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Draft for discussion. Subject to change.CTRP – Package 2: Top 10 (as of September 17, 2019) Draft for discussion. Subject to change.

Package 2COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM PROGRAM

Corporate income tax and incentives reform

Why reform is needed

http://taxreform.dof.gov.ph/publication/recent-presentations/

As of September 17, 2019

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Table of contents

1. Ten reasons why we need to reform the corporate income tax and incentives systema. Problemsb. Solutions

2. Summary of reform

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Ten reasons why we need to reform the corporate income tax and incentives system:

Problems and solutions

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Ten reasons why we need to reform the corporate income tax and incentives system

1. To lower the corporate income tax (CIT) rate and make it regionally competitive;2. To grant incentives more judiciously to reduce fiscal cost amounting to 441 billion pesos

(2.8 percent of GDP) in 2017;3. To make tax incentives performance-based;4. To make tax incentives targeted to priority industries;5. To make tax incentives targeted to priority areas; 6. To make tax incentives time-bound;7. To make tax incentives transparent;8. To reduce the abuse of transfer pricing;9. To improve governance in the grant of tax incentives through the Fiscal Incentives Review

Board (FIRB);10. To ensure regular and rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the impact of incentives on

the economy through cost-benefit analysis.5


Source: Asian Development Bank and PWC

Problem 1. Highest corporate income tax rate in the region.

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Problem 1. Highest corporate income tax rate in the region.

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LocationRevenue1 Capital assets2

PHP billions Percent share PHP billions Percent share

Philippines 84.6 66 33.5 34

Foreign 43.2 34 63.8 66

Note:1. Revenues are from external customers by geographical market.2. Capital assets refer to non-current assets excluding financial, deferred tax and pension assets.3. Most of URC subsidiaries in Asia are located in China, with a 25% CIT rate.Source: 2018 audited financial statements 2018

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Due to lower CIT rates in the region, URC Philippines expands internationally, investing 66% of its total capital

assets abroad. This means lost job opportunities here. If our CIT rate were lower, URC can invest here instead.


Solution 1. Lower the corporate income tax rate to make it regionally competitive and bring back jobs.

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In 2017, over PHP 441 billion (2.8% of GDP) was granted to 3,150firms.

Source: DTI, TIMTA, and DOF estimates

Problem 2. PHP 441 billion in foregone revenue in 2017 from tax incentives, many of which are unnecessary incentives.

1. Firms with no incentives pay the regular rate of 30% of net taxable income.

2. For example, almost all of the 90,000 SMEs pay the regular 30% rate.

3. Firms with incentives pay between 6% and 13% effective tax.

In 2017, 989,166 registered firms.

In addition, PHP 63 billion (0.4% of GDP) was lost due to possibleabuse of transfer pricing.

Total: PHP 504 billion(3.2% of 2017 GDP)

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Type of tax

2015 Revenue foregone

(in billion pesos)


(in billion pesos)


(in billion pesos)

Income tax incentives 86.3 121.2 126.9

Income tax holiday 53.8 74.5 70.2

Special rate 32.5 46.7 56.7

Customs duties 18.1 57.4 46.5

Import VAT (gross) 159.8 202.1 267.7

Local VAT (gross) 37.0 TBC TBC

Subtotal 301.2 380.7 441.1

Local business tax 1.6 1.0 TBC

Possible leakage from transfer pricing abuse

42.7 52.5 63.1

Total 345.5 434.2 504.2

2015 to 2017 estimated foregone revenue due to tax incentives


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PHP 441 billion of foregone revenues in 2017 could have funded…

33,000 public markets or

46,000 kilometers of roads or

130,000 daycare centers or

450,000 classrooms.

Source: DOF estimates


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An estimated PHP 5.5 trillion in tax incentives was given to PEZA firms since 1995, while PEZA approved investment amounted to only PHP 3.6 trillion.0

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100

150

200

250

300

350

400

PH

P b

illi

on

s

PEZA tax incentives vs. PEZA approved investments

Total incentives Total approved investments

Source: PSA and DOF staff estimates

Note: Approved investments are based on official PSA data, while tax incentives before 2011 were estimated using a linear trend with available data .



