MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

Text by ALBERT SEATON

Color plates by MICHAEL YOU ENS

CJ1ieussi{ln~my

oftheapoleonic 'Wars

CJTieussian Q../ffmy

oftheapo/eonic 'Wars

Text by ALBERT SEATON

Color plates by MICHAEL YOU ENS

mHIPPOCRENEBOOKS, INC.

© Copyright 1973 Osprey Publishing Ltd

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First published in the United States 1973

ISBN 0 88254 167 6

First published in Great Britain in 1973 byOsprey Publishing Ltd, P.O. Box 25,707 Oxford Road, Reading, Berkshire

In the preparation of this text acknowledgement ismade to Opisanie Odezhdui Vooruzheniya RossiiskikhVoisk edited by Viskovatov (St Petersburg 1899­1902) and L'Armee Russe by Bujac (Paris 1894). Thephotographs are reproduced by courtesy of the

.Keeper, the Library of the Victoria and AlbertMuseum (Photographer: Berkhamsted Photographic,Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire). Grateful acknowledge­ment is made to Macmillan Ltd. for permission toreproduce extracts from the accounts of Sir RobertWilson and Sir Robert Porter, included in 1812

edited by Anthony Brett-James.

Printed in Great Britain

CJ1ie ~sian ~my ofthe~oleonic 'Wars

Introduction

Until the end of the sixteenth century there wasno standing army in times of peace in Russia.When danger threatened or a campaign was tobe mounted, the ruler ordered the nobility intothe field and these armed and provisioned theirown retainers and serfs. In consequence there wasno uniformity in organization, equipment, ordress; nor was the Principality of Moscowmilitarily strong enough to withstand invadingarmies, whether from out of Asia or out ofEurope.

Muscovy survived because of its privilegedposition among the Russian principalities as thetax-gatherer for the overlord Tartar, who helddominion over the Slav lands as far west as theDnieper. The Mongol-Tartar Empire beganrapidly to decline with the separation of theGolden Horde from the Mongols, while in thewest the Tartars were challenged by the growingmilitary power of Lithuania-Poland. It wasIvan III who first threw off the Tartar yoke, butby then the Golden Horde was breaking up intothe three separate Tartar khanates of the Crimea,Kazan, and Astrakhan. Not until the accession ofIvan IV (the Terrible) was the first body of Musco­vite troops set up as a permanent establishmentin peace. This was the corps of streltS}, the streletsbeing an archer or musketeer usually recruitedfrom the peasantry. The streltS} lived in barracksand garrisoned Moscow and the frontier towns,being responsible not only for defence but forpolice, fire and watch duties.

The original streltS} organization was that of thecompany and it was not until the mid-seventeenthcentury that the many independent companieswere united into regiments. In all there were fortyregiments, each about 600 strong, the men-at-

arms carrying a sword, an axe, and a musket orpike.

The use of artillery field-pieces had first beenintroduced in 1389, but it was not until 1550 thata permanent artillery force came into being.Artillerymen, however, like those elsewhere inwestern Europe, were not regarded as soldiers butmerely as camp-following auxiliaries.

The reign of Boris Godunov and the 'Time ofthe Troubles' showed that the streltS} was littlemore than a territorial militia unfit for Europeanwar. Large numbers of mercenary soldiers flockedto offer their services to Moscow - Germans,Livonians, and Swedes predominant among them,

A grenadier of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, c. 1801

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and these formed the officer and non-commis­sioned officer cadres for newly-raised cavalry,dragoon, and infantry regiments, organized andequipped on the Western pattern. Of the regi­ments founded in 1642, the Moskovsky continuedin service until 1792, and the Butirsky, under itschanged title of 13 Erivansky Grenadiers, until1917. When Peter the Great came to the throne in1689, his predecessor Theodor had left him astanding army of twenty-five regiments of cavalryand forty regiments of infantry.

'Peter the (ireatPeter the Great in his youth had played atsoldiers, drilling and exercising his two companiesof the Preobrazhensky and the Semenovsky. In1689 and 169 I these two names were transferredto two of his newly formed guard regiments, whilethe cannoniers of his childhood were formed intothe 1st Battery of the Artillery Brigade. of theGuard.

In 1697 Peter left on a tour of western Europeand during his absence the streltsy mutinied, poss­ibly incited to do so by Peter's sister Sophia, theformer Regent. The streltsy were already a politicalpower within the state and to this they owed theirbloody suppression on the Tsar's return. Theirremnants were disbanded and Peter determinedthat many of the foreign mercenary regimentsshould be abolished, their replacements beingfound by a national conscription introduced in1699. Only a proportion ,of the male populationwas called to the colours for an unlimited periodof full-time service, which really meant for life.(Not until fifty years later was the term of serviceregulated to twenty-five years, this law, enactedby the Empress Anne, remaining in force until1874.)

Peter's first conscription brought him only32,000 recruits and these, drafted into twenty­seven infantry and two dragoon regiments, wereformed into three infantry divisions under thecommand of Weide, Repnin, and Galovin. ButPeter could not, and probably would not, ridhimself of the foreign officers on whom he reliedfor experience and instruction, for of the twenty-

4

seven infantry regiments, twenty-two were com­manded by colonels with German names, whilefour of the remaining five had non-Russian names.The two colonels of dragoons were called Schnee­wanz and Goltz, Goltz's regiment still being inexistence in 1917 as I Moskovsky Dragoons. In1708 most of the original twenty-nine regimentswere given titles of the names of towns or pro­vinces, usually where they were raised, and manyof these were retained until the twentieth century.The only Imperial Tsarist Russian regimentswhich could claim existence before this time werecertain cavalry who owed their earliest originsto the 'town Cossack' levies ofSouth-west Muscovyand the Ukraine, the Sumsky, Kharkovsky,Izyumsky, Akhtirsky, and the Chernigovsky,Seversky, and Kievsky regiments.

In 1700 the new Russian Army was completelydefeated by Charles XII of Sweden on the Narva,with only the regiments of the Russian guardshowing any great steadiness. Undeterred, theTsar reorganized his forces, but continued toplace his trust in his infantry rather than in

Shabrack and bolster-covers used by (top) anInfantry reghnental officer, and (bottol1l) an in­fantry field officer, c. 1796

artillery or mounted troops. By J 709, when theSwedes were defeated by Peter at Poltava in theUkraine, the strength of, the Russian Army hadrisen to 90,000 men, with fifty-three regiments ofinfantry of the line and thirty-two of mountedinfantry dragoons. It had no light or heavycavalry.

In J 720 Peter the Great reformed his army oncemore and the effect of these changes was stillapparent seventy years later at the time of the

apoleonic Wars.The overall army strength was increased to

J25,000 men, half of which were allocated to fieldformations, the remainder providing garrisontroops and static installations. And so there wereforty-eight regiments of field and forty-eight ofgarrison infantry; each regiment had two batta­lions, each of four companies of musketeers,together with a ninth (regimental) company ofgrenadiers. A battalion was about 600 men strongand four battalions (two regiments) formed acorps.

The mounted force numbered 40,000 of which36,000 served in the field force. The whole of theregular cavalry of forty-one regiment~ were ofdragoons, each regiment consisting of ten com­panies of mounted infantry and one of mountedgrenadiers.

Hussars formed no part of the army after J 707,

the place of light cavalry being filled by mountedCossacks of the main hosts. There were originallytwo types of Cossack: the 'town Cossacks',permanent bodies of troops raised by frontierRussian towns, these eventually being absorbedinto the regular cavalry; and the Cossacks of thehosts (voiska) of the Don, the Terek, the Ural, andSiberia. These were warrior settler peoples whowere obliged to provide the Tsar with mountedtroops in exchange for certain freedoms fromtaxation and for the grant of common rights andlands. Each Cossack from the hosts was responsiblefor furnishing, at his own expense, his h0rse,uniform, arms and equipment. Cossack ranks,methods and training were very different fromthose of the regular army and, with his scantregard for formal discipline, the Cossack wasviewed by his Russian brother as more thanunreliable.

The artillery arm was still little developed

Grenadiers of the Preobrazhensky, Selllenovsky, andIzlllallovsky Guard Reghnents, c. 1797

although it had taken under its wing the en­gineers, the sappers, and the miners. An artilleryregiment might have as many as 11,000 men on itsstrength, including six companies of cannoniers(guns), a company of bombardiers (originallymortars and howitz'ers), and several companies ofminers and pontoniers. This was .additional towhat was known as 'battle artillery', the light gunsbelonging to infantry .and cavalry regiments,for each line regiment had three cannon ormortars under its own command, and the Preo­brazhensky and Semenovsky Guards each hadten.

early cighteenth­Gentury Ghanges

Peter the Great died in J 725 and, if one exceptsthe forming (in J 728) of a new engineer corpsindependent of the artillery, there were no furtherchanges until the accession of the Empress Annein 1730. That year a new guards infantry regiment

5

Cossack banners. Left: the Ural Host;bottom. right: the Ural Guard Squadron;top right: the 1st and 2nd ChugusvskyRegim.ents, c. 1798

was raised, the Izmailovsky, and a number ofdragoon regiments were reformed as the ImperialHorse Guards. .

The Russian mounted arm had had very littlesuccess against the Turkish light cavalry. TheCossack was valueless for shock action againstenemy horse, and the Russian dragoon was bettertrained as an infantry soldier than as a cavalry­man. The native Russian horse lacked weight,bone and stamina compared with the Turkish­bred Arab. It was only at the prompting of theRussian Field-Marshal Mtinnich that the EmpressAnne agreed to the formation of three regimentsof heavy cuirassiers, equipped with a metalhelmet and breastplate and mounted on well-bredhorses imported from Germany. An attempt wasmade, too, to reform the Cossacks and use at leastpart of their number as cavalry by regroupingmany of their independent squadrons (sotni orhundreds) into regiments.

It was during Anne's reign, too, that theinfantry grenadier changed his basic function(although he retained his name) and became amusketeer-infantryman, grenade-throwing being

6

an additional, specialized skill. Nor were fusiliersnecessarily armed with the fusil or light musket.

The value of Russian troops was still an un­known factor in Europe, for, although Peter hadovercome the Swedes at Poltava, within two yearshe suffered a near-disastrous defeat at the handsof the Turks on the Pruth. Anne intervened in theWar of the Polish Succession and fought anotherwar against the Turks, this time in company withAustria as a Russian ally. But Russian successeswere comparatively trifling and it was left to theEmpress Elisabeth (1741-62) to pit her armiesagainst a European foe.

In 1753 the Russian line infantry regimentswere reformed from a two- to a three-battalionstructure, each having three companies of fusiliersand one of grenadiers. Grenadier regiments on theother hand remained on a two-battalion organiza­tion with an additional company to each battalion,making ten companies to the regiment. Garrisonregiments of infantry remained at two battalionseach.

Russian cavalry, too, was reorganized, andbetween 1741 and 1759 twelve new hussar

..

Cavalry hebnets, I799

regiments were raised, the ranks being filled forthe most part by light cavalry enlisted from abroad.In 1756 nine existing Russian dragoon regimentswere re-formed as nine cuirassier regiments andsix regiments of horse grenadiers. Most mountedregiments had an establishment of five squadrons,but the dragoons had six and the hussars had aloose company (half-squadron) organization whichvaried by regiments: eight hussar regiments hadten companies and four of them (two furtherregiments had been raised) as many as twentycompanies each.

