ottoman reform, islam and palestine's peasantry

8/11/2019 Ottoman Reform, Islam and Palestine's Peasantry

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Erik Freas is Assistant Professor of History in the Department of Social Sciences at City

Erik Eliav Freas

OTTOMAN REFORM, ISLAM,

AND PALESTINES PEASANTRY

When considering the situation o the Arab peasantry in nineteenth-centu-ry Ottoman Syria (inclusive o present-day Palestine),1a sel-evident truth

seems to have developed that rural peasants were exploited and oppressed

by local elitesboth urban notables and rural shaykhs. Yet was it really as

simple as that? In the period beore incentives generated by global market

orces that were brought about by increased European economic activity,

came to define economic relations between the twolikewise, beore the

Ottoman anzimat reorms saw the establishment o ormalized adminis-

trative structuresa case could be made that the authority o urban nota-bles and rural shaykhs was, to a significant degree, dependent on its tacit

acceptance by the peasantry, such that the latter was not entirely without

leverage.2One might even argue that this authority was something that had,

in a sense, to be earned, that the peasantry expected urban notables and

rural shaykhs to behave in a manner worthy o their authority. Particularly

in the case o the latter, the act that there ofen existed rival claimants or

the loyalty o constituents would seem to lend support to this thesis.3


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Freas

Although it must be conceded that global market orces and increased ad-

ministrative centralization did indeed have a negative effect on the peas-

ants circumstances, I challenge the prevailing idea that it was largely amatter o exacerbating a pre-existing situation.4Rather, these actors e-

ected a transormation in what was hitherto a relatively more equitable

relationship between the peasantry and local elites. I take my lead rom

Beshara Doumanis pioneering study,5 in which he addresses socio-eco-

nomic actors related to the regions integration into the global economy

during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how they impacted

Nablus and its environs. In so doing, he paints a much more nuanced pic-

ture o the situation o Palestines peasantry than that generally providedby historians dealing with nineteenth-century Syria and Palestine. oo

ofen, the tendency has been to skim over the state o affairs prior to the

intensification o European economic penetration and the advent o the

anzimat reorms. Inasmuch as I take my lead rom Doumani, I would

acknowledge historical distinctions between the Nablusi region and other

parts o Palestine. Nonetheless, given that what ollows in this article is

intended primarily as a first step in a reexamination o peasant-elite rela-

tions during the period in question, and that there did exist at the time asense o Palestine as constituting a distinct and coherent geographical en-

tity,6I believe it is legitimate to speak o that region as a whole with respect

to the aorementioned thesis.

As a corollary to this thesis, I argue that changes in the nature o the

relationship between the traditional elite and the peasantry altered the

way in which most Muslim peasants understood their religious identity, in

connection with a gradual ormalization o Islamic practice. Prior to

changes that took place over the course o the nineteenth century, the au-thority o notables largely maniested itsel in their collective role as me-

diators between ormal Islamic institutions and the peasantry.

Correspondingly, religious identity among the peasantry was generally

conceived o in a relatively inormal manner. Most peasants had limited

direct affiliation or interaction with ormal Islamic institutions; corre-

spondingly, their understanding o Islam largely conormed to what were

more or less vaguely defined notions as to what constituted proper Islamic

behaviora set o values ofen reflective o cultural norms or broadly con-

ceived ideas about social justice. For most peasants, authority figures such


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as rural shaykhs were in a very real sense the ace o the Islamic author-

ity represented by urban-based institutions, likewise in terms o what con-

stituted proper Islamic practice. ogether with urban notables, theseshaykhs mediated between the peasantry and the more ormal Islamic in-

stitutions o the urban milieu,7and it was their ability to do this that to no

small extent earned them their positions o authority. Related to this, said

authority was very much dependent on its tacit acceptance by the peas-

antry, something, it is argued, that was in turn dependent on whether

these local elites were seen as warranting the peasants respect. While the

measure o elites worthiness in this sense might be understood in terms

o whether they were good Muslims, the peasantry did not reckon suchthings in a ormalistic way. Certainly relevant, especially with respect to

urban notables, was whether one held a position within an Islamic institu-

tion and/or carried a reputation as a learned and pious Muslim. More im-

portant, however, was the degree to which one behaved in what would

have been considered by the peasantry as an appropriately Islamic man-

nerthat is, whether one was generous, hospitable, air, and honest,

among other traits. Formal practice and training would not have consti-

tuted the only estimation, indeed, probably not even the most importantone by which ones worth as a Muslim was measured.

Tis was particularly true o rural shaykhs, a category inclusive o

both nahiyaand village shaykhs. Te ormer were powerul local shaykhs,

whose jurisdictions corresponded to administrative sub-districts known

as nahiya.8As o the beginning o the nineteenth century, in general, the

nahiyashaykhs were responsible or collecting taxes, maintaining law and

order, and dispensing justice. In turn, each village in the nahiyehad a vil-

lage shaykh responsible or running local affairs.9Even where technicallyappointed by the Ottoman government, however, it was usually only with

the general consent o those under their authority that the shaykhs were

able to maintain their respective positionsas the American missionary

Elihu Grant put it, their positions were confirmed by acclamation or by

general consent.10Based on the aorementioned Islamic criteria, rural

shaykhs were expected to be air when meting out justice, resolute when

conronting adversity, pious in their own personal behavior, and generous

with peasants experiencing hard times. Put in more technical terms, their

actions were circumscribed by social and cultural boundaries that de-


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fined ideals or accepted behavior, notions o justice, and levels o account-

ability to the collective community.11

For urban notables, the case was somewhat different, and more ormalIslamic credentialsones knowledge o the Quran, or how many times one

had made pilgrimagedid in act carry considerable weight. Nonetheless,

expectations similar to those applying to rural shaykhs applied to urbanites

as well, both when dealing with non-elites in the towns (i.e., townsolk),

and, perhaps more importantly or our purposes, with respect to town-vil-

lage relations, where [g]enerosity and cooperation rom the notability cre-

ated bonds o loyalty between urban and rural sectors.12In sum, then, both

urban and rural notables were expected to represent the interests o thelarger community when dealing with the Ottoman authorities.13In this re-

spect, it should also be noted that, at least until the middle o the nineteenth

century, the distinction between elite and non-elite was arguably not as

rigid as it would later become. o begin with, both elites and non-elites were

understood as integral to the society as a wholethe social gap between the

leaders and the larger population was small, and as noted by Adel Manna,

between the apex and the base o the social pyramid [there was] limited

salience, particularly in rural society, which constituted the demographicmajority.14Indeed, particularly in the countryside, the delineation between

elites and non-elitesthat is, between shaykhs and peasantswas not al-

ways clear; nor, or that matter, was it clear among the peasant themselves,

many o whom were semi-nomadic and occupied a social space between

the more purely nomadic Bedouin tribes and more land-rooted peasantry,

orallahin.o put it another way, social categories, much like religious ones,

were relatively fluid and individuals could, up to a point, move between

them. Tis was soon to change.As the nineteenth century progressed, the interests o both urban no-

tables and rural shaykhs became increasingly tied to external economic

orces. Teir political authority became embedded in ormal administrative

structures, such that they became beholden first and oremost to the

Ottoman center in Istanbul. Correspondingly, the amount o leverage peas-

ants had in their relationships to with them greatly diminished. Perhaps

more importantly, social categories began to crystallize and the division be-

tween local elites and the peasantry widened. In connection with the new

economic opportunities brought about by European economic penetration,


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the ormer increasingly used their collective position o authority to exploit

a peasantry with whom they elt ewer ties. Rural shaykhs, now in the guise

o absentee landlords, along with urban-based creditors, were increasinglydriven by commercial considerations. Correspondingly, the criterion deter-

mining elite status came to be one based almost entirely on wealth, particu-

larly wealth acquired through commerce. Te old rules o patronage and

mediation no longer applied, and the relationship between local elites and the

peasantry became one wherein the latter was exploited by the ormer. In sum,

[t]he new social elite had economic and political interests that differed

rom those o the traditional leaders. [Tereore, it] was not to be

expected that the new elite would [challenge the Ottoman] authorities

that had been responsible or its rise, enabling it to consolidate its eco-

nomic position as part o the anzimat and modernization policies.15

Tese developments also saw a growing intrusion among the peasantry o

ormal urban institutions, inclusive o Islamic ones, in support o notable

interests; or their part, as peasants became less able to negotiate their situ-

ation directly with urban notables and rural shaykhs, they ound it in-

creasingly necessary to seek recourse in ormal Islamic institutions, in thehope o achieving a modicum o justice. All o these actors had the effect

o ormalizing the peasantrys sense o religious identity. As elaborated

below, Islam, until then largely understood on the basis o local olk prac-

tices,16 became more ormalized over time. As a consequence, peasants

came to conceive o their identity on the basis o a more orthodox under-

standing o Islam.17 Not surprisingly, perceptions o the notable class

among the peasantry became increasingly negativealongside the or-

malization o Islamic practice among the peasantry, notables came topresent a point o contrast, and there would be a growing perception that

their behavior was something decidedly un-Islamic. Tis point will be

taken up in more detail below.

