peace and security council report no 39

7/31/2019 Peace and Security Council Report No 39

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Peace and SecurityCouncil Report

1PSC Report ProgrammeInstitute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa

T | +251 11 515 6320/24/67/98 F | +251 11 515 [email protected]

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IN THIS ISSUE

Early warning issues forOctober 2012

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Country Analysis: Somalia 2

Country Analysis: South Sudan 7

Country Analysis: Cte dIvoire 11

Important dates to diarise 16

SomaliaSomalia is currently experiencing apolitical and historical turning point.A ter almost 8 years o thetransitional period and 21 years o state collapse, the end o thetransition and the launching o anew government have engenderedthe hope that this could be theinception o a broader politicalprocess embracing all Somalis. It also

During October, continuing turmoiland division in Mali, with militantIslamist orces accentuating theircontrol in the north, remain a cause

or concern. Recent attacks in CtedIvoire emphasizing the enormouschallenges o disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration,security sector re orm andreconciliation, are among earlywarning and ongoing issues that

require close attention at a timewhen the A rican Union is about towelcome the new Chair o the AUCommission. Events in the Sahel,developments in Sudan and SouthSudan, events in Somalia andneighbouring Kenya, and theterrorist acts o Al Shabaab and BokoHaram also require the closeattention o the A rican Union andrelevant RECs.

Early warning issues for October 2012

Peace and Security Council Protocol

Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the A rican Unionby undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which eedsin ormation into the decision-making process o the PSC PSC/PR/(CLX), 5December 2008, Conclusions o a Retreat o the PSC on a mechanism o interaction between the Council and CSOs.

Bio data: H.E. Dr Ruben Maye Nsue MangueCurrent posts: Equatorial Guineas Ambassador to Ethiopia,

Permanent Representative to the AUand Chair o the PSC

Current PSC Chair

Livingstone formula

Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the A rican Union

by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which eedsin ormation into the decision-making process o the PSC PSC/PR/(CLX), 5December 2008, Conclusions o a Retreat o the PSC on a mechanism o interaction between the Council and CSOs.

ISSUE 39,October 2012

Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Cte dIvoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, theGambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe

South SudanAlthough there is a promising startto the new peace road map betweenthe two Sudans, Juba still aces

opens the door or a possible andmuch needed trans ormation rom awar-based economy to a post-warcivilian economy. However, thestabilisation o the country is a longway o .

numerous security challenges romwithin. The government is aced witha big challenge to disarm the variousarmed ethnic and rebel groups. The

many rumours o ailed coups alsodemonstrate the tensions among thevarious groups in the armed orcesand relations with the government. The increasing cost o living and theinability o the government to ul illthe expectation o the citizens o thenew state are other actors thatcould urther a ect the stability o South Sudan. Furthermore, theincrease in armed groups has createdinsecurity in several parts o the

country, and increased pressure onthe SPLA to deal with them andprotect the civilian populationdespite the governments ailure to

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Country AnalysisSOMALIA

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Previous PSC and AUCommuniqus

The A rican Union (AU) has expressedsatis action with the politicalimprovements made by all Somalistakeholders that have marked theend o the transition and areushering in a new stage in the Somalipolitical landscape.

In its communiqu o 29 August2012, issued at its 331st meeting, thePeace and Security Council (PSC)underscored its approval o thelaunching o a new interimConstitution on 1 August 2012. Italso welcomed the inauguration o anew Federal Parliament on 20 August2012 and applauded the coordinatede orts o the Traditional Elders, the

Technical Selection Committee (TSC)and International observers inundertaking the respectiveprocedures or ending o thetransition in Somalia. TheChairperson o the Commission o the AU, Jean Ping, in the AU PressRelease o 11 September 2012,congratulated all involved or theswearing in o Mr Hassan SheikhMohamud as President o the FederalRepublic o Somalia.

With regard to the persistent andworryingly precarious securitysituation, the communiqu o thePSCs 331st meeting pointed out that

despite the progress made by theSomali National Forces (SNF) withthe support o AMISOM and theEthiopian National De ense Force(ENDF), Al Shabaab was stilldestabilising the country. Thecommuniqu also expressed concernabout the actions o some individualspoilers who inteneded to derail theongoing e orts to inalise thetransitional process. The DeputySpecial Representative o theChairperson o the A rican Union

Commission (DSRCC) or Somalia, MWa ula Wamunyinyi, in the AU PressRelease o 14 August 2012 shed lighton such concerns and expresseddiscontent about the intimidation o ,and threats made against, the TSCmembers.

Crisis escalation potential

Somalia is currently experiencing apolitical and historical turning point.A ter almost 8 years o the

transitional period and 21 years o state collapse, the end o thetransition and the launching o anew government have engenderedthe hope that this could be theinception o a broader politicalprocess embracing all Somalis. It alsoopens the door or a possible andmuch needed trans ormation rom awar-based economy to a post-warcivilian economy. However, despitethe abovementioned achievementstowards peace, the stabilisation o the country is a long way o .

The emerging challenges have theirroots in the same post-transitional

government, the consequences o the imper ection o the ongoingpeace process and the threats posedby Al Shabaab, which in the

oreseeable uture will largely ramethe Somali security agenda andde ine the domestic and regionalpolitical environment.

Firstly, the main concern with regardto the political context is whetherthe establishment o a newgovernment and president will

improve the quest or thestabilisation o the country.Ostensibly, the grievances that arose

rom the inherent imper ections inthe whole transition process ( orexample, rampant corruption inSomalias various administrations,di iculties in monitoring the use o

inancial resources and equipment,the lack o a governance capabilityamong civil servants, and clan

avouritism) and the many problemsthat emerged during the electoralprocess (an unequal playing ield inthe run-up to the Presidency,allegations about seat-buying, andintimidation o members o the TSC),were oreseen in the Roadmap orEnding the Transition in Somalia, yetcontinue to raise questions anddoubts and provoke dissatis actionamong the population.

Secondly, the current peace process,according to some critics, is

characterised by limitedinclusiveness, which has led toinequalities in the representation o di erent sections o Somali society

resolve the root causes o thecon lict. The culture o extending anamnesty to rebel groups who havecommitted atrocities re lects a ailureby the government to e ectively

address the problems o crime and justice.

Cte dIvoireAt the end o September 2012, CtedIvoire was the scene o renewed

attacks by unidenti ied armedelements against security sites in thedistrict o Port Bout in Abidjan andagainst a post in No, on the borderwith neighbouring Ghana. These

incidents occurred a ter a ew weekso calm, ollowing a series o similarattacks in August. The eventshighlighted many shortcomings o the Ivorian security architecture thatemerged rom the post-electioncrisis. The list o security weaknesses

is long and includes a lack o basictraining among newly integratedelements within the Forcesrpublicaines de Cte dIvoire(Republican Forces o Cte dIvoire,

FRCI), competition among thevarious intelligence services, ailuresin the chain o command, and a lack o coordination in responding tosecurity threats.

Country reports continued


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in the emerging political and socialsphere. The growing disa ectionwith regard to the new politicalsystem is one o the consequenceso perceived exclusion. In addition,the community-level reconciliationprocess, oreseen within theRoadmap, has hardly beendeveloped. These grievances couldlead to a re-emergence o di erentexpressions o ragmentation inSomali society, possibly in the ormo the resurgence o clan militias orwarlords, producing even deepersocial ractures that result in aresumption o violence. There orethe new Somali government and

the international community needto take urgent action to remedysuch laws in the ongoing peaceprocess.

Thirdly, Al Shabaab continues tolose in luence in south Somalia. InSeptember 2012, AMISOM orcestogether with TFG soldiers capturedMiddo town (16 km south o A madow, lower Juba, which wassecured by AMISOM troops in July2012); Harbole town (6 km romMiido) and the strategic town o Bibi. AMISOM has also deployedtroops at the port o Elmaan, about40 km north east o Mogadishu. Thisport had previously been used oracquiring illegal weapons and

errying oreign ighters rom theGul o Aden into Somalia.

