Open Contracting Scoping Study

SYNTHESIS REPORTWest Africa Open Contracting Assessment Project

February 28, 2017

Produced By

Supported By

Scoping Studies onOpen Contracting inWestAfrica:

SynthesisReport

February28,2017

SubmittedbyDevelopmentGateway,Inc.1110VermontAvenueNWSuite500|Washington,DC20005USA

SubmittedtoUKForeign&CommonwealthOffice

ContactPointAndrewG.Mandelbaum|SeniorAssociate|DevelopmentGatewayamandelbaum@developmentgateway.org

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ExecutiveSummaryAccordingtotheWorldBank,publicprocurementaccountsfornearly15percentofGDPpercapitainSub-SaharanAfrica.1Howgovernmentsspendthismoneyhasasignificantimpactonthelivesofcitizens.Duetothepotentialforsharedprosperityaccruedtocountrieswithstrongprocurementsystemsandtheirtradepartners,theUKForeign&CommonwealthOffice(FCO)hassupportedtheeffortsofDevelopmentGatewayandtheOpenContractingPartnershiptoconductaseriesofopencontractingscopingstudiesin6WestAfricancountries:Ghana,Nigeria,Guinea,Liberia,SenegalandCôted’Ivoire.Thisinitiativestemsfromtherecognitionthatopencontracting,whichreferstoasetofglobalprinciples2aimedatimprovingprocurementdatadisclosureandcitizenparticipation,supportssharedprosperitythroughanemphasisoncreatingfair,competitivemarketsthatincreasevalueformoney,improveservicedeliveryandreducecorruption.Thissynthesisreportsharesthefindingsfromthese6countryreports,alongwithinsightsgarneredthroughareportonBritishPrioritiesandInterestsinrelationtoopencontracting,whichfocusesontheopportunitiesandrisksofinvestinginWestAfricanprocurementmarketsastoldbyBritishandinternationalcompanies.Ourfindingsaresummarizedinthefollowingrecommendations:

1. Enactmeasurestoensuretheindependenceofprocurementandregulatoryauthorities.2. Designtargetedapproachestoenhancingcapacityofprocurementstaff.3. Improvethebidevaluationprocessbyempoweringwhistleblowersandcomplainants.4. Strengthenlegalrequirementsonprocurementdatacollection,andopen,proactivedisclosure.5. Putopencontractingontheregionalradarthroughlocalandinternationalengagement.6. Supporttheuseofnewtechnologies,includinge-procurement,thatstrengthenlegalcompliance

andtheOpenContractingPrinciples.7. Strengtheningdisclosureofinformationthroughallstages,butparticularlyoncethecontracthas

beensigned.8. Improvethepracticeofdatacollectionanddisclosurewithspecificuserneedsinmind.9. Engagestakeholdersroutinelytoimprovetheprocurementprocess.10. Supportcivilsocietyengagementthroughstrengtheningcapacity,resourcesanddata.11. Increasedcollaborationamonginternationalinstitutionscanensurethatresourcesareeffectively

managedinthesupportofprocurementreform.12. Collaboratewithsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)topromoteopencontractingandother

practicalmeasurestoensurethatprocurementreformsrespondtotheirneeds.13.ArangeofchallengescreatedisincentivesforparticipationofBritishandWesterncompaniesin

WestAfricanmarkets,butensuringafairandcompetitiveprocesswouldproduceavaluableincentivetoengage.

14. LaygroundworkforinteroperabilitybetweenprocurementdataandbroaderPFMinfrastructure.

1See:http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/public-procurement-rich-country-s-policy.Accessed:12.20.16.2http://www.open-contracting.org/get-started/global-principles/

2http://www.open-contracting.org/get-started/global-principles/

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IntroductionAccordingtotheWorldBank,publicprocurementaccountsfornearly15percentofGDPpercapita inSub-Saharan Africa.3 How governments spend this money has a significant impact on the lives ofcitizens. Where governments can account for public spending, citizens are likely to receive betterinfrastructureandservices.Freeandfaircompetitionamongsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)forgovernmentcontractshelpstoensurethatspendingbenefitslocalcommunitiesandgrowsthedomesticprivate sector. Spending on contracts awarded to international business can improve internationaltrade,bringinspecificexpertise,andfosterdiplomaticlinkages.

Duetothepotential forsharedprosperityaccruedtocountrieswithstrongprocurementsystemsandtheirtradepartners,theUKForeign&CommonwealthOffice(FCO)hascommissionedaseriesofopencontractingscopingstudiesin5WestAfricancountries:Ghana,Nigeria,Guinea,Liberia,Senegal.Thesestudies,conductedbyDevelopmentGatewayandtheOpenContractingPartnership(OCP),aimtogaugethe stateof opennessof public procurementprocesses in each country, tounderstand the capacitiesandinterestsofkeyprocurementactors,andtoidentifyopportunitiesforprocurementreformandtheadoptionofopencontractingprinciples.AnadditionalstudyofBritishPrioritiesandInterestsinrelationtoopencontractinghasbeenconductedtogain insightsontheopportunitiesandrisksof investing inWestAfricanprocurementmarketsastoldbyBritishandinternationalcompanies.Thissynthesisreportseeks to highlight the principal lessons learned across these studies, as well as through an opencontractingstudyinCôted’IvoireconductedbyOCPfortheBritishEmbassyinAbidjan.

Opencontractingrefers toasetofglobalprinciples4aimedat improvingprocurementdatadisclosureand recognizing the importance of public participation in the contracting process. This includes thepublication of procurement data in open and structured formats that enable public use and reusethroughadvancedtechnologieswithoutrestriction.

