pandora cell. danish emergency management agency
TRANSCRIPT
Pandora Cell
Challenge to crisis management organisations
What has happend? What are we doing about
it? What are the
consequences? What if..?
Frequent assumption
Impact
Time
”Things are under control”Deployed measures will be sufficiently effective in mitigating the consequences of the incident at hand, and in preventing further adverse developments.
Now
What if..?
Impact
Time
ProlongationCurrent situation and issues persist
ReframingSomething else happens (or already happend)
ExacerbationThe current situation intensifies and worsens
FatiguingRecovery is (too) slow
Now
CrisisManagement
Staff
Chief of StaffSecretariat HR & Legal ICT & Logistics Operations Crisis
communication
Crisis management organisation
CrisisManagement
Staff
Chief of Staff Secretariat HR & Legal ICT & Logistics Operations Crisis
communication Pandora cell
Crisis management organisation
NOW16 % BETTTER!
Aim• Strengthen proactivity in the crisis response• Prevent bad situations from getting worse due to lack of
attention to the immediate future, and failing memory of past learning points
Task• Analyse the crisis and identify circumstances that may
cause the current situation to deteriorate in the near future
Output• A list of 3-5 issues for the staff leadership to consider• Further input to the decision-making process during
crisis situations, as requested
Pandora Cell
CURRENT CASE• Situation report• Media• Social Media• other
PREVIOUS CASES• Written evaluation reports• Risk assessment reports• Personal experience• other
COMMON ISSUES
INVENTORY
THE INCIDENT
LOSS OF CONTROL
RESOURCE GAPS
SPREADING
DRIVERS
STRENGTH
MOMENTUM
INDICATORS
PHASE ISense-making
PHASE IICalibration
TIME HORIZON
ORGANISATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
PHASE IIISense-breaking
OUTPUT
Recommendations
for the crisis staff
PHASE IVSelection
Methodology
The incident
Increased intensity Prolonged duration Increased mortality Different from what was initially assumed The projection or forecast is misleading […]
Loss of control
Breakdown of physical barriers Breakdown of procedures Breakdown of communication systems Inefficient crisis management Insufficient overview Insufficient situational awareness Lack of attention to loss and needs of those affected Insufficient focus on recovery Loss of credibility or reputation Loss of political support (local/national/internat.) Rumours/misinformation Anxiety/unrest Undesirable behavioural changes Active resistance towards authorities Riots […]
Resource shortages
Staff shortage Transport shortage Insufficient facilities, systems or equipment Insufficient time Exhaustion/fatigue Limited redundancy Fiscal limitations (short/long term) Insufficient leadership/prioritisation/delegation Insufficient rear area support Insufficient training/experience Insufficient technical capabilities Insufficient recovery capabilities […]
Spreading
Breakdown/failure of critical functions Critical functions under pressure Knock-on effects btw. sectors Geographical (local/national/internat.) Socially Pollution/contamination […]
Common Issues Inventory
Exercise lead-out
• Collision btw. the Russian nuclear-powered vessel ’Sevmorput’ and a Danish bulk carrier
• Severe damage to and subsequent grounding of ’Sevmorput’ 70 km east of Aarhus
• Limited communication with ’Sevmorput’
• Strictly no access to ’Sevmorput’
CURRENT CASE• Situation report• Media• Social Media• Other
PREVIOUS CASES• Written evaluation reports• Risk assessment reports• Personal experience• Other
COMMON ISSUES
INVENTORY
THE INCIDENT
LOSS OF CONTROL
RESOURCE GAPS
SPREADING
DRIVERS
STRENGTH
MOMENTUM
INDICATORS
PHASE ISense-making
PHASE IICalibration
TIME HORIZON
ORGANISATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
PHASE IIISense-breaking
OUTPUT
Recommendations
for the crisis staff
PHASE IVSelection
ChernobylSubmarine incidentsRussia’s current stance on national security issues
24 hours
DEMA
Example: CMX 2015Wednesday , November 11th 2015
The incident
Increased intensity Prolonged duration Increased mortality Different from what was initially assumed The projection or forecast is misleading […]
Loss of control
Breakdown of physical barriers Breakdown of procedures Breakdown of communication systems Inefficient crisis management Insufficient overview Insufficient situational awareness Lack of attention to loss and needs of those affected Insufficient focus on recovery Loss of credibility or reputation Loss of political support (local/national/internat.) Rumours/misinformation Anxiety/unrest Undesirable behavioural changes Active resistance towards authorities Riots […]
Resource shortages
Staff shortage Transport shortage Insufficient facilities, systems or equipment Insufficient time Exhaustion/fatigue Limited redundancy Fiscal limitations (short/long term) Insufficient leadership/prioritisation/delegation Insufficient rear area support Insufficient training/experience Insufficient technical capabilities Insufficient recovery capabilities […]
Spreading
Breakdown/failure of critical functions Critical functions under pressure Knock-on effects btw. sectors Geographical (local/national/internat.) Socially Pollution/contamination […]
Common Issues Inventory
Issues to take into account
Specific issues IndicatorsNot just a nuclear incident
It may also be a matter of national security for Russia
• Continued withholding of information• Russian threats of intervention by
force• Noncompliance with international law
No experience with nuclear incidents on Danish territory
Planning focused on incidents in other European countries
• Exhaustion of experts and DEMA personnel
• Confusion regarding procedures for Host Nation Support
• Loud concerns regaring health issues and protective gear
Unknown hazards related to lost containers
No information on number, content and position of lost containers
• Matitime accidents caused by malfloating containers
• Accidents caused by contact with unknown container content
10 NM20 NM
Russian frigat
Sea Guardian
Sevmorput
Royal Danish Navy
Read all about it
• https://www.oecd.org/governance/toolkit-on-risk-governance/home/
• Contacts at DEMA– Head of Division Mads Ecklon, [email protected] – Head of Section Morten Thoft Korslund, [email protected]