optimizing africa's security force structures

8/6/2019 Optimizing Africa's Security Force Structures

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AfricA Security Brief

Opzg Afrcas ScurForc Srucurs

By HelmOed HeitmAn

A P u b l i c A t i o n o f t h e A f r i c A c e n t e r f o r S t r A t e g i c S t u d i e S

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Nigerias total oil production. Moreover, illegal sh-

ing costs the continent $1 billion annually. Illegal

logging and mining, arms traicking, and general

smuggling urther add to the dimension and com-

plexity o these threats.

Irregular orces include guerrillas ghting per-

ceived disenranchisement (Darur) or injustice

(Niger Delta), or secession (Cabinda, Angola, and

Casamance, Senegal), or or other causes. They alsocomprise militias protecting territory and resources

(the Democratic Republic o the Congo [DRC]),

private armies hired by illegal miners, loggers, and

smugglers, and groups with no rational cause (the

Lords Resistance Army). There is also a growing

problem o terrorism, including groups such as al

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al

Shabaab in Somalia, and eorts by international

There is much happening in Arica that is posi-

tiveeconomically, socially, and politically. But a

large share o the continent remains ragile, putting

those gains at risk. The most pressing challenges ac-

ing many Arican states are paramilitary threats

threats that are beyond the ability o most police

orces and requently transcend national borders.

Organized crime, rural banditry, piracy, local war-

lords, guerrillas, ethnic and religious violence, andextremist Islamist groups are just a ew o an array o

such threats.

These paramilitary threats are growing in size

and scope. Organized crime is increasingly linked to

narcotics tracking rom South America through

West Arica and rom Asia through East Aricaa

trade now running in the tens o billions o dollars.

Oil thet (bunkering) amounts to 10 percent o


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Islamist terrorist groups to establish themselves else-

where in Arica.

Many o these irregular orceswheth-

er criminal or guerrillaare dangerous oppo-

nents. They are highly experienced in bush war

and are well armed with assault riles, RPG7s,

and heavy machineguns. Moreover, they are

highly mobile in our-wheel-drive vehicles and

well equipped with global positioning systems,

night vision goggles, and satellite telephones.

A ew may have man-portable antiaircrat mis-

siles. In 2002, terrorists ired two SA7s at an

Israeli airliner in Mombasa, and in 1996, cattle

rustlers used one to shoot down a Kenyan police

helicopter, killing all on board. Some are supported

by neighboring countries, enabling access to even

better equipment. General Laurent Nkundas orces

in the eastern DRC had T55 tanks and ield ar-

tillery. Guerrillas in the Central Arican Republic

(CAR), Chad, and Uganda have been supplied and

even deployed by air. Some smugglers are using air

transport extensively.

There also seems to be a trend toward collabo-

ration. The operations o AQIM, Tuareg rebels,

and smugglers in Mali and Niger are increasingly

intertwined. The Movement or the Emancipa-

tion o the Niger Delta has developed symbiotic

relationships with bunkering gangs in Nigeria and

guerrillas in Cameroons Bakassi Peninsula. Al

Shabaab derives some o its unding rom piracy

o the coast o Somalia.

Most o the states in the region lack orces able

to counter these threats, mainly because they can-not aord them. Compounding this issue is the act

that the equipment o their armed orces is oten

not suited to the type o operations they conront.

Nor are these problems suciently addressed by se-

curity assistance initiatives or typical security sector

reorm programs, which tend to ocus on downsizing

rather than optimizing security orces. New orce

structures are needed to conront these challenges.

Arica must develop security orces that are con-

text appropriate, adequate to deal with current and

likely threats, and aordable.

geogrAPhic, demogrAPhic,

culturAl, And economic chAllengeS

The obvious geographic challenge is the size o

most Arican countries. Cte dIvoire is larger than

Italy, Sudans Darur region is the size o Spain, the

CAR and Somalia are each the size o France, Chad

is twice the size o France, and the DRC is twice the

size o France and Spain combined. Dicult terrain

and climate, poor transport inrastructure, and low ru-

ral population density oten compound the problem.