The diminution o Al Shabaabootholds in the south is developing

in parallel with the on-goingbuild-up to the capture o Kismayoby the Kenyan contingent o AMISOM. Somalias Radio Garowerecently announced that Al Shabaabo icials had withdrawn romKismayo and that all prisoners hadbeen released.

Finally, on 28 September, reportsindicated that AU orces hadlaunched a beach assault against AlShabaab orces and had takencontrol o parts o Kismayo. A

Kenyan military spokesman, ColCyrus Oguna, subsequentlycon irmed that parts o Kismayo hadbeen captured and that the town

was expected to all soon. A victoryby AU orces would cost Al Shabaabits main base in southern Somalia.

Nonetheless, since the presidential

elections on 10 September 2012, thesecurity situation in Somalia hasbeen worsening. Suicide attacks andassassinations are increasing in thecapital, Mogadishu. For instance, twodays a ter the inauguration o Somalias new president, there wasan attempt to assassinate himthrough a terrorist attack that was

oiled by Somali security orces withthe support o AMISOM. Al Shabaabhas also threatened to targetmembers o the new parliament. On22 September, gunmen shot dead amember o Somalias new parliamentin Mogadishu, Musta a Haji Maalim. The victim was the ather-in-law o

ormer President Shari SheikhAhmed, and was also the irstparliamentarian to be targeted sincethe new 275-member assembly wasinstalled in August 2012.

In addition, the terrorist group hasbegun to change its style o

operations towards the increaseduse o hit and run tactics, alsoundertaken, or instance, by NigeriasBoko Haram militias. Reversion toguerrilla tactics, including strategicwithdrawals rom territory under itscontrol and ixed de ensive positions,is a logical option or Al Shabaab atthis point, bearing in mind the oddsit is acing. Currently it is seeking thespace and time to reorganise andregroup.

Furthermore, the actual andpotential spoilers, domestic andinternational, and local clan-based

ighters are continuing to threatencertain geographical zones andborders. In this line, Somaliasgovernment remains extremely weak and a large part o Somali territoryremains beyond e ective statecontrol. This situation could osterthe re-emergence o armed militiagroupings in di erent parts o the

country. Kenya and Ethiopia arebeing encouraged to establish andimplement appropriate measures inorder to de end their borders and

avoid the violence spilling over intotheir territories.

To sum up, in Somalia the situation ischaracterised by the persistence o avariety o threats namely clanism,warlordism, corruption, terrorismand, o course, piracy, which are allcapable o uelling violence and canpotentially undermine the emergingpolitical process in Somalia.

Key issues and internal dynamics

In the political sphere, three keybenchmarks or inalisation o thetransition, laid down by the SecurityCouncil in July, were ul illed duringAugust and September 2012: thelaunching o a new ederalconstitution on 1 August 2012, to beplaced be ore the Somali public orapproval in a national re erendumand national election scheduled or2016; the setting up o a newparliament; and the election o a newpresident o the country. Thebeginning o the post-transitionperiod shows willingness romstakeholders to oster the rebirth o

ormal government institutions and

iron out the political and socialtensions provoked by the ormer Transitional Federal Government(TFG). Since numerous challengesderived rom the institutionalheritage o the ormer governmentprevail in the new administration,the high expectations created by thenew government should bebalanced.

With regard to the new constitution,it is important to emphasise that its

creation was ormulated uponclan-based criteria in order to ensurea air representation o the di erentcommunities o the country. Thus,135 delegates rom all Somali clans(25 representatives rom each o the

our big clans and 35 rom thesmaller clans) participated in it. Theprovisional constitution envisages a

ederal and parliamentary systemwith a national assembly and anupper house. It is de ined by a rule o

law which has to be compatible withIslam and the representation o women amounting to 30% o therepresentatives. Despite the progress


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represented by the dra ting o theinterim constitution, the eventssurrounding the launching havebeen shrouded in controversy.

The act that this institutionalprocess has been dominated byinternational actors, such as UnitedNations (UN), the AU and theIntergovernmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD), in alliance withlocal and national orces as well hasmarginalised the role o certainsegments o Somali society. This hasled to discontent and has raisedquestions o ownership. In thiscontext, the constitution was inallyendorsed in the ace o continuingdisagreements and con usionamongst the di erent stakeholdersregarding crucial points, or instancethe question o minority rights or thestatement that Somali borders canbe discussed at a later date. There ore, the possibility that, in theimmediate uture, the constitutionmay lead to divisions andpolarisation among the Somalisociety, has to be envisaged. The newlegal charter also has to contendwith the challenge posed bytraditional authorities and customarylaw that have experienced a revivalamid the collapse o the central state.

With regard to the launching o theParliament, the chie o publicin ormation at the UN Political O ice

or Somalia, Nick Birnback, hasrecently stated that parliamentsconvention with a majority o lawmakers is an important advance

or Somalia. But it is just that a loto hard work remains in the daysahead. Accusations o intimidation,bribery and seat-buying marred thenominations o legislators made bytribal elders rom complex clanstructures. As the UN SpecialRepresentative or Somalia,Augustine Mahiga, mentioned, somein the process have a vested interestin maintaining the status quo.

One o the immediate tasks o the

new parliament was the election o the president. However, the electoralprocess or this election was alsocriticised and de ined as a lawed

process. In this sense, the act thatthe primary stakeholders in thetransition have also beencompetitors on the political playing

ield provoked tensions in public

opinion.Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hasbecome Somalias irst president witha ull mandate since the all o thedictator Siad Barr in 1991. The newpresident was elected by the SomaliParliament rom among 22contenders drawn rom academia,the political milieu and the Diaspora,including women, a ter three roundso voting. He is largely unknownoutside Somalia, but highlyrespected in Mogadishu. He enjoysthe support o the educated class,civil society, business people and avariety o Somali clans. He is widelyconsidered a committed, uni yingand conciliatory igure and, above all,he is not viewed as belonging to thediscredited political establishment. Taking into account the widespreaddissatis action towards the more

ormal structures o government, MrHassan Sheikh Mohamud has to

encourage Somali society to getinvolved in the ongoing peaceprocess, showing that he isamenable to lessons learned romthe practices carried out by the

ormer TFG.

In spite o undeniable politicalprogress in Somalia, as evidenced bythe above-mentioned developments,questions still persist regarding thecapability and willingness o the newgovernment to learn rom the

mistakes o ine ective interimadministrations o recent years. Theso-called Mediated State model o governance, in which the centralgovernment outsources its core

unctions to local polities, privatesector and non-pro it organisations,was practiced by the ormer TFGgovernment. As a result, theemerging government has inheriteda weak and almost non-existentpolitical institutional apparatus. In

addition, there is increasing warinesso the e ectiveness o ormal stateinstitutions o government, due tomismanagement and non-service

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delivery by public services aspracticed by the ormer TFG. Forinstance, the so-called taxingwithout service, consisted o thepractice o collecting taxes withoutany provision o public goods orservices in return. Moreover, despitethe apparent goodwill exhibited bythe new government and itsinternational acceptance, it is likelythat the government will have alimited territorial impact and willremain heavily dependent onexternal support, due to theweaknesses o its state institutions.Mr Hassan Sheik Mohamud also hasthe arduous task o struggling to

de eat corruption, the cliental-basedcriminal networks and the ractiousclan politics that became endemicduring the tenure o the ormer TFG.

Considering these structuralgrievances, it is unlikely in the near

uture that the new president will beable to project his authority muchbeyond the environs o Mogadishu. Thus, it is probable that the controlo most o the country, which is stilllargely in ormal and subject to thee ectiveness o local sel -governancestructures, will remain underpower ul, in luential, autonomousindividuals, sel -proclaimedautonomous states such as Puntland,and Somaliland, clan militias and theterrorist group, Al Shabaab.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

IGAD is depicted as the REC that hasworked most closely with Somalia. Itssupport and the orientation o itspolitical positions re lect thepositions o the AU and the UN andto some extent the largerinternational community, as theRoadmap also re lects.