During the eighteenth century Russian artillerydeveloped rapidly. By 1757 an artillery regimenthad two battalions, each of a company of bom­bardiers, manning howitzers and mortars, andfour companies of carinoniers manning guns.Each regiment had over ninety artillery pieces ofvarious types. In addition to the field armyartillery there were numerous regiments andparks of specialized artillery of siege-guns andhowitzers. Presumably because the gunners werethe principal users, the pontoon regimentsformed part of the artillery and not of the en-

gineers. Regimental artillery, permanently allo­cated to infantry or cavalry regiments, had alsobeen increased.

The first regiment of engineers, an offshoot ofthe artillery, was formed in 1728 of two com­panies of miners, two of sappers, and two con­struction companies.

G'atherine the (;reatDuring the Seven Years War (1756-63) Russiantroops took the field against Frederick the Great'sPrussia. They enjoyed alternating fortunes, anddistinguished themselves by their tenacity. Itappeared that Frederick must be finally defeated,when suddenly the Russian Empress Elisabethdied. Her unstable successor, Peter III, anadmirer of the King of Prussia, hastened to makepeace, but within six months he had been deposedby his own German wife who subsequentlybecame Catherine II, or Catherine the Great.

Catherine reigned from 1762 to 1796 and was

7

Non-comtnissioned officer clerk and a private of adragoon regiment, c. 1800

Empress of all the Russias at the time of theFrench Revolution, and the Revolutionary andNapoleonic Wars. Catherine claimed to be anenlightened patron of the arts and sciences, asindeed she was, and a social reformer, which, allthings considered, she was not. Her interests wereRussian and were centred on the aggrandizementof Imperial Russia by political or military means,and she took a close interest in the strength andorganization of the Russian Army.

At the time of Catherine's accession the lineinfantry in the field army consisted of fifty-threeregiments of 160 battalions, 80,000 men in all.Garrison infantry comprised forty-seven regimentsof ninety-nine battalions, totalling 65,000 men.The cavalry had fifty-two regiments of 265

squadrons, amounting to 40,000 men, and thirty­eight regiments of regular or territorial UkrainianCossacks outside the so-called 'irregular' troopsof the main Don, Terek, and Siberian Hosts.Together the regular infantry and cavalry madeup 320,000 men.

In the first two years of her reign Catherinecompletely reformed her army. New infantry

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regiments were raised, mainly from the Ukrainianmounted militia, bringing the infantry strengthof the field army to sixty-two regiments of 132

battalions, totalling I I 1,000 men; but she revertedto the old organization of two battalions to aregiment, each of six companies. The fusilierbattalions were renamed musketeers (althoughthis was only a temporary redesignation) and eachhad a grenadier company. The eighty-fourbattalions of garrison infantry, mostly of sixcompanies, were given operational tasks, sixty-fiveof them being allocated to frontier defence.

The cavalry, too, was reorganized once moreand in 1763 Catherine introduced carabineers ­cavalrymen armed with carbine and sword, butdiffering from dragoons in that they carried nobayonet. These were raised by converting fivedragoon and six horse grenadier regiments. Toreplace the dragoon regiments thus lost, furtherunits were raised, mainly from the Ukraine,bringing the total number of dragoon regimentsup to twenty-three. The five ancient 'townCossack' regiments, sometimes known as theCherkassy or Dnieper Cossacks, and the twelveexisting regiments of hussars, were converted toeleven new hussar regiments and four lancerregiments. The three cavalry regiments, privatelymaintained by the Hetman of the UkraineCossacks, were taken over by the St PetersburgGovernment. In the newly-reformed regimentsthe heavy cavalry and dragoons each had fivesquadrons, while the light cavalry (hussarsand uhlan lancers) had six. Each squadroncould be broken down into half-squadrons(companies). After the reorganization there werein all, sixty regular cavalry regiments of 3 I 5squadrons, totalling 50,000 men which did not,ofcourse, include the Cossack sotni or the Ukrainianmounted militia.

Under Catherine the artillery was expanded tofive regiments, one of bombardiers, two ofcannoniers, and two of fusiliers. Each artilleryregiment had two battalions, each of five com­panies. The pontoniers, still only a companystrong, remained as part of the artillery. In 1793,at the time of the French Revolutionary War, afurther seven battalions of bombardiers wereraised, but not until 1794 was the first companyof horse artillery brought into existence.

Throughout Catherine's long reign, the numeri­cal strength of the Russian Army grew slowly butsteadily, particularly in the cavalry arm. Theguard cavalry regiments remained at five squad­rons, but, after 1775, all cavalry was increasedto six squadrons except for the dragoons, whichwere raised to ten, and the Cossack regimentswhich had eight satni.

By 1790 the standing Russian Army had astrength of half a million men. l

%sia makesWlarineurope

From the death of Peter the Great in 1725 untilthe accession of Catherine the Great in 1762,Russia lacked strong government. Most of themonarchs were women and the succession wasusually disputed by force, the decision beingdetermined by the officers of the palace guards.Ultimate power rested in the guards regiments inSt Petersburg.

Yet in spite of its internal weaknesses ImperialRussia remained a power to be reckoned with incentral and eastern Europe. This it owed to thestrength of its standing army.

From 1726 to the end of the Seven Years Warin 1763 Russia remained allied to Austria, thealliance being based on a mutual hostility to­wards the Ottoman Empire and a joint interestin dominating Poland. Russia again defeated theSwedes in 1743 and was ceded part of Karelia.The situation in Central Europe was changing,however, with the rising power of Prussia, whosemonarch, Frederick the Great, with the backingof the French, had recently overrun AustrianSilesia. Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress,was determined to recover the lost provinces andshe entered into agreements with London andSt Petersburg preparatory to a new war. Mean­while Frederick the Great, by his personalunpopularity, had lost much of his support inVersailles. Prussia's position had deterioratedeven further in that Britain, fearing Frederick'sdesigns on Hanover, signed a treaty in 1755 withthe Empress Elisabeth, by the terms of which, in

The standard of an infantry grenadier regimentof household troops with shaft crest and tassel,c. 1800

exchange for British gold, a force of 55,000Russian troops were to be concentrated on theEast Prussian frontier. Hanover was, therefore,to be protected from the Baltic.

In 1756 Frederick the Great made a pre­emptive attack on Saxony because he believedthat failure to do so would result in a joint offen­sive being launched on him by Austrian, Russian,Saxon, and possibly French troops. The oddsagainst Frederick were immense. In 1756 he haddefeated the Saxons but the next year he failedagainst the Austrians, and the Russians invadedEast Prussia. In 1758 Britain, motivated byopposition to France, changed sides; but Prussiahad no other ally. In August of that same year,however, the Prussians defeated the Russians atZorndorf in the bloodiest battle of the war, butthis costly victory was of little comfort since thatOctober Frederick lost once more to the Austriansat Hochkirch in Saxony, and in the followingyear, in 1759, was decisively defeated by theRussian commander, Saltykov. By 1760 Berlinwas occupied once again. Yet Prussia still con­tinued in the war, when a little more energy on

9

Foot artillery. Left: officer's shabrack and horse ornalnentholster-covers; right: a cOlnpany and a field officer'sepaulette

the part of the Russians, should have destroyed it.The death of the Empress Elisabeth at the end

of 176 I saved Prussia. Her loss was keenly feltin the Russian Army, for Elisabeth had interestedherself in military matters and had gained muchpopularity by restoring to Russia much of itsself-confidence and national pride.

The new Emperor, Peter III, born Karl PeterUlrich of Holstein, was a German admirer ofPrussia. He ordered the immediate withdrawal ofall Russian troops from Germany, asking fornothing in return, since he was interested merelyin his native Holstein's quarrel with Denmark.To wage war against Denmark he neededFrederick's neutrality. Within six months Peterwas dead, probably murdered by officers of theguard with the connivance of his wife, who hadherself crowned Catherine II.

Catherine, although a German, was not pro­Prussian. She made a peace with Frederick ongrounds of expediency, which cost her, however,the friendship of France and Austria. But Cather­ine's immediate interest was the elimination ofPoland. The first partition in 1772 took Russian

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frontiers westwards to the Dvina and upperDnieper; the second, in 1793, took in most ofBelorussia, Volhynia, and Podolia; while thethird, in 1795, took Russia to the Niemen and theBug and absorbed Lithuania and Podlesia intothe Empire. Poland disappeared, divided upbetween Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and was notto re-emerge as a national state, except for abrief Napoleonic interlude, until 1918.

Peter the Great had been largely unsuccessfulin his wars against the Turks, but in 1738, afterthe Third Treaty of Vienna, Russia and Austriahad attempted to encroach once more on Turkishterritory. The Empress Anne's Russian troopsinvaded the Turkish North Black Sea littoral andthe Crimea. The Turko-Tartar resistance wasfierce, however, and Anne gained nothing exceptthe cession of the port of Azov, giving to Russiathe control of the estuary of the Don.

Catherine was moved both by Russian interestsand by personal ambition and vainglory. Shewanted to eliminate Turkey in the Black Sea areaand in the Balkans and even dreamed of herselfas head of the Orthodox Greek Church in an

Grenadier head-dress I8n-I6. Left: a non-commissionedofficer; right: two grenadiers

Islam-free Constantinople. The Turks, on theother hand, made anxious by the Russian threatto dominate and eventually liquidate Poland, andincited by French diplomacy, decided to strikebefore Russia should become too powerful. Warwas declared in 1768. Turkey, however, was theloser, for Russian troops speedily overran Mol­davia and Wallachia and the Crimea, whileRussian men-of-war, partly officered and mannedby the British Navy, sailed from the Baltic to theBlack Sea and destroyed a Turkish fleet off thecoast of Asia Minor. By the Treaty of KuchukKainarji in 1774, Russia returned to Turkey herconquests of Georgia, Moldavia, Wallachia, andBessarabia, but was given the control of the KerchStraits and access into the Black Sea.

These gains, however, merely whetted theappetite of Imperial Russia. Catherine, anadventuress and opportunist, annexed the Crimeain 1784 and, on the death of Maria Theresa,hastened to come to an alliance with Joseph II ofAustria. The Turkish Sultan, sufficiently pro­voked, declared war on Russia and fought asuccessful campaign against both Austria and

Russia. Under Potemkin, the Empress's favourite,Russian troops had little success until theystormed the great fortresses of Ochakov on theDniester in 1788, and Izmail on the Danube in1790. The credit for these successes belonged toSuvorov, the outstanding general of tsaristRussia.

CJfie Influence ifc3uvorovAlexander Vasilevich Suvorov has become such alegend both in tsarist and in communist Russia,that it is difficult to establish the limitation of histalents. Born in 1730 he was, according to thepopular account, a puny and sickly child. Heappears to have had some education, for he couldwrite in French, German, and Polish tolerablywell, and he was a great reader. He was supposedto have entered the army as a private soldier atthe age of fifteen, but was not commissioned as anofficer until nine years later, in April 1754. It ispossible that this was in fact the case; on the other

II

Brigadier's shabrack and hol8ter-cover8 and ageneral'8 embroidered in8ignia (until 17(6)

hand it is not unlikely that his name was enteredon the lists of the regiment when he was fifteen,but that he himself did not join until a later date,and then as a Fanenjunker or other-rank officeraspirant. Aspiring guards officers were sometimesentered on the rolls of their regiments when theywere still in the cradle.