Open contracting supports shared prosperity through an emphasis on creating fair, competitivemarkets that increase value for money, improve service delivery and reduce corruption. Thecommitmenttotransparencyandpublicengagementengenderedthroughopencontractingcreatesanenvironmentinwhichparticipantscanhaveconfidencethatafairopportunitywashadbyall.ForSMEs,open contracting can be attractive as it enables monitoring implementation of policies that seek tosupport SME participation in public markets. For international or foreign companies, it can createconfidencethatunderhandedorcorruptpracticeswillnotpreventthefromhavingafairchance,eveniftheyarelessknowntoprocurementofficialsthanlocalcompanies.Theuseoftechnology-includinge-procurement-thataccompaniesthecommitmenttoopencontractingandimplementationoftheOpenContracting Data Standard (OCDS) - a schema for collection and publication of procurement data -assuresbusinessesandthepublicthatprocurementisbeingconductedfairlyandforthebenefitofall.

In general, study countries have exhibited substantial advancement in their public procurementpoliciesandenvironments.Thepastdecadehasseennewpoliciesandlegislationfocusedonincreasingthe independence and fairness of procurement processes come into play, often creating newinstitutions (e.g. regulatorybodies, audit commissions) tooverseeprocurementprocesses. Inmostofthecountriesstudied,intervieweessuggestedthattheimpacthasbeentransformative.InCôted’Ivoire,therehavebeen171 cases taken to court by the regulatory authority (ANRMP) since2010, against 0

3See:http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/public-procurement-rich-country-s-policy.Accessed:12.20.16.4http://www.open-contracting.org/get-started/global-principles/

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prior.Nigeria’sBureauofPublicProcurement(BPP)hasgainedrespectasaprocurementauthorityandregulatory body,while opening up to citizens by convening a civil societyworking group to facilitatecollaboration in the development of an open contracting data portal.5 In Senegal, the regulatoryauthority (ARMP) has launched a master’s degree program in public procurement, opened a publicportal on procurement and tightened its governance of procurement processes significantly.Ghana’sprocurement authority routinely publishes a variety of important procurement data from planning,tender,awardandcontractphasesonitswebsite.Broadlyspeaking,farmoreattentionisbeingpaidbygovernmentinstitutionstoensurethatprocurementregulationsarebeingrespected.

Nevertheless, there remains significant room for improvement. Interviews suggest that relevantlegislation and procurement procedures in most countries are not fully applied by all institutions,including by sub-national procuring entities (PEs), and smaller ministries and agencies. In mostcountries, skepticism remains around the applicationof procurementpracticesby institutionsdealingwith national security or the extractive industries. Publication of procurement data is often delayed,inconsistent,andprovidedinnon-openformatsthatposeachallengetocitizenmonitoringandprivatesectoruse.Whilemanyprocurementauthoritiesandregulatoryagencieshaveissuedhelpfultemplatesfordatacollection, there isa significantneed forcapacitybuildingand theuseof technology tools tostreamlineprocurementprocesses, facilitate real-timemonitoringbyofficials topreventcostlyerrors,andenabletheuseofdataanalyticstocombatcorruptionandincreasevalueformoney.Despitenewregulations to reduce direct contracting and increase competition, the resort to non-competitivecontractingmethodsremainsaprobleminsomecountries.

Methodology

Themethodologyfollowedbythestudies,dividedinto7partsandaccompaniedbyaninterviewguideandannexes,seekstoaidstudyleadersto:

● Documentcurrentlevelsofopennessinpubliccontractingintargetedpolities;● Identifyandassessexistingsystemsanddatasources(includingnon-public)withingovernment

forcollecting,analyzing,andsharingprocurementdata;● Mapkeystakeholdersandtheircapacitiesandenthusiasmforadvancingopencontracting;and,● Provide recommendations on realistic targets and use cases for open contracting moving

forward.Thesevensectionsofthemethodologycoveredbythisstudyare:1)institutionalarrangement,2)legalframework, 3) policy context, 4) technical and data systems, 5) user engagement, 6) stakeholderidentification,7)broaderpublicfinancialmanagementenvironment.

In each of the 6 country studies conducted by DG and/or OCP, between 15-25 interviews wereconductedduringOctober-November,2016.Inmostinstances,datacollectionwasconductedbyalocalconsultantwithcollaboration froman international consultantor staffpersonofDGand/orOCP.TheBritish Priorities and Interests study was conducted around the same timeframe and included 17interviewswithBritishandinternationalcompaniesthatconductbusinessinWestAfrica.

5See:http://www.nigeriaoc.org/.Accessed:03.09.17.

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Results&Recommendations

InstitutionalArrangement

1.Enactmeasurestoensuretheindependenceofprocurementandregulatoryauthorities.

Mostofthegovernmentinstitutionswithprocurementorregulatoryauthorityinthecountriesstudiedareintendedtohaveinstitutional-bothfinancialandadministrative- independencefromthepoliticalelementsofgovernment,inparttoreduceactualandperceivedconflictsofinterest.Inpractice,thisisrarelythecase.

Recommendations:AsinSenegal,wherethedirectorofthePublicProcurementRegulatoryAuthority(ARMP)isselectedamongapoolofcandidatesbyanindependentjury,countriesshouldtakestepstoselect an independent head of procurement authorities. Where opportunities for reformingprocurement laws exist - including with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)policies that govern 8 countries - providing support to enable civil society and private sectorinvolvementcanhelpensurethatdiscussionsareinclusiveandcarrylegitimacy.

Examples: InLiberiaandGuinea, theheadsoftheregulatoryauthoritiesaredirectlyappointedbythepresident,whilethelegalfoundationforGuinea’sprocurementauthority(ARMP)presentsthebodyasanindependentinstitution.OurresearchsuggeststhatGuinea’sinstitutionalstructureismostinneedofreform, as efficiencies could be increased by reducing the number of bodies responsible for theprocurementprocess(therearepresently4).

