perceptions of borders and human migration: the human (in)security of shan migrant workers in...

8/14/2019 PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERS AND HUMAN MIGRATION: THE HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF SHAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN

1/90


2/90


3/90

PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERSAND HUMAN MIGRATION

THE HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF SHANMIGRANT WORKERS IN THAILAND


4/90

About the Author

As a B.A. majoring in International Relations from Thammasat

University in Thailand with experience in Thailands Foreign Ministry,Ropharat Aphijanyatham focused her research on border issues betweenMyanmar and Thailand, especially the increasing movement of low-skilllabor from Shan State in Myanmar into Thailand to seek jobs. She alsoanalyzed the proposed means by which to secure their safe, legalemployment across the borders with decent wages and access to somesocial protections, including health care and their childrens education.She has completed her Masters Degree from Keio University, Japan and

has returned to Bangkok recently in order to prepare her PhD.

Cover, Maps and Layout: Mikael BroduPhotographs (including cover): Ropharat Aphijanyatham

ISBN 978-616-90282-1-5

IRASEC, October 2009All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted,in any form or means, without prior permission of the author or the publisher.The opinions expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s).


5/90

A collection under the supervision of Anne-Lise Sauterey and Benot de Trglod

Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration:The Human (In)Security of Shan Migrant Workers in Thailand

By Ropharat Aphijanyatham

Carnet de lIrasec / Occasional PaperSrie Observatoire / Observatory Series

n01


6/90

4

Lobservatoire se concentre depuis 2008 sur lanalyse des activits et des mouvementstransfrontaliers illicites en Asie du Sud-est continentale par le biais de programmes derecherche et danalyses acadmiques ou stratgiques. Il est accueilli au sein de lIRASEC Bangkok.LInstitut de recherche sur lAsie du Sud-Est contemporaine (USR 3142 UMIFRE 22

CNRS MAEE) sintresse depuis 2001 aux volutions politiques, sociales et environ-nementales en cours dans les onze pays de la rgion. Bas Bangkok, lInstitut fait appel des chercheurs de tous horizons disciplinaires et acadmiques quil associe au gr desproblmatiques. Il privilgie autant que possible les dmarches transversales.

The Observatory is in charge since 2008 of the analysis of illicit cross-border movements withinmainland Southeast Asia. It supports research programmes and publishes both academic andstrategic works. It is based within the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia inBangkok.The Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia ,, based in Bangkok, Thailand, callson specialists from all academic fields to study the important social, political, economic andenvironmental developments that affect, together or separately, the eleven countries of the region(Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam).

LE COMIT DITORIAL DE LIRASEC

Jean BAFFIE, CNRS, IRSEA

Bndicte BRAC de la PERRIERE, CASE,CNRS, EHESS Sophie BOISSEAU du ROCHER, Asia

Centre Jean-Raphal CHAPONNIERE, AFD Christian CULAS, IRASEC CNRS Gilles DELOUCHE, INALCO Jean-Luc DOMENACH, CERI, Rseau

Asie Evelyne DOURILLE-FEER, CEPII

Stphane DOVERT, MAE Frdric DURAND, Universit deToulouse

Alain FOREST, Paris VII Guy FAURE, IAO Michel FOURNIE, INALCO Charles GOLDBLUM, Institut franais

durbanisme Christopher GOSCHA, Universit de

Montral

Yves GOUDINEAU, EFEO

Andrew HARDY, EFEO, Hanoi Jacques IVANOFF, IRASEC CNRS Franois LAGIRARDE, EFEO Bangkok Christian LECHERVY, MAE Arnaud LEVEAU, IRASEC LE Huu Khoa, Universit de Lille Charles MAC DONALD, CNRS Rmi MADINIER, IRASEC CNRS Philippe PAPIN, EPHE Franois RAILLON, CASE, CNRS,

EHESS Jean-Franois SABOURET, CNRS,Rseau Asie

Christian TAILLARD, CASE, CNRSLASEMA

Hugues TERTRAIS, Universit deParis I

Benot de TRGLOD, IRASEC Marie-Sybille de VIENNE, INALCO


7/90

5

Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................7

1 - Understanding Borders Perceptionsand Human Security in Human Migration ..............................................7

2 - Research Framework ..................................................................................83 - Organization of the Paper ..........................................................................9

Chapter 1A history of borders and its influence on Shan

migrant workers migration behaviour .....................................111 - An Introduction to the Shan, the History of Borders

and Migration Today ................................................................................112 - The Contemporary Migration Situation in Northern Thailand ..........14

2.1 - Push Factors: Political and socio-economic insecuritiesin Burma drive more people to move to Thailand ..................................14

2.2 - Pull Factors: The Availability of low-paid jobs, work for womenand demographic factors in Thailand attract more people from

Burma to become migrant workers ........................................................193 - An Increasing Influx of Foreign Workers in Thailand

and their Macroeconomic Contribution to the Thai GDP ....................204 - The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand .......................................26

Chapter 2A comparative analysis of the different perceptions

of bordersand of the cost-benefit assessment betweenthe Thai government, Shan migrant workers,

Thai employers and informal brokers ........................................31

1 - Human Security and Migration ..............................................................311.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factors in Migration .....................311.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities?

the Post-Migration Situation in Thailand ..............................................33


8/90

PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERS AND HUMAN MIGRATION

6

2 - Three Actors Perceptions of Borders, their Cost-BenefitAssessment, and the Migration of Shan Migrant Workers ................. 422.1 - The Thai Governments Perception of Borders:

Legal Borders vs. Social Borders ............................................................42

2.2 - Shan Migrant Workers Perception of Borders: Borderless orEthnic Borders - An Interpretation of Socio-Economic Demand ..........472.3 - Thai Employers and Informal Brokers Perception of Borders:

Economic Advantages from the Multi-Perceptions of Borders...............612.4 - The Acquiescent Reciprocity:

A Factor in the Migration Phenomenon................................................653 - Differences in the Perceptions of Borders

and the Perpetuation of Illegal Migration .............................................66

Summary and conclusion ..................................................................67

1 - From the Solid Meaning of Borders by the Nation-Stateto the Different Perceptions of Borders by the Locals .........................67

2 - Recommendations ....................................................................................722.1 - Inclusion of the Different Perceptions of Borders

in Policy Formulation ............................................................................72

2.2 - The Need to Accelerate the Legal Process and to Create Coherencein Immigration and Registration Policies ..............................................73

Glossary .......................................................................................................75

Bibliography ..............................................................................................77


9/90

7

Introduction

1 - Understanding Borders Perceptions

and Human Security in Human MigrationWhile there are many prior studies to date on the internal conflicts

in Burma, these are mostly focused on the human rights situation withinthe country. In addition, many previous marked studies, such as worksfrom Thai academics, International Organizations or the World HealthOrganization1, have highlighted the human securities of migrantworkers in the destination country whereby the process of migration has

already taken place. However, none of them have focused on thephenomenon of migration in relation toperceptions of borders and human

1 1) Punpuing et al., Migrant Domestic Workers: from Burma to Thailand (Nakhon Pathom,Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, 2004), :, 20042) Archavanitkul, Migrant Workers and Research Direction [In Thai] (Nakhon Pathom,Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, 2002)

, , , , 20023) Chantavanich, Needs Assessment of Host Communities in Burmese Border Refugee Camp Area:Tasongyang and Pobpra District, Tak Province (Bangkok, Institute of Asian Studies,Chulalongkorn University, 2003) , -: ,, 20034) International Labour Organization (ILO), The Mekong Challenge: Underpaid, Overworkedand Overlooked: The Realities of Young Migrant Workers in Thailand, 20065) World Health Organization (WHO),Adolescent Migrants in the Greater Mekong Sub-region:

Are they equipped to protect themselves against sexual and reproductive health risks, WHO, 2007


10/90


8

security. The lack of study addressing the influence of borders and humansecurities as the key indicators to peoples migration behaviour supportsthe significance and relevance of this research.