During the Seven Years War, Suvorov foughtwith distinction and was present when thevictorious Russian troops entered Berlin inOctober 1760. By the end of the war, still in hisearly thirties, he commanded a regiment and hesoon won renown for his insistence on realisticbattle training, for he was an outstanding leaderof men.

Suvorov's success lay in his understanding of thecharacteristics and simple capabilities of Russianinfantry. Two centuries of the Tartar yoke, serf­dom, the absolute despotism of the Tsars, theseverity of the climate, and the harshness of livingconditions, had bred into the soldier passiveobstinacy, unthinking obedience, and an exag­gerated respect for rank. The Russian soldier - andthis applied, too, to his officer - had courage and

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great stamina, coupled with an indolent natureand a lack of individuality and initiative. Suvorovwas able to exploit the soldier's strength and tominimize the effect of his weaknesses.

Training was reduced to that level which couldbe understood by the illiterate of the meanestintelligence and was reinforced by a host of easilyremembered maxims. This well suited the Russianmentality. The most widely known of these - 'thebullet is a fool, the bayonet is a fine fellow(molodets)' - might be regarded as unsounddoctrine, but in fact it was based on the conditionsof the time. The Russian infantryman's musketwas slow to load and inaccurate when fired. Thepraise of the bayonet made him more ready toclose with the enemy, and he fought best in closecolumn under the eyes of his officers. In somerespects Suvorov was ahead of his time in that alltraining had to have a purpose. The relationshipbetween himself and his commanders, and inparticular between commanders and troops, wereeasier and less formal than the harsh unthinkingmethods used elsewhere in central Europe. Andhe himself understood the value to the troops'morale of the direct personal appeal.

Suvorov was the author of two well-knownbooks., The Science of Victory and The Seven Lawsof War.

Although Suvorov is considered in Russia to beone of the world's greatest generals, it is doubtfulwhether he was among the foremost captains.Suvorov's strength lay in his sense of realism andhis ability to reduce the art of war to its essentials.He was a tactician and not a strategist and thebasis of his tactics was that boldness always pays;his only formula was that of moving quickly to theattack. Flexibility was entirely lacking. Suvorov'smethods did much to improve the fightingefficiency and the morale of the infantry; on theother hand, in typical Russian fashion, lossesmeant nothing to him, for he would rather wastelives than powder. In front of the walls of Izmailhis order contained the words, 'to seize the fortressby assault, without regard to losses'. By nature hewas entirely brutal.

Suvorov led the Russian troops against Polandand took Warsaw in October 1794, for whichCatherine the Great had him promoted to field­marshal. Two years later, when Paul came to the

throne, Suvorov was retired and exiled to thecountry. For the Emperor Paul had strongopinions on military matters and they were muchat variance with those of Suvorov.

Cj1ie (ia/china GorpsPaul was Catherine the Great's eldest son and hisfather was assumed to be Tsar Peter III, themonarch who, after only six months' reign, wasmurdered with the complicity of his own wife.Paul had no sympathy and little affection for hismother, while she had little regard for his talents,being jealous and fearful in case he should replaceher. Because of the peculiarity of the precedentsand the law relating to the imperial succession,the monarch at that time exercised the right tonominate his or her successor. Paul suspected, notwithout reason, that his mother Catherineintended to disinherit him and nominate as hersuccessor Paul's eldest son (her own grandson)Alexander Pavlevich. This preyed on his mindand, resentful at his exclusion from the councils ofstate, caused him to withdraw entirely from theImperial Court at the Winter Palace in StPetersburg.

Paul moved with his wife and immediateentourage (but not with his two eldest sons whoremained in the care of Catherine) to Gatchina,a town about fifty miles south-west of St Peters­burg. There he remained until the forty-secondyear of his life. He was a curious man of a some­what unstable temperament who could by turnsbe suspicious, vindictive, cruel, liberal, andgenerous. He had great sympathy for the Polesand made no secret of his opposition to the warbeing waged against them by his mother. Heregarded the French as oppressors of Europe anddisapproved of his mother's reluctance to enterthe Allied coalitions against the revolutionaries.Paul was in the main pro-German and he ex­pressed the greatest of admiration for the Prus­sians. This gave rise to further contradictions, forlike his father and his great-grandfather he dearlyloved to play the soldier and he ran his household,his suite, and the Gatchina Court, on Prussianmilitary lines. All activities were regulated by the

An officer of the Hussar lJfe Guards, c. I7C)8

drum-beat. A corps of troops was stationed thereunder his command and he was permitted toparade and drill this corps at his pleasure. By hisdirection, the training methods and the uniformof the troops there were altered to conform to thePrussian pattern. The Tsarevich became largelyabsorbed in the minutiae of military rules anddress regulations, an interest which he passed onto both of his sons, Alexander and Nicholas.

The military methods of this little Potsdam ofthe north were extremely harsh, even allowing forthe conditions of the time. The Gatchina Colonelof Artillery was Arakcheev, a man who was laterto be responsible for the pattern of Russianmilitary development for nearly a quarter of acentury.

Cj1ie emperor PaulThe Empress Catherine the Great died suddenlywithout dictating her wishes as to the succession.

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a

g

rn

s

b

h

t

c

o

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d

p

v

e

k

q

w

f

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x

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Banners of grenadier regirnents, c. 1798. (a) and (b) Pavlovsky, (c) and (d)Ekaterinoslavsky, (e) and (f) Little Russian, (g) and (h) Sibirsky, (i) and(j) St Petersburg, (k) and (I) Astrakhansky, (rn) and (n) Fanogorisky, (0)and (p) Khersonsky, (q) and (r) Kievsky, (s) and (t) Moskovsky, (u) and (v)Tavrichesky, (w) and (x) Caucasian

And so Paul came to the throne. The Gatchinabattalions, in their obsolete and cumbersomePrussian-type uniforms, moved into the WinterPalace.

Paul had long feared that instead of becomingTsar he would be imprisoned or murdered byCatherine's successor. His suspicions were notentirely baseless for there had been at least twosuch murders in recent memory. Peter III andIvan VI had both been done to death at theinstigation of Paul's own mother. Nor were hisworries lighter when he came to the throne for hecontinued to fear a usurper. He became increasinglyeccentric and his form of government was basedon a never-ending series of personal ukaz;y, manyliberal but most of them repressive. Althoughhardly the champion of the serfs, he attempted torestrict many of the abuses against them, and thisdispleased the landowning nobility. He made nosecret of his dislike of the regiments of the guard,and gave preference to officers of the Gatchinacorps. He enforced the Gatchina methods andstyle of uniform on the rest of the army. Many ofhis actions were rational and some of them werejust, but he alienated too many factions and hefailed to make good his threat, in the interest ofhis own safety, to exile the imperial guard regi­ments to the distant outposts of the Empire. Hewas subject, too, to great rages which made hisfamily and suite fear him.

Russia's foreign policy under Paul, although notirrational, became increasingly incoherent. Napo­leon had, on his way to Egypt, seized Malta fromthe Grand Master of the Order of St John. Thisincensed Paul and in 1798 he accepted, from theVolhynian Priory of the Maltese Order, theGrand Mastership, introducing the new titles andbadges of the Order into the guards cavalrycorps. Great Britain succeeded in persuading Paulto enter the Second Coalition arrayed against theFrench. Paul gave a stately home and generouspension to Louis XVIII, the exiled Bourbon Kingof France, against the time when he should bereturned to his rightful throne, and since Pauldisapproved of Prussian reluctance to join thecoalition, he broke off diplomatic relations withBerlin and concentrated an army under Kamenskyagainst the Prussian border. In 1799 he recalledSuvorov from retirement and sent Russian troops

Ornate bridle and curb piece used by a cavalryofficer of the guard; a cuirass and a cavalryovertunic, 1797-1801

to Italy to help the Austrians against the French;he gave Suvorov the new rank of Generalissimus,to befit his new dignity as the Allied Commander­in-Chief.

Suvorov, having crossed the Alps, took Milanand Turin and won the battles of Trebbia andNovi, preparatory to invading France. But, as hecould not agree with the Austrians, he movednorth into Switzerland to join a second Russianarmy under Korsakov. Meanwhile, however, theItalian Jew, Massena, formerly in the ranks of theSardinian Army but now a high-ranking generalin the French revolutionary forces, defeatedKorsakov near Zurich before Suvorov couldjoin him.

This moved Paul to anger. He recalled Suvorovand made a break with Austria as the author ofhis misfortunes. He quarrelled with England overthe British occupation of Malta and returned tothe policy initiated by Catherine the Great in theearliest days of the Revolutionary War, signingwith Sweden and Denmark a treaty of armedneutrality directed against Britain. The Bourbonpretender Louis XVIII was flung out of his

15

Left: a non-conunissioned officer of the BelonissianHussars; right: a soldier of Tatarsky and a non-eotn­tnissioned officer of Utovsky (Uthuanian) Cavalry

grace-and-favour estate at Mitau. By 180 I it wasimpossible to tell who was regarded by Paul as hisfoe. Theoretically he was at war with France andhe had broken off diplomatic relations withAustria. But he was ready to fight his ally England,and had sent 20,000 Cossacks eastward to invadeIndia.

In March 180 I, by a palace coup in whichPahlen, the Governor-General 'of St Petersburg,and a small group of army officers together withthe Semenovsky Guards took part, Paul wasmurdered. He was deposed, it is believed, withthe foreknowledge of his son and successorAlexander.

C]tie rJIrmy under~/extlnder I

Alexander had been a constant visitor to Gatchinawhen his father was still a grand duke, and he andhis two brothers, Constantine and Nicholas, were

16

fascinated by the drill-ground. One of theirgreatest pleasures was in the shouting of military­style orders and in parades and uniforms. Likehis father, Alexander became increasingly underthe influence of Alexei Andreevich Arakcheev,an artillery officer who had come to the Imperialnotice when at Gatchina. Arakcheev was a brutaland blunt martinet, although probably an honestman, with considerable organizing abilities.Being indifferent to the opinion of others, indeedgoing so far as to revel in his unpopularity, hewas blamed by the army for all Alexander'sdeficiencies.

Alexander himself was friendly and modest,going to great lengths to avoid giving offence, andhaving actually contrived, when Catherine wasalive, to remain on good terms with both theEmpress and his father. Exuding charm andgrace, he was a secretive dissimulator and anaccomplished actor, somewhat weak and vacil­lating, forming his opinions slowly and trusting noone. Like his father, he could be both autocraticand liberal. His mind was continually troubled,possibly on account of his own part in the deposing

of his father. Like many of weak will, he could beextraordinarily obstinate.

Alexander wanted peace and he arrangedtcrms with both the British and the French. TheRussian relationship was uneasy, however, withboth of these powers. He flirted with Prussiawhich had not been at war since 1795. TheEuropean peace was broken by the kidnappingin 1804 of the Duc d'Enghien on Baden territoryby French agents, and his subsequent murder.For Napoleon rejected the Russian note of protestwith an insulting inquiry as to 'when Alexanderproposed to bring to justice the murderers of thelate Tsar'. The French crossed Prussian territory,without leave, on their way to invade Austria.

