on the notion of cause-russell

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7/17/2019 On the Notion of Cause-Russell http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/on-the-notion-of-cause-russell 1/12  An essay by Bertrand Russell On The Notion Of Cause   ________________________________________________ Title: On The Notion Of Cause Author: Bertrand Russell [More Titles by Russell] In the following aer I wish! first! to "aintain that the word #$ause# is so ine%tri$ably bound u with "isleading asso$iations as to "a&e its $o"lete e%trusion fro" the hilosohi$al 'o$abulary desirable( se$ondly! to in)uire what rin$ile! if any! is e"loyed in s$ien$e in la$e of the suosed #law of $ausality# whi$h hilosohers i"agine to be e"loyed( thirdly! to e%hibit $ertain $onfusions! ese$ially in regard to teleology and deter"inis"! whi$h aear to "e to be $onne$ted with erroneous notions as to $ausality* All hilosohers! of e'ery s$hool! i"agine that $ausation is one of the funda"ental a%io"s or ostulates of s$ien$e! yet! oddly enough! in ad'an$ed s$ien$es su$h as gra'itational astrono"y! the word #$ause# ne'er o$$urs* +r* ,a"es -ard! in his _Naturalis" and Agnosti$is"_! "a&es this a ground of $o"laint against hysi$s: the business of those who wish to as$ertain the ulti"ate truth about the world! he aarently thin&s! should be the dis$o'ery of $auses! yet hysi$s ne'er e'en see&s the"* To "e it see"s that hilosohy ought not to assu"e su$h legislati'e fun$tions! and that the reason why hysi$s has $eased to loo& for $auses is that! in fa$t! there are no su$h things* The law of $ausality! I belie'e! li&e "u$h that asses "uster a"ong hilosohers! is a reli$ of a bygone age! sur'i'ing! li&e the "onar$hy! only be$ause it is erroneously suosed to do no har"* In order to find out what hilosohers $o""only understand by #$ause!# I $onsulted Baldwin.s _+i$tionary_! and was rewarded beyond "y e%e$tations! for I found the following three "utually in$o"atible definitions:// "CAUSALITY. (1) The necessary connection of events in the time-series.... "CAUSE (notion of). Whatever may e inc!#e# in the tho$ht or %erce%tion of a %rocess as ta&in$ %!ace in conse'ence of another %rocess.... "CAUSE A E**ECT. (1) Case an# effect ... are corre!ative terms #enotin$ any t+o #istin$isha!e thin$s, %hases, or as%ects of rea!ity, +hich are so re!ate# to each other that +henever the first ceases to eist the secon# comes into eistence imme#iate!y after, an# +henever the secon# comes into eistence the first has cease# to eist imme#iate!y efore." 0et us $onsider these three definitions in turn* The first! ob'iously! is unintelligible without a definition of #ne$essary*# 1nder this head! Baldwin.s _+i$tionary_ gi'es the following:// "ECESSAY. That is necessary +hich not on!y is tre, t +o!# e tre n#er a!! circmstances. Somethin$ more than rte com%!sion is, therefore, invo!ve# in the conce%tion/ there is a $enera! !a+ n#er +hich the thin$ ta&es %!ace." The notion of $ause is so inti"ately $onne$ted with that of ne$essity that it will be no digression to linger o'er the abo'e definition! with a 'iew to dis$o'ering! if ossible! _so"e_ "eaning of whi$h it is $aable( for! as it stands! it is 'ery far fro" ha'ing any definite signifi$ation* The first oint to noti$e is that! if any "eaning is to be gi'en to the hrase #would be true under all $ir$u"stan$es!# the sub2e$t of it "ust be a roositional fun$tion! not a roosition*[34] A roosition is si"ly true or false! and that ends the "atter: there $an be no )uestion of #$ir$u"stan$es*# #Charles I.s Search

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Page 1: On the Notion of Cause-Russell

7/17/2019 On the Notion of Cause-Russell

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/on-the-notion-of-cause-russell 1/12

 An essay by  Bertrand Russell 

On The Notion Of Cause

 

 ________________________________________________Title: On The Notion Of CauseAuthor: Bertrand Russell [More Titles by Russell]

In the following aer I wish! first! to "aintain that the word #$ause# is so ine%tri$ably bound u with

"isleading asso$iations as to "a&e its $o"lete e%trusion fro" the hilosohi$al 'o$abulary desirable(

se$ondly! to in)uire what rin$ile! if any! is e"loyed in s$ien$e in la$e of the suosed #law of

$ausality# whi$h hilosohers i"agine to be e"loyed( thirdly! to e%hibit $ertain $onfusions! ese$ially in

regard to teleology and deter"inis"! whi$h aear to "e to be $onne$ted with erroneous notions as to

$ausality*

All hilosohers! of e'ery s$hool! i"agine that $ausation is one of the funda"ental a%io"s or ostulates

of s$ien$e! yet! oddly enough! in ad'an$ed s$ien$es su$h as gra'itational astrono"y! the word #$ause#

ne'er o$$urs* +r* ,a"es -ard! in his _Naturalis" and Agnosti$is"_! "a&es this a ground of $o"laint

against hysi$s: the business of those who wish to as$ertain the ulti"ate truth about the world! he

aarently thin&s! should be the dis$o'ery of $auses! yet hysi$s ne'er e'en see&s the"* To "e it see"s

that hilosohy ought not to assu"e su$h legislati'e fun$tions! and that the reason why hysi$s has

$eased to loo& for $auses is that! in fa$t! there are no su$h things* The law of $ausality! I belie'e! li&e

"u$h that asses "uster a"ong hilosohers! is a reli$ of a bygone age! sur'i'ing! li&e the "onar$hy!

only be$ause it is erroneously suosed to do no har"* In order to find out what hilosohers $o""only

understand by #$ause!# I $onsulted Baldwin.s _+i$tionary_! and was rewarded beyond "y e%e$tations!

for I found the following three "utually in$o"atible definitions://

"CAUSALITY. (1) The necessary connection of events in the time-series....

"CAUSE (notion of). Whatever may e inc!#e# in the tho$ht or %erce%tion of a %rocess as ta&in$ %!ace

in conse'ence of another %rocess....

"CAUSE A E**ECT. (1) Case an# effect ... are corre!ative terms #enotin$ any t+o #istin$isha!e

thin$s, %hases, or as%ects of rea!ity, +hich are so re!ate# to each other that +henever the first ceases to

eist the secon# comes into eistence imme#iate!y after, an# +henever the secon# comes into eistence

the first has cease# to eist imme#iate!y efore." 

0et us $onsider these three definitions in turn* The first! ob'iously! is unintelligible without a definition of#ne$essary*# 1nder this head! Baldwin.s _+i$tionary_ gi'es the following://

"ECESSAY. That is necessary +hich not on!y is tre, t +o!# e tre n#er a!! circmstances.