In the statement Ending thetransition in Somalia, issued inAugust 2012, IGAD, the AU and theUN expressed their concerns aboutthe spoilers that, through the use o

violence, bribery or intimidation,were thwarting the expectedinalisation o the transition process.

In addition, they urged the Technical


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Selection Committee (charged withselecting the members o parliament) to single out and excludepoliticians regarded as having ahistory o violence and criminalbehaviour. The August statementwas highly criticised by thesupporters and promoters o a moreinclusive transition. In their commonstatement, the three internationalorganisations once again con irmedtheir convergence, alliance andcommon position with regard to theending o the transition period inSomalia and identi ied what stillneeded to be done.

In the IGAD Statement on thepolitical situation in Somalia,released on 23 August 2012, theinstitution congratulated the newmembers o parliament on theirinauguration. Two weeks later, in itsstatement o 10 September 2012,IGAD also welcomed the newpresident o Somalia and reiteratedits support in assisting Somalia tocontinue on the path to a prosperous

uture.

United Nations The UN has expressed its satis actionwith regard to the emerginggovernment o Somalia. UNSecretary-General Ban Ki-moonconvened a mini-summit on Somaliain New York on 26 September 2012on the margins o the UN GeneralAssembly. The CommuniquSG/2187AFR/2450 issued on that daypointed out that President HassanSheikh Mohamud o Somalia had

participated by video telecon erencerom Mogadishu and was being

represented in New York by PrimeMinister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali.Other participants included Dr JeanPing, Chairperson o the A ricanUnion Commission, together withthe Chairperson-elect, Dr NkosazanaDlamini-Zuma, and high-levelrepresentatives o Burundi, China,Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia,France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan,

Kenya, Norway, Qatar, the Republico Korea, Russian Federation, SaudiArabia, Sierra Leone, South A rica,Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda,

United Arab Emirates, UnitedKingdom, United States, Yemen, AU,European Union (EU), League o ArabStates and the Organization o Islamic Cooperation, IGAD, A rican

Development Bank, World Bank andIslamic Development Bank.

Participants congratulated PresidentHassan Sheikh Mohamud, the Somaliauthorities and the people o Somalia on the peace ul end o thetransition process. It was also notedthat the new Somali authorities andthe international community wouldbegin to work jointly to identi ypriority tasks in capacity andinstitutional building in the areas o security, justice, equitable provisiono basic services, economic recovery,human rights, humanitarian access,and good governance, andunderscore the necessity o coordination o all actors engaged inSomalia. Finally, the participantsrea irmed their strong commitmentto supporting a more peace ul andstable Somalia.

International community

The international community hasollowed the events in Somaliaclosely. There is widespreadacceptance o the adoption o thenew Constitution and the election o the new president that reportedly,will serve as a basis or taking thecountry orward. The InternationalContact Group (ICG) on Somalia (agroup o UN Ambassadors andintergovernmental organisations(IGOs), initiated by the United Statesat the UN headquarters in June 2006)has been leading the Roadmap toEnd the Transition, which wascreated on 6 September 2011.

The EU, in its communiqu o 25October 2012, announced itsdecision to provide additionalsupport to AMISOM in order to allowthe mission to continue to ul il itsmandate and to reach its totalstrength o 17 731, as authorised bythe UN. According to the EU, the

support covers costs such as troopallowances, costs o the police andcivilian component o the mission,medical care, housing, uel and

communication equipment. The EUslatest unding support amounts to82 million. The new unding bringsthe overall EU contribution to 411.4million since 2007.

Civil society

The contribution o civil societyactors (CSOs) traditional andreligious leaders, the businesscommunity and NGOs as well ascommunity-based organisations has been erratic and intermittent.During the con lict, they wereembattled and hampered byinsecurity. Due to the collapse o thestate, the Somali authorities

indirectly took advantage o civilsociety skills and work, using CSOs todeliver public services in the ield.Also, thanks to CSO services, thegovernance in Somalias localcommunities could be strengthenedto better sustain peace and securityin the country.

In this line, due to the weaknesses o Somalias ormal governancestructures, numerous localcommunities have experimented

with hybrid orms o governance,which combine traditional structures(clan elders) with ormalarrangements. In this regard, thecase o Somaliland or Puntland isillustrative o the path travelled toestablish and consolidate so-calledhybrid governance structures intheir institutions. Actually, the TFGhas done the same, employing clanelders as representatives in anational constituent assembly thatwas assigned to select a newparliament and approve thecountrys constitution. Thesedynamics have emerged as societalresponses that seek to tackle theinstitutional and political vacuum inSomalia and decrease the likelihoodo turmoil or disorder. However, suchresponses have been highly criticisedsince they can lead to aninstrumentalisation by traditionalauthorities o the structures, leadingto a decline in their legitimacy.

Another element o civil society toconsider is the role o businessleaders. In reality, most o them have


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relocated their trading toneighbouring Kenya in order toavoid the tax payments imposed byeither Al Shabaab or the ormer TFG. There ore, the government shouldenvisage the introduction o stimulating economic measures toentice back the commercial networksand oster the restoration o socialties.

With regard to the legitimacy o thenew government, it seems that thepresident has the support o onlypart o the population. For instance,the Somali Civil Society Coalition(SCSC) issued a statement on 14September, acknowledging theoutcome o the Somali presidentialelection and expressing loyalty to MrHassan Shiekh Mohamoud as thenew president o Somalia, urginghim to strive to bring stability,reconciliation and integration to thecountry. At this incipient stage o Somalias political progress,sympathies rom the bulk o Somalias clans, militias andcommunities are di icult to appraiseand will largely depend on thepolitical per ormance o the newgovernment.

The reconciliation, reconstructionand development o Somalia are allcritical actors required to ensuredurable peace and prosperity or thecountry. The task o responding tothis challenge rests on all Somalis,

rom all segments o society. All havea role to play. Hence, undoubtedlythe e ectiveness o this newpromising government will bedependent on the initiatives o Somali society and its willingness torepair broken ties and damagedrelations

Scenarios

Scenario 1

Ideally, there is a consolidation o thenewly emerged governmentstructures in Somalia which governaccording to the rule o law. The

parliament acts independently o any external in luence. The capacityo ormal structures to e icientlyprovide public services and goods to

the society leads to an improvemento living standards.

Somalias political institutions, withthe support o the internationalcommunity, bring about a Somalireconciliation process based ondialogue and inclusiveness o allclans, political stakeholders and localcommunity-based groups. Thebalanced representation o marginalised segments o society inthe political sphere reduces thedisa ection and distrust that ormalstructures provoked and encouragethe participation and involvement o those actors.

This induces civil society andtraditional authorities to cra tgrassroots reconciliation strategieswhich enjoy legitimacy among thelarger Somali society. The Somalis

inally achieve unity irrespective o their political opinions andgeographical loyalties. Theinvolvement o a broader range o actors in the stabilisation o thecountry allows or a more e ectivepeace process based on bottom-upand top-down dynamics.

The legitimacy o , and support or, AlShabaab and other local, regionaland international spoilers o thepeace process are e ectively reducedby the above-mentionedimprovements. The Somaliauthorities develop channels ordialogue with Al Shabaab in order toachieve an inclusive peace ulsettlement.

In terms o international inter erence,

Somalias ormal structures manageto strike a balance betweenconstructive support and counter-productive inter erence.

Scenario 2

The grievances that emerged romthe ongoing peace process and thenewly established government mayprovoke an increasing ragmentationo society that could lead to violenceand political unrest. The government

may ail to deliver lasting securityand basic services. Consequently,predatory militia violence spreadsacross the country, causing massive

casualties and humanitarian crises,and hence destabilises the ragileprogress achieved. Neither thegovernment nor traditionalauthorities can control the militias.As a result, lawlessness and disorderemerge in Somalias variouscommunities, preventing theimplementation o the peaceprocess.

International inter erence also mayprevent a sustainable settlement inSomalia. The government isperceived as western-backed and asa continuation o the ormeradministration characterised byrampant corruption, allegations o mismanagement o resources andthe centralisation o political powerrather than seeking a ter ederalsolutions to guarantee minoritygroup representation.