A key demographic challenge is rapid urban-

ization, resulting in concentrations o unemployed

youth in cities and towns, presenting a pool o po-

tential recruits to criminal and guerrilla groups.

It also spawns growing inormal settlements that

present tactical challenges: dicult navigation,

roads easily blocked by ditches, civilians who can-

not escape ghting, homes vulnerable to penetra-

tion by most munitions, and the risk o re among

fimsy structures.

Cultural challenges include ethnic, linguistic,

religious, and tribal dierences. Moreover, secu-

rity orces must typically overcome disconnects

between rural villagers and a predominantly urban

ocer class.

Most Arican countries are also extremely

poor, inding it diicult to meet the legitimate

aspirations o their people. The resulting discon-tent is easily exploited by criminals, warlords, and

some politicians, with obvious security implica-

tions. Poverty also makes it dicult to und ad-

equate orces. CAR, with a population o 4.5 mil-

lion, spent only $18 million or deense in 2007.

Chad, with 10.3 million people, committed only

$70 million. Even relatively prosperous Kenya,

with 39 million people, expended a modest $681

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million. The result is security orces ar too small

and ill equipped or their responsibilities.

APProPriAte, AdequAte, And

AffordAble forceS

The undamental requirement or security orces

is to prevent security threats rom arising at all, by

deterrence or preemption, and to respond eectively

to such threats that do materialize. In Arica, this

must be achieved within tight unding constraints,

expansive geographic areas, and poor transportation

inrastructure. That will demand some unconven-

tional thinking.

Arican countries ace highly diverse security

threats and have quite dierent security requirements.

There is no one size ts all or even one style suits

all solution. Nevertheless, given the nature o many

o these threats, most operations will be constabulary

or counterinsurgency in nature. Some undamental

requirements can be identied on that basis.

Acceptance and trust by the people, without

which eective operations against groups moving and

operating among the people are not possible. Secu-

rity orces must be thoroughly embedded and engaged

with the local population, willing and able to assist

in times o need. The people must see themselves re-

fected in the security orces and see them as a riend

and helper. This requires ocused recruiting, training

to enable troops to assist the people, and ensuring

that troops are aware o local customs and can con-

verse in local dialects. Reservists living in an area can

be immensely valuable in this respect.

Security orces must also be demonstrably com-

petent i they are to be accepted by local commu-

nities. That demands a ocus on proessionalism,

particularly or ocers and noncommissioned o-

cers. Security orces must also be visibly honest.

This demands careul selection, education, rigor-

ous monitoring, competitive salaries and service

conditions, and reliable administration to make

petty corruption unnecessary. Finally, they must

be politically neutral, which demands great care to

ensure that senior appointments are clearly based

on proessional considerations.

Sustained presence, without which security

orces will not be able to protect and support the

population, discourage organized crime and orma-

tion o irregular orces, and develop popular support.

This is undamental to policing and should be equally

so to constabulary or stability operations. Forces o

appropriate strength that are properly tasked, trained,

and equipped can provide eective protection against

bandits and guerrillas, develop intelligence, deuse

dissatisaction by assisting the people, and keep gov-

ernment authorities apprised o critical needs. A

well-considered basing strategy that permits quick

access to the population but does not impede its daily

activity must, thereore, be part o any orce design.

Current, comprehensive intelligence, without

which small security orces cannot be eective. Se-

curity orces must ully understand their opponents

and the social environment within which they must

operate. That requires continuously updated intel-

ligence to enable security orces to monitor trends,

highlight relevant developments, predict potential

threats, and develop situational assessments.

Security orces must also have current opera-

tional and tactical intelligence to be eective against

elusive and wary opponents. This requires eective

collection, collation, and distribution, and an inor-

mation-intelligence-action cycle run at the lowest

possible unit level. A typical bureaucratic intelli-

gence system that provides intelligence long ater it

might have been useul will not suce.

deSigning bAlAnced generAl

PurPoSe forceS

Against this background, it is possible to devel-

op some concepts that can be widely applicable as astarting point or a tailored orce design (see table).