Somethin$ more than rte com%!sion is, therefore, invo!ve# in the conce%tion/ there is a $enera! !a+

n#er +hich the thin$ ta&es %!ace." 

The notion of $ause is so inti"ately $onne$ted with that of ne$essity that it will be no digression to linger

o'er the abo'e definition! with a 'iew to dis$o'ering! if ossible! _so"e_ "eaning of whi$h it is $aable(

for! as it stands! it is 'ery far fro" ha'ing any definite signifi$ation*

The first oint to noti$e is that! if any "eaning is to be gi'en to the hrase #would be true under all$ir$u"stan$es!# the sub2e$t of it "ust be a roositional fun$tion! not a roosition*[34] A roosition is

si"ly true or false! and that ends the "atter: there $an be no )uestion of #$ir$u"stan$es*# #Charles I.s

Search

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head was $ut off# is 2ust as true in su""er as in winter! on 5undays as on Mondays* Thus when it is

worth saying that so"ething #would be true under all $ir$u"stan$es!# the so"ething in )uestion "ust be

a roositional fun$tion! i*e* an e%ression $ontaining a 'ariable! and be$o"ing a roosition when a

'alue is assigned to the 'ariable( the 'arying #$ir$u"stan$es# alluded to are then the different 'alues of

whi$h the 'ariable is $aable* Thus if #ne$essary# "eans #what is true under all $ir$u"stan$es!# then #if

 _%_ is a "an! _%_ is "ortal# is ne$essary! be$ause it is true for any ossible 'alue of _%_* Thus weshould be led to the following definition://

"ECESSAY is a %re#icate of a %ro%ositiona! fnction, meanin$ that it is tre for a!! %ossi!e va!es of

its ar$ment or ar$ments." 

1nfortunately! howe'er! the definition in Baldwin.s _+i$tionary_ says that what is ne$essary is not only

#true under all $ir$u"stan$es# but is also #true*# Now these two are in$o"atible* Only roositions $an

be #true!# and only roositional fun$tions $an be #true under all $ir$u"stan$es*# 6en$e the definition as

it stands is nonsense* -hat is "eant see"s to be this: #A roosition is ne$essary when it is a 'alue of a

roositional fun$tion whi$h is true under all $ir$u"stan$es! i*e* for all 'alues of its argu"ent or

argu"ents*# But if we adot this definition! the sa"e roosition will be ne$essary or $ontingenta$$ording as we $hoose one or other of its ter"s as the argu"ent to our roositional fun$tion* 7or

e%a"le! #if 5o$rates is a "an! 5o$rates is "ortal!# is ne$essary if 5o$rates is $hosen as argu"ent! but

not if _"an_ or _"ortal_ is $hosen* Again! #if 5o$rates is a "an! 8lato is "ortal!# will be ne$essary if

either 5o$rates or _"an_ is $hosen as argu"ent! but not if 8lato or _"ortal_ is $hosen* 6owe'er! this

diffi$ulty $an be o'er$o"e by se$ifying the $onstituent whi$h is to be regarded as argu"ent! and we

thus arri'e at the following definition:

#A roosition is _ne$essary_ with rese$t to a gi'en $onstituent if it re"ains true when that $onstituent

is altered in any way $o"atible with the roosition re"aining signifi$ant*#

-e "ay now aly this definition to the definition of $ausality )uoted abo'e* It is ob'ious that the

argu"ent "ust be the ti"e at whi$h the earlier e'ent o$$urs* Thus an instan$e of $ausality will be su$h

as: #If the e'ent [Math: e_9;] o$$urs at the ti"e [Math: t_9;]! it will be followed by the e'ent [Math:e_9<;]*# This roosition is intended to be ne$essary with rese$t to [Math: t_9;]! i*e* to re"ain true

howe'er [Math: t_9;] "ay be 'aried* Causality! as a uni'ersal law! will then be the following: #=i'en

any e'ent [Math: t_9;]! there is an e'ent [Math: e_9<;] su$h that! whene'er [Math: t_9;] o$$urs!

[Math: e_9<;] o$$urs later*# But before this $an be $onsidered re$ise! we "ust se$ify how "u$h later

[Math: e_9<;] is to o$$ur* Thus the rin$ile be$o"es://

#=i'en any e'ent [Math: e_9;]! there is an e'ent [Math: e_9<;] and a ti"e/inter'al > su$h that!

whene'er [Math: e_9;] o$$urs! [Math: e_9<;] follows after an inter'al >*#

I a" not $on$erned as yet to $onsider whether this law is true or false* 7or the resent! I a" "erely

$on$erned to dis$o'er what the law of $ausality is suosed to be* I ass! therefore! to the other

definitions )uoted abo'e*

The se$ond definition need not detain us long! for two reasons* 7irst! be$ause it is sy$hologi$al: not the

#thought or er$etion# of a ro$ess! but the ro$ess itself! "ust be what $on$erns us in $onsidering

$ausality* 5e$ondly! be$ause it is $ir$ular: in sea&ing of a ro$ess as #ta&ing la$e in $onse)uen$e of#

another ro$ess! it introdu$es the 'ery notion of $ause whi$h was to be defined*

The third definition is by far the "ost re$ise( indeed as regards $learness it lea'es nothing to be

desired* But a great diffi$ulty is $aused by the te"oral $ontiguity of $ause and effe$t whi$h the

definition asserts* No two instants are $ontiguous! sin$e the ti"e/series is $o"a$t( hen$e either the

$ause or the effe$t or both "ust! if the definition is $orre$t! endure for a finite ti"e( indeed! by the

wording of the definition it is lain that both are assu"ed to endure for a finite ti"e* But then we are

fa$ed with a dile""a: if the $ause is a ro$ess in'ol'ing $hange within itself! we shall re)uire ?if

$ausality is uni'ersal@ $ausal relations between its earlier and later arts( "oreo'er! it would see" that

only the later arts $an be rele'ant to the effe$t! sin$e the earlier arts are not $ontiguous to the effe$t!

