patterns of electoral corruption in peru: the april 2000 general election

Crime, Law & Social Change34: 391–415, 2000.© 2000Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Patterns of electoral corruption in Peru: The April 2000 generalelection

LEWIS TAYLORInstitute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, UK

Abstract. In 2000 Alberto Fujimori became president of Peru for a third consecutive termvia an election process of dubious legality. This article details the variety of underhand andfraudulent manoeuvres employed by Peru’s ruling clique as it strove to ensure that the regimemaintained itself in power. It opens with a review of the thinking behind the government’slong-term national development strategy, before outlining its controversial behaviour duringthe election campaign, irregularities occurring on polling day, as well as when votes werebeing counted.

Introduction

The general election held on 9 April 2000 proved to be the most controversialballot conducted in Peru since 1931. Amid allegations of vote-rigging on amassive scale, with an estimated 1.4 million more votes than voters, in thedays following the poll thousands of Peruvians spilled onto streets throughoutthe country to protest against what they believed to be a government orches-trated fraud of scandalous proportions. Although in the late nineteenth andearly decades of the twentieth century electoral skulduggery was rife, uponthe return to elected government after twelve years of military rule (1968–1980), it appeared that this tradition was gradually being transcended.1 Asense that more scrupulous habits were taking root within Peruvian politicalculture was fostered by the clean election organised to establish a ConstituentAssembly in 1978, a first step on the path to “redemocratisation”, followed bylargely non-corrupt ballots in the general elections of 1980, 1985 and 1990.

Bucking this trend, in the months proceeding the 1995 general electionaccusations of malpractice surrounded the poll in the department of Huá-nuco, but the scale of the government’s victory meant that it received littleattention. With hindsight, however, it would appear that the Huánuco ballotcomprised a trial run for the manipulation of votes on a far grander scale inApril 2000. This article focuses on the various legal and non-legal methodsemployed by the regime headed by Alberto Fujimori as it fought to maintainits monopoly control over the executive, legislative and judicial arms of the

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state. It opens with an examination of why the Fujimori regime chose to godown this particular path.

Political background: “The Green Plan” and “Militarised Democracy”

Against all the odds, in June 1990 Alberto Fujimori achieved a spectacularelection victory over novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. He was propelled intothe presidency as a result of the growing economic and political turmoilthat overtook Peru during the 1980s. The Acción Popular administration ofFernando Belaunde (1980–1985) and the APRA government led by AlanGarcía (1985–1990), proved inept at managing the economy, with the res-ult that as the decade progressed inflation soared (reaching 2,775% in 1989and 7,650% in 1990), recession deepened (GNP declined 12.3% in 1989and 2.3% in 1990), unemployment increased and incomes plummeted – by1989 real wages for blue collar workers stood at 45% of their 1985 level;white collar wages fell by 47.6% over the same period. Hand in hand withan economic crisis on a scale not seen since the War of the Pacific (1879–1882), went a marked spread of corruption throughout all state institutions,as inflation decimated the disposable income of public employees (by 1989–1990 an army general was earning the equivalent of US$60 per month) andgovernment departments became filled with hundreds of party appointees,most of whom proved unable to fulfil their functions efficiently. These yearsalso witnessed an intensification of guerrilla activity mounted by the maoistPartido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) and the guevaristMovimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA).

Not surprisingly, buffeted on all sides by economic and political chaos ofepic proportions, voters lost patience with the political class and their partyorganisations, in the 1990 general elections opting for an “outsider” who wasuntainted by accusations of incompetence or corruption – Alberto Fujimori.For his part, Fujimori was totally unprepared to assume the presidency, havingonly put his candidacy forward in order to gain access to the free televisioncoverage that would enhance his chances of achieving his initial objective –election to Congress. Consequently, he possessed no detailed manifesto orprogramme for government.2

Fujimori did, however, have skeletons in the cupboard in the shape of anumber of property deals of dubious legality. If these became publicised, hisimage as an “independent” above the party squabble would be tarnished andpolitical prospects damaged. In order to resolve these difficulties, Fujimoriturned to a controversial ex-officer and lawyer, who in the 1970s had beendrummed out of the army after spying for the CIA and, since his discharge,earned something of a reputation for defending drugtraffickers: the enig-

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN PERU 393

matic Vladimiro Illich Montesinos. Montesinos succeeded in getting the legalcases against Fujimori shelved and despite being banned from setting foot onmilitary premises, became the recently elected president’s security adviser.3

While these machinations were afoot, an elite intelligence unit within thePeruvian armed forces had been busy elaborating a confidential documentthat lay down a strategy for promoting the long-term development of thecountry. The plan aimed to overcome the corruption and incompetence ofthe Belaunde and García administrations, eliminate the threat posed by PCP-SL and MRTA guerrillas, as well as reverse what they considered to be “thesocial decomposition” of Peru. Its geo-political objective was to allow Peruto recover lost ground and enable the country to compete effectively withChile and Ecuador. Labelled after being leaked to the press, the“Plan Verde”(“Green Plan”), in its original version this document envisaged a militarycoup to be launched in May 1990 to torpedo the anticipated election of asecond APRA government allied to the Izquierda Unida (United Left). Inits place a military-civilian regime committed to internal “order”, disciplineand “national regeneration” would be installed. This authoritarian regime, thePlan Verdeauthors argued, would remain in power during “fifteen to twentyyears, for a whole generation, in order to create a new Peruvian man”. Toachieve this end, the Plan posited that it would be necessary to implement“a clear policy of preventative repression lasting until the medium-term”, forwhich reason:

among the first acts of the Military Government would be the overthrowof the Peruvian Constitution, an event that will allow the Governmentto establish a new legal order and facilitate support from increasingnumbers of civilians.4

The surprise election of Fujimori upset the plotters calculations and pre-parations for the coup were put on hold pending an evaluation of the newadministration’s performance. A copy of the Plan, however, did fall into thehands of Montesinos, who suggested to Fujimori that it could be plagiarisedand serve as the government programme that the inexperienced presidentneeded so desperately. Additionally, as Fujimori was voted into office withouta solid political base or party to back him and did not command a majorityin Congress, to remain in power and govern effectively he would need thesupport of the military.

To this backdrop, on 27 July 1990, the day prior to Fujimori’s inaugurationas president, a final revision to the Green Plan proposed a “negotiation andagreement with Fujimori”, to establish a “directed democracy” that wouldprovide “long-term solutions for the country and resolve the strategic prob-lems of the state”. If Fujimori did not accede to the military’s demands, the

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last point on the memo noted that a coup should be launched to oust him.Pragmatically, Fujimori accepted the military’s agenda. Due to this concat-enation of circumstances, therefore, by 1991 the armed forces had emergedas the cornerstone of the Fujimori government and another component of the“Plan Verde” had fallen into place:

It is proposed to establish a CIVIL-MILITARY government, in whichthe armed forces assume responsibility for running the country. . . in alli-ance with honest, reliable, patriotic and technically competent civilians.

It is the armed forces who need to decide in which direction thevehicle of state should travel to attain our long-term national objectives.The armed forces should employ the best civilian drivers to steer thisvehicle.5

Regarding the non-military dimension of the proposed “civil-military gov-ernment”, demonstrating political skills beyond expectations, Fujimori se-cured his position in the eighteen months after assuming office. During 1991Vladimiro Montesinos also acquired significant additional power within theregime, reorganising the intelligence services into a single unit under his com-mand, the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN). Despite his past record,Montesinos also managed to establish a close working relationship with thedominant faction inside the armed forces. Ironically, over these months theoriginal authors of the Green Plan were marginalised and under the guidanceof Montesinos, aspects of the Plan started to be implemented – a trend thataccelerated markedly in 1992.