Beore proceeding urther, a word is needed concerning the sources

used in this study. Simply put, historians seeking to reconstruct the situa-

tion o the peasantry in Palestine during the Ottoman period have had

limited sources with which to work.18Probably the most important type,

and one which historians have indeed put to great use, has been the sijillat,or shariacourt records. Yet apart rom the act that they have constituted


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an important primary source or some o the secondary sources reer-

enced here, I do not directly utilize them. In part, this choice reflects the

uneven and inconsistent use that the peasantry made o the shariacourtsin Palestine. Doumani observes that in Nablus, up to 1830, there is a vir-

tual absence o court cases involving the peasantry. Significantly, afer that

dateand in keeping with the changes discussed herethe number o

peasant-related cases appearing in the court records in Nablus rose con-

siderably; by the late 1850s, peasant involvement in legal proceedings had

turn[ed] into a flood that showed no signs o abating, hence signaling the

culmination o the hinterlands integration into urban legal and cultural

spheres.19

Judith ucker observes that during the eighteenth and nine-teenth centuries, the notable class was over-represented in the sijillat.20

Dror Zeevi notes the problematic nature o the sijillatas a source or social

history, inasmuch as they provide ew clues as to how representative they

are o the society at large, especially regarding certain segments o the

population.21 In a similar vein, Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual,

with respect to their survey o Damascene society around the year 1700,

note the difficulty in knowing what percentage o the population is actu-

ally represented in the court records, and the likelihood that certaingroups are in act under-represented.22

Tis is certainly not to maintain that urther investigation o the sijil-

latwould not prove ruitul with an eye to better ascertaining the degree

to which the peasantry took recourse in the shariacourts during the pe-

riod in question. Additionally, based on the different local histories o di-

erent communities in Palestine, there is compelling reason to believe that

there existed a good deal o regional variation regarding peasant attitudes

towards the sharia courts. While the studies o Nablus conducted byDoumani and ucker suggest that during the early part o the nineteenth

century the peasantry o Jabal Nablus was reluctant to seek recourse in the

sharia courts, Amy Singers conclusions with respect to sixteenth- and

seventeenth-century Jerusalem and its environs suggest that this was not

the case everywhere. While no doubt much had changed between the sev-

enteenth century, on the one hand and the eighteenth and early-nineteenth

centuries (the period we are interested in here) on the other, it would seem

that, based on Singers study, such actors as village proximity and security

(or lack thereo) o travel were not entirely irrelevant.23


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As such, and with an eye toward ascertaining the nature o relations be-

tween the peasantry and ormal Islamic institutions, I have ocused primar-

ily on the accounts o European and North American travelers on the sub-ject o Palestines peasants. While indicative o a source type inherently

problematicinasmuch as they are largely impressionistic and are certainly

reflective o Western biasessuch accounts nevertheless have value, even i

too ofen consideration o them has been limited to studies aimed at expos-

ing their Orientalist character.24 I used judiciously, such accounts can

provide certain insights not readily available rom other sources. Westerners,

or instance, were ascinated by Palestines peasantry (in many cases be-

cause o a tendency to conflate them with peasants depicted in the Bible25

)to a much greater degree than was the case with Ottoman subjects. 26In this

respect, Western travelogues and the like arguably fill a gap lef by other

source types. For instance, the sijillat, even when dealing with cases involv-

ing peasants, demonstrate little interest regarding questions o motivation

and background.27By contrast, it was not uncommon or Western travelers

and pilgrims to devote entire sections, articles, and even stand-alone vol-

umes to the topic o Palestines peasantry,28and while sometimes these were

only too obviously reflective o religiously derived preconceptions, as ofenas not, they were written with the purpose o correcting some o the biases

and prejudices commonly held by Westerners.29

Town and Village

As o the beginning o the nineteenth century, Islam as practiced by the

peasantry was o a relatively inormal nature, defined more by local, tradi-

tional practices than by textual legalism. Among other things, this reflect-

ed the nature o the relationship between the peasantry and local elites

(urban notables and rural shaykhs), wherein the latter acted as mediators

between ormal Islamic institutions and the peasantry. Te seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries had been a period marked by increasing Ottoman

decentralization,30a time during which the Porte was no longer able to

directly exert its authority over the outer provinces, and local elites be-

came the principle administrators o the Empire, particularly in the Arab

provinces.31 Inasmuch as there existed little by way o ormal Ottoman

institutions or mechanisms during this period by which local elites


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collective position might be guaranteed, their ability to exercise authority

was to a large degree dependent on the compliance o the peasantry and

townsolk. Notably, that support was also a means by which local eliteswere able to resist the occasional attempt by the Ottoman center to reassert

its authority. A good example o this is the rebellion that took place in

1824-1826, which saw Palestines peasantryunder the leadership o local

elitessuccessully resist the attempt o the recently appointed governor

o Damascus to impose a levy on taxes.32By the same token, both urban

notables and rural shaykhs occasionally ound themselves under pressure

rom below to resist government authority. Tis was certainly the case

during the time o Ibrahim Pashas occupation o Palestine; when calledupon by the pashas representative to deend Jerusalem against a peasant

uprising, the notables replied that it was not a wise policy or them to

fight against theellaheen [sic] and pleaded all kinds o excuses, but es-

pecially the lack o arms.33Peasant support was especially critical with

respect to the strong internal rivalries that ofen existed between different

notables and rural shaykhs. Each sought to attract as many supporters as

possible; correspondingly, a great deal o effort was devoted to cultivating

good relations with members o the peasantry in order to solicit theirbacking, ofen via patronage.34 It also meant arming them.35o a large

extent, then, the peasantry expected local elites to look out or their inter-

ests as well as maintain harmony among the members. With respect to the

latter, this mostly meant settling disputes, and in doing so local elites gen-

erally exhibited a great deal o flexibility in their application o Islamic law.

Tis was particularly true in the countryside, where rural shaykhs were in

act more likely to base their rulings on local custom than sharia.

Tis is not to say that ormal Islamic institutions were o little impor-tance. Within the cities and larger towns, the individuals charged with

upholding law and order during this period were generally members o the

ulama, a group which in many respects overlapped with the urban notable

class.36Significantly, the holding o religious positions and the ability to

provide patronage were strongly interrelated. Tus, or instance, through

their control o pilgrim hostels, notables were ofen able to provide various

orms o assistance to low-paid religious unctionaries.37Related to this,

relations between elites and non-elites tended to be very personalized. Even

where exploitative, it was important that interactions between the two at


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least appear amicable and intimate.38 Particularly i acting in the role o

qadiIslamic judgeit was also expected that the urban notable in ques-

tion should behave airly; this was especially the case i he was acting as anarbiter between members o the peasantry and government officials.39

In many respects, the same expectations defined relations between

town and countryside, and indeed, through the early part o the nine-

teenth century, a airly equitable relationship existed between the various

urban centers in Palestine and their respective satellite villages.