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and therefore ?by the definition@ $annot influen$e the effe$t* Thus we shall be led to di"inish the

duration of the $ause without li"it! and howe'er "u$h we "ay di"inish it! there will still re"ain an

earlier art whi$h "ight be altered without altering the effe$t! so that the true $ause! as defined! will not

ha'e been rea$hed! for it will be obser'ed that the definition e%$ludes lurality of $auses* If! on the other

hand! the $ause is urely stati$! in'ol'ing no $hange within itself! then! in the first la$e! no su$h $ause

is to be found in nature! and in the se$ond la$e! it see"s strange//too strange to be a$$eted! in siteof bare logi$al ossibility//that the $ause! after e%isting la$idly for so"e ti"e! should suddenly e%lode

into the effe$t! when it "ight 2ust as well ha'e done so at any earlier ti"e! or ha'e gone on un$hanged

without rodu$ing its effe$t* This dile""a! therefore! is fatal to the 'iew that $ause and effe$t $an be

$ontiguous in ti"e( if there are $auses and effe$ts! they "ust be searated by a finite ti"e/inter'al >! as

was assu"ed in the abo'e interretation of the first definition*

-hat is essentially the sa"e state"ent of the law of $ausality as the one eli$ited abo'e fro" the first of

Baldwin.s definitions is gi'en by other hilosohers* Thus ,ohn 5tuart Mill says://

#The 0aw of Causation! the re$ognition of whi$h is the "ain illar of indu$ti'e s$ien$e! is but the fa"iliar

truth! that in'ariability of su$$ession is found by obser'ation to obtain between e'ery fa$t in nature and

so"e other fa$t whi$h has re$eded it*#[3]

And Bergson! who has rightly er$ei'ed that the law as stated by hilosohers is worthless! ne'ertheless

$ontinues to suose that it is used in s$ien$e* Thus he says://

#Now! it is argued! this law [the law of $ausality] "eans that e'ery heno"enon is deter"ined by its

$onditions! or! in other words! that the sa"e $auses rodu$e the sa"e effe$ts*#[3]

And again://

#-e er$ei'e hysi$al heno"ena! and these heno"ena obey laws* This "eans: ?@ That heno"ena

 _a_! _b_! _$_! _d_! re'iously er$ei'ed! $an o$$ur again in the sa"e shae( ?<@ that a $ertain

heno"enon 8! whi$h aeared after the $onditions _a_! _b_! _$_! _d_! and after these $onditions only!will not fail to re$ur as soon as the sa"e $onditions are again resent*#[3]

A great art of Bergson.s atta$& on s$ien$e rests on the assu"tion that it e"loys this rin$ile* In

fa$t! it e"loys no su$h rin$ile! but hilosohers//e'en Bergson//are too at to ta&e their 'iews on

s$ien$e fro" ea$h other! not fro" s$ien$e* As to what the rin$ile is! there is a fair $onsensus a"ong

hilosohers of different s$hools* There are! howe'er! a nu"ber of diffi$ulties whi$h at on$e arise* I o"it

the )uestion of lurality of $auses for the resent! sin$e other gra'er )uestions ha'e to be $onsidered*

Two of these! whi$h are for$ed on our attention by the abo'e state"ent of the law! are the following://

?@ -hat is "eant by an #e'ent#D

?<@ 6ow long "ay the ti"e/inter'al be between $ause and effe$tD

?@ An #e'ent!# in the state"ent of the law! is ob'iously intended to be so"ething that is li&ely to re$ur

sin$e otherwise the law be$o"es tri'ial* It follows that an #e'ent# is not a arti$ular! but so"e uni'ersal

of whi$h there "ay be "any instan$es* It follows also that an #e'ent# "ust be so"ething short of the

whole state of the uni'erse! sin$e it is highly i"robable that this will re$ur* -hat is "eant by an #e'ent#

is so"ething li&e stri&ing a "at$h! or droing a enny into the slot of an auto"ati$ "a$hine* If su$h an

e'ent is to re$ur! it "ust not be defined too narrowly: we "ust not state with what degree of for$e the

"at$h is to be stru$&! nor what is to be the te"erature of the enny* 7or if su$h $onsiderations were

rele'ant! our #e'ent# would o$$ur at "ost on$e! and the law would $ease to gi'e infor"ation* An

#e'ent!# then! is a uni'ersal defined suffi$iently widely to ad"it of "any arti$ular o$$urren$es in ti"e

being instan$es of it*

?<@ The ne%t )uestion $on$erns the ti"e/inter'al* 8hilosohers! no doubt! thin& of $ause and effe$t as$ontiguous in ti"e! but this! for reasons already gi'en! is i"ossible* 6en$e! sin$e there are no

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infinitesi"al ti"e/inter'als! there "ust be so"e finite lase of ti"e > between $ause and effe$t* This!

howe'er! at on$e raises insuerable diffi$ulties* 6owe'er short we "a&e the inter'al >! so"ething "ay

haen during this inter'al whi$h re'ents the e%e$ted result* I ut "y enny in the slot! but before I

$an draw out "y ti$&et there is an earth)ua&e whi$h usets the "a$hine and "y $al$ulations* In order

to be sure of the e%e$ted effe$t! we "ust &now that there is nothing in the en'iron"ent to interfere

with it* But this "eans that the suosed $ause is not! by itself! ade)uate to insure the effe$t* And assoon as we in$lude the en'iron"ent! the robability of reetition is di"inished! until at last! when the

whole en'iron"ent is in$luded! the robability of reetition be$o"es al"ost _nil_*

In site of these diffi$ulties! it "ust! of $ourse! be ad"itted that "any fairly deendable regularities of

se)uen$e o$$ur in daily life* It is these regularities that ha'e suggested the suosed law of $ausality(

where they are found to fail! it is thought that a better for"ulation $ould ha'e been found whi$h would

ha'e ne'er failed* I a" far fro" denying that there "ay be su$h se)uen$es whi$h in fa$t ne'er do fail* It

"ay be that there will ne'er be an e%$etion to the rule that when a stone of "ore than a $ertain "ass!

"o'ing with "ore than a $ertain 'elo$ity! $o"es in $onta$t with a ane of glass of less than a $ertain

thi$&ness! the glass brea&s* I also do not deny that the obser'ation of su$h regularities! e'en when they

are not without e%$etions! is useful in the infan$y of a s$ien$e: the obser'ation that unsuorted bodies

in air usually fall was a stage on the way to the law of gra'itation* -hat I deny is that s$ien$e assu"es

the e%isten$e of in'ariable unifor"ities of se)uen$e of this &ind! or that it ai"s at dis$o'ering the"* All

su$h unifor"ities! as we saw! deend uon a $ertain 'agueness in the definition of the #e'ents*# That

bodies fall is a 'ague )ualitati'e state"ent( s$ien$e wishes to &now how fast they fall* This deends

uon the shae of the bodies and the density of the air* It is true that there is "ore nearly unifor"ity

when they fall in a 'a$uu"( so far as =alileo $ould obser'e! the unifor"ity is then $o"lete* But later it

aeared that e'en there the latitude "ade a differen$e! and the altitude* Theoreti$ally! the osition of

the sun and "oon "ust "a&e a differen$e* In short! e'ery ad'an$e in a s$ien$e ta&es us farther away

fro" the $rude unifor"ities whi$h are first obser'ed! into greater differentiation of ante$edent and

$onse)uent! and into a $ontinually wider $ir$le of ante$edents re$ognised as rele'ant*