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PEZA

Year ITH Special rateDuty waived

(in million pesos)Import VAT waived (in million pesos)

Total (in million pesos)

1995 34,070 22,830 19,808 106,308 183,016

1996 35,077 23,504 20,394 109,450 188,4251997 36,084 24,179 20,980 112,592 193,8351998 37,091 24,854 21,565 115,735 199,2451999 38,098 25,529 22,151 118,877 204,6542000 39,105 26,204 22,736 122,019 210,064

2001 40,112 26,878 23,322 125,162 215,4742002 41,119 27,553 23,907 128,304 220,884

2003 42,126 28,228 24,493 131,446 226,2932004 43,133 28,903 25,078 134,589 231,7032005 43,697 29,280 25,406 136,346 234,729

2006 44,260 29,658 25,733 138,104 237,7552007 44,823 30,035 26,061 139,861 240,780

2008 45,386 30,413 26,388 141,619 243,8062009 45,950 30,790 26,716 143,377 246,8322010 46,513 31,168 27,043 145,134 249,8582011 47,076 31,545 27,371 146,892 252,8842012 51,112 34,249 29,717 159,485 274,564

2013 57,319 38,409 33,326 178,853 307,9062014 44,162 29,592 25,676 137,799 237,2302015 43,800 29,349 25,466 136,668 235,2822016 55,469 37,169 32,250 173,079 297,9662017 64,269 43,066 37,367 200,539 345,240

TOTAL 1,019,852 683,386 592,952 3,182,237 5,478,426Average 44,341 29,712 25,781 138,358 238,192

An estimated PHP 5.5 trillion in tax incentives was given to PEZA firms since 1995, while PEZA approved investment amounted to only PHP 3.6 trillion.


Incentives are not really needed by most investors


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1.97

1.30

0.13

9.80

-1

1

3

5

7

9

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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Approved foreign investments by investment promotion

agency and foreign direct investments, in USD billions

BOI PEZA Other IPAs FDISource: PSA

1. Wider gap between total FDI and approved FDI means most investors don’t need incentives.

2. PEZA approved investments have been declining even without CITIRA.

3. BOI approved investments are higher than PEZA, suggesting that firms don’t need forever incentives to invest.

4. Prior to 2013, PEZA approved FDI were consistently higher than total FDI. This suggests that many approved investment don’t materialize.

USD

bill

ion

s


Solution 2: Package 2 to promote a fair and accountable tax incentives system.

Every peso granted as tax incentive is a peso off the budget that could have been spent for infrastructure, health, education, and social protection that benefit all, and not only a few.

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Problem 3. Incentives are not performance-based.

1. No monitoring of firm performance on its “commitment” to increase export, create jobs, or raise productivity (e.g., approved vs actual investment).

2. Counterfactual analysis shows no significant difference in the performance between firms receiving incentives and those that do not receive incentives.

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Outcome IndicatorsPanel

2012/20152014 2015

Employment and compensation

Total employment / total assets

Total employment / total sales

R&D employment / total employment

Total compensation

Total compensation / total expenses

Average compensation to workers

Total salaries / paid workers

R&D=1 if establishment has R&D spendingR&D expenses / total expensesTotal investments / total assets

Capital investments

Land assets / total assetsTotal fixed assets / total assets

Building assets / total assets

Machineries / total assetsExports Direct exports / sales

Productivity

Average hours workedSales / total employment

Sales / paid workers

Summary of counterfactual analyses

Note: Panel data used the 2012 CPBI and the 2015 ASPBI with the 2015 TIMTASource: PSA, TIMTA, DOF estimates

= Registered firms performed significantly better than non-registered firms

Problem 3. Incentives are not performance-based.

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Solution 3: Package 2 offers a more competitive incentives menu that rewards performance with more incentives.