Depending on the town, it was not unusual that the surrounding villages

had the upper hand. Hebron, or instance, was ofen subjected to attack by

orces rom the neighboring villages.40

Likewise, Jerusalem ofen ounditsel at the mercy o militias made up o neighboring villagers under the

leadership o the Abu Ghawsh amily, who during much o the nineteenth

century controlled the main avenues rom the coast to Jerusalem. 41

Palestinian natives commented to the American missionary Elihu Grant

at the beginning o the twentieth century that hal a century or more

agothe ellahin were ofen in the ascendancy and the city people glad to

treat with them.42Yet even by the middle o the nineteenth century, in

connection with certain transormations taking place related to the grow-ing European economic penetration o the region, villages were increas-

ingly coming to be dominated by neighboring urban centers. Tese chang-

es would see the urban notable class transormed into a merchant-dominated

elite, one driven primarily by commercial considerations and rooted in

newly created administrative institutions. While this new elite (new in the

sense o having a different basis) would eventually come to include the

more powerul o the rural shaykhs (treated more ully below), I first con-

sider how these changes impacted the urban notable class.In Palestine, European economic penetration began with the coastal

areas43and was initially mostly based on the cultivation o cotton or ex-

port to Europe, primarily France, as well as to Egypt and Damascus.44Te

same period also saw an increase in European demand or various cereals,

particularly in Britain ollowing the repeal o the Corn Laws in 1846.45In

effect, this constituted the first step toward the regions integration into

the world economy and initiated socioeconomic changes associated with

the related intensification o commercial agriculture.46 Externally, this

meant a growing dependency on world markets; internally, it meant


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peasant differentiation, the commoditization o land, and the expansion

o money-lending practices.47At the same time, the coastal area was sub-

jected to an influx o European manuactured goods, primarily textiles,48

against which local production ound it difficult to compete.49Tough the

interior was able to resist European penetration or a while by concentrat-

ing on production aimed at local markets as well as trade related to the

hajjthe northern route to Mecca passed nearby50it too was inevitably

drawn into the global economy.51Tus, as market relations intensified be-

tween the coastal areas and the interior, a snowball effect ensued, as pro-

duction increasingly shifed rom local to export markets. Tis process

was accelerated by the increased importation o European manuacturedgoods, which served to undercut respective local production.52Economic

activity in the interior increasingly turned to the production o cash crops,

and merchants in the interior soon began acting as middlemen or mer-

chants along the coast, in effect becoming their agents or infiltrating the

interior. Tis process was augmented by the attempt on the part o coastal

merchants to cut out intermediaries and deal directly with the local peas-

antry through the provision o profit-related incentives.53

During the same period in which these economic changes were takingplace, the Ottoman Porte initiated the anzimat reorms, inspired in large

part by a desire to modernize along European lines. Ibrahim Pasha, ol-

lowing Egypts temporary takeover o those territories between 1832 and

1841, had earlier initiated efforts at modernization in Syria and Palestine.

Afer reasserting its authority, the Ottoman government continued and

even extended those reorms. In concert with the changes brought about

by increased European-related economic activity,54 these reorms, which

were both political and economic in nature, inevitably undermined theexisting criterion determining elite statusthat is, ones position with re-

spect to Islamic institutions and ones reputation defined largely in Islamic

termsin avor o a new one derived largely o commercial success.55

Members o the notable class were able on the basis o their positions un-

der the old order to take advantage o the new economic opportunities

that now presented themselves.

In large part this shif reflected the generally capital-intensive nature

o such opportunities, whereby only established individuals and amilies

(that is, the urban notable class) were able to take advantage o them. Yet


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even when not having direct access to capital, members o the notable

class had certain advantages. Many urban notables were able, or example,

through their monopolization o the management o waqs and dominantpositions in the sharia courts, to acquire waq properties or revenue-

generating purposes.56 Additionally, most urban notables (and rural

shaykhs) had over the course o time established extensive, socially based

commercial networks, which they were now able to exploit in competing

with outside merchants or the rural surpluses o cash crops, most notably

grain and cotton.57Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this developing

new elite were able to co-opt what were newly created political structures.

In short, they were able to adapt, and while the basis o their elite statusmight have changedlikewise, their exact place in the pecking orderthe

same notable amilies might, by and large, still be ound among the upper

elite. As Doumani notes, the old ruling political amilies were transormed

into a new merchant-dominated elite[, one based on a]...fluid alliance be-

tween influential members o the merchant community, key ruling ami-

lies (both urban and rural), and the top religious leaders.58

Probably the most significant new political structures created in con-

nection with the anzimat reorms were the advisory councils, introducedin 184059with the objective o giving local communities a consultative role

in local administration. Redesignated as administrative councils, or maja-

lis al-idara,60with the Provincial Regulation o 1858, these were essentially

established in order to better enable the Ottoman center to maintain con-

trol o the outer provinces. In actual act, they became a means by which

the local elite was able to consolidate its authority at the local level. 61Te

purpose o these councils was to reduce the autonomous powers o the

provincial governors,62and while in theory they were nonetheless answer-able to them, almost rom the start, their ability to participate in adminis-

trative decisions and challenge gubernatorial authority proved ar-reach-

ing.63 Tis was even more the case given that governors were generally

appointed or airly short terms, and thus ofen remained relatively una-

miliar with local conditions until just prior to leaving.64As such, the coun-

cils were able to exert a strong influence over them. Te great majority o

those sitting on the councils came rom urban notable amilies,65and while

in theory they were supposed to represent the interests o the people at large,

it quickly became apparent that their primary concern was with their own.66


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Functioning as they did as intermediaries between the appointed gover-

nors and the local population, it was ofen only with the assistance o ur-

ban notables that other anzimat reorms could be implemented.67

It wasairly easy, then, to ensure that such reorms were carried out in such way

as to serve the notables own interests.68Trough the administrative coun-

cils, or example, they were able to gain control o the allocation o tax

collecting duties, a particularly lucrative unction and traditionally the

prerogative o the more powerul rural shaykhs,69in their role as tax arm-

ers.70Following the Vilayet Law (Law o the Provinces) o 1864, tax arms

were allocated by the majalis al-idarato the highest bidders, who inevita-

bly were drawn rom their own members.71

Ottoman authorities inIstanbul quickly recognized that the councils were actually blocking re-

ormshence the Provincial Law o 1858 which sought, among other

things, to concentrate power once again in the hands o the governors.72

Te point o the new law was to ensure that the majalis al-idara coordi-

nated more effectively with the local governors. Nonetheless, the councils

continued to prove an effective means by which urban notables were able

to control the pace and nature o reorm.73

Prior to the anzimat period, villages had been largely sel-sustainingand had not depended on the larger towns or their livelihood.74But eco-

nomic integration together with the urban notables appropriation o the

new Ottoman administrative structuresthe majalis al-idara, in particu-

larquickly undermined whatever leverage the peasant class had.75

Whereas a notable or shaykhs ability to exert influence among the peas-

antry had in large part depended on his ability to provide patronage, as

well as the respect he enjoyed as a pious Muslim, it was now increasingly

defined within the context o the new administrative structures. Oncehaving appropriated control o these structures, urban notables (as well as

those rural shaykhs incorporated within this new merchant-dominated

elite) no longer needed the support o townsolk or the peasantry, whether

tacit or overt. Tis tendency was urther reinorced by the act that, as ur-

ban notables living in the same urban centers ound common interest in

competing with merchants rom rival ones (not to mention oreign mer-

chants based in the coastal cities), the internal rivalries between them

quickly diminished. What rivalries did remain increasingly played out in

the majalis al-idara, o which most local elitesnot only urban notables,


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but the more important rural shaykhs as wellwere now members.76As

the possibility o violent conrontation between rival local elites became

more remote,77

their relative status became less dependent on their abilityto employ actual physical orce. Consequently, they ound it less necessary

to solicit the support o non-elites or the purpose o creating militias,

something that had usually involved a certain degree o largesse. Te posi-

tion o the urban notables was urther institutionalized by the creation o

the Ottoman Parliament; rom among its ranks were drawn representatives

who were thus better able to promote their collective interests in Istanbul.78

Te majalis al-idaraalso provided an effective mechanism by which

urban notables were able to extend their authority over their respectivehinterlands, significantly, in a manner that circumvented the intermedi-

ary role o rural shaykhs.79Te various commercial networks established

under the old order as discussed above constituted an additional actor in

this process. In much the same manner that they acilitated their exploita-

tion, they provided the ramework through which the various hinterlands

were eventually absorbed into the political, economic, and social nexuses

o their respective urban centers.80Tis process would prove especially im-

portant with respect to the towns o the interior. Trough existing net-works, or example, the urban notables o Nablus were able to integrate the

surrounding villages ully within that citys rapidly expanding soap indus-

try during the latter part o the nineteenth century. 81Te corresponding

commercialization o agriculture along with the growing pervasiveness o

money lending,82on the basis o which town merchants had greater access

to ever increasing crop surpluses, only served to acilitate the consolida-

tion o notables control over the surrounding villages.83 Added to this,

mechanisms such as the salamcontractwhich allowed notables to chargepeasants a disguised interest84urther served to institutionalize elite-

peasant relations while integrating satellite villages within respective ur-

ban legal and political spheres.