2 - Research Framework

This research aims to understand the differences in theperceptions ofborders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thaiemployers, and informal brokers, which perpetuate the flow of illegalmigration.

Due to the increasing number of illegal Shan migrant workers who

are living, producing and consuming products and services in Thailand,or in other words, being absorbed into and continuing to contribute tothe Thai economy, it is necessary to map out a framework of borders,human migration and human security for policy-makers to approach anduse in addressing the migration issue as a basis for future theoreticaldevelopment. A focus on the different perceptions of borders in themigration phenomenon may lead toward a more comprehensive view ofthe international migration process, particularly for ASEAN to have

more realistic border and migration policies.Based on the purpose of the research mentioned above, my

hypothesis is as follows:The flow of illegal migrant workers is continuing and increasing

due to the differences in the perceptions and functions of bordersbetween the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employersand informal brokers.

The actual primary data is derived from fieldwork conducted bothin Thailand and Burma. In addition, secondary data collected fromavailable literature was processed and reviewed in order to support theborders approach in addressing human security and migration. Finally, acomparative case study of Cambodian migrant workers is examinedbased on fieldwork made in the Rayong province of Thailand.


11/90

THE HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF SHAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN THAILAND

9

CHINA

LAO PDR

BURMA

Taunggyi

SHAN STATE

THAILAND

Kengtung

Chiang Mai

Chiang Rai

Mae Sai

Tachilek

Mandalay

3 - Organization of the Paper

In Chapter One, we would first like to discuss how and in whichhistorical context the borders between Burma and Thailand were drawn,

and how they consequently influenced the imagination of borders in theminds of Shan migrant workers. Furthermore, it is important to discussin this Chapter how the perceptions of borders and human security affectnot only Shan migrant workers behaviour in migrating to Thailand, butalso the migration legal framework in the country.

The core analysis of this study is in Chapter Two, which consists ofthe analysis of the different perceptions of borders and the cost-benefitassessment between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai

employers and informal brokers. This part intensely discusses the


12/90


10

different perceptions of borders among each of the above-mentionedactors, and how these have affected governmental immigration policies,Shan migrant workers migration behaviour and Thai employerspatterns of employment.

This Chapter discusses and analyses three main topics. Firstly, byattempting to determine the push-pull factors that influence Shan peopleto migrate, it examines what types of insecurities migrant workersexpect to resolve through migration. Secondly, we will continue todeliberate on defining the respective perceptions of borders of each actorinvolved in the migration phenomenon of Shan workers. Finally, itdiscusses what the costs and benefits are for 1) the Thai government andThai employers when it comes to the border crossing of Shan migrant

workers and 2) the Shan migrant workers in measuring their well-beingand weighing the advantages between living in Thailand and Burma.

Finally, conclusions are made based on the results of the analysis,and recommendations as to the governmental policies regardingmigration are also proposed. The section concerning recommendationstries to point out the importance of including different perceptions ofborders in policy formulation and the need to accelerate the legal process

and create coherence in immigration and registration policies.


13/90

11

Chapter 1A history of borders and its influenceon Shan migrant workers migrationbehaviour

1 - An Introduction to the Shan,the History of Borders and Migration Today

The Shan, or Tai-Yai (members of the Greater Tai ethnic family)2,are a Tai-speaking group who call themselves Tai but whom theBurmese call Shan - which also refers to all Thai people in the AyudiaShan Kingdom (Ayutthaya Siam) or what is now Thailand. The wordSiam is a variation of the word Shan or Sham in Burmese.

The Shan are the second biggest ethnic group3 in Burma, forming7 percent of the total population in the 1930s4, and about 4 million or

2 The term Shan will be used throughout this research to refer to people who arecurrently living in the Shan State of Burma or who migrated from the Shan State toThailand. (Please refer to the map Migration Flow from the Shan State to northernThailand)3 According to the 1983 census, there were 135 distinct ethnic groups in Burma. TheBurmans (Bamars), the largest group, are estimated to constitute two thirds of thepopulation (about 33 million out of 50 million, or 66 percent). However, these numbersprobably include people of Mon, Karen (Kayin) and other ancestry who have assimilatedthemselves to the mainstream Burman language, customs, culture, and most importantly,to Burmese Buddhism. Seekins, Historical Dictionary of Burma (Burma) (Lanham MD,

Scarecrow Press, 2006), p.7


14/90


12

8 percent of Burmas population of approximately 50 million people5 in1999. In the past, the Shan State was divided into more than30 individual states, with each having its own saophas or sawbwa (Shanprinces) as the governing leader. The Shan states survived under British

colonial rule; that is to say, the authority of saophas was recognized bythe British colonial administration. The status of the Shan princes wassomewhat similar to that of the rulers of the Indian princely states.

It is believed that the native land of the Tai-Yai is located betweensouth-western Yunnan (province of China) and north-eastern Burma,with the Salween river to the east and the valley of Indias Assam Stateto the west, near the 8th century trade routes that linked China, India and

the rest of Southeast Asia. This geographic proximity illustrates thesocio-economic relation between people living in these areas and theirmovement since then.

The greater Tai race progressively dispersed itself over timethroughout the valley of Assam in eastern India, farther into inlandChina, northern Thailand, northern Laos, and some parts of northernVietnam, with a majority settling in north-eastern Burma, now known as

the Shan State. As the populations of the Tai race settled throughout theabove-mentioned region where other polities had also established ahome base, they were thus within close reach of various communities.Interactions thus developed between them as geographic proximity andcultural assimilation supplement each other. As a result, this type of

geographic assimilation shapes the kingdoms leaders and peoplesperspective of borders. To the leaders, there is an overlapping sovereigntyover the overlapping kingdom boundaries. To the people, like their

leaders, geographic proximity and cultural similarity absorb people intothe same socio-economic system.

4 According to the 1931 census, Silverstein, Burmese politics: the dilemma of national unity(New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1980)5 Keat Gin Ooi, Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor

(Santa Barbara CA, ABC-CLIO, 2004), p.1191


15/90


13

If we explore both State and non-State actorsperceptions of borders inthe 19th century, before the transformation of each kingdom into themodern conception of a nation, we can see that the inter-state relationsand multiple sovereignties between overlords and tributary states

created a concept of borders as a blended region where people from bothkingdoms co-existed, rather than an imaginary line on the map.6 Thiskind of border perception leads to two consequences. First, people inboth kingdoms perceived border-crossing as a general movement.Second, the assimilation of ethnic identities among these various culturalareas, resulting from political and/ or socio-economic exchange, takesplace both intentionally and voluntarily. These perceptions and activitieshave remained in the local peoples perspective of borders to this day.

For instance, the Kachin have assimilated themselves to the Shan byadopting the sawbwa7 political system from them in the 19th century.Thus, political, socio-economic and cultural exchanges were, and are stillto this day, commonplace. In the same way, Shan people who nowadaysmigrate to Thailand view their border-crossing as a day-to-day generalmovement, and not as an act of international migration, just as theirancestors did. They have also intentionally adjusted and transformedtheir own identity to Thai cultural norms in the hope of changing their

economic and political status in Thailand. At the same time, they aretrying to resurrect the idea of their shared Tai or Thai ethnic heritage inorder to ensure the legitimacy of their entering Thailand.8

On the other hand, the modern concept of borders has transformedthe above-mentioned perception into a clear-cut line in the mind of the

6 Winichakul, Siam Mapped:A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University of

Hawaii Press, 1997)7 Sawbwa (Burmese term) or Saopha (Shan term) is the political system by which ahereditary prince rules the state. Iijima, An Oral History Approach to a Sawbwa Family'sStrategy: Research Notes for a Short History of Hsenwiin Ecological Resource Use and SocialChange in the Minority Regions of Burma(Kyoto, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies of KyotoUniversity, 2007) Vol.45, No.3, p.4508 Based on this fact, identity is a kind of perception that can be recreated, transformedand extended to serve both political and socio-economic purposes. With regard to thismethod of thought, each head town did not develop at the same time as others, but over along period of time these were gradually combined. Shanness is, as a result, a man-made

history pulling each individual under the same umbrella of ancestral legend.