The rin$ile #sa"e $ause! sa"e effe$t!# whi$h hilosohers i"agine to be 'ital to s$ien$e! is therefore

utterly otiose* As soon as the ante$edents ha'e been gi'en suffi$iently fully to enable the $onse)uent to

be $al$ulated with so"e e%a$titude! the ante$edents ha'e be$o"e so $o"li$ated that it is 'ery unli&elythey will e'er re$ur* 6en$e! if this were the rin$ile in'ol'ed! s$ien$e would re"ain utterly sterile*

The i"ortan$e of these $onsiderations lies artly in the fa$t that they lead to a "ore $orre$t a$$ount of

s$ientifi$ ro$edure! artly in the fa$t that they re"o'e the analogy with hu"an 'olition whi$h "a&es

the $on$etion of $ause su$h a fruitful sour$e of falla$ies* The latter oint will be$o"e $learer by the hel

of so"e illustrations* 7or this urose I shall $onsider a few "a%i"s whi$h ha'e layed a great art in

the history of hilosohy*

?@ #Cause and effe$t "ust "ore or less rese"ble ea$h other*# This rin$ile was ro"inent in the

hilosohy of o$$asionalis"! and is still by no "eans e%tin$t* It is still often thought! for e%a"le! that

"ind $ould not ha'e grown u in a uni'erse whi$h re'iously $ontained nothing "ental! and one ground

for this belief is that "atter is too dissi"ilar fro" "ind to ha'e been able to $ause it* Or! "ore

arti$ularly! what are ter"ed the nobler arts of our nature are suosed to be ine%li$able! unless the

uni'erse always $ontained so"ething at least e)ually noble whi$h $ould $ause the"* All su$h 'iews see"

to deend uon assu"ing so"e unduly si"lified law of $ausality( for! in any legiti"ate sense of #$ause#

and #effe$t!# s$ien$e see"s to show that they are usually 'ery widely dissi"ilar! the #$ause# being! in

fa$t! two states of the whole uni'erse! and the #effe$t# so"e arti$ular e'ent*

?<@ #Cause is analogous to 'olition! sin$e there "ust be an intelligible _ne%us_ between $ause and

effe$t*# This "a%i" is! I thin&! often un$ons$iously in the i"aginations of hilosohers who would re2e$t

it when e%li$itly stated* It is robably oerati'e in the 'iew we ha'e 2ust been $onsidering! that "ind

$ould not ha'e resulted fro" a urely "aterial world* I do not rofess to &now what is "eant by

#intelligible#( it see"s to "ean #fa"iliar to i"agination*# Nothing is less #intelligible!# in any other sense!

than the $onne$tion between an a$t of will and its fulfil"ent* But ob'iously the sort of ne%us desired

between $ause and effe$t is su$h as $ould only hold between the #e'ents# whi$h the suosed law of$ausality $onte"lates( the laws whi$h rela$e $ausality in su$h a s$ien$e as hysi$s lea'e no roo" for

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any two e'ents between whi$h a ne%us $ould be sought*

?3@ #The $ause _$o"els_ the effe$t in so"e sense in whi$h the effe$t does not $o"el the $ause*# This

belief see"s largely oerati'e in the disli&e of deter"inis"( but! as a "atter of fa$t! it is $onne$ted with

our se$ond "a%i"! and falls as soon as that is abandoned* -e "ay define #$o"ulsion# as follows: #Any

set of $ir$u"stan$es is said to $o"el A when A desires to do so"ething whi$h the $ir$u"stan$es

re'ent! or to abstain fro" so"ething whi$h the $ir$u"stan$es $ause*# This resuoses that so"e

"eaning has been found for the word #$ause#//a oint to whi$h I shall return later* -hat I want to "a&e

$lear at resent is that $o"ulsion is a 'ery $o"le% notion! in'ol'ing thwarted desire* 5o long as a

erson does what he wishes to do! there is no $o"ulsion! howe'er "u$h his wishes "ay be $al$ulable

by the hel of earlier e'ents* And where desire does not $o"e in! there $an be no )uestion of

$o"ulsion* 6en$e it is! in general! "isleading to regard the $ause as $o"elling the effe$t*

A 'aguer for" of the sa"e "a%i" substitutes the word #deter"ine# for the word #$o"el#( we are told

that the $ause _deter"ines_ the effe$t in a sense in whi$h the effe$t does not _deter"ine_ the $ause* It

is not )uite $lear what is "eant by #deter"ining#( the only re$ise sense! so far as I &now! is that of a

fun$tion or one/"any relation* If we ad"it lurality of $auses! but not of effe$ts! that is! if we suose

that! gi'en the $ause! the effe$t "ust be su$h and su$h! but! gi'en the effe$t! the $ause "ay ha'e beenone of "any alternati'es! then we "ay say that the $ause deter"ines the effe$t! but not the effe$t the

$ause* 8lurality of $auses! howe'er! results only fro" $on$ei'ing the effe$t 'aguely and narrowly and the

$ause re$isely and widely* Many ante$edents "ay #$ause# a "an.s death! be$ause his death is 'ague

and narrow* But if we adot the oosite $ourse! ta&ing as the #$ause# the drin&ing of a dose of arseni$!

and as the #effe$t# the whole state of the world fi'e "inutes later! we shall ha'e lurality of effe$ts

instead of lurality of $auses* Thus the suosed la$& of sy""etry between #$ause# and #effe$t# is

illusory*

?E@ #A $ause $annot oerate when it has $eased to e%ist! be$ause what has $eased to e%ist is nothing*#

This is a $o""on "a%i"! and a still "ore $o""on une%ressed re2udi$e* It has! I fan$y! a good deal to

do with the attra$ti'eness of Bergson.s #_durFe_#: sin$e the ast has effe$ts now! it "ust still e%ist in

so"e sense* The "ista&e in this "a%i" $onsists in the suosition that $auses #oerate# at all* A 'olition

#oerates# when what it wills ta&es la$e( but nothing $an oerate e%$et a 'olition* The belief that$auses #oerate# results fro" assi"ilating the"! $ons$iously or un$ons$iously! to 'olitions* -e ha'e

already seen that! if there are $auses at all! they "ust be searated by a finite inter'al of ti"e fro" their

effe$ts! and thus $ause their effe$ts after they ha'e $eased to e%ist*

It "ay be ob2e$ted to the abo'e definition of a 'olition #oerating# that it only oerates when it #$auses#

what it wills! not when it "erely haens to be followed by what it wills* This $ertainly reresents the

usual 'iew of what is "eant by a 'olition #oerating!# but as it in'ol'es the 'ery 'iew of $ausation whi$h

we are engaged in $o"bating! it is not oen to us as a definition* -e "ay say that a 'olition #oerates#

when there is so"e law in 'irtue of whi$h a si"ilar 'olition in rather si"ilar $ir$u"stan$es will usually be

followed by what it wills* But this is a 'ague $on$etion! and introdu$es ideas whi$h we ha'e not yet