1. Depreciation allowance of qualified capital expenditure:

a. 10% for buildingsb. 20% for machineries

2. Additional deduction of up to:a. 100% for research and development (R&D) b. 100% for trainingc. 100% for country-wide infrastructure

developmentd. 50% for labor expensee. 50% for domestic input expensef. 50% for reinvestment allowance in

manufacturing industry

3. Enhanced net operating loss carry-over (NOLCO) (3 years over 5 years)

4. Exemption from customs duty on imported capital equipment and raw materials

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Summary of additional deductions incentives in ASEAN countries

Country

Additional deductions (percent)

R&D Labor TrainingCapital

expenditure

Infrastructure

development

Investment/

reinvestment

allowance

Domestic

input

PhilippinesCurrent 50**

CITIRA 100 50 100 100 50 50

Cambodia

Indonesia 30

Lao PDR

Malaysia 100 200 60

Myanmar

Singapore 150 100 100

Thailand 300 200 100 25

Vietnam 10

**Additional deduction of 50% of the incremental labor expense if the prescribed ratio of capital assets to annual labor is met, additional deduction of 100% of the incremental labor if located in less-developed areas (cannot be availed of simultaneously with the ITH). Cells in red: no additional deductionsSources: Deloitte, KPMG, PWC



1. Application for incentives shall constitute an agreement to achieve targets such as job creation, export, and productivity.

2. High performance -> incentives

3. Low performance -> no incentives

4. Review of firm’s performance every two years by the FIRB.


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Problem 4. Incentives are not targeted to priority industries.

1. There are 342 investment and non-investment laws that provide tax incentives outside the tax code.

2. The investment priority plan (IPP) covers up to 64 percent of all industries.

3. As a result, up to 69 percent of the economy in terms of value-added can potentially be given incentives.

4. These are far from being targeted.

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Type of laws Number

Investment 133

Franchise 57

Investment incentives 64

Others 12

Non-investment 209

GOCCs 19

Private sector 190

Total laws 342

Number of special laws, by type

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE


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Number of industries covered CountShare to number

of firms, in percent

SIPP 677 53.5

IPP 815 64.4

SIPP and IPP 879 69.5

Total PSIC industries at 5 digit level1,265 100.0

Sources: PSA, DTI, and DOF estimates,


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Total value-addedby industries covered

Value intrillion pesos

Share to GDP, in percent

SIPP 4.0 63.2

IPP 4.4 69.4

SIPP and IPP 4.4 69.4

Total GDP 6.3 100.0

Sources: PSA, DTI, and DOF estimatesNote: value-added of covered industries were calculated based on the 2006I-O table.


Solution 4. A strategic investment priority plan (SIPP) will be formulated to prioritize incentives.

A 3-year SIPP shall be formulated by BOI and approved by the President.

1. The BOI shall ensure a more targeted list covering activities with significant positive externalities that really matter for the future.

2. Only the President may propose activities not in the SIPP that may be granted more tax incentives.

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Draft for discussion. Subject to change.CTRP – Package 2: Top 10 (as of September 17, 2019)

Source: PEZA, IPAs, and DOF staff calculations

IPA No. of ecozones

AFAB 1

APECO 1

BCDA -

BOI -

CDC 1

CEZA 1

PEZA 531

PIA 1

PPMC 1

TIEZA 5

SBMA 1

RBOI-ARMM -

ZCSEZA 1

TOTAL 544

As of 2018, there are 544 ecozones, all of them are separate customs territory, meaning they are exempt from all taxes.

Moreover, 223 or 41 percent of these ecozones are in Metro Manila alone.

Problem 5. Incentives are not targeted by area.

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Source: Individual country investment promotion offices.

Problem 5. Incentives are not targeted by area.

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In other countries, poorer areas are where the ecozones are located.


Solution 5. The SIPP shall also improve targeting by giving more incentives to priority areas.

1. Administrative Order 18 series 2019 provides for a moratorium on the proclamation of new economic zones in Metro Manila.

2. The House-approved Package 2 bill provides for additional three years of incentives for:

a. Registered activities relocating outside Metro Manila and selected urbanized areas adjacent to Metro Manila;

b. Agribusiness projects of registered enterprises located outside Metro Manila and urban areas;

c. Projects located in less developed areas or those recovering from armed conflict or a major disaster.

3. All future ecozones must be based on an economy-wide cost-benefit analysis to determine their viability and value-added.

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Problem 6. Incentives are not timebound.

We grant the most generous fiscal incentives since they are in lieu of all taxes and given forever.