The Austrians were defeated at Vim in Octoberof 1805, and the Russian forces under PrinceKutuzov, a soldier of popularity and some dis­tinction who had served under Suvorov at Izmailfifteen years before, retired into Moravia. Napo­leon was already in Vienna and Alexander madethe journey to Olmtitz in Moravia to meetFrancis I of Austria and insist that the cautiousKutuzov stop his withdrawal and bring his troopsto battle. Kutuzov sulkily declined, and had theconduct of operations taken from his hands byAlexander and the Austrians.

The battle at Austerlitz began at 9.00 on awintry December day and lasted only two hours.It was Napoleon's boast that out of thirty or morebattles, Austerlitz was the easiest and mostdecisive of his career. The Russian troops ranaway, cursing the Austrians as they did so, andboth Alexander and Francis had to flee for theirlives. This was Alexander's lesson that war wasnot to be learned on the parade-ground and thathe himself was without ability as a field com­mander. After the battle he wept, blamingKutuzov for not having insisted more strongly onavoiding battle.

Russian troops were not temperamentallysuited to fighting alongside allies, being by naturesuspicious and obstinate to the point of arrogance.An earlier Anglo-Russian expeditionary force inthe Low Countries had been a failure. A secondAnglo-Russian expedition made up of 5,000British and 13,000 Russians, together with aNeapolitan army of 40,000, had more fortune in1805 in that they cleared the French from Italy.

By then Austria was out of thc war and Massenareturned to the south, overrunning the whole ofthe Italian mainland by the spring of 1806. Theexpeditionary force was evacuated.

Alexander's attention reverted once more toPrussia, with whom he concluded a secret agree­ment. On 26 September 1806 the King of Prussiasent an ultimatum to Napoleon demanding thatFrench troops quit German territory east of theRhine. Napoleon's reply was to march troopswhich inflicted twO successive defeats of thePrussian Army at lena and AuersUidt. On 25October Napoleon entered Berlin and Frenchtroops occupied Prussian Poland as far east asWarsaw. Russia was now directly vulnerable tothe French Army which had arrived at its frontier.On 26 December Bennigsen, a Hanoverian soldierof fortune in command of the Russian forces,repulsed a French foray near Warsaw.

Two months later Bennigsen met Napoleonagain at Preussisch-Eylau in East Prussia. Heclaimed a further repulse, whilc Napoleon

Troopers of the Kurlandsky and Pereyaslavsky DragoonRegiments, c. 1806

17

Snow leopard skin, worn by officers of theHussar Guard RegiDlent; (right) black silkfurnishings for the officer's charger, c. 1801

regarded the battle as a French victory. TheRussians had a numerical superiority yet theengagement cost them in casualties 26,000 dead.

The Russian position had been much weakenedby a new war against Turkey. Pru sia had beenoverrun by the French, except in the north-eastcorner. The British subsidy to Russia was inade­quate and there was a lack of mutual trustbetween London and St Petersburg. Alexanderwas particularly irritated by British reluctance(because of the Prussian seizure of Hanover) toafford any assistance to Prussia and London'srefusal to land British troops in northern Europe.Meanwhile Bennigsen's 50,000 Russians gavebattle at Friedland in June 1807, but they weredecisively defeated by less than half their numberof Frenchmen. Alexander asked Napoleon forpeace.

The Treaty ofTilsit had far-reaching provisions.A new state, the Polish Grand Duchy of Warsaw,was resurrected with the King of Saxony as itshead. The Polish province of Bialystok went toRussia. Prussia lost its Polish territories and alllands west of the Elbe. The rest of Europe was

18

to be drawn into a coalition against Great Britain.In 1809 Russia, encouraged by Napoleon to do so,went to war with Sweden and occupied andannexed Swedish Finland. The war with Turkeyin the Balkans dragged on until 1812. OnlyAustria dared to take up arms again againstNapoleon.

C]lie I3tg ~mistice

Having asked Alexander in vain for a Romanovas his new bride, Napoleon turned to the AustrianHabsburgs. It appeared that the relations betweenFrance and Austria would henceforth be on amore friendly footing. Alexander, however, wassuspicious of the Franco-Austrian accord and,fearing dissension among his Polish subjects, wassensitive to the new Polish Duchy set up byNapoleon on the Russian frontier. Russia was themain loser by the new anti-British alliance sincethe main importer of the Empire's goods wasBritain, and the loss of customs revenue to the

government contributed to the steady depreciationof the currency. At the end of 1810, in a fit ofpique against the French, St Petersburg repliedby the imposition of a heavy tax on the importa­tion by land of luxury goods, which in fact weremainly of French origin. Paris protested. InDecember of that year and during January of 181 I

Napoleon annexed to France the whole of thenorth German coast, including the Duchy ofOldenburg, which belonged by marriage toAlexander's sister, Catherine.

During 181 I the uneasy truce with Napoleonbecame more strained and Alexander lookedabout for allies. The Austrian royal house, linkedby marriage with France, was for the momentdisinterested. Prussia was too fearful. Russia did,however, improve its relations with Sweden.Meanwhile Kutuzov, in command in the south,was ordered to come to terms with the Turks. Bythe Treaty of Bucharest, Alexander abandonedthe Serbs to their fate and gave up his conquestsof Wallachia and Moldavia, keeping only Bess­arabia, the eastern portion of Moldavia betweenthe Dniester and the Pruth. Alexander thenlooked to Britain for another alliance.

Alexander had made use of the remaining twoyears of peace to improve the efficiency of hisarmed forces. In 1810 Arakcheev left the WarMinistry to undertake the reorganization of theartillery and the supply of all warlike equipment.His successor as War Minister was a Livonian,Barclay de Tolly.

There had been some change in the field group­ing, in accordance with the Napoleonic pattern,the tactical formation now being the division.The infantry of the field army was, by 1812, madeup of 170 regiments of 5 I I battalions, there beingthree battalions to the regiment. 2 On mobiliza­tion, however, this number of active field batta­lions was due to be reduced to 40 I, since thesecond battalion in each regiment was to findreinforcements to bring the first and third batta­lions to full strength and throw off an elitecompany, these companies being grouped intonew grenadier battalions. The remnant of thesecond battalion became the depot battalion forthe mobilized regiment of two field battalions. Aguard battalion at war strength numbered 764men, and one of the line 732.

Banners awarded to the Tavrichesky Grenadiers(top), and local district troops, c. 1800

The 170 first-line infantry regiments wereformed into twenty-eight divisions (six regimentsto the division of which two were light infantry).Of these twenty-eight divisions, eighteen weredeployed in the west, four in Moldavia, three inFinland, two in the Caucasus, and one on theBlack Sea.

In addition to the 284,000 first-line infantry ofthe field force there were 103 garrison infantrybattalions and 2 I 6 infantry battalions of thereserve, in all another 230,000 men, organised intoeighteen reserve divisions, numbered from 30 to 47inclusive. These divisions had a command andadministrative, rather than a tactical, function;for the battalions were drafted into the field armyafter the war started, and the reserve divisionseventually disbanded.

In 181 I there were seventy regiments of regularcavalry, totalling 440 squadrons, of which eighty­one squadrons formed the depot squadrons intime of war.3 The remaining 359 field formationsquadrons numbered 49,000 horse. These troops,including the guard and Ukrainian Cossacks, wereregular cavalry. The Emperor could easily raise,

19

A cuirassier's arltls and accoutreltlents, c. 1801, and (right)a cuirassier officer's cuirass, showing the breast-badgeand broadsword

however, a further 100,000 cavalry from theCossack hosts, at least eighty-two regiments fromthe Don, ten from the Black Sea, fifteen from theUkraine, and more elsewhere. I t was to theseso-called 'cavalry irregulars', particularly to theCossacks of the Don, that Kutuzov owed much ofhis success during the French retreat in 1812 and181 3.

There were twelve regular cavalry regiments inMoldavia, two in Finland, and three in theCaucasus. The remaining fifty-three were in thewest.

The artillery totalled 159 batteries/companiesof which thirty-two were depot companies.4 Eachcompany of foot artillery was 250 men strong andwas equipped with twelve guns. Horse artillerybatteries usually varied by designation. Heavybatteries had four twenty-pounders and eighttwelve-pounders, while light batteries had fourtwelve-pounders and eight six-pounders. Divi­sional artillery brigades normally had one heavyand one light company.

The engineer corps comprised twenty-fourcompanies of pioneers and the same number of

20

pontoon companies which, by 1812, had beentaken over from the artillery.

In all the Russian Army in 1812 numbered700,000 men not including the Cossack hosts orthe opolchenie, the home guard militia.

In the early summer of 1812 the troops inwestern Russia were deployed in three armies.The first, under Barclay de Tolly (who stillretained his post as Minister of War), of sixinfantry corps and four of cavalry, was made upof 127,000 men and 500 guns. The second, underBagration, of two infantry corps and two ofcavalry, had only 45,000 men and 200 guns, whilethe third, under Tormazov, of three small corpsand a corps of cavalry, totalled 46,000 men and160 guns. 5

C]1ie 'Warof1812

The last approach to reason was made by theTsar to the French Ambassador, General Lauri­ston, in April of that year. Alexander said that he

was prepared to accept the indemnity offered byFrance to the Duke of Oldenburg and wouldmodify the Russian customs system which dis­criminated against French imports. On the otherhand, he insisted on freedom to trade with neutralsas he thought fit and, fearful for his own security,demanded that French troops should evacuateSwedish Pomerania and Prussia. He went so faras to say that if there was any reinforcement ofthe French garrisons on the Vistula he wouldconsider this to be an act of war.

Napoleon made no reply to these demands butkept up diplomatic activity merely to gain time,for he had already decided to invade Russia. InMay the French Emperor arrived in Dresdenpreparatory to taking over the field command.Alexander was already at Vilna with his armies.

Against the Russian covering forces of about225,000, Napoleon's Grand Army numbered over500,000, but only a half were Frenchmen. Theremainder of the force were Germans, Poles,I talians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Croats,many of them doubtful and unwilling allies. On24June 1812, without a formal declaration ofwar,the Grand Army crossed the Niemen on its wayinto Russia.

Alexander's presence at the field headquarterswas an embarrassment to the Russian High Com­mand. No Russian Commander-in-Chief hadbeen appointed. Kutuzov was still in the southand Alexander had heartily disliked him from theday of Austerlitz. In default, the mantle fell onBarclay de Tolly, the War Minister who, at thistime, was also the commander of 1 Army, by farthe largest in the field. But, as the Emperor'sminister, he had to refer all his orders to Alexander.

Alexander lacked a practical mind, and waslater to become obsessed with mysticism. He wascontinually seeking a new revolutionary approachto warfare and a solution of the military problemsof the day. These were provided by Pfuel, aPrussian colonel in the Russian service who, muchto the irritation of Barclay de Tolly's staff,advocated a huge defensive bastion to be set upon the banks of the Drissa. Alexander had been soimpressed with the proposal that thousands ofworkmen had been employed excavating earth­works. The ideas and the defences had no bearingon the war. Arakcheev, Balashev, and Shishkov

Non-e:oDunissioned officer and pdvates of 24, 25, and 26Eger Reghnents, in walking out, undress, and paradeunif'onn, c. 1807

petitioned the Tsar that he should leave the armyand return to his capital for, they rightly argued,the supreme command should be given only to asubject whom the sovereign would be free todismiss, should it be necessary. Otherwise themonarch would bear the responsibility, in the eyesof his peoples, for defeats which none could avoid.Remembering Austerlitz, Alexander left, firstlyfor Moscow and then for St Petersburg.