$onsidered* -hat is $hiefly i"ortant to noti$e is that the usual notion of #oerating# is not oen to us if

we re2e$t! as I $ontend that we should! the usual notion of $ausation*

?4@ #A $ause $annot oerate e%$et where it is*# This "a%i" is 'ery widesread( it was urged against

Newton! and has re"ained a sour$e of re2udi$e against #a$tion at a distan$e*# In hilosohy it has led

to a denial of transient a$tion! and then$e to "onis" or 0eibniGian "onadis"* 0i&e the analogous "a%i"

$on$erning te"oral $ontiguity! it rests uon the assu"tion that $auses #oerate!# i*e* that they are in

so"e obs$ure way analogous to 'olitions* And! as in the $ase of te"oral $ontiguity! the inferen$es

drawn fro" this "a%i" are wholly groundless*

I return now to the )uestion! -hat law or laws $an be found to ta&e the la$e of the suosed law of

$ausalityD

7irst! without assing beyond su$h unifor"ities of se)uen$e as are $onte"lated by the traditional law!

we "ay ad"it that! if any su$h se)uen$e has been obser'ed in a great "any $ases! and has ne'er beenfound to fail! there is an indu$ti'e robability that it will be found to hold in future $ases* If stones ha'e

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hitherto been found to brea& windows! it is robable that they will $ontinue to do so* This! of $ourse!

assu"es the indu$ti'e rin$ile! of whi$h the truth "ay reasonably be )uestioned( but as this rin$ile is

not our resent $on$ern! I shall in this dis$ussion treat it as indubitable* -e "ay then say! in the $ase of

any su$h fre)uently obser'ed se)uen$e! that the earlier e'ent is the _$ause_ and the later e'ent the

 _effe$t_*

5e'eral $onsiderations! howe'er! "a&e su$h se$ial se)uen$es 'ery different fro" the traditional relation

of $ause and effe$t* In the first la$e! the se)uen$e! in any hitherto unobser'ed instan$e! is no "ore

than robable! whereas the relation of $ause and effe$t was suosed to be ne$essary* I do not "ean by

this "erely that we are not sure of ha'ing dis$o'ered a true $ase of $ause and effe$t( I "ean that! e'en

when we ha'e a $ase of $ause and effe$t in our resent sense! all that is "eant is that on grounds of

obser'ation! it is robable that when one o$$urs the other will also o$$ur* Thus in our resent sense! A

"ay be the $ause of B e'en if there a$tually are $ases where B does not follow A* 5tri&ing a "at$h will

be the $ause of its igniting! in site of the fa$t that so"e "at$hes are da" and fail to ignite*

In the se$ond la$e! it will not be assu"ed that _e'ery_ e'ent has so"e ante$edent whi$h is its $ause in

this sense( we shall only belie'e in $ausal se)uen$es where we find the"! without any resu"tion that

they always are to be found*

In the third la$e! _any_ $ase of suffi$iently fre)uent se)uen$e will be $ausal in our resent sense( for

e%a"le! we shall not refuse to say that night is the $ause of day* Our reugnan$e to saying this arises

fro" the ease with whi$h we $an i"agine the se)uen$e to fail! but owing to the fa$t that $ause and

effe$t "ust be searated by a finite inter'al of ti"e! _any_ su$h se)uen$e _"ight_ fail through the

interosition of other $ir$u"stan$es in the inter'al* Mill! dis$ussing this instan$e of night and day! says://

#It is ne$essary to our using the word $ause! that we should belie'e not only that the ante$edent always

 _has_ been followed by the $onse)uent! but that as long as the resent $onstitution of things endures! it

always _will_ be so*#[3H]

In this sense! we shall ha'e to gi'e u the hoe of finding $ausal laws su$h as Mill $onte"lated( any

$ausal se)uen$e whi$h we ha'e obser'ed "ay at any "o"ent be falsified without a falsifi$ation of any

laws of the &ind that the "ore ad'an$ed s$ien$es ai" at establishing*

In the fourth la$e! su$h laws of robable se)uen$e! though useful in daily life and in the infan$y of a

s$ien$e! tend to be disla$ed by )uite different laws as soon as a s$ien$e is su$$essful* The law of

gra'itation will illustrate what o$$urs in any ad'an$ed s$ien$e* In the "otions of "utually gra'itating

bodies! there is nothing that $an be $alled a $ause! and nothing that $an be $alled an effe$t( there is

"erely a for"ula* Certain differential e)uations $an be found! whi$h hold at e'ery instant for e'ery

arti$le of the syste"! and whi$h! gi'en the $onfiguration and 'elo$ities at one instant! or the

$onfigurations at two instants! render the $onfiguration at any other earlier or later instant theoreti$ally

$al$ulable* That is to say! the $onfiguration at any instant is a fun$tion of that instant and the

$onfigurations at two gi'en instants* This state"ent holds throughout hysi$s! and not only in the se$ial

$ase of gra'itation* But there is nothing that $ould be roerly $alled #$ause# and nothing that $ould beroerly $alled #effe$t# in su$h a syste"*

No doubt the reason why the old #law of $ausality# has so long $ontinued to er'ade the boo&s of

hilosohers is si"ly that the idea of a fun$tion is unfa"iliar to "ost of the"! and therefore they see&

an unduly si"lified state"ent* There is no )uestion of reetitions of the #sa"e# $ause rodu$ing the

#sa"e# effe$t( it is not in any sa"eness of $auses and effe$ts that the $onstan$y of s$ientifi$ law

$onsists! but in sa"eness of relations* And e'en #sa"eness of relations# is too si"le a hrase(

#sa"eness of differential e)uations# is the only $orre$t hrase* It is i"ossible to state this a$$urately in

non/"athe"ati$al language( the nearest aroa$h would be as follows: #There is a $onstant relation

between the state of the uni'erse at any instant and the rate of $hange in the rate at whi$h any art of

the uni'erse is $hanging at that instant! and this relation is "any/one! i*e* su$h that the rate of $hange

in the rate of $hange is deter"inate when the state of the uni'erse is gi'en*# If the #law of $ausality# is

to be so"ething a$tually dis$o'erable in the ra$ti$e of s$ien$e! the abo'e roosition has a better right

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$onstituted*

A syste" "ay be $alled #ra$ti$ally isolated# during a gi'en eriod if! although there _"ight_ be states

of the rest of the uni'erse whi$h would rodu$e "ore than the assigned "argin of error! there is reason

to belie'e that su$h states do not in fa$t o$$ur*

5tri$tly sea&ing! we ought to se$ify the rese$t in whi$h the syste" is relati'ely isolated* 7or e%a"le!