The latter months of 1991 and early 1992 witnessed growing conflictbetween the government and Congress, when the legislature rejected a num-ber of executive sponsored decrees designed to give additional power to themilitary in its counter-insurgency campaign against guerrilla forces, as wellas other measures aimed at strengthening the state. To resolve the impasse, inApril 1992 Fujimori (with the aid of Montesinos and Chief of Staff generalNicolás de Bari Hermoza) moved to tighten his grip on power via a palacecoup (“autogolpe”). Opposition politicians, journalists and judges were de-tained, Congress closed and the president announced that normal democraticlife would be put in abeyance “temporarily” until reforms aimed at modern-ising the state and its institutions could be implemented. Corrupt membersof the judiciary were to be removed from their posts. Significantly, in histelevised speech to the nation on the night of 5 April 1992, Fujimori declaredthat he was now heading a “Government of National Reconstruction” – thevery title concocted by the military intelligence personnel who devised the“Plan Verde”.


After seizing power, Fujimori, Montesinos and Hermoza, proceeded toexecute policies aimed at constructing the “directed democracy” allied tofree market economics laid out in the “Green Plan”. The 1979 Constitutionwas rewritten in 1993 to permit Fujimori’s re-election in 1995, which wasaccomplished with an impressive 64% of valid votes (in a partly fraudulentpoll) and a level of support sufficient to deliver a pro-government majorityin the reorganised Congress.6 The significant popular backing for Fujimori atthis juncture was due to his administration’s ability to control inflation andstabilise the economy, success in the counter-insurgency campaign againstleftist guerrillas (the general secretary of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán, wascaptured in September 1992) and continued public dislike of politicians.

Since the 1992autogolpeand 1995 election success, however, a numberof features characterised the Fujimori regime as it sought (vainly) to emulatethe development strategy of South Korea and Taiwan: the personalisationand consolidation of presidential power; executive domination over a weakand compliant Congress; government by a small group of civilian adviserslinked to a faction of the military; and growing authoritarianism, widespreadphonetapping, with considerable levels of SIN agent interference in politicallife (targeting the media, the opposition, human rights campaigners, etc.).7

Faithfully following the prescription to remedy Peru’s ills laid out in theGreen Plan – the need for a government to stay in power for “fifteen to twentyyears” – the regime forced through a number of measures that would allow itscontinuance in office beyond 2000. To this end, the clause (Article 112) in the(fujimorista) 1993 Constitution prohibiting the president from standing for asecond re-election was rewritten in 1996. The following year, three membersof the Constitutional Tribunal who ruled against Fujimori’s bid for a thirdterm were dismissed (the two judges who acquiesced to Fujimori’s desire tostay in power argued that his first period in office did not count, as the 1990election victory occurred under the now defunct 1979 Constitution). Theirseats remained vacant, depriving the Tribunal of the quorum needed to de-clare a law unconstitutional. In 1998 legislation decreeing that a referendumneeded to be conducted on the issue of re-election was annulled. Approval forthese manoeuvres was given by an executive-dominated National ElectoralTribunal (JNE), the body responsible for overseeing the constitutionality ofthe election process. Three of the JNE’s five members have been appointedby the government, which also controls the National Office of Electoral Pro-cedures (ONPE), the agency charged with administering ballots, conductingthe count and issuing official results.8 With regard to the third organisationentrusted with ensuring efficient and fair democratic process, the NationalIdentification and Civil Status Registry (RENIEC), which compiles the elect-oral voting list, an investigation by aides of opposition congresswoman Anel

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Townsend discovered that at least five SIN security personnel were employedin the agency, two of them under false names. One intelligence officer loyal toMontesinos, María Cecilia Zuñiga, occupied a high-ranking post in RENIEC,being adviser to the agency’s director.9

Due to the labours of the head of the intelligence services, therefore, bythe time supporters of the president’s political alliance, entitled Perú 2000,entered the JNE’s offices on 27 December 1999 to inscribe Fujimori’s can-didature, the ruling Fujimori-Montesinos clique enjoyed control over all thestate institutions involved in supervising the electoral process. The purposebehind these machinations was also understood by informed members of thepublic: in findings published by the Apoyo polling agency on 14 December1999, 56% of respondents believed that the regime would resort to fraud inorder to secure the “re-reelección” of Alberto Fujimori in the forthcomingballot.10

Indeed, in his final campaign speech delivered in Lima and broadcast tothe nation, Fujimori (employing the language and logic of the “Green Plan”)intimated that the widespread perception that the government would go to anylengths to retain power was justified. The president informed the crowd: “Thisgovernment headed by‘el Chino’ (‘the Chinese’ – Fujimori’s nickname) hasacted extremely tough, with a firm hand” and “has delivered real benefits”,but ten years in power “have not been sufficient to solve Peru’s problems”.It was therefore imperative, he reasoned, to “govern for five more years sothat I can deliver more schools, medical posts, more roads and infrastructure,so that you can better yourselves”.11 In the following sections the manner inwhich the ruling cabal operated over the three phases of the electoral cycle –campaign, polling day and counting the vote – as they strove to retain controlof the state, are examined.

Electoral malpractice: The campaign

Under the Peruvian electoral system, a simultaneous ballot is held every fiveyears to elect a president and deputies to a 120 member single chamber Con-gress. If no presidential contender receives 50% plus one vote, a second roundcontest between the two frontrunners takes place. Election to Congress isdetermined by proportional representation, with a preferential vote decidingwhich individuals from the various party lists occupy the number of seatsappertaining to each group – complex procedures that facilitate fraudulentpractices. From the outset, Fujimori’s goal was to register a first round victoryin the presidential vote and secure the election of the maximum number of hissupporters to Congress. With ten parties or alliances standing in the congres-sional ballot, producing a total of 1,200 candidates, the resulting dispersed


vote made this second objective problematic; nevertheless, the aim was to getas near to 60 seats as possible in parliament on the official Perú 2000 ticket.

When campaigning started in earnest in January 2000, Fujimori’sre-re-elecciónappeared eminently achievable. An opinion poll published by theApoyo agency on 18 January gave the incumbent 45% of voter preferencesin greater Lima (which houses one-third of the electorate), well ahead of hisnearest rival, who languished on 19% and possessed a weak political baseoutside the capital.12 Keen not to fall into the trap of complacency, however,the ruling circle moved to exploit their control of the state to consolidateFujimori’s advantage. Army conscripts were mobilised to paint Perú 2000election propaganda, which even appeared on military property. State ownedtelevision channels gave exclusive air time to the president’s activities. “Inde-pendent” terrestrial television stations became “tied in” to the official causeby virtue of the large sums of advertising revenue they received from thegovernment, the threat being that this would be withdrawn if they broadcastadverts for other candidates or gave them significant air time. To reinforcethe pressure, it was made clear to proprietors that if they did not succumbto the government’s wishes, the state inland revenue agency (SUNAT) wouldbe instructed to collect tax arrears and undertake robust audits of companyaccounts. As a result, Fujimori’s rivals found it extremely difficult to gain ac-cess to terrestrial television, which during January-April 2000 dedicated 80%of its political coverage to Fujimori’s announcements, meetings and officialvisits around the country (usually in military aircraft paid for by taxpayers).When they did broadcast programmes featuring other presidential candidates,these invariably adopted a critical editorial line.

Coverage of the election in the tabloid press demonstrated even greaterbias. The owner of two of the most popular publications was placed at number68 on the Perú 2000 list for Congress, ensuring support from these papers.Backing for Fujimori was also attained through more underhand means: ac-cording to one former tabloid owner, titles occupying this section of thepress receive subventions organised through the intelligence service varyingbetween US$1,000 and US$5,000 per day; furthermore, their sensationalistheadlines and political campaigns were written and coordinated “in an officelocated physically in the SIN headquarters”.13 Needless to say, throughoutthe January-April campaign period the tabloids ran scurrilous character assas-sination campaigns against Fujimori’s opponents, who were labelled “liars”,“cheats”, “crooks”, “terrorists” and more, with no right of reply.