InNigeria, the head of the procurement authority (Bureau of Public Procurement - BPP) should beselectedbytheNationalCouncilonPublicProcurement(NCPP),amulti-stakeholdergroup.AstheNCPPhas never been formally assembled, the BPP Director General is appointed by the president. Côted’Ivoire’sANRMP,whichhassomeinstitutionalautonomy,stillreportstothepresident.

2.Designtargetedapproachestoenhancingcapacityofprocurementstaff.

The request forassistance in raising thecapacityofprocurement institutions isuniversal. Inallof thecountries studied, staff would benefit from training to gain in-depth understanding of the relevantprocurement laws, data collection and analysis, anduse of information technology (IT) tools. Currenteffortstotrainprocurementstaffvaryfromone-offtrainingstoonlinecoursestograduate-leveltrainingprograms.Buttheseopportunitiesarenotavailabletoallprocurementstaffinallcountries.

Recommendations: While each country would benefit from support for efforts to increase staffcapacity, specific interventionsmustbedesignedaroundtheopportunitiesavailable ineachcontext(see specific country examples below). As these countries continue to adopt technology tools to aidtheirprocurementmanagementefforts,includinge-procurement,capacitybuildingeffortswillneedtochange to account for the increased use of ITs. Here, as in other instances where internationaldevelopmentpartnersareengagingonsimilarissues,coordinationamongthemtoensureefficientuseofcapacitybuildingresourcesiscrucial.

Examples: In Guinea, where a World Bank report on 3 ministries found that just 13 percent ofprocurements met legal requirements, staff suffer from a lack of training and few opportunities toincrease their knowledge and skill-sets. Liberia’smost knowledgeable staff tend to be recent collegegraduateswithdegreesthatmayincludesometrainingonprocurementorrelatedsubjects.

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In Nigeria, the BPP offers a training program that results in procurement officers joining theprocurementcadre,whichensurescontinuedtrainingopportunitiesandthattheywillnotbepoachedby other parts of the public service. But the BPP is unable to provide in-depth training to allprocurement staff and there remain PEs without dedicated staff with any formal training, a sharedprobleminmanyofCôted’Ivoire’sparastatals. BecauseCôted’Ivoire’suniversitycurriculumdoesnotoffer degree programs in procurement, there is no certification and so the government is unable todevelop a salary range for trained procurement specialists. A procurement official earning less than£170permonthmaybeinvitedtopartakeincommitteesdiscussingcontractsofmorethan£24million.

Meanwhile,withrespecttoICTskills,theGhanaresearchersfoundvariedcapacitylevelswithinpublicsectorPEs.Notably,whilekeypersonnelweretrainedinskillssuchasuploadingprocurementplansontothePPA’sportal,staffatlowerlevelinstitutions,suchasschools,didnothavethesameskill-sets.

ChallengestoDoingProcurementRightAlloftheprocurementsystemsstudiedcanbenefitfromimprovingcertainaspectsofprocedure.Herearesomeofthetopissuesthatarose.

PlanningPhase

Budgetpreparationandprocurementplans: Inanumberofcountries,theprocurementprocessis delayed due to delays in budget preparation and approval. In some instances, post-adoptionchanges to procurement prevent the start of procedures for approved purchases. Lack of linksbetweenIntegratedFinancialManagementInformationSystem(IFMIS)andprocurementsystemsslowdowntheprocess forprocurementplanapprovalandcertificationof fundavailability.Asaresult, procurement officials come under pressure to conduct procurement quickly, potentiallyreducingcompetitionandinvitingmalfeasance.Conducting appropriate assessments and engaging beneficiaries: Few countries provideinformationontheresultsofneedsassessments,environmental impactreportsorotherstudiesthatmaybeundertakeninadvanceofaprocurement.Affectedcitizensarenotoftenconsulted.

TenderPhase

Fair announcement of public tenders: Legal requirements related to the posting and timing oftender announcements are often not respected. InGhana, the cost of international advertisingoften leads procurers to forgo the process; inNigeria, the BPP struggles to enforce advertisingtime requirements. Theadoptionofe-procurementanduseofpublicportals for tenderswouldresolvethisshortcomingthroughautomatedvalidation,increasingopportunitiesforcompetition.Equitable pre-bidding procedure: Interviewees suggest that pre-bidding procedures are oftenusedtonarrowthespecificationofaprojecttotheexclusionofsomebiddersonuncleargrounds.Reducing the competitive field can result in the reduction of value for money. At times,international organizations have required re-bidding on projects using their funds due to themisapplicationofpre-biddingprocedures.Combatting informal tendering procedures:Businesses interviewed suggested the existence ofparallel tendering procedures, whereby a formal process often gives way to closed-doornegotiations.

AwardPhase

Secrecy of the evaluation: Although evaluations must be conducted in secret, losing biddersshould have an opportunity to understand why they lost, while participants should have anopportunitytoblowthewhistlewhenneeded.Inadequatecomplaintsprocedure:Nearlyall thecountrieshavea formalcomplaintsprocedure,

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butinfewinstancescancomplainantsbesurethattheirconcernswillbetreatedwithimpartiality.

ContractPhase

Lackofaccesstocontractinformation:Noneoftheparticipatingcountriesprovidepublicaccessto contracts, and few provide key information. A lack of public access to contracts andamendments altering the scope of work and/or increasing the budget present a significantopportunityforreducedvalueformoney(dueto“upcharges”)orcorruption.

Implemen-tationPhase

Delays in payment processing: Poorly functioning public financial management (PFM) systemsand paper-based project management tools often result in long lead times for payments toimplementingfirms(ofteninexcessof90days).Thesepaymentdelaysreducetheappealofpublicprocurement opportunities for international firms, and can be damaging to cash flowmanagementofSMEs.Lack of information and a posteriori oversight: Little information is available about projectimplementation and payments, preventing citizens and governments from ensuring thatprocurement isresulting inefficientservicedelivery. InNigeriaandGuinea,auditingbodies lackcapacity and resources to conduct audits thatwould help ensure service delivery and value formoney.InGhana,onlyperformanceauditsarebeingconducted.