Scenario 3

Despite the imper ections o thepeace process in Somalia, the end o the transition and the inaugurationo a new government constitute amajor step orward towards stability.

Undoubtedly, this engenders hopesand expectations amongstakeholders. Particularly the AU, theUN and other members o theinternational community expect thesystem to evolve into representativedemocracy as conditions improve. The new government tries todistance itsel rom the ine ective TFG by launching anti-corruptionmeasures in order to avoidmismanagement o resources by civil

servants and to build legitimacyamongst ordinary Somalis.According to the roadmap o theintended peace process, there areattempts to build consensus aboutthe nature o the state with regard tothe central government and ederalunits, the role o Islam and sharedgovernance between traditional and

ormal authorities. Nevertheless, theinstitutions o government inSomalia are still extremely weak and

unable to ully implement thepolicies o the Somali authorities. TheSomali people are atigued by theconditions they continue to su er,


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governance o territories is stillhybrid and complex, and corruptionis unavoidable.

Violence by clan militias, Al Shabaabinsurgents and regional spoilerscontinues to threaten the ragilestability achieved by the SNF withthe support o AMISOM. Al Shabaabcontrols certain areas and carries outregular targeted bombings andshootings in the capital, Mogadishu.

The Somali government remainsheavily reliant on international

orces, particularly AMISOM orcesighting in coordination with

Ethiopian orces and their local

proxies. The on-going peace building processremains characterised by a top-downand security-driven approach,obstructing the achievement o atruly legitimate local solution topeace and good governance inSomalia.

Options

Option 1

The new Somali authorities with thesupport o the AU, the UN, and theinternational community, shouldcontinue to actively promote theSomali peace process in order toachieve higher degrees o reconciliation amongst Somaliasdi erent clans and communities, abetter level o inclusiveness o underrepresented sections o societyand the development o asustainable stability or the country.

These measures should also includethe ostering o an inclusive bottom-up dialogue among Somalis over thecountrys uture security architecture,in line with the Provisional

Constitution, and noting speci icallythe need to engage women. Theprocess o disen ranchisement o women during the last electionshould be addressed.

Option 2

The PSC should propose policy-driven measures to the Governmentin order to seek to re orm andrein orce Somalias ormal structures.Capacity and institutional building in

the areas o security, justice,provision o basic services, economicrecovery, human rights,humanitarian access and goodgovernance should be stronglyrecommended. Moreover, it wouldbe positive to launch institutionalmechanisms to control thecorruption or other expressions o mismanagement o public resources.Bottom-up popular and inclusiveinitiatives to address the challengesemerging rom hybrid governance(coexistence o traditional and ormalauthorities) should also beconsidered.

Option 3

The PSC should also recommendsecurity-driven solutions. There is anurgent requirement involving are orm o the security sector toensure national security andAMISOM has the intricate task o

training and reorganising Somaliasnational orces. The new governmentalso needs to develop a policy onDisarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration (DDR) to address the

issue o combatants and ormercombatants. AMISOM should alsodevelop strategies to address theabove-mentioned new tacticsundertaken by Al Shabaab, which aresimilar to Boko Harams strategy.

Documentation

AU documents

Peace and Security Council, A ricanUnion, 331st MEETING, PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXXXI), Addis Ababa,Ethiopia, 29 August 2012.

Press Release: The A rican UnionWelcomes the Success ul PresidentialElection in Somalia, 11 September2012.

Press Release: AMISOM Foils Attack on Somali President, 12 September2012.

IGAD documents

IGAD Statement on the politicalsituation in Somalia, 23 August 2012.

Country Analysis

SOUTH SUDANPrevious PSC and AUcommuniqus

The AU High-Level ImplementationPanel, which was created in 2009,played a signi icant role in leadingthe talks between Sudan and SouthSudan. The two governments, whose

relations subsequently deteriorated,inally signed a series o agreements

under the auspices o the AU inAddis Ababa on 27 September 2012. The details o some o theagreements are yet to be released bythe A rican Union.

During a meeting held on 3 August2012 the PSC received the report o Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity as theChairperson o the AU HighImplementation Panel (AUHIP), and

considered a number o previouscommuniqus and documents bythe Council on the situation betweenSudan and South Sudan. In acommuniqu PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXXIX) that ollowed the Augustmeeting the Council called on theparties to address their securityissues in order to promote

con idence building between thetwo countries. The PSC also urgedthe two governments to comply

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with the decisions on the Abyei JointOversight Committee (AJOC) to

inalise the establishment o theAbyei Police Service so that it cantake over policing unctions in theAbyei area.

The di erences between Sudan andSouth Sudan also eatured in themeeting o the PSC held on 14 July2012. The Council, which consideredthe brie ing by the AUHIP head, Thabo Mbeki, also discussed theterms o its communiqu PSC/MIN/COMM/3 (CCCXIX), which articulateda Roadmap to help resolve thesituation between Sudan and SouthSudan. In addition, the Councildiscussed the communiqu adoptedat the 4th meeting o the Sudan-South Sudan Consultative Forum,held in Addis Ababa on 22 June2012, that was convened jointly bythe AU and the United Nations. In itscommuniqu PSC/MIN/COMM/3, on2 May 2012 the PSC welcomed theUnited Nations Security Councilsadoption o Resolution 2046(2012),which endorsed the Roadmap andacknowledged the support extendedto the AU-led e orts by otherbilateral and multilateral partners. The Council also commended SouthSudans acceptance o theadministrative and security map orthe Sa e Demilitarised Border Zone(SDBZ) submitted to the Parties bythe AUHIP in November 2011 andcalled on the Government o Sudanto do the same.


In one o their most success ulattacks against the armed orces o South Sudan, on 17 August 2012,rebels in South Sudans largest state,Jonglei, attacked a convoy o 200soldiers, killing more than thirtygovernment soldiers. The rebels, ledby David Yau Yau, had split romSouth Sudans army (SPLA) in April2012. The August attack took place inthe Pibor region o Jonglei a tergovernment soldiers were sent to

investigate reports that Yau Yau hadbeen sighted in the area. The groupwas one o several militias ightingthe government near Pibor, a remote

corner o the eastern state o Jonglei.Some reports claimed that the rebelswere joined by youths rom theMurle tribe who were resistinggovernment e orts to disarm theircommunity. The region has seendevastating clashes between variousethnic and armed groups, claimingthe lives o hundreds o victims lastyear. A heavy-handed governmentdisarmament campaign to halt tribalrebellion has triggered strongresistance by the ethnic militias andrebel groups in the area. The deathso so many soldiers raised questionsabout the capacity andpro essionalism o South Sudans

armed orces and the strength andimpact o the various rebel groupsand tribal militias who were intenton destabilising the new state. YauYau began his rebellion a ter the2010 elections, when he ailed to beappointed as Pibors Commissioner.

South Sudan experienced anescalation o tension in the lastweeks o July 2012, ollowing thespread o a convincing rumour o a

ailed military coup attempt in Juba

by a group known as Garangs Boys,loyalists o the late SPLM leader, JohnGarang. Subsequent reports claimedthat the attempt was carried out byhigh-ranking o icers in the army. Thebelievability o the rumour andresultant uncertainty orcedPresident Salva Kiir to come outpublicly on 30 July 2012 anddenounce speculation about thecoup dtat, also accusing hisnorthern neighbour o being theinstigator. The president termed therumour a abrication and called onpeople to remain calm. This is thethird rumour o an attempted coupagainst Kiir since South Sudansindependence.

Although there is a promising startto the new peace road map betweenthe two Sudans, Juba still acesnumerous security challenges romwithin. The government is aced witha big challenge to disarm the various

armed ethnic and rebel groups. Themany rumours o ailed coups alsodemonstrate the tensions among thevarious groups in the armed orces

and relations with the government. The increasing cost o living and theinability o the government to ul ilthe expectation o citizens o thenew state are other actors thatcould urther a ect the stability o South Sudan. Furthermore, theincrease in armed groups has createdinsecurity in several parts o thecountry, and increased pressure onthe SPLA to deal with them andprotect the civilian populationdespite the governments ailure toresolve the root causes o thecon lict. The culture o extending anamnesty to rebel groups who havecommitted atrocities re lects a ailure

by the government to e ectivelyaddress the problems o crime and justice.