Barclay sent Wittgenstein's corps towards theBaltic to cover the Dvina and approaches to thecapital, and Napoleon followed suit by detaching70,000 men to the north under Macdonald andOudinot. These troops formed what was in effectanother theatre. An Austrian corps faced Torma­zov in Volhynia. Yet further to the south AdmiralChichagov with 35,000 men was still in Moravia.The main campaign was to be fought in westernand central Russia, to the north of the PripetMarshes.

As Barclay showed no inclination to stand andfight, but retired steadily eastwards, Napoleontried to cut off Bagration and prevent his rejoin­ing Barclay by thrusting Davout's I French Corps

21

Trtunpeter of the Marlupol Hussar Regianent, c. I80I

22

between the two armies. It seems likely thatBagration would have been destroyed if JeromeBonaparte, Napoleon's brother, had acted withmore dispatch. As it was, Bagration escaped bymarching steadily to the south-east, and after acircuitous passage he joined Barclay in Smolenskat the beginning of August.

Early in July, when Bagration believed himselfto be isolated and surrounded, he wrote toArakcheev urging in the bluntest terms thatBarclay should attack in the centre and not relyon the defences of 'Mr Pfuel', for these, saidBagration, would surely be outflanked. Con­demning the Russians for re.treating like Prussians(the Prussians were held in little regard as soldiersat this time), Bagration used strong language,judging, but not naming, the man who orderedthe withdrawal as a traitor to the Tsar and thecountry. Bagration had little idea of the enemystrength facing the Russians; he himself believedit insignificant. In fact there can be no doubt thatBarclay, and Kutuzov after him, were right inwithdrawing. But the discontent that Bagrationvoiced was widespread, and made the corpscommander Constantine, Alexander's brother,ask whether Barclay, intent on sacrificing thewhole Empire, was bound for the White Sea.

In the second week in August Napoleon arrivedat Smolensk where Barclay was drawn up await­ing him. By then the strength of the French forcehad shrunk to about 200,000 men, thinned by thecorps detached to the north and south, by themany stragglers and deserters, particularly amongthe non-French element, and by heat and sicknesscasualties. Some fighting had taken place on thedistant northern and southern flanks, with resultsby no means unfavourable to the Russians, forWittgenstein gave a good account of himself atthe battle of Polotsk while Tormazov pinned downthe Austrian corps as well as Reynier's Frenchcorps sent to extricate it. Against his inclinationand judgement Barclay decided to give battle.

Shortly before the Battle of Smolensk wasfought, General Sir Robert Wilson, with theBritish Military Commission serving in Russia,arrived at the scene of operations, and he has leftsome revealing descriptions of his impressions ofthe Russian soldier at this time. Wilson might bejudged to be a Russophil, for he could hardly have

Cannonier and company officer of foot artillery, 1808

survived in this appointment if he were not. Someof his comment probably has an underlying pro­paganda theme in that it was meant to endear theRussian ally to a British public, which in the pastwas none too sure whether the Russian was friendor foe.

Wilson describes the Russian infantrymen as'between the ages of eighteen and forty, short,stocky and strong, inured to weather and hard­ships and the scantiest of food, accustomed tolaborious toils and the carriage of heavy burthens;ferocious but disciplined; obstinately brave,patient, docile and obedient; devoted to theirsovereign, their chief and their country'. All ofthis was undoubtedly true.'The Russian soldier, continues Wilson, isextremely subordinate and attached to hisofficer, who treats him with a peculiar kindnessand not as a machine, but as a reasonable being.Punishment is not so frequent as in other armies,nor is it so very severe. The Russian officer,although frequently making the greatest physicalexertion, is, however, inclined to indolent habitswhen not on duty, he loves his sleep after foodand dislikes to walk or ride far. No troops canand do defend so well in retreat.'

A miner and a pionier from 1 Pionier Regiment, c. 1806

Another Englishman, Robert Porter, was muchintrigued by what he saw of the free Cossacks ofthe Don Host, in which each trooper furnished athis own expense horse, uniform, and arms. Ofthem Porter says:'Their persons, air, and appointments and theanimals on which they are mounted, seem sototally at variance, that you can hardly supposea reason for so unequal a union. The men arerobust and fit for service; their horses appearcompletely the reverse; mean in shape andslouching in motion, every limb speaks oflanguor and every moment you expect to seethem drop down dead under their heavyburthen; but so false are these shows, that thereis not a more hardy animal existing; it will travelincalculable journeys and remain exposed to theheat or cold, day and night, without manifestingany sense of inconvenience. They never knowthe luxury of a snug stable and a well litteredbed, nor ever enjoy the comfort of a currycombor a wisp of straw. Their sustenance is of themost scanty sort.'

23

:fromc:Smolenskto CJ3orodino

Since Barclay was insistent that he should firstsecure his withdrawal route to Moscow beforeaccepting battle, he dispatched Bagration's2 Army to Dorogobuzh, about eight miles furthereast. Raevsky's 7 Corps inside Smolensk wasrelieved by Dokhturov's 6 Corps.

On the afternoon of 17 August Napoleondirected Ney, Davout, and Poniatowsky againstthe defences in front of the suburbs and beforeevening had reached the city walls. By nightfallmuch of Smolensk was on fire and Russian losseshad been heavy - estimated at 20,000. Barclay deTolly gave the order for the retreat to be resumedand by daybreak the Russian columns werealready several miles to the east. The next day,on the Valutina plateau due east of Smolensk,Barclay was attacked again by Ney. IfJunot hadco-operated in the outflanking movement Barclaywould have lost a large part of his remaining100,000 men.

Barclay de Tolly was in a precarious personalposition vis-a-vis both Russian generals and troops.Although nominally in command, he was juniorto Bagration. The Russian is chauvinistic and tooready to cry treason, and no one is more sus­picious of strangers and foreigners. As a Livonian,Barclay was regarded as a foreigner, for it is saidthat he was more fluent in German than inRussian. There were of course a great number ofLivonian and German officers in the service of theTsar, some of them corps commanders, so thatBagration, Barclay's most outspoken critic, whobore the non-Russian title of the royal house ofGeorgia, complained that 'there were so manyGermans that a Russian could not breathe'. Andso on 29 August Prince Kutuzov, a man of greatpopularity in the Russian Army, arrived to takeover the post of Commander-in-Chief in the West.His arrival restored, albeit temporarily, the moraleof the tired and dispirited troops. Barclay returnedto the command of I Army.

Kutusov, who was both cautious and strong-

24

Kettle-drununers from the Sibirsky, Orenburgsky, and

Ingermanlandsky Dragoon Regiments, c. 1801

willed, had in his time been a commander ofdistinction. His name was linked with Suvorov,dead twelve years before, and he had seen longservice against the French and the Turks. But nowhe was a few years short of his seventieth birthday,sick and prematurely old. Too gross to sit a horse,he travelled everywhere by carriage, and hisindifferent health caused him to sleep eighteenhours a day.

Napoleon, too, had lost much of his fire and,as an Emperor, had lost touch with some of therealities of war. His main error, however, lay inhis lack of a political aim, for in invading Russiahe had intended no more than teaching Alexandera sharp military lesson that the man of destinycould not be defied. He had hoped to do this inone short campaign, ·possibly in one or twopitched battles. Napoleon believed, in companywith many European statesmen that as soon asthe Grand Army had made a deep penetrationinto Russia, Alexander would submit, particularlyif Moscow appeared to be threatened. But, in fact,the French Emperor had not been able to bringthe elusive Barclay to battle, except for the un-

Ryadovoi, Guards Cavalry Corps, everyday unHonn, 1799""1800

MICHAel YQUENS A

B

1

1 Fusilier, Kievsky Grenadier RegiJnent,winter field service uniforlD, 1797-1801

2 Nestroevoi Serzhant, Infantry RegilDent,walking-out dress, 1786-«)6

3 St Petersburg Grenadier, winter generalservice uniforlD, 1808

3

MICHAEL YOUENS

MICHAel YOUENS

1

1 Officer of Horse Artillery, SUIl1mergeneral service uniform, 1797-1801

2 Infantry General, summer parade uniform,1808-10

3 Unter-Ofitser, SUII1sky Hussars, summerparade dress, 1797-1801

2

f

c

1 BOD1bardir, Foot Artillery,sununer field serviceunifonn, 1808-9

2 Unter-Ofitser, 8 EgerReghnent, winterparade unifonn, 1802

3 Ryadovoi of Uhlans,Tsarevich KonstantinPavlovich's ReglD1ent,undress uniforD1, 1803-0

2

MICHAEL YOUENS

MICHAEL YOUENS

Litavrshchik, Glukhovsky Cuirassiers, cerelnomal parade uniform, I802-3

E

1 Konduktor, Engineer Corps, everydayumdfornn, 1812-16

2 Trooper, Tartar Horse Reginnent, winterfield service umdfornn, 1803-6

3 Unter-Ofitser, Balaclava Greek InfantryBattalion, cerennonial dress, 1797-1830

MICHAel YOU ENS

MICHAEL YOUENS

1

1 Unter-Ofitser, z4 Eger Regiment, walking­out dress, 1806-7

2 Ober-Ofitser, Kirnburnsky Dragoons,winter parade uniform, 1812-14

3 Ryadovoi, LiHyandsky (Livonian Horse­Eger Regiment, winter parade uniform,1813-14

2

G

H

:I

:I Bombardir, Horse Artillery, winterparade uniform, :18:14-:16

2 Pontomer, Pontoon Regiment, fieldservice unifonn, :1805-'7

3 Unter-Ofitser, Astrakhan Cuirassiers,winter cerelDomal parade uqiforlD,:18:12-:14

3

MICHAEl VOUENS

A hussar's head-dress, a saddle-cloth, and a hussargeneral's head-dress pbune, c. I80I

satisfactory engagement at Smolensk, and he hadwasted precious weeks awaiting in vain the peace­parlementaires from St Petersburg. Not until24 August, very late in the Russian campaigningseason, did he decide at last to make for Moscow.

Kutuzov had received some 30,000 reinforce­ments, many from the opolchenie of very indifferentquality, and he decided to give battle nearBorodino on the main highway to Moscow. TheFrench forces had dwindled to about 125,000 andby now were slightly outnumbered by the Russians.After a preliminary engagement on 5 September,the main battle began two days later and lastedthroughout daylight. The French were left inpossession of the field but their losses amountedto 30,000. Before the end of that day GeneralRapp, already wounded, commented to theEmperor that he 'would be forced to send in theguard'. To which Napoleon replied that he would'take good care not to' as he did not want itdestroyed. By not committing the guard Napoleonmay have permitted Kutuzov to escape. But in theevent, the decision was of relatively little import­ance, for Napoleon himself sealed the fate of the

Grand Army by remaining too long in Moscow.The weather did the rest, not Kutuzov.

OfBorodino Murat said to Ney, on the morningafter the battle, that he had 'never seen anythinglike it for artillery fire, the armies being so closetogether that most ofit was grape'. And, comment­ing yet more soberly, added 'but the Russiansretired in good order'.