16/90


14

state, a phenomenon that Benedict Anderson calls an artificial boundary9.Meanwhile, the Shan immigrants perception and definition of bordersand movement still remain the same as in the 19th century. The Stateshave institutionalized the modern concept of borders and have

established this as the law in order to identify the others, who move fromanother nation-state in the hope of improving their human securities, asimmigrants, and the action of movement as migration. This approach ismeant to benefit the nation in two ways. The first is to identify theownership of natural resources, and the second is to create a sense ofsuperiority, unity and loyalty among us or citizen, the new status givento those who belong to the nation-state. The result is that the Thaigovernment views Shan migrant workers in Thailand as a threat to the

security of the receiving population.

2 - The Contemporary Migration Situationin Northern Thailand

2.1 - Push Factors: Political and socio-economic

insecurities in Burma drive more peopleto move to Thailand

2.1.1 - Ethnic Conflict: Ethnic Cleansing War, Depleted Forest,Environmental Degradation and Forced Relocation

The remains of the Kuomintang (KMT) invasion during the 1950sand the ongoing fighting since Burmas independence between the Mong

Tai (also known as the Shan Army or MTA) and the Burmese militarywithin the Shan State have placed a great hardship on local civilians. Thispolitical instability causes a feeling of life instability or social insecurity(crime or internal disorder) among the Shan population. Due to thisceaseless war and irregular farming, the agricultural environment hasbeen degraded, while forests are being depleted because of the increase inlarge-scale teak logging, thus displacing people and their activities.

9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York, Verso, 1983)


17/90


15

CHINA

LAOPDR

BURMA

Push Factor on the Burmese Side

THAILAND

Displaced villagesin Eastern Burma(1996-2007)

Hiding Areas

Ceasefire Areas

Refugee Camp

Source: based on maps retrieved on January the 9th 2009 from www.tbbc.org


18/90


16

Furthermore, military forces suddenly increased three-fold in 1988.The Burmese government sent one fourth of its armed forces to stationwithin the Shan State. As a result, the biggest forced relocation tookplace during 1996-1997 from rural areas to the central part of the Shan

State. More than 300,000 people from 1,400 villages were forced to leavefor the newly assigned areas.10 This time, relocation not only led to thesecond and third biggest migration waves into northern Thailand (thefirst wave took place in 1962), but also to the increase in numbers andseverity of rape, crime, forced labour, tax demands and other violentactivities in the centre of the Shan State. Hence, the pattern of migrationhas evolved into becoming more or less a phenomenon of long-termsettlement ever since the relocation policy was enforced, whereas during

the colonial period, people went from the Shan State to neighbouringareas mainly for trading purposes, and thus movements took place on ashort-term basis.

2.1.2 - Socio-Economic Hardships:Unpaid Labour, Lost Land and Lack of Food

The Burmese military government exploits the traditional economic

system and its forms of labour exchange by manipulating them intobecoming forms of unpaid labour. Badly affected by this malpractice onthe militarys part, the Shan, questioning the efficiency of their ownlabour exchange system, have shifted from their traditional ideas to anew concept whereby labour is something that may be sold and boughtin the market. This new form of idea motivates people to migrate frompeasant economic areas to the commercial production sector.Additionally, land has become a market commodity and a capital for

commercial production. When peasants need to forfeit land to creditors,their production capability is reduced to a rice production that is merelysufficient for household consumption, and considerably insufficient tosell for capital gain. Finally, many people are forced to sell their labourfor daily wages in the commercial sector. Most peasants do not have the

10 Please refer to the map on the previous page.


19/90


17

CHINA

SHANSTATE

LAOPDR

BURMA

Rangoon

Naypyidaw

BangkokAndaman Sea

Unpaid Labour

THAILAND

Source: based on maps retrieved on January the 9th 2009 from www.tbbc.org

Hydropower Project

Mining

Gas Pipeline

Proposed

Asia Highway

Logging

Agricultural Project


20/90


18

required skills or education for urban work. As a result, they becomecomparatively worse off, particularly in the case of Shan migrant pea-sants who migrate to work in modern commercial sectors in Thailand.Many become unemployed or under-employed. But with the changes in

the whole fabric of social and economic life in Shan villages in Burma,they are forced to move with the expectation of getting daily wage work,in spite of wages below the national standard or their disadvantages insocial and work welfare.

2.1.3 - The Lack of Socio-Cultural Freedom

The suppression of ethnic language is a good example to demonstrate

the process of Burmanization undertaken by the Burmese militarygovernment. There is an interesting dimension to the altered names, notonly the countrys name (from Burma to Myanmar in 1989), but also thecapital (from Rangoon to Yangon), and minority areas such as towns inthe Shan State: Hsipaw to Thibaw, Hsenwi to Theinli or Thinli, Kengtungto Kyaingtong, Mong Hsu to Maing Shu, Lai-Hka to Laycha, Pangtara toPindaya, the list goes on. The important point here is that the originalname of each town has a meaning in the Shan language, while the new

Burmanized names have none.11

Deprived of their tradition and history,ethnic minorities were further dissatisfied. Furthermore, the currentprohibition on learning Shan language and on group gatherings createsmore disparity between Shan and Burmese people.

11Lintner., op.cit.; Lintner gives a very clear detailed description of the linguistic andsymbolic implication of Myanmar/Burmas military junta. It is controversial whetherMyanmar or Burma is the legitimate term for the country. In 1989, Burmas militarygovernment changed the countrys name from Burma to Myanmar. The name Burma is

claimed illegitimate because of its association with the British colonial administration,which named the territory after the main ethnic group in the country, the Burmese.Myanmar was chosen instead as it was argued that it includes the Burmese and all otherethnic races, including the Shan, the Karen, the Mon, the Kachin and more than 100 otherethnic groups. However, some argue that the use of Myanmar is a tool to legitimize themilitary governments power, and that the term is not appropriate to encompass themultitude of people within the union, as the actual situation seems to be the opposite. As aresult, those who do not recognize the military governments power and its claimedlegitimacy reject the Myanmar appellation. However, both names have been usedinterchangeably throughout history, with Burma being more colloquial and Myanmar

more formal.


21/90


19

2.2 - Pull Factors: The Availability of low-paid jobs,work for women and demographic factors inThailand attract more people from Burmato become migrant workers

Human security is the significant pull factor in the dynamic forceand cross-border activities. At the same time, invisible borders facilitatemigration. Human networking across boundaries reinforces todaysfamiliar term- borderless world. The role of nationalism has subsided, yetsome military-dominated states, like Burma, still insist on exertingnationalism by subjugating and discriminating other ethnic groups inthe country.

One significant characteristic of international migration in Asia isthe increasing availability of workfor women in the labour market. Thisis the result of rapid industrial development and increasing competitionwith a globalizing economy in the destination countries, together withthe declining population of people of working age. Border areas betweenThailand and Burma seem to be a favourable place for relocation due toits infrastructure development and access to cheaper labour.12 Borderindustrialization, with its huge demand for cheap female workers,empowers the border-crossing mobility of more and more Shan women.Moreover, many Shan migrant workers may benefit from the availabilityof professions that accompany border industrialization, namelyconstruction, domestic, restaurant and entertainment work. Theincreasing number of jobs available to women and the influx of Shanfemale migrant workers go hand-in-hand with the increasing numbersof total Shan migrant workers in Thailand.

Demographic factors also represent one of the main forces pullingmigrants from neighbouring countries into Thailand. The averageannual growth rate of the Thai population is now only 0.8 percent. Thepopulation of people aged between 15-39 years old is hardly growing inThailand, whereas it is increasing by 1.3 percent per annum in Burma.