LegalContext

3.Improvethebidevaluationprocessbyempoweringwhistleblowersandcomplainants.

Confidentiality in the bid evaluation process is necessary to protect against undue influence of theselection process. However, the precedence of confidentiality should not prevent the adoption ofmeasuresthatenableaposteriorireviewofbidprocedureanddecision-making.

Recommendations:Allcountrylegalframeworksshouldinclude1)clearevaluationcriteriaestablishedprior to the evaluation process; 2) a public summary of the evaluation; 3) opportunity for losingbidders to receive feedback; 4) opportunity for evaluation members to blow the whistle on unfairpractices,and;5)opportunityforlosingbidders-andeventhegeneralpublic,asinGuinea-toprotestthe award. For participants and citizens to have confidence in the complaints process, complaintsshould be received by an independent body,with a public complaint and outcome summary, as inNigeria.

Workingwithprocurementauthoritiesineachcountry,alongwithrelevantinternationalbodies,suchas theWAEMU, presents an opportunity for FCO to engage on the reform of regulations that canenhancetheevaluationprocess.Whilesomeofthereformssuggestedhereinwouldrequirelegislativechanges, others can likely be enacted through regulations adopted by procurement authorities.Collaborationwithcivilsocietyandtheprivatesectortodeviseanadvocacystrategyonthisandotherreformissuespresentsanopportunitytoimprovelegislationandbuildcitizentrustinprocurement.

Examples: In most of the countries studied, complaints are reviewed by the same procurementauthorities against which they are possibly being levied.Guinea andNigeria6 are the only countrieswherethecomplaintcouldconceivablybereviewedbyanindependentthirdparty.InGuinea,Senegal6AlthoughsomeprocuremententitystaffinNigeriaaretechnicallyofficersoftheBureauofPublicProcurement,whichrespondstocomplaints,manyprocurementofficersremainwithinthecivilservice.

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and Nigeria, the rules stipulate a relatively short lead time for decisions from the first-tier review,comparedtoGhana.However, inGuinea,ourcountrystudyrevealedonly5 instancesofcancellationsdue to complaints and zero audits have occurred. While some countries, such as Senegal, allow forrepresentativesofcivilsocietyandtheprivatesectortositinoncomplaintreviewcommittees,Ghanaistheonlycountrythatmandatestrainingforcommitteemembers.

Beyond complaints, therewas little opportunity found for reviewof theevaluation criteria, despite anumber of interviewees suggesting that procedures (such as reviewing technical proposals prior tofinancialproposals)werenotalways followed.Business representatives sometimescomplainedof theinability to receive feedback, and often not being told that their company had not been selected.Although legislation often stipulates that the evaluation criteria be publicly announced in the tenderdocuments, there appears to be little recourse for participants in the evaluation committee whencriteria are ignored. In Guinea, for example, an evaluation participant who suspects collusion, is toinformhis/hersupervisor(s),theARMP,andthePE.Nolegalprotectionissuggested.

4.Strengthenlegalrequirementsonprocurementdatacollection,andopen,proactivedisclosure.

Whilegovernmentshaveadutytoprotectsensitivedatafrompublicdisclosure,transparencyanddatause can prevent corruption and lead to increased efficiencies. None of the countries studied arecurrentlypublishingdatainanopenformat,althoughNigeria,whichcurrentlyranksasoneoftheleasttransparentcontractingenvironmentsof thegroup (see tableonpage8), ismakingsignificant stridestowardspublishinginOCDS.

Recommendations: The adoption of e-procurement or other electronic systems that require PEs toreportdata toprocurementauthorities inorder forprocurement to takeplacewill improve internaldata collection.7 While such tools can facilitate the publication of data through online data portals,legislativerequirementsmustbeupdatedtoensurethatthisdataremainspublic.Concomitantly,datacollectionsystemsshouldbeupdatedtocollecttimelydataonarollingbasis.Publishingopendata,inaddition to the technical requirementsof using anopenand structured format, requiresunrestrictedlicensingsothatdatacanbefreelyusedandmixedbythepublic.Althoughthisisinitiallyaconcerningpropositiontosomepublicofficials,providingprocurementinformationasopendatacanhavepositiveeconomic ramifications (e.g. through third-party engines that enable businesses to target specificcontractsandthroughcivilsocietymonitoringthathelpidentifycollusionandothermalfeasance).

Examples:Nigeria’s procurement authority (BPP) only receives detailed data from PEs on an annualbasis; more frequent reporting would enable enhanced use of data analytics for understandingcorruption risk, the efficiency of their procurement processes, and value for money. WhileGhana’sPublicProcurementAct (663of2003and914of2016) requirespublicationof tenderannouncementsandfinalawards,andenablespublicationofcontracts,itdoesnotspecifywhenorhowthispublicationshouldtakeplace. InLiberia,onlytendernoticesandcontractawardsaboveacertainamountrequirepublication.InGuinea,asummaryreportofprocurementactivitiesismadepubliconaquarterlybasisafterapprovalbytheMinistryofFinance.InCôted’IvoireandSenegal,WAEMUdisclosureregulationsfor the planning, tender and award phases require procurement plans be published annually byDecember 1, tender notices at least 7 days after the procurement plan, procurement statistics each

7InLiberiaandotherlocationswherespottyInternetoftenresultsinthelossofdata,onlinetoolsthatautomaticallysavedatawhetheronlineoroffline,canreducedataloss.

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trimester,provisionalawardnoticeswithin3daysofbidevaluation,andfinalawardnoticeswithin15daysofprovisionalaward.

PolicyContext

5.Putopencontractingontheregionalradarthroughlocalandinternationalengagement.

