100% on the left graph).

4.7.8 In fact, distributions of traffic before regulation (blue line) and after regulation (red line) are not very different in this case. Yet, 20% of flights delayed more than 30 minutes are due to such ATFM regulations. Moreover, 45% of flights are constrained by regulations shorter than the ATFM slot upper limit (10 minutes), as illustrated in the right part of Figure 31.

4.7.9 In summary, ground regulations appear to be ineffective in controlling flows when demand is close to declared capacity (demand/capacity<110%), yet cause significant delays and reduce aircraft/airport operator flexibility.

4.7.10 On the contrary, ground regulations are effective ATFM measures when demand significantly exceeds declared capacity (demand/capacity>120%), as shown in Figure 32, and need to be preserved for such cases.

4.7.11 More accurate flow control would allow capacity to be increased (without additional ATC resources, but with some additional ATFM resources), and unnecessary delays to be reduced, while preserving safety.

30 Values published in past reports included delays due to lost slots. 31 This corresponds to regulations generating less than 10 minutes of delay per flight on average.


0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150Demand/Capacity Ratio (%)

after ATFM regulation

before ATFM regulation

Traffic load before and after ATFM regulations

source : EUROCONTROL Summer 2003

(regulations with less than 10 min delay per f light on average)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Delay duration (minutes)

Slo t to lerance bo undary. ( -5 to +10 mins fro m allo cated slo t)

Distribution of flights delayed by regulations

source:EUROCONTROLSummer 2003

(regulat ions with less than 10 min delay per f light on average)

Figure 31: Ground regulations generating < 10 minutes of delay/flight

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150

Demand/Capacity Ratio (%)

after ATFM regulation

before ATFM regulation

Summer 2003 source : EUROCONTROL

Traffic load before and after ATFM regulations (regulat ions with more than 10 min delay per f light on average)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Delay duration (minutes)

Slo t to lerance bo undary. ( -5 to +10 mins fro m allo cated s lo t )

Distribution of flights delayed by regulations

source:EUROCONTROLSummer 2003

(regulat ions with more than 10 min delay per f light on average)

Figure 32: Ground regulations generating > 10 minutes of delay/flight

4.7.12 The marginal cost of capacity (additional ATFM resources) and delay benefits arising from more accurate flow management techniques would have to be compared with the marginal cost of capacity using traditional techniques32, in order to decide optimum ATFM/ATC strategies.

EVOLUTION OF FLOW MANAGEMENT

4.7.13 The European Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) function33 is progressively becoming more proactive and flexible in managing flows, using not only ground regulations, but also other flow measures, e.g. re-routing and level-capping. Co-operative Decision Making (CDM) is more and more applied to address en-route constraints. This would need to be complemented by more tactical ATFM measures, such as traffic sequencing by upstream ACCs, vectoring and holding at arrival. This would require more co-operation among ANSPs.

4.7.14 The ATFCM strategy already incorporates the concept of more tactical ATFM called for in the last PRR 6 [Ref. 18]. Research has started with operational trials being prepared

32 ATC resources are approximately proportional to capacity in the medium term 33 SES terminology (see ATFM definition in glossary)


under the “CAMES” project34. However, ATFM strategies would need to be refined and implementation should follow at an adequate pace when concepts are validated. The Central Flow Management Unit has a crucial role to play in developing ATFM strategies, in ensuring adequacy and consistency of flow measures and in minimising network effects across Europe.

ATFM REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

4.7.15 SES implementing rules should foster, and not impede, the evolution of ATFM towards more tactical and flexible flow management.

4.8 Conclusions

4.8.1 Improvements in air transport punctuality are to a significant extent linked with improvements in ATM-related delays.

4.8.2 ATM-related delays significantly decreased in summer 2003 (1.2 min/flight, -35%), met the agreed target (2.1 min/flight), and almost reached the medium term optimum delay target (1 min/flight). This is a major achievement, the credit for which is to be attributed to co-operation between the EUROCONTROL Agency and ANSPs regarding capacity and flow management.

4.8.3 This highlights the value of setting performance targets. It also shows that ambitious targets can be met under co-operative arrangements. Implementing rules of the Single European Sky should facilitate such co-operative arrangements.

4.8.4 Costs incurred by airspace users due to ATFM and associated reactionary delays are estimated at €400M for en-route delays in 2003, which is understood to be close to optimum, and at €400M for airport ATFM delays.

4.8.5 In order to preserve good performance in terms of delays, effective capacity needs to grow at an annual rate consistent with traffic forecasts. Capacity increases need to be carefully planned. They can arise from: • improved airspace management, • better use of existing resources (combined sectors deserve special attention) • more accurate flow management, • additional resources.

4.8.6 Ground regulations are ineffective in controlling flows when demand is close to capacity, and yet cause significant delays and reduce aircraft/airport operators’ flexibility. More accurate flow control would allow increased effective capacity and reduced unnecessary delays, while preserving safety.

4.8.7 More tactical ATFM measures need to complement ground regulations. Such measures are part of the ATFCM strategy, and are starting to be applied. Further research has begun under the “CAMES” project, and implementation should follow at an adequate pace. The Central Flow Management Unit has a crucial role to play in developing ATFM strategies and in ensuring adequacy and consistency of flow management measures.

4.8.8 SES implementing rules should facilitate, and not impede, the evolution of ATFM towards more tactical and flexible flow management.

34 CAMES involves Geneva, Milan, Rome, Marseille, Barcelona and Palma ACCs.

PRR 7 - ATFM delays at Airports 25

5 ATFM DELAYS AT AIRPORTS

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 In reviewing airport and terminal area performance issues, the PRC elected to focus first on airport ATFM delays. It is understood that this is only one facet of a complex issue.

5.1.2 Since 2000, airport ATFM delays have doubled in proportion (46% vs. 23% of all ATFM delays) and have not improved significantly in absolute value since 1997 (see Figure 20).

5.1.3 In the majority of cases (91% in 2003), ATFM airport regulations are applied to arrival traffic. The following chapter therefore concentrates on “arrival airport ATFM delays”.

5.1.4 It is important to understand that “arrival ATFM airport delays” are generated by the destination airport, but experienced at the departure airport. For instance, a flight from Paris-CDG to Frankfurt, which experiences an ATFM regulation because of capacity limitations at Frankfurt, will be held on the ground in Paris-CDG.

5.1.5 This chapter focuses on the top 8 delay generating airports shown in Figure 33. These 8 airports, which account for 19% of arrivals in Europe, generate 71% of all arrival airport ATFM delays and 31% of the total ATFM delay. A corresponding reactionary delay has to be added (i.e. a primary delay of 50 minutes could generate a reactionary delay of 40 minutes in next flight segments).

Frankfurt FRA

Paris CDGRome FCO

London LHR

Milan MXPZurich ZRH

Amsterdam AMSBarcelona BCN

Heraklion HERVienna VIE

Munich MUC

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 50 100 150 200 250 300Arrival Traffic (Thousand Flights)

Arr

ival

ATF

M A

irpor

t Del

ay (T

hous

and

Min

utes

)

Top 8 airports w ith most ATFM arrival delay

Airports w ith > 100 000 min of ATFM arrival delay


1 minute

Average arrival delay for arrival traff ic

2 minutes

3 minutes

4 minutes

Figure 33: Arrival airport ATFM delays


5.2 Analysis of arrival ATFM delays at top 8 airports

5.2.1 Analyses of delays were conducted for each of those eight airports, and validated with individual airports and ANS providers. Generic findings are as follows: • Each airport is a specific case and requires special analysis. • Weather is the predominant cause of airport ATFM delays (35%). Weather related

delays are addressed in more detail in section 5.3 below. • Outside weather events, most airports apply ATFM regulations nearly every day, as

shown in Figure 34. This point is further examined in section 5.4. • Airport ATFM delay causes are generally but not always correctly assigned35. All

involved parties (airport, aircraft operators and ANSP) should be aware of delay cause assignments and have an option to contest them.

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

Milan MXP Paris CDG Rome FCO BarcelonaBCN

FrankfurtFRA

Zurich ZRH London LHR AmsterdamAMS

% o

f day

s in

200

3

No regulation Weather OnlyWeather and Multiple Causes Aerodrome or ATC Delay CauseOther & Multiple Causes

source: EUROCONTROL

Figure 34: Breakdown of arrival ATFM delay causes36 (2003)

5.2.2 London Heathrow (LHR) and Amsterdam apply ATFM restrictions less than half of the time, outside bad weather. Six airports apply substantial ATFM restrictions for specific problems other than weather or special events: Milan MXP, Paris-CDG, Rome FCO, Barcelona, Frankfurt, and Zurich.

5.2.3 Milan MXP applies ground regulations every day, most of the time for causes other than weather. Furthermore, in 2003, 77% of “weather” ATFM regulations were cancelled before the planned time (see Figure 37), and 63% of “aerodrome non-ATC” ATFM regulations were cancelled. This appears to be a case of inappropriate use of ground regulations.

5.2.4 Paris CDG experienced staffing issues relating to ATCO resource utilisation and/or shortage in 2003. When this occurred, arrival capacity in Paris CDG was generally reduced by 10%, and up to 30% in some cases.

35 The distinction between ATC and airport causes is often inadequate. That is why these two causes are

presented together in Figure 34. 36 The “Multiple Causes” label relates to when more than one regulation is used on a particular day with

different delay causes. For example, for a day to be classified as “Weather and Multiple Causes” a weather-related regulation has occurred on that day as well as a regulation relating to either ATC, Aerodrome Capacity or Other cause.


5.2.5 In Rome FCO, ATC capacity is significantly lower than scheduled airport capacity, which indicates that co-ordination between the ANSP, airport, airlines and scheduling committee should be improved.

5.2.6 The only capacity constraint in Barcelona is wind, which forces the airport to use less than optimal runway configurations. The rest of the time, ATFM regulations are used to stream the traffic rather than to cope with capacity constraints. Opening of the second parallel runway in 2004 is expected to significantly increase airport capacity.

5.2.7 The actual arrival demand in Frankfurt seems to be frequently above the scheduled one. A specific working group is analysing the underlying causes and what remedial actions could be implemented.

5.2.8 The arrival throughput at Zurich is affected by noise regulations. So far, despite concerted efforts from Skyguide, it has not been possible to offset this by increasing ATC capacity. At some stage in the near future, Zurich airport may face a dilemma: either to reduce the co-ordinated traffic demand or to accept further worsening of the delay situation.

5.2.9 The identification of en-route bottlenecks has resulted in a rapid improvement. EUROCONTROL and concerned ANSPs should work in a similar way to improve airport ATFM delays at the most critical airports.

5.3 Managing flows in bad weather

5.3.1 In this report, the term “bad weather” indicates poor visibility37 or high winds which have the potential to reduce the capacity of the arrival runways.

5.3.2 Weather-related ATFM regulations lead to significant airport capacity reductions at some airports, much less so at others, as shown in Figure 35. It will be useful to determine and learn from best practices. Different flow management strategies may be required for such different capacity reductions.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

AmsterdamAMS

Paris CDG Rome FCO FrankfurtFRA

London LHR Milan MXP Zurich ZRH BarcelonaBCN

Arr

ival

Cap

acity

Declared peak hour arrival capacityWeighted average arrival capacity w hen regulatedMinimum arrival capacity w hen regulated

Data source: EUROCONTROL, ANSPs and Airpo rt A uthorities

Figure 35: Arrival capacity reductions in case of bad weather

5.3.3 Weather delays are typically longer than others (see Figure 36, right). Long delays are more costly to airlines (see section 4.5), and are most likely to generate additional reactionary delay.

37 In technical words arrival operations at CAT II approach or lower.


0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

01-0

5

06-1

0

11-1

5

16-2

0

21-2

5

26-3

0

31-3

5

36-4

0

41-4

5

46-5

0

51-5

5

56-6

0

> 60

Delay duration in minutes

% o

f del

ayed

flig

hts

Slot tolerance (-5 to +10 mins from allocated slot time)


ATC/airport causes (Paris-CDG)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

01-0

5

06-1

0

11-1

5

16-2

0

21-2

5

26-3

0

31-3

5

36-4

0

41-4

5

46-5

0

51-5

5

56-6

0

> 60

Delay duration in minutes

% o

f del

ayed

flig

hts

Slot tolerance (-5 to +10 mins f rom allocated slot time)


Weather causes (Amsterdam)

Figure 36: Distribution of arrival ATFM delays

5.3.4 When an airport is regulated due to bad weather, a large number of arrival regulations are cancelled before the planned end (typically 2 hours before), as shown in Figure 37. This raises the question of weather forecast accuracy and strategies to deal with uncertain weather.

0 h 1 h 2 h 3 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 7 h 8 h

Zurich ZRH

Rome FCO

Paris CDG

Milan MXP

London LHR

Frankfurt FRA

Barcelona BCN

Amsterdam AMS

Regulation duration

Average planned duration of regulationsAverage duration of cancelled regulations

source: EUROCONTROL

% of w eather regulations cancelled 29% 57% 36% 54% 77% 39% 51% 18%

Amsterdam Barcelona Frankfurt London LHR Milan MXP Paris CDG Rome FCO Zurich ZRH

Figure 37: Cancelled ATFM regulations due to weather

5.3.5 When ATFM regulations are cancelled at late notice: • Flights which are already airborne, or are close to their ATFM slot time, cannot avoid

delays; • The airport which was subject to ATFM regulation will not be able to use a

significant part of its capacity after the weather improves.

5.3.6 Weather related delays at major airports are local, but also network issues:


• Weather delays are longer and tend to propagate through reactionary delays throughout the network (see Figure 36).

• Weather is frequently bad at several airports on the same days, which compounds the issue. As shown in Figure 38, there are weather regulations at two or more of the top eight airports on 60% of days in the year.

Number of airports affected by weather

0 airport18%

1 airport23%

2 airports22%

3 airports18%

4 airports10%

>5 airports3%5 airports

6%

0102030405060708090

0 1 2 3 4 5 >5Number of airports

Number of days regulated


Figure 38: Airports among Top 8 regulated on the same day due to weather

5.3.7 Optimum flow management strategies will need to be developed for bad weather. Before this can be done, a number of questions will need to be addressed: • Could weather forecasts be better integrated into ATM decision-making? • Does ATM use up-to-date meteorological technology for weather forecasting? • Could airport weather forecasting be made more accurate, and if so, at what price? • What are the best options to deal with uncertain weather conditions? • What are the best CDM processes in deciding flow management measures?

5.4 Inappropriate use of ground regulations

5.4.1 Figure 34 shows a breakdown of ATFM restrictions applied during the year at the eight airports generating most ATFM delays. All but two (London Heathrow and Amsterdam) apply ATFM restrictions nearly every day. ATFM restrictions should in principle be applied only in exceptional circumstances where runway throughput is reduced, particularly due to weather. Section 4.7 has given evidence that ground regulations are effective only where demand is well above capacity. All eight airports being fully co-ordinated, demand should not significantly exceed capacity for extended periods. This is an indication of inappropriate use of ATFM regulations at those airports.

5.4.2 As shown in Figure 36 (left), 72% of flights arriving in Paris-CDG are delayed less than the ATFM slot tolerance (+10 minutes). Such delays have very little influence on demand, as demonstrated in section 4.7, yet cause some long delays and reduce aircraft operator and departure airport flexibility.

5.4.3 Airport scheduling complemented with vectoring/holdings appears to be an efficient strategy to maximise runway throughput and minimise ATFM delays. This strategy is applied at London-Heathrow, which handles the third highest traffic in Europe with only two runways, and in Amsterdam, which generates the lowest delay per flight among the eight airports, in spite of stringent environmental restrictions. This strategy however, entails airborne holdings. The optimum trade-off between ground and air holding has been found to be dependent on uncertainties in start and end times of capacity reduction [Ref. 19].


5.4.4 Flow control into airports must be very accurate in order to maximise runway utilisation, while avoiding delays and eventual safety hazards due to excess demand. Optimum strategies will need to be developed for flow control into airports, using a combination of airport scheduling, ground regulations, en-route flow control and vectoring/holding at arrival.

5.5 ATFM issues at Greek airports

5.5.1 There are specific airport ATFM delay problems in Greece. The opening of Athens-Spata in 2001 significantly improved the situation. However, other Greek airports38 caused 6% of all airport ATFM delays in 2003, which is disproportionate to their traffic. More than 11000 flights arriving in Greece (11% of arrivals excluding Athens) experienced more than 30 minutes on average of airport ATFM delay. Relevant factors are low runway and airport capacity (e.g. number of stands, passenger terminal, etc.), and high traffic variability.

5.5.2 Concerned parties should find solutions to high ATFM delays caused by Greek airports.

5.6 Conclusions

5.6.1 In reviewing airport and terminal area performance issues, the PRC elected to focus first on airport ATFM delays at the top eight delay-generating airports (Amsterdam, Barcelona, Frankfurt, London Heathrow, Milan MXP, Rome FCO, Paris CDG and Zurich), which together handle 19% of the traffic and generate 69% of all ATFM arrival airport delays. More work is clearly needed on airport issues and the PRC will contribute its share.

5.6.2 The mismatch between the regulated and available capacity under bad weather is often significant. More detailed analysis will be needed to develop optimum flow management strategies for use in bad weather. Before this can be done, there are a number of questions that will need to be addressed: • Could weather forecasts be better integrated into ATM decision-making? • Does ATM use up-to-date meteorological technology for weather forecasting? • Could airport weather forecasting be more accurate, and if so, at what price? • What are the best options to deal with uncertain weather conditions? • What are the best Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) processes in deciding flow

management measures?

5.6.3 When there is a slight excess in demand, tactical measures would appear to be best suited to regulate the demand. In such cases, ATFM ground regulations appear to have little influence on demand and yet cause unnecessary delays and reduce the flexibility of airlines/airport operations.

5.6.4 Flow control into airports must be very accurate in order to maximise runway utilisation, while avoiding delays and eventual safety hazards due to excess demand. Optimum strategies will need to be developed for flow control into airports, using a combination of airport scheduling, ground regulations, en-route flow control and vectoring/holding at arrival.

5.6.5 Concerned parties should find solutions to high ATFM delays caused by Greek airports.

38 Mainly Heraklion, Rhodes, Thessaloniki, Zakyntos, Chania and Kerkyra.

PRR 7 - Cost-effectiveness 31

6 COST-EFFECTIVENESS

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 European Air Navigation Services (ANS) cost some €6 300M in 200239. Previous PRC reports [Ref. 18, 25] have highlighted the need to improve ATM cost-effectiveness in Europe. Section 6.2 presents factual information on European en-route ANS costs. National en-route ANS unit costs are compared factually in section 6.3. They are compared using econometric techniques to account for individual traffic characteristics in section 6.4.