12 Kusakabe and Pearson, Border industrialization and labour mobility: A case of Burmesemigrant workers in border area factories, Presented at the 10th International Conference

on Thai Studies, Bangkok, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008


22/90


20

3 - An Increasing Influx of Foreign Workers inThailandand Their Macroeconomic Contributionto the Thai GDP

Thailand has attempted to shift from being an agricultural countryto an industrialized one since the 1980s, and has seen a rapid growthfrom the mid-1980s. After the financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in1997, the economic situation has somewhat recovered, and the flow ofmigration from neighbouring countries, namely Burma, Laos andCambodia, was all the while increasing. This phenomenon is motivatedby previously mentioned push-pull factors from both sending and

receiving countries.Threats to their living conditions in Burma are pushing Shan peopleto move to Thailand, seeking human security. Chiang Mai and ChiangRai have demonstrated a high level of employment demand for migrantworkers, which can be observed through the registration periods and thehigh number of work permits being granted. Regarding the total numberof immigrants permitted to work in Thailand (August 2008), Table 1shows that Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai rank 1st and 3rd in having the

highest number of illegal immigrants permitted to work in the country13

,with 25,995 out of 56,990 being illegal ethnic minority immigrants beingShan.

Furthermore, Table 2 reports the increasing number of migrantworkers in Thailand by showing the estimated number of migrants andthe Thai labour force between 1996 and 2006. The number of migrantshas increased by 153 percent over this decade, from 700,000 to almost1.8 million, compared to the Thai labour force has seen a mere increase

of 13 percent, from 31.5 million to 35.7 million.

13 This refers to a certain number of immigrants who entered Thailand and worked illegallyuntil the registration process was initiated, thus enabling them to change their legal status.This problematic registration policy which takes place after the immigrants entry intoThailand is later discussed in The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand in this chapter.


23/90


21

CHIN

STATE

KACHIN

STATE

ARAKAN

STATE

KAREN

STATE

THAILAND

LAOS

CHINA

CHINA

INDIA

BHUTAN

BANGLADESHBANGLADESH

MON

STATE

TENASSERIM

DIVISION

IRRAWADDY

DIVISIONYANGON

DIVISION

MAGWE

DIVISION

PEGU

DIVISION

MANDALAY

DIVISION

SAGAING

DIVISION

KAYAN

STATE

SHAN

STATE

Naypy idawNay Pyi Daw

RangoonRangoon

Bangkok

Kawthaung Ranong

Sangkhla Buri

Mae Sot

TachilekMae Saiae SaiMae Sai

MyawaddyyawaddyMyawaddy

Shan

Shan

Shan

Kashin

Chin&Bur

manArak

an

Rohingya

Kashin

Any

eth

nic

group

Anye

thnic

grou

p

Any

ethnicg

rou

p

Mon

Muslim

Mon

Burman

Karen

Karen

Ka

yan

Kayan

To Malaysia

To SouthernThailand

By AirTo Malaysia& Singapore

To Tak provinceor Central Thailand

To upperNorthernThailand

Mizoram

Manipur

ArunacheiPradesh

Migration Flows from Burma

0 100 200 km

Source: Mekong Migration Network, Asian Migrant Centre,Resource Book: Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion, 2005.


24/90


22

500 000

400 000

300 000

200 000

100 000

0

TotalIllegal

Immigrants

Total in Thailand Chiang Mai Chiang Rai Tak

3 Nationalities

(Burma, Lao,Cambodia)

Ethnic Minority(Shan=25 995)

558 560

501 570

56 990

59 222

39 213

20 009

13 192

7 806

5 386

28 128

26 619

1 509

Total Number of Immigrants Permitted to Work in Thailand (August 2008)

Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration (Work Permit), http://www.doe.go.th

An increasing Number of Migrants Workers in Thailand (1996-2007)

Note: An additional 53,202 migrants were registered under the MOU (Memorandumof Understanding) in 2006. Most were already in Thailand.

Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration (Work Permit), http://www.doe.go.thMinistry of Labour, Presentation by Rattanarut, 2006 and Huguet, 2007, cited in Martin,

The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy Development, 2007.

36

35

34

33

32

31

30

Millions of workers

(total labour force in Thailand)

Millions of workers (total migrant workers)

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

Registered migrant workers

Non registered migrant workers


25/90


23

The following statistics of illegal Shan migrant workers and theirmacroeconomic contributions to Thailands Gross Domestic Product(GDP) are shown to address the significant role of Shan migrant workersin relation to Thai economic consumption.

Migrant Workers Contribution to the Thai GDP (Sector Analysis, 2005)

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

EmploymentTotal

EmploymentMigrants

Value added2005 ($ million)

Output/Worker2005 ($ million)

15,120,000

7,320,000

13,500,000

35,940,000

720,000

720,000

360,000

1,800,000

16,931

82,863

76,808

176,602

1,120

11,320

5,689

4,914

42%

20%

38% 40%

40%

20%

Agriculture

IndustryServicesTotal Migrants

According to the table above, most studies report that, among theapproximate 1.8 million migrant workers, 40 percent work in agricultureand fisheries, 40 percent in industry and construction and 20 percent inservices.

However, most migrant workers in Thailand are low-skilled. Butgiven that some Thai workers are also low-skilled, the value-addedcalculations in the table next page were based on an assumption thatmigrant workers are either 25, 50, 75 or 100 percent as productive as Thaiworkers according to specific sectors of employment, in order tocompare the average efficiency of Thai and migrant workers in doing thesame job. For example, if migrants are 25 percent as productive as Thaiworkers in each sector, they account for 1.2 percent in agriculture,2.4 percent in industry and construction, and 0.6 percent in services, or1.6 percent of the total value-added in the Thai economy. If migrants are


26/90


24

as productive as Thais in each sector, their total contribution would be6.2 percent of the Thai GDP.

Assumptions or scenarios on the productivity of migrant workerscompared to Thai workers, Migrant value-added ($ million, 2005)

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

25% 50% 75% 100%

202

2,038

512

2,751

403

4,075

1,024

5,502

605

6,128

1,540

8,274

806

8,150

2,048

11,004

Assumptions or scenarios about productivity of migrant workerscompared to Thai workers, Migrant value-added (% of total, 2005) *

Note: Migrant employment is assumed to be distributed as follows: 25 percent in agriculture, 15 percent infisheries, 40 percent in industry and 20 percent in services.

* For further details on the migrant workers contribution to the Thai GDP, please refer toPhilip Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy Development,

International Labor Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia, ILO/EU Asian Programmeon the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan Managing Cross-border Movement of Labour

in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

25% 50% 75% 100%

1.2%

2.4%

0.6%

1.6%

2.4%

4.9%

1.3%

3.1%

3.6%

7.3%

2.0%

4.7%

4.8%

9.8%

2.7%

6.2%

It is controversial whether migrant workers have a negative impacton the status of Thai workers in the labour market. There are two

perspectives on this topic, each varying from one extreme to the other.


27/90


25

On the one hand, migrant workers and local workers are considered asperfectly inter-changeable. As a result, it is often thought that theentering of migrant workers into Thailand decreases the availability of

jobs for local Thai workers. On the other hand, it is argued that migrant

workers take on the jobs that local workers have abandoned. Regardlessof which view one may adopt, the presence of migrant workers in theThai labour market may encourage local workers to avoid migrant jobs,or so-called 3D jobs - dirty, difficult and dangerous.14

In fact, migrant workers are considered to be both substitutes andcomplements to national workers. Their presence undoubtedly affectswages as well as employment options for local workers. The degree to

which migrants can be substitutes for or complements to nationalworkers varies according to factors ranging from the workers respectivecharacteristics to technologies of production, and from the nature ofwork to product markets.15 For example, in the border districts, we canassociate lower wages with a higher share of migrants. As a result of thelarge numbers of unregistered migrants, the latter seem to be the mainfactor in putting downward pressure on Thai wages.