Beforepolicymakerscanlegislate“open”intolaw,theymustknowwhatitis.Todate,Nigeriaistheonlycountryofthe6withastrongunderstandingandplantoimplementopencontracting.However,otherstudycountriesmayquicklycomeonboard.

Recommendations:Insomecountries,notablyNigeriaandtheUkraine,governmentawarenessofopencontractinghasbeen largely initiatedbyengagement from localcivil society, in the formofprototypedigital tools for visualizing procurement data with OCDS. FCO could provide support to local orinternational groups to develop simple tools using already-available data, which can then bepresentedtogovernmenttoraiseawareness.ThisapproachwouldmostlikelybeappropriateinGhana,Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, where civil society digital skills are more sophisticated.Alternatively,engaginggovernmentandcivilsocietyrepresentativesthroughinternational initiativesliketheOpenGovernmentPartnership(OGP)8canresult inhigh-levelcommitment,whichmustthenbefollowedbyengagementatthetechnicallevelsofbureaucracytofurtherimplementation.

Examples: InthecaseofNigeria,civilsocietyactors ledthepushforopencontractingbydevelopingatool that converts procurement data into OCDS. Using Budeshi,9 these activists were able todemonstratetheutilityofOCDSandarenowworkingdirectlywithsomePEstoconverttheirdataontheir behalf. They are also working with the BPP, which has embraced OCDS and open contractingprinciples. The BPP and civil society counterparts are releasing an open contracting portal in early2017.10

Senegalhasundertakenavarietyofopendatainitiatives,largelyledbytheMinistryofFinanceandtheNationalAgency for StatisticsandDemography.Ghana’sNational InformationTechnologyAgencyhasimplemented anopendata portal11 andGhana’s civil society has been advocating for data release inopen formats for several years. In these countries, engagement with civil society and governmentdirectlywouldlikelybefruitful.InGuineaandLiberia,wheredigitalskillsarelessavailable,collaborationwithinternationalcivilsocietyactorsengagedinopencontractingcouldsupplementlocalcapacity.

Nigeria,Ghana,andLiberiaarepresentlyparticipatinginOGPandbothNigeriaandGhanahavemadecommitments to implement open contracting principles. Côte d’Ivoire has recently surpassed theparticipationcriteria,althoughithasnotformallysignaleditsintenttojoin.Côted’Ivoire’sparticipationinapartnershipofcountriesaimingtoenhancegovernmentopennesswouldprovidevalidationofopendataadvocacybylocalactors.

8See:http://www.opengovpartnership.org/.Accessed:12.21.16.9See:http://www.budeshi.org/.Accessed:12.21.16.10See:http://www.nigeriaoc.org/.Accessed:03.09.17.11Availableat:http://data.gov.gh/.Accessed:12.21.16.

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TechnicalAnalysis

6.Supporttheuseofnewtechnologies,includinge-procurement,thatstrengthenlegalcomplianceandtheOpenContractingPrinciples.

Evenwheneffective institutionsand legal frameworksare inplace forprocurement, timely reporting,proper data management, compliance monitoring, and proactive disclosure are likely to remain achallenge due to a lack of digital tools for procurement. A growing trend, e-procurement can enableopen contracting, reinforce procurement law, streamline international participation through onlinebidding,andenableanalyticsforprocurementefficiencyandintegrity.

Recommendation: While e-procurement represents a substantial investment, implementing e-procurementshouldbeviewedasapriorityinthecountriesstudied.Wheretechnologiesarealreadyinuse,e-procurementcan increaseefficienciesandadvancepractices thatare relatively familiar to staffinvolved (although training would be needed).Where technologies are partially in use or not at all,additionalbarrierstosuccesswouldneedtobeaccountedfor (suchaspoor internetaccess,electricalconnectionsorthelackofcomputers).Inallcaseswherethishasnottakenplacealready,adeep-divetechnicalandprocessneedsassessmentfore-procurementshouldbeundertaken.Theseassessmentsshould includeanalysisofhowe-procurementsystemscan linkwithbusinessandtaxregistries,andwith government budget systems (see PFM section 7). Similar assessments have been performed inmany countries, including by British companies like Crown Agents. For British and internationalcompaniesinterviewedforthisproject,aparticularlyimportantareafortechnologyande-procurementwastransparencyandopennessoftheentireprocurementprocess–theywould liketoseeeffortsbytheBritishandhostgovernmentstobuildtransparencyintothesystemandtodesigncorruptionoutofit.

Examples:Evenwiththeuseofadvancedtechnology,managingthehundredsofagenciesprovidingdatatoasinglesource,whileengagingthousandsofprivatebusinessespresentssignificantchallenges.Yetitislittlesurprisethatthethreecountriesusingtechnologytoolstofacilitateprocurementmanagement-Ghana,Senegal, andCôted’Ivoire - are the countriesprovidingpublic informationona routinebasis(seetheKeyDataCategoriestablebelow).

Althoughnoneofthecountriesstudiedarecurrentlyusingfull-featurede-procurementsystems,GhanaandNigeriaaresoontobetenderingforsuchsystems.Thereisasmall,butgrowing,bodyofresearchshowing that e-procurement can increase competition in publicmarkets, such as by ensuring that allinvitationstobidarepostedonauniqueportal.12Italsoincreasesefficiencybyfacilitatingdatatransferbetween procurement bodies. In Nigeria, interviewees from government and civil society wereunanimouslysupportiveoftheadoptionofe-procurementbecauseitwouldforcecompliancewithlegalrequirements.Forinstance,thiswouldfacilitatetheprocurementauthority’s(BPP)jobofensuringthatcompetitive thresholdsare respected,while savingPEstaff fromhaving to redobids that fall shortofrequirements(e.g.advertisementobligations).

12See,forinstance:http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/results-through-transparency-does-publicity-lead-better-procurement-working-paper-437.pdf.