Te exploitation o the peasantry took other orms as well, not least

the expropriation o their land. As already noted, control o the majalis

al-idara enabled the urban notables to influence the manner in which

other reorms were implemented, or instance, those related to tax collec-

tion. In like manner notables took advantage o those reorms dealing

with land registration. Tus, the Ottoman Land Code o 1858, enacted


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with the purpose o giving the Ottoman government greater control over

miri, or state, land so as to better check the growth o large private-land

ownership, actually had the opposite effect. Fearul o taxation and con-scription, peasants with long-standing traditional rights allowed members

o the urban and rural elite to register large areas o land on their behal,

with the consequence that they became, in effect, the latters personal

properties85(though this would seem to have been more o a problem in

the lowland areas than in the hill regions, where small plots and individu-

al ownership and/or usuruct was more common86). Tis actor, combined

with the corruption and ineptitude o Ottoman administrators, contrib-

uted to a tendency or land to accumulate in the hands o wealthy urbannotables, a process urther acilitated by their control o the majalis al-

idara.87Tis also had the effect o depriving the peasantry o much o their

land usage rights, with many peasants being converted into sharecroppers

and hired laborers.88Compounding the problem was the act that, too o-

ten, peasants ound themselves unable to pay their taxes. As a result, they

were ofen orced to borrow money, and eventually, under the burden o

tax and debt, to sell their land to wealthy notables.89

Rural Shaykhs

Not surprisingly, all o this saw a diminution o the power o the rural

shaykhs, who since at least the sixteenth century had exercised a good deal

o authority within their respective nahiya and villages,90 by collecting

taxes and ensuring peasant production, but also by representing villagers

interests vis--vis Ottoman authorities and neighboring cities and towns.

Te latter role was reflected in the common title o rais al-allahin, literally

head o the peasants.91Tese were men who, by virtue o their age, experi-

ence, and local prominence, had come to represent their ellow villagers

beore the Ottoman authorities.92Significantly, while publicly confirmed

by the authorities,93all indications are that shaykhs were essentially cho-

sen by their ellow villagers, and were only able to maintain their status so

long as they continued to enjoy their support.94While they would, by the

nineteenth century, lose the title, both their unction and the nature o

their status would remain in many respects the same, even i the basis

underlying their role as tax collectors would eventually be greatly altered.95


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In any case, the authority enjoyed by the rural shaykhs, whether at the

nahiyaor village level, was sufficiently dependent on the support o the

peasantry, such that the ormer might reasonably be expected to keep thelatters interests at heart. Relevant in this respect is that rural shaykhs en-

joyed a certain degree o leverage vis--vis the urban notables, something

ofen enough reflected in what were generally equitable relations between

the rural peasantry and those residing in nearby towns.96Over the course

o the nineteenth century, this situation was to change in two important

respects. First, or reasons already noted, the role o the rural shaykhs as

intermediaries between town and village was significantly undermined.

Second, their authority within the villages themselves was directly dilutedby the anzimat reorms, more specifically, by the Vilayet Law o 1864,

which abolished the offices o both nahiyashaykh and village shaykh in

terms o allocating them any specific unction.

We might at this point consider what was probably the chie unction

o rural shaykhsat least rom the perspective o the Ottoman govern-

ment prior to the period o reorm. Since at least the seventeenth century,

government revenues had been collected largely through tax arms, or ilt-

izamat. Essentially, the government armed out the right to collect taxesby selling the privilege, the price paid being equivalent to the revenue esti-

mated by the government as corresponding to the territory in question.

Any revenue the tax armer collected beyond that constituted a profit.97

Prior to the period o reorm, tax arming had largely been the prerogative

o rural shaykhs,98 individuals who, inasmuch as their authority was

somewhat dependent on the support o the peasantry, were unlikely to

abuse the privilege. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, as already

noted above, the urban elite was increasingly taking on this role.Significantly, their authority, unlike that o the rural shaykhs, was not tied

to the peasantry, but rather depended almost solely on the institutions o

provincial governmentin particular, the majalis al-idaracreated

through the anzimat reorms.99In addition to opening the peasantry to

abuse by individuals minimally beholden to them,100the new situation saw

a diminution in the ability (and incentive) o rural shaykhs to serve as

mediators between the peasantry and the urban-based notables. Some did

continue to carry out this unction, but these generally shifed their base

o operations to the larger towns, effectively becoming part o the new


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urban-based merchant elite.101Added to this, many rural shaykhs took ad-

vantage o the 1858 Ottoman Land Code to acquire large estates. oo ofen,

such individuals came to be absentee landlords, effectively severing what-ever personal connections they had with the peasantry. Te less powerul

village shaykhs, or their part, were stripped o their judicial powers and

converted into government-appointed mukhtars. As such, their positions

were entirely dependent on the Ottoman government. Whether through

the one process or the other, the rural shaykhs were effectively incorpo-

rated into the Ottoman bureaucratic system.102

At this point, we might examine more closely the manner in which the

role o the rural shaykh changed, as this perhaps best exemplifies the pro-cess considered until nowthat is, the process whereby the relationship

between local elites and the peasantry was radically altered. Even more

than the writ o urban notables, prior to the changes discussed above, the

authority o rural shaykhs was to a great extent dependent on the peas-

antrys support. We might start by considering the actual living condi-

tions o the peasantry. Well into the latter hal o the nineteenth century, it

was arguably the case that the of-used phrase downtrodden peasant

was something o an overstatement.103Indeed, numerous Westernersex-actly those one might expect to take or granted the truth underlying the

clich o a destitute and oppressed peasantry104described the situation o

the peasantry as anything but deprived. Elizabeth Anne Finn, the wie o

a British consul stationed in Palestine during the first hal o the nine-

teenth century, characterized the peasantry o the interior as sturdy

mountaineers [who] had never been subjected to the iron hand o despo-

tism by their urkish rulers.105 Te British traveler Laurence Oliphant,

who visited Palestine during the 1870s, characterized the peasantry as anenergetic and very stalwart race, with immense powers o endurance,106

while another Western traveler, who visited Palestine during roughly the

same period, described them as scarcely less wild and lawless than the

Bedawin [sic][as] a rough, athletic, and turbulent racemostly armed

with gun and dirk.107Te latter went on to describe them [as] robust and

rigorous, [noting that] much might be hoped or rom them i they were

brought under the influence o liberal institutions, and i they had exam-

ples around them o the industry and enterprise o Western Europe.108

Such descriptions would seem borne out by the fierce resistance elicited


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rom the peasantry by the Egyptian subjugation o Palestine beginning in

1832; Palestines peasants greatly resented Egyptian reorms aimed at cen-

tralizing authority, imposing conscription, and granting political equalityto non-Muslims.109Particularly relevant to our discussion is that this resis-

tance eventually evolved into a coordinated rebellion under the leadership

o the urban notables and rural shaykhs, both o whom were earul that the

reorms initiated by the Egyptians would inevitably see their positions o

authority greatly undermined. More than simply enjoying strong peasant

support in this, it was arguably the case that local elites were compelled by

the peasantry to revolt, and this in spite o the act that many o the reorms

the Egyptians sought to implement would likely have benefited them.110

A missionary visiting during the middle part o the century described

the inhabitants o one village as industrious and thriving and went on to

describe the surrounding country as filled up with their flourishing or-

chards[a] thousand reapers, gleaners, and carriers were abroadthe

children at play, or watching the flocks and herds, which were allowed to

ollow the gleaners. But no description can reproduce such a tableau. It

must be seen, heard, and enjoyed to be appreciated.111Certainly it was not

uncommon to hear a town or village described as flourishing,112or tofind depictions such as those o one mid-nineteenth century traveler, who,

on approaching Nablus, noted the vales clad with olives, ull o gardens

and orange groves with palm-trees, and watered by plenteous rills.113Tis

is not to say that there were not peasants who were less prosperous, though

ofen these resided in areas dominated by semi-inhabited abandoned vil-

lages;114as such, they may well have reflected more situations o transition

than evidence o overall decline and destitution, though certainly at times

it also reflected the act that areas still subject to Bedouin harassmenttended not to have more ully developed settlements.115Relevant also in

this respect were the circumstances at the time o visitingthus,

Napoleons invasion o Palestine at the beginning o the nineteenth cen-

tury devastated the countryside, as did that o Ibrahim Pasha several de-

cades later.116In any event, to the extent that semi-inhabited villages were an

indication that the country was underpopulated, this was not always a bad

thing or the peasantry. John Lewis Burckhardt, while visiting Syria and

Palestine during the early part o the nineteenth century, commented that

there was ofen more land than people who required it, as a consequence o


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which, the peasantry ofen took to roping off large plots o land or their

own personal use.117

It was ofen the case that the peasantry, as represented by differentclans, were euding with one another, usually in support o rival shaykhs118

or that neighboring villages were compelled to orm coalitions in order to

better protect themselves against Bedouin tribes.119Te need to orm mili-

tias was ofen paramount; more important rom the standpoint o the wel-

are o the peasantry, it usually entailed the provision o substantial pa-

tronage. As noted by Moshe Maoz, a typical militia might consist o as

many as 200,000 armed peasants.120 Indeed, the history o Palestine dur-

ing much o the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centurieswas defined by constant struggle between various peasant actions.121 A

notable example o this was in the period ollowing the expulsion o the

Egyptians in 1841, which temporarily resulted in a power vacuum, one

that saw a fierce struggle between various notables and shaykhs.