This will be complemented by specialized orce el-

ements including airpower and, depending on the

particular country, maritime elements.

The reality aced by most Arican security sectors

is that small orce elements must be able to conduct

operations without support. Dispersed deployment will

be essential or presence and to develop and main-

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tain a usable intelligence picture. Meanwhile, quick

reinorcement will be dicult at best. Poor roads will

in many cases make it dicult to deploy and sustain

large orces. All orce elements must, thereore, have

balanced general purpose combat capabilities and pro-

tected mobility. Fire support will require long range

(to support dispersed orces deployed or patrolling ar

rom base), lightweight ammunition (to oset supply

problems), and precision (or ecient use o munitions

and to avoid collateral casualties and damage).

Several South Arican examples exempliy

this approach.

The Modular Battalion. An inantry battalion

whose number o companies, armored cars, mounted

or motorcycle troops, engineers, and other attached

elements varied depending on its area o responsibil-

ity (AOR). Each company in turn was also modular

in structure, oten with ve inantry platoons and one

o armored cars as well as some Armored Personnel

Carriers (APCs) or mobile patrols. Such modularity

allowed each battalion and company to be tailored

precisely to its AORsize, terrain, roads, population

densityand to conduct a range o operations with

its own resources.

The Battalion Group. A mechanized or motor-

ized inantry battalion with an integral armored car

company, artillery battery, and engineers. Even light

inantry units were organized as battalion groups

with an armored car company, an artillery battery,

and some APCs or mobility when not engaged in

oot operations. This versatile yet light structure

took cognizance o the act that battalion level units

would oten have to operate ar rom other units or

supporting arms and gave them the inherent inter-

nal fexibility to do so eectively. This also virtually

eliminated common problems that came with tempo-

rarily attaching elements o dierent arms to a unit.

Another example is Cameroons Rapid Interven-

tion Battalion, ormed speciically to counter rural

banditry and having its own air component with light

aircrat and helicopters. It has proven successul in large

part because o its specic doctrinal and organizational

ocus on combating paramilitary opponents rather than

conventional military operations. It also has a range o

in-house capabilities that enable it to respond quickly

and fexibly as a situation develops without having to

request support attachments and wait or their arrival.

At a higher organizational level is the French

army example o the demi-brigade, and at a lower

level many armies use hal-battalions, company

groups, and hal-companies to good eect. The

key is a balance o capabilities that match an array o

likely tactical requirements.

In addition to balanced capabilities, orce design

must at all levels provide or:

operational, tactical, and logistical mobil-

ity and agility, to allow prompt and quick

ocusing o combat power to seize leeting

opportunities to engage elusive opponents

rapid and sustained dominance in an AOR,

including the elasticity (strength and logis-

tics) and lexibility (balanced capabilities)

to extend deployments in time or area and

to adapt deployments as a situation develops

precision irepower, to enable small, dis-

persed orces to overmatch and quickly

overwhelm opponents and minimize collat-

eral casualties and damage

assured communications, using aerial relay

when conditions require it

assured logistic support that takes into ac-

count the diiculties o movement overpoor roads and the very real risk o ambush

or interruption o logistic routes.

In most Arican countries, optimal orce design

will comprise a mix o permanently deployed orce

elements with responsibility or assigned sectors and

mobile orce elements that can be shited to adapt

orce density or serve as reaction orces when needed.

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AfricAS PArAmilitAry threAtS And counterforce requirementS

opaa cas f ds ipas

Many irregular groups present a signicant military

threat, at least at a tactical level.

Counter and defeat opponents at a military level, which

require sufcient capacity and assets to overmatch

opponents. There is no excuse for sending government

forces to a fair ght.

Irregular forces are often more criminal than military,

requiring an appropriate mindset to counter them.

Understand and counter irregular forces criminal intent

and activities.

Most irregular forces are well embedded within the

population, voluntarily or through intimidation, and have

good local knowledge.

Engage destabilizing forces in populated areas without

undue collateral casualties or damage.