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7.Strengtheningdisclosureofinformationthroughallstages,butparticularlyoncethecontracthasbeensigned.

Asshowninthetableabove,eventhecountriesmostproactiveindisclosingprocurementdatadisplaynoticeablegapsindatapublication.Disclosureinthecontractingandimplementationstages,whereservicedeliveryandpaymenttakesplace,isparticularlyweak.

Recommendation: Providing online, useable procurement information supports the mission ofprocurementauthoritiestoconductefficientandeffectiveprocurement.Whileincreasedtransparencycandetersomecorruptionandfostermorerobustengagementbybusinesses,publictrustwrestsontheabilityofthepublic(includingcivilsocietyandthemedia)toconfirmthatofficialresultscomplywithon-the-groundrealities:aschoolprocuredshouldbeaschoolbuilt.Procurementauthorities-andPEsthatmaintain post-award data - should make contracts and amendments, as well as implementationdetails, available to the public as open data. As governments worldwide cope with the changingexpectations of citizens for how governments should operate and the results achieved,procurementauthoritiesshouldengagecivilsocietyandprivatesectorstakeholderstounderstandtheirneedsandthechallengestheyfaceinusingthesedataformonitoringandfeedback.

Examples:Thetableabovehighlightsthechallengestoonlinedisclosureofprocurementinformationinallofthecountriesstudied.Thelackofdisclosureisevidentinallphasesoftheprocurementprocess:

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● Planning:WhileSenegal, Liberia, andGhana alwaysor sometimespublishprocurementplansandconsultationdocuments,onlyGhanahasuniqueprojectidentifiersandthecapacitytotrackprojectimplementationacrossotherphasesoftheprocurementprocess.

● Tender:Ghanapublishestenderdocumentsonlineconsistently,whilealloftheothercountriespublishsometimes.Publishingtendersonline,includingkeyinformationabouttenderdatesandqualifications,iskeytoensuringfaircompetitionbybusinesses.

● Award:Allcountriespublishawardamountsandsuppliernamesalwaysorsometimes.Inmostinstances,thecomplaintsprocedureisalsoavailable.

● Contract:OnlyGhanaalwayspublishescontractamountsanddates;NigeriaandLiberiadoonlyforcontractsabovecertainfinancialthresholds.

● Implementation: The across-the-board lack of implementation data online prevents citizensfrom understanding if procurement money is being used appropriately, including if contractamendmentsalterthebudgetandscopeofworkofprocurementtobenefitthewinningbidderandreducevalueformoney.

UserEngagement

8.Improvethepracticeofdatacollectionanddisclosurewithspecificuserneedsinmind.

When procurement authorities collect data, they should understand how various stakeholdersmightuse it. Engaging with various user groups (government, civil society, and private sector) can help toidentifykeygaps inexistingdatacollectionand informefforts to improvedatasystems (including thedesignofanye-procurementsolution).

Recommendations:Theadoptionofopencontractingprinciplescanhelpprocurementauthoritiesmeettheir own data needs, aswell as those of external users. Byengagingwith civil society, the privatesectorandotheragenciesandentitieswithinthegovernment,procurementauthoritiescanbegintounderstand the variousways inwhich data can support various needs. Through collaborationwithinternational organizations, such asOCP, and engaging in initiatives to develop tools for analyzingprocurementdata, procurementauthorities canalsoexploredatause froma varietyofperspectives.These stakeholder engagements should feed into any efforts to scope and design e-procurementsystems,ensuringthatinvestmentsindigitaltoolsmeettheneedsofusers.

Examples: Procurement authorities themselvesmay bemost interested in using data to ensure thattheir procurement operations are smooth and efficient, and that they are receiving value formoney.Civilsocietygroupsfocusingonaccesstoeducationorhealthcaremaybeinterestedindataonservicedelivery. Businesses may care about competitiveness and statistics about contracts to SMEs orinternationalfirms.

Our research found a diversity of needs by different data users, many of which support the coremissions-valueformoney,competition,efficiency,etc.-ofprocurementauthoritieswhoarethedataowners.Nevertheless,we found thateven thesedataownersdonot always collect sufficientdata tomeeteventheirownobjectives.Forinstance,someprocurementauthoritiesarenotcollectingdataonlosingbids,suchasthenamesandidentifiersofbiddingcompaniesandtheamountsofthesebids.Thisinformation iscritical to theuseofanalytics for identifyingtheriskofbidrigging,collusionandfraud.The use of unique identifiers - for projects (as Ghana does), companies, items being procured andprocuring entities - also boosts the utility of data that can be used for assessing the value ofprocurement deals and the efficiency of these processes. A key driver of Nigerian procurement

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authority’s(BPP)interestinopencontractingistherecognitionofthevaluetheycangainfromrunninganalyticsonprocurementdata.

9.Engagestakeholdersroutinelytoimprovetheprocurementprocess.

Developing effective policies for procurement processes requires a broad perspective that extendsbeyond government to incorporate views from civil society (with an interest in ensuring fair andeffectiveprocurementandservicedelivery)andprivatecompanies(withaninterestinensuringalevelplayingfieldandefficientprocessesthatreducetransactioncosts).Experiencesinstudycountriespointtopossibilitiesforinclusive,collaborativepolicydesign.

Recommendations: While relations between government and external stakeholders are oftencombative, the experience inNigeria and other countries studied suggests that this need not be thecase.By establishingworking groups and othermechanisms of routinized collaboration among thevarious stakeholders, procurement authorities can broaden their perspectives and find means ofworking towards collective goals. Where civil society and business interests groups are active onprocurementissues,suchinitiativescanresultintheadoptionofregulationsthatmeetuserandcreatedynamic relationships that lead to improved oversight. Support for such initiatives would be bestoperationalizedinconjunctionwithsupportfortheimplementationofinitiativesthatresultfromsuchdiscussions,includingthedevelopmentoftoolsforusingprocurementdata.