On 29 September 2012, theSudanese security orces raided thehouse o the South Sudanese rebelleader, James Gai, in Khartoumwhere they arrested some memberso his militia and seized weapons.Gai, who leads the South Sudan

Liberation Movement/Army(SSLM/A), escaped the raid, but thesecurity orces were able to arrest

ive o icers and 70 individuals andalso seized arms and ammunitiona ter an exchange o ire. The raidwhich, came two days a terKhartoum and Juba signed a serieso agreements ranging rom securityto oil and trade deals, wasconsidered a promising start to theconsolidation o peace andcooperation between the two states. The government o Sudan statedthat the rebel SSLM/A was opposedto the new agreements and wasdetermined to continue their ightagainst Juba. Days be ore the raid,the cabinets o Sudan and SouthSudan had approved the agreementssigned in Addis Ababa relating tounresolved issues resulting romSouth Sudans independence.

The series o agreements signed on

27 September in Addis Abababetween Khartoum and Juba wasconsidered a breakthrough a terseveral months o near-war


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experiences between the two statesand a stalemate in negotiationsabout numerous outstanding issues. The agreement about securitymatters required the withdrawal o

orces on both sides o the borderand the operationalisation o a Sa eDemilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) inaccordance with the administrativeand security map presented to theparties by the AUHIP in November2011. The agreement alsoconsolidated overall bordermanagement between the twostates and committed them to theso t border principle, to ensure thatthey maintain a peace ul, sa e and

secure border in which themovement o their respectivenationals would remain unhindered.It urther recommitted the two statesto complete the demarcation o theirinternational border and borderdemarcation modalities, includingthe establishment o broadinstitutional arrangements ormanaging the border. The onlyoutstanding issue, namely the inalstatus o the Abyei region, is to bere erred to the AU Peace and SecurityCouncil or decision.

One o the most contentious issuesbetween the two governments hasbeen the issue o oil revenues. Anagreement was reached on 27September 2012 acilitatingcooperation between the two statesto ensure that the production,processing and marketing o oilproduced in south Sudan reachesconsumer markets. The partiesagreed to the processing andtransportation o oil through Sudansubject to a one dollar per barreltransit ee.

The Cooperation Agreement a irmsthe two states commitment to theprinciple o mutual viability andworking towards promoting andbuilding a relationship o prosperity

or the peoples o Sudan and SouthSudan. The two states also agreed toestablish a Joint High Level

Committee (JHLC), to oversee jointmanagement and decision-makingabout issues relating to theirrespective nationals to acilitate

residence, movement, economicactivity, and the right to acquire anddispose o property o the citizens o the two nations. Trade and trade-related issues and cooperation oncentral banking issues were also parto the deal and an agreement wasreached to set up joint ministerialand technical committees to ostertrade relations and to develop along-term trade policy bene icial toboth countries. In an e ort to resolvethe numerous challenges arising

rom the secession, the two countriesalso reached an agreement onmanaging the division o theirrespective national assets and

liabilities, arrears and claims. Theparties also agreed to work togetherin approaching the internationalcommunity to ind ways o alleviating Sudans debt burden andto seek an end to sanctions imposedon that country.

The con lict with its northernneighbour has been the mostserious security issue a ecting SouthSudan. It is hoped that theagreements signed under strong

international and regional pressurewill acilitate urther talks andcooperation in tackling the varioussecurity challenges acing SouthSudan and Sudan. However, recentmonths have experienced increasedattacks by rebel groups within thecountry, causing a serious securityconcern and leading to manycasualties or the army. There is alsoan increase in the activities andimpact o the renegade militia

groups (RMGs).Following the attack against theSouth Sudan army on 17 August2012 that took the lives o morethan thirty government soldiers, theGovernment o South Sudanpledged to eradicate the rebel groupled by David Yau Yau. In past years,populations that have beendisarmed in South Sudan haveexpressed ears that they were beingmade vulnerable to attack by other

tribes, particularly neighbouringgroups that may have beenoverlooked in the governmentsdisarmament operation. Earlier this

year the South Sudanese Armyconducted a state-widedisarmament campaign in Jongleistate, ollowing clashes between theMurle and Luo Nuer tribes whicha ected over 100-000 people. SPLAo icials have stated that thedisarmament process will continueas planned despite sti resistance

rom targeted communities. In themeantime, the government hasneither the capacity to protect thedisarmed groups rom their rivalsnor the trust o the generalpopulation or the a ected groups.

On 4 September 2012, South SudansDeputy Minister o De ence, Majak DAgot Atem, said the governmentwas committed to making peacewith Yau Yau, and allowing memberso his group to participate ingovernment. The remarks weremade days a ter a lethal attack bythe same group on SPLA soldiers. The Deputy Minster said that i YauYau wanted to come home he wouldbe welcome to do so because hewas a South Sudanese citizen. YauYau brie ly responded to thepresidential amnesty o ered bySalva Kiir and signed an agreementwith the Juba government in 2011be ore taking up arms again in April2012. He accused the government o

ailing to honour the agreement andallow his ighters to becomeintegrated into the national army orallow the inclusion o some o hispolitical supporters in thegovernment. Yau Yau also wanted toremain a general by constitutional

appointment.South Sudan has experiencedsurging in lation sinceindependence. The annual in lationrate was 43% in August and 60% inJuly. Food prices have contributedthe biggest share. The SouthSudanese pound ell sharply a ter oilrevenues began to dry up. SouthSudan imports most o its ood as ithas no sizeable agricultural industry.

The increasing cost o living and theinability o the government to ul ilthe expectation o the citizens o thenew state are additional actors that


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could urther complicate the stabilityo South Sudan.


Africa and RECs

The series o agreements signed on27 September was considered agreat diplomatic success or theA rican Union and the AUHIP onSudan. The 5th Sudan-South SudanConstructive Forum (SSSCF), whichtook place on 29 September 2012,commended the presidents o Sudanand South Sudan, Omar Al-Bashirand Salva Kiir Myardit, or thebreakthrough achieved during thenegotiations held in Addis Ababa. Acommuniqu issued by the A ricanUnion stated that the Forum,co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and theChairperson o the Commission o the A rican Union (AU), Dr Jean Ping,as well as the Chairperson-elect o the AU Commission, Dr NkosazanaDlamini-Zuma, commended the twopresidents or demonstratingconstructive leadership and politicalwill to reach agreements on the

ollowing issues: security, borderissues (including demarcation), oil,the status o nationals o the otherstate and other economicarrangements. The Forum alsopraised the AUHIP, chaired by the

ormer President o South A rica Thabo Mbeki, or acilitating theresolution o outstanding issuesbetween the parties.

United Nations

On 20 September 2012, the UnitedNations Security Council received abrie ing by Special Envoy HaileMenkerios on the implementation o Resolution 2046 (2012) and theA rican Union road map. The Councilwelcomed the resumption o thenegotiations between Sudan andSouth Sudan under the auspices o the A rican Union High-levelImplementation Panel and urged thenegotiators to continue their

intensive work to resolve allremaining issues outlined inresolution 2046 and the road map. The Council urther emphasised the

urgency o immediately establishingthe Joint Border Veri ication andMonitoring Mission on the basis o asa e demilitarised border zone andurged all parties to expedite allnecessary steps to immediatelycommence humanitarian relie operations in accordance with therelevant Memoranda o Understanding the parties hadsigned with the tripartite partners.