Although it is obvious from the above consideration that manysemi- and low-skilled goods and services consumed by Thai people aremostly produced by migrant workers from Burma, the importance oftheir existence in Thailand is still practically not recognized by the Thaigovernment when it comes to the formation of border perceptions andmigration. The Thai nation-states imagined boundary and definition ofShan migrant workers have framed Thai peoples ideology, in a way thatShan workers become marginalized. This kind of prejudice is

repeatedly reflected in the Thai mass media, creating the image of

14 Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards PolicyDevelopment, International Labour Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia,ILO/EU Asian Programme on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan ManagingCross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007, p.1515 Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards PolicyDevelopment, International Labour Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia,ILO/EU Asian Programme on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan Managing

Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007.


28/90


26

Burma migrant workers as aliens, dirty and dangerous, and the sourceof all social problems16. This attitude creates a bias in viewing themigration issue, particularly among policy-makers.

In conclusion, Thai people are still consuming goods and serviceswhich are mostly produced and provided by Burma migrant workers.Hence, one can not overlook the fact that Thai people live in associationwith Shan migrant workers, who represent the largest group of migrantworkers in northern Thailand. This is the starting line from which theresearch was launched.

4 - The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand

According to Chantavanich (2006), the countrys immigrationpolicies can be divided into 4 periods: the first period being the area-based, non-quota system that took place from 1992 to 1998, and thesecond being the area and quota-based system from 1999 to 2000. Thethird was the amnesty policy that occurred from 2001 to 2003. Finally,the last and most recent period was the second amnesty in 2004-2005.

The chronology of registration policies is shown below.

The most recent immigration policy that has been exercised is theregistration procedure for all migrants from Burma, the Lao PDR andCambodia at the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The registration systemcomprises two main parts. One needs to register at the MOI in order toget permission to stay and seek employment in Thailand until thedesignated deadline. For example, migrants who registered in July 2004

were given permission to stay until 30 June 2005. Once one getspermission and finds employment, he or she needs to apply to theMinistry of Labour (MOL) for a work permit which is valid for up to oneyear.

16 Kerdmongkol and Karnjanadit, Burmese Migrant Workers and Violence, midnight2545,

2002 [in Thai]


29/90


27

As the registration policy states that a migrant has to findemployment before applying for a work permit, a loophole in the policyis thus created, allowing the employer to play a key role in directing themigrants ability to apply for a work permit and to extend it. Moreover,

the system is problematic in itself due to the workers dependentcondition on their employers. Workers who registered with a specificemployer were given permits valid for only one year, restricted to thatparticular employer. If their employment were terminated, so wouldtheir legal status in Thailand (MAP Foundation, 2007). In addition,employers usually keep the work permit in their possession, giving theworker a mere photocopy in order to limit his or her ability to leave foranother job. In this case, migrants are often exploited by their present

employers.

As the registration in 2004 was gratis for migrants, the number ofregistered migrants doubled those who registered in 2001 and 2002. Thisassumes that there had been a large number of illegal migrants who hadbeen working in Thailand without being previously registered.However, migrants who arrived in Thailand after 31 July 2004 have notbeen permitted to register. This lack of continuity in the registration

policy has consequently contributed to the governments inability toestimate the actual number of migrants and the resulting greater numberof illegal migrant workers.

The time of enforcement of migrant registration according to theThai Immigration Law (1978) is also problematic. It allows Shan migrantworkers to register after their entry into Thailand. This enables illegalbrokers to exploit irregular Shan migrant workers due to their need of

alien and work permit cards. I would recommend that the cardregistration procedure take place before migration in order to minimizethe current illegal influx of Shan migrant workers. Moreover, the Thaigovernment should adjust the total cost of the registration process to anaffordable price in order to gradually restrict the role of illegal brokers.


30/90


28

Chronology of Registration Policies for Migrant Workers in Thailand (1992-2000)

Administration Anand

1992 1996 1998 1999 2000

Chavalit Chuan

Year

Policies

Workers'Nationality Burmese Burmese, Laotian, Cambodian

Procedure Medical check-up Medical check-up and social security card

Area9 border

provinces43 provinces

5 sectors

4 years 2 years 1 year

24 sectors 47 sectors 18 sectors

54 provinces 37 provinces

Sector ofEmployment

Quota Not specified 106,684 persons Unlimited

Duration ofWork Permit

GovernmentOffice inCharge

Measure/Implementation

Allow migrantworkers to beemployed in 9borderprovinces

Regulate andcontrol theemploymentof illegalmigrantworkers inunskilledlabour andhouse work

Regulate andcontrol theemploymentof illegalmigrantworkers onlyin theunskilledlabour sector

- Regulate and control theemployment of illegal migrantworkers only in the unskilledlabour sector- Arrest and deport illegalmigrant workers who did notregister- Promote the employment ofThai workers

Department of Employment,Ministry of Labour and SocialWelfare

Department of Employment,Ministry of Labour and SocialWelfare

Departmentof ProvincialAdministra-tion, Ministryof Interior


31/90


29

Source:Chantavanich(2

006),inapaperpresentedatthe2007

ConferenceonInternationalMigration,Multi-localLivelihoodsandHuma

n

Security:Pers

pectivesfromEurope,AsiaandAfrica.AttheInstituteofSocialStudies,th

eHague,29-30August2007.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Chronology of Registration Policies for Migrant Workers in Thailand (2001-2005)

Thaksin

Burmese, Laotian, Cambodian

Medical check-up and social security card

11 sectors

1 year

6 sectors2 major sectors:

unskilled labour

and house work

76 provinces

Unlimited409,339persons

814,247persons

Unlimited

Measure/Implementation

- Firstamnesty to allillegal migrantworkers in theunskilledlabour sector- Promote theemploymentof Thaiworkers

- Extension of the firstamnesty to all illegal migrantworkers in the unskilled laboursector- Arrest all illegal migrantsworkers who do not register- Promote the employment ofThai workers

- Extension of the

second amnesty

to all illegal migrantworkers in the

unskilled labour

sector and to their

family members

- Arrest all illegal

migrant workers

who do not register- Promote the

employment of

Thai workers

- Secondamnesty to allillegal migrantworkers in theunskilled laboursector and totheir familymembers- Promote theemployment of

Thai workers

Department of

Employment,

Ministry of Labour

and Social

Welfare and

private company

Department of Employment,Ministry of Labour

Department ofEmployment,Ministry of Labour,and Department ofProvincialAdministration,Ministry of Interior

Department ofEmployment,Ministry ofLabour andSocial Welfare


32/90


33/90

31

Chapter 2

A Comparative Analysis of theDifferent Perceptions of Bordersand of the Cost-Benefit Assessment

Between the Thai Government,Shan Migrant Workers, Thai Employersand Informal Brokers1 - Human Security and Migration

1.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factorsin Migration

People move because of some threat to security or toimprove their security. In so doing, they are often seen as a

threat to the security of the receiving population, or at leastsections thereof, particularly if the movement is large enoughin numerical terms or dissimilar enough in qualitative terms.(Graham, 2000)

In Wongboonsins work on Human Security and TransnationalMigration, she points out that the transnational migration of labourers inThailand is induced by the problem of human insecurity within the

countries of origin and results in a widening and deepening scope of


34/90


32

human insecurity in both sending and receiving countries.17 At thispoint, I would like to clarify the dimensions and extent of threat andsecurity in the above argument which is also referred to in this research.To Shan migrant workers, insecurity can be visible or perceivable only

when the previous or current conditions of life are threatened. Whenpeople perceive threats to their immediate security, they often becomeless tolerant. The oppression and perceptions of injustice of Shan peopleinflicted by the Burma military, who invade their villages, take theirfood and land - the first two priorities in their hierarchy of needs - haveled to a violent protest and armed conflicts against authoritarianismbetween the Shan and Burmese armies. These situations have alsomotivated Shan local people to migrate to where they believe they can

broaden their range of choices in terms of economy, food, health andpersonal/political security. Moreover, their destination needs to be aplace where they believe they can exercise these choices safely andfreely, where they can be relatively confident that the opportunities theyhave today will not be totally lost tomorrow.18