Food aid and the distribution of other commodities formed another im-portant aspect of the (mis)use of state resources undertaken in the drive toprocure Fujimori’sre-reelección. Owing to widespread poverty in town andcountry, an estimated million schoolchildren in greater Lima receive breakfast

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at school, while another million adults are provided with a daily meal via anetwork ofcomedores populares(soup kitchens); meanwhile, approximately2.5 million small-scale farmers living in the Andes rely on food donationsfrom the USA and EU channelled through the state. Such a degree of de-pendence gives the National Food Aid Programme (PRONAA) considerablepolitical significance. To exploit this situation to the full, over the monthsprior to election day PRONAA functionaries throughout the country wereforced to work for Fujimori’s campaign, threatening vulnerable voters that thesupply of foodstuffs would cease if“el Chino” was not returned to the pres-idential palace. Of particular importance in this regard, was the role playedby PRONAA controlled literacy brigades employed to work with illiteratesenrolled in thecomedores populares. Despite the practice of hiring via short-term contracts (usually of two to three months duration) and a modest salaryof approximately 200soles(£50) per month, these posts are much soughtafter. They are invariably filled by women with few resources, whose needfor work is taken advantage of by PRONAA directors to force them to engagein pro-government political propaganda – such an imposition is constant, butthese demands became particularly strong during the months leading up tothe April 2000 election.14

Participants in the food programme were also put under pressure to at-tend Fujimori’s campaign meetings (with transport provided by the state). AtFujimori’s rallies it was common practice to give away cooking utensils andother useful items, which was done openly and captured on camera. Anothermechanism utilised by PRONAA staff to influence voting behaviour con-cerned the purchase of agricultural commodities from peasant farmers. In thedepartments of Cajamarca and Cusco, for example, during the month prior toelection day PRONAA officials promised to buy large quantities of potatoes atan agreed price. Agriculturalists were left in no doubt that the deal would notbe honoured if they did not back“el Chino” .15 Other state institutions activein the countryside were mobilised to the same end. The National Project forWater and Soil Conservation (PRONAMACHCS) operates in 18 departmentswith funds from the World Bank and Japan. Since the municipal elections of1998, when distributing seeds, tools and fertlizer, its staff have been engagedin handing small-scale farmers t-shirts and caps with pro-government logos,as well asfujimoristaelectoral material. According to one ex-employee, “re-fusing to undertake these tasks meant dismissal. . . political work in favour ofthe government is part of the job. It’s as straightforward as that”.16

In another clear inducement to voters, half way through the election cam-paign (February 2000) the government announced the creation of the PRO-FAM housing development agency, which offered citizens the prospect ofaccess to plots for house construction, with basic services (piped water, elec-


tricity, etc.) provided by the state. At an election rally held in the town ofTrujillo, Fujimori declared that he was going to build 700,000 new homes,and over following weeks some 800,000 people registered their names forinclusion in the scheme. Plots were to be allocated to needy families after theelection, with the clear message being that this would only occur if the presid-ent remained in power. Such a cynical ploy was denounced by Transparencia(Transparency), an autonomous organisation founded in 1994 to inform cit-izens about their democratic rights and monitor elections, as “manipulatingthe hopes of the poor”.17

The whole state apparatus, including high-ranking officials in govern-ment departments, local army commanders, departmental prefects, provincialsubprefects, district governors and lieutenant governors at the village level,became involved in coordinating these activities.18 Indeed, government ap-pointees in the provinces received specific instructions from Lima to particip-ate energetically on behalf of Fujimori, a command that was made public bythe subprefect of Ayabaca province (in the department of Piura), who ratherfoolishly in a taped interview told the local station Radio Cutivalú:

With good reason, the Interior Ministry has sent round a directive or-dering lieutenant governors throughout the country to create SupportCommittees. Nationally there are 30,000 lieutenant governors, so some300,000 people are involved. That is 300,000 individuals who, as some-one said, comprise Peru’sfujimoristaarmy. Additionally, there are morethan 200 subprefects and 2,000 governors. All of us constitute the exten-ded family of the Interior Ministry. We are disposed, and as I understandit, committed, to defend this crusade which aims to benefit our coun-try; a crusade that has been initiated by our leader and mentor, AlbertoFujimori – who has to grow and become great, just as the dreams of ourleader and guide are great.19

Such a blatant use of the state machine for partisan political ends signified thatthe campaign between January and April comprised an unequal affair. TheFujimori re-reeleccióndrive enjoyed levels of media access, finance and hu-man resources that eclipsed that available to all the opposition candidates puttogether. As envisaged in the “Green Plan”, the “state” and the “government”had become indistinguishable.

This lack of a level playing field not only produced significant protest fromwithin Peru. US and EU diplomats expressed their disquiet about the unfairnature of the contest, concerns that were also voiced by an Organisation ofAmerican States mission sent to observe the election and independent mon-itoring organisations such as the Carter Center.20 The barrage of criticismproduced no real change. The Fujimori-Montesinos clique remained determ-

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ined to employ every means at its disposal to secure a victory for the officialcandidate, and despite making several public statements (aimed primarily toplacate Lima’s diplomatic community) suggesting that the president was keento see a more balanced media coverage and changes made to rectify otherirregularities flagged by international observers, no concessions materialised.Fujimori’s “re-reelección” continued to be pursued at all costs, as the authorsof the Green Plan would have wanted.

Electoral malpractice: Polling day

Having invested so much effort and money in attempting to win in the firstround, much to the disappointment of Fujimori’s campaign team, rather thanthe president climbing in the ratings to the hoped-for 50%, as election dayapproached his standing declined (poll data released on 21 March gave him40%). To complicate matters, a dark horse presidential candidate - AlejandroToledo of the Perú Posible grouping – started to command large-scale sup-port, rising from 7% in mid-January, to 27% by late March and to 39% inan Apoyo poll conducted one week before the vote (2 April).21 Toledo’s latesurge transformed what in January had appeared to be a straightforward winfor Fujimori into a real contest. This meant that the government needed to pullout all the stops on polling day if the incumbent was to emerge victorious, afactor that increased the temptation to engage in skulduggery.

This took on various forms. One unsophisticated trick was to omit Toledofrom the ballot paper. By coincidence, the main opposition candidate figuredat the bottom of the ballot (one’s position on the ballot paper is determinedby drawing lots), and when many voters entered the polling booth to registertheir preference, they found to their surprise that Toledo’s name had been cutoff. ONPE officials claimed this was an accidental printshop error, but failedto explain why adulterated ballots appeared in different corners of Peru (i.e.it was not just one rogue batch) and why nobody had thought to check theirintegrity prior to 9 April. Another irregularity occurring throughout the coun-try involved proselytisation on 9 April by members of the state apparatus infavour of Fujimori. Peruvian electoral law states that campaigning must stopon the Thursday before the Sunday election and prohibits any electioneeringon polling day. Nevertheless, dozens of cases were recorded of prefects, sub-prefects and district governors distributing propaganda and urging citizens tosupport the official candidate (on occasions issuing threats) as they queuedup to vote. In many localities they even entered buildings where the vote wasbeing conducted.