The UN maintains a peacekeepingmission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The mission was established throughSecurity Council Resolution 1996 on8 July 2011. On 24 August 2012UNMISS accused the South Sudanarmy o serious human rightsviolations allegedly committed byundisciplined soldiers who werepart o the contingent participatingin the disarmament programme inJonglei. Between 15 July and 20August, the Mission declared thatthe SPLA soldiers had allegedly killedone person and that there werenumerous allegations o torture andill treatment, such as beatings, andsimulated drownings in some cases,12 rapes, six attempted rapes andeight abductions. The Missionunderscored that the victims weregenerally women and in some caseschildren. The Mission called on theSouth Sudanese authorities to holdaccountable those who hadcommitted these abuses againstcivilians, stressing that suchviolations undermined thecon idence in and collaboration o local communities with the

disarmament process.International community

The agreement o 27 September,2012, which included concurrenceon security matters and bordermanagement, was warmly welcomedby international role players inSudan. On 28 September, USPresident Barack Obama andSecretary o State, Hillary Clinton,welcomed the agreement reached

by Sudan and South Sudan on anumber o outstanding issues thathad complicated ties between thetwo neighbours. President Obama

hailed the agreement as a break-through and described it as(breaking) new ground in support o the international vision o two viablestates at peace with each other, and(representing) substantial progress inresolving the outstanding securityand economic issues between Sudanand South Sudan.

The European Union oreign policychie , Catherine Ashton, alsocommended the signing o theagreement, re erring to the move asa historic step or both Sudan andSouth Sudan. She also congratulatedboth governments on the leadershipand spirit o compromise they haddemonstrated in reaching theseagreements. It is now essential orboth sides to implement theagreement without delay. It isparticularly important that oil starts

lowing and cross-border traderesumes as this will bene it botheconomies and improve the lives o ordinary people.

Scenarios

These are the possible scenarios that

could occur in South Sudan:Scenario 1

The continuation o violencebetween the di erent communitiescould urther complicate thedisarmament process. The clashesbetween SPLA and rebel groupscould also continue to causecasualties and humanitarian crises inJonglei and other states.

Scenario 2

A genuine initiative by the SouthSudan government, accompanied bytransitional justice and meaning ulnegotiations, could address thecauses o the rebellion, therebycreating a much sa er environment

or disarmament.

Scenario 3

The peace deal with Sudan andrecent raids by Sudan could weakenthe rebel groups, orcing them to

concede and negotiate with thegovernment in Juba. However, theact that South Sudan is expected to

do the same in respect o the rebel


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groups ighting against Khartoumcould create tensions between theSPLA and targeted groups.

Options

Given the above scenarios, theollowing options could be

considered by the PSC to supportcon lict prevention e orts in SouthSudan:

Option 1

The PSC could request the AUCommission to help the Governmento South Sudan develop andimplement a comprehensive politicaland development strategy,

accompanied by a transitional justiceelement, to address inter-communalviolence in the country with

particular attention to the situationin Jonglei.

Option 2

The PSC could call upon the

Government o South Sudan toundertake the investigation it haslaunched into the recent violence,with the utmost impartiality andtransparency and on the basis o aninclusive process, while ensuring thatthe outcome o the investigation isimplemented with the ullparticipation o the concernedcommunities.

Option 3

The PSC could encourage theGovernment o South Sudan toexpand the presence o state

institutions and call upon theinternational community to supportsuch e orts. As part o this process,the government should develop anearly response and interventioncapability, taking advantage o thesupport o UNMISS.

Documentation

AU documents

PSC/PR/COMM./(CCCI) (30 November2011) PSC Communiqu on theActivities o the AUHIP

Country Analysis

CTE DIVOIREIntroduction The last country analysis on CtedIvoire was published in theFebruary 2012 edition o the Peaceand Security Council Report. Thepresent analysis coversdevelopments that occurredbetween February and September2012. Readers interested in previousevents are invited to consult theFebruary issue.

Previous PSC and AUcommuniqus

In a press release dated 17 August2012, the Commission o the A ricanUnion condemned the series o attacks by armed elements ... inAbidjan and other parts o thecountry, including Abengourou,Agboville Pkambly and Dabou,noting that all claims and anypolitical objective must be pursuedthrough democratic and peace ul

means. The AU has rea irmed its ullsupport or the e orts o the Ivorianauthorities and reiterated itsengagement to continue to support

them in the process o reconciliation, reconstruction, peacebuilding and the consolidation o democracy. Be ore this release, thelast mention o Cte dIvoire withinthe PSC took place more than a yearago, at the 288th meeting on 10August 2011. A ter reviewing thereport PSC/PR/2(cclxxxviii) o theCouncils mission conducted in CtedIvoire rom 25 to 30 July 2011, theCouncil rea irmed its commitmentto do everything in its power tosupport ongoing e orts o peacebuilding and post-con lictreconstruction, and asked theCommission to send a mission toassess the situation o Ivorianre ugees, (and lend) support to thereconstruction and development o post-con lict national reconciliationincluding the re orm o the de enseand security sectors.

The assessment mission composedo technical experts was led byAnicet Georges Dologuele, ormerPrime Minister o the Central A ricanRepublic, with the aim o

evaluating the overall situation inCte dIvoire, identi ying thechallenges acing the country,in orming national and bilateral

partners and makingrecommendations. Although themission was dispatched rom 5 to 12November 2011, the report has notyet been o icially released and

urther actions by the AU, includingthe organisation o an A ricaninitiative o solidarity within thecontext o the AU post-con lictreconstruction and development

ramework, are still awaited.


At the end o September 2012, CtedIvoire was the scene o renewedattacks by unidenti ied armedelements against security sites in the

district o Port Bout in Abidjan andagainst a post in No, on the borderwith neighbouring Ghana. Theseincidents occurred a ter a ew weekso calm, ollowing a series o similarattacks in August. Those eventshighlighted many shortcomings o the Ivorian security architecture thatemerged rom the post-electionscrisis. The list o security weaknessesis long and includes a lack o basictraining among newly integrated

elements within the Forcesrpublicaines de Cte dIvoire(Republican Forces o Cte dIvoire,FRCI), competition amongst the


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various intelligence services, ailuresin the chain o command, and a lack o coordination in responding tosecurity threats. To all this is added acertain passivity or complicity,especially noticeable in the attack against Akoudo military camp, atthe end o August, which re lects thelack o integration and persistentmistrust between ormer Forces deD ense et de Scurit (De ence andSecurity Forces, FDS), o the regimeo Laurent Gbagbo, and ormerForces Nouvelles (New Forces, FN),which supported Alassane Ouattara,both o which now cohabit withinthe FRCI. I some blind spots persist

about the identity o theperpetrators o some o theseattacks, their exact motives and theirsponsors, and although securitysources say that these events do nothave the potential to plunge thecountry back into a crisis, theynevertheless highlighted theurgency o implementing e icientdisarmament, demobilisation andreintegration (DDR) and securitysector re orm (SSR) processes as wellas actions in avour o both politicaland military reconciliation that gobeyond mere symbolic actions.Reactions to these attacks have alsostressed that the civilian power inCte dIvoire did not trust these irstcategory orces (police andgendarmerie), mostly rom ex-FDS,and still relied heavily on the ormerzone commanders rom the ex-FN tomanage emergency securitysituations.

In August 2012, Cte dIvoire alsowitnessed vandalism o a politicalnature that had the potential toundermine the e orts o post-con lict reconciliation. On themorning o 18 August, theheadquarters o the party o ormerpresident Laurent Gbagbo, theIvorian Popular Front (FPI), wasattacked by armed individuals. The

ollowing night the o ices o thenewspaper, Le Temps, politicallyclose to Laurent Gbagbo, were alsovandalised.

As mentioned above, several armedattacks against the FRCI (Republican

Forces o Cte dIvoire) occurredduring recent weeks. Violent attackstook place on 25 August at a FRCIcheckpoint near Grand Lahou,south-west o Abidjan, and on 14August, at a military post on theborder with Liberia. It is in thisclimate o insecurity thatIndependence Day was celebratedon 7 August 2012, in the a termatho the attack on the Akouedomilitary camp, which killed sixmembers o the FRCI. This attack waspreceded by one in Yopougon, onthe night o 4-5 August, whichresulted in our FRCI deaths, and asubsequent attack on a FRCI military

base in the city o Abengourou, alsoon 5 August.