6.1.2 ANS costs can be broken down into ATM/CNS, MET, EUROCONTROL and other (e.g. regulatory) costs, as shown in Figure 39. • The adoption of information disclosure requirements allows for more detailed

analyses of ATM/CNS Cost-Effectiveness (ACE). The results for participating ANSPs are summarised in section 6.5 and forward-looking projections examined in section 6.6.

• EUROCONTROL costs are addressed in section 6.7. • MET costs are briefly introduced in section 6.8 and discussed in detail in Chapter 9. • Other costs are discussed in section 6.9.

ATM/CNS

EUROCONTROL

Payments tonational

government

MET

En-route ATM/CNS

TerminalATM/CNS

Total ATM/CNS costs: €5 500MTotal ANS cost: €6 300M

88%

24%

76%

6% 1%

5%

source : EUROCONTROL/ACE2002

Figure 39: Breakdown of ANS costs (approximate figures 2002)

6.2 Real unit costs for en-route ANS (European level)

6.2.1 These sections focus on en-route costs for 2002 (last final data), and for 2004 (data used for the establishment of the national unit rate). Data for 2003 are interim estimates40.

6.2.2 En-route costs for 2002 amounted to €4 953M. This is some 1% less than the forecast made in November 2001. Figure 40 (blue curve) shows that efforts have clearly been

39 European terminal ANS costs are not known precisely. 40 Final data for 2003 will not be known until after the publication of this report.


made to contain total costs in 2002, but cost growth in 2001 combined with traffic stagnation in 2001-2002 resulted in real unit costs increasing by more than 6% from 2000 to 2002 (see Figure 41 below).

6.2.3 Costs will have increased steadily in 2003 and 2004. Year 2004 costs are planned to be 10% above 2002. Thanks to traffic growth and, to some extent, to cost containment measures taken by States/ANSPs, deflated unit costs in 2004 are expected to be slightly below 2002 levels, but still 4% above 2000 levels.

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

P

2004

P

€ 20

02/ k

m

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

280


All States in CRCO system Data source : EUROCONTROL/CRCO

Figure 40: Unit costs per km (KPI), total costs and traffic

6.2.4 Figure 41 gives detailed figures for traffic, costs, and real unit cost (net of inflation).

2000 2001 2002 2003P 2004P 2002/2000 2004/2002Contracting States 28 29 30 31 31 28 30 Total en-route costs 4 477 4 783 4 953 5 245 5 469 10% 10%

National costs 4 077 4 354 4 486 4 755 4 928 9% 10%EUROCONTROL Maastricht 85 97 103 117 122 21% 19%EUROCONTROL Agency 316 332 364 373 419 13% 15%

Kilometre (Million) 6 310 6 327 6 293 6 581 6 837 -1% 8%Unit Cost (Euro/km) 0.71 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.80 11% 2%Price Index 1.060 1.085 1.109 1.132 1.153 5% 4%Unit cost ( Euro2002 /km) 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.77 6% -2%

Figure 41: European en-route ANS costs

6.2.5 These results were achieved in a context where traffic in 2002-2003 was some 15% below forecasts made in 2000 (see section 2.2) and where capacity increased significantly over the period (see section 4.6).

6.3 Real unit costs for en-route ANS (State level)

6.3.1 Figure 42 shows that European aggregate figures presented in the previous section (€0.79 per km in 2002) result from very contrasted levels and evolutions across Member States. Section 6.4 will explore to what extent factual differences observed here can be explained by individual traffic characteristics.


0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Uni

ted

King

dom

Belg

ium

-Lux

.

Spai

n C

anar

ias

Switz

erla

nd

Ger

man

y

Aust

ria

Spai

n C

ontin

enta

l

Bulg

aria

Italy

Slov

ak R

ep.

Slov

enia

Net

herla

nds

Rom

ania

Den

mar

k

Fran

ce

Portu

gal

Swed

en

FYR

OM

Cro

atia

Nor

way

Irela

nd

Hun

gary

Turk

ey

Mal

ta

Cyp

rus

Gre

ece

Mol

dova

Finl

and

Cze

ch R

ep.

€ 2

002/

km

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4200020022004

Eurocontrol Average 2002

Data source : EUROCONTROL/CRCO

Figure 42: Unit costs per State

EVOLUTION 2000-2002

6.3.2 Unit costs can be compared more easily in a given State over time. Annex II gives details for all States over the period 1998-2004. Unit costs increased in a majority of States in 2002. 10 States experienced increases exceeding 15% over 2000 levels. In many cases, increases in total costs were well above traffic variations, as can be seen in Figure 43.

2002/2000 Currency Cost variation

(national currency)

Price Index

Traffic variation

(km)

Unit costs variation (national currency)

Unit costs variation

(€)

Non deflated Deflated Deflated

Ireland EUR 30% 5% -3% 29% 29% Hungary HUF 18% 15% -3% 5% 24% Sweden SEK 30% 5% -7% 33% 23% Belgium-Lux. EUR 15% 5% -8% 19% 19% Spain continental EUR 26% 5% 2% 18% 18% Netherlands EUR 19% 5% -2% 16% 16% Germany EUR 15% 5% -4% 14% 14% Norway NOK -2% 4% -10% 5% 13% Greece EUR 13% 5% -4% 12% 12% Italy EUR 13% 5% -3% 11% 11%

Figure 43: Top 10 increases in unit costs expressed in Euros (2000-2002)

6.3.3 When considering unit costs in national currency, so as to remove exchange rate variations, the most significant increases are observed in Sweden (+33%), Ireland (+29%), Belgium (+19%), Spain (+18%), Netherlands (+16%), and Germany (+14%).

6.3.4 A majority of States have adopted cost containment measures, but actual savings for 2002 rarely exceeded 3%. In a few cases, actual costs for 2002 were even higher than initially planned in November 2001, despite traffic being lower than expected. This was the case, in particular, for Greece, Ireland, FYROM, and Sweden.

6.3.5 A few States were able to achieve significant savings in 2002. Figure 44 compares actual costs for 2002 with those planned and disclosed in November 2001. A special mention is warranted for Switzerland where initial plans included a significant cost increase (+15%), but costs were finally kept below 2000 levels.


2002/2000 Planned cost

increase Actual cost variation

Savings

Switzerland 15% -1% -14% Spain Canarias 16% 7% -8% Denmark 7% -1% -7% Netherlands 19% 14% -5% Belgium-Lux. 14% 10% -4% France 5% 2% -3% Germany 13% 10% -3%

Figure 44: Actual costs for 2002 compared to plans

6.3.6 Eight States decreased their unit costs in 2002. The top five are shown in Figure 45.

2002/2000

Currency Cost variation (national currency)

Price Index

Traffic variation

(km)



(€)


Turkey EUR 1% 5% 7% -10% -10%Portugal Lisboa FIR EUR 2% 5% 5% -7% -7%Bulgaria EUR 0% 5% 2% -7% -7%Slovak Rep. SKK 15% 11% 16% -11% -6%Austria EUR -4% 5% -4% -4% -4%

Figure 45: Top 5 improvements in unit costs (2000-2002)

FORECAST 2004

6.3.7 During the course of 2003, several States announced various degrees of cost containment measures and revised their 2004 cost base downwards. In this context, the 2004 cost bases of Greece and Romania have decreased by 9% compared to preliminary estimates provided in June 2003. Several States also decided to spread the under-recovery of 2002 over several years beyond 2004.

6.3.8 Although unit costs are expected to stabilise on average over Europe, this is the result of a very contrasted picture, with variations of unit costs ranging from -19% (Moldova, FYROM41) to +19% (Spain Canarias) compared to 2002, as shown in Figure 46.

6.3.9 In fact, high cost increases are again expected in Ireland and Spain; from 2000 to 2004, total costs will have increased in real terms by 55% and 49%, respectively.

41 In this context, FYROM should be praised for the quality of the information provided to the enlarged

Committee.


2004/2002 Currency Cost variation

(national currency)

Price Index

Traffic variation

(km)



(€)


Spain Canarias EUR 31% 4% 7% 18% 18% Ireland EUR 28% 4% 9% 13% 13% Cyprus CYP 21% 6% 2% 11% 12% Switzerland CHF 25% 3% 2% 19% 12% Spain Continental EUR 28% 4% 14% 8% 8%

United Kingdom GBP 13% 6% 11% -4% -12% Malta MTL 15% 4% 22% -9% -13% Greece EUR -4% 4% 11% -16% -16% Moldova MDL 14% 18% 16% -16% -19% FYROM MKD 1% 6% 28% -26% -19%

Figure 46: Evolution of planned total costs, traffic and unit costs (2002-2004)

6.4 Econometric analysis of en-route ANS costs (per State)

6.4.1 This section provides an update of the econometric cost-benchmarking model presented in PRR 3, 4 and 5, in response to several comments regretting that this information was omitted in PRR 6. Details are available from the Performance Review Unit [Ref. 20].

6.4.2 Beyond factual analysis of differences in unit costs presented in section 6.3, the econometric model seeks to identify to what extent costs charged by States are related to their traffic characteristics. It is acknowledged that other important factors such as labour costs, position in the investment cycle and quality of service would need to be considered.

6.4.3 One should therefore refrain from drawing firm conclusions from these results, which are only indicative, and not normative, at this stage. Consequently, the results of this model cannot be directly transposed into national cost targets.

6.4.4 This update is calibrated on 23 States using a time series of 5 years (1998 to 2002), based on final costs and traffic data reported to the enlarged Committee for Route Charges. The variable to be explained is en-route national costs. The input variables that were used are: • Distance controlled in the charging area (provided by the CRCO); • Density of airspace: this variable takes into account the spatial concentration of traffic

within the charging area; • Vertical activity: the ratio of airport movements to distance controlled is used as the

proxy for vertical activity; • Seasonal traffic variability: this is measured as the ratio between the traffic in the

peak week to the weekly traffic average in 2002.

6.4.5 Seasonal traffic variability is a new variable that has been introduced in the model to better reflect traffic characteristics. The model should be further developed to incorporate explanatory variables such as input factor costs and quality of service. As more data become available from Information Disclosure and the time series builds up, it is the PRU’s intention to develop a more comprehensive econometric cost model, which should more accurately estimate predicted costs and relative levels of efficiency.

6.4.6 Figure 47 summarises results and shows the estimated level of national costs with respect to the European average in 2002 (regression line) and projections for 2004. It also shows


the notional “efficiency frontier”, which corresponds to the best results achieved in Europe. Care should be taken in using the notion of “efficiency frontier”. On the one hand, it is likely that even the “best in class” could achieve further efficiency gains. On the other hand, the result achieved by the “best in class” might partly be due to individual circumstances (e.g. lower labour costs) which cannot be transposed across Europe.

United Kingdom

Turkey

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain continental

RomaniaPortugal (FIR Lisboa)

Norway

Netherlands

Italy

Ireland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

France

Finland

Denmark

Czech Rep.

Cyprus

Croatia

Bulgaria

Belgium-Lux.Austria

10

100

1 000

10 100 1 000

Predicted en-route costs in M€

Obs

erve

d en

-rou

te c

osts

in M

€

"Efficiency" frontier

Regression line

States 2002 2004

Portugal (FIR Lisboa) +49% +47%Bulgaria +43% +34%Romania +27% +24%United Kingdom +27% +14%Croatia +21% +23%Belgium-Lux. +19% +22%Austria +18% +16%Sweden +14% +12%Norway +12% -1%Italy +7% -3%Denmark +6% +16%Spain continental +6% +15%Switzerland +1% +17%Germany +1% +7%Ireland -2% +12%Netherlands -6% -11%Cyprus -8% +7%Finland -10% -15%France -12% -12%Greece -13% -28%Turkey -14% -9%Hungary -17% -11%Czech Rep. -20% -31%

Figure 47: Results of econometric benchmarking model (year 2002)

6.4.7 There is a large spread of relative difference between actual and estimated costs (-20% to +49% in 2002). If all States were operating on the notional “efficiency frontier”, yearly savings would be in the order of €850M-1000M.

6.4.8 Noteworthy points are: • When traffic related circumstances are accounted for, some States whose unit costs

are close to the European average appear, in fact, to be well above expected costs (e.g. Portugal +47%, Bulgaria: +34%). Although the model results cannot be taken prima facie, this is an indication that costs there should be examined more closely;

• Similarly, but to a lesser extent, 2004 planned unit costs for Romania (+24%), Croatia (+23%) and Belgium-Luxembourg (+22%) noticeably diverge from those estimated by the model;

• The difference between planned and estimated unit costs for UK is decreasing in 2004. This is an encouraging trend, partly due to depreciation of the Pound Sterling (see Figure 46). Further improvement of the relative cost-effectiveness is also anticipated to occur in Greece.

• Cyprus and Ireland are becoming less cost-effective due to recent cost increases; • The Czech Republic has best performance according to the model.

6.5 ANSP cost-effectiveness benchmarking

6.5.1 Analyses presented in section 6.4 above are on a State basis, using submissions to the enlarged Committee for Route Charges as the main information source. By virtue of Decision No. 88 of the Permanent Commission, whereby all ANSPs must disclose specified information to the PRC every year [Ref. 21], more detailed analyses for ANSPs


economic performance can be conducted. This section summarises benchmarking analyses of ATM cost-effectiveness (ACE) published in ACE reports [Ref. 8 & Ref. 22].

6.5.2 These analyses were conducted in close co-operation with the ACE Working Group42, which enabled participants to develop a shared understanding of data accuracy, underlying assumptions, and interpretation of results.

6.5.3 The ACE work also contributed towards two advances: • the development of a methodological framework for the analysis and comparison of

data on cost-effectiveness, which should become a valuable tool to monitor performance of one ANSP over time and to identify best practices across ANSPs;

• the definition of a composite output measure that reflects more fully the nature of services provided gate-to-gate, and is therefore more suitable for gate-to-gate performance comparisons.

6.5.4 Figure 48 presents cost-effectiveness indicators for ANSPs in 2001. It is computed as the ANSP gate-to-gate ATM/CNS cost per composite flight hour43 controlled. This indicator must not be interpreted as a ranking of cost-effectiveness: one would have to consider observed differences given the individual context (e.g., traffic characteristics, input factor costs) and quality of service. It should be noted that Maastricht (MUAC) costs do not include the costs of MET services, Surveillance (Radar) and Navigation infrastructure, which are borne by the delegating States.

383

234

606

461508

424

158

295

504

269

531

263

328

221

437 419395

337336

373372411

529

226

560

429

277

383345

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Aena

(ES)

ANS

CR (C

Z)

ANS

Swed

en (S

E)

ATSA

Bul

garia

(BG

)

Aust

ro C

ontro

l (AT

)

Belg

ocon

trol (

BE)

DFS

(DE)

DHM

I (TR

)DN

A (F

R)EA

NS (E

E)EN

AV (I

T)

Finl

and

CAA

(FI)

FYRO

M C

AA (M

K)

Hung

aroC

ontro

l (HU

)IA

A (IE

)LG

S (L

V)LP

S (S

K)LV

NL (N

L)M

IA (M

T)

MO

LDAT

SA (M

D)M

UAC*

NATA

M/A

VINO

R (N

O)

NATS

(UK)

NAV-

FIR

Lisb

oa (P

T)NA

VIAI

R (D

K)

Oro

Nav

igac

ija (L

T)

ROM

ATSA

(RO

)Sk

ygui

de (C

H)

Slov

enia

CAA

(SI)

€ pe

r com

posi

te fl

ight

-hou

r European Average

Figure 48: ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness indicator (gate-to-gate, 2001)

6.5.5 The methodological framework proposes to breakdown cost-effectiveness into three main components: 1. Productivity; 2. Employment costs; and, 3. Support costs ratio.

PRODUCTIVITY

42 The ACE group comprises representatives of ANSPs, airspace users, the European Commission,

EUROCONTROL and the PRU. 43 Composite flight hour: See glossary


6.5.6 Productivity is measured as the ratio of flight hours controlled divided by ATCO-hours on operational duty. It is equal to the average number of aircraft under control per ATCO on duty. Productivity is affected, inter alia, by traffic complexity. For the purpose of comparing productivity, ACCs have been grouped into clusters of similar traffic characteristics, as shown in Figure 49.

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.8

MUAC

Lond

on AC

Zurich

Rhein

Reims

Genev

a

Munch

enPari

s

Flig

ht-h

ours

per

ATC

O-h

our

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.8

Manch

ester

Amsterda

m

Lond

on TC

Brusse

ls

Bremen

Milano

Dusse

ldorf

Frankfu

rt

Palma

Dublin

Flig

ht-h

ours

per

ATC

O-h

our

0.00.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.01.2

1.4

1.61.8

Sunds

vall

Tampe

re

Stockh

olm Bodo

Canari

as

Rovan

iemi

Oslo

Stavan

ger

Flig

ht-h

ours

per

ATC

O-h

our

Mal

mo

Bre

stS

cotti

shB

orde

aux

Ank

ara

Rom

aP

raha

Wie

nTa

llinn

Kob

enha

vnM

adrid

Mar

seille

Brin

disi

Bud

apes

tP

adov

aS

hann

onIs

tanb

ulB

arce

lona

Rig

aS

evilla

Tron

dhei

mB

erlin

Var

naS

ofia

Bra

tisla

vaB

ucur

esti

Viln

ius

Mal

taLj

ublja

naS

kopj

eC

hisi

nau

Lisb

oa

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

Flig

ht-h

ours

per

ATC

O-h

our

Cluster 1: High density and high vertical movements

Cluster 4: Low density and low vertical movementsCluster 3: Low density and high vertical movements

Cluster 2: High density and low vertical movements

Figure 49: Summary of productivity results (2001)

6.5.7 Even after grouping ACCs into clusters of similar traffic characteristics, there are significant productivity differences among ACCs, which would warrant further investigation in order to better understand performance drivers.

ATCO HOURLY EMPLOYMENT COST

6.5.8 ATCO hourly employment cost is the ratio between total employment costs for ATCOs in OPS and the number of hours spent on duty by ATCOs in OPS. The ATCO hourly employment cost is widely dispersed across European ANSPs. To a large extent, the discrepancies observed among ANSPs relate to differences in income/GDP44 per head. Relatively lower ATCO employment costs for ANSPs in central and Eastern Europe positively contribute to their cost-effectiveness.

6.5.9 EUROSTAT publishes Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) for most EUROCONTROL Member States [Ref. 23]. These can be used to adjust ATCO hourly employment costs for purchasing power, as shown in Figure 50.