In the case of Shan migrant workers, migration is also driven by themany images and messages emitted particularly from Thailand through

the development of global communications and entertainment networks.Shan migrant workers mostly receive outside information through radioand television. Personal networks also play a significant role through theaccounts of returning migrant workers of life outside Burma. It hashelped to expand awareness of life beyond the borders and to create theimage of a more civilized and secure lifestyle in Thailand. Imaginationand Hope of Betterment (according to Shan informants corresponds tothe comparatively higher number of choices at the destination) and is the

17 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21stCentury Centre of Excellence Programme Policy Innovation Initiative: Human SecurityResearch in Japan and Asia, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University,

Japan, 2004).18, , : ,2542, 51-90.Trichot, The Burmese Government and the Ethnic Minority Groups [In Thai] (The ThailandResearch Fund and The Foundation for The Promotion of Social Sciences and HumanitiesTextbooks Project, Bangkok, 1999), pp.51-90.


35/90


33

push factor influencing Shan migrant workers cost and benefit assess-ment of migration.

However, whether Shan migrant workers can achieve the aim of

widening their choices and whether a new form of insecurity must betraded off for the achievement of another will be discussed in thefollowing section.

1.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities?The Post-Migration Situation in Thailand

Labour movements from the Shan State into Thailand create multi-dimensional impacts on both source and destination countries at microand macro levels, affecting not only the migrant at an individual level,but also their family and community, and at national and regional levels.This issue is raised in order to explain how the forms and conditions ofhuman insecurity change after the migration process.

1.2.1 - At the Individual Migrant Level

Due to their illegal status and lack of skills, in the short termperspective, illegal Shan migrant workers are at risk of poor and abusiveworking conditions, coupled with irregular income. This economicinsecurity causes both the unplanned or extended migration time framein Thailand and their chronic migration after returning to the Shan State.In the short term, some may enjoy higher wages, but in the long run,some may end up in an unsustainable professional life in Thailand

fraught with not only financial problems (debt repayments for migrationfees and relatively higher living costs), but also with fewer opportunitiesin terms of skill development or even, in some cases, basic education. Inthis situation, it can be argued that the freedom of migrant workers inprofessional terms is defined by different actors such as the militarygovernment in Burma, Thai brokers, Thai employers and the Thaigovernment. In terms of health insecurity, their hope of gaining a highernumber of socio-economic choices has led to their assessment of health


36/90


34

risks from poor working conditions as a mere trade-off for their higherincome in Thailand.

Most Shan migrant workers believe that it is more secure to work in Thailand than in

Burma. The way in which they perceive securities varies from one life condition to theother at a given place and time. Their insecure professional life in Burma is expressedthrough the lack of freedom in selecting jobs, in daily life and in managing their income.19However, conditions ofinsecurity in Thailand exist in different forms.

At home we are treated by the Burmese government unequally. We are forced tobehave and follow the governments unjust rules and orders. We cannot refuse themilitary if they want to take our agricultural products and possessions. Moreover, we areprohibited to teach and learn our Tai Yai language. I once was arrested by the military onthis unfair charge and forced to sign a document stating that we will not continue to studyour language.

Although it is easier to live and work in Thailand, we are treated unequally by Thaiemployers. We are often threatened to be fired and sent back to Burma if we ask forholidays or sick leave.

Source: (), : , , ,, 2545, 5-6, 13-14.

Pornsuk Kerdsawang (ed.), Kon Tor Ta Wan: Ten Conversations with Refugees/ Displaced Persons and MigrantWorkers from Burma [In Thai] (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Pern Rai Pom Dann, 2002), pp. 5-6, pp.13-14.

The broker system manages the chronic selling of migrant workers. This means thatmigrant workers go from one broker to the other until one of them manages to sell themto an employer for the highest price. This chronic selling causes the chronic debt to eachnew broker. As a result, an amount is deducted from their salary each month in order to

pay the brokers fee. Consequently, the possibility of acquiring savings to expand theirchoices and opportunities becomes almost unattainable. Most are unaware of their rightsand describe their circumstances as sheer bad luck. After a certain period of time, someof them choose to save money in order to move back to their original country.

Source: A MAP (Migrant Assistance Programme) Foundation Staff, interviewed by the author at the MAPFoundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008

19 Such as their commitment to military provisioning and unpaid labour.


37/90


35

To summarize the issue of Shan migration in relation to humansecurity, the number of choices and the opportunity to utilize thesechoices are indicators of improved conditions at the destination, not onlyfor the individual but also for his/her children and the rest of the family

back in the Shan State.

There is nothing here to compare to the big roads and department stores in Chiang Maiat all. I know many people who moved to work in Thailand and later decided not to goback to the Shan State because they started getting used to the modern life in the bigcities. I think they just can not stand the simple life back here. There is nothing to buy.

Source: A Shan migrant worker who lives on the Burma side of the border with Thailand where she has workedfor 10 years until now, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008

Everything in Rayong is better than the conditions back home. We earn more moneymore easily here, so we can save enough money to send back home every month.Moreover, there are a lot of massage parlours here, too.

Source: A 17-year-old Cambodian male migrant worker, interviewed by the author in Rayong province,February-March 2008

Thus, in this sense, it is not necessarily the greater availability of

commodities at the destination, but rather the command over goods andservices, whether self-produced or otherwise, that attract migrantworkers. Choices, to Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms ofcommodity possession. The more money they earn, the morecommodities they can obtain, coupled with the relatively higher livingstandard in Thailand.

In the Mae Suai District, only two percent of Shan people are involved in crime or illegaldrug trade. To us, we feel neutral towards Shan people. Most of them work and live asimple life, without causing so many problems compared to hill tribes. If we compareShan migrant workers to Thai workers who are at a similar socio-economic transition, wethink the former develops their economic status much better than the latter. This mightbe explained by the stronger need for Shan migrant workers, whose status is alien here,to improve their socio-economic conditions and by their willingness to struggle.

Source: A policeman from Mae Suai police station, Chiang Mai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in ChiangMai, August-September 2008


38/90


36

Nevertheless, Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of thisso-called betterment, often demanding higher investment, such as bribesto local Thai policemen as a guarantee to ignore their illegal status inThailand.

It is difficult to bring a charge against Thai employers when migrant workers do notreceive the full amount of their salary. It is widely known that bribery exists between Thaiemployers and local authorities, not to mention the informal agreement between informalbrokers and Thai employers regarding debt collection (bribery fee and broker fee),deducted from the employees salary.

Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Tachilek, Burma,interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008

In conclusion, there seems to be some recklessness in theassessment of costs and benefits on the part of Shan migrant workers,since they mostly assess improved conditions by the value of moneythey can earn from working in Thailand. On the contrary, they forget totake working conditions and the availability of merely temporary jobsinto account. As a result, they can not live on a regular basis and relymore and more on the notion of chance.

1.2.2 - At the Household Level

Improved human security at the household level can be expectedfrom migrant remittances. Many Shan migrant workers perceive thecontribution of their migration to their household back in the Shan Statemerely in financial terms. However, the remittance may not improvetheir familys living and economic conditions. In this research, we may

find that most Shan migrant workers are subject to recruitment fees.