A few examples can be given to illustrate this kind of illegal practice. Onelection day morning in the peasant community of Chacolla (department of


Ayacucho), the local lieutenant governor organised the preparation of soupin the village square before polling commenced and as electors were servedbreakfast, he warned of the need to vote for“el Chino” if they wished tocontinue receiving food donations. Onecampesinofrom a neighbouring com-munity noted that: “The governor told us that we must vote for Fujimori,otherwise food and other assistance would stop. Many people were afraid”.22

On election morning in the town of San Marcos (Cajamarca department), anarmy helicopter arrived transporting sacks of grain, which were distributedto voters along with instructions to support the official candidate; just incase the message had not been assimilated, ONPE employees accompaniedelectors into the (supposedly secret) polling booths and showed them howto vote23. ONPE staff in Andahuaylas (Apurímac department) charged withinforming the public where their polling station was located, also indicatedto electors that they should vote for the official Perú 2000 slate. Outside oneof the main polling stations in the Amazonian city of Tarapoto, Perú 2000activists assembled loudspeakers and harangued electors queuing to vote withpro-Fujimori propaganda, while police and army personnel stood idly by.The police proved more proactive in Cutervo, a town located in the northernhighlands. Here the subprefect distributed sacks of rice and oats to electors inreturn for votes. Keen to do their bit, the police urged people to support thepresident as the authorities handed out boxes of matches carrying a picture ofFujimori and the Perú 2000 logo.24

In the province of Panao (Huánuco department), municipal trucks wereemployed to bring rural voters to the polling stations, where they were handedPerú 2000 leaflets and instructed to vote for Fujimori. Furthermore, govern-ment functionaries working in Panao took control of the voting tables andissued ripped ballot papers to known opposition supporters with the inten-tion of nullifying their vote.25 Elsewhere in the department of Huánuco, onelection day the mayor and subprefect of the district of Molinos (Pachiteaprovince), could be found inside the local school, which doubled up as thepolling station, exhorting voters to cast their ballots for Fujimori. To com-pound the irregularities, somebody had stolen all thehologramas(holograms– security stickers) that are supposed to be placed on each electors identi-fication document after they have cast their ballot to prevent people votingseveral times. They are also attached to the final return from each votingtable. Not surprisingly, several electors found that unknown individuals hadcast a vote on their behalf. Nor could a clean vote be guaranteed, for withoutthehologramafalse voting returns could be substituted for the original.26

These illegal practices occurred most commonly in rural areas, where theability of state officials (civilian and military) to browbeat electors is partic-ularly strong – one legacy of Peru’s recent political history. Between 1980

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and 1993 a bitter civil war developed and successive governments declaredlarge swathes of the country (particularly in Andean and jungle areas) tobe “Emergency Zones”. Here normal citizens rights evaporated and militaryedict ruled. As part of the armed forces counter-insurgency strategy the ruralpopulation was organised into civil defense committees, whose office-holdersoften exploited their influence with local military commanders to settle per-sonal disputes over property, debts, women and family honour. Being de-nounced as a “terrorist” by a member of the village civil defence committeecould mean death, a life prison sentence or at best a severe beating – andtoday many leading figures in the defence committees occupy lower-rankingpositions in the state apparatus, i.e. in the words of the subprefect of Ayabaca,they comprise Fujimori’s “army” of district governors and village-level lieu-tenant governors. Although the degree of guerrilla activity has diminishedsubstantially in recent years, military personnel still wield influence in manyrural areas and the local lieutenant governor is not someone to be messedwith. In electoral terms, the political significance of these local power struc-tures arises from: (i) the orders emanating from the high command to officersstationed in the provinces to back Fujimori’sre-reelección; and (ii) the largenumber of rural voters open to intimidation by army personnel and theircivilian cronies. This susceptibility is increased by the fact that many ruralvoters in the highlands do not believe that“el voto es secreto”, and fear theability of the authorities to discover for whom they have cast their preference.According to Transparencia, over 10% of the electorate (approximately 1.4million voters) inhabit zones where the military hold sway.

As anticipated by independent observers, army involvement on electionday contributed substantially to Fujimori’s vote, an outcome facilitated byan absence of independent monitors and opposition scrutineers in isolatedrural areas.27 Two examples suffice to illustrate normal practice in this regard.In the district of Santiago (Apurímac department), Transparencia volunteersdenounced members of the armed forces who they encountered instructingpeople how to vote for the official candidate. The Satipo region, which ispopulated by Asháninka indians and where Sendero Luminoso remains act-ive, possesses a high illiteracy rate and many women are monolingual non-Spanish speakers. Despite these limitations, many voting returns indicated100% support for Fujimori, incredibly with no blank or void ballot papers.Overall, in most localities where the military exercise authority in alliancewith pro-Fujimoricoq de village, the official candidate obtained overwhelm-ing majorities.28

Instances of straight monetary inducements being given to voters wererecorded in various parts of the country, especially in the provinces and,given the franciscan poverty of opposition groups, mainly involved Perú 2000


campaign workers.29 A more sophisticated – even ingenious – mechanism foraccumulating votes compared to paying straight cash bribes (electors mightmark the ballot paper differently once inside the polling booth), appeared inthe shape of the“carrusel” (“carrousel”), also known as“la ruleta” (“roul-ette”). In terms of organisation (or better said “disorganisation”), in April2000 the Peruvian electorate was divided up among 87,277 voting tables(“mesas de sufragio”), the roll appertaining to individual tables containinganywhere between 130 and 230 names. Eachmesais usually presided overby three citizens (supposedly selected at random), who issue ballot papersto voters assigned to “their” table, ensure that the vote is deposited in “their”ballot box, are responsible for counting votes appertaining to “their” electorallist and jointly sign a return (“acta” ) indicating the final distribution of votes.When a ballot paper is handed over to an elector before (s)he votes, to bevalid it has to be signed by the“presidente” (head) of the appropriatemesa.

To get around this inconvenience and set the“carrusel” in motion, anindividual intent on buying votes locates a couple of blocks away from thepolling station and tries to attract “customers”. The first “client” is sent intovote with a void ballot paper (it does not carry the signature of the personpresiding over the voting table) concealed about their person, which (s)hedeposits in the ballot box and returns to thecarruseloperator with the blankballot containing the necessary signature before receiving payment. The per-son directing thecarrusel then completes the (valid) blank ballot paper inthe desired fashion, which is handed over to the next “client”, who depositsit and returns with another blank voting slip. Through this mechanism, onevote is lost, but 50 or 60 can be accumulated permesa. The beauty of thescam resides in the fact that it is very difficult to detect: all but one of theballots appear perfectly in order. Thecarruselis an undertaking that is partic-ularly attractive to aspiring congresswomen and men, for it not only assuresvotes for the party presidential candidate and general congressional list, italso permits the accumulation of a substantial preferential vote. In the periodfollowing the 9 April poll, evidence emerged that thecarruselhad been set inmotion, mostly in favour of official candidates in the provinces (the highlandareas of Piura, Cajamarca, Huánuco, Apurímac and Puno), although it wasalso employed to secure votes in the coast (Chepén) and Tarapoto in theAmazonian department of San Martín.30

One interesting case in this regard involves Adolfo Amorín, a medium-scale landowner from Cajamarca and close acquaintance of the president,who is not very well liked in the region and attempts to improve his popularityby donating fighting bulls tocorridasheld at local town festivals (in which heplays openly to the public gallery) and engages in other“cholerías” (acts ofdubious taste). As expected, Amorín did not receive a substantial preferential

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vote in his home area, but surprisingly garnered several thousand additionalvotes in the departments of Cusco and Puno, sited over 2,000 kilometresaway adjacent to the border with Bolivia, where he has no local connection. Itwas strongly rumoured that Fujimori issued orders to the effect that Amorínshould be elected to Congress “come what may”, with the result that Perú2000 activists in Cusco and Puno had been instructed to carry out the pres-ident’s command. Conveniently, the distance between Cajamarca and thesesouthern departments was great enough to make it unlikely that anyone wouldtravel the length of the country to investigate.31

Electoral malpractice: The count

Polling terminated at 4.00 p.m. Thereafter four points in the administrativecycle existed at which vote-rigging could occur: (i) when votes are addedup for eachmesaand the official return (acta) is completed with signaturesand thumbprints from the people presiding over a particular voting table;(ii) when the returns from each voting table are being transported (with theballot boxes) from the polling stations to the 56 regional counting centres (aresponsibility often taken on by the army and police); (iii) when the figuresfrom individualactasare being fed into the ONPE computing system at theseregional collation points; and (iv) during transmission via the internet of con-solidated data to the centre in Lima and their compilation to produce nationalreturns.