On 13 September Kutuzov held the celebratedcouncil of war at Fili and decided to give upMoscow rather than destroy his army. He leftthe old capital, moving off south-eastwards on theRyazan road. French troops entered the city thenext day.

c%oscowAlexander had decreed for the raising of a newmilitia for the defence of St Petersburg andMoscow and for the creation of a new reserve indepth based on Nizhnii Novgorod. The threedistricts raised, respectively, 25,000, 125,000, and

25

Non-conurUssioned officer and trooper from the Litovsky­Tatarsky (Lithuanian-Tartar) Regiment of Horse, inwinter uniform, c. 1801

40,000 men. By far the majority of the recruitswere serfs, and these took up arms either willinglyor without complaint.

The Governor-General of Moscow, CountRostopchin, had been responsible for raising thegreater part of this militia from provinces as farafield as Moscow, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, YaroslavlVladimir, Ryazan, and Kaluga, and in an effort tosustain the morale of his new levies had depictedKutuzov's battles as victories. As the enemyapproached Moscow he assured the soldierpeasantry that the city would be defended andnot given up. Rostopchin never forgave Kutuzovfor his decision to abandon the city.

The day after the occupation of Moscownumbers of fires broke out. Fanned by a strongnorth wind, they spread rapidly and gutted wholedistricts. French troops brought them undercontrol; but two days later the fires flared upagain. At first the Russians blamed the Frenchfor wanton destruction. Yet the evidence, suchas it is, is more inclined to the view that the fireswere deliberately started by Russian incendiaries.The French certainly had little motive for destroy-

26

ing the city, since they required the supplies andshelter which only Moscow could give. TheRussians, and particularly the Cossacks, on theother hand, traditionally burned or destroyedanything which might be of use to the enemy.According to contemporary French reports mostof the Russian fire-fighting equipment hadalready been removed and among the few arson­ists taken in the act were Russian police officials.

The fire has never been satisfactorily explained,but the likelihood is that it was Russian work,whether instigated by Rostopchin or not. Morethan three-quarters of the buildings were gutted.

The discipline of the French soldiery and theirallies broke down shortly after entering thesuburbs and Moscow was given over to plunderand looting. The occupying troops often behavedbadly to the remaining inhabitants, and therewas a sharp increase in the numbers of Frenchmenmurdered by civilians.

Napoleon, foolishly believing that the destruc-'tion of Moscow had strengthened his own bargain­ing power, sent two further messages to the Tsarin St Petersburg, asking for an end to hostilities.Alexander, although deeply depressed, remainedobdurate and ignored the notes. For he had lostmuch popularity in Russia, not on account of thedefeats or his unwillingness to treat with theenemy, but because of his earlier friendship andalliance with the French. Napoleon was noteasily discouraged and on 5 October he sentGeneral Lauriston, the former French Ambassadorto St Petersburg, to parley with Kutuzov outsidethe lines in what was in effect no-man's-land.Kutuzov would have done so, but General SirRobert Wilson, who was present, protested. Andso Lauriston had to make his way to Kutuzov todeliver a note which was forwarded to the Tsar.Alexander's only reaction was a letter of censureto Kutuzov and Bennigsen, forbidding all contactwith the enemy.

Meanwhile, as Wilson noted with satisfactionsome days later, 'regiments of Don Cossackscontinued to pour in. Such a reinforcement ofcavalry was perhaps never equalled'. And theybrought with them abundant supplies.

Kutuzov's decision to move off to the south ofMoscow, instead of northwards to Tver fromwhere he might cover the route to St Petersburg,

Left: a field officer of the EkateriDoslavsky Cuirassiersin parade dress, 1814; right: a trooper of the GlukhovskyCuirassiers in undress unifornt, of a pattern which wasto rentam in use for over fifty years

turned out to be a masterly one. It was unexpectedby the French. Moreover, Kutuzov secured easyaccess to the Tula armament works, the Donterritories and the rich fqod-producing areas ofthe south. After moving towards Ryazan heturned sharply westwards and, after a few days'forced march, arrived at Tarutino on the Kalugaroad in the area to the south-west of Moscow.There he was suitably poised to threaten thewestward communications of the French. On18 October Kutuzov surprised Murat in a sharpengagement near Tarutino, inflicting on him4,000 casualties.

On that day Napoleon gave the order toevacuate Moscow and begin the homewardmarch.

There were neither shelter nor supplies inMoscow for the 100,000 troops of the GrandArmy to winter in the city. Nor could Napoleondirect the affairs of state of his huge empire fromthis eastern outpost. So admitting failure, hedecided to return, using a more southerly routeon which, he hoped, supplies might be available.

The French imperial forces moved south-

westwards down the Moscow-Kaluga road buttheir progress was barred by a Russian force inMaloyaroslavets, and the fighting which followedwas of such intensity as to discourage Napoleonfrom following the southern route. He then turnedback northwards along the Smolensk road, theaxis along which he had come, a route which hadbeen eaten bare of all supplies thirty miles to thenorth and south.

Wilson, much encouraged by the Russiandefence at Maloyaroslavets, exhorted Kutuzovto fall on the marching French columns anddestroy Napoleon between Vyazma and Smolensk.But Kutuzov, acting either according to his owninclinations or to political instructions from StPetersburg, would have none of it. For he toldWilson that 'the destruction of Napoleon and hisarmy would be of no benefit to Russia or to therest of the European continent ... only Britainwould benefit'. This was a rather roundabout wayof saying that it was in Russia's interest to preserveits own armies, the better to be represented at thefinal peace. Henceforth Kutuzov was shortly tohand over the conduct of operations to Platov

27

Trooper and officer from His Majesty's CuirassierRegiment, c. 1801

and his Don Cossacks, a cheap and easily replace­able source of soldiers. Kutuzov was content thathis regular forces should make flank marches,doing little more than shepherding the enemyout of Russia. Wisely, he fought only when itsuited him.

CJhe'Destructionrfthe grand~my

When the spearhead of the Grand Army leftMoscow it was 100,000 strong. Except for that ofthe guard, discipline had already been eroded bythe loss of good leaders and, more particularly,by the demoralizing effect of looting and excesses.Caravans of plunder were included in the with­drawing columns. Very soon there was a shortageof food which could only be met by slaughteringdraught animals. The heavy autumn rains turnedthe roads into a morass, in which animals foun­dered and artillery and carts had to be abandoned.

28

The Cossacks were particularly daring andtroublesome and it was dangerous to leave thehighway in search of shelter or food. Scores ofpartisan bands raided and butchered isolateddetachments. Terrible atrocities took place, thesight of which so sickened Wilson that he feltcompelled to protest to the Tsar. Yet the Frenchthemselves were by no means guiltless and Russiansoldier prisoners were done to death in theirthousands when they could no longer be fed orguarded.

At the beginning of November Napoleonreached Smolensk, where Victor's reserve armyheld the reinforcements and stores. The with­drawing columns had already been reduced to40,000 men. Even so the stores were not sufficient,for the undisciplined mass of soldiery plunderedthe depots, emptying the base in a few days. Thebitter cold sapped the French strength and in thefurther battles about Krasny Napoleon sufferedmore serious losses. When the Grand Army fellback on the Berezina it was scarcely 20,000

strong.Meanwhile, on the far northern flank, Witt­

genstein's corps attacked Macdonald near Polotsk,drove him back to the south-west, and took theFrench military base at Vitebsk. In the southAdmiral Chichagov had marched from Moraviaand, joining up with Tormazov, moved north­wards, seizing the great French supply base atMinsk. Chichagov then attempted to cut off thewithdrawal route of Napoleon's centre column byoccupying the crossing-places on the Berezina atBorisov. From the third week of November on­wards the Russian Army began seriously to disputeFrench movement, Wittgenstein and Chichagovdoing their utmost to destroy the remnants ofthose troops who had withdrawn from Moscow.But Kutuzov, impervious to Wilson's anger,displayed his customary inertia in failing to cometo the support of his countrymen, excusin.g himselfon the grounds that NapOleon's forces were stillformidable and that it was foolish to risk defeatwhen cold and hunger would finish off theFrenchmen anyway.

In the event, this is what happened. Theweather suddenly became colder. Wittgensteinand Chichagov, unsupported by Kutuzov, wereunable to drive in Victor's rearguards, but cold

Officer and trunlpeter-nlajor of the Odessa Hussars,c. 1803

and panic destroyed most of Napoleon's forcesand camp-followers waiting to cross the Berezina.Napoleon left for Paris.

In all about 400,000 of the original half-million­strong Grand Army failed to return from Russia.Russian losses were probably in the region of aquarter of a million.

CJfie endofthe~oleonic 'Wars

Kutuzov, true to his nature, was disinclined topursue the French beyond the Russian borders.Alexander, however, insisted that Russian forcesshould enter Germany, for the Tsar had come tolook upon himself as the saviour of Europe.

In December 1812 Yorck's Prussian troops,without authority from the King of Prussia, wentover from Macdonald's French corps to theRussians. Prussia welcomed the entry of Russiantroops as liberators from the French yoke. The

Grenadiers of the Liftyandsky Inspectorate of the Tav­richesky Grenadier Repent, c. 1805

timid monarch Frederick William was forced tofollow and, in the following March, declared waron France. Kutuzov took command of a Russo­Prussian army, until his death in April, when hewas succeeded by Wittgenstein. Only westernGermany and the Rhineland remained toNapoleon.

By April, however, Napoleon had taken to thefield again. At the beginning of May he wonLiHzen, driving Russians and Prussians backbehind the Elbe. Three weeks later he defeatedthem again at Bautzen, but this time the Russiansyielded the field in good order and were shortlyready for battle once more. Wittgenstein lost hiscommand to Barclay de Tolly.

Austria meanwhile used its good offices toattempt to arrive at a peace settlement. Napoleonwas willing to talk, since every day gainedstrengthened his position. By August it wasapparent that Napoleon was disinclined for peace,except on his terms, and war was resumed,Austria joined Russia and Prussia.

Napoleon won the two-day battle of Dresden,but a few days later Barclay won a victory at

29

Kulm. In October all three allies converged onLeipzig for the 'Battle of the Nations', on whichfield, between 16 and 18 October, Napoleon wasdecisively defeated.

On 30 March 1814 Alexander entered Paris.Napoleon abdicated on I I April and was exiledto Elba. In the final three-day campaign in 1815,which culminated in the Battle of Waterloo andthe end of Napoleon, neither Russian nor Austriantroops took part.

which had ten and Ukrainian Cossacks which hadeight. )

4. Since 1806 the artillery brigade had been takeninto use. The 1812 Russian artillery strength was:Guard, one brigade of two horse batteries and fourfoot companies; Line, twenty-seven brigades of threecompanies; ten reserve brigades of four companies;four depot brigades of eight companies.