Correspondingly, respective amilies ound it necessary to mobilize peas-

ant militias or support.122As a consequence, peasants were generally indi-

vidually armed, usually with a gun in addition to a short sword.123Te very

act o a widely armed peasantry would certainly have acted as a constrainton the authority o rural shaykhs. ellingly, when Ibrahim Pasha called

upon the rural shaykhs to disarm the peasantry ollowing Egypts inva-

sion o Syria and Palestine, it was an imperative they were quite reluctant

to carry out.124We might add here that urban notables were ofen under

pressure to enter into alliances with the more powerul rural shaykhs,

something which served to strengthen the latters positionlikewise, that

o the peasantry vis--vis urban dwellers.125

Rural shaykhs were expected to look afer the welare o the peasantry,both in mediating between the villages and neighboring urban centers

and in maintaining law and order within the villages themselves. O

course, as already discussed, they were also responsible or collecting tax-

es, yet even in this respect the peasantry was not without leverage. Evasion

o payment, or instance, was ofen not such a difficult matter, especially to

the extent that shaykhs lacked backing rom the Ottoman center.126I the

situation were sufficiently dire, a member o the peasantry might right-

ully seek the protection o his shaykh. I such a course proved ill advised,

the peasant might alternatively abandon him and seek the protection o


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another shaykh;127indeed, it was not entirely uncommon or peasants to

abandon their arms, sometimes even entire villages, or the mountains,

towns, or even neighboring countries, such as Egypt.128

In many respects,the relationship between shaykh and peasant was one o mutual obligation.

Certainly this was evident in the expectation that shaykhs behave hospita-

bly, particularly in their dealings with travelers.129Likewise, they were ex-

pected to look out or the welare o those peasants in their charge, helping

them out during difficult times, or instance, by providing seed ollowing

a bad harvest or making good on a peasants debt when he was unable to.130

A particularly interesting responsibility ofen expected o rural shaykhs

was the provision o a kind o assurance with respect to commercial andpolitical dealings involving peasants; in effect, they would adopt the role

o surety, or kafl, guaranteeing that the terms o a commercial contract or

negotiated truce were carried out, i necessary, at their own expense.

Importantly, the ability o a shaykh to take on this role depended in no

small part on his reputation or honor and honesty.131Another similar ob-

ligation o shaykhs with respect to peasantsand one that also reflected

strongly on their sense o honorwas that represented by the practice o

dakhal, or the taking o sanctuary, whereby a peasant under threat mightverbally evoke the protection o an individual o influence and rank. I

said peasant were to be slain, the shaykh whose protection had been

evoked would be obligated to avenge him.132Characterizing the situation

then as simply one wherein the peasantry was at the mercy o local elites

would constitute something o a misrepresentation. Particularly during

periods when the Ottoman center was unable to make its presence elt in

the outer provinces, rural shaykhs were, in many respects, on their own.

As a visiting missionary put it (and this during the latter part o the nine-teenth century, when in many places, this was arguably no longer the case),

rural shaykhs had no other authority over [their charges] than such as a

Bedouin Sheikh exercise[d] over his tribe,133which was another way o

indicating authority o a very limited kind.

As with the urban notables, the trust and respect accorded rural

shaykhs had, in many ways, a religious dimension, defined on the basis o

the aorementioned Islamic virtuesthat the shaykh should be pious,

considered to be air and just, and so orth. Such virtues were linked to

Islam, but it was an Islam o the most inormal kind, defined


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more by tradition and recognized practice than legalism, and ofen enough

incorporating olk religious practices. In most villages, or instance, one

was more likely to find a shrine (maqam) dedicated to saints (wali) than aproper mosque.134Tis is not to say that religion was not important. As

observed by the missionary Elihu Grant, Eastern lie simply [could not]

be understood apart rom religion. And yet, the natives o the country

[were] not, strictly speaking, theological in their way o thinking.135While

such a characterization no doubt reflected something o an Orientalist

outlookthat is, one that over-emphasized the supposed centrality o

Islamit was also indicative o the act that or most peasants, Islam in

many ways constituted an extremely fluid ramework inclusive o a rangeo societal and cultural values. Put another way, Islamic was what was

good and correct and proper; as Elizabeth Anne Finn observed, most

peasants in Palestine were largely ignorant o the Quran, and most o

what they knew about Islam, they picked up rom their shaykhs.136

In terms o its content, Islamas understood by the peasantrycon-

sisted primarily o a set o legal and cultural norms, perhaps best defined

by the term ur, which mostly drew on local social practices. For the most

part, it was these norms that provided the legal ramework by which thepeasantry lived, and more ofen then not, legal disputes were decided by

the shaykhs.137Tey ruled largely according to a code o unwritten tradi-

tional laws, some o which could be traced to the Quran (shariat

Muhammad), but more ofen, to regional codes o little known origin.

Tus, in the south o Palestine, cases were ofen judged under the Law o

Abraham (shariat Khalil), which was thoroughly well known, and

held in the highest veneration, and was believed to reflect a legal code that

could be traced back to the patriarch himsel.138Quranic law was gener-ally associated with cities and it was noted that the peasantry always

preer[red] the law o Abraham to that o the Koran, [moreover, that] it

[should be] administered by the shaykh and the elder.139

Ofen, legal codes drew upon what were considered purely Bedouin

social norms. Tus, in the area around Bethlehem, Elizabeth Finn noted

that in certain cases shaykhs ound it necessary to resort to Bedawy or

wild Arab code.140Te ability to draw upon different codes o law allowed

the rural shaykhs a certain degree o flexibility in discharging their re-

sponsibilities, particularly those o a judicial nature.141Te actual judicial


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arrangements were also based on rural custom, and trials were generally

held beore the shaykhs.142While in principle the option existed, peasants

rarely took recourse in the ormal Islamic courts, either with respect tocommercial transactions, or issues related to personal status.143As noted

by French scholar Philip J. Baldensberger, who was visiting Palestine at the

time, peasants preerred to settle their disputes so ar as possible without

resort to the government.144Indeed, among many o the peasantry, it was

considered that going to accuse in towns show[ed] a decadence o their

independence.145Added to that was a general distrust o any kind o gov-

ernment official. As one missionary put it, the government was seen as

gloves or the hand that is stretched out or more o the means o the vil-lager, as a consequence o which [t]he peasants look[ed] suspiciously on

every movement o every officer, reusing to believe that any government

representative [could] have good intentions or do worthy actions.146Indeed,

whenever it proved necessary to deal with a government figure, villagers

usually turned to the local village shaykh to intervene on their behal.147

Te importance o shaykhs reputations vis--vis the peasantry was

perhaps nowhere more evident than in the great pride they took in being

sought afer and respected in connection with their ability to dispensejustice wisely.148 Moreover, members o the peasantry were ofen quite

likely to resist an arbitrary application o the law by any given shaykh.