During voting hours, under Peruvian electoral law accredited volunteersfrom Transparencia, employees of the Defensoría del Pueblo (ombudsman’sdepartment) and scrutineers authorised by political parties (personeros), areable to observe the conduct of the poll and be present when votes are counted.Personerosalso have the right to challenge any vote they consider to be in-valid (i.e. if the cross made by an elector has extended outside the appropriatebox). This system works reasonably well when independent observers andrepresentatives from several competing parties are present to check votes areadded up fairly. However, in April 2000 the ombudsman’s office and opposi-tion political groups proved unable to mobilise sufficient scrutineers to ensurethat every polling station and voting table was covered (nationally 3,750polling stations existed). Only Fujimori’s Perú 2000 alliance possessed the re-sources to have a presence throughout the country, the result being that votescast in a large number ofmesas(particularly in rural areas) could be mas-saged bypersonerosof Perú 2000 or Fujimori’s “army” of local lieutenantgovernors and subprefects.

Detecting fraud committed at this stage in the proceedings becomes almostimpossible for opposition candidates, because under Peruvian regulations


once theactaand ballot box reach ONPE’s 56 decentralised collation centres,ballot papers are destroyed and theactabecomes the sole piece of paper indic-ating the vote in a particularmesa(Venezuela and Panama are the only otherLatin American countries who employ this procedure). Despite the problemof discovering whether returns from the various tables have been doctored, onthe afternoon and evening of 9 April a number of cases were exposed, two ofwhich will be mentioned to illustrate what was afoot. In the rural district of LaEncañada (department of Cajamarca), not only did the local governor (whohappened to be under the influence of alcohol) install a minor as head of a vot-ing table when his mother failed to turn up to undertake the task, he allowedpersonerosbelonging to Perú 2000 to stand by the ballot box and inspectvoting slips completed by electors. Those in favour of Fujimori were placedin the box, while votes cast for opposition candidates were thrown into anadjacent waste bin. Not content with this chicanery, when the polls closed thegovernor was captured on video in the company of five Perú 2000 campaignworkers, adjusting down votes for opposition candidates and inflating thosefor Fujimori – shenanigans that were broadcast throughout Latin America bythe CNN network.32

The second piece of data originates from Chachapoyas, capital of the de-partment of Amazonas in the northern sierra, where thecarruselappears tohave been extensively employed. Here, returns frommesaswhere the oppos-ition did not have monitors and only supporters of Perú 2000 witnessed thecount, gave Fujimori an average of 68% of valid votes compared to Toledo’s25% (in somemesasFujimori garnered 78%). Revealingly, for those votingtables wherepersonerosfrom opposition parties attended the count, Fujimoripolled 49% to 44% for Toledo, a significant difference. The ability to engagein such fraudulent antics was increased by military interference: in pollingstations throughout the departments of Tumbes, Piura and Ancash, army per-sonnel refused to allow independent scrutineers from Transparencia to ob-serve how the election proceeded during polling, how the count was conduc-ted and the accuracy with whichactas from individual voting tables werecompleted. In Tarapoto, the army only allowedpersonerosof Perú 2000 toenter the polling stations before 10.00 a.m., so they had two hours to engage ingerrymandering before representatives from non-official organisations couldmonitor how the ballot was progressing.33

Under Peruvian legislation, representatives of the different groups can se-lect one of their number to accompany the transfer ofactasand ballot boxes toONPE’s provincial computing centres dotted around the country. When thisis located several hours away, it is commonplace for the electoral materialto be transported without monitors because nobody can spare the time orthe money to travel – a scenario that opens up possibilities for substituting

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false returns in favour of the official candidate, through replacing actas andballot papers with others that have been completed prior to election day.34

This posed a real problem given that the army is often in charge of transport,has become heavily politicised under the influence of Montesinos and gen-eral Hermoza (who was dismissed in 1998 after a disagreement between thetwo over their respective roles during the MRTA occupation of the Japaneseambassadors residence), and that regional commanders had received ordersto back Fujimori. The length of time taken to deliveractasand ballot boxesto ONPE’s offices also facilitated corrupt practices – in most cases regionalONPE computing centres did not receive all voting returns until 8.00 a.m. onMonday 10 April, fully 16 hours after polling finished.

Responding to this situation, the leader of the OAS monitoring missionsent to Lima, Eduardo Stein, deplored the “phenomenal delays” that occur-red.35 For its part, the Defensoría del Pueblo noted the “severe problems”arising during this stage in the electoral process. According to the ombuds-man’s department, military personnel regularly refused to allow observers toaccompany voting returns from polling station to processing centre and madelast minute changes to prearranged routes when delivering them to ONPEregional offices. Upon their arrival, it was observed that many envelopes con-tainingactashad their security seals broken. Ballot boxes were encounteredin a similar condition. Also, returns from polling stations were delivered toONPE without security holograms, but with “corrections” having been madeto the number of votes cast for each candidate.36

Once theactasbecame the responsibility of ONPE and the collating ofresults from individual voting tables could begin, numerous problems arose.Major causes for concern related to the slow pace at which the count pro-gressed, the reliability of ONPE’s computing software, the possibility thatit could be “hacked” into and the inability of monitoring agencies to seewhat was being fed into the system. OAS mission head Eduardo Stein voicedhis disquiet regarding these issues in a strong statement delivered at a pressconference the day following the poll. Stein declared that “something verysinister is happening” and could “not understand why by eight o’clock onMonday the majority of processing centres had not received all theiractas”.In the intervening period, ONPE had released results for 40% of the totalnumber of voting tables, but OAS observers and computing specialists hadbeen unable to monitor the count “because the computing centres were closedon Monday morning and we were informed that they would not reopen untilthree or four o’clock in the afternoon”. The official explanation was that stafffeeding election results into the computers had been working to 3.00 a.m. andneeded sleep. But, queried Stein, “what were they doing if the majority of


actashad not arrived by then? We need an explanation”. He also complainedthat:

We have no means of checking if changes (in the number and distri-bution of votes – LT) are being made, because the system does notallow us to access electronic windows. An additional system is neededso that verification terminals can be installed in each of the 56 computingcentres.37

Stein had ample cause for anxiety. In Ayacucho department, like many otherprocessing centres, the computing system crashed erasing all the stored data.Furthermore, local ONPE officials did not allow observers from Transpar-encia to monitor the feeding of information into the computing system untilfive o’clock in the afternoon. A common complaint from around the countryrelated to the distance scrutineers were kept away from ONPE employeesprocessing data. In the opinion of the Defensoría, this policy meant that “theirpresence was purely symbolic”.

Irregularities in the summation of votes soon appeared. In the jungle pro-vince of Coronel Portillo the local computing centre was shut down between2.11 a.m. and 11.24 a.m. on Monday 10 April, but this did not prevent thenumber of votes for Fujimori increasing by 1,186. Bizarrely, various provin-cial ONPE computing centres and the Lima headquarters started to releasefigures indicating that there were more votes than voters. In the small districtof Máncora (Piura) 4,934 votes were apparently cast even though only 4,033electors appear on the roll; in the adjacent district of Los Negritos the respect-ive figures were 7,658 and 5,652. On a grander scale, ONPE figures returned283,117 votes in the department of Cusco when voters numbered 219,345; inthe department of Huánuco with 99.74% of the count completed, the numberof votes totalled 197,157 even though only 147,324 electors had voted.38

Overall, at the national level an excess of 1.4 million votes appeared, a factthat the director of ONPE explained away as being due to poor arithmetic onthe part ofmiembros de mesa, who he claimed, had added up the ballot paperswrongly for their particular voting tables.