In addition to these attacks againstFRCI personnel, deadly clashes took place on 20 July in Nahibily re ugeecamp in the western part o thecountry, where, according tohumanitarian sources, up to 5-000re ugees were beingaccommodated. Young people romthe town o Dukou killed 13people in the camp in response tothe death o our other victims theprevious night. On 8 June, sevenpeacekeepers rom Niger were killedin an ambush in a orest area near Tai.


Several political, security, judicial andelectoral dynamics must be takeninto account at the national level.First, at the political level, nearly twoyears a ter the 2010 presidential

elections, the divisions between therespective camps o the candidates

or the election run-o are still verydeep, and the consequences o thepost-elections crisis continue toshape the Ivorian political landscape.In this polarised context, politicaldialogue is experiencing a stalemate,in spite o initiatives such as theGrand-Bassam Con erence in April2012, hosted by the Prime Minister,Jean-Marie Ahoussou, or meetings

between political parties led by theDialogue Truth and ReconciliationCommission (CDVR), directed byCharles Konan Banny, a major PDCI

igure and ormer prime ministerrom 2005 to 2007.

Since the post-elections crisis, a largeproportion o FPI supporters are

either in exile or in prison. In August2012, two additional representativeso the party (Laurent Akoun andAlphonse Douati, respectivelySecretary General and DeputySecretary General o the FPI) wereimprisoned. Radical positions takenby this historical party seem tore lect its current weakness and howdi icult it might be or its interimleadership to engage in a dialoguewithout having its legitimacyquestioned. Other pro-Gbagboparties have mostly stopped asking

or Gbagbos a prerequisite ordialogue and now ocus their claimson the ollowing points: the releaseo all political prisoners, theun reezing o assets, the return o exiles and the creation o conditions

or air and transparent localelections (including re orming theIndependent Electoral Commission(IEC), de-linking the holding o municipal and regional elections, aswell as ensuring reedom o expression and association).

The Houphouetist Rally or Peaceand Democracy (RHDP), the coalitionthat brought Alassane Ouattara topower during the 2010 presidentialelections, was already showing signso erosion during the December2011 legislative elections. Manyparties, both within and outside thecoalition, currently denounce thecatch-up policy o AlassaneOuattaras Rally o Republicans (RDR),a policy aimed at making up or theyears during which the RDR wasmarginalised. It is a policy thatinvolves positioning its members inkey positions in the administrationwhile maintaining corrupt practicessimilar to those in place during thetime o the previous regime.

Second, rom a security or militaryperspective, the various possibilities

regarding the perpetrators o theattacks o recent months illustratethe need to urgently review theIvorian de ence and security


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architecture. The Interior Minister,Hamed Bakayoko, said at thebeginning o August that the authorso such attacks were rom the galaxyo pro-Gbagbo militiamen andex-FDS. In a press release dated 5August 2012, the Democratic Partyo Cte dIvoire (PDCI) asserted thatthe actors and authors o thesedeadly attacks generally come notonly rom the ranks o pro-Gbagbomilitia, but also dozos [traditionalhunters who ought alongside theFRCI] and the uncompensateddemobilized auxiliaries and somerogue elements o the FRCI, thusmaking it necessary to accelerate the

re orm o the army and disarm thedozos. Several entities withconverging objectives, but which arenot necessarily coordinating orcollaborating, are probably involvedin those attacks. Among theseentities, there are o course pro-Gbagbo militias and ormermembers o the de ence and security

orces, but even within the camp o the victors, there are alsodisappointed winners with

weapons, including supporters o Ibrahim Coulibaly (who was killed bythe FRCI), some elements o the FRCIwaiting or promised rewards ordemobilisation, and elements o theFRCI who wish to remind theauthorities o the role they played inthe e ective installation o theelected President.

Government responses to thesesecurity challenges have beenmulti aceted. From a practical point

o view, it was decided to equip thede ence and security orces with anew type o uni orm to di erentiatebetween authorised orces and alseelements. Each attack was ollowedby repressive combing operationsand arrests which did not alwaysrespect international standards. Inrecent weeks, check points havereturned to the streets o Abidjanand the main access roads to theeconomic capital with the aim o

intercepting weapons. At theinstitutional level, a ter the attacks o early August, a decree creating aNational Security Council (NSC) was

adopted. The NSC, which comprises19 members and is chaired by thePresident o the Republic, is mainlyresponsible or coordinating allmatters relating to the internal andexternal security o Cte dIvoire,provides strategic direction, setsnational priorities on SSR, as well asin orms and continuously advises theHead o State about security issues.Other decrees issued on the sameday have suppressed manystructures that hitherto managedDDR and created a single Authorityin charge o DDR (ADDR). This is asigni icant change in dynamicsregarding DDR and SSR, as it brings

those matters under the supervisiono the presidency, matters whichhad, since the beginning o the crisis,been managed by the primeministers o ice. I these institutionaldevelopments are potentiallypositive developments, it remains tobe seen how e ective they will be interms o their implementation.Expectations are high and DDR andSSR processes will require politicalcourage.

Third, in terms o justice, despite thecommitment o President Ouattarato ight impunity, the Ivorian PopularFront (FPI) has denounced victors justice. It must be recognised that noone close to President Ouattara hasyet been prosecuted. The August2012 publication o the report o theNational Commission o Inquiry onviolations o human rights andhumanitarian law which occurreda ter the presidential elections o 31October and 28 November 2010, hasgenerated strong reactions romboth sides. According to this report,the orces supporting LaurentGbagbo are responsible or thedeaths o nearly 1-500 people, whilethe FRCI orces, who ought orPresident Ouattara, are responsible

or the deaths o about 730 people.Following up on this report will becentral to give weight to Ouattarasclaim to ight impunity in all camps.

The ourth and inal importantdynamic relates to the upcominglocal elections (municipal andregional), scheduled or February

2013. The approach o this electioncould create a window o opportunity or negotiationsregarding the participation andstatus o the opposition, the re ormo the Independent ElectoralCommission (IEC) (designed in thepeace agreements only orpresidential and legislative elections)and the revision o the voters list. Theresolution o these issues could leadto important preliminary steps interms o political reconciliation inCte dIvoire.


Africa and RECs

Neither the AU PSC nor the ECOWASMediation and Security Council hasmet recently to consider the securitysituation in Cte dIvoire. Despitemaintaining its presence in CtedIvoire through the o ice o theRepresentative o the President o the AU Commission and itscondemnation o the attacks thatoccurred during August 2012, the AUhas remained publicly very discreet. The ECOWAS representation in

Abidjan has also maintained apresence in Cte dIvoire through itso ice. It donated ood to the Ivoriangovernment in May 2012 andprovided inancial support to theDialogue, Truth and ReconciliationCommission (CDVR) in February 2012

or the implementation o itsactivities. The ECOWASCommissioner or Political A airs,Peace and Security, SalamatuHussaini Suleiman, also noted, on 13

August 2012, a deterioration o thesituation in Cte dIvoire. Thetimorous reactions rom the politicalleadership o the AU and ECOWASabout Ivorian issues may be relatedto their preoccupation in dealingurgently with the crises in Mali andGuinea Bissau or the entrance o Cte dIvoire into a new peace-building phase led by the Ivoriangovernment which has de ined anew role or external partners. The

accession o Alassane Ouattara to thePresidency o ECOWAS, in February2012, has also limited themanoeuvrability o ECOWAS in


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addressing issues relating to CtedIvoire.

The attacks at the borders withLiberia and Ghana have stressed theimportance o an increased bilateraland regional cooperation,particularly between these countriesand Cte dIvoire. On 23 June 2012,the Liberian authorities arrested andextradited 41 Ivorians suspected o being involved in crimes committedduring the post-elections crisis. A tertwo emergency meetings that took place in Abidjan and Monrovia,Liberia also strengthened itscollaboration on border security withCte dIvoire as part o the ManoRiver Union.