the earth is relati'ely isolated as regards falling bodies! but not as regards tides( it is _ra$ti$ally_

isolated as regards e$ono"i$ heno"ena! although! if ,e'ons. sunsot theory of $o""er$ial $rises had

been true! it would not ha'e been e'en ra$ti$ally isolated in this rese$t*

It will be obser'ed that we $annot ro'e in ad'an$e that a syste" is isolated* This will be inferred fro"

the obser'ed fa$t that aro%i"ate unifor"ities $an be stated for this syste" alone* If the $o"lete laws

for the whole uni'erse were &nown! the isolation of a syste" $ould be dedu$ed fro" the"( assu"ing!

for e%a"le! the law of uni'ersal gra'itation! the ra$ti$al isolation of the solar syste" in this rese$t

$an be dedu$ed by the hel of the fa$t that there is 'ery little "atter in its neighbourhood* But it should

be obser'ed that isolated syste"s are only i"ortant as ro'iding a ossibility of _dis$o'ering_ s$ientifi$

laws( they ha'e no theoreti$al i"ortan$e in the finished stru$ture of a s$ien$e*

The $ase where one e'ent A is said to #$ause# another e'ent B! whi$h hilosohers ta&e as funda"ental!

is really only the "ost si"lified instan$e of a ra$ti$ally isolated syste"* It "ay haen that! as a result

of general s$ientifi$ laws! whene'er A o$$urs throughout a $ertain eriod! it is followed by B( in that

$ase! A and B for" a syste" whi$h is ra$ti$ally isolated throughout that eriod* It is! howe'er! to be

regarded as a ie$e of good fortune if this o$$urs( it will always be due to se$ial $ir$u"stan$es! and

would not ha'e been true if the rest of the uni'erse had been different though sub2e$t to the sa"e laws*

The essential fun$tion whi$h $ausality has been suosed to erfor" is the ossibility of inferring the

future fro" the ast! or! "ore generally! e'ents at any ti"e fro" e'ents at $ertain assigned ti"es* Any

syste" in whi$h su$h inferen$e is ossible "ay be $alled a #deter"inisti$# syste"* -e "ay define a

deter"inisti$ syste" as follows://

 A system is sai# to e "#eterministic" +hen, $iven certain #ata, 0ath2 e3415, e3465, ..., e34n5, at

times t3415, t3465, ..., t34n57 res%ective!y, concernin$ this system, if 0ath2 E34t57 is the state of the

system at any time 3t3, there is a fnctiona! re!ation of the form

[Math: _9t; J f ?e_9;! t_9;! e_9<;! t_9<;! ***! e_9n;! t_9n;! t@]* ?A@

The system +i!! e "#eterministic thro$hot a $iven %erio#" if 3t3, in the aove form!a, may e any

time +ithin that %erio#, tho$h otsi#e that %erio# the form!a may e no !on$er tre. If the niverse,

as a +ho!e, is sch a system, #eterminism is tre of the niverse/ if not, not. A system +hich is %art of a

#eterministic system I sha!! ca!! "#etermine#"/ one +hich is not %art of any sch system I sha!! ca!!

"ca%ricios." 

The e'ents [Math: e_9;! e_9<;! ***! e_9n;] I shall $all #deter"inants# of the syste"* It is to be

obser'ed that a syste" whi$h has one set of deter"inants will in general ha'e "any* In the $ase of the

"otions of the lanets! for e%a"le! the $onfigurations of the solar syste" at any two gi'en ti"es will be

deter"inants*

-e "ay ta&e another illustration fro" the hyothesis of sy$ho/hysi$al arallelis"* 0et us assu"e! for

the uroses of this illustration! that to a gi'en state of brain a gi'en state of "ind always $orresonds!

and 'i$e 'ersa! i*e* that there is a one/one relation between the"! so that ea$h is a fun$tion of the other*

-e "ay also assu"e! what is ra$ti$ally $ertain! that to a gi'en state of a $ertain brain a gi'en state of

the whole "aterial uni'erse $orresonds! sin$e it is highly i"robable that a gi'en brain is e'er twi$e ine%a$tly the sa"e state* 6en$e there will be a one/one relation between the state of a gi'en erson.s

"ind and the state of the whole "aterial uni'erse* It follows that! if _n_ states of the "aterial uni'erse

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are deter"inants of the "aterial uni'erse! then _n_ states of a gi'en "an.s "ind are deter"inants of

the whole "aterial and "ental uni'erse//assu"ing! that is to say! that sy$ho/hysi$al arallelis" is

true*

The abo'e illustration is i"ortant in $onne$tion with a $ertain $onfusion whi$h see"s to ha'e beset

those who ha'e hilosohised on the relation of "ind and "atter* It is often thought that! if the state of

the "ind is deter"inate when the state of the brain is gi'en! and if the "aterial world for"s a

deter"inisti$ syste"! then "ind is #sub2e$t# to "atter in so"e sense in whi$h "atter is not #sub2e$t# to

"ind* But if the state of the brain is also deter"inate when the state of the "ind is gi'en! it "ust be

e%a$tly as true to regard "atter as sub2e$t to "ind as it would be to regard "ind as sub2e$t to "atter*

-e $ould! theoreti$ally! wor& out the history of "ind without e'er "entioning "atter! and then! at the

end! dedu$e that "atter "ust "eanwhile ha'e gone through the $orresonding history* It is true that if

the relation of brain to "ind were "any/one! not one/one! there would be a one/sided deenden$e of

"ind on brain! while $on'ersely! if the relation were one/"any! as Bergson suoses! there would be a

one/aided deenden$e of brain on "ind* But the deenden$e in'ol'ed is! in any $ase! only logi$al( it

does not "ean that we shall be $o"elled to do things we desire not to do! whi$h is what eole

instin$ti'ely i"agine it to "ean*

As another illustration we "ay ta&e the $ase of "e$hanis" and teleology* A syste" "ay be defined as

#"e$hani$al# when it has a set of deter"inants that are urely "aterial! su$h as the ositions of $ertain

ie$es of "atter at $ertain ti"es* It is an oen )uestion whether the world of "ind and "atter! as we

&now it! is a "e$hani$al syste" or not( let us suose! for the sa&e of argu"ent! that it is a "e$hani$al

syste"* This suosition//so I $ontend//throws no light whate'er on the )uestion whether the uni'erse

is or is not a #teleologi$al# syste"* It is diffi$ult to define a$$urately what is "eant by a #teleologi$al#

syste"! but the argu"ent is not "u$h affe$ted by the arti$ular definition we adot* Broadly! a

teleologi$al syste" is one in whi$h uroses are realised! i*e* in whi$h $ertain desires//those that are

deeer or nobler or "ore funda"ental or "ore uni'ersal or what not//are followed by their realisation*