44 National Gross Domestic Product.


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Aena (

ES)

NAV-FIR

Lisb

oa (P

T)

ATSA Bulg

aria (

BG)

MUAC

Austro

Con

trol (A

T)

ENAV (IT)

Skygu

ide (C

H)

ANS CR (C

Z)

Belgoc

ontro

l (BE)

NATS (UK)

LVNL (

NL)

DFS (DE)

ROMATSA (RO)

LPS (S

K)

Hunga

roCon

trol (H

U)

DNA (FR)

Sloven

ia CAA (S

I)

Finlan

d CAA (F

I)

ANS Swed

en (S

E)

NAVIAIR

(DK)

NATAM/AVIN

OR (NO)

IAA (IE

)

EANS (EE)

Oro Nav

igacij

a (LT

)

DHMI (TR)

ATC

Os

in O

PS

uni

t cos

t per

hou

r (E

uro

per h

our)

ATCOs in OPS unit cost per ATCO-hour adjusted to reflect PPPsATCOs in OPS unit cost per ATCO-hour

Figure 50: ATCO hourly employment costs with and without PPP adjustment (2001)

SUPPORT COST RATIO

6.5.10 The support cost ratio is the ratio of total ATM/CNS costs and total employment costs for ATCOs in OPS. For every Euro spent on employing ATCOs, an additional €3.47 is spent on other costs on average. These other costs comprise mainly: • non-ATCO employment costs; • non-staff operating costs45, and, • capital-related costs (such as depreciation) and the cost of capital (such as interest).

10.5

9.48.5

7.97.2

6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.2

4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.33.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3

2.4

22.0 15.8

3.73.84.0

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

DHM

I (TR

)LG

S (L

V)

MO

LDAT

SA (M

D)

FYRO

M C

AA (M

K)

Oro

Nav

igac

ija (L

T)LV

NL (N

L)NA

TS (U

K)LP

S (S

K)

Hung

aroC

ontro

l (HU

)

ATSA

Bul

garia

(BG

)AN

S CR

(CZ)

EANS

(EE)

DNA

(FR)

ANS

Swed

en (S

E)NA

VIAI

R (D

K)DF

S (D

E)

ROM

ATSA

(RO

)

NAV-

FIR

Lisb

oa (P

T)

Aust

ro C

ontro

l (AT

)Sk

ygui

de (C

H)IA

A (IE

)M

UAC*

ENAV

(IT)

NATA

M/A

VINO

R (N

O)

Belg

ocon

trol (

BE)

Finl

and

CAA

(FI)

MIA

(MT)

Slov

enia

CAA

(SI)

Aena

(ES)

Tota

l cos

ts p

er A

TCO

s st

aff c

osts

European Average

Figure 51: Support cost ratio (gate-to-gate, 2001)

6.5.11 Figure 51 shows wide variations in support cost ratios across ANSPs. Benchmarking of support costs would be very worthwhile to identify and foster best practices. It is however

45 Including exceptional costs.


a difficult area given, inter alia, very little homogeneous information availability and the variety of cost allocation practices.

6.6 Forward-looking projections (2002-2007)

6.6.1 Forward-looking information is an essential element in managing the future performance of Air Navigation public services operating under monopoly. SES implementing rules should make the submission of this information mandatory and enforceable.

6.6.2 It is encouraging to note the net improvement in the number of States that provided forward looking information. However, one third of the States, did not comply with this basic requirement for the 2002-2007 period.

6.6.3 All but three reporting States are planning to increase their cost base slower than traffic. Unit costs are expected to decrease by more than 10% over 5 years in 10 States. However, because larger States tend to plan more modest cost reductions, the European average is not expected to decrease significantly.

11%

-11%

14%7%

39%36%

11%

17%

-9%-15%

-7% -7%

9%

-2% -1%

16%

-5%

25%

-2%

22%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

Austria

Bulgari

a

Denmark

Finlan

d

France

FYROM

German

y

Hungary

Irelan

dMalt

a

Moldov

a

Netherlan

ds

Portug

al

Romania

Slovak R

ep.

Slovenia

Spain

Spain

Canaria

s

Sweden

Maastr

icht

Information provided to the enlarged CommitteeInformation disclosureTraffic increase

Cost increase 2002-2007 (National currencies - deflated)

?

Albania Belgium-Luxembourg. Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic. Greece Italy Norway Switzerland Turkey UK (applies the pricing option)

?

No information provided

Figure 52: Projected cost variations (2002-2007)

6.6.4 SES implementing rules should provide for the mandatory submission of forward-looking information by National Supervisory Authorities (NSA) concerning all ANS costs under their supervision (ATS, MET, etc.). More details are given in section 8.4.

6.7 EUROCONTROL Agency costs

6.7.1 This section analyses EUROCONTROL Agency costs (i.e. what is paid by airspace users), excluding Maastricht UAC46 and CEATS, composed of: • The EUROCONTROL cost base (Parts I & IX, €364M in 2002) represents some 5%

of all ANS costs in 2002 (see Figure 39). The EUROCONTROL cost base is higher than the Member States contributions to the EUROCONTROL budget47.

• CRCO costs48 (Part II, €19M in 2002).

46 The performance of Maastricht UAC is discussed in section 6.5 above. 47 A major reason for this difference is the internal tax paid by EUROCONTROL employees (some

€50M). This internal tax is entered as a receipt in the EUROCONTROL budget, which reduces Member States’ contributions. Austria and the United Kingdom have decided to include only their contributions to the EUROCONTROL budget in their national cost bases, not the full cost.


6.7.2 There has been substantial focus on Agency performance, budget and accounts within the Advisory Financial Group (AFG) and the Audit Board in 2003. This is anticipated to continue in the new Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). The PRC, therefore, has not devoted major resources to reviewing the performance of the EUROCONTROL Agency.

6.7.3 Although the EUROCONTROL Agency budget has been subject to strict constraints as of 1999 (the “Triple Zero”), the EUROCONTROL cost base (i.e. what airspace users pay) has experienced a steady increase over the 2000-2004 period, as shown in Figure 53. EUROCONTROL Agency costs have increased by 7% in 2002, and a further increase of 11% is expected between 2002 and 2004 (in real terms).

20%

31%

20%

6%1% 4%

11%

3%6% 6%

9%3%7%10% 10%

23%

050

100150200250300350400450500

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

million € 2002 deflated)

% change over previous year

Figure 53: Evolution of EUROCONTROL Agency costs (Part I and IX)

6.7.4 These increases arise mainly from new tasks given to the EUROCONTROL Agency (e.g. European AIS Database (EAD) for EATM, implementation of the ATFM action plan for the CFMU, creation of the Regulatory Committee49 in Institutional bodies), as can be seen in Figure 54, and from the following financial decisions, as can be seen in Figure 55: • Pension costs have been lower than employee contributions for more than 20 years,

but are now higher. The EUROCONTROL Organisation should resolve this issue as soon as possible.

• Application of the IAS 38 standard further to recommendations from the Audit Board implies a change in capitalisation policy50 and temporary increases in staff and operating costs.

Variation

2001 2002 2003P 2004P 2004P/2002

EATM 103 115 122 136 18%Logistics 58 62 65 66 6%CFMU 80 86 99 104 21%EEC 63 67 70 66 -2%IANS 13 13 14 14 3%Institutional bodies 3 4 5 8 104%Other * 12 16 20 26 63%Total Part I & IX 332 364 395 419 15% Part II - CRCO 19 19 20 20 7%Total Part I, II & IX 351 383 415 439 15%Price Index 1.085 1.109 1.132 1.153 4%Deflated cost 359 383 407 423 11%

* Concerns mainly the balance of pensions

EstablishmentYearly cost (M€)

EATM31%

Logistics16%CFMU

22%

EEC17%

IANS4%

Other *4%

CRCO5%

Figure 54: Breakdown of EUROCONTROL Agency costs (Parts I, II and IX)

48 The CRCO is financed through a separate administrative rate, not through State contributions. 49 This creation contributed to the 104% increase in Institutional bodies between 2002 and 2004. 50 Part of the Staff and Operating expenditures (see Figure 55), that were previously capitalised and

subsequently depreciated over their amortisation period according to their purpose, are now expensed in one year.


Variation2001 2002 2003P 2004P 2004P/2002

Staff 192 202 214 236 17%Operating 32 36 38 52 44%Balance of pensions 13 16 20 26 63%Depreciation 81 97 108 91 -6%Interest 14 13 15 14 8%Total Part I & IX 332 364 395 419 15%Price Index 1.085 1.109 1.132 1.153 4%Deflated cost 339 364 387 403 11%

Type of expenditureYearly cost (M€)

source : EUROCONTROL Figure 55: Breakdown of EUROCONTROL costs per type of expenditure

6.7.5 Agency efforts to improve the transparency of the budgetary processes and the quality of the information provided need to be encouraged and actively pursued.

6.7.6 Future costs of the EUROCONTROL Agency need to be controlled as part of the overall cost-effectiveness effort of the EUROCONTROL Organisation. The Standing Committee for Finance agreed to “Budget parameters”, including an “Efficiency factor” of 3%. The evolution of the EUROCONTROL cost base would need to be examined in relation to services delivered.

6.8 MET costs

6.8.1 Figure 56 shows the development of en-route MET costs between 1998 and 2004 for a consistent sample of 25 Member States for which data for a time series analysis was available. After reaching a peak in 2000, en-route MET costs slightly decline in real terms (i.e. deflated) until 2003. However, aeronautical en-route MET costs are expected to rise again in 2004. MET costs are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003P 2004P 2002/

2000 2004/ 2002

Contracting States 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 Total en-route MET costs (Million) 295 305 319 324 325 326 337 2% 4%

Price Index (2002) 0.926 0.936 0.956 0.978 1.000 1.021 1.040 5% 4% Total en-route MET costs (Million) (2002 deflated) 319 326 334 331 325 319 324 -3% 0%

Figure 56: En-route MET costs between (1998-2004)

6.9 Other costs COST OF REGULATION

6.9.1 Other costs comprise mostly payments to national government in respect to regulation. Some States identify a clear payment made to the government in respect of regulatory costs (c.f. States’ submissions to the enlarged Committee for Route Charges, Nov 2003 and the ACE 2001 report [Ref. 8]. The proportion of regulatory costs in the national en-route cost base appears to vary between 0.5 and 5%. In the UK, where safety, airspace and economic regulation are well-developed, but also where economies of scale are at play, regulatory costs amount to approximately 1.5% of the national en-route cost base.

6.9.2 The Single European Sky foresees that National Supervisory Authorities (NSA) will be created and run either directly or through Recognised Organisations. Obviously, this comes at a cost, and it will be useful to keep regulatory costs and ANSP costs for regulatory compliance under control.


6.10 Conclusions

6.10.1 ANS costs can be broken down into ATM/CNS (88%), MET (~6%), EUROCONTROL (~5%) and other costs (~1%), in particular regulatory costs. Cost-effectiveness should be under control for all ANS cost components.

6.10.2 Previous PRC reports have highlighted the need to improve ATM cost-effectiveness in Europe. En-route ANS unit costs are being contained overall after three years of relatively rapid increases. This will need to continue and improve in a context of increasing traffic.

6.10.3 ATM/CNS costs represent the largest share of ANS costs (88%). Their evolution is very contrasted across States, with good cost control in some parts and worrying trends in others.

6.10.4 Forward-looking information is an essential element in managing the future performance of Air Navigation Services. SES implementing rules should make the provision of historic and forward-looking information mandatory and enforceable for ANS operating under monopoly.

6.10.5 Productivity and support costs were identified in PRR 6 as main areas of action to improve ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness. Benchmarking of support costs would be a very worthwhile effort to identify and foster best practices, and to characterise the effects of fragmentation.

6.10.6 The newly-created Standing Committee on Finance is expected to keep the EUROCONTROL budget under control. It should address the full EUROCONTROL cost-base in relation to service provided. To this effect, measures of output need to be developed to produce efficiency indicators.

6.10.7 Regulatory costs should also be kept under control, especially in the context of new Single European Sky requirements.

44


PRR 7 - Performance Targets 45

7 PERFORMANCE TARGETS

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 The ECAC Institutional Strategy [Ref. 24], the EUROCONTROL revised Convention [Ref. 5] and the Single European Sky Framework regulation [Ref. 1] contain objectives to improve the performance of the European ATM System. This chapter reviews progress towards setting corresponding European performance targets and makes further proposals to this effect. Chapter 8 gives initial considerations on associated performance management processes so that targets are met.

EUROPEAN PERFORMANCE TARGETS

7.1.2 Transport ministers agreed qualitative objectives at MATSE 6 (2000) as part of the ATM 2000+ Strategy [Ref. 6] in particular for safety, capacity and economics (see box).

7.1.3 At the forefront of the EUROCONTROL Revised Convention, contracting parties “commit themselves to the establishment of specific targets regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of ATM operations” (Art. 1.1b).

7.1.4 Article 1 of the SES “Framework Regulation” [Ref. 1] states: “The objective of the Single European Sky initiative is to enhance current safety standards and overall efficiency for general air traffic in Europe, to optimise capacity meeting the requirements of all airspace users and to minimise delays”.

EUROPEAN PERFORMANCE TARGETS

7.1.5 Performance parameters, metrics and quantified targets must be agreed for Key Performance Areas, including safety, capacity/delays and cost-effectiveness.

7.1.6 The Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) is developing safety indicators, targets and regulatory requirements to ensure that safety targets are met. A medium term European target was agreed for ATFM delays in 2001, which is closely related to capacity. No such quantified target and associated processes have yet been agreed for cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, this chapter reviews the suitability of the delay target and presents initial proposals towards a European cost-effectiveness target.

ATM 2000+ objectives (extract)

Safety: to improve safety levels by ensuring that the number of ATM-induced accidents and serious or risk-bearing incidents do not increase and, where possible, decrease. Capacity: to provide sufficient capacity to accommodate demand in typical busy hours without imposing significant, operational, economic or environmental penalties under normal circumstances. Economics: to reduce the direct and indirect costs per unit of aircraft operations.


7.2 The need for a balanced approach to ANS performance

7.2.1 All three KPAs (Safety, Delays and Cost-effectiveness) are interlinked51. ANS policy must address them in a balanced way to ensure that improvement of one KPA does not result in the deterioration of another.

SAFETY

7.2.2 Safety regulatory requirements (ESARRs) adopted by the Permanent Commission of EUROCONTROL will, as appropriate, be transposed into European Union legislation (SES “Service Provision” Regulation, art 4) [Ref. 2]. Legally enforceable provisions will therefore exist to verify that the agreed safety target is achieved.

7.2.3 Regulatory impact assessments (e.g. operational and economic implications) should be conducted before new safety regulations are adopted. Any trade-off between other KPAs and safety should be decided at political level. Once adopted, safety regulations will influence capacity and economic performance, but not the converse.

7.2.4 Verification that the agreed safety target is met presupposes that safety KPIs are measured reliably. Despite several PRC recommendations (see Annex I) and Provisional Council decisions52 to this effect, this is still not the case. Adoption and regular publication of key safety indicators is a prerequisite for managing ATM performance and target setting.

7.2.5 The SRC work to define safety key performance indicators and targets needs to progress as a matter of urgency (see PC decision in annex I, item 8).

CAPACITY/DELAYS

7.2.6 The ATM 2000+ capacity objective is “to provide sufficient capacity…”. The corresponding delay target of one minute per flight was endorsed by the Provisional Council53 in 2001. Figure 57 shows that this target is achievable and being met well before the target date of 2006. While approximately one third of delay improvements in 2001-2002 can be attributed to traffic slowdown, the rest corresponds to genuine capacity increases.

2.9

4.1

5.5

3.63.1

1.81.2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

En-route ATFM delay

En-route target

En-route optimum



Summer

minutes per f light

Airport ATFM delay


51 See PRR 6, chapter 8 - Trade-offs [Ref. 18]. 52 PC 14 (July 2002) requested the SRC to “propose adequate ECAC-level safety performance

indicators before July 2003, and associated targets at an appropriate juncture, for approval by the Commission through the Provisional Council and invited it to include corresponding indicators in its regular safety reports to the Provisional Council”.

53 PC 10 (April 2001) “endorsed an overall ATM network target to reduce progressively to a cost-optimum average ATFM delay of one minute per flight by the summer 2006, as a basis for the co-operative planning and provision of capacity”


Figure 57: ATFM delays: KPI and target

7.2.7 This delay target was proposed by the PRC, as it represented the optimum en-route ATFM delay under the prevailing economic conditions (i.e. incremental cost of capacity54 and cost of delays55). Any imbalance between air traffic demand and ATM capacity results in high penalties for airspace users: too little capacity generates too high delays, too much capacity generates excessive costs.

7.2.8 The agreed European delay target should remain for en-route the time being, as • The average and incremental cost of capacity did not change significantly; • The delay target is achievable, and has focused efforts;

7.2.9 The PRC will give consideration to developing a target for airport delays.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS PERFORMANCE

7.2.10 The economic efficiency objective of the ATM 2000+ Strategy is “to reduce the direct and indirect costs per unit of aircraft operations”. Improving the economic performance of the European ANS system is one objective of the Single European Sky. The efficiency of the European ANS system is crucial for a competitive and efficient air transport system, which will benefit end users and society at large.

7.2.11 The delay target corresponds to a first level of economic optimisation, whereby the right level of capacity is provided under the prevailing cost of capacity and cost of delays (static efficiency). The next step will be to improve the cost of capacity, so as to meet both safety and capacity targets in the most cost-effective way (dynamic efficiency). This is illustrated in Figure 58. This necessarily has a longer term perspective.

0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5

Capacity/demand ratio

Year

ly c

osts

Static economic optimum

Delay costs

Cost of capacity

Total economic costs

Dynamic economic optimum

Figure 58: Static and dynamic economic optima

7.3 An upper bound for ANS costs

7.3.1 As shown in Figure 59, the high-level relationship between traffic and en-route costs has been approximately linear. On average, there was no cost-effectiveness improvement in

54 See § 7.3.1. 55 See Section 4.5.


the last twelve years: the traffic index and the total en-route cost index (net of inflation, base 100 in 1990) were identical in 1990, 1997 and 2002.

7.3.2 This macroscopic relationship is the net result of very different individual circumstances, where some costs grow faster than traffic (e.g. new investment) and others more slowly (e.g. better use of existing resources with growing traffic).

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.019

90

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

P

2004

P

€ 20

02/ k

m

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

280


All States in CRCO system Data source : EUROCONTROL/CRCO

Figure 59: En-route unit cost per km (KPI), total en-route costs and traffic

7.3.3 The linear relationship was achieved with essentially constant operational concepts, where the main way to add capacity is to add more ATM systems and human resources (recruitment and training). Experience in the US tends to indicate that it would be possible to safely control twice the traffic in the same airspace volume as Europe, using present day technology and operational concepts. The linear cost trend is therefore anticipated to remain achievable in the short to medium term.

7.3.4 Furthermore, 5-year growth projections (2002-2007) are generally lower for costs than traffic in all but three States/ANSPs according to information submitted by States/ANSPs (see § 6.6.3).