Given the massive number of votes involved, this statement was met withincredulity by a majority of citizens, who began to clamour for his resig-nation – the electorate was not naive enough to believe that many of these“surplus” votes went to opposition candidates. Evidence of this came fromChachapoyas, capital of the department of Amazonas, where a whole seriesof unlawful occurrences blighted the electoral process. On 3 April 2000 thelocal head of ONPE, Jenny Vargas, resigned when her request for an officialinvestigation into events in the office under her authority remained unatten-ded by the organisation’s directors in Lima. Vargas complained that Perú

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2000 supporters had been contracted as ONPE employees in the province ofLuya without going through an open competition: one of the organisation’s“election specialists” (Noemí Plascencia) placed six of them on the payrollon condition they gave her 1000solesout of their first monthly wage of1600 soles. Thereafter, these individuals (one employing a false surname)used their official position to undertake open proselytisation on behalf ofFujimori. In a workshop in Luya organised to inform local electors aboutthe composition of the ballot paper and how to vote, Plascencia engagedin pro-Fujimori propaganda using real ballot papers.39 Following Vargas’sresignation, serious irregularities took place when voting returns were beingdelivered from outlying districts to Chachapoyas and during the computingstage. Agreed routes for the transfer ofactasand ballot boxes were ignored.In the province of Luya, an ONPE employee charged with bringing voting re-turns to the town of Lamud called into a bar on route and, accompanied by twopolicemen supposedly detailed to ensure their safe arrival, spent the eveninggetting drunk. When they finally arrived at the provincial collection point,the befuddled trio refused to hand over the documents in their possession.At the departmental computing centre, supervisors were in possession of thepasswords used by the processors, allowing easy access to the system. When anumber of processors (five resigned on 11 April declaring that they wanted nopart of the irregularities being perpetrated) noted problems in the programmeand the unauthorised use of their passwords, local supervisors ordered themto continue feeding in data, which was sent to Lima to be “consolidated”at ONPE’s national headquarters. Strangely, the Lima office bounced back“consolidated” figures that inflated Fujimori’s total by 1,040 votes, whichcaused the local computing centre to undertake a manual calculation.40

Lack of confidence in ONPE’s competence and widespread public sus-picion that something underhand was being stage-managed by dark forcesinside the regime, was heightened by the mysterious and illogical fluctuationsin votes that occurred as the count advanced. Just as votes could “appear”from nowhere, they could also evaporate in the strangest of circumstances.One instance of this arose in the Amazonian province of Maynas, an area ofthe country hostile to Fujimori. When ONPE released figures accounting for23.7% of the ballots cast for president in this province (from 318mesas) andlater when 42.8% of the votes had been processed (returns from 573mesas),the total number of votes registered remained the same (38,620), as did thenumber of ballots marked for each party. In other words, 255 voting tablesapparently contained no electors, with the result that approximately 30,000votes had somehow “disappeared” from a locality where the main oppositioncandidate Toledo was attracting 61.5% of valid votes.41


Part of the difficulties ONPE experienced in collating the election returnscan be put down to incompetence by inadequately trained processors trans-ferring information into the system, who were at a loss to know what to dowhen computing problems developed. Corruption among ONPE staff alsocontributed to the large number of irregularities. In Ayacucho, for example, acandidate on the official Perú 2000 congressional list denounced on 29 April2000 that a local ONPE functionary had asked him for US$20,000 to ensurethat he was elected. Earlier, six of ONPE’s computer processors in Limahad been dismissed for increasing artificially the preferential votes of fivecandidates in the congressional poll, while a further eight were accused ofsimilar chicanery in Chiclayo.42

Among the host of irregularities surrounding the calculation of preferen-tial votes, those involving Francisco Tudela and Absalón Vásquez (locatedfirst and second on the Perú 2000 congressional list) stood out. With 96.2%of preferential votes counted, Tudela and Vásquez stood on 689,519 and604,693 votes respectively; when 99.2% of preferential votes had been calcu-lated their individual totals rose to 734,760 and 650,308, and to 809,269 and720,364 when counting reached 99.9% of preferential votes cast. This signi-fied that when the number of ballots processed rose from 96.2% to 99.9%,which represented 367,611 valid votes cast at the national level, Tudela gar-nered 32.57% and Vásquez 31.46% of the votes in question – an extremelyimprobable scenario given that there were 1,200 congressional candidatesin competition. Furthermore, as the number of ballots counted passed from99.2% to 99.9%, which according to ONPE figures summed 69,548 votes,Tudela’s preferential vote shot up by 74,509 votes, well above the total amountin play.43

Rather than straightforward incompetence, others saw the more sinisterhand of Valdimiro Montesinos and the SIN behind such inconsistencies, afeeling that grew once the “dance of the votes” reached massive proportions.This conclusion was drawn by Transparencia, who opined that:

the incredible incompetence of the electoral authorities and chaos thatsurrounded the whole process is palpable. While such a degree of inca-pacity to conduct the elections efficiently is a cause for grave concern, itis also necessary to state that ample reasons exist to believe that this wasdeliberate.44

Frequent allegations were made that members of Perú 2000 and the intelli-gence service had hacked into ONPE’s computers and were intercepting databeing sent to Lima from the provinces.45 It was also claimed that SIN agentshad infiltrated ONPE and were working from inside the organisation. Indeed,two Perú 2000 militants were caught redhanded penetrating ONPE’s network

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from a public internet cabin on the outskirts of Lima – with a plastic bag fullof actas in their possession.46 Preoccupation about the SIN’s involvementwas also fuelled by declarations from Leonor La Rosa, an ex-member ofthe Servicio de Inteligencia Especial (she formed part of the unit’s so-called“Death Squad”), who had been tortured and disabled by her own “colleagues”in 1997 after being suspected of leaking information to the press about theiractivities. According to La Rosa, during the 1995 election SIN personnel hadengaged in switching ballot boxes and carried out alterations to voting datavia a powerful computer located in its Lima headquarters. Undoubtedly, shestated, the SIN was pursuing a similar stratagem in April 2000.47 While theseaccusations have not been verified at the time of writing (July 2000), secretservice operatives following the principles of the “Green Plan” would havehad no scruples about defrauding the popular will by resorting to such actions.

Conclusion

On election night, ONPE’s director announced that Fujimori had garnered48% of valid votes to Toledo’s 41%, a figure that was adjusted upwards to49.96% by Tuesday 11 April. Operatives within ONPE surreptitiously leakedto the press that the government’s strategy was to gradually raise Fujimori’svote to 50.18% in the days following the ballot, so enabling him to attainan outright first round victory. This plan was derailed by large-scale streetprotests and intense diplomatic pressure from the US and EU, which forceda retreat and a second round ballot that Fujimori “won” convincingly whenToledo withdrew from the contest. Summing up the whole electoral process,Transparencia concluded that “what we have witnessed has been the consum-mation of a systematic and coldly calculated fraud”, an opinion that is sharedby a majority of Peruvians.48

The upshot is that the regime’s cynical and arbitrary abuse of power throug-hout the campaign and during the count, resulted in a significant underminingof its credibility and legitimacy, so jeopardising its ability to continue pursu-ing the basic tenants of the “Green Plan”. Another twist is that the latestantics of the Fujimori-Montesinos clique have created a more vociferous op-position to the status quo from retired military officers. For example, in theprotest meetings that followed the 9 April poll, former president FranciscoMorales Bermúdez appealed for a campaign of “peaceful resistance” againsta “manipulative” regime and made a thinly disguised call for “honourable”serving officers to remove Montesinos and his clique in order to preservethe independence of the armed forces. Other ex-generals have issued sim-ilar statements, including the much respected Alberto Arciniega, one of thearmy’s more effective officers in its struggle against PCP-SL and MRTA


guerrillas. Reports also suggest that within the middle ranks of the officercorps (Montesinos appears to have the generals in his pocket), discontent ismounting at the degree of interference in the military’s affairs. Paradoxicallythen, a government that has been committed to implementing many policiescontained in the “Green Plan” may well be ousted by the very institution thatdevised it.