All other countries have a maximum duration and it applies only to few highly targeted industries and are not automatically given.

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Number of firms enjoying incentives for at least 10 years: 1,169

1,169

Source: 2017 masterlist of registered enterprises, TIMTA

Time, in years Years AFAB BCDA BOI CDC CEZA PEZA PPMC SBMA Total

40-45 1972-1976 1 1

36-40 1977-1981 5 5

31-35 1982-1986 4 4

26-30 1987-1991 45 45

21-25 1992-1996 207 32 239

16-20 1997-2001 1 2 272 58 333

11-15 2002-2006 1 434 107 542

6-10 2007-2011 2 378 3 31 783 161 1,358

0-5 2012-2017 96 6 845 506 189 1,353 5 394 3,394

Total 98 6 1,225 511 220 3,104 5 752 5,921


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Dividends declared were equivalent to 133% of income tax incentives received.

Source: SEC, TIMTA


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Dividends versus tax incentives, in billion pesos


Solution 6. Approved activities shall be given incentives for a 5 to 10 year period, renewable if they meet the criteria.

Special rate (2020)18% on net taxable income after ITH for up to 3, 4 or 6 years depending on the location.

- 1.5% to province- 1.5% to municipality

Income tax holidayUp to 3, 4, or 6 years, depending on the location plus 2 year extension if investing in

agribusiness, or in less developed areas, or if relocating outside Metro Manila and adjacent urban areas.

Year Special rate (%)National

government (%)Province (%)

Municipality (%)

2020 18 15 1.5 1.5

2022 17 14 1.5 1.5

2024 16 13 1.5 1.5

2026 15 12 1.5 1.5

2028 14 11 1.5 1.5

2030 13 10 1.5 1.5

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Sunset provision for existing incentives

For RBEs which availed of ITH:Continue until remaining period ends or for a period of 5 years, whichever comes first.

For RBEs enjoying existing 5% GIE:

Number of years enjoying 5% GIE

Number of years allowed to continue

5 years below 5

5 to 10 years 3

Above 10 years 2

Solution 6. A sunset provision shall be given to existing incentives. After the period ends, they can reapply again for the new incentives.

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After the sunset, firms can apply again for the new package of incentives if they qualify.


Problem 7. Incentives are not transparent.

1. Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) do not publicly disclose the names of firms and amount of incentives given.

2. Likewise, firm-level benefits, such as exports, investment, and employment figures are not submitted as part of TIMTA.

3. The TIMTA law requires firm level incentives data but only industry level benefits data

4. There is a lot of confidentiality, discouraging public analysis and full transparency.

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Solution 7. An enhanced monitoring system of the incentives, including the collection of detailed information on the cost and benefits of incentives.

1. Integrate tax expenditure reporting into the budget process.

a. DOF to submit to DBM details of tax incentives availed, including estimated claims and programmed fiscal incentives for the following years.

b. Incentives will not be budgeted but should be reported as a tax expenditure for transparency purposes.

2. The FIRB shall publish the names of the recipients of incentives and other related information on their costs and benefits to assure the public that tax incentives are used properly.

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Problem 8. Transfer pricing is one of the top abuses of tax incentive regimes, resulting in substantial revenue loss for the government.

1. Export zones – leakages into domestic economy2. Regional investment incentives and enterprise zones – diverting activities to outside

the region or zone3. Transfer pricing schemes with related entities (through sales, services, loans,

royalties, and management contracts)4. Disguising or burying non-qualifying activities into qualifying activities5. Churning or fictitious investments (lack of recapture rules)6. Schemes to accelerate income (or defer deductions) at the end of a tax holiday period7. Overvaluation of assets for depreciation, tax credit, or other purposes8. Employment and training credits – fictitious employees and phony training programs9. Domestic firms restructure as foreign investors10. Existing firms transform into new entities to qualify for incentives

Source: Comparative Tax Policy and Administration program, Harvard Kennedy School 35

Top abuses of fiscal incentives



In 2017, an estimated 63 billion pesos in government revenues was lost due to possible transfer pricing abuse and misallocation of profits and costs.

A company under three tax regimes can shift profit and cost across activities to minimize taxable income and thus tax liability.