7.3.5 Total European ANS costs should therefore, as a minimum, not grow faster than traffic over the medium term.

7.4 Significant scope for improvement

7.4.1 ANS benchmarking published in previous PRRs indicates that there is significant scope for improvement given the present level of European ANS cost-effectiveness.

US-EUROPE COMPARISONS

7.4.2 The comparisons of cost-effectiveness and productivity between US and Europe at the system level have highlighted significant performance differences (cf. PRR 6, Chapter 9). The two ATM systems operate in different environments, and thus cannot be directly compared. However, the US system constitutes a useful reference point and it is interesting to understand the major causes of difference. According to the study, the European ATM system is some 70% more expensive in terms of unit costs than the US system, with comparable safety performance. This is an indication that European costs are


high and could be lower, even more so as the present US ATM system cannot, of itself, be considered as the ultimate reference of ATM performance56.

7.4.3 The US/Europe Report ACC comparison [Ref. 9] found that unit costs are about +62% higher in European ACCs. This comparative study highlighted that the main areas for improvement in European ACCs were ATCO productivity and support costs (see box).

7.4.4 In Europe, ATCO productivity could be improved in the short to medium term by better matching traffic and human resources (dynamic manpower management). In the longer term, operational and technology improvements should deliver further cost-effectiveness benefits.

7.4.5 In Europe, support costs (i.e. all costs beyond ATCO employment costs) could be reduced both within individual ANSPs through internal rationalisation, and across ANSPs through reduction of fragmentation, joint or common programmes, etc.

EUROPEAN BENCHMARKING

7.4.6 As highlighted in the ACE 2001 Benchmarking Report [Ref. 8], significant differences in terms of productivity and cost-effectiveness also exist across European States. Initial econometric studies (see section 6.4) indicate that cost savings could reach €850M-€1000M per annum if all States operated along the “European efficiency frontier”. This roughly amounts to yearly capital expenditure (investments) for ATM/CNS in Europe.

7.4.7 It is recognised that not all States operate under the same economic conditions, and that monetary factors (such as the cost of living) have not been taken into account in the model. It is nevertheless an indication that significant efficiency gains could be achieved at European level.

7.4.8 In conclusion, there is significant scope for improvement of European ANS cost-effectiveness using current ATM operational concepts.

7.5 Benefits of curbing the linear trend

7.5.1 Short-term cost containment measures can certainly be taken, but the scope for action and results are limited, as experienced when trying to reduce unit rates for 2004.

7.5.2 On the other hand, curbing the linear trend over a long period would have massive benefits. Section 7.3 concludes that the linear relationship between traffic and ANS real costs identified in section 7.2 should be considered as an upper bound for ANS unit costs under the current operating mode. The net present value of yearly cost-efficiency gains of 2%-5% sustained over a longer term amounts to several billion euros: such a magnitude certainly warrants significant effort to develop and implement solutions to achieve such savings.

7.5.3 Over the next ten years, it should be expected that the new SES regulatory environment, the significant scope for improvements identified in section 7.4, and efforts to rationalise

56 Recognising that scope for improvement also exists in the US, a performance-based Air Traffic

Organisation is being implemented within the FAA.

US-Europe ACC comparison [Ref 9] (Main quantitative results)

Cost-effectiveness: Unit costs in selected European ACCs are +62% higher, which can be broken down as follows: • ATCO-hour productivity:

+29% higher in the US • Employment costs per ATCO-hour:

6% lower in Europe • Support costs:

+34% higher in Europe.


and make more effective use of existing systems/resources would make it possible to achieve yearly efficiency gains in the range of 2%-5%.

7.5.4 In the longer term, further operational and technology improvements from targeted R&D programmes should lead to improved capacity and economic performance, while at the same time maintaining safety. If not, there would be little sense in introducing them.

7.6 A European cost-effectiveness target A KPI FOR ANS COST-EFFECTIVENESS

7.6.1 A European cost-effectiveness target, consistent with other targets, needs to be agreed to drive ANS performance.

7.6.2 The PRC has been monitoring the “en-route real unit cost per km” as its cost-effectiveness KPI (see Figure 59). It is computed by dividing the deflated total en-route costs charged (i.e. net of inflation) by the number of kilometres charged57.

7.6.3 Information concerning route charges paid by airspace users is readily available from the Route Charges System. This information is robust and can be compared over time. En-route ANS costs, by definition, are equal to charges in the case of full cost recovery. They comprise the bulk of gate-to-gate ANS costs (around 80%). Moreover, States are required to provide five years forward-looking projections of their en-route ANS costs for the purposes of calculating the unit rate. This should provide sound information on projected European cost-effectiveness performance levels. Finally, en-route ANS costs can be broken down so as to allow identification of individual costs components that contribute to the overall cost-effectiveness (see box).

7.6.4 A European cost-effectiveness target related to the total en-route ANS cost base has the merit of being simple, transparent, and comprehensive enough to drive productive efficiency. When a single charging scheme for both en-route and terminal is introduced as foreseen in Single European Sky legislation, total gate-to-gate costs should be used instead.

FROM WHERE DO WE START?

7.6.5 In order to determine a reasonable target, it is relevant first to consider the evolution of “en-route real unit cost per km”. Figure 60 shows that real unit costs decreased by 3% per year in the period 1993-1999 (minus 14% over five years on average). Reducing real unit costs by 3% per annum is therefore achievable. This performance appears however to have been achieved in periods of high traffic growth, and at the expense of increasing delays. If one adjusts the observed unit costs for [poorer] quality of service, the resulting “unit cost of capacity” has decreased by some 1% per year over the same period.

57 The PRC is also using hours flown in the context of ANSP benchmarking. Apart the fact that the two

measures are closely correlated, kilometre charged is generally perceived as more relevant from the airspace users perspective (demand side), and hours flown more relevant from the ANSP perspective.

National en-route costs ATM/CNS MET AIS & SAR Regulatory costs

EUROCONTROL costs Total en-route ANS costs


0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

P

2004

P

€ 20

02/ k

m

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Min

ute

/ flig

ht

Cost Per Km En Route Delay (Summer))

All States in CRCO system source : EUROCONTROL

Historical trend -3%

3%4%3%4%4%

-2%

0%5% 3% 3%3%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010


2004 Forecast

source : EUROCONTROL( before 1997, estimation based on Euro 88 traffic variation)

Traff ic


Figure 60: Trend in average delay and unit costs (left)-Traffic forecast (right)

7.6.6 Despite peaks and troughs, the long-term trend in traffic growth remains (+4.8% per annum on average in the 90’s), and is likely to continue with globalisation and EU enlargement (see Figure 60-right). All else being equal, traffic growth should positively contribute to lowering unit costs.

7.6.7 Recent experience has shown that it is possible to meet the agreed European delay target (see Figure 57). The real challenge will be to improve cost-effectiveness, while meeting safety requirements and keeping delays at optimum levels. Meeting all performance targets will require resolute and sustained actions from all parties involved.

A COST-EFFECTIVENESS TARGET FOR EN-ROUTE ANS

7.6.8 The recommended parameter for setting a European ATM cost-effectiveness target is the real unit cost per km for en-route. The average “gate-to-gate ANS real unit cost” should be used instead when a common charging scheme for both en-route and terminal air navigation services has been introduced, as envisaged under the SES.

7.6.9 In setting the European cost-effectiveness target, a yearly reduction of 1% would be insufficiently challenging, while 5% may prove to be difficult to reach58. A yearly reduction of 3%59 would appear to be both achievable and reasonably challenging. The exact value should be a matter of political decision.

7.6.10 As there is certain rigidity in costs, and any change would take some time to implement, the target should be set over the medium term, typically for a period of 5 years. A challenging yet feasible target for European ATM cost-effectiveness could be for the real unit cost per km in 2008 to be 14% below the 2003 level, while meeting the European delay target, as illustrated in Figure 61 below.

58 This value was applicable to NATS under its initial economic regulatory conditions. Since 2003,

under the “Composite Solution”, NATS’ efficiency factor is set at 2%. 59 In other words, the objective would be for the real unit cost to remain below RPI-3% of the preceding

year, with the RPI being measured by the Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price [MUICP], and 3% the yearly performance improvement factor.


0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

2003

P

2004

P

2005

P

2006

P

2007

P

2008

P

En-r

oute

cos

t per

Km

(€ 2

003)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

En-r

oute

del

ay p

er fl

ight

(min

)

Unit cost target: -14%

En-route delay target 1 minute/flight

for En-route

Figure 61: European delay and cost-effectiveness targets for en-route ANS

7.6.11 This European target should not be seen as, or directly translated into, individual objectives for each ANSP. The diversity of individual circumstances (e.g. different traffic growth and/or investment cycles) requires a corresponding degree of diversity in individual objectives. Individual performance objectives are further discussed in chapter 8.

7.7 Conclusions

7.7.1 Qualitative objectives were agreed at MATSE 6 (2000) for safety, capacity, and economic efficiency. The next step is their quantification and measurement: • The SRC’s work to define safety key performance indicators and targets needs to

progress as a matter of urgency; • The agreed European en-route delay target should remain; • The PRC will give consideration to developing a target for airport delays; • A European cost-effectiveness target should be agreed, which will focus attention and

action.

7.7.2 Key performance areas are interdependent. Safety regulations will help to ensure that improvements in other Key Performance Areas do not adversely affect safety. Reliable safety indicators are needed to verify that this is actually the case.

7.7.3 European ANS costs have tended to grow in line with traffic. The PRC advocates that, as a minimum, ANS costs should grow slower than traffic over the medium-term.

7.7.4 The net present value of improving cost-effectiveness by 3% every year over a 10-year period would be massive, in the order of billions of Euro.

7.7.5 The PRC considers that an overall network target to reduce progressively the average “en-route ANS real unit cost” to 14% below the 2003 level in 2008, while meeting the European delay target, would serve as a challenging and achievable basis for co-operative planning.

7.7.6 This European cost-effectiveness target should not be seen as, or directly translated into, individual objectives for each ANSP. The diversity of individual circumstances (e.g. different traffic growth and/or investment cycles) requires a corresponding degree of diversity in individual objectives.

PRR 7 - Performance Management

53

8 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 It is important to set performance targets to drive performance. It is even more important to create the adequate environment so that targets are met. This chapter contains initial PRC considerations on how to steer European ANS performance in line with agreed performance targets, in the context of decentralised ANS provided under designation by States and mostly under monopoly.

8.2 Outline process to steer European ANS performance

8.2.1 Adoption of European targets will constitute a clear signal of the political willingness of the EUROCONTROL Organisation to manage its performance. This will however be of little value without the individual commitment of all participants and without processes to ensure that these targets are met.

8.2.2 The process for setting and approving individual objectives will vary depending on governance, incentive and accountability arrangements. An adequate mix of regulatory and co-operative arrangements will need to be defined for regulation, service definition (quantity, quality and cost of service), charging/funding, ANSP governance, service provision and performance review, in order to ensure that the actual performance of the European ANS system converges towards agreed European targets.

8.2.3 It is the States’ responsibility to designate (and delegate their responsibilities to) specific regulatory authorities, such as the National Supervisory Authority (NSA) foreseen by SES regulations, and to set up the rules that will govern the relationship between the regulatory authorities and the designated ANS providers. Whatever the individual arrangements are, it is essential to meet some minimum requirements: • Proper airspace user consultation, with public outcome; • Explicit performance objectives statements by ANSPs and clear accountability for

meeting them; • Publication of strategic business plans by ANSPs for their monopoly services; • Consolidation of individual plans at European level; • Actions of States/NSAs/ANSP governing bodies will need to be co-ordinated so as to

ensure consistency and alignment with European decisions.

8.2.4 These minimum requirements are in line with the PRC five ATM governance principles (see PRR 5, chapter 11 [Ref. 25]) noted by the Provisional Council in July 2002 (PC 14).

8.2.5 Disclosure of own performance objectives (including safety, cost-effectiveness and quality of service) and of business plans to meet them are essential to improve user consultation. The focus of user consultation should move to longer term performance objectives and means to achieve them.

8.2.6 Effective consultation will require the common willingness of both users and ANSPs to engage in a constructive dialogue. While ANSPs have a key role to play in this process,

PRR 7 - Performance Management 54

effective consultation also requires the commitment of airspace users to engage in such a dialogue and to allocate the right resources.

8.2.7 While the responsibility for setting individual objectives should remain largely at national level, it is important to recognise that all components are part of a common European network. A common framework will need to be set up so as to allow the consolidation of individual objectives at European level, and to ensure the consistency and alignment of individual objectives and European targets as illustrated in Figure 62 below.

8.2.8 Key elements of the business plans, including main capital expenditures, should also be consolidated so as to provide European policy makers with a clear picture of where the ANS system is heading, and to provide them with the necessary information to act in case of deviation from the agreed European targets.

Individual objectives

Business Plans

European consolidation & co-ordination

NSA/regulatory authorities

ANS providers

Member State EUROCONTROL OrganisationMember State EUROCONTROL Organisation

European targets



Governance board

Figure 62: Matching individual objectives and European targets

8.3 Cost-effectiveness objectives and charging regimes

8.3.1 Adoption of both European targets and individual performance objectives is seen as central in steering future performance. Charging regimes will influence to what extent targets are met.


8.3.2 There are presently two charging options for en-route, i.e. full cost recovery (Option A) and independent national economic regulator (Option C). Other options can be envisaged, as summarised in Figure 63.

Option A Option A+ Option B Option C Option D Full cost

recovery Option A plus

individual objectives

“Contractual” (Binding

agreement)

Independent national economic

regulation

Independent European economic

regulation

Perf

orm

ance

O

bjec

tives

Status quo Statement of individual performance objectives (5 years) after consultation with users

5-years rates set by ANSP/State after extended consultation with users

Rates set by independent economic regulator – National level

Rates set by independent economic regulator – European level

Applies in most EUROCONTROL States

Under investigation by enlarged Committee

Applies in UK

Adv

anta

ge + In existence + Longer term focus;

+ Improved user consultation; + Accountability

+ Minimal intrusiveness; + Incentives to deliver performance objectives

+ Strong incentives; + Option exists

+ Strong incentives

Dis

adva

ntag

e - Limited incentives; - Short term focus.

- Need new option in Route Charge Principles

-Heavy regulatory load for ANSP and States; - Risk of regulatory fragmentation

- Heavy regulatory load for ANSP

Figure 63: Some options for charging regimes

8.3.3 The full cost recovery regime applies in most States. The PRC argued in PRR 660 that “the [present] full cost recovery regime does not provide incentives to deliver performance and be responsive to user needs beyond levers normally available in public sector”.

8.3.4 Effective involvement of users in the definition of ANSP performance objectives and the obligation for ANSPs to publish individual objectives, and to comment in case of deviation, would in itself create a non-financial incentive to improve performance (Option A+). This option would give a longer term perspective in the setting of charges under the full cost recovery regime.

8.3.5 States may already opt for the alternative charging regime whereby a price cap is set by an independent national economic regulator (Option C). If the ANSP achieves better performance than the minimum allowed, it retains part (or the totality) of the surplus. Application of this option in the UK is too recent to assess results, although indications are that incentives to improve NATS performance are benefiting airspace users through lower charges (see § 6.4.8).

8.3.6 Option C, which requires strong economic regulators, has the potential to add regulatory fragmentation to the present airspace fragmentation. This goes against Single European Sky objectives. The creation of a strong and independent European economic regulator (Option D in Figure 63) would avoid regulatory fragmentation and ensure consistency across Europe.

8.3.7 On the other hand, there might be an opportunity to develop alternative incentive mechanisms which depart from NATS-like price caps. As emphasised in a recent report

60 Ref 18, § 5.7.23


prepared by RPI (ref. 26, page 35) the role of regulation in network sectors has shifted, and continues to shift, in fundamental ways:

“The challenge is less to ‘represent consumers’ on the ground that it is infeasible to give ‘voice’ to consumers in any other way when each consumer is small and there are millions of them, than to develop and supervise institutional arrangements in which the ‘voice’ of network users – relatively few in number, frequently large and commercially sophisticated – can be heard directly and cannot be ignored.”

8.3.8 In this context, a new option could be developed to offer States the possibility to opt for a more “contractual” approach, within an appropriate regulatory framework, whereby airspace users and ANSPs commit to some form of binding agreements covering key features such as allowable revenues, outputs, risk sharing, and future investments (Option B). Although the regulator would play a less central role than in Option C and Option D, it could critically act as (1) facilitator for the emergence of such agreements; (2) adjudicator in case of conflicting interests; (3) promoter of identification and revelation of effective information in formats that will allow all parties to contribute to an efficient operation and development of the network.

8.3.9 The enlarged Committee for Route Charges is investigating the option of setting unit rates for a period of 5 years. This proposal, supported by adequate users consultation and information disclosure requirements, would be consistent with Option B above and would enhance flexibility and accountability whilst allowing for incentives.

8.3.10 Each option outlined above has its own merits and limitations which would need to be further addressed. However, experience suggests that even very modest incentive arrangements can have substantial effects on performance, particularly when they are introduced for the first time. As noted in the RPI report [Ref. 26, page 153] one of the underlying reasons could be that the mere exercise of specifying and measuring performance improvements can lead to a shift in the business focus and conduct of the ANSP.

8.4 The SES regulations

8.4.1 The SES regulations apply to Member States of the EEA61 and Switzerland through bilateral agreements. However, extension of the SES to other European countries is an explicit objective of the European Community. To that end, it is explicitly foreseen that the Community shall endeavour, either through bilateral agreements, or within the context of EUROCONTROL, to extend the scope of the SES to those countries (ref. Art 7 ‘Framework Regulation’).

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

8.4.2 SES implementing rules should seek to enhance ANS governance and performance by bringing clearer accountability, responsibility and roles among the State, regulatory authorities, and ANSPs.

8.4.3 The SES ‘Framework Regulation’ and the ‘Service Provision Regulation’ are particularly relevant in the context of ANS performance.

8.4.4 Art. 4(1) of the SES ‘Framework Regulation’ foresees National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) nominated by Member States. Art 2(1) of the SES ‘Service Provision Regulation’ states that NSAs “…shall ensure the appropriate supervision of the application of this Regulation, in particular with regard to the safe and efficient operation of air navigation service providers…”. Therefore, the SES regulations will enshrine the independence of ANSPs and regulators in EU law.

61 See glossary


8.4.5 A key feature of the SES ‘Service Provision Regulation’ is Art. 6 on “common requirements for the provision of ANS”. Art. 7(3) ‘Service Provision Regulation’ foresees that “NSAs shall issue certificates to ANSPs where they comply with the common requirements referred to in Art. 6.” SES common requirements should include, inter alia, the obligation on ANSPs (including aeronautical MET providers and AIS providers) to supply their NSA with yearly Strategic Business Plans, Annual Plans, and Annual Reports. These reports should be publicly available. Requirements may have to be adapted where competition applies.