Finally, it is also important to note that by April 2000, the ruling cabal’sdetermination to remain in office at all costs was not just being driven bylofty notions of “national regeneration”. Since the early 1990s their appetitefor power has grown visibly, along with the potential risks of losing controlof the state. These loom ever more ominously in the shape of investigationsabout illicit enrichment (a scandal surrounding the foreign bank accountsof Valdimiro Montesinos erupted in 1999), exposures regarding past misde-meanours (i.e. vote-rigging in Huánuco during the 1995 election) and, last butnot least, a heightened probability of prosecution for human rights violationsafter the arrest of Pinochet in the UK.

Notes

Fieldwork for this article was undertaken in January and April–May 2000. The names ofcertain informants who supplied sensitive data have been omitted in order to guarantee theirpersonal security.1. Few detailed studies of traditional political practice at the local level exist. Three on the

northern highlands are Taylor, L.,Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Vi-olence in Hualgayoc, 1900–1930, (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1986);and Taylor, L.,Society and Politics in Late Nineteenth Century Peru: Contumazá, 1876–1900, (Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1990); and Nugent, D.,Modernityat the Edge of Empire: State, Individual, and Nation in the Northern Peruvian Andes,1885–1935(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

2. For an excellent account of Fujimori’s background as the eldest son of a Japanese im-migrant family who arrived in Peru in 1934, and his political trajectory from mathematicslecturer at the National Agrarian University, to rector of the university and “exotic” presid-ential candidate, see Jochamovitz, L.,Cuidadano Fujimori: la construcción de un político(Lima: PEISA, 1994).

3. Montesinos also assisted Fujimori’s campaign by providing polling data undertaken by thesecurity services. On this and the allegations of illegal land deals, see Burt, J., “Facade ofDemocracy Crumbles in Peru”,NACLA Report on the Americas, 1992; xxiv (1), 3–6; andespecially, Bowen, S.,The Fujimori File, (Lima: Perú Monitor S.A., 2000), chapter 3.

4. Plan Verde: apreciación de inteligencia, mimeo (Lima, February 1990). The “missionstatement” for the group devising the Plan was to: “Evaluate future scenarios so as toselect the best option for overthrowing the civilian government, dissolving the executiveand legislature, in order that the armed forces as an institution can assume control of thestate with the goal of reversing the current political, social and economic situation, whosedeterioration threatens to bring down the whole system and the leading institutions ofthe Republic”. They opined that the coup would have the benefit of: “Complete surprise.

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Planning has taken place with the utmost care andcompartimentaje(compartment, i.e.secrecy achieved by dividing one working group from another – LT). The enemy forcesdo not consider that a coup is possible in the present conjucture”. Extracts from thisdocument were published in the weekly magazineOiga, 647 (12 July 1993) and in theLima newspaperLa República(3 August 1997).

5. The document also contained strong fascist overtones. If Peru was to move forward to a“superior phase” and “transform itself into a modern society in the twenty-first century”,the Plan’s authors reasoned, it was a “HISTORICAL NECESSITY” to apply the deathpenalty to “the nation’s enemies” and commence “hostilities against APRASUBVERS-IVES, to cause their definitive eradication”. This required a “GESTAPO” style securityapparatus. In addition, it was considered that Peru possessed a “surplus population” whichneeded to be brought under control via a massive sterilisation campaign, targeted at thepoor and indigenous groups. Words in capital letters as they appeared in the originaldocument.

6. On the 1995 general election, see Crabtree, J.,The 1995 Elections in Peru: End of theRoad for the Party System?(London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995), Occa-sional Papers, No. 12.

7. For additional background information on these trends, see Mauceri, P.,State UnderSiege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996); Kay,B., “ ‘Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru”,Journal of Inter-American Studiesand World Affairs1997 (38:4), 55–98; and Crabtree J. and Thomas, J.,Fujimori’s Peru:the Political Economy, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).

8. Doubts about ONPE’s neutrality surfaced with a vengeance in February-March 2000,when Peru’s leading newspaperEl Comercio, published details of a scandal involvinghigh-ranking members of the regime and ONPE personnel. Working to the orders oftop presidential aide Absalón Vásquez, a team formed by acolytes of Vásquez forged1,263,148 signatures in 27 days in order to officially register a component of the rulingcoalition (under Peruvian electoral law newly formed parties have to obtain the signaturesof nearly 500,000 electors). ONPE approved 503,870 of these signatures, many of whichwere obviously fraudulent. The head of ONPE in the department of Arequipa played aprominent role in this chicanery, as did a member of ONPE’s technical staff in the Limaoffice. SeeEl Comercio(Lima), 29 February 2000; 14 March 2000; 22 March 2000; 4April 2000.

9. La República(Lima), 14 November 1997; and Youngers, C., “Fujimori’s Relentless Pur-suit of Re-election”,NACLA Report on the Americas2000 xxxiii:(4), 6–10.

10. El Comercio, 14 December 1999.11. Expreso(Lima), 7 April 2000. In an election rally held in Cusco on 2 April 2000, one

of Fujimori’s closest civilian advisers (Absalón Vásquez), made a similar point, statingthat the president “ought to stay in power for several more periods”.El Comercio, 3 April2000. In an interview for a Japanese newspaper, Fujimori was asked if he would seek afourth term, to which he replied in the affirmative, given “that no other candidates havethe ability to continue what I have begun”.Liberación(Lima), 8 April 2000.

12. El Comercio, 18 January 2000.13. La República, 9 June 2000. The informant added: “The cover price of fifty cents definitely

does not meet the cost of printing, distribution and commission to the sellers”. It was alsoalleged that the SIN financed the production of one million t-shirts bearing the Perú 2000logo, which were distributed widely in shanty towns and the countryside.

14. This dependent situation can also result in sexual harassment. One young woman whoformed part of PRONAA’s literacy brigade in the department of Cajamarca not only re-


ceived unwelcome attentions from her boss, she was dismissed after refusing to servepro-Fujimori propaganda to the women she was employed to teach. Following theseevents, a complaint was made to the local branch of the Defensoría del Pueblo (ombuds-mans office), which is currently being investigated. Personal communication by a memberof the Defensoría del Pueblo, Cajamarca, 17 April 2000. Use of PRONAA’s influencewith the poor contained another gender dimension. Prominent female politicians on theofficial Perú 2000 congressional list, such as Martha Chávez and Luz Salgado, toured thecomedores popularesrelaying the message that in addition to voting for Fujimori, womenorganised in these groups should cast their preferential ballot for their “sisters”, so as toenhance the representation of women in parliament. Personal communication, employeeof the Defensoría del Pueblo, Lima, 28 April 2000.

15. Personal communication, PRONAA employee, Cajamarca, 15 April 2000. Frequentlythe purchasing agreement between PRONAA and producers was not honoured once theelection was over. For this scenario in Cusco, seeLa República, 19 June 2000.