5. The deployment of Russian troops in the westin May 1812 (including a number of Cossack regi­ments called up from the hosts):

NOTES

I. In 1790 the field organization of the RussianArmy stood at:

50 REGIMENTS OF CA VALR Y

Horse Guards Cuirassiers 5Horse Grenadiers Carabineers 13

Horse-Eger 2 Hussars 14

Dragoons 14 Cossacks 6208 BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY

Guard Regiments 3 Eger Corps 10

Grenadier Regiments 13 Corps Battalions 22

Fusilier Regiments 56

2. In 1812 before the recommencement of the warthe 170 regiments of field infantry were made up ofsix guard regiments; fourteen grenadier regiments;ninety-six fusilier regiments; fifty light infantryregiments (not necessarily rifle-armed eger; fourmarine regiments.(First-line infantry numbered in all 286,000 men.)

3. The seventy Russian cavalry regiments com­prised six guard regiments: Gentlemen of the Guard;Horse Guards; Hussars; Dragoons; Lancers; andCossacks (all the guard regiments had five squadronsexcept for the Cossacks which had three); and sixty­four cavalry of the line regiments: eight cuirassiersregiments; thirty-six dragoon regiments; elevenhussar regiments; five lancer regiments; and fourUkrainian Cossack regiments. (Line regiments hadfive squadrons except for the hussars and lancers

30

I ARMY (BARCLAY DE

CORPS

IrifantryI Wittgenstein2 Baggovut3 Tuchkov4 Shuvalov5 Constantine6 DokhturovCavalryI Uvarov2 Korf3 Pahlen

Platov

2 ARMY (BAGRATION)

CORPS

Infantry7 Raevsky8 BorosdinCavalry4 Sievers

Ilovaisky

3 ARMY (TORMAZOV)

CORPS

InfantryKamenskyMarkovSakken (depot corps)CavalryLambert

TOLLY)

InfBn28

242423

27

24

InfBns2422

Inj.Bns12

2412

Cav.Sqns

16

8

48

20

8

20

2424

Cav.Sqns

820

Cav.Sqns

88

24

CossackRegts

3

CossackRegts

9

CassackRegts

9

Trooper in undress and Don-commissioned officer ineverday uniform of His Majesty's Cuirassier Guards,c. 1803

C]!ie 'PlatesA Ryadovoi (Trooper) of the Guards Cavalry Corps,

in everyday uniform, 1799-1800The guards cavalry was re-formed in April 1799into a composite guards cavalry corps under theauspices of the Grand Master of the Order ofSt John of Jerusalem, and the Cross of St Johnwas incorporated into the intricate cap-badge.The corps was designed to fill the very pressingneed for light cavalry and the troopers werearmed with the I797-pattern broadsword, a pairof pistols carried one each side in the pommelholsters of pig-leather (and known for this reasonas chushki or pigs), and a carbine carried on theright-hand side and suspended by a swivel to thebroad shoulder-belt of Russian red yuft leatherrunning over the trooper's left shoulder. Thesoldier carried the sabretache (lyadunka) commonlyworn at that time by sword-carrying infantry aswell as cavalry: the sabretache, like the porte-epee

and scabbard being in red moroccan leather,trimmed at the edges with raspberry-colouredsilk and carrying on it a brass and silver star withthe Order of the Cross. The horse is ridden, aswith all guards cavalry, on the curb rein of therather fierce long-cheeked Pelham bit, the lowerchain visible in the drawing being an ornamentand not the curb chain which fits, of course,closely under the horse's chin. The uniforminsignia is of particular interest, since its intro­duction commemorated the assumption by theTsar Paul I of the Grand Mastership of theMaltese Order of St John.

Bl Fusilier of the Kievsky Grenadier Regiment, winterfield service uniform, 1797-1801

The design of this uniform, which was in generaluse at about this time, was taken from that of theGatchina infantry. The.tunic (known as the caftanor mundir) was in the dark green colour traditionalto the Imperial forces, and the pattern was not

31

Insignia of rank (full dress) of a general; right: a general­adjutant, cuff and collar facings, 1808 and 1815

very different from that worn by the infantry ofthe Empress Catherine II. There were variationsby regiments; some wore white metal buttons anddifferent-coloured facings; some Moskovsky regi­ments wore the parallel cuff woollen braidvertically instead of horizontally; but in the mainthe general appearance for the line infantry tunicwas not greatly different. Underneath the tunicthe soldier wore a red neckerchief, a shirt orwaistcoat of the same colour as the pantaloons,usually white but in some regiments citron orstraw-coloured, and in cold weather a sheepskinhalf-jacket or shuba. Pantaloons were of wool inwinter and linen in summer and the spats orleggings were of strong, black, canvas-like cloth.All the leather equipment for the soldier'saccoutrements was of Russian yuft except for thepack which was of black calf-leather. The crossedwhite shoulder-straps were traditional to theRussian Army for nearly 150 years. The cap wasof a very old-fashioned pattern since discarded inwestern Europe, with a thin metal coveringbearing a crown, the inscription 'God is with us',and a large Imperial eagle. The musket was of

32

Prussian design, having a walnut butt and stock,brass and steel fittings with bayonet cleaning-rodand ramrod attached. In length it was one arshinfourteen vershkov (about fifty-two inches) or, withbayonet fixed, sixty-eight inches. It was inaccurateand had an effective range of less than 200 yards.The soldier carried a sword as well as a bayonetand a grey unlined winter greatcoat.

B2 Nestroevoi Serzhant (Non-combatant Sergeant) ofan Infantry Regiment, walking-out dress, I786-96

Non-combatant officials formed a considerablepart of the Tsarist Army and carried out a widevariety of functions. They manned the supply andtransport service both inside and outside theregiments; they were the collectors of the woundedand what passed in those days for the medicalorderlies, known as overseers (nadzirateli) of thewounded; they were the commissariat and thesutlers, the clerks, the draughtsmen, the artisans,and even the barbers; some were officials ofofficer grade, doctors, surgeons, auditors, pay-

Cavalry head-dress 1803-8. Left: a curassier trooper andnon-cotnnUssioned officer; right: a non-cotnnUssionedofficer of the Grebensky Cuirassiers

masters, apothecaries, and priests. For the otherranks, the pattern of the uniform was similar tothat shown here, always in green with the redcap, wearing the tesak sword and a.cane for thewalking-out dress. Although they were classifiedas non-combatants, they carried a musket or pistolin time of war. Non-combatant officials of officergrade wore the everyday green officer's uniform,but their swords were of a distinctive patternwith a straight blade and a single guard on thehilt.

BJ A St Petersburg Grenadier, winter general serviceuniform, 1808

By a new army regulation of 7 November 1807all heavy infantry, that is to say line and grena­diers, were to have distinguishing patches on thegreatcoat collar and the tunic collar and cuffs,denoting the seniority of each regiment in thedivision: red for the first, white for the second,yellow for the third, dark green with thin redpiping for the fourth, and sky-blue for the fifth.

In addition grenadier regiments were to wear adistinctive colour on the shoulder-straps (pagani) :yellow for St Petersburg, white for Siberia, andred for the remainder, the number of the division,where applicable, being shown on the grenadier'sshoulder-strap, in gold for officers and stitched forother ranks. The new pattern of uniform showedFrench Napoleonic and Prussian influences andwas to remain in service, little altered, for the nextforty years. The greatcoat, carried rolled over theshoulder in traditional fashion, was grey, thewinter woollen pantaloons being exchanged insummer for those of Flemish linen. At his back thegrenadier carried a sword and bayonet scabbard,a black leather iyadunka or cartridge-case bearingthe same regimental crest (the flaming grenades)as was worn on the cap, a black calf-leather packand a water-bottle. The re~ulation load for thepack was two spare shirts, one pair pantaloons,footwrappings (instead of socks), a soft forage-cap,spare boots, drawers, twelve flints for the flintlock,three brushes, two graters, a button-stick, pipeclayand boot polish, and a housewife. The summerweight of the pack was 25 lb, in winter 26t lb.

33

A non-coDlInissioned and a cosnpany officer of the~oskovskyGrenadiers,c. 1801

Cl Officer of Horse Artillery, summer general servzceuniform, 1797-1801

The artillery had not long before been acceptedas an arm of the field army rather than as auxili­aries, and the pattern of the uniform at this timeshowed the officer to be more like a countrysquire than a soldier. No epaulettes or badges wereworn and there was little about the wearer, exceptfor his straight and heavy cuirassier officer-patternsword to show that he was part of the Tsar'sregular forces. Mounted, of course, he looked alittle more imposing, usually on a bay chargerwith a dark green gilt-edged shabrack with theEmperor's monogram surmounted by a crownembroidered in gold in the corner and on theholster covers. The uniform of the horse artilleryat the time was almost identical to that of footartillery, but, by 1812, the horse artillery adopteda pattern of dress very like that of cuirassiers anddragoons with a high-crested tall helmet, a shortgreen tunic with a black high collar and cuffsedged in red, red and gold epaulettes, a whitecummerbund, and grey trousers buttoned at theside from hip to ankle bone.

34

C2 Infantry General, summer parade uniform, 1808-10The commanders of all formations of the size ofbrigade and above were part of the generalitet,another military collective borrowed from Prussia,although in the guard regimental commandersmight be major-generals. Generals were usuallyclassified, again German fashion, according toarm so that as full generals they were known asGenerals of Infantry or Artillery. The pattern ofthe collar and sleeve braid was usually common toarms, however, except that the General-Adjutanta designation bestowed also on admirals (whoshared the army ranking system), had his ownvery distinctive gold braid pattern.

C3 Unter-Ofitser (Junior Non-Commissioned Officer orCorporal) of the Sumsky Hussars, summer paradedress, 1797-1801

The Sumsky Hussars claimed that they were oneof the oldest regiments, if not the oldest, in theImperial Army, having been founded, accordingto tradition, in 165 I as the town Cossacks of thefrontier town of Sumy, near the Russo-Ukrainianborder about half-way between Kiev and Khar­kov. These town Cossacks were in fact regularforces and had no connection with the mainCossack hosts, and during their long life theSumsky cavalry had been Cossacks, dragoons,uhlans, and hussars. But even among hussarsthey were regarded as an aristocratic and exclusiveregiment and the regiment was often included inthe guard cavalry corps. In winter a blue-greycloak with fawn fur edging was worn, togetherwith heavier brick-red breeches with a white stripeat the edge. The long flowing shabrack saddle­blanket was blue-grey with white toothed edging,and bearing the monarch's monogram at the rear.

Dl Bombardir (Bombardier) of Foot Artillery, summerfield service uniform, 1808-9

A bombardir was later, like his British equivalent,a corporal of artillery, but at this time he was aprivate of artillery, a gunner, usually manning amortar or howitzer. Except that he carried no

Hussar regbnent, waist-belt, porte-epee, sabre and car­bine, pistol, shabrack and cartridge-ease, c. 1801.

musket his equipment and his load were the sameas that for an infantryman. Across his shoulderhe slung his greatcoat, and on his back he wore ablack calf-leather pack and water-bottle, a blacklyadunka ammunition case, and the tesak, astraight-bladed short sword. He appears to havecarried no other weapons, for French reportsdescribed Russian gunners defending their gunsagainst cavalry and infantry, using swords,rammers, and handspikes.