8.4.6 It should be noted that on the basis of PRC recommendations, the Provisional Council has already taken a number of decisions in respect to the provision of forward-looking plans (see PC 6, November 1999 and PC 17, July 2003). Currently, however, several States/ANSPs do not produce a Strategic Business Plan. For those that do publish business plans, these are usually not integrated business plans linking technical/operational projects to associated human and financial resources and investments.

8.4.7 Finally, Art. 12(1) of the ‘Service Provision Regulation’ specifies that “Air navigation service providers, whatever their system of ownership or legal form, shall draw up, submit to audit and publish their financial accounts”.

INITIAL PROPOSALS TOWARDS ENHANCING THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

8.4.8 Both Art. 11(2c) ‘Framework Regulation’ and Art. 15(2e) ‘Service Provision Regulation’ provide the basis for improving transparency and the consultation process between airspace users and ANSPs. More specifically, Art. 15(2e) specifies that “…Implementing rules for the provision of information by the service provider shall be adopted in order to permit reviews of the provider’s forecasts, actual costs and revenues. Information shall be regularly exchanged between the NSAs, services providers, airspace users, the Commission, and EUROCONTROL”.

8.4.9 As part of the Strategic Business Plan published by the ANSPs, there should be an explicit requirement for ANSPs to set their individual key performance objectives after consultation with stakeholders and endorsement of the State/NSA and/or board (i.e. in agreement with their own governance channel). Typically, such key performance objectives should be set out for a medium term period covering the life span of the Strategic Business Plan (e.g. 5 years).

8.4.10 Although non-binding62, this process should entail a commitment by ANSPs to meet the KPI objectives published in their Strategic Business Plan.

8.4.11 ANSPs could be required to publish a written report on the consultation process and this should include recognition of, and responses to, arguments and issues raised in submissions by other parties (e.g. an independent performance review body as identified in Art. 11 of the ‘Framework Regulation’).

8.4.12 Effective oversight and review requires access to information and ability to verify this information. Existing EUROCONTROL Information Disclosure requirements, extended as required to fulfil the SES needs (according to Art. 11 ‘Framework Regulation’), should support independent performance review and benchmarking (i.e. identification of best practice and room for improvement).

8.4.13 It is expected that Annual Reports will include a quantitative assessment of actual ANSP performance against performance objectives stated in past Annual/Business Plans, audited

62 Except where NSAs would adopt more stringent and binding economic regulation on ANSPs

performance parameters.


accounts, specified information compatible with EUROCONTROL Specification for Information Disclosure and commentary.

8.4.14 Implementing rules for both the ‘Framework Regulation’ and ‘Service Provision Regulation’ should include measures to enhance the consultation process, accountability, responsibility and transparency.

INITIAL PROPOSALS FOR A CONSOLIDATION AND CO-ORDINATION PROCESS

8.4.15 Member States have the collective responsibility to set and approve unit rates for route charges. Art. 15(2b) ‘Service Provision Regulation’ emphasises that the costs to be taken into account include “… costs incurred by NSAs and/or recognised organisations, as well as other costs incurred by the relevant Member State and service provider in relation to the provision of air navigation services”.

8.4.16 Consequently, Member States, through their NSAs and EUROCONTROL, should be in a position to consolidate 5 year objectives drawing upon their ANSP’s Strategic Business Plan and Annual Plan.

8.4.17 This in turn, would allow the EUROCONTROL Organisation to anticipate future system performance and, in particular, to assess and expose any divergence with respect to the European cost-effectiveness target. Clearly, this will necessitate minimum reporting requirements to ensure that the information is available in homogeneous form and content (see Figure 62).

8.4.18 In order to ensure consistency of individual ANSP regulation-governance and agreed European targets, co-ordination processes of States/NSAs/ANSP boards will need to be introduced, addressing all performance aspects in a balanced way.

8.5 Regulatory/ co-operative policy mix

8.5.1 A mostly regulatory approach, complemented by an Implementation Monitoring and Support Programme, is followed for safety. This regulatory/co-operative policy mix is deemed to be adequate, given the overriding importance of safety.

8.5.2 For quality of service (i.e. delays), the EUROCONTROL Organisation elected to follow a co-operative approach, using joint capacity management processes based on information sharing and mutual commitments. This approach has been successful in meeting the delay target (see section 4.3), without “heavy” regulatory constraints.

8.5.3 With the advent of the SES, the co-operative approach to capacity management may have to be complemented with minimum regulatory requirements, concerning, for example, disclosure of capacity plans in business plans and measures taken to manage capacity in annual reports.

8.5.4 For economic performance, the regulatory/co-operative policy mix will depend on the charging option adopted by each State. In this context, Art 15(3e) ‘Service Provision Regulation’ specifies that charges may be used to provide mechanisms, including incentives consisting of financial advantages and disadvantages, to encourage ANSPs and/or airspace users to support improvements in ATM.

8.5.5 Finally, the economics of regulation suggest that direct and indirect (e.g. due to fragmentation) regulatory costs, as well as ANSPs costs for regulatory compliance should be carefully assessed when developing policies (see also section 6.9). The use of recognised organisations could help to keep those costs at appropriate levels.


8.6 Conclusions

8.6.1 It is important to set European ATM performance targets. It is even more important to ensure that performance targets are met, in a context of decentralised ANS provided under designation by States and mostly under monopoly. Performance management and related processes will be essential elements to ensure that individual objectives are consistent with European targets.

8.6.2 An adequate mix of regulatory and co-operative arrangements will need to be defined for regulation, service definition and provision (quantity, quality and cost of service), charging/funding, ANSP governance and performance review, in order to ensure that the actual performance of the European ANS system converges towards agreed European targets.

8.6.3 A first package of regulatory and co-operative arrangements is suggested: • ANSPs should publish individual performance objectives and corresponding business

plans for their monopoly services, after consultation with airspace users and approval by their governing body. This should be part of SES implementing rules;

• States/NSAs should have an explicit responsibility to ensure that the designated ANSPs’ performance is effectively managed. Common requirements for ANSP governance may have to be developed. The five governance principles presented in PRR 5 (Chapter 11) are relevant in this respect. Charging principles and incentives are also relevant, and several options are presented. Specific SES implementing rules should be developed and agreed;

• Actions of States, NSAs and ANSP governing bodies would need to be co-ordinated so as to ensure consistency and alignment with decisions at European level. The EUROCONTROL Agency has an important role to play in aggregating individual plans, identifying and promoting best practices, assisting States in planning and implementation;

• Finally, independent oversight and review with right of access to critical information is needed at national level and European level.

8.6.4 Regulatory costs and ANSPs costs for regulatory compliance should be carefully assessed when developing policies. The use of recognised organisations could help to keep those costs at appropriate levels.

60


PRR 7 - MET Costs 61

9 MET COSTS

9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 Meteorological (MET) services have been established by States for the protection of life and property and the wellbeing and safety of their citizens. Today, National MET Services (NMS) fulfil a large variety of tasks and functions and have a multitude of user groups with different needs and requirements. Amongst others, vital industries such as energy, agriculture, transportation, fishery, construction, tourism, the media, and users such as the military and the general public benefit from MET services and products.

9.1.2 According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aeronautical MET services are part of Air Navigation Services (ANS). The costs for aeronautical MET services are therefore usually included in ANS charges and thus recovered from aeronautical users.

9.1.3 Aviation is one of the few industries directly charged for MET services. In 2002, aeronautical MET costs represented approximately 6% of total (en-route and terminal) ANS costs. Overall, civil aviation paid some €380 M for en-route and terminal MET services in Europe in 2002.

9.1.4 The aeronautical MET infrastructure and MET data supplied by aircraft contribute significantly to the overall national and global MET observation system which is used for the benefit of many different user groups and the general public as recognised by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) [Ref. 27].

9.1.5 Over the past years, aeronautical MET charges have repeatedly given rise to discussion as to whether civil aviation pays a disproportionately high share of national MET costs and therefore subsidises other MET users.

9.1.6 In order to assess whether the large contribution of civil aviation towards the recovery of national MET costs is justified, a need to analyse the provision of aeronautical MET services in Europe was identified. This chapter is based on the findings of a special PRC report on aeronautical MET costs [Ref. 28].

9.2 The Aeronautical MET cost base

9.2.1 ICAO and the WMO provide basic guidance, including an inventory list of what can be attributed to civil aviation. However, the guidance material is not binding and therefore leaves scope for interpretation. Consequently, there are many ways of calculating the share of costs to be recovered through ANS charges.

9.2.2 According to ICAO guidelines, the aeronautical MET cost base is the sum of direct costs for MET facilities and services intended exclusively to serve aeronautical requirements plus a share of the MET ‘core’ costs.

9.2.3 Whilst direct costs for aeronautical MET services are relatively easy to identify, the allocation of ‘core’ services among MET user groups seems to be more difficult.


9.2.4 The costs for MET ‘core’ services cannot be allocated to one individual industry sector or user group and includes, amongst others, items such as the observation network, satellite systems, and general forecast and data processing centres. In some States, contributions to satellite programmes (such as EUMETSAT) seem to be a major MET cost driver of which a significant share is attributed to civil aviation. Overall, ‘core’ costs allocated to civil aviation typically represent a share of more than 50% of total civil aviation MET costs.

9.2.5 Despite WMO recommendations, aeronautical users are often not effectively consulted concerning product improvements and developments, nor are they given the opportunity to understand or question the MET costs they have to pay. There is scope for improving the relationship between the aeronautical users groups and the MET service providers.

9.3 MET cost allocation and recovery

9.3.1 Once the aeronautical MET cost base is established, the costs need to be attributed to “service areas” (en-route and terminal) and user groups, according to the ICAO cost-reflectiveness principle. Failure to correctly determine and reflect the en-route and terminal MET cost drivers in the cost base of the respective “service areas” most likely results in cross-subsidy between aeronautical user groups.

9.3.2 Although ICAO recommends that allocation of ANS costs should be in accordance with operational boundaries and user groups, some 89% of the aeronautical MET costs were allocated to en-route services in 2001. Of the 28 countries analysed, only 16 attributed MET costs to terminal ANS services, in very different proportions, as shown in Figure 64.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Den

mar

k

FYR

OM

Ger

man

y

Hun

gary

Irela

nd

Italy

Mal

ta

Net

herla

nds

Por

tuga

l

Slo

veni

a

Spa

in +

Can

aria

s

Turk

ey

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Rom

ania

Sw

eden

Slo

vak

Rep

.

Bel

gium

-Lux

.

Fran

ce

Aus

tria

Mol

dova

Sw

itzer

land

Cze

ch R

ep.

Bul

garia

Latv

ia

Nor

way

Lith

uani

a

Est

onia

Finl

and

Terminal MET Costs 2001 En-route MET Costs 2001 Source: ACE 2001

Figure 64: MET cost allocation to En-route and terminal charges (2001)

9.3.3 Although there is a harmonised and effective European system to recover consolidated en-route ANS costs, including associated MET costs, there is no such system for the recovery of costs allocated to terminal MET services. The high share of aeronautical MET costs that is currently allocated to en-route services suggests that the existing system for the recovery of en-route ANS costs might be used as a convenient way for the recovery of total aeronautical MET costs.

9.3.4 In some States, national MET costs allocated to civil aviation would appear to be disproportionately high, compared to other MET users. Civil aviation MET costs


typically represent 25% of the total national MET costs, a share ranging from 10% to 50% among States [Ref. 29].

9.3.5 In view of the growing importance of MET services to other industries and the general public, there is a need to ensure that aeronautical users are not asked to pay for MET services they do not require or that are not properly allocated to them. Instead, MET services should make the most effective use of the existing national and international aeronautical MET infrastructure to avoid duplication of services.

9.4 European Aeronautical MET cost development

9.4.1 Meaningful and reliable data on aeronautical MET costs in Europe are still scarce. For the calculation of the national unit rates, only one figure is supplied for en-route MET costs. Increases in aeronautical MET costs are usually not commented.

9.4.2 The SES regulations are expected to have a significant influence here, as aeronautical MET services are part of ANS (c.f. Art.2 (4) ‘Framework Regulation’ [Ref. 1]). SES requirements, e.g. for transparent charging schemes and accounts (c.f. Art.12 & 14, ‘Service Provision Regulation’ [Ref. 2]), will therefore apply to aeronautical MET services.

9.4.3 Figure 65 shows the development of European en-route MET costs as a proportion of total en-route ANS costs. Due to the relatively high growth rate of ATM/CNS costs, the share of aeronautical MET costs within the total en-route ANS costs decreased from 7.9% in 1998 to 6.7% in 2002. However, the share of MET costs within the total (en-route) ANS costs is expected to rise again between 2003 and 2004.

250

260

270

280

290

300

310

320

330

340

350

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 (P) 2004 (P)

En-

rout

e M

ET

cost

s (m

illion

)

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

% o

f tot

al (e

n-ro

ute)

AN

S co

sts

MET costs (en-route)En-route MET costs as a proportion of total (en-route) ANS costs

Source: CRCOCosts were deflated by using the MUICP deflator from Eurostat Figure 65: En-route MET costs as a proportion of en-route ANS costs (1998-2004)


9.4.4 Aeronautical en-route MET costs remained fairly stable over the past five years, and appear to follow traffic trends at European level as shown in Figure 66.

100

105

110

115

120

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 (P) 2004 (P)

Inde

x: 1

00 =

199

8

(En-route) MET costs Km flown

Costs were deflated by using the MUICP deflator from Eurostat Source: CRCO Figure 66: En-route MET costs and traffic (1998-2004)

9.4.5 At national level, the Czech Republic (+15.1%), Hungary (+11.4%), Slovak Republic (+9.9%), Greece (+8.3%), Norway (+6.4%), and Italy (+4.5%) show the highest average annual growth rates between 1998 and 2002 (see Figure 67).

9.4.6 A number of States succeeded in reducing their en-route MET costs over the analysed period. States with a notable negative growth rate are Malta (-13.2%), Austria (-4.8%), Spain (-3.2%), Switzerland (-3.1%) and Bulgaria (-3%).

4.0%

8.3%

2.1% 4.

4%

0.6%

4.2% 6.

4%

11.4

%

9.9%

0.3%

15.1

%

0.8%

-13.

2%

-2.6

%

-3.0

%

-3.1

%-4.8

%

-3.2

%

-0.6

%

-1.4

%

0.7%

4.5%

-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10

01020304050607080

Fran

ce

Ger

man

y

Italy

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Spa

in +

Can

aria

s

Aus

tria

Turk

ey

Net

herla

nds

Gre

ece

Bel

gium

-Lux

.

Irela

nd

Sw

eden

Sw

itzer

land

Portu

gal

Den

mar

k

Bul

garia

Nor

way

Cyp

rus

Hun

gary

Cze

ch R

ep.

Slo

vak

Rep

.

Mal

ta

Eur

o (m

illio

n)

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

MET (en-route) costs in 2002 4-year average annual growth rate (1998-2002)

Source: CRCOCosts were deflated by using the MUICP deflator from Eurostat (2002 Prices) Figure 67: En-route MET costs (2002) and average annual growth rates (1998-2002)

9.4.7 Whereas the Czech Republic plans to maintain its high growth rate for aeronautical MET costs, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Norway plan to reduce their en-route MET costs substantially between 2002 and 2004.

9.4.8 Data from the 2001 ACE Benchmarking Report [Ref. 8] enables a first analysis of total ANS (terminal + en-route) MET costs (see Figure 68). The five States with the highest overall MET costs in 2001 (France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Spain) accounted for two thirds of the total MET costs allocated to civil aviation, as shown in Figure 68.


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Fran

ceG

erm

any

Italy

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Spa

in +

Can

aria

sA

ustri

aTu

rkey

Sw

itzer

land

Bel

gium

-Lux

.N

ethe

rland

sIre

land

Bul

garia

Rom

ania

Sw

eden

Nor

way

Finl

and

Portu

gal

Den

mar

kH

unga

ryC

zech

Rep

.S

love

nia

Mal

taS

lova

k R

ep.

FYR

OM

Mol

dova

Eur

o (m

illio

n)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

cum

ulat

ed %

Terminal + En-route MET costs 2001Cumulative MET costs (2001)Cumulative Km flown (2001) Source: ACE 2001

Figure 68: Total (en-route + terminal) MET costs by State (2001)

9.5 Comparison of Aeronautical MET charges

9.5.1 The following section focuses on a comparison of aeronautical MET charges imposed on airspace users for the provision of aeronautical MET services. It is acknowledged that the scope and quality of services differs among MET providers63.

9.5.2 It is important to keep a gate-to-gate perspective because the allocation of MET charges among en-route and terminal ANS varies between States and might introduce a bias in the analysis. The ‘total MET charges per composite flight-hour’ is used here to assess the relative weight of MET charges for users,

9.5.3 Figure 69 indicates that Austria has the highest unit MET cost per composite flight-hour (€81), followed by Bulgaria (€53). In both States, MET services are provided by the ANSP itself. The lowest unit MET costs are charged by the Czech Republic (€8), Sweden (€11) and Moldova (€12).

9.5.4 If the ten MET service providers with the highest gate-to-gate MET charges were able to reduce their MET related charges to an average gate-to-gate level, total MET costs to civil aviation could be reduced by as much as 11% per annum (i.e. €39M savings).

63 For example, the UK MET office is in charge of one World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC), which

contributes to operational costs.


81

53

3834 33

29 29 28 28 28 27 26 25 25 2519

16 15 13 13 13 13 12 11 8

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Aus

tria

Bul

garia

Sw

itzer

land

Italy

Rom

ania

Slo

veni

a

Finl

and

Turk

ey

Irela

nd

Fran

ce

Bel

gium

-Lux

.

Ger

man

y

Net

herla

nds

Mal

ta

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Spa

in +

Can

aria

s

Nor

way

Portu

gal

FYR

OM

Den

mar

k

Hun

gary

Slo

vak

Rep

.

Mol

dova

Sw

eden

Cze

ch R

ep.

Eur

o ch

arge

d pe

r com

posi

te fl

ight

-hou

r

Average (26)

MET Service provided internally by ANSP Source: ACE 2001 Figure 69: MET charges per composite flight-hour (2001, gate-to-gate)

9.6 Conclusions

9.6.1 Aviation is one of the few industries directly charged for MET services. In 2002, civil aviation paid some €380M for en-route and terminal MET services in Europe in 2002 (6% of ANS costs).

9.6.2 Although aeronautical MET costs have remained stable at European level between 1998 and 2002, significant variations were observed at national level. The share of MET costs within the total en-route ANS costs is expected to rise again between 2003 and 2004.