Again quoting Finn, should he utter a decision or express an opinion con-

trary to the traditionary [sic] code, he is liable to be corrected, and to have

his sentence questioned by the merest child.149Where there existed any

concern about the possible airness o a shaykhs ruling, a peasant might

seek recourse in a shaykh other than his or her own. Tus, sometimes a

shaykh would acquire a reputation or being particularly knowledgeableand just; [c]ases rom all the countryside [were] brought to such a man,

and his sentence [was] generally accepted as binding.150

A New Elite

As long as the interests o rural elites coincided with those o their respec-

tive charges, the system worked reasonably well. Te institution o the

anzimat, however, very quickly eroded the status o rural shaykhs as me-

diators between town and village.151 Correspondingly, their authority


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became based less on whatever personal qualities might have earned them

the respect o the peasant class, and more on their political positions as

defined within the rapidly consolidating Ottoman hierarchy. Tey weretransormed into servants o the state and appendages o the urban elite.152

Tose able to take advantage o new commercial opportunities soon ound

their interests aligned with those o the developing merchant class in the

neighboring urban centers. What remaining status they enjoyed vis--vis

the peasantry became the basis or the latters exploitation.153In an effort

to compete with other merchants in gaining access to the surplus crops

needed or the manuacture o various goods, textiles or soap, rural

shaykhs ofen sought to use their position o authority in the villages andthe relationships they had cultivated to their own advantage. Moreover, as

with their urban counterparts, rural shaykhs (particularly the more pow-

erul o the nahiya shaykhs) increasingly sought to define their right o

exploitation as one o legal prerogative. In many respects, they became an

extension o the urban elitein some cases, physically a part o that group,

as many relocated to the larger towns and cities where they became absen-

tee landlords. Tis made their ability to exploit the peasantry that much

easier, as together with urban notables they were able to consolidate theircontrol o the various legal and administrative institutions. Butrus Abu

Manneh notes that, during the nineteenth century, the traditional and

natural leaders o the peasantry were destroyed or lost their military and

political power, [as a consequence o which], the countryside, leaderless,

was laid open to the influence and domination o the city.154He might

have added that a air number o these natural leaders o the peasantry

were effectively co-opted by their respective city or town, as they became a

part o the urban elite.In short, a new elite had come into being which, though consisting o

many o the same notable amilies as beore, was now defined on the basis

o a different criterion; whereas previously it was ones position in, and

reputation with respect to, certain Islamic institutions that determined

elite statusor in the case o rural shaykhs, ones reputation as a generous,

hospitable, and just Muslimit was now based to a much greater degree

on wealth, particularly that derived rom commerce. Not surprisingly, ur-

ban notables still ound it useul and preerable to identiy their status in

connection with the ormer. Many were uncomortable with the new basis


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o their elite status. oo great a ocus on commerce was considered un-

seemly and notables still tended to define their elite status either by hold-

ing positions within Islamic institutions or at the very least, maintainingreputations as pious Muslims.155 More than a question o sensibilities,

however, in many respects their reputations were also imperative to their

success as merchants. For one thing, it was a means o acquiring waq

property.156 Perhaps more importantly, in connection with the aoremen-

tioned networks, it was important or maintaining a certain degree o legiti-

macy among the peasantry. Te surest way o doing this was through the

cultivation o religious status.157A good example o this can be seen in the

Husayni amilys appropriation o the Nabi Musa estival, the control owhich provided a means or demonstrating notable generosity (in the orm

o public meals) as well as claiming a socio-religious community status.158

Nevertheless, affiliation with Islamic institutions was no longer the

sole basis o elite status; instead, it became a means o legitimizing status

afer the actit provided a veneer o respectability.159Te core determi-

nant o elite status had become commercial success. Tese developments

had a particularly negative impact on the peasantry. Certainly, it had al-

ways been the case that notable authority constituted something o a bal-ancing act, between the legitimacy conerred by the Ottoman government

and that given by those over whom authority was exercised. As Albert

Hourani put it when describing the typical notable elite, It is because he

has access to authority that he can act as leader, and it is because he has a

separate power o his own in society that [the higher] authority needs him

and must give him access.160What was changing was that the balance was

shifing in avor o the ormer. Previously, the authority o urban notables

and rural shaykhs had depended in equal part on the support they enjoyedamong the peasantry, something determined in no small measure by their

ability to respond to the latters needs, as well as provide patronage. Te

peasantry had at least some leverage.

Under the new order the authority enjoyed by urban notablesand

likewise, that o a air number o rural shaykhswas no longer dependent

on peasant support. A new basis or elite status had been created, one no

longer tied to the peasantry, but rather dependent on ones relationship to

the global market and control o administrative institutions. In more con-

crete terms, their authority was now tied to institutions reflective o a


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greater degree o Ottoman centralization, their ortunes, to changed eco-

nomic circumstances. Most important with respect to the ormer was the

majalis al-idara, control o which acilitated the ability o elites to accesstax revenue, promote policies that acilitated their acquisition o local in-

dustries and actories, control the movement o commodities, and mini-

mize state intererence where it clashed with their own political and eco-

nomic interests. Te act that they were no longer dependent on the

peasantrys support as one basis o their authority meant that they were

better able to exploit them, among other things, in the acquisition o sur-

plus cash crops such as were valued by oreign markets.161

The Formalization of Religious Identity

No longer able to rely on local elites or justice, the peasantry increasingly

ound it necessary to take recourse in the ormal judiciary institutions o the

Islamic courts in the larger urban centers. Te problem was that, too ofen,

these courts were under the control o the very notables who were trying to

exploit them. Peasants, in act, increasingly ound themselves brought into

court at the notables behest. Merchants, or instance, might take to court

peasants with whom they had salamcontracts i they elt the latter had some-

how been remiss in ulfilling their contractual obligations. Such contracts

generally constituted what were quite sophisticated commercial arrange-

ments, the enorcement o which ofen depended on court backing. Tis was

particularly the case when involving individualsthat is, peasants on one

side and merchants on the othercoming rom different towns (an increas-

ing occurrence) inasmuch as there were no other ties linking the two parties.

Such contracts then only served to augment the role o the courts in the lives

o the peasantry, and notably, there was a pronounced rise in the number o

cases appearing in the Islamic courts during this period.162Tis process ex-

tended beyond mere court visits; Islamic law increasingly came to provide

guidelines with respect to business practices, the resolution o social con-

flicts, and the defining o social roles (or instance, on the basis o gender).163

At the same time, olk practices were increasingly coming under attack by

religious reormers. Mosques preaching Islamic orthodoxy replaced maqams

(saints shrines) as centers o village worship, and peasants were increasingly

educated as to which practices were perceived to be authentically Islamic.164


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Te end result was that the Islam practiced by the peasantry was becoming

increasingly ormalized and tied to Islamic institutions. At the same time,

there was a growing sentiment among the peasantry that the exploitativepractices o this newly developed merchant class were something decidedly

un-Islamic. Many were anything but generous, hospitable, air, and honest,

and increasingly they seemed disinclined to look out or the interests o the

peasantry, whether vis--vis their own commercial interests or with respect

to Ottoman authority figures. Worse was that the merchant classs Muslim

members seemed willing to exploit their control o ormal Islamic institu-

tions, particularly the courts, to better serve their own commercial interests.

For many peasants, such unscrupulous behavior seemed entirely unworthyo Muslim notables, the elite status o whom had previously been based

largely on their reputations as good Muslims. Given their decidedly un-

Islamic behavior, then, it was not surprising to Muslim peasants that this

new merchant elite should be open to non-Muslims; correspondingly, there

was a growing tendency or members o the peasantry to see Muslim and

Christian merchants as constituting a single interest group.165

In connection with other changes then taking place, the peasantry

was becoming increasingly conscious o their identity as an Islamic one ina radically new way. Islam, previously recognized as an inherent aspect o

a traditional mode o living now took on a new dimension; it was an iden-

tity less defined by practice and more by ideal, an Islam defined less by

tradition and more in connection with its institutions, among them, legal

ones. Te extent to which any particular practice was considered Islamic

had been more a actor o to what degree it reflected local social and cul-

tural norms, directly pertained to ones day-to-day circumstances, and

was in some manner efficacious. Tat it should be theologically rooted inIslamic scripture was, at best, o secondary importance. Tis was perhaps

nowhere more evident than in the practice o saint worship: tellingly, in

Palestine, Muslims and Christian peasants ofen worshipped the same

saints, with little regard or whether the saint in question was in act either

Muslim or Christian.166 Tis, too, was changing. Religious practice was

becoming rooted in what Doumani reers to as an orthodox or urban

Islam167an Islam within which there was a right practice and wrong

practice, based no longer on utility but more on archetypes. It was an

Islam rooted in a proper theological interpretation o Islamic scripture, a


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scripture, moreover, uniormly recognized throughout the Muslim world.

Significantly, as such, it provided the basis o a definable shared Islamic

identity,168

one that might be set in opposition to other identities, as theparticulars o what the ormer should entailas ar as proper Islamic be-

havior and beliesbecame more and more rigidly defined.

For a large majority o the peasantry, their sense o Islamic sel-iden-

tity had, by the latter part o the nineteenth century, become more par-

ticularistic and more pronounced. In this sense, it was also more suscep-

tible to being appropriated by certain leaders o the national movement at

the time o the British Mandate, leaders o a certain religious qualifica-

tion. Exemplary in this respect is the 1930s militant-reormist ShaykhIzz al-Din al-Qassam, who stood outside the traditional elite and was

able by evoking a religious criterion to effectively challenge their author-

ity, particularly given that many o the elite could count themselves as

such on the basis o little other than their wealth. Given the perceptions

held by the peasantry with respect to this newly developed merchant

class, as discussed above, it would prove an effective means o challeng-

ing the latters authority.169


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ENDNOES1. Geographically speaking, Palestine is a term encompassing the region between the

Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and inclusive o the modern state o Israel and

the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. In actual act, during the Ottoman period,there was no corresponding administrative unit known as Palestine. For most o the

roughly three and a hal centuries o Ottoman rule, with only minor variation, what is

today known as Palestine consisted o roughly our districts, known as sanjaqs.