However, relations with Ghanaremain strained. Ghana is home tomany pro-Gbagbo political andmilitary exiles who have insertedthemselves into the inancial andpentecostal circuits o Ghanaiansociety. The acting president o Ghana, John Dramani Mahama,declared on 5 September that theterritory o Ghana (would) never beused as a base to destabilize CotedIvoire. However, the attack in Noon 20 September, Cte dIvoiressubsequent closure o the border,and the release on bail by Ghanaian judicial authorities, on September 25,o Gbagbos Budget Minister duringthe post-elections crisis, Justin KonKatinan, who is suspected o havingsponsored some o the recentattacks, are contentious issuesa ecting relations between thesetwo countries (he was re-arrested

three days later). The Ivorian Ministero the Interior stated on 27September: We have evidence thatwhatever happens is coordinated inGhana. ... I have no evidence to provethe complicity o the Ghanaian state,but it happens on the territory o Ghana. The enhancement o securityrelations between Cte dIvoire andits neighbours is an urgent necessityin what has become a sub-region incrisis. It should also be mentioned

that many weapons distributedduring the post-elections crisis havenot yet been recovered.Consequently, there is a real

possibility that illegal arms tra ickingwill result in increased arms lowstowards Mali, through northern CtedIvoire.

United Nations

In its resolution 2062 o 26 July 2012,the Security Council o the UNstrongly condemned the attack byarmed elements on a patrol o theUnited Nations Operation in CtedIvoire (UNOCI) in the south west o Cte dIvoire on 8 June 2012, inwhich seven peacekeepers and anumber o other persons were killed. The UNSC urged the United NationsMission in Liberia to cooperate with

UNOCI to ensure border security andto work together on any matterwithin its mandate. The SecurityCouncil urther reiterated its concernwith the unresolved key challengeso disarmement demobilization andreintegration and security sectorre orm as well as the continuedcirculation o weapons whichcontinue to be signi icant risks to thesecurity o the country, particularly inwestern Cte dIvoire. It also notedwith interest, the creation o theinter-ministerial working group onDDR and SSR, which developed thestrategy to be implemented by theAuthority or DDR and the NationalSecurity Council. The resolutiondecided that UNOCI shall put added

ocus on supporting the Governmenton DDR and SSR. Finally, Resolution2062 extends the mandate o UNOCI31 July 2013 as well as theauthorisation given to the French

orces to support UNOCI within theirmeans and in their areas o deployment.

International community

The Head o Delegation o theEuropean Union in Cte dIvoire saidon 27 August that recent securityincidents were matters o concern

or the government, but also orthe international community and theEuropean Union. The deputyspokesman o the French Foreign

Ministry, Vincent Floreani, hadpreviously stressed thatdisarmament and re orm o thesecurity sector should be more than

ever a priority, as well as thecontinuation o the process o national reconciliation and the ightagainst impunity.

On 3 October 2011 the ICCProsecutor was allowed to open aninvestigation into the situation inCte dIvoire or crimes allegedlycommitted since 28 November 2010.It was decided, on 22 February 2012,to extend its authority to investigatethe situation in Cte dIvoire toinclude within the jurisdiction o thecourt, crimes allegedly committedbetween 19 September 2002 and 28November 2010. In parallel, two billsrelated to the ICC were adopted bythe Ivorian Council o Ministers at theend o September 2012 to acilitatethe rati ication o the Rome Statuteby Cte dIvoire. Regarding theproceedings against ormerPresident Gbagbo, the hearingconcerning the con irmation o charges, scheduled or 13 August,was postponed. A closed-doorhearing was held on 24 and 25September to determine whetherLaurent Gbagbos health statuswould enable him to take part in theproceedings against him. Noin ormation has yet been madepublic in this regard.

Civil society

On 8 september 2012, the IvorianLeague o Human Rights (LIDHO)expressed concern about thesecurity situation. Its presidentstrongly condemned the latestviolence perpetrated against FRCI

and invited the political class toshow restraint in political discourse.Also, he emphasised thatreconciliation and re orm o thesecurity sector and armed orceswere urgent matters that were takingtoo long to be implemented.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis, threescenarios can be identi ied:

Scenario 1

A reconciliation ramework takinginto account some o the claims o the opposition (including the re orm


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o the Independent ElectoralCommission or local elections andthe revision o the law on the

inancing o political parties) is inplace to revive the political dialogue.

The ensuing appeasement o thepolitical climate creates a newsituation in the relations betweenthe government and the politicaland military pro-Gbagbo exiles inGhana. In parallel, DDR and SSRprocesses are conducted in ane ective manner, leading to animproved security situationconducive to post-con lictreconstruction and economicgrowth.

Scenario 2 The political reconciliation processremains stalled. Attempts at dialoguedo not lead to any progress in termso reconciliation and radicalelements on both sides still hold onto their positions. In the absence o asigni icant dialogue and given thetensions between Cte dIvoire andGhana on issues regarding thepolitical and military exiles, thesecurity situation remains unstable.In parallel, DDR and SSR processestake time to go beyond the recentinstitutional development. Even i the continuing attacks do notrepresent a serious threat to those inpower, the climate hinders post-con lict reconstruction andeconomic recovery.

Scenario 3

The absence o political dialoguewidens the gap between the two

camps. Attacks against security sitescontinue. The repressive governmentreactions occur without thenecessary discernment, which

urther consolidates the political and

military opposition. Advocacy led bypro-Gbagbo exiles in Ghana andinternal tensions ahead o electionsin Ghana do not avour arapprochement between Accra andYamoussoukro. In parallel, corruptionpractices in DDR and SSR stall thereconciliation processes and create

rustration among ex-combatantsand militamen. The continuingclimate o insecurity hinders post-con lict reconstruction andeconomic recovery as it does notencourage the return o investmentin the economy.

Options

Option 1 The large number o military andcivilian exiles in Ghana since thepost-elections crisis, the unilateralIvorian decision to close the borderbetween Ghana and Cte dIvoire

ollowing the attack at the borderpost o No at the end o Septemberand the release on bail o GbagbosMinister o Budget and spokesmanduring the post-elections crisis,Justin Kon Katinan, also at the end

o September, are seriouscontentious points between Ghanaand Cte dIvoire. The A rican Unionand ECOWAS could play a discreetmediation role to encourage betterbilateral cooperation on securityissues.

Option 2

The National Security Council andthe Authority or DDR were createdby the Ivorian authorities to

implement recently developed SSRand DDR policies. These institutionalchanges must be accompanied byreal progress on the ground. Thus,the A rican Union and ECOWAS

should continue to monitor theimplementation o these policies andbe ready to o er technical assistance,

inancial or material i necessary andin coordination with UNOCI. Sharingo experience between Cte dIvoireand ECOWAS, which is developing adra t regional concept on sectorsecurity governance, could especiallybe considered.

Option 3

The A rican Union and ECOWASshould continue to support thegovernment in the delicatereconciliation process byencouraging an open, rank and

constructive political dialoguebetween the opposition and thegovernment, especially in thecontext o the orthcoming localelections.

Documentation

AU Documents

Statement o the President o theCommission press release o 17August 2012.

Report PSC/PR/2 (cclxxxviii) o theCouncils mission to Cte dIvoire

rom 25-30 July 2011.

ECOWAS Documents

Press release No. 229/2012 o 13August 2012.

UN documents

Resolution 2062 (2012) adopted bythe Security Council at its 6817thmeeting, on 26 July 2012.


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2012, Institute or Security Studies

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Country Election Date *

TogoNational Assembly

Local

October 2012

October 2012

Sierra Leone

Presidential

House o RepresentativesLocal

17 November 2012

17 November 201217 November 2012

Burkina Faso National Assembly December 2012

Ghana

Presidential 1 st Round

Presidential 2 nd Round

National Assembly

7 December 2012

28 December 2012

28 December 2012

*could change, dependent on circumstances

AcknowledgementField research, conducted by ourDakar researchers or the countryanalysis on Cte dIvoire, was undedby the Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Ghana.