9.6.3 As there is no apparent justification for a link of aeronautical MET costs to en-route traffic levels, it is important that aeronautical MET costs are effectively managed and not simply adjusted to traffic increases.

9.6.4 In some States, national MET costs allocated to civil aviation would appear to be disproportionately high, compared to other MET users. In view of the growing importance of MET services to other industries and the general public, there is a need to ensure that aeronautical users are not asked to pay for MET services they do not require or that are not properly allocated to them. Instead, MET services should make the most effective use of the existing national and international aeronautical MET infrastructure to avoid duplication of services.

9.6.5 Decisions concerning the national MET infrastructure are often taken without aeronautical user consultation and irrespective of user requirements. There is a need to move towards a more customer-focused relationship, including more effective consultation meetings.

9.6.6 Disclosure of relevant information and transparency is crucial in order to build confidence, to enable justified and cost-reflective MET charges, and to avoid user discrimination and make any cross-subsidisation transparent.


9.6.7 SES regulations apply to aeronautical MET services, as they are part of ANS (c.f. Art. 2(4) ‘Framework Regulation’). SES implementing rules should include requirements applicable to MET services, e.g. consultation, transparent charging schemes and accounts (c.f. Art.12 & 14, ‘Service Provision Regulation’).

9.6.8 Separate reporting and consultation requirements should be developed for MET. More detailed information on MET cost allocation mechanisms, MET cost drivers, operational MET data, MET outputs, and planned investments that are likely to affect the level of aeronautical MET charges would encourage performance improvements by enabling users to understand and to question the MET costs they have to pay. The implementation of transparent accounting systems which allocate the costs in accordance with operational boundaries and product categories would be an important step forward.

9.6.9 Within Europe, there are wide variations in the MET infrastructure, the way it is managed and operated, and in the services rendered to aviation. There are also variations in charges levied, which would appear to be related to efficiency and/or cost allocation issues.

68


69

ANNEX I - IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF PAST RECOMMENDATIONS

SAFETY

PRR 1 Recommendation PC 5 decision (July 1999) PRC Comment

1 The Provisional Council is invited to establish urgently a harmonised safety performance reporting system.

The Provisional Council recognised the need to establish urgently a harmonised safety performance reporting system.

The SRC developed, and the Permanent Commission approved, ESARR 2,which came fully into force on 01/01/02.


2 The Provisional Council is invited to encourage all States to recognise that the collection of safety data is facilitated by the adoption of “no penalty” reporting policies.

{Considered under “Safety” agenda item”} The Provisional Council urged all States to adopt “no penalty” safety incident reporting policies where these were not already in place.

The PRC safety survey on legal impediments to penalty-free safety incident reporting (2002) found this was not the case in a majority of States. Transposition of directive 2003/42/EC on incident reporting into national laws should improve the situation.


3 The Provisional Council is invited to urge States to incorporate and implement in their national regulatory frameworks the initial elements of the safety measurement and improvement programme (ESARR 2), in accordance with Commission Decision No. 80.

The Provisional Council agreed to urge States to incorporate and implement in their national regulatory frameworks the initial elements of the safety measurement and improvement programme (ESARR 2), in accordance with Commission Decision No. 80.

The ESARR Implementation Monitoring and Support Programme reveals that ESARR 2 was still not fully implemented by all States In 2003.


4 The Provisional Council is invited to request States to supplement, where possible, the detection of safety occurrences and safety data collection by using automated tools, harmonised at European level. This should be done in a non-punitive environment, as decided at PC 5 (July 1999) and supported at MATSE 6 (January 2000).

The Provisional Council requested States to supplement, where possible, the detection of safety occurrences and safety data collection by using automated tools, harmonised at European level, on the understanding that this should be done in a non-punitive environment, as decided at its 5th Session and supported at MATSE 6.

Systematic detection of safety occurrences and non-punitive environment only apply in a minority of ANSPs.


5 The Provisional Council is invited to agree that it is essential that ESARR 2 is implemented in each Member State and that, in that context, a formal obligation is placed by Member States on their Air Traffic Management Service Providers to systematically detect, report and analyse all safety occurrences to the level specified in ESARR 2.

The Provisional Council agreed that it was essential that ESARR 2 be implemented in each Member State and that, in that context, a formal obligation should be placed by Member States on their Air Traffic Management Service Providers to systematically detect, report and analyse all safety occurrences to the level specified in ESARR 2.

ESARR 2 is still not fully implemented by all States. Systematic detection of all safety occurrences is implemented in a few ANSPs only

Implemented Partially implemented Not implemented Recent decision or no action needed

70

PRR 4 Recommendation PC 11 decision (July 2001) PRC Comment 6 The Provisional Council is invited to

request States to ensure that ESARR 3 is implemented by their Air Traffic Management Service Providers by the target date of July 2003.

The Provisional Council requested States to ensure that ESARR 3 is implemented by their Air Traffic Management Service Providers by the target date of July 2003.

The implementation status of ESARR 3 will be unknown until Spring 2004.


7 The Provisional Council is invited to agree that separation between safety regulation and service provision functions should be established in each EUROCONTROL Member State, and also to urge those Member States which are also members of the European Community to have this principle enshrined in Community legislation.

The Provisional Council requested the Safety Regulation Commission, in collaboration with the Director General, to examine the issues of separation between safety regulation and service provision functions and to report to a future session of the Provisional Council.

The Safety Regulation Commission has drafted principles, but they are not applied in a number of cases.


8 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Safety Regulation Commission to propose adequate ECAC-level safety performance indicators and associated targets before July 2003 for adoption by the Commission through the Provisional Council. The SRC should be invited to include corresponding indicators in its regular safety reports to the Provisional Council.

The Provisional Council requested the Safety Regulation Commission to propose adequate ECAC-level safety performance indicators before July 2003, and associated targets at an appropriate juncture, for approval by the Commission through the Provisional Council and invited it to include corresponding indicators in its regular safety reports to the Provisional Council.

Because of the patchy and uneven availability of data in Europe, a reliable European safety indicator cannot be built. The safety trends measured so far are incomplete. It is not possible to assess whether the ECAC safety objective is being met.


9 The Provisional Council is invited to urge States to comply with the Commission Decision No. 80 and to ask the Commission to decide that the EUROCONTROL Publication and Confidentiality Policy should permit publication of States’ compliance with safety processes and EUROCONTROL standards, whilst at the same time protecting individuals and detailed safety data.

The Provisional Council urged States to comply with Commission Decision No. 80, and requested the Agency, in consultation with the SRC, to carry out a study of the legal frameworks related to the EUROCONTROL Publication and Confidentiality Policy and of the criteria and conditions required to permit publication of States’ compliance with safety processes and EUROCONTROL Standards, whilst at the same time protecting individuals and detailed safety data, and to report to the 15th Session.

ESARR 2 is still not fully implemented by all States.. At PC 17, SRC announced intention to name States that do not comply with safety regulations.


10 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Commission to introduce binding provisions for the minimum legal protection of individuals reporting safety occurrences in EUROCONTROL Member States and to avail itself of all mechanisms, in particular those provided in the European Community legal order, to ensure swift and effective implementation.

The Provisional Council requested the Agency, in consultation with the SRC, to carry out a study of the legal frameworks as well as the criteria and conditions required to submit appropriate additional draft binding provisions for the minimum legal protection of individuals reporting safety occurrences in EUROCONTROL Member States for Commission approval via the Provisional Council.

Superseded by adoption of Directive 2003/42/EC on 13 June 2003.

71

PRR 6 Recommendation PC 17 decision (July 2003) PRC Comment 11 The Provisional Council is invited:

(i) to request those States which have not yet done so to implement the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements – Reporting and Assessment of Safety Occurrences in ATM (ESARR 2) without delay and,

(ii) to request the European Community to adopt the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) that shall be made mandatory under Community law, as soon as the relevant Single European Sky regulation enters into force.

The Provisional Council: c) requested those States which had not

yet done so to implement the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements – Reporting and Assessment of Safety Occurrences in ATM (ESARR 2) without delay, and

ii. requested the European Community to adopt the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) that shall be made mandatory under Community law, as soon as the relevant Single European Sky regulation enters into force.

Recent decision

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to safety

Implementation of PC decisions relating to safety is not satisfactory. The lack of commitment by States and ANSPs to the implementation of ESARRs indicates that some form of enforcement may be needed. Despite numerous decisions, safety data collected from States still do not allow meaningful conclusions to be derived at European level in terms of actual safety achievement and trends (SRC Conclusion). Systematic detection of all safety occurrences is implemented in a few ANSPs only. The non-punitive environment prerequisite is fulfilled in a few States only. Adoption of the Directive 2003/42/EC is expected to improve both occurrence reporting and a non-punitive environment when transposed into national laws. Only part of ESARR 2 has been transposed into the Directive.

72


AIRSPACE


12 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Agency and concerned States, in addition to initiatives that are being taken by the EUROCONTROL Organisation, to develop top-down airspace designs in the most critical areas in Europe, with the objective of meeting the ATM 2000+ safety objective, and to increase airspace capacity, flight efficiency and, where possible, cost-effectiveness. Priority should be given to upper airspace in critical areas, in particular the “Area South” and “Area North identified in PRR 1.

The Provisional Council requested the Agency and the States concerned, in addition to initiatives being taken by EUROCONTROL, to develop airspace designs in the most critical areas in Europe, with the objective of meeting the ATM 2000+ safety objective, and to increase airspace capacity, flight efficiency and, where possible, cost-effectiveness, with priority being given to upper airspace in critical areas, in particular the “Area South” and “Area North” identified in PRR 1 on the understanding that it would examine these proposals at its 6th Session.

The Agency and States concerned took initiatives, e.g. CHIEF, 5-States, meetings of Directors OPS, establishment of capacity enhancement function, which resulted in substantial improvements in Area North and South.


13

14

The Provisional Council is invited to note that 80% of ATFM delays originated from upper airspace in Summer 1998, reiterates its plea to all concerned parties to ensure timely implementation of RVSM, and encourages early RVSM application where possible. The Provisional Council is invited to request the Agency and concerned ATSPs to sign agreements by mid 2001, which specify agreed upper airspace capacity increase profiles upon implementation of RVSM, and attempt to reduce any temporary decrease to the minimum possible.

{Both PRC recommendations were taken together by the Provisional Council} The Provisional Council noted that 80% of ATFM delays originated from upper airspace and ground-unlimited sectors in Summer 1998, reiterated its plea to all parties concerned for timely implementation of RVSM, and encouraged early RVSM application where possible taking into the conditions required in the ICAO 70/30 document.

RVSM was implemented successfully in January 2002.

PRR 2 Recommendation PC 6 decision (November 1999) PRC Comment

15 The Provisional Council is invited to invite the EUROCONTROL Commission to establish a task force, involving the European Community and the PRC, to design terms of reference for an Airspace Policy Commission (APC) which has the objective of making best use of European airspace and ATM resources, with an establishment date of 30/6/2000 for the APC.

The Provisional Council recognising the importance of airspace issues, invited the Director General to develop proposals, in consultation with all interested parties, the PRC and CMIC, for effective airspace regulation, design and management decision-making process, with the objective of making best use of European airspace for civil and military purposes and of ATM resources on the understanding that these proposals should be presented to the 7th Session of the Provisional Council.

The proposal for an APC was not accepted. However, this decision is superseded by adoption of the Single European Sky “Airspace regulation”.

73


16 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of the Agency to reinforce existing co-operative capabilities for airspace design (e.g. fast time simulations) and to resource them adequately.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General of the Agency to reinforce existing co-operative capabilities for airspace design (e.g. fast time simulations) and to resource them adequately.

Co-operative airspace design capabilities remain unchanged due to budget limitation.


17 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to examine the implementation status of Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) in European States, and to put in place a programme to ensure best practice and to foster integration of civil/military air traffic services. Real-time information should be made readily available to civil and military authorities to enable them to maximise the use of airspace and existing capacity.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to examine the implementation status of Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) in European States, and to put in place a programme to ensure best practice and to foster integration of civil/military air traffic services, making real-time information readily available to civil and military authorities to enable them to maximise the use of airspace and existing capacity.

The report “Status of civil-military co-ordination in ATM” was published by the PRU and the Agency in September 2002. The Agency has developed a Civil-Military Action plan. Its effectiveness must be monitored.


18 The Provisional Council is invited to transform the five-States programme into a project similar to CHIEF with a view to ensuring prompt delivery of capacity in Area North, in liaison with the United Kingdom. A report should be made to the November 2000 Session of the Provisional Council.

The Provisional Council noted that the Five States Route Structure Steering Group would be examining this recommendation and that a report on the outcome would be given to the Provisional Council’s Spring 2001 Session.

The CHIEF report was submitted. Group is now dissolved.


19 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to prepare a proposal for a complete European airspace re-design for application in the medium-term (i.e. 2005+), taking into account civil and military airspace requirements from the outset. As a first step, areas where civil and military traffic interact significantly should be identified.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to prepare a proposal for a complete European airspace re-design for application in the medium-term (i.e. 2005+), taking into account civil and military airspace requirements from the outset and, as a first step, identifying areas where civil and military traffic interact significantly.

Sketches were developed internally and in “One Sky” EC contract. However, no definite proposals could be submitted. Present validity to be reviewed in view of “bottom-up” orientation towards building FBAs.

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to Airspace

Progress has been made in airspace matters. The PRC, therefore, has made no recommendations on this subject since 2000. Nevertheless, progress in top down airspace design has been slow.

Airspace design and implementation of Reduced Vertical Separation (RVSM) played a significant role in the recent capacity and delay improvements. A civil-military action plan is being developed, but implementation of Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) is incomplete and behind schedule in a number of States. A plan for the Dynamic management of airspace has started. However, the airspace situation is still not optimal.

74


AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT


20 The Provisional Council is invited to ask the Director General of EUROCONTROL to identify accountabilities of all parties concerned (States, ANSPs, Aircraft operators, Airports, Agency) for obtaining overall ATM system performance enhancements that result from EUROCONTROL programmes.

The Provisional Council asked the Director General to identify accountabilities of all parties concerned (States, ANSPs, Aircraft operators, Airports, EUROCONTROL Agency) for obtaining overall ATM system performance enhancements that result from EUROCONTROL programmes.

The EUROCONTROL Agency tracks the implementation of CIP, but accountabilities still need to be clarified.


21 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to develop proposals for transparent processes to share information on airport slots, airline schedules and ANSP capacity plans at strategic level.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to develop proposals for transparent processes to share information on airport slots, airline schedules and ANSP capacity plans at strategic level.

The ATFCM plan includes interaction between airport and ATFM slots. Draft ATFM regulations may address some of the issues. Transparent information sharing processes are not in place.


22 The Provisional Council is invited to agree in principle that ANSPs and aircraft operators should be bound to meet European minimum functional requirements and interoperability standards by specified dates, according to a Master Plan to be developed and agreed under the leadership of the Director General.

The Provisional Council agreed in principle that ANSPs and aircraft operators should be bound to meet European minimum functional requirements and interoperability standards by specified dates, according to a Master Plan to be developed and agreed under the leadership of the Director General and taking account of the existing European Convergence and Implementation Plan (ECIP) and the associated national Local Convergence and Implementation Plans (LCIPs).

Implementation of CIPs is not enforceable. Progress is expected from implementing the SES interoperability regulation and definition of the Master Plan.

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to ATM

The EUROCONTROL Agency tracks the implementation of Convergence and Implementation Plans (ECIP, LCIP). The accountability of all parties concerned (States, ANSPs, Airports and Agency) for obtaining overall ATM system performance enhancements that result from EUROCONTROL programmes still needs to be clarified.

Implementation of the EU Single European Sky regulation on interoperability is expected to improve the situation.

75


AIR TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT (ATFM)


23 The Provisional Council is invited to encourage air traffic service providers and the CFMU to adopt a more pro-active interaction in order to establish and manage capacity more efficiently.

The Provisional Council agreed that Member States should request air traffic service providers to adopt a better interaction with the CFMU in order to establish and manage capacity more efficiently, and urged the CFMU to reciprocate accordingly.

Interaction has improved, but the level of unnecessary ATFM regulations and wasted capacity is still too high.


24 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of the Agency to commission an independent study into how to optimise the use of existing capacity, and to improve ATFM principles, processes and operation, in order to reduce delay, with the involvement of the PRC/PRU.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General of the Agency to commission an independent study into how to optimise the use of existing capacity, and to improve ATFM strategy, processes and operation, in order to reduce delay, with the involvement of the PRC/PRU and CMIC/EMEU.

“Jaquard” report issued.


25 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to reinforce the interactions between airspace planning, capacity planning and flow management; so that they can act as one cohesive process.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to reinforce the interactions between airspace planning, capacity planning and flow management so that they can act as one cohesive process.

The Agency has prepared an ATFCM action plan and an initiative on Dynamic Management of Airspace. Both are in progress.


request the Director General to extend the ATFM Action Plan to cover a review of ATFM principles and modes of operation, and to develop appropriate rules of application.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to examine the need to extend the ATFM Action Plan to allow it to cover a review of ATFM principles and modes of operation, and to make proposals as appropriate.

The ATFCM Strategy covers the issue, but the implementation of this strategy will take some time.


27 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to investigate the feasibility and benefits of applying more tactical Air Traffic Flow Management in Europe.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to investigate the feasibility and benefits of applying more tactical Air Traffic Flow Management in Europe following the presentation of the Air Traffic Flow Management Strategy.

Recent decision R&D started with the CAMES project.

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to ATFM

The ATFCM Strategy satisfactorily addresses PRC recommendations towards more tactical ATFM. However, the speed and degree of implementation could vary, depending on the commitment of stakeholders and States. This seems to be a major risk to the ATFCM Strategy.

76


CAPACITY and DELAYS


28 The Provisional Council is invited to express full support for the collaborative short and medium term capacity planning processes led by the Agency, with full co-operation of all air traffic service providers concerned, and furthermore to request that this is developed by all air traffic service providers into rolling five-year capacity plans.

The Provisional Council expressed full support for the collaborative short and medium term capacity planning processes led by the Agency, with full co-operation of all air traffic service providers concerned, and agreed it would examine the issues involved in developing these processes into 5-year capacity plans at its 6th Session on the basis of a more detailed proposal.

Capacity plans were produced, but only after a second recommendation (32 below). Recent PRC studies have shown the need to link capacity plans and cost plans into a cohesive business plan.


29 The Provisional Council is invited to request all air traffic service providers concerned to support the PRU and/or the Agency in investigating the root causes of delays in the most critical control centres and sectors in Europe.

The Provisional Council agreed that its Members should request their air traffic service providers to support the PRU and/or the Agency in investigating the root causes of delays in the most critical control centres and sectors in Europe on the understanding that the Agency should prepare the text of a standard letter which they could use for this purpose and that the Director General would request ECAC States which are not members of EUROCONTROL to do likewise.