2. See, or instance, Jane Hathaway, with contributions by Karl K. Barbir, Te Arab Lands

Under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800(Pearson Longman: Harlow, England, 2008), 175.

3. See, or instance, Laurence Oliphant, Haia or Lie in Modern Palestine (New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1887), 194.

4. See, or instance, Karl Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758 (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1980); Gad G. Gilbar, Te Growing Economic

Involvement o Palestine with the West, 1865-1914, in David Kushner, ed., Palestine

in the Late Ottoman Period: Political Social and Economic ransormation (Jerusalem

Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1986), 188-210; Ruth Kark, Te Rise and Decline o Coastal

owns in Palest ine, in Gad G. Gilbar, ed., Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in

Economic and Social History (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 69-89; Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule

in Jerusalem, 1890-1914 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985); and Gabriel Baer, Te

Impact o Economic Change on raditional Society in Nineteenth-Century

Palestine, in Moshe Maoz, ed., Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period

(Jerusalem Magnes Press, 1975), 495-498.

5. Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Te Merchants and Peasants o Jabal

Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley, CA University o Caliornia Press, 1995).

6. See Yehoshua Porath, Te Political Awakening o the Palestinian Arabs and TeirLeadership owards the End o the Ottoman Period, in Maoz, Studies on Palestine,

355 360; and Haim Gerber, Palestine and Other erritorial Concepts in the

Seventeenth Century, International Journal o Middle East Studies 30 (1998), 563

572.

7. In addition to mufis and qadis, possible positions included imams, the leaders o public

prayer in mosques, khatibs, who were in charge o public oration, muadhdhins, who

were in charge o summoning the aithul to prayer, and religious instructors or the

general population. Particularly lucrative positions were those related to the supervision

o religious endowments. See Stanord J. Shaw, History o the Ottoman Empire and

Modern urkey, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 138.

8. Tis in effect constitutes a second-level subdivision o a first-level division (such asthe sanjaq), and was usually inclusive o a number o villages and sometimes an

urban center. Te nahiyain turn was subdivided into mahallas, which constituted

the smallest Ottoman administrative subdivisions.

9. Abu Manneh, Jerusalem in the anzimat Period, 4-5.

10. Elihu Grant, Te People o Palestine (Westport, C: Hyperion, 1976 [1921]), 150. See

also John Lewis Burckhardt, ravels in Syria and the Holy Land (London: Dar

Publishers, Ltd. [Te Association or Promoting the Discovery o the Interior Parts o

Arica], 1992 [1882]), 349; also Burckhardt, ravels in Syria and the Holy Land, 382.

11. Doumani, 35.

12. Divine, 39.

13. Dick Douwes, Te Ottomans in Syria: A History o Justice and Oppression (London: I.

B. auris, 2000), 167; see also Adel Manna, Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century


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Rebellions in Palestine,Journal o Palestine Studies 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), 63;

Albert Hourani, Te Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century, Studia Islamica 8

(1957); and Muhammad Adnan Salamah Bakhit, Te Ottoman Province o Damascus

in the Sixteenth Century, Ph.D. dissertation, School o Oriental and Arican Studies,February, 1972, 210.

14. Manna, 63.

15. Ibid., 59.

16. Tat is, local traditions and customs not rooted in official religious doctrine.

17. Tis was by no means a phenomenon limited to Palestine and its environs. Troughout

the Ottoman Empire, the anzimat reorms would act to restrict the administrative role

o the clerical establishment, thus heightening the emphasis placed on its religious

unction. As noted by Mardin, Islam had stopped being something that was lived and

not questioned. Secularizing reorms had made Islam become more Islamic. Seri

Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern urkey: Te Case o Bedizzaman Said

Nursi (Albany, NY: State University o New York Press, 1989), 117-118.18. See, or instance, Hathaway, 172-174.

19. Doumani, 152.

20. Judith ucker, ies that Bound: Women and Family in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-

Century Nablus, in Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron, eds., Women in Middle Eastern

History: Shifing Boundaries in Sex and Gender (New Haven, C: Yale University

Press, 1991), 236.

21. Dror Zeevi, Te Use o Ottoman Sharia Court Records as a Source or Middle

Eastern Social History: A Reappraisal, Islamic Law and Society5, no. 1 (1998), 39-40.

22. Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, Familles et ortunes Damas 450 Foyers

Damascains en 1700(Damascus, 1994), cited in Zeevi, Te Use o Ottoman Sharia

Court Records, 44.

23. Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration

Around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),

21. See also Hathaway, 174. Tough it should be noted that even during the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries, it seems that peasants were reluctant to appear in court,

and ofen were compelled to do so, usually by an official Ottoman escort. Whenever

possible, they preerred to settle disputes in their respective village. Singer, 21, 27.

Tis was not unique to Palestine. See, or instance, Galal H. El-Nahal,Judicial

Administration in Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century: A Study Based on the

Shariah Court Registers, Ph.D. dissertation, University o Chicago, 1978, 25-26.

24. See Erik Freas, Muslim Women in the Missionary World,Muslim World88, no. 2(April 1998), 141-164.

25. Yehuda Karmon, Changes in the Urban Geography o Hebron during the

Nineteenth Century, in Maoz, Studies on Palestine, 80.

26. Tus, Bakhit notes that during the sixteenth century, Syrian writers, although

providing plenty o inormation about lie in the cities, were little concerned with

what transpired in the countryside; likewise, biographical treatises rarely dealt with

rural shaykhs. Bakhit, 223.

27. Tough this reflected in large part the procedural ocus o most sijillrecords, and not

necessarily any prejudice against peasants versus individuals o different back-

grounds. Zeevi, 48.

28. See, or instance, Elihu Grant, Te Peasantry o Palestine: Te Lie, Manners and

Customs o the Village(New York: Pilgrim Press, 1907); Elizabeth Anne Finn,


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Palestine Peasantry: Notes on Teir Clans, Warare, Religion, and Laws (London:

Marshall Brothers, 1923); William McClure Tomson, Land and the Book, or, Biblical

Illustrations Drawn rom the Manners and Customs, the Scenes, and Scenery o the

Holy Land (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1954); . C. Wilson, Peasant Liein the Holy Land (London: John Murray, 1906); Oliphant, Haia; F. A. Klein, Lie,

Habits, and Customs o the Fellahin o Palestine, Palestine Exploration Fund

Quarterly Statement(1883), 41-48; Samuel Bergheim, Land enure in Palestine,

Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement(1894), 191-199; George E. Post,

Essays on the Sects and Nationalities o Syria and Palestine, Essay 2, Introduction,

Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement(1891), 99-147.

29. A notable example in this respect is Cyrus Hamlin,Among the urks (New York:

American ract Society, 1877).

30. Until recently, conventional scholarly opinion held that, during the period in

question, the Ottoman Empire was in a state o decline, a ramework historians have

since largely rejected. Nonetheless, it is air to say that by the eighteenth century thecentral government in Istanbul was finding it difficult to exert direct authority over

the outer provinces. See Hathaway, 7-8.

31. Shaw, 165; also M. Skr Hanioglu,A Brie History o the Late Ottoman Empire

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 6-7; and Hathaway, 8, 79-82.

32. Manna, 33-35; also S. N. Spyridon, trans., extracts romAnnals o Palestine

1821-1841, a manuscript by Monk Neophitos o Cyprus (Jerusalem Ariel Publishing

House, September 1979),Journal o Palestine Oriental Society 18 (1938), 73-83. A

similar successul rebellion took place in Palestine in 1703-1705. Tis revolt was

known as the naqib al-ashra rebellion, in considerat ion o the role played by the

naqib al-ashra, or head o the association o shuraa, the descendants o the prophet.

Notably, in both cases, the notable leaders o the rebellion were careul to reward

those peasants who had participated, primarily by exempting them rom having to

pay certain taxes. Ibid., 52, 54, 58-59. See also Bakhit, 250.