The most common practice of human trafficking is the phenomenon of bringing Shanmigrant workers from their hometown in the Shan State to the Burma-Thailand border viainformal brokers, who either demand payment of travelling fees at the place of origin iffunds are available, or collect it as a debt at the destination. After that, they will be takento find jobs. Although the brokers fees start at a fixed rate, the Shan migrant workers arenot informed of the other costs that will be incurred, nor are they made aware of the


39/90


37

specific place they will be taken to, who they will work for, their salary details, the termsof employment or the debt that often follows. When they left their homes, none of theShan migrant workers knew exactly how much the trip to Thailand would cost, nor didthey learn of the specific patterns of the travelling route. As a result, most of their savings

they made from working in Thailand are spent to reimburse the recruitment fee.Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Taung Gyi, Burma,interviewed by the author in Taung Gyi, February-March 2008

As a result, these remittances become the main source of funding topay back debts and interests. The financial burden created by themigration determines how long the migrants work in Thailand,depending on each informants situation. However, for some families,

remittances play a prime role in minimizing household economicpoverty and improving housing, education and healthcare.

I migrated to Thailand about 40 years ago because I think it is easier to earn money andto make a living in Thailand than in Burma. After I had worked for a certain period of timeand had gathered some savings, I bought a piece of land and put my daughters nameon the title deed, as I did not get Thai nationality, but my daughter who was born inThailand did.

Source: A 65 and 60 year-old Shan couple in Bann Rom Po Thong, Tha Ko Town, Mae Suai District, ChiangRai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Chiang Rai, February-March 2008

Even though the real benefits of these remittances are oftenquestionable as to whether they are spent towards a productive invest-ment or wasted on luxury non-productive consumption, remittances canhelp provide a stimulus for local suppliers and local industry.

However, outward migration from the Shan State is also likely to

cause family problems. The sizeable number of Shan female workersmigrating to work in Thailand has produced a social and cultural gap ofgendered contribution in the private sphere in Burma, creating adistortion in family- and child-care.


40/90


38

As people leave with the expectation of socio-economic benefits at the destination, thedemographic trend of Shan-Thai people from old Shan villages in north-eastern ShanState and rural areas in northern Thailand has resulted in an aging society. On the otherhand, upon examining the recent Shan migrant workers in Thailand overall, specifically in

urban areas, its demographic trend is increasingly full of young and working-age migrantworkers.Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author in Tachilek,February-March 2008

1.2.3 - At the Community Level

Even though remittances may represent a considerable contributionto some families and even their community, they may also increase, andtherefore worsen, the income gap between people and householdswithin a certain community.

The problem that has recently surfaced in our community is the lack of human resourceswithin social work. The media and the neighbours who receive remittances give newmeanings to money and its value, which then have a profound influence on young Shan

peoples perception of money. Their lack of choices and cases of successful migrantworkers in Thailand considerably push them to struggle for higher education or moremoney-making jobs, thus leaving their former identity.

Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008

Their friends and relatives networks that are currently working or used to work inThailand have a considerable influence on their decision to migrate. A simple story of

better infrastructure, higher wages and higher purchasing power effectively attracts Shanlocal people to migrate with the expectation of experiencing the same things. Badexperiences of migration to Thailand within their social networks are assessed by thisgroup as unavoidable bad luck.

Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008

The examples of successful Shan migrant workers induce more

migration from the Shan State to Thailand.


41/90


39

1.2.4 - At the National Level

-Boosting economic growth in the labour receiving country-Thai employers can enjoy cheaper Shan labourers, helping to fill the

gaps in 3D (Dangerous, Dirty, Difficult) tasks avoided by domesticworkers. Also, Thailand, as the labour-importing country, can use theavailability of Shan migrant workers as a tool to keep a lid on risingwages.20 This means consumers generally benefit from cheaper goodsand more affordable services, such as cheaper Shan maids who anincreasing number of Thais are employing. Semi and unskilled jobs,which are mostly performed by Shan migrant workers, have contributedto higher production with lower costs for the export market and have

come to be associated with the increase of the Thai national income.Thus, Shan migrant workers mobility can be seen as a variable boostingThai economic activity.21

Nevertheless, there are still concerns and dissatisfaction amongdomestic workers who are afraid that the influx of Shan migrant workersis synonymous with the displacement of local workers and thedepression of their wages.

We treat both Thai and migrant workers all the same. However, I think other Thaiemployers prefer to hire Shan migrant workers due to the cheaper wages. They are easyto control and order. At least they can understand Thai better than Burmese or Karenmigrant workers can.

Source: A Thai employer who owns an agricultural farm and hires Shan migrant workers, interviewed by theauthor in Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008

-Negative impacts on long-term economic development-

The unsystematic flows of Shan migrant workers not only lead tothe failure of the Thai government to control the invisible flows of labour

20 Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards PolicyDevelopment, International Labour Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia,ILO/EU Asian Programme on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan ManagingCross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007, pp.15-16.21 The Institute of Asian Studies, Migrant Workers from Burma to Thailand, for a seminarReviewing Policies and Creating Mechanisms to Protect Migrant Workers,

Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 2003, pp. 17-19.


42/90


40

migration, but also affect the possibility for Thailand and Burma to reachhigher capacities for their national economies and, especially in the caseof Thailand, to upgrade its international competitiveness. According tothe ADB22, Thailand is classified as a middle-income country moving

towards more skill-intensive activities and production. Thus, as a resultof the great influx and availability of low-skilled Shan migrant workers,both the governmental and private sector are less motivated to invest inmore productive human resources, which is the main factor in gaininghigher competencies in the world market. This has minimized thecountrys ability to move into higher value-added economic activities. Inthe short term perspective, it may seem that Thailand gains hugebenefits from cheap Shan labour. However, in the long run, the country

will not be able to avoid facing severe competition from countries withhigh technological capacities and labour-intensive strategies ofdevelopment, given the fact that the number of industrial countries withoutsourcing market strategies is greatly increasing.23

In turn, Burma, being the country that is sending its labour forceelsewhere, is also losing the opportunity to develop its human resourcesof people of working age. Adequate human resources would have

enabled the country to optimize its economic capacity and to be includedin the category of middle-income countries at a further stage.24Furthermore, with the minimal opportunities to develop labour skillswhile working in Thailand, these Shan migrant workers remain low-skilled labourers and unavoidably become part of the aging population,thus carrying a financial burden to society, rather than building aproductive workforce. Unless awareness of this circle of circumstance israised, the economic drive of the entire ASEAN region toward acquiring

22 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited inWongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, KeioUniversity, Japan, 2004, p.21.23 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21stCentury Centre of Excellence Programme Policy Innovation Initiative: Human SecurityResearch in Japan and Asia, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University,

Japan, 2004), pp.21-2524 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited inWongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, Keio

University, Japan, 2004, p.22


43/90


41

the sustained opportunities and choices for people to lead their dailylives and achieve the basic human needs of food, shelter, clothing,education and healthcare to their highest potential, may take too long.

1.2.5 - At the Regional Level

-Regional cooperation on international migration in ASEAN-Labour-exporting countries are keen to lower the barriers to

international labour migration, while labour-importing countries haveasymmetrical policies that regard the import of unskilled/semi-skilledworkers as politically and socially sensitive, and are more inclined tofavour flows of professional/skilled workers and business persons.25

This situation is reflected in ASEAN cooperation. Prospects of anASEAN free labour market remain remote as the vision for the ASEANEconomic Community, which is hoped to be realized by 2020, includesonly free movement of skilled labour. Cooperation is still limited on thecore migration issues, such as orderly recruitment of migrant workers,protection of migrant workers rights, acceptance of asylum seekers,compensation for the loss of skilled workers and the facilitation of

circular migration and remittance flows. However, in reality, the influxof unskilled labourers within ASEAN is increasing heavily and the Thaigovernment is failing to systematically manage its flow in accordancewith legal procedures. My concern is that the lack in addressing thisunsystematic migration movement represents an important barrier forASEAN to reach the goal of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in2015 regarding the regulation of international migration flow.26 These

25 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21stCentury Centre of Excellence Programme Policy Innovation Initiative: Human SecurityResearch in Japan and Asia, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University,

Japan, 2004)26 United Nations (ESCAP: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia andPacific), Ten as One: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN Integration, Bangkok, 2007. TheInitiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) establishes several areas of cooperation as thefollowing: 1) Investment and Financial Flows; 2) Trade Integration; 3) Management ofInternational Migration Flows; 4) Control of Communicable Diseases and their Spreadacross Borders; 5) Environment Sustainability; 6) Energy Security; 7) Information

Infrastructure; 8) Transport Infrastructure.