The PRU visited the most-critical centres and the Agency and obtained an adequate response.


30 The Provisional Council is invited to request that aircraft operators operating in European airspace, who are in a position to do so, provide OOOI data to the Agency and assist in the development of its use, according to a procedure to be defined under Agency leadership.

The Provisional Council agreed that aircraft operators operating in European airspace, who are in a position to do so, should provide OOOI data to the Agency and assist in the development of its use, according to a procedure to be defined under Agency leadership and requested Member States to take the appropriate steps to ensure compliance on the understanding that the Director General would request ECAC States which are not members of EUROCONTROL to do likewise.

Agency proposal on reporting of air transport punctuality was submitted to PC 9 (November 2000). OOOI data are now being provided to E-CODA on a regular basis, but by not by all potential providers. EU rules are in preparation.


31 The Provisional Council is invited to call a special Provisional Council Session on the delay crisis, to take place before MATSE 6 (January 2000) which would examine, inter alia, States’ ability to meet agreed performance targets and solve bottlenecks identified in PRR2, particularly in Switzerland, Italy, Spain and France (CH, I, E, F), and a report by the Agency on the medium-term action plan.

The Provisional Council invited Switzerland, Italy, Spain and France together with the Agency to present a written report to the Provisional Council, describing proposed action and related time-scale to address the bottlenecks identified in PRR 2, on the understanding that this written report should be available before the 7th Session of the Provisional Council.

An ad hoc PC Session was held in March 2000 (after MATSE 6) to address capacity issues.

77

PRR 2 Recommendation PC 6 decision (November 1999) PRC Comment 32

33

The Provisional Council is invited to require ATSPs to publish 5-year capacity plans annually (see economic information disclosure), and evidence that plans have been consulted with airspace users. The Provisional Council is invited to ensure that ATSPs are committed to delivering agreed capacity, answerable before the Provisional Council.

{Both PRC recommendations were taken together by the Provisional Council} The Provisional Council agreed that States would require their air traffic service providers (ATSPs) to publish 5-year capacity improvement plans annually, developed in consultation with airspace users; and that States would also require their ATSPs to be committed to delivering agreed capacity enhancement measures. In this regard, States shall account to the Provisional Council.

All ECAC States have produced capacity plans. However, these plans are non-binding.


34 The Provisional Council is invited to require the Agency to consolidate capacity plans and check against traffic forecasts.

The Provisional Council instructed the Agency to consolidate capacity plans in co-operation with air traffic service providers.

The EUROCONTROL Agency publishes updates regularly. However, information may be incomplete or inaccurate.


35 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to produce official air transport departure and arrival punctuality data in co-operation with the European Commission, investigate causes of air transport delays and publish findings on a regular basis.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to produce official air transport departure and arrival punctuality data in co-operation with the European Commission, and to investigate causes of air transport delays and publish findings on a regular basis.

E-CODA now publishes punctuality information based on a limited set of airlines. Co-operation with the European Commission on this subject is covered by the MOC.


request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to develop specifications for airline reporting, in consultation with all interested parties, and to report to the November 2000 Session of the Provisional Council.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to develop specifications for airline reporting, in consultation with all interested parties, and to report to the 9th Session of the Provisional Council.

EUROCONTROL/CODA developed and issued a suitable specification.

PRC Recommendation PC 10 decision (April 2001) PRC Comment

37 The optimum average en-route ATFM delay for the ECAC areas in the summer period is approximately 1 minute, which is consistent with the conclusions of the ATM/CNS Group (ACG). The PRC recommends that this target is reached as rapidly as possible without compromising safety, while at the same time keeping costs under control.

The Provisional Council noted information paper PC/01/10/5 from the Chairman of the Performance Review Commission, in particular its conclusion that the optimum average en-route ATFM delay for the ECAC area in the summer period of approximately 1 minute needed to be reached as rapidly as possible without compromising safety, while at the same time keeping costs under control.

ATFM Delays in 2003 were close to optimum.

78


agree that there should be no reduction of effort in optimising the use of existing resources and, where necessary, increasing capacity to meet and maintain the optimum en route summer delay target, while decreasing the other delays (i.e. en route delays in winter season, ATM airport and terminal delays).

The Provisional Council agreed that there should be no reduction of effort in optimising the use of existing resources and, where necessary, increasing capacity to meet and maintain the optimum en route delay target, while decreasing the other delays (i.e. ATM airport and terminal delays).

The interim delay target was met in 2002. ATFM delays were close to optimum in 2003

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to Capacity / Delays

Adoption of the ECAC delay target in 2001 and the active involvement of ANSPs and the Agency in related capacity management programmes resulted in ambitious targets being set and met.

Capacity should continue to be managed so as to avoid recurrence of high delays.

79


ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE


39 The Provisional Council is invited to agree that Member States should require Air Traffic Service Providers to provide the following information to users, other ATSPs and the PRC/PRU: Separate accounts for their air

traffic management activities, prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and independently audited;

A limited separation of key revenue, cost and asset items into those for en-route and those for approach and airport activities, also independently audited;

Information on the physical inputs used by the ATSP and the outputs/capacity produced;

require Air Traffic Service Providers to also provide plans which show how they will meet projected demand, covering staff, investment and training, and supported by appropriate resourcing plans including projected charges; encourage Air Traffic Service Providers, which are in position to do so, to participate in the pilot project.

The Provisional Council agreed that States should require Air Traffic Service Providers to provide the following information to users, other ATSPs and the PRC/PRU: - Separate accounts for their air traffic

management activities, prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and independently audited;

- A limited separation of key revenue, cost

and asset items into those for en-route and those for approach and airport activities, also independently audited;

- Information on the physical inputs used by

the ATSP and the outputs/capacity produced;

agreed to ensure that States should require Air Traffic Service Providers to also provide plans which show how they will meet projected demand, covering staff, investment and training, and supported by appropriate resourcing plans including projected charges; encouraged Air Traffic Service Providers which are in position to do so, to participate in the pilot project.

ANSPs participated in the pilot project on Information Disclosure. PC 12 (November 2001) approved the PRC’s Specification for Information Disclosure (Version 2) as a basis for mandatory reporting by ANSPs.

PRC Recommendation PC 9 decision (November 2000) PRC Comment

40

41

The Provisional Council is invited to recommend the Commission to agree that States should direct their respective ANSPs to publish information in conformity with the “Specification for Information Disclosure” on a yearly basis. The first submission relating to year 2000 to be provided by 1 June 2001. The Provisional Council is invited to recommend the Commission to agree that the information provided should be publicly disclosed unless the ANSP can demonstrate that disclosure would not be in the long-term interest of the stakeholder community.

{Both PRC recommendations were taken together by the Provisional Council} The Provisional Council welcomed the report submitted by the PRC in PC/00/9/2 and requested the PRC to re-examine the issues raised, in the light of the observations made in discussion, and to report back to the Provisional Council at the earliest opportunity.

The Specification for Information Disclosure was further developed (V2) and approved by PC 12 (November 2001).

80

PRC Recommendation PC 10 decision (April 2001) PRC Comment 42 The Provisional Council is invited to

encourage all Member States to ensure that their ANS Providers participate in the validation of information disclosure.

The Provisional Council agreed that all Member States should be encouraged to ensure that their ANS providers participate in the validation of information disclosure.

18 ANSPs participated in the validation phase on a voluntary basis.

PRC Recommendation PC 12 decision (November 2001) PRC Comment

43

The Provisional Council is invited: (1) to adopt a decision stating that

Member States shall require ANS Providers to provide EUROCONTROL’s Performance Review Commission with information on a yearly basis, in conformity with the “Specification for Information Disclosure”. The first submission relating to the year 2001 shall be due by 15 July 2002.

(2) to approve the “Specification for Information Disclosure”.

The Provisional Council: (1) adopted a decision stating that Member

States shall require ANS Providers to provide EUROCONTROL’s Performance Review Commission with information on a yearly basis, in conformity with the “Specification for Information Disclosure”. The first submission relating to the year 2001 shall be due by 15 July 2002.

(2) Approved the “Specification for Information Disclosure”.

2001 data were submitted by all but three ANSPs (Greece, Cyprus, Croatia). All concerned ANSPs submitted Year 2002 data.


44 The Provisional Council is invited to request the European Community to ensure that its rules on information disclosure include the Specification for Information Disclosure adopted by EUROCONTROL.

The Provisional Council requested the European Community to ensure that its rules on information disclosure include the Specification for Information Disclosure adopted by EUROCONTROL.

Recent decision. The EC indicated its acceptance.


45 The Provisional Council is invited: (i) to request the States to do their

utmost to control their unit rates and associated ANSPs’ costs;

(ii) to request the States to ensure that ANSPs develop forward-looking plans, which include capacity and cost performance objectives, in line with the decision taken at PC 6 (November 1999);

(iii) to ask the States to take these forward-looking plans into account when establishing unit rates.

The Provisional Council: (i) requested States to do their utmost to

control their unit rates and associated ANSPs’ costs,

(ii) requested States to ensure that ANSPs develop forward-looking plans, which include capacity and cost performance objectives, in line with the decision taken at PC 6 (November 1999), and

(iii) asked States to take these forward-looking plans into account when establishing unit rates.

Recent decision

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations

relating to Economic Performance Adoption of Information Disclosure requirements and the active participation of ANSPs has resulted in suitable data becoming available, in a better understanding of ATM cost-effectiveness and the yearly publication of ATM cost-effectiveness reports (ACE). There remains however much to be done to improve the economic performance.

81


EUROCONTROL ROUTE CHARGES SYSTEM


46 The Provisional Council is invited to give the Director General of EUROCONTROL the right of initiative to investigate States’ compliance with the EUROCONTROL Principles for Establishing the Cost-base for Route Facility Charges and the Calculation of the Unit Rates, in anticipation of the ratification of the Revised Convention.

The Provisional Council requested the enlarged Committee for Route Charges to investigate the issue of States’ compliance with the EUROCONTROL Principles for Establishing the Cost-base for Route Facility Charges and the Calculation of the Unit Rates.

At its November 2001 session, the enlarged Committee referred the matter to one of its working groups. No significant progress has been made.


47 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Director General of EUROCONTROL to commission an independent review of the charging principles in order to improve incentives for performance, taking account of the European Commission’s work on economic regulation and drawing out any implications for governance and regulation, and to report to the November 2003 session of the Provisional Council.

The Provisional Council requested the Director General to examine, together with the enlarged Committee, the need for a further independent review of the charging principles in order to improve the economic performance of the system, taking account of the European Commission’s work on economic regulation and drawing out any implications for governance and regulation once the other current parallel initiatives have reached their conclusion, and to report back to a future session.

Scenarios offering a greater flexibility in the route charges system are being developed by the Enlarged Committee.


48 The Provisional Council is invited to agree that the process for determining and setting route charges needs to be reviewed to ensure better control of costs and to ensure greater airspace user involvement at each stage of the process.

The Provisional Council agreed that the process for determining and setting route charges needed to be reviewed to ensure better control of costs and to ensure greater airspace user involvement at each stage of the process; tasked the enlarged Committee for Route Charges with assessing this process as part of its approach to achieving greater flexibility in the route charges system, and invited it to report the result to the 19th Session.

Recent decision

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to the

EUROCONTROL Route Charges System There has been no independent review of charging principles. The enlarged Committee has been entrusted to implement PC decisions related to the Route Charges System.

82


US/EUROPE COST-EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON


49 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Member States to encourage their Air Navigation Service Providers to participate actively in the benchmarking exercise being undertaken by the Performance Review Commission to understand the root causes for the wide performance gaps between US and Europe ATM Systems, as found in the PRC’s initial study, in co-operation with interested parties.

The Provisional Council requested Member States to encourage their Air Navigation Service Providers to participate actively in the benchmarking exercise being undertaken by the Performance Review Commission in co-operation with the interested parties.

Six ANSPs participated in the US-Europe ACC comparison.


50 The Provisional Council is invited to note the report entitled “A Comparison of Performance in Selected US and European En-route Centres”.

The Provisional Council noted the report entitled “A Comparison of Performance in Selected US and European En-route Centres”.


51 The Provisional Council is invited to request the Member States to encourage their Air Navigation Service Providers to identify and promote best practices towards ATM cost-effectiveness.

The Provisional Council requested the Member States to encourage their Air Navigation Service Providers to identify and promote best practices towards ATM cost-effectiveness.

Recent decision

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to US/Europe Cost-

effectiveness Comparison ANSPs have participated actively in benchmarking projects undertaken by the PRC. This resulted in substantial progress not only for performance review, but also for performance management, user consultations and social dialogue, and has shown that there is considerable room to improve European productivity.

83


ATM GOVERNANCE


52 The Provisional Council is invited to note that the PRC encourages application of the following five ATM governance principles:

1. clear accountability of the ANSP to the owners and regulators;

2. clear high level ANSP performance objectives endorsed by the State (safety, capacity/delay, cost-effectiveness);

3. explicit statements about autonomy of the ANSP in pursuing the performance objectives;

4. incentives to the ANSPs to achieve the performance objectives;

5. definition of rights and roles of regulators, owners and stakeholders at the national and European levels.

The Provisional Council noted that the PRC encourages application of the following five ATM governance principles once developed:

1. clear accountability of the ANSP to the owners and regulators;

2. clear high level ANSP performance objectives endorsed by the State (safety, capacity/delay, cost-effectiveness);

3. explicit statements about autonomy of the ANSP in pursuing the performance objectives;

4. incentives to the ANSPs to achieve the performance objectives;

5. definition of rights and roles of regulators, owners and stakeholders at the national and European levels.

Overall comment on implementation of PRC recommendations relating to ATM Governance

The Provisional Council has noted the PRC’s five ATM governance principles, which are crucial for improving European ATM performance. However, these principles have not been implemented widely.

84

ANNEX II - EVOLUTION OF UNIT COSTS PER STATE

Albania0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

9095100105110115120

Cost Per Km 1.13 1.04

Total Costs (index) 100 106

Traffic (index) 100 115

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Austria0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.99 1.05 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.85

Total Costs (index) 100 98 98 96 90 92 91

Traffic (index) 100 92 106 104 102 105 105

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Belgium-Lux.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.96 1.01 1.08 1.03


Traffic (index) 100 108 113 109 104 107 112

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Bulgaria0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.78


Traffic (index) 100 102 109 112 111 106 107

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Croatia0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90140190240290340390440490540

Cost Per Km 0.45 1.27 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.67


Traffic (index) 100 79 245 277 305 321 346

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Cyprus0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.46


Traffic (index) 100 110 121 119 111 112 114

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Czech Rep.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90110130150170190210230

Cost Per Km 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.44


Traff ic (index) 100 133 132 149 166 196 205

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Denmark0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.71


Traff ic (index) 100 107 110 110 104 106 104

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Finland0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

9092949698100102104106

Cost Per Km 0.49 0.47 0.46

Total Costs (index) 100 97 96

Traff ic (index) 100 102 104

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

France0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.77 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70


Traff ic (index) 100 109 116 117 116 121 124

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

85

FYROM0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.6

€ 20

02/ k

m

90

140

190

240

290

340

Cost Per Km 0.00 1.65 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.67

Total Costs (index) 100 115 125 124 125 128

Traff ic (index) 100 242 263 246 251 315

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Germany0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.86 0.91 0.99 0.95


Traff ic (index) 100 106 113 112 109 112 114

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Greece0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90110130150170190210

Cost Per Km 0.33 0.55 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.49 0.46


Traff ic (index) 100 108 122 121 118 125 130

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Hungary0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160170180

Cost Per Km 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.56


Traff ic (index) 100 100 103 102 100 104 104

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Ireland0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.57


Traff ic (index) 100 110 116 115 112 120 123

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Italy0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.80 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.75


Traff ic (index) 100 122 124 123 120 130 137

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Malta0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.54


Traff ic (index) 100 107 103 108 116 143 141

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Moldova0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

8090100110120130140

Cost Per Km 0.63 0.57 0.44 0.46

Total Costs (index) 100 94 90 87

Traff ic (index) 100 104 130 120

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Netherlands0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.72


Traff ic (index) 100 109 116 116 113 116 123

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Norway0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.56 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.66 0.58


Traff ic (index) 100 111 105 103 95 99 100

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

86

Portugal0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.58 0.58 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.68


Traff ic (index) 100 114 118 124 124 130 136

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Romania0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.71 0.57 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.71


Traff ic (index) 100 154 122 120 124 135 136

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Slovak Rep.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.84 0.68 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.74


Traff ic (index) 100 152 120 132 139 160 156

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Slovenia0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.79 1.06 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.73


Traff ic (index) 100 68 132 138 136 137 140

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Spain0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160170180190

Cost Per Km 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.76 0.79


Traff ic (index) 100 110 118 120 121 129 137

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Spain Canarias0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.75 0.71 0.80 0.84 0.85 1.00 1.01


Traff ic (index) 100 110 111 112 110 115 118

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Sweden0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.71 0.68 0.68


Traff ic (index) 100 105 108 107 101 103 103

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Switzerland0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.97 0.90 1.06 1.00


Traff ic (index) 100 105 111 107 104 105 106

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Turkey0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 0.63 0.77 0.61 0.64 0.55 0.62 0.56


Traff ic (index) 100 99 103 104 111 110 119

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

United Kingdom0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4

€ 20

02/ k

m

90100110120130140150160

Cost Per Km 1.24 1.14 1.19 1.25 1.18 0.97 1.04


Traff ic (index) 100 106 112 113 109 114 121

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

87

ANNEX III - GLOSSARY

ACC Area Control Centre. That part of ATC that is concerned with en-route traffic coming

from or going to adjacent centres or APP. It is a unit established to provide air traffic control service to controlled flights in control areas under its jurisdiction.

Accident Source: ICAO Annex 13

An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:

c) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: • Being in the aircraft, or • Direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have

become detached from the aircraft, or • Direct exposure to jet blast,

except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

c) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: • Adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight

characteristics of the aircraft, and • Would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected

component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories, or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin;

c) the aircraft is missing or completely inaccessible. ACE ATM Cost-Effectiveness programme ACG ATM/CNS Consultation Group (EUROCONTROL) ACI Airports Council International AENA Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea (AENA), Spain AFG Advisory Financial Group AGAS EUROCONTROL Action Group for Aviation Safety Agency The EUROCONTROL Agency AIS Aeronautical Information Service Alerting Service A service provided to notify appropriate organisations regarding aircraft in need of

search and rescue aid, and assist such organisations as required. ANS Air Navigation Service. A generic term describing the totality of services provided in

order to ensure the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation and the appropriate functioning of the air navigation system.