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Below is the estimated tax foregone if:1. Special and regular activities had the same cost structure as exempt activities, and2. Regular activities had the same cost structure as special activities.

Estimated CIT foregone from potentially abusive transfer pricing

in billion pesos 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Estimated leakage from

Goods* 17.5 25.5 23.9 29.6 34.0 43.7 51.7

Exempt and special rate 3.0 3.7 2.9 3.0 6.9 8.1 10.3

Special and regular rate 14.5 21.8 21.1 26.6 27.1 35.6 41.4

Exempt and regular rate** 18.8 6.2 34.2 9.5 3.1 6.5 5.6

Services 8.4 10.9 11.2 10.4 8.6 8.8 11.4

Exempt and special rate 0.4 0.8 0.7 4.2 4.0 2.2 2.3

Special and regular rate 7.9 10.1 10.5 6.2 4.6 6.5 9.1

Exempt and regular rate** 7.9 6.2 7.1 10.7 9.9 17.9 18.9

Total 25.9 36.5 35.1 40.0 42.7 52.5 63.1Sources: BIR, DOF staff estimates

Notes: *Goods refer to manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade. Services refer to all other industries.

**Leakages from exempt and regular rates were not included in the total amount as they may result in double counting of leakages.

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Solution 8: Shift to net income tax system and enhanced anti-avoidance rules

1. The shift from gross income* taxation to net income taxation can limit transfer pricing abuse since it reduces the number of tax regimes.

2. Enhancement of Section 50 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.a. Authority of the Commissioner to

distribute, apportion, allocate, and impute income and deductions to disregard and counteract tax avoidance arrangements.

38* Gross income earned is defined in the National Internal Revenue Code as gross sales less sales returns, discounts, allowances, and cost of goods sold.


Problem 9. There are multiple investment promotion agencies with the power to grant incentives, and the DOF has very little say.

13 Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs)

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IPA DOF board membership

Aurora Pacific Ecozone (APECO) None

Authority of the Freeport Area of Bataan (AFAB) None

Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) None

Board of Investments (BOI) None

Clark Development Corporation (CDC) None

Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA) None

Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)Member

(1 voice out of 13 members)

PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA)Member

(1 voice out of 10 members)

Poro Point Management Corporation (PPMC) None

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) None

Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) None

Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Authority (ZCSEZA) None

Regional Board of Investments - ARMM (RBOI-ARMM) None

Problem 9. There are multiple investment promotion agencies with the power to grant incentives, and the DOF has very little say.

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Solution 9. The FIRB will have oversight function over all IPAs and approve all incentives. The DOF secretary chairs the FIRB.

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BOI determines the priority sectors through the Strategic Investment Priority

Plan (SIPP)

BOIBoard of Investments

RBOI-ARMM

Approval/disapproval of incentives

IPAs recommend the tax incentives to be given to registered enterprises



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IPA vs. FIRBRole IPA FIRB (DOF revised) FIRB (CITIRA)

Registration ✓

Receipt of Application ✓

Evaluation ✓

Submission to the FIRB ✓

Approval (Regular) ✓ ✓

Approval (Special) ✓ ✓ ✓

Cancellation (Regular) ✓ ✓

Cancellation (Special) ✓ ✓ ✓

Audit ✓ ✓


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1. Prevent the grant of unnecessary incentives through uniform application of incentives;

2. Improve transparency in the grant of fiscal incentives;

3. Improve accountability in the grant of fiscal incentives;

4. Ensure that the costs and benefits of fiscal incentives are consistently measured and factored in drawing up fiscal policies;


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Expanding the FIRB will…


Expanding the FIRB will…

5. Improve policymaking with enhanced cost-benefit analyses;

6. Ensure that IPA-specific priorities are aligned with the government’s fiscal priorities;

7. Improve accountability in the grant of fiscal incentives;

8. Align the country’s grant of incentives with international best practices;


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Powers and functions of the FIRB

1. To exercise policy making and oversight functions over the IPAs.

2. To require the IPAs to submit the following:

a. Summaries of approved investment and incentives granted;

b. Firm or entity level fiscal incentives and benefits data; and

c. Documents, records, books, or other data relevant to the evaluation of application for fiscal incentives and tax subsidies.