D2 Unter- 0jitser (Corporal) of 8 Eger Regiment, winterparade uniform, 1802

Light infantry of foot (eger from German Jager)usually wore a light green uniform, but the colourof the collar and sleeve varied according to thenumber of the regiment. Eger never wore thecoloured shoulder-straps (pogoni) as did theinfantry a.nd t.he other arms. The greatcoat was ofregulation ·grey, without shoulder-straps, and insummer all ranks wore white trousers ofunbleached

linen. Some regiments wore coloured piping onthe green pantaloons. As light infantry theirparade and skirmishing order was without packand other impedimenta, no sword was carriedother than a sword-bayonet similar to that in useelsewhere a century later. The firearm was ashort-barrelled ft.intlock with an eight-grooverift.ed bore, the bayonet mounting being on theright-hand side of the barrel. This rift.e was firstmanufactured as early as 1775. Eger rifle batta­lions provided the skirmishers and screens, relyingon their fleetness of foot and long-range fire, tocover the main body of infantry and artillery.

D3 Ryadovoi (Trooper) of Uhlans (His Royal Highnessthe Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich's Regiment),undress uniform, 1803-6

Uhlans were light cavalrymen, armed with lance,sword, and carbine, first used by the Turks andthen by the Poles in the Austrian service. Theirname in Turkish meant 'children', and can be

35

Left: an officer of the Taganrog Dragoons; right: a hussar'shead-dress, 1803

compared with the Italian infante in infantry.Uhlans were adopted by Austrian, Pole, German,and Russian. The honorary Colonel of the regi­ment, the Tsarevich Konstantin, son of the TsarPaul and brother of Alexander I, had taken up hisresidence in Warsaw where he was a greatadmirer of Polish troops and Polish women. Thistrooper is shown in undress, wearing the softforage-cap of the period. The dress for ceremonialparades was similar except that the forage-capwas replaced by the tall square uhlan shako, withglazed peak and high plume, and the blue overallsby dark grey pantaloons buttoned at the side fromhip to ankle. The usual two broad white leathershoulder-belts were worn, one on each shoulderand crossing at the chest, one for the sword andthe other for the carbine.

E Litavrshchik (Kettle-drummer) of the GlukhovskyCuirassiers, ceremonial parade uniform, 1802-3

The Glukhovsky Cuirassier Regiment was origin­ally raised at Glukhov, a town in the north-east

36

of the Ukraine. The kettle-drummer wore almostthe same uniform as that of the staff-trumpeter; insome cuirassier regiments buttons and braid werein silver and not gold. Like all kettle-drummers,when the drums were in play, he controlled hishorse by snaffle reins attached to the stirrup-irons.Like dismounted non-commissioned officers healso carried the long walking-out cane (trost).

Fl Konduktor (Conductor or Senior Non-CommissionedOfficer) of the Engineer Corps, everyday uniform,1812-16

The engineer corps, including sappers, miners,and pontoon troops, were really an offshoot of thefoot artillery and their uniforms had much incommon. The grenadiers and artillery used theflaming grenade or bomb as the regimental badge,and the engineer troops followed suit. The shako,except for slight differences in the badge andplume, was identical and the tunic was somewhatsimilar to that of foot artillery. The engineers,however, wore thick grey overalls in winter (white

A grenadier's arms and equipment, C. 1801,showing musket with bayonet fixed, scabbardand lock-eover; porte-epee, short sword andcartridge-case

linen in summer) with the protective button-upgaiters. All other ranks of engineers carried theshort sword as a side-arm.

F2 Trooper of the Tartar Horse Regiment, winterfield service uniform, 1803-6

Tartar cavalry often served as part of Cossackformations although it was, of course, in no wayCossack,. and the Tartar uniform dress was acurious mixture of pattern. The Tartar troopershown here is wearing a uhlan shako, but hisshoulder-belt, sabretache (not visible), and porte­epee all of Russian red yuft, together with thesabre are of hussar pattern, except that they arewithout the usual white silk or wool edge trim­ming. This particular Tartar regiment was some­times paired with a Lithuanian horse regimentwhich was similarly accoutred. The nine-footlance was carried by a shoulder-sling whenmounted, or held in the crook of the right armwhen on dismounted guard duty. The white slingon the left shoulder is attached by a swivel to acarbine (behind the soldier's back).

F3 Unter-Ofitser (Corporal) of the Balaclava GreekInfantry Battalion, ceremonial dress, 1797-1830

There were a number of small Greek colonies onthe Black Sea ports and Tsarist Russia gave refugeto fellow members of the Orthodox religionfleeing from the oppression of the Turk. TwoGreek battalions had been formed, the first in thereign of the Empress Catherine II, really as anexpression of Tsarist goodwill to the Greeks, andthey were used mainly for guard duties. Theywere very colourful, but their arms and equipmentwere so obsolete that, when eventually theywere committed to battle, they demanded modernRussian arms. But these, when received, were noimprovement and caused the Greeks to mutiny.The ·uniform of officers was similar to that shownon the plate, except that the gold edging was muchwider and gold buttons were worn; privatesoldiers, on the other hand, had no gold braid atall. The difference between the first and secondbattalions lay in the variation of colours betweenwaistcoats, shirts, cuffs, and collars, in green, darkgreen, and red.

Insignia for General Staff (suite) officers in full­dress uniform, and (right) shabrack and bolster­covers,c.1808

37

G1 Unter-Ofttser (Corporal) of 24 Eger Regiment,walking-out dress, 1806-7

There was some variation in the uniforms of thefoot eger regiments. Most were in light greenuniforms, but they could also be found, as here,in dark green tunics and dark green or summerwhite linen overalls. The collar and cuff colourswere of course another distinguishing feature,which varied between regiments. All eger regi­ments were, however, armed with the rifledcarbine and all wore black leather belts andaccoutrements. Unlike the line, other ranks nevercarried the sword but relied on the bayonet asthe side-arm. The newly introduced stove-pipehead-dress shown in the plate was common inother armies of western Europe. For fatigue wearor in undress the stove-pipe head-dress wasreplaced by the forage-cap with a drooping crownand hanging tassel, looking very much like thenineteenth-century nightcap.

b

Horse artillery officer'scartridge-pouch andforage caps worn byother ranks of thegarrison artillery,c.18n-17

38

a

Top: a dragoon officer's cartridge-ease and ashako of the Kiev Dragoons; below: the head­dress of the horse eger (a) trooper, (b) a non­conunissioned officer, c. 1814

G2 Ober-Ofttser (Junior Officer) of the KirnburnskyDragoons, winter parade uniform, 1812-14

At about this time there was much change in thedetail of the uniform of the cavalry of the line,for the Kirnburnsky Dragoons could also be foundwith brass spurs, and a light green tunic, usually

Left: a non-eonunissioned officer of the TverskyDragoons; right: a Fanenjunker (officer aspirant) of theSt Petersburg Dragoon Regbnent, c. 1803

worn with the white cloth summer pantaloons.Each dragoon regiment was allotted a basiccolour, although a single colour might be sharedby several regiments, and this colour was commonto the collar patch, the cuff, the shoulder-straps(pogoni) and the saddle-cloth.

G3 Ryadovoi (Trooper) of the Lijiyandsky (Livonian)Horse-Eger Regiment, winter parade uniform,1813-14

Whereas the dragoon was meant to be themounted heavy infantryman, the horse eger filledthe need for mounted rifles. Like his cousin of thefoot he was the skirmisher and the scout, findingthe screens and standing patrols for cavalry as wellas infantry. Yet he was supposed to be able tofight as cavalry, for he carried the heavy-patterncurved cavalry sword. His uniform was somethingbetween that of the horse artillery and the dis­mounted eger, and at his back he carried a blackleather sabretache surmounted by the Imperialdouble-headed spread-eagle in brass. His horseshabrack was in dark green edged in red.

HI Bombardir of Horse Artillery, winter paradeuniform, '1814-16

The horse artillery wore a distinctive head-dressquite different from that of the foot and carriedthe mounted-pattern sabre. Ranks could bedistinguished by the horse-hair sultan or plume. Aprivate soldier had a plume, as shown in this plate,of white with black and orange at the root;non-commissioned officer's was black and orangeat the top and white below; a trumpeter's wasred. An officer's was different again in design.Foreign spectators at about this time reportedthat the horse artillery also wore a uniform verysimilar to that of dragoons or cuirassiers, with thehigh fur combed helmet, a green tunic and greyoveralls buttoned up at the side.

H2 Pontonier of a Pontoon Regiment, field servzceuniform, 1805-7

The Russian engineers, sappers and miners were,as we have said, an offshoot of the gunners and in1805 the pontoon regiments were still listed underartillery. In consequence the uniform was little

39

LIVONIA

....c".,.

"-,.">,l.

...., Brest Litovsk,.!\

,.. ...\..,,-."/ \

Napoleon's Dlarch on Moscow, 1812

pripet

I

MOSCOW IBorodin~1

9'\.. /'~ "."// Maloyaroslavets

-:..;::;..

N

--- Napoleon's route

o SO 100 200,-I__-'--_----1.' ------'1 miles

H3 Unter-Ofitser (Corporal) of Astrakhan Cuirassiers,winter ceremonial parade uniform, I8I2-I4

By a St Petersburg order of 12 October 181 I theAstrakhansky Cuirassier Regiment and the Nov­gorodsky Cuirassier Regiment were ordered tochange the colour of their uniforms, the Astrak­hansky Regiment taking a plain yellow uniformwhile the Novgorodsky Cuirassiers took pink.Otherwise the design of their unif0rms, in commonwith most other cuirassier regiments, was almostidentical except for the collar and shoulder-strapcolours.

40

different from that of the foot artillery, from whichthe pontonier could be distinguished only by hisblack shoulder-strap and the black cockade in thecentre of the other ranks' shako. The pontoniercould also be found wearing grey overalls,buttoned up at the side, instead of leather kneeboots. The wide white leather shoulder-beltcarried a black leather ammunition case display­ing the Imperial double-headed spread-eagle inbrass. The pontonier carried a curved half-sabreand not the foot-artilleryman's straight-edgedtesak.

Men-at-Arms Series 3.95

Each title in this serie gives a brief history of a famous fighting unit, with afull de cription of its dre and- accoutrements, illu trated with eight colorpI te and many drawings and photographs.. Collectors of militaria, war

me enthusiasts, historians and amateur military strategists will find in theseworks a wealth of enriching background material that will add to their know­ledge of this fa cinating subject.

MEN-AT-A MERlEBLUCHER'S ARMY .Peter ToungFRE CH FOREIGN LEGION Martin WindrowGEO GE WASHINGTON'S ARMY Peter ToungTH IRO BRIGADE John SelbyJ PA ESE ARMY OF WORLD WAR II Philip WarnerLUFTWAFFE AIRBORNE AND FIELD UNITS Martin WindrowTHE PANZER DIVISIO S Martin WindrowTHE SOVIET ARMY A.lbert SeatonU ITED STATES MA I E ·CORPS John SelbyWAFFE SS Martin WindrowWELLI GTO 'S PE I SULAR ARMY James Lawford

UEUTENANT-COLONEL AL E T EATON (Retd.) is the author ofmany books on Ru ian military hi.story; his The Russo-German War 1941-45 isprob bly the only complete and authoritative account published in the freeworld, nd has app t d in London, New York nd Frankfurt. Among hisrecently published work is The Battle for Moscow; Stalin as Military Commanderwill be published in 1973, and he is at present engaged on the writing ofStalingrad.

Hippocrene Books, Jnc., 171 Madi on Avenu, ew York, .Y. 10016Distributed by Optirrt'Um Book rketin Co.