ANS CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic ANSP Air Navigation Services Provider. APP Approach Centre / Control Area North Munich, Karlsruhe, Maastricht, Reims ACCs Area South Marseille, Milan, Geneva, Zurich ACCs ASM Airspace Management.

A generic term covering any management activity provided for the purpose of achieving the most efficient use of airspace based on actual needs and, where possible, avoiding permanent airspace segregation.

ASDG Automated Safety Data Gathering ASMT Automated Safety Monitoring Tool ATC Air Traffic Control. A service operated by the appropriate authority to promote the

safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer ATFCM Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management.

88

ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management. ATFM is established to support ATC in ensuring an

optimum flow of traffic to, from, through or within defined areas during times when demand exceeds, or is expected to exceed, the available capacity of the ATC system, including relevant aerodromes. SES definition: “A function established with the objective of contributing to a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic by ensuring that ATC capacity is utilised to the maximum extent possible, and that the traffic volume is compatible with the capacities declared by the appropriate air traffic service providers”.

ATM Air Traffic Management. ICAO definition: A system consisting of a ground part and an air part, both of which are needed to ensure the safe and efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of operation. The airborne part of ATM consists of the functional capability which interacts with the ground part to attain the general objectives of ATM. The ground part of ATM comprises the functions of Air Traffic Services (ATS), Airspace Management (ASM) end Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM). Air traffic services are the primary components of ATM.

ATS Air Traffic Service. A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service, area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service. For the purposes of PRR 7, ATS comprises ATC, FIS and Alerting Services.

ATSA BULGARIA Air Traffic Services Authority of Bulgaria AUSTRO CONTROL Austro Control: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Zivilluftfahrt mbH, Austria

BELGOCONTROL Belgocontrol, Belgian ANSP

CAMES Co-operative ATM Measures for a European Single Sky (EC funded project).

CAMES involves Geneva, Milan, Rome, Marseille, Barcelona and Palma ACCs. CDM Collaborative Decision Making. A means to enable decisions based on the sharing of

real-time data about actual events that incorporate preferences and constraints. CDM is a central supporting feature of gate to gate, and for enhancing capacity [airports].

CEATS Central European Air Traffic System. The CEATS Programme is created to meet the needs of eight States – Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungry, Italy, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia – to co-operate in the provision of air traffic services within their airspace.

CEO Chief Executive Officer CESC Chief Executive Standing Conference CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain. CFMU EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit CFMU Area (36 States)

EUROCONTROL Member States in 2003 + Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine

CHIEF CH (Switzerland), I (Italy), E (Spain), F (France) CIP Convergence and Implementation Plan CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance. Commission The governing body of EUROCONTROL, formerly the Permanent Commission.

It is responsible for formulating the Organisation’s general policy. Composite flight hour En-route flight-hours + 0.22 x IFR terminal movements. See section 4.4 of Ref 8. CRCO EUROCONTROL Central Route Charges Office

DFS DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, Germany DHMi Devlet Hava Meydanlari Isletmesi Genel Müdürlügü (DHMi), General Directorate of

State Airports Authority, Turkey DNA Direction de la Navigation Aérienne France

89

EAD European AIS Database EANS Estonian Air Navigation Services, Estonia EASA European Aviation Safety Authority EATM European Air Traffic Management Enhancement Programme, EUROCONTROL EC European Commission ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference. ECIP European Convergence and Implementation Plan EEA European Economic Area (all EU Member States plus the States of Norway, Iceland

and Liechtenstein) EEC EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre, Brétigny Effective capacity The traffic level that can be handled with optimum delay (cf. PRR 5 Annex 6) ENAV Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo (ENAV) Company for Air Navigation

Services, Italy Enlarged Committee Enlarged Committee for Route Charges Enlarged Commission Enlarged Commission for Route Charges ESARR ESARR 2 ESARR 3 ESARR 4 ESARR 5 ESARR 6

EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement “Reporting and Analysis of Safety Occurrences in ATM” (Ed 2.0) “Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM Service Providers” (Ed 1.0) “Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM” (Ed 1.0) “Safety Regulatory Requirement for ATM Services' Personnel” (Ed. 2.0) “Safety Regulatory Requirement for Software in ATM Systems” (Ed 1.0)

ETFMS Enhanced Tactical Flow Management System. ETFMS gathers radar data in Europe in order to present an actual traffic picture to flow managers.

EU European Union EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites EUROCONTROL

The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. It comprises Member States and the Agency.

EUROCONTROL Member States

There were 31 Member states at 31 December 2003: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

EUROCONTROL Route Charges System

1988 (11 States): Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Portugal, Austria, Spain. 1997 (23 States): idem + Greece, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, Norway, Denmark, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, Slovak Republic. 2000 (28 States): idem + Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Monaco, FYROM. 2001 (29 States): idem + Moldova. 2002 (30 States): idem + Finland. 2003 (31 States): idem + Albania

EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Community EUROSTAT MUIC Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price

90

FAA Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America FDP Flight Data Processing. The FDP system processes elements of Flight Plan

Information for various applications such as flight data strip printing, radar data tag information, billing processes, national defence requirements. The Flight Data Processing System is responsible for collecting and interrogating aircraft position-related data derived from on-board navigation and position fixing systems for presentation to the ATC controllers. The FDP system uses this information to then probe for potential conflicts.

FIR Flight Information Region 1- A three-dimensional area in which aircraft are under control of usually a single authority. Internally, a FIR is divided into several geographical areas called sectors. Sometimes one or more FIRs have a combined upper area control. 2- an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided.

FIS Flight Information Services. A service provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.

FL Flight Level. Altitude above sea level in 100 feet units measured according to a standard atmosphere. Strictly speaking a flight level is an indication of pressure, not of altitude. Only above the transition level (which depends on the local QNH but is typically 4000 feet above sea level) flight levels are used to indicate altitude, below the transition level feet are used.

FMU Flow Management Unit. The strategic objective of an FMU is to co-ordinate traffic flow in such a way as to maximise the yield of available airspace.

FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance programme FUA Flexible use of airspace. Concept based on the fundamental principle that airspace

should not be designated as purely civil or military, but rather be considered as a continuum in which all user requirements should be accommodated to the greatest possible extent.

FYROM The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GAT General Air Traffic. Encompasses all flights conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures of ICAO.

GDP National Gross Domestic Product

IAA Irish Aviation Authority, Ireland IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO ADREP 2000 Accident/Incident Reporting System IFR Instrument Flight Rules. Properly equipped aircraft are allowed to fly under bad-

weather conditions following instrument flight rules. Incident An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft

which affects or could affect the safety of operation. Interested parties Government regulatory bodies, Air Navigation Service Providers, airport authorities,

airspace users, international civil aviation organisations, EUROCONTROL Agency, the advisory bodies to the Permanent Commission, representatives of airspace users, airports and staff organisations and other agencies or international organisations which may contribute to the work of the PRC.

ISO International Standards Organisation ISO 9000 International Standards For Quality Management, 1990

KPA Key Performance Area KPI Key Performance Indicator

91

LCIP Local Convergence and Implementation Programme Level bust Any unauthorised vertical deviation of more than 300 feet from an ATC flight

clearance. LGS SJSC Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (LGS), Latvia LPS Letové Prevádzkové Služby, Slovak Republic LVNL Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland, The Netherlands

M Million Maastricht The EUROCONTROL Upper Area Centre (UAC) Maastricht. It provides ATS in the

upper airspace of four States: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Northern Germany.

MATSE ECAC Transport Ministers’ meeting on the Air Traffic System in Europe MET Aeronautical Meteorology Services MIA Malta International Airport plc, Malta MOLDATSA Moldavian Air Traffic Services Authority, Moldova MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning MUAC Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre, EUROCONTROL MUICP Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price (EUROSTAT)

NATAM/AVINOR Luftfartsverket, Norway NATS National Air Traffic Services, United Kingdom NAV EP Navegação Aérea de Portugal E.P., Portugal NAVIAIR Flyvesikringstjenesten, Air Navigation Services, Denmark NM Nautical mile (1.852 km) NMS National Meteorology Services NSA National Supervisory Authorities (SES)

OAT Operational Air Traffic. Encompasses all flights which do not comply with the

provisions stated for General Air Traffic and for which rules and procedures have been specified by appropriate national authorities.

Occurrence (Source: ESARR 2)

Accidents, serious incidents and incidents as well as other defects or malfunctioning of an aircraft, its equipment and any element of the Air Navigation System which is used or intended to be used for the purpose or in connection with the operation of an aircraft or with the provision of an air traffic management service or navigational aid to an aircraft.

OOOI Out (Departure Block Time)-Off (Take-off)-On (Landing)-In (Arrival Block time) OPS Operational Services Organisation See “EUROCONTROL”. ORO NAVIGACIJA State Enterprise Oro Navigacija, Lithuania

PPP Purchasing Power Parities PRC Performance Review Commission PRR PRR 1 PRR 2 PRR 3 PRR 4 PRR 5 PRR 6 PRR 7

Performance Review Report First Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 1998 Second Performance Review Report - special report on Delays, Jan-Sept 1999 Third Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 1999 Fourth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2000 Fifth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2001 Sixth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2002 Seventh Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2003

PRU Performance Review Unit Primary Delay A delay other than reactionary Permanent Commission See “Commission” above PC Provisional Council of EUROCONTROL

Reactionary delay Delay caused by late arrival of aircraft or crew from previous journeys

92

Revised Convention Revised EUROCONTROL International Convention relating to co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation of 13 December 1960, as amended, which was opened for signature on 27 June 1997.

ROMATSA Romanian Air Traffic Services Administration, Romania Runway incursion European definition: Any unauthorised presence on a runway of aircraft, vehicle,

person or object where an avoiding action was required to prevent a collision with an aircraft. Source: ESARR 2. US definition: Any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground, that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking-off, intending to take off, landing or intending to land. Source: US (FAA order 8020.11A).

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima. RVSM was implemented in Europe in January 2002. It created six new flight levels between 29,000 ft and 41,000 ft at which aircraft approved for RVSM operations may fly with RVSM of 1,000 ft. the vertical separation was previously 2,000 ft.

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SES Single European Sky (EU), see Ref. 1 to 4, and

http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/single_sky/index_en.htm SKYGUIDE Skyguide, Switzerland Slot A take-off window assigned to an IFR flight for ATFM purposes SMF Safety Monitoring Facility (UK NATS) SRC Safety Regulation Commission SRU Safety Regulation Unit Stakeholders See “Interested parties” Summer period May to October inclusive

TOKAI Tool Kit for ATM Occurrence Investigation

UAC Upper Airspace Area Control Centre UK United Kingdom US The United States of America

VFR Visual Flight Rules. Under clear weather conditions (VMC), aircraft are allowed to

fly using visual navigation. Most small aircraft use visual navigation as they do not have proper equipment to permit IFR navigation.

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions. Meteorological conditions under which there is sufficient outside view to enable visual aircraft control and navigation (VFR flights).

WMO World Meteorological Organisation

93

ANNEX IV - REFERENCES

Most references are available on line from the PRC Website (http://www.EUROCONTROL.int/prc).

1 Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the framework for the

creation of the Single European Sky (“Framework Regulation”) 2 Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of air navigation

services in the Single European Sky (“Service provision Regulation”) 3 Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the organisation and use of the

airspace in the Single European Sky (“Airspace Regulation”) 4 Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the

European Air Traffic Management Network (“Interoperability Regulation”) 5 EUROCONTROL Revised Convention, Brussels (June 1997) 6 EUROCONTROL, Air Traffic Management Strategy for the Years 2000+ (ed. January 2003),

http://www.eurocontrol.int/eatmp/library/strategydoc/html 7 EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre, EEC Note 20/03, Traffic Complexity Indicators and Sector Typology

Analysis (November 2003), http://www.eurocontrol.fr/public/reports/eecnotes/2003/20.htm 8 Performance Review Commission, ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE) 2001 Benchmarking Report (September 2003),

http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html 9 Performance Review Commission, “A comparison of performance in selected US and European en-route Centres

(May 2003), http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html 10 High-Level European Action Group for ATM Safety, EUROCONTROL,

http://www.eurocontrol.int/activities/safety/agas.html 11 Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 June 2003 on Occurrence Reporting in

Civil Aviation (Official Journal 4 July.2003 L 167/24), http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/legislation/air_safety_en.htm

12 ESARR 3: Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM Service Providers, http://www.eurocontrol.int/src/documents/deliverables/esarr3v10ri.pdf

13 Annual safety report 2002, SRC DOC 31, EUROCONTROL Safety regulation Commission, http://www.eurocontrol.int/src/documents/deliverables/srcdoc31_e20_ri_no_signatures.pdf

14 Performance Review Commission, “Legal constraints to non-punitive ATM Safety Occurrence Reporting in Europe”, December 2002, http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html

15 EUROCONTROL, CFMU, ATFM summary 2003, February 2004, http://www.cfmu.eurocontrol.int/ATFM/public/docs/publicreport_2003year.pdf

16 University of Westminster “Evaluating the true cost to airlines of one minute of airborne or ground delay” (2003). 17 Institut du Transport Aérien (ITA) Cost of Air Transport Delay in Europe, Final Report November 2000,

http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/reports/stu2/documents/stu2.pdf. 18 Performance Review Commission, Sixth Performance Review Report (PRR 6), An assessment of Air Traffic

Management in Europe during the calendar year 2002 (July 2003), http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html 19 Impact of weather event uncertainty upon an optimum ground-holding strategy, John W. Andrews, Air Traffic

Control Quarterly, Vol 1(1), John Wiley & Sons, 1993 20 Progress towards cost-benchmarking of the European ATM system, Update of the cost-benchmarking model for

States in 2002 and predictions for 2004, Performance Review Unit, Technical Note, Spring 2004, http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html

21 EUROCONTROL, Specification for Information Disclosure, adopted by Decision 88 of the Commission in November 2001, http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/reports/eco1/documents/eco1.pdf

22 Performance Review Commission, ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE) 2002 Benchmarking Report (Spring 2004) 23 EUROSTAT (2002), “Purchasing power parities and related economic indicators for EU, acceding and candidate

countries and EFTA”. Not available for Malta and Moldova. 24 Institutional Strategy for European Air Traffic Management, European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),

MATSE 5, Copenhagen 1997, http://www.ecac-ceac.org 25 Performance Review Commission, Fifth Performance Review Report (PRR 5), An assessment of Air Traffic

Management in Europe during the calendar year 2001 (July 2002), http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html 26 Regulatory Policy Institute (RPI), Study on the implementation rules of economic regulation within the framework

of the implementation of the single Sky, October 2003, study commissioned by the European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/single_sky/doc/studies/2003_study_implementation_rules.pdf

27 WMO, Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology, Framework for Implementing Cost Recovery for Aeronautical Meteorological Services, March 2003.

28 EUROCONTROL, Report on aeronautical MET costs, commissioned by the Performance Review Commission, Spring 2004

29 EUROCONTROL, Final Report from the Enlarged Committee Task Force on the Allocation of MET Costs to Civil Aviation Users (MET/TF), November 2001.

Notice(Photo courtesy: British Airways and Air France)

The PRC has made every effort to ensure that the information and analysis contained in this documentare as accurate and complete as possible. Only information from quoted sources has been used andinformation relating to named parties has been checked with the parties concerned. Despite theseprecautions, should you find any errors or inconsistencies we would be grateful if you could please bringthem to the PRU’s attention.

The PRC’s website address is http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc.

The PRU’s e-mail address is [email protected].

Copyright notice and Disclaimer

© European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)

This document is published by the Performance Review Commission in the interest of the exchange ofinformation.

It may be copied in whole or in part providing that the copyright notice and disclaimer are included.The information contained in this document may not be modified without prior written permission from thePerformance Review Commission.

The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy ofEUROCONTROL, which makes no warranty, either implied or express, for the information contained inthis document, neither does it assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness orusefulness of this information.

Printed by EUROCONTROL, 96, rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium.

About the Performance Review CommissionThe Performance Review Commission (PRC) was established to provide advice to the Governing Bodies ofEUROCONTROL in order to ensure the effective management of the European Air Traffic ManagementSystem through a strong, transparent and independent performance review and target-setting system. Thissystem addresses all aspects of air traffic management including policy and planning, safety management atand around airports and in the airspace, as well as financial and economic aspects of services rendered.

The PRC was established by the Permanent Commission of EUROCONTROL in 1998, following adoptionof the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Institutional Strategy the previous year. This strategyprovided that “an independent Performance Review System covering all aspects of ATM in the ECAC areawill be established to put greater emphasis on performance and improved cost-effectiveness, in response toobjectives set at a political level”.

The PRC is composed of twelve independent members with senior managerial and technical experience ofaviation. They are nominated by the EUROCONTROL Member States and appointed by the ProvisionalCouncil. Nominees must have professional experience of air traffic management (planning, technical,operational or economic aspects), safety or economic regulation in one or more of the following areas:Government regulatory bodies, air navigation services, airports, aircraft operations and research anddevelopment.

The Commissioners who prepared this report are:

Mr Jozsef Bakos Mr Jovica Lazarevski Mr Adrian Serban

Mr Francisco Cal Pardo Mr Gregory Nanidis Mr Per Wallden

Mr Cees Gresnigt Mr Vittorio Pimpinelli Mr Keith Williams

Mr Philippe Jaquard Dr Johannes Reichmuth

The Performance Review Unit (PRU) supports the PRC and operates administratively under, butindependently of, the EUROCONTROL Agency.

The PRC can be contacted via the Performance Review Unit, Rue de la Fusée 96, B-1130 Brussels,Belgium. Tel: +32 2 729 3956. The PRU’s e-mail address is: [email protected]. The PRC can also becontacted through its website. The address is: http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc

PRC processes

The PRC reviews ATM performance issues on its own initiative, at the request of the deliberating bodies ofEUROCONTROL or of third parties. It prepares annual Performance Review Reports (PRR), benchmarkingreports on Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP), and ad hoc reports.

The PRC gathers relevant information, consults concerned parties, draws conclusions and submits its reportsand recommendations for decision to the Permanent Commission, through the Provisional Council. Thesereports are made available in printed and electronic form (http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc) and on requestfrom the PRU ([email protected]), after they have been seen by the Provisional Council, unless the lat-ter requests otherwise.

An Assessment of Air Traffic Managementin Europe during the Calendar Year 2003

Performance Review Commission

Performance Review

Report

PRR 7

April 2004

Pe

rform

an

ce

Re

view

Re

po

rt - PR

R 7 - A

pril 2

00

4

For any further information please contact:

Performance Review Unit, 96 Rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium

Tel: + 32 2 729 3956Fax: + 32 2 729 9108

[email protected]://www.eurocontrol.int/prc

Performance Review

Report

performance review report performance review report3.5 safety occurrence assessment and reporting by...

Documents