Security forces must be broadly representative, aware

of cultural issues, and able to communicate in local

dialects.

Personnel must be educated and trained to high

standards to enable small, dispersed force elements to

be effective against varied threats.

Many irregular forces are very mobile, on foot in forests

or mountainous terrain or in four-wheel-drive vehicles.

Enhanced mobilityon foot, by vehicle, and by airis a

key force multiplier.

Most irregular forces have adequate communications

for command and control.

Deployed force elements must have balanced

capabilities (infantry, armor, engineers, communications,and so forth) to handle immediate tasks, avoid time-

consuming attachments or reinforcements, and offset

inadequate overall strength, dispersed deployment, and

mobility constraints.

Distances can render radio communications tenuous,

requiring special measures.

Difcult terrain and weather will hamper operations.

Moreover, informal settlements present a particularly

important and complex challenge.

Specialized force elements for certain terrain types

(forest, mountain, river, informal settlements)

are needed.

Good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are

difcult to provide, particularly in rural and border areas. Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capability

are required at all levels. Basing and deployment

decisions must offset mobility constraints.Operational, tactical, and logistical maneuverability is

difcult and slow.

States have insufcient force densities and elements to

counter multiple threats.

Equipment that balances capability, supportability, and

affordability is required.

The permanently deployed orce elements will

in most cases best be modular battalions with com-

pany and perhaps hal-company bases in key parts

o their AOR. They can be supported by a mobile

element that would conduct pseudo-random pa-

trols throughout the battalion area to conuse op-

ponents, vary orce density within selected zones,

and serve as a reaction orce. Reinorced platoonsmay suce or some outposts, although there al-

ways should be two commissioned ocers, one to

lead patrols while the other ensures command and

control. Eective village protection can even be

provided by reinorced inantry sections. In each

case, however, such small orce elements must be

assured o prompt supportor their own protec-

tion and to ensure their credibility.

Whether the mobile elements o the modular

battalions are mechanized or motorized will depend

on the terrain, nature o the opponent, and avail-

able unding. The aim should be to overmatch likely

opponents in mobility and repower, while also en-

suring orce protection. In most cases, simple, easily

maintained, and aordable mine-protected APCs

should suice. Full-scale Mine Resistant AmbushProtectedtype vehicles will be required only where

orces cannot conveniently move o road, and thus

become vulnerable to improvised explosive device

attacks. In particularly dicult terrain, these orce

elements may best comprise light inantry deployed

and supported by vehicle or helicopter.

The main mobile operations orces will in most

cases best be battalion groups or company groups that


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employ high-mobility operations concepts and tac-

tics. The key to their eectiveness will lie in mobile

thinking and then translating that into doctrine and

detailed organization.

Wherever possible, all mobile orce elements

should exploit their asymmetric edge over light op-

posing orces. There is nothing quite as asymmetric

as an armored combat vehicle engaging a guerrilla

on oot. The South Arican mechanized ollow-

up concept provides one example. It was based on

combining a short intelligence cycle at platoon level,

tracking skills, and the mobility, repower, and pro-

tection o mine-protected APCs. This was supported

by helicopters or reconnaissance, command and

control, and re support. Such a combination was

extremely dicult or guerrillas to counter.

Specialized Force Elements. In some situations,

it will be worth developing specialized units to com-

plement conventional orces. Each situation will de-

mand its own solution, but among the concepts that

have proven tactically eective and cost-ecient in

multiple conficts are the deployment o special orces

teams to live with remote rural communities, assist-

ing and protecting them while also developing an

intelligence picture; the deployment o detachments

to live in and protect rural villages; and the develop-

ment o local sel-protection orces.

Theaters with long lines o communication will

require careul thought to adequately protect logisticmovements. Convoys and checkpoints alone will not

suce against competent opponents. There will also

need to be mobile orce elements conducting pseudo-

random patrols o the areas through which those lines

o communication run.