Examples:Beyondfilingcomplaints,thecountriesstudiedareengagingwithstakeholdersinavarietyofways.InSenegal,civilsocietyandprivatesectorrepresentativessitontheregulatoryauthority’s(ARMP)Regulatory Board and Committee for Settlement of Disputes. In Guinea, members of the ConseilNationaldesOrganisationsdelaSociétéCivile(CNOSC)participateintheevaluationofbids,aswellasinregulationcommissionoftheregulatoryauthority(ARMP).

Nigeriahasadoptedanumberofmeasuresforstakeholderinclusion.PEsarelegallyrequiredtoinvitecivil society and professional bodies to observe every procurement process. But the procurementauthority (BPP), going beyond the satisfaction of legal requirements, provides PEs with a list ofaccredited civil society organizations so that they can be contactedwhenever there is a bid openingprocess.Withrespecttopolicydevelopment,BPPhostsconsultativemeetingsduringrevisionprocessesfor standard bidding documents and an annual national procurement conferencewhere civil society,private sector and the various arms of government hold robust discussions and deviserecommendationstofurtherreformtheprocurementprocess.TheBPPhasrecentlyformedaworkinggroup with civil society to facilitate its adoption of open contracting principles as part of an OGPcommitment.

StakeholderIdentification

10.Supportcivilsocietyengagementthroughstrengtheningcapacity,resourcesanddata.

In study countries, civil society organizations expressed an interest to engagewith procurement dataandprocesses, butoften lack the technical skills, procurement knowledge, and/or resources todo soeffectively.

Recommendations: In all of the countries, civil society organizations are active on procurement orrelated issues, such as monitoring the extractive industries or financial management. Support forincreasingcapacity,particularlyon theminutiaeofprocurementprocesses,wasnotedasaneed for

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some. In other instances, support could focus on the development of technology tools to facilitatemonitoring activities. Key challenges to procurement engagement for civil society are the need fortraining,resourcestosupportprogramming,andforupdateddata.

Examples: In some instances, due to the lack of procurement data, civil societymonitoring of publicprojectsareobliged tousebudgetdata tocompensate,whichcancause inefficienciesandconfusion.This is a challenge faced by CODE in Nigeria, which has staff in each state who help support theorganization’s efforts tomonitor implementation of public procurement. Civil society can also play aconvening role: the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), through its Dialogue on OpenContracting,13 has brought together civil society andprocurement authority leadership to help bridgemulti-stakeholdervoicesonopencontracting.

11.Increasedcollaborationamonginternationalinstitutionscanensurethatresourcesareeffectivelymanagedinthesupportofprocurementreform.

Recommendations: International institutionshaveplayedan invaluable role inassisting thecreationandmaturationofprocurementauthoritiesandregulatorybodiesintheregion.TheWorldBankandAfricanDevelopmentBank (AfDB)areamong the institutions thathavebeen supportingprocurementinitiativesinWestAfricaoverthepastdecade.Asadditionaldevelopmentpartnersseektosupportopencontractingandprocurement reform, coordinationamong thesevariousgroups is critical.FCOshouldengagewiththeseleadingsupporterstocreatecountry-leveldonorworkinggroupsonprocurement,combined with coordination of agencies at the regional level. In particular, FCO should considersupportto,orengagementwith,themulti-donorPublicProcurementSupportProjectintheWAEMU.

Examples: Throughout the region, theWorldBank and theAfricanDevelopmentBankwere routinelymentionedamongtheinstitutionsfocusedonprocurementsupport.TheWorldBankhassupportedthereform processes in each of the countries studied. It was key in the creation of the procurementauthority (BPP) inNigeriaandtheadoptionofthePublicProcurementAct inGuinea.TheWorldBankconducts audits in some of the countries and engages through its Benchmarking Public Procurementinitiative, which assesses procurement systems based on specific criteria. TheWorld Bank has beeninvolved in discussions on support for e-procurement implementation in a number of the countriesstudied.

AfDBsupportstheadoptionandstrengtheningofregionalnormsandstandardsinpublicprocurement.AfDB isengaged in themulti-donorPublicProcurementSupportProject in theWAEMU,whichaims tomodernize and harmonize public procurement systems in the region. In Senegal, AfDB focuses onstrengthening procurement systems and institutions for governing public resources, including incollaboration with the regulatory authority (ARMP). In Côte d’Ivoire, AfDB is a strong supporter ofprocurementreform,includingforgingmoreeffectiveandtransparentprocurementsystems,bothonacountry and regional level. This comes throughpolicy and institutional support programs, and eventssuchasregionalpublicprocurementforums.

13Formoreinformation,see:http://www.gaccgh.org/details.cfm?corpnews_scatid=7&corpnews_catid=7&corpnews_scatlinkid=35#.WE7Ov_mLTIU.Accessed:12.22.16.

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12.Collaboratewithsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)topromoteopencontractingandotherpracticalmeasurestoensurethatprocurementreformsrespondtotheirneeds.

AkeypublicprocurementchallengeistoensurethatSMEshaveanequalopportunitytoparticipate,aprioritythatshouldbebalancedwithensuringacompetitiveenvironment.

Recommendations:DevelopmentorProsperityprojectscouldfocusonhelpinghostgovernmentstoopenpublicprocurementtoparticipationbymoreSMEs,by:buildingcapacityofSMEstoparticipateinpublictendersandprovidingtrainingforSMEsinbasiccomplianceandresponsiblebusinesstechniques,includinghowtoresistcorruption.EngagementofSMEsshouldalsofocusonthepotentialofopencontractingtohelpthemmonitorregulationsthataimtosupporttheirinterests.FromtheperspectiveofBritishandotherforeigncompanies,thisagendawouldenhancecompetitionanddrivegrowth,aswellasimprovetheriskprofileofinternationalcompanies’supplychains.