16. See the testimony of Carlos Rojas, ex-employee of PRONAMACHCS in the departmentof Puno,La República, 9 June 2000.

17. Instituto de Defensa Legal,Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones(Lima: June 2000),13.

18. On Sunday 16 January 2000 the author was drinking in a bar located in a small ruralpueblooutside the city of Cajamarca in Peru’s northern highlands. By coincidence theman who for much of the 1990s had been thefujimorista prefect of the departmententered and we started up a conversation. He admitted freely that he and his campaignteam had been out “tying up the peasant vote” through a judicious mixture of threats andgift giving. Another tactic commonly employed by government officials, occurred on 29January 2000, when an opposition presidential candidate (Alberto Andrade of the SomosPerú alliance) held a meeting in Cajamarca’s main square. That day the ex-prefect, thesubprefect and their associates organised the distribution of tin sheets for roofs, exercisebooks for schoolchildren and other goodies to rural people in the surrounding area, soreducing attendance at Andrade’s rally.

19. Instituto de Defensa Legal,Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 13. Presumablyeach “Support Committee” would contain ten members.

20. For example, two months before polling day, a Carter Center report highlighted unequalmedia access, media bias, the hounding of opposition candidates and domestic electionobservers, the (mis)use of state resources for electoral advantage and a lack of transpar-ency in electoral administration, as features of the campaign that needed to be addressedif the election was to “meet international standards”. See, The Carter Center, “Statementof the NDI/Carter Center February 2000 Pre-Election Delegation to Peru”, mimeo, Lima,11 February 2000.

21. Poll results published inEl Comercio, 18 January 2000, 21 March 2000, and 24 March2000. The 2 April findings remained confidential due to Peruvian electoral law, which pro-hibits the publication of data on voting intentions during the week leading up to electionday. All figures come from the Apoyo agency.

22. La República, 12 April 2000.23. Instituto de Defensa Legal,Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 30.24. Instituto de Defensa Legal,Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 31–32.25. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 25, 27, 30.26. La República, 10 April 2000.27. Reports were made from points throughout Peru that while voting was in progress, army

officers took down the names, addresses and details from identification documents of

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electors and individuals involved in administering the poll. Although illegal, given thepower of local commandeers this seemingly innocuous practice would have been suf-ficient to intimidate many rural voters. SeeLas elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones,26–27.

28. La República, 22 June 2000. The respected head of the Instituto de Defensa Legal, anorganisation established to defend human rights that monitored the April 2000 electioncampaign, noted that: “in all those zones once under a state of emergency, where thearmed forces have a presence, Fujimori has won with 94% and Toledo has 3%. Thisis interesting. . .”. La República, 23 April 2000. An example of the pressure local armyofficers can put on rural voters comes from the high-altitude provinces of Cusco, wheremilitary personnel occupied the polling stations, nominated who should take on the re-sponsibility for conducting the ballot (usually lieutenant governors who backed Fujimori),and allowed voting to go ahead without secret polling booths. SeeLas elecciones Franken-stein: 830 razones, 26, 29–32.

29. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones. On election day a friend of the author inCajamarca happened to be sat in his pick-up truck waiting for his wife to finish votingat a nearby polling station. A group ofcampesinosapproached and asked him: “¿Ud.es el caballero del señor gobierno quien está pagando diez soles por voto?” (“Are youthe gentleman from the president who is buying votes at 10soles?”). Ten solesis theequivalent of £2.00.

30. Personal communication, member of Transparencia, Lima, 28 April 2000. Also see,Laselecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 27.

31. Personal communication by a member of Transparencia, Cajamarca, 25 April 2000.32. The CNN reporter happened to be in Cajamarca on vacation. On this scandal, also seeLa

República, 16 April 2000.33. La República, 10 April 2000. The need to havepersonerosor independent observers

present to witness the count becomes imperative due to a quirk of Peruvian electoral law.If the number of ballots cast at a particular voting table happens to exceed the number ofcitizens who have actually voted, but does not amount to more than the quota of electorsassigned to thatmesa, then the poll is declared “valid”, i.e. legally nothing is untoward ifa mesawith 180 electors on the register has recorded 100 voters who have signed theirnames in the appropriate fashion, but 150 votes are encountered when counting takesplace. Such a bizarre situation has led to the phrase“acta mata voto” (“the voting returnoverrides the vote”). This anomaly is important considering that the ONPE printed twomillion extra ballot papers, many of whom were in the hands of Perú 2000 campaignworkers.

34. On the night before polling day, two individuals were detained by police nearby the Ceresmarket area in the Ate-Vitarte district of Lima. They happened to be in possession of 1,707ballot papers with crosses already marked against the government’s Perú 2000 symbol.Preferential votes had also been “cast”. On election day morning in the same locality,observers from Transparencia also discoveredactasthat had been filled in and “signed”by members presiding over a number of voting tables, along with a pile of blank ballotpapers. It materialised that the “culprits” were ONPE personnel, whose pick-up truckwas quickly surrounded by angry voters when word spread what they had been up to.ElComercio, 11 April 2000;La República, 11 April 2000. A pre-election day scandal brokeas a result of an investigation mounted by the magazineCaretas, who interviewed a manwho claimed that in a house located on the southern outskirts of Lima, 25 people wereworking throughout the day filling out duplicate voting returns on official ONPE forms.The informant alleged that the plan was to switch up to 30,000actaswith the objective of


presenting Fujimori with a victory by a narrow margin in the first round. Those involvedhad also been given instructions as to the preferential votes that should be inserted. Theballot boxes stuffed with false votes and rogueactas, he stated, were to be switched inprovincial ONPE offices, prioritising those parts of the country where few independentobservers or party representatives supervised the count. SeeCaretas, 1613 (7 April 2000).

35. See the interview with Stein inCaretas, 1614 (14 April 2000).36. Defensoría del Pueblo,Elecciones 2000: informe de supervisión de la Defensoría del

Pueblo(Lima 2000), 79–80, 92. In the department of Piura observers from the Defensoríaencountered 119 unsealed envelopes filled with voting returns, manyactasdid not havethe necessary hologram and in 27 cases the results had been altered.

37. El Comercio, 11 April 2000;La República, 11 April 2000.38. According to the newspaperLiberación(15 April 2000; 16 April 2000), vote “inflation”

stood at 20% for the department of Abancay, 17% for Arequipa, 22% in Ica, 21.5% inCajamarca, 17% in Huancayo and a massive 22.5% in Huánuco.

39. When Vargas reported these illegal activities to her superiors, she was told: “What’sthe matter with you? Your job is to keep quiet, deny everything and cover up theseirregularities”. See the interview with Jenny Vargas inEl Comercio, 19 April 2000.

40. Instituto de Defensa Legal,Chachapoyas 2000: para la historia de un fraude – un casoparadigmático, mimeo, Lima, May 2000. Also see the interview with Jenny Vargas,ElComercio, 19 April 2000.

41. El Comercio, 13 April 2000.42. La República, 16 June 2000, 19 June 2000. In the Chiclayo case, the individuals concerned

claimed that it was their supervisors who were altering votes.43. Caretas, 1620 (26 May 2000).44. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 5.45. According to a report inLiberación(9 April 2000), informants from within the military

stated that the SIN had a parallel computing system already mounted to undertake an“electronic fraud”. For its part, Transparencia declared that a web page sited in Australiahad been established for the same end.La República, 10 April 2000.

46. Caretas, 1615 (20 April 2000);Liberación, 11 April 2000. When confronted, the indi-viduals involved claimed they were feeding information into the Perú 2000 data base.

47. Caretas1611 (24 March 2000);Caretas1621 (2 June 2000). In 1997 La Rosa’s colleague,Mariela Berreto, was dismembered and died in the most cruel fashion at the hands ofthe “Death Squad”. It was also claimed that the intelligence services had penetrated thecomputing system of Transparencia and were doctoring its data.La República, 10 April2000.

48. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 5. According to a poll published inEl Comer-cio (26 April 2000), 56.8% of electors felt a fraud had been committed. Two-thirds ofmiddle class voters held this view, while among the poor the figure fell to 45.9%. Noless than 71% stated that “radical changes need to take place in ONPE to guarantee a fairballot”.

patterns of electoral corruption in peru: the april 2000 general election

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