Airpower.With the continents large theaters,

low orce densities, and poor road links, airpower can

be a critical actor and provide an asymmetric edge in

Arica. Given the cost o airpower, however, the ocus

should be on a combination o low-cost turboprop

aircrat and aordable high-tech systems to provide

essential capabilities such as:

reconnaissance, surveillance, and commu-

nications intelligence, using single- or twin-

engine utility aircrat with optronic turrets

and basic communications intelligence sys-

tems. Unmanned aerial vehicles are an op-

tion but oten not as inexpensive or simple

as they appear.

transport, to deploy and support orce ele-

ments, including light vehicles. It is not

helpul to ly in and then have to move 100

kilometers or more on oot while the op-

ponent departs or even to maneuver using

our-wheel-drive vehicles.

tactical helicopter mobility, preerably or at

least two platoons in a single lit to ensure an

eective element on the ground, and, when

possible, with support by armed helicopters

combat air support, using armed turbo-

prop trainers and light ixed-wing gun-

ships with low-cost precision weapons or

an optimal mix o persistence, irepower,

and aordability

airspace control, using a mix o observation

posts, transportable stealthy radars, and

low-cost turboprop interceptor aircrat to

prevent irregular orces making use o air

transport.

Maritime Elements. Most Arican countries de-pend on seaborne trade, shing, and other oshore

industries but lack eective navies or coast guards.

This applies equally to countries with long lake bor-

ders or major riverine transport systems. Even small

rivers can be used as smuggling routes by light crat

and must be secured. As with airpower, low-cost

systems that give the required minimum capability

should be prioritized. Maritime security capabilities

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will have to be developed in phases as unding allows

and operational experience makes practicable:

security around ports and inshore ishing

grounds, using light inshore patrol crat

with only very basic systems and light

weapons but capable o night operations

to deter smuggling

prevention o over-the-beach smuggling,

which will require seacrat o some endurance,

ideally with support by light surveillance air-

crat (even single-engine types will suice)

protection o oshore assets, which will

require larger vessels, 45 to 90 meters de-

pending on the typical sea condition and

distance to those assets. Protection will

best be perormed by a combination o pa-

trol vessels and surveillance aircrat, which

can be light twin turboprops. This might be

handled in collaboration with ishing and

oil companies or unded directly by a tax on

their activities.

protection o the Exclusive Economic Zone,

which can essentially be an extension o the

protection o oshore assets.

militAry or PArAmilitAry?

Much o what Arican security orces will have

to do over the medium term will be either constabu-

lary or counterinsurgency in nature and will not re-

quire a ull-scale military. In act, a orce that starts

out with a policing mindset might well be better than

a conventional military. A military will inevitably

run the risk o comparing itsel to and benchmark-ing itsel against the armed orces o larger countries,

which ace entirely dierent challenges.

Arican countries should, thereore, consider

whether they might not do better with a constabu-

lary or gendarmerie that incorporates civil police,

paramilitary units, coast guard, air patrol, and trans-

port elements rather than separate police and armed

orces. A paramilitary orce o this type would also

amalgamate a ull range o capabilities within a single

organization, eliminating the inevitable duplications

o having both police and military.

This approach might, o course, simply not be

practicable politically. That still leaves the option o

the European example: a paramilitary gendarmerie

that is part o the military but has a policing ocus

and reports to the interior ministry in times o peace.

During conlict or war, that type o orce provides

security and rear area protection, and its specialist

antiterrorist elements complement military special

orces. This approach will be more expensive than a

single orce but would bring the best o both worlds.

concluSion

Arican security orces will ace varied chal-

lenges over the medium term, ew o them o a kind

to be ound in most manuals. They will need to ap-

ply imaginative thinking and to FOCUS: Focus on

their mission, Optimize their orce structure, Control

operations tightly, Understand what is actually hap-

pening (not what they might like to be happening),

and Seize tactical and operational opportunities as

they arise.


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AfricA center for

StrAtegic StudieS

Director: Ambassador William

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Deense University

300 Fith Avenue, Building 21Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.aricacenter.org

AfricA center

regionAl office

in dAkAr

Regional Manager:

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: [email protected]

AfricA center

regionAl office

in AddiS AbAbARegional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000


AfricA Security briefS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808


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