44/90


42

failures are partly due to the low level of collaboration betweengovernments and employers, especially to the reluctance of employers inlabour-importing countries to commit themselves to improve themigrants working conditions and skills.

What is still missing in the regional context is an institutionestablished to formulate labour migration policies and to implementthese on a regional level. I believe that the analysis of the perceptions ofborders and the migration costs and benefits assessment of each actorinvolved constitute the essential ingredient that can lead to a newframework of human migration, borders and human security for policy-makers to approach and use in identifying the migration problem.

2 - Three Actors Perceptions of Borders,Their Cost-Benefit Assessment and the Migrationof Shan Migrant Workers

2.1 - The Thai Governments Perception of Borders:

Legal Borders vs. Social Borders

The objective of this section will be to identify how the differentperceptions and functions of borders between the Thai government, Shanmigrant workers, Thai employers, and informal brokers shape themigration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and perpetuate theillegal migration phenomenon. In order to do so, we will engage in anin-depth analysis on how the various definitions and functions of borders

according to the Thai nation-state and its active body, the Thaigovernment, were formed and have effectively influenced governmentalimmigration policies at both macro and micro levels.

In the indigenous polity in which the power field of asupreme overlord radiated like a candles light, the tiny tributarieswere always located in the overlapping arena of the power fields. Inthe indigenous interstate relations, the overlapping margin of two

power fields was not necessarily considered a problem unless it


45/90


43

served as a bridge for the enemy to invade. For a modern state,however, the overlapping frontier is not permissible. The divisionof territorial sovereignty between states must be clear-cut at thepoint where both power fields interface. To transform a pre-modern

margin to a modern territorial interface, or to create a modern edgeof a state out of a pre-modern shared space, there could be morethan one possible boundary, and all of them would be equally

justified because the boundary could be anywhere within theoverlapping arena, depending on how the sovereignty of atributaries was decided.

In the wake of modern state boundaries, administration, boundary

demarcation and mapping are equipped to keep boundaries fixed andsovereignty exclusive.27

There has always been a tension between the fixed, durable andinflexible requirements of national boundaries and the unstable andflexible requirements of people. If the principle fiction of the nation-stateis ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then bordersalways give the lie to this construct.28 According to Anderson29, borders

(which Anderson refers to as frontiers) are both institutions andprocesses. In order to maintain state sovereignty and rights to individualcitizenship, borders were institutionalized and employed by stategovernments. Borders function through the imagination of eachindividual within the state boundaries. Borders, thus, are made capableto control the people within them. Given this, they create a sense of bothpolitical and social separateness and otherness. This function of borderssimultaneously excludes people who live in the border areas from

national society. Borders emphasize peoples heterogeneity and create thephenomenon that distinguishes them from homogeneous and powerfulzones at the state core. In other words, borders are also recognized by

27 Winichakul, Siam Mapped:A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University ofHawaii Press, 1997), pp.100-101.28 Horsman and Marshall,After the Nation-State, 199429 Malcom Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, 1996


46/90


44

Anderson as the markers of political and socio-cultural identities of boththe people and the modern state.30

In an era of the cultural globalization and internationalization of

economics and politics, the modern idea of defined legal borders hasappeared, as opposed to the traditional concept of fluid borders. Myconcern is that globalization and liberalization have opened the borderand eased state controls for high-skilled workers, but have limited themovements of low-skilled workers, including their goods, capital andinformation. It is controversial that the nation-state in the era ofcapitalism demands a greater number of cheap labourers to fulfil itseconomic objectives, while it imposes selective immigration policies on

migrants, especially low-skilled workers. In the case of the Thaigovernment, they have to balance the needs of the nations two publicentities: the Thai employers demand for cheap labour and the Thaiworking-class opposition to surpluses of foreign workers who increasecompetitiveness within the labour market. The government has tocontrol potential effects on national unemployment, a drain on publicand private funds, and public dissatisfaction, while maximizing itsnational economic capacities and interests. Borders for the Thai

government sometimes serve as a tool to define the eligibility of requiredcheap migrant workers, and often act as a screen or filter whichfunctions through a defensive legal wall. Borders, in this sense, determinewho is eligible for the governmental protection of human security.

However, many studies on borders and boundaries with regard tomigration, when tracing the evolution of national and internationalboundaries and examining their structures and functions, are mostly

focused on the formal arrangements made between states, often failingto take into account the needs, desires and other realities of the peoplewho live at the borders, as well as the cultural significance of borders tothe people living there.31

30 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 5.31 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 11.


47/90


45

The Thai governments perceptions of physical and geographicalborders can not solely explain the perpetuating illegal migrationphenomenon. Addressing how the definition of social borders among thelocals influence their migration will attempt to supplement the yet-

lacking correspondence of border perceptions between state and non-state actors, which is the main barrier to decreasing the degree of illegaland unsystematic migration. Social borders, in the case of Shan migrantworkers, are interpreted according to their socio-economic benefits. Theysimply perceive the border areas along the Shan State of Burma andnorthern Thailand as the same social borders where individuals areaware that they share a common status, that they are a single socialcategory.32 The transfusion of racial, linguistic and other cultural

characteristics of the Tai ethnic group who live primarily in the ShanState and northern Thailand has formed a cultural homogeneity for thesake of socio-economic benefits. However, the legal borders imposed byBurma and Thai legislation have become a significant factor inseparating insiders from outsiders in terms of both legal status andsocial identity. I would like to conclude that perceptions of social bordersamong Shan migrant workers overlap each other when it comes todetermining their migration behaviour.

2.1.1 - Benefits

In conclusion, borders according to the Thai government serve asboth a geo-political and economic line dividing two nation-states thatpractice two different legal systems and economies. Borders areformalized as a mechanism to create a sense of superiority towards theother and unity among their own, whereby a status of inferiority is

attributed to illegal migrant workers, such as the Shan, who areconsidered an economic threat to Thailand due to decreasing jobopportunities. Imagined borders are also utilized to formulategovernmental immigration policies, which fluctuate between restrictiveand welcoming ones depending on the economic demand of cheapmigrant workers.

32 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, in Social Borders: Defintions of Diversity,Current Anthropology, vol.16, no.1, 1975, pp.53-72


48/90


46

Furthermore, borders defined by the nation-state lead to theemergence of local powers governing access to social and public servicesin Thailand. Thai local authorities, such as border patrol policemen orlocal government officers, at the border areas exploit the virtual

existence of border lines and deportation laws as a means to gain bothpower and money from illegal Shan migrant workers.

2.1.2 - Costs

The differences and lack of common perceptions of bordersbetween the Thai government and non-state actors (Shan migrantworkers, Thai employers and informal brokers) are the main factors

perpetuating the illegal and unsystematic flow of Shan migrant workersto Thailand. This situation is costly for the government both directly andindirectly. In financial terms, huge national budgets are spent onpreventing and deporting illegal migrant workers. At the same time, thegovernment fails to organize the national budget on social welfare forthe unnumbered migrant workers.33

According to the Thai national budget in 2008, 43.4 percent of 19.6 percent of thenational budget in general administration was allocated to national security.

41.9 per cent of the national budget was spent on the community - education, publicwelfare and social work.

It is controversial that the national budget on community and socialwelfare, which is supposed to be allocated for Thai citizens, is largely

consumed by mi

perceptions of borders and human migration: the human (in)security of shan migrant workers in...

Documents