33. Spyridon, 91-92. Also Bakhit, 94.

34. See Maoz, Ottoman Reorm, 115; also Roger Owen, Te Middle East in the World

Economy, 1800-1914(London: Methuen, 1981), 173; Bakhit, 270-271; and Doumani,

26, 34-44, concerning the area around Nablus. Regarding rivalries in the region o

the Judean Hills and around Hebron and Jerusalem, see Maoz, 119-121. Concerning

peasant warare in general, see ibid., 131, and Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial

Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650 (Beirut: American University o Beirut, 1985),

161-198.35. Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study o the Firman

According to the Mhimme Deferi (Oxord: Clarendon Press, 1960), 63, 80, 79,

inclusive o thefirmanto Mehemmed Beg, Beg o Saad, identified as vol. 14, no. 99,

Muharrem (?) 979 (May/June 1571).

36. Abu-Husayn, 161-198; Hourani, Te Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century, 27.

Tough to be sure, not all provincial elites in the Arab provinces were, strictly

speaking, members o the ulama.

37. Abu Manneh, 22.

38. ed Swedenburg, Te Role o the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt

(1936-1939), in Edmund Burke III and Ira Lapidus, eds., Islam, Politics, and Social

Movements (Berkeley, CA University o Caliornia Press, 1988), 172.

39. Singer, 21, 27, 29.


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Freas

40. Karmon, 80.

41. Mordechai Abir, Local Leadership and Early Reorms in Palestine, 1800-1834, in

Maoz, Studies on Palestine, 290.

42. Grant, Te People o Palestine, 225. Tis was equally so during the late sixteenth andseventeenth centuries. See Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials, 37,

90-91; also vol. 69, no. 25, 9 Receb 1001 (11 April 1595), in Heyd, Ottoman Docu-

ments on Palestine, 50.

43. Owen, Te Middle East, 176; also Kark, Te Rise and Fall o Coastal owns, 70.

44. Shmuel Avitsur, Te Influence o Western echnology on the Economy o Palestine

during the Nineteenth Century, in Maoz, Studies on Palestine, 485; Owen, Te

Middle East, 86, 178; and Omer Celal Sar, anzimat ve Sanayimiz (Te anzimat

and Our Industry), in anzimat (Istanbul, 1941), reproduced in Charles Issawi, ed.,

Te Economic History o the Middle East 1800-1914: A Book o Readings (Chicago:

University o Chicago Press, 1966), 49.

45. Tus, trade in cotton was later eclipsed by other commodities such as wheat, barley,sesame seeds, olive oil, and, later, oranges. Owen, 86, 178, 167, 177; also Doumani,

105.

46. See, or instance, Owen, 29-30, 51-53.

47. A. Granott, Te Land System in Palestine: History and Structure (London: Eyre and

Spottiswoode, 1952), 58-77.

48. Maoz, Ottoman Reorm, 177-178; Kark, 70, 82-83; and Haim Gerber, Modernization

in Nineteenth-Century Palestine: Te Role o Foreign rade,Middle Eastern Studies

18, no. 3 (July 1982), 251; also Sar, anzimat ve Sanayimiz, 49 50.

49. Gilbar, 199.

50. Concerning the pilgrimage and its impact on the Nablus economy, see Owen, Te

Middle East, 24; also Barbir, 124.

51. Doumani, 14, 33, 97, 237; Owen, 124.

52. Doumani, 184.

53. Ibid., 129-130, 141-142, 165.

54. Particularly ollowing the trade convention o Balta Liman signed with Britain in

1838. For the actual document, see Issawi, Economic History, 39-40.

55. What Doumani reers to as a shared material base characterized by moneylending,

land ownership, urban real estate, trade, and manuacturing. Doumani, 129, 241.

56. A waqis an Islamic oundation, whereby a given property is designated or a specific

purpose. Tough in theory eternal and inalienable, certain mechanisms did exist

which could establish private rights and assets over waqproperty. See Gabriel Baer,Te Dismemberment o Awqa in Early Nineteenth-Centur y Jerusalem, in Gilbar,

Ottoman Palestine, 299-300, 306-308, 314-316.

57. Owen, 90, 175; also Doumani, 93, 117-118.

58. Ibid., 135. See also Butros Abu Manneh, Aspects o Socio-Political ransormation

in Palestine in the anzimat Period (1841-1876), paper presented at urks and

Palestine: A Tousand Years o Relations, Jerusalem, 22 24 June 2004.

59. In essence, a carryover o the majlis al-shura, initiated by Ibrahim Pasha during the

time o the Egyptian occupation.

60. Singular,Majlis al-Idara.

61. Hourani, Ottoman Reormand the Politics o Notables, 62.

62. Stanord J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History o the Ottoman Empire and Modern

urkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 84-85.


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63. Among their powers, the advisory councils were allowed to ask or inormation rom

the governors on all matters, to register complaints concerning their administration

with the Grand Vezir in Istanbul, to testiy to the Vezirs representatives when they

came on inspection, to hear appeals rom the religious courts where the decisionsinvolved large amounts o money, and to discuss not only current problems but also

measures that might be taken to improve the welare and security o the state. Ibid., 87.

64. In some cases, they were not even able to speak the local dialect. James Finn, Stirring

imes: Or Records rom Jerusalem Consular Chronicles o 1853 to 1856, vol. 1

(London: C. Kegan Paul and Company, 1878), 163.

65. Membership in the majlis al-idarawas confined to candidates who paid a direct tax

o no less than 500 piasters per year. As the majority o village dwellers could not

afford this, the management o their internal affairs was effectively lef in the hands

o what was a rising group o wealthy urban notables. Doumani, 235; also Abu

Manneh, Jerusalem in the anzimat Period, 12.

66. See Doumani, 129-130, 238-239.67. Hourani, Ottoman Reorm and the Politics o Notables, 62; see also Philip Mattar,

Te Mufi o JerusalEM: Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National

Movement (New York: Columbia Press, 1988), 4.

68. As Doumani puts it, local merchants use[d] their recent access to political office (the

majalis al-idara) in order to adjust the politics o ree trade in their avor. Doumani,

97; Hourani, Ottoman Reorm and the Politics o Notables, 64; Shaw and Shaw, 86;

and Porath, 364.

69. Concerning the different ranks o rural shaykhs, see Abu Manneh, Jerusalem in the

anzimat Period, 4-5.

70. Kenneth W. Stein, Te Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill, NC:

University o North Carolina Press , 1984), 7. Concerning reorms with respect to tax

arming during this period, see also Hanioglu, 88, 90.

71. Porath, 365.

72. Shaw and Shaw, 88.

73. See, or instance, Laurence Oliphant, Te Land o Gilead with Excursions in the

Lebanon (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1881), 129; ibid., 128; and

Hourani, Ottoman Reorm and the Politics o Notables, 63.

74. Abu Manneh, Jerusalem in the anzimat Period, 4.

75. See, or instance, Mattar, 4.

76. Owen, Te Middle East, 174.

77. Something the gradual strengthening o Ottoman authority in the outer provincesollowing the ousting o Ibrahim Pasha went a long way toward diminishing as well.

Abu Manneh, Jerusalem in the anzimat Period, 23-35.

78. Te members o the first Parliament, which convened in March 1877, were

determined by the majalis al-idararather than popular suffragehence it was the

majalis al-idarathat controlled who was actually sent as a representative. Robert

Devereux, Te First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study o the Midhat

Constitution and Parliament (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964),

124.

79. Hourani, Ottoman Reorm and the Politics o Notables, 62; also Abu Manneh,

Jerusalem in the anzimat Period, 37. Te majalis al-idarawere granted authority over

matters pertaining to the surrounding countryside previously considered outside their

jurisdiction, but which now strengthened their authority over it. Ibid., 13.


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Freas

80. Swedenburg, 109, 182.

81. Doumani, 14. By the end o the nineteenth century, soap manuacture had in act

become the dominant economic activity in Nablus. Ibid., 183-184, 238-239.

82. Gilbar, 205; and Swedenburg, 174. See also Grant, Te Peasantry o Palestine, 149.83. Doumani, 239, 103.

84. Essentia lly, a salamcontract a llowed or immediate payment by the buyer in

anticipation o goods to be delivered at a later date. A typica l salamcontract might

take the orm o a loan, whereby a merchant paid the taxes o a village in return or a

specified amount o produce, to be delivered at the time o its harvest . Significantly,

the salamcontract usually had a calculated rate o interest disguised as an artificially

low price, hence guaranteeing a profitable return when the lender sold the related

good on the open market. Doumani, 135-144.

85. Granott, Te Land System in Palestine, 72-77.

86. Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: Te Construction o Modern National