Now the fa$t//if it be a fa$t//that the uni'erse is "e$hani$al has no bearing whate'er on the )uestion

whether it is teleologi$al in the abo'e sense* There "ight be a "e$hani$al syste" in whi$h all wishes

were realised! and there "ight be one in whi$h all wishes were thwarted* The )uestion whether! or how

far! our a$tual world is teleologi$al! $annot! therefore! be settled by ro'ing that it is "e$hani$al! and thedesire that it should be teleologi$al is no ground for wishing it to be not "e$hani$al*

There is! in all these )uestions! a 'ery great diffi$ulty in a'oiding $onfusion between what we $an infer

and what is in fa$t deter"ined* 0et us $onsider! for a "o"ent! the 'arious senses in whi$h the future

"ay be #deter"ined*# There is one sense//and a 'ery i"ortant one//in whi$h it is deter"ined )uite

indeendently of s$ientifi$ laws! na"ely! the sense that it will be what it will be* -e all regard the ast as

deter"ined si"ly by the fa$t that it has haened( but for the a$$ident that "e"ory wor&s ba$&ward

and not forward! we should regard the future as e)ually deter"ined by the fa$t that it will haen*

#But!# we are told! #you $annot alter the ast! while you $an to so"e e%tent alter the future*# This 'iew

see"s to "e to rest uon 2ust those errors in regard to $ausation whi$h it has been "y ob2e$t to

re"o'e* Kou $annot "a&e the ast other than it was//true! but this is a "ere ali$ation of the law of

$ontradi$tion* If you already &now what the ast was! ob'iously it is useless to wish it different* But also

you $annot "a&e the future other than it will be( this again is an ali$ation of the law of $ontradi$tion*And if you haen to &now the future//e*g* in the $ase of a forth$o"ing e$lise//it is 2ust as useless to

wish it different as to wish the ast different* #But!# it will be re2oined! #our wishes $an _$ause_ the

future! so"eti"es! to be different fro" what it would be if they did not e%ist! and they $an ha'e no su$h

effe$t uon the ast*# This! again! is a "ere tautology* An effe$t being _defined_ as so"ething

subse)uent to its $ause! ob'iously we $an ha'e no _effe$t_ uon the ast* But that does not "ean that

the ast would not ha'e been different if our resent wishes had been different* Ob'iously! our resent

wishes are $onditioned by the ast! and therefore $ould not ha'e been different unless the ast had

been different( therefore! if our resent wishes were different! the ast would be different* Of $ourse!

the ast $annot be different fro" what it was! but no "ore $an our resent wishes be different fro"

what they are( this again is "erely the law of $ontradi$tion* The fa$ts see" to be "erely ?@ that

wishing generally deends uon ignoran$e! and is therefore $o""oner in regard to the future than in

regard to the ast( ?<@ that where a wish $on$erns the future! it and its realisation 'ery often for" a

#ra$ti$ally indeendent syste"!# i*e* "any wishes regarding the future are realised* But there see"s no

doubt that the "ain differen$e in our feelings arises fro" the a$$idental fa$t that the ast but not the

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future $an be &nown by "e"ory*

Although the sense of #deter"ined# in whi$h the future is deter"ined by the "ere fa$t that it will be

what it will be is suffi$ient ?at least so it see"s to "e@ to refute so"e oonents of deter"inis"! notably

M* Bergson and the rag"atists! yet it is not what "ost eole ha'e in "ind when they sea& of the

future as deter"ined* -hat they ha'e in "ind is a for"ula by "eans of whi$h the future $an be

e%hibited! and at least theoreti$ally $al$ulated! as a fun$tion of the ast* But at this oint we "eet with a

great diffi$ulty! whi$h besets what has been said abo'e about deter"inisti$ syste"s! as well as what is

said by others*

If for"ulL of any degree of $o"le%ity! howe'er great! are ad"itted! it would see" that any syste"!

whose state at a gi'en "o"ent is a fun$tion of $ertain "easurable )uantities! "ust be a deter"inisti$

syste"* 0et us $onsider! in illustration! a single "aterial arti$le! whose $o/ordinates at ti"e _t_ are

[Math: %_9t;! y_9t;! G_9t;]* Then! howe'er! the arti$le "o'es! there "ust be! theoreti$ally! fun$tions

[Math: f_9;! f_9<;! f_93;]! su$h that

[Math: %_9t; J f_9t;?t@! y_9t; J f_9<;?t@! G_9t; J f_93;?t@*]

It follows that! theoreti$ally! the whole state of the "aterial uni'erse at ti"e _t_ "ust be $aable of

being e%hibited as a fun$tion of _t_* 6en$e our uni'erse will be deter"inisti$ in the sense defined abo'e*

But if this be true! no infor"ation is $on'eyed about the uni'erse in stating that it is deter"inisti$* It is

true that the for"ulL in'ol'ed "ay be of stri$tly infinite $o"le%ity! and therefore not ra$ti$ally

$aable of being written down or arehended* But e%$et fro" the oint of 'iew of our &nowledge! this

"ight see" to be a detail: in itself! if the abo'e $onsiderations are sound! the "aterial uni'erse _"ust_

be deter"inisti$! _"ust_ be sub2e$t to laws*

This! howe'er! is lainly not what was intended* The differen$e between this 'iew and the 'iew intended

"ay be seen as follows* =i'en so"e for"ula whi$h fits the fa$ts hitherto//say the law of gra'itation//

there will be an infinite nu"ber of other for"ulL! not e"iri$ally distinguishable fro" it in the ast! but

di'erging fro" it "ore and "ore in the future* 6en$e! e'en assu"ing that there are ersistent laws! we

shall ha'e no reason for assu"ing that the law of the in'erse s)uare will hold in future( it "ay be so"e

other hitherto indistinguishable law that will hold* -e $annot say that _e'ery_ law whi$h has held

hitherto "ust hold in the future! be$ause ast fa$ts whi$h obey one law will also obey others! hitherto

indistinguishable but di'erging in future* 6en$e there "ust! at e'ery "o"ent! be laws hitherto unbro&en

whi$h are now bro&en for the first ti"e* -hat s$ien$e does! in fa$t! is to sele$t the _si"lest_ for"ula

that will fit the fa$ts* But this! )uite ob'iously! is "erely a "ethodologi$al re$et! not a law of Nature* If 

the si"lest for"ula $eases! after a ti"e! to be ali$able! the si"lest for"ula that re"ains ali$able

is sele$ted! and s$ien$e has no sense that an a%io" has been falsified* -e are thus left with the brute

fa$t that! in "any deart"ents of s$ien$e! )uite si"le laws ha'e hitherto been found to hold* This fa$t

$annot be regarded as ha'ing any _a riori_ ground! nor $an it be used to suort indu$ti'ely the

oinion that the sa"e laws will $ontinue( for at e'ery "o"ent laws hitherto true are being falsified!

though in the ad'an$ed s$ien$es these laws are less si"le than those that ha'e re"ained true*