Examples:InGhanaandSenegal,privatesectorgroupsexpressedconcernsaboutcompetitionfacedbyinternational and foreignbusinesses. Senegal’s private sector groupshave requested the governmentmodify the procurement code’s definition of a “national company” to include only Senegalesecompanies,asopposedtoallofthoseregistered inWAEMUstates.ProtectionistpolicieshavealreadybeenratifiedinCôted’Ivoire,wherearecentreformrequiresthat30percentofallprocurementbidsbereserved for SMEs. Additional requirements for involvement of local partners by internationalcompaniesalsopassed.

13.ArangeofchallengescreatedisincentivesforparticipationofBritishandWesterncompaniesinWestAfricanmarkets,butensuringafairandcompetitiveprocesswouldproduceavaluableincentivetoengage.

Ourresearchshowsthatwhilenosinglerisktoparticipationinacountry’smarket–suchascorruption,anuncertainprocurementenvironment,geography,etc.-isdisqualifying,thecombinationoftheseandotherfactorswillhaveadetrimentaleffectonacompany’sappetiteforinvestment.Intheend,formanybusinessesthechoicetoparticipateinagivencountryisamatterofothermarketsappearingtobemoreattractive.

Recommendations:ThereareanumberofmeasuresthatFCOandBritishinstitutionscantaketoenhancetheparticipationofBritishcompaniesinWestAfricanmarkets.InterviewswithBritishcompaniessuggestedthatthesupportoftheFrenchandGermangovernmentsforinvestmentinSub-SaharanAfricacouldbereplicated.WhileBritishpostsandBritishCouncilareseenasmakingefforts,therewasaviewthatadditionalmeasurescouldbetaken,including:tradedelegationstoandfromtheWestAfricancountries,amorerelaxedvisaregime,positivepressandapragmaticapproachtobusiness.

Examples:Corruptionriskisasignificantdeterrenttodoingbusiness.Buttherearemanyfactors,inadditiontocorruptionrisk,thatcoulddiscourageforeigncompaniesfrominvestinginortradingwithaparticularcountry.Theseincludethestateoftheeconomyoreconomicpolicies(e.g.Nigeria’sforeignexchangerestrictionsandartificiallyhighexchangerate),politicalinstabilityandsecurityrisks(e.g.Liberiaduringorpost-civil-war),healthrisks(e.g.Liberia’sandGuinea’soutbreaksofEbola),relativegrossnationalincome(GNI)(e.g.Nigeria’sGNIpercapitaof$2950comparedtoLiberia’s$400)andpopulationsize(e.g.Nigeria’s179millioncomparedtoLiberia’s4million).Foreigncompanies

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interviewedforthisreportalsociteanumberofotherfactors,suchaslanguagebarriers(Britishbusinesspeoples’poorknowledgeofFrenchinfrancophone),thatcoulddiscourageparticipation.

BroaderPublicFinancialManagementEnvironment

14.LaygroundworkforinteroperabilitybetweenprocurementdataandbroaderPFMinfrastructure.

Theprocurementprocessisacentralelementofpublicfinancialmanagement:procurementplanningandbudgetformulationshouldbecloselyintegrated,whilecontractimplementationandtreasurypaymentsarecloselylinked.Investmentsinprocurementsystemsshouldconsiderinteroperabilityandfutureintegrationwithgovernmentbudget(IFMIS)andimplementationmonitoringfunctions.

Recommendation:Asstudycountriescontinuetotakeefforts(e.g.e-procurement,policyreformsondatadisclosure)tomodernizeprocurementlegislation,processes,andtechnicalsystems,carefulanalysisandpreparationshouldtakeplacetoensurethefeasibilityoflinkageswithrelevantPFMsystems.ThisincludessettingcleardatastandardsforcoreelementsusingthesameclassificationsusedintheIFMISChartofAccounts(CoA),includingorganizations(PEsandsuppliers),programs,regions/districts,andfundingsource(e.g.governmentbudgetandofficialdevelopmentassistance).Wherepossible,linkswithbusinessandtaxregistriesshouldalsobepursuedbyusingthesameidentifiersandsynchronizingdataacrossbothsystems.Tofacilitatethis,anye-procurementsystemdesignshouldincludeanin-depthtechnicalassessmentwithadetailedevaluationoftheCoA.

Keybenefitsofthisapproachinclude:abilitytovalidateappropriatetaxstatusofanysupplier;verificationofcompanycapacity(e.g.numberofstaff),priorqualifications,andcorporateblacklists;verificationofavailabilityoffundspriortoissuanceoftenderdocuments;integrationofprocurementplansandbudgetpreparationtoincreaseefficiencyofbudgetexecution,and;validationofpaymentsagainstcontractdocumentstoensuretimelypaymentandpreventover-paymentofsuppliersagainstcontractamounts.

Examples:InLiberia,procurementplansaresubmittedaspartofthebudgetpreparationprocess,buttheplanningdataarenotintegratedbetweenprocurementsystemsandtheIFMIS.InNigeria,theIFMISsystemispreparingtoaddbackwardscompatibilitywithprocurementdata,includingprocurementplans,tender,andcontractawardsdata,theuseofadatastandardlikeOCDScanfacilitateinteroperability.InSenegal,thegovernmentisintheprocessofimplementingits2011reform,includingnewbudgetclassifications-implementationisanticipatedtobecompletedin2017.Thisclassificationmodernizationpresentsastrongopportunityforlearningandinteroperabilityintheprocurementsystem.InGuinea,noIFMISsystemiscurrentlyinplace,posingachallengeforbudgetplanningandexecution,althoughwithanopportunityforconcurrentinvestmentsinIFMISande-procurementwithmutualinteroperabilitydesignedfrominitiationofdesign.