3. To publish the list of firms with detailed estimated amount of fiscal incentives, tax payments, and other related information.


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3. To submit annual reports to the Office of the President, as part of the budget process, covering its policies and activities, including recommendations, on fiscal incentive policies and approval of fiscal incentives.

4. To submit to Congress monthly reports on approvals, disapprovals, cancellations, suspensions, and withdrawal of fiscal incentives, including the methodology utilized.


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5. To grant tax subsidies to government-owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs), Government Instrumentalities (GIs), Government Commissaries and State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) as may be provided under the annual GAA.

6. To recommend to the President the grant of additional incentives, including a long period, to highly desirable projects. As Chair of the FIRB and as the custodian of fiscal prudence and responsibility, the Secretary of Finance shall exercise oversight functions and shall have veto power over the approval and cancellation of tax incentives under Section 298 (c).


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Problem 10. No regular cost benefit analysis (CBA) has ever been conducted to determine the impact of incentives on the economy.

1. There has been little to no effort to do a regular CBA analysis.a. AFAB only

started working on a CBA starting 2018.

b. PEZA wants to begin one after decades of existence.

July 2, 2019

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Summary of first-ever compre-hensive CBA conducted by DOF

Solution 10. The first comprehensive CBA analysis has been undertaken by DOF. Going forward, the FIRB shall regularly conduct the CBAs.

50Note: 2015-2017 averages


Solution 10. The first comprehensive CBA analysis has been undertaken by DOF. Going forward, the FIRB shall regularly conduct the CBAs.

1. The FIRB shall “…conduct regular monitoring and evaluation of investment and non-investment fiscal incentives, such as using cost-benefit analysis (CBA), to determine their impact on the economy and whether agreed performance targets are met.”

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Package 2 to promote a fair and accountable tax incentives system.

Every peso granted as tax incentive is a peso off the budget that could have been spent for infrastructure, health, education, and social protection that benefit all, and not only a few.

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Package 2 promotes a fair and accountable tax incentives system

Fair and accountable tax incentives system with enhanced FIRB functions including regular CBA, IPA oversight, and incentives approval.

Lower the corporate income tax rate from 30 to 20 percent by 2029.

Provide incentives to attract industries consistent with development priorities through additional deductions and a more targeted SIPP.

Simplification and rationalization of tax incentives system by repealing and amending some 87 special laws, and putting those qualified in the SIPP.

1 2

3 4

Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

CIT rate 30 29 28 27 26

2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029

25 24 23 22 21 20

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Rationalize investment tax incentives

One menu of incentivesapplicable to IPAs

No double registrationof activities

Only new and qualified investment/ activities shall be granted income tax incentives

Only expansions can avail of exemption from customs duty of

capital equipment

Special VAT incentives for exporters: 70% of export salesare actually shipped out of the

country

Domestic firms allowed if included in the strategic investment priority plan

Three-year additionalincentives for firms

moving out of Manila and adjacent areas

Three years additional incentives for lagging regions, conflict, and calamity-stricken

regions

Three years additional incentives for agribusiness

projects of registered enterprises located outside

Metro Manila and urban areas54


Skilled and hardworking talent pool that needs sufficient

human capital investments.Solution: investment in K12,

TESDA, UHC

Ambitious infrastructure development program that requires fiscal commitment.Solution: PHP 8 trillion BBB

Sizeable small and medium enterprise community that

deserves to be treated fairly through easier doing business

processes. Solution: EODB

More than tax incentives, investors need...

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President Duterte’s policy to attract foreign investments

1. Provide a safe place for businesses by maintaining peace and order

2. Wipe out corruption3. Eliminate red-tape in the

bureaucracy, to which the Ease of Doing Business Law is a welcome development.

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Progress in achieving the 10-point socioeconomic agenda is advancing strongly.

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“Far from the claim that we are killing the goose that lays the golden egg, we want to reform our current tax system so that the fattened goose may share its food with everyone else.”

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I want to share my blessings.


Thank you!For more information, please visit:

For questions, you may directly email us at:

http://taxreform.dof.gov.ph/publication/recent-presentations/

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