Moreo'er it would be falla$ious to argue indu$ti'ely fro" the state of the ad'an$ed s$ien$es to the futurestate of the others! for it "ay well be that the ad'an$ed s$ien$es are ad'an$ed si"ly be$ause! hitherto!

their sub2e$t/"atter has obeyed si"le and easily as$ertainable laws! while the sub2e$t/"atter of other

s$ien$es has not done so*

The diffi$ulty we ha'e been $onsidering see"s to be "et artly! if not wholly! by the rin$ile that the

 _ti"e_ "ust not enter e%li$itly into our for"ulL* All "e$hani$al laws e%hibit a$$eleration as a fun$tion

of $onfiguration! not of $onfiguration and ti"e 2ointly( and this rin$ile of the irrele'an$e of the ti"e

"ay be e%tended to all s$ientifi$ laws* In fa$t we "ight interret the #unifor"ity of nature# as "eaning

 2ust this! that no s$ientifi$ law in'ol'es the ti"e as an argu"ent! unless! of $ourse! it is gi'en in an

integrated for"! in whi$h $ase _lase_ of ti"e! though not absolute ti"e! "ay aear in our for"ulL*

-hether this $onsideration suffi$es to o'er$o"e our diffi$ulty $o"letely! I do not &now( but in any $ase

it does "u$h to di"inish it*

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It will ser'e to illustrate what has been said if we aly it to the )uestion of free will*

?@ +eter"inis" in regard to the will is the do$trine that our 'olitions belong to so"e deter"inisti$

syste"! i*e* are #deter"ined# in the sense defined abo'e* -hether this do$trine is true or false! is a

"ere )uestion of fa$t( no _a riori_ $onsiderations ?if our re'ious dis$ussions ha'e been $orre$t@ $an

e%ist on either side* On the one hand! there is no _a riori_ $ategory of $ausality! but "erely $ertain

obser'ed unifor"ities* As a "atter of fa$t! there are obser'ed unifor"ities in regard to 'olitions( thus

there is so"e e"iri$al e'iden$e that 'olitions are deter"ined* But it would be 'ery rash to "aintain

that the e'iden$e is o'erwhel"ing! and it is )uite ossible that so"e 'olitions! as well as so"e other

things! are not deter"ined! e%$et in the sense in whi$h we found that e'erything "ust be deter"ined*

?<@ But! on the other hand! the sub2e$ti'e sense of freedo"! so"eti"es alleged against deter"inis"!

has no bearing on the )uestion whate'er* The 'iew that it has a bearing rests uon the belief that $auses

$o"el their effe$ts! or that nature enfor$es obedien$e to its laws as go'ern"ents do* These are "ere

anthroo"orhi$ suerstitions! due to assi"ilation of $auses with 'olitions and of natural laws with

hu"an edi$ts* -e feel that our will is not $o"elled! but that only "eans that it is not other than we

$hoose it to be* It is one of the de"erits of the traditional theory of $ausality that it has $reated an

artifi$ial oosition between deter"inis" and the freedo" of whi$h we are introse$ti'ely $ons$ious*

?3@ Besides the general )uestion whether 'olitions are deter"ined! there is the further )uestion whether

they are _"e$hani$ally_ deter"ined! i*e* whether they are art of what was abo'e defined as a

"e$hani$al syste"* This is the )uestion whether they for" art of a syste" with urely "aterial

deter"inants! i*e* whether there are laws whi$h! gi'en $ertain "aterial data! "a&e all 'olitions fun$tions

of those data* 6ere again! there is e"iri$al e'iden$e u to a oint! but it is not $on$lusi'e in regard to

all 'olitions* It is i"ortant to obser'e! howe'er that e'en if 'olitions are art of a "e$hani$al syste"!

this by no "eans i"lies any sure"a$y of "atter o'er "ind* It "ay well be that the sa"e syste"

whi$h is sus$etible of "aterial deter"inants is also sus$etible of "ental deter"inants( thus a

"e$hani$al syste" "ay be deter"ined by sets of 'olitions! as well as by sets of "aterial fa$ts* It would

see"! therefore! that the reasons whi$h "a&e eole disli&e the 'iew that 'olitions are "e$hani$ally

deter"ined are falla$ious*

?E@ The notion of _ne$essity_! whi$h is often asso$iated with deter"inis"! is a $onfused notion not

legiti"ately dedu$ible fro" deter"inis"* Three "eanings are $o""only $onfounded when ne$essity is

so&en of://

?@ An _a$tion_ is ne$essary when it will be erfor"ed howe'er "u$h the agent "ay wish to do

otherwise* +eter"inis" does not i"ly that a$tions are ne$essary in this sense*

?@ A _roositional fun$tion_ is ne$essary when all its 'alues are true* This sense is not rele'ant to our

resent dis$ussion*

?@ A _roosition_ is ne$essary with rese$t to a gi'en $onstituent when it is the 'alue! with that

$onstituent as argu"ent! of a ne$essary roositional fun$tion! in other words! when it re"ains truehowe'er that $onstituent "ay be 'aried* In this sense! in a deter"inisti$ syste"! the $onne$tion of a

'olition with its deter"inants is ne$essary! if the ti"e at whi$h the deter"inants o$$ur be ta&en as the

$onstituent to be 'aried! the ti"e/inter'al between the deter"inants and the 'olition being &et

$onstant* But this sense of ne$essity is urely logi$al! and has no e"otional i"ortan$e*

-e "ay now su" u our dis$ussion of $ausality* -e found first that the law of $ausality! as usually

stated by hilosohers! is false! and is not e"loyed in s$ien$e* -e then $onsidered the nature of

s$ientifi$ laws! and found that! instead of stating that one e'ent A is always followed by another e'ent B!

they stated fun$tional relations between $ertain e'ents at $ertain ti"es! whi$h we $alled deter"inants!

and other e'ents at earlier or later ti"es or at the sa"e ti"e* -e were unable to find any _a riori_

$ategory in'ol'ed: the e%isten$e of s$ientifi$ laws aeared as a urely e"iri$al fa$t! not ne$essarily

uni'ersal! e%$et in a tri'ial and s$ientifi$ally useless for"* -e found that a syste" with one set of

deter"inants "ay 'ery li&ely ha'e other sets of a )uite different &ind! that! for e%a"le! a "e$hani$ally

deter"ined syste" "ay also be teleologi$ally or 'olitionally deter"ined* 7inally we $onsidered the

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roble" of free will: here we found that the reasons for suosing 'olitions to be deter"ined are strong

but not $on$lusi'e! and we de$ided that e'en if 'olitions are "e$hani$ally deter"ined! that is no reason

for denying freedo" in the sense re'ealed by introse$tion! or for suosing that "e$hani$al e'ents are

not deter"ined by 'olitions* The roble" of free will _'ersus_ deter"inis" is therefore! if we were right!

"ainly illusory! but in art not yet $aable of being de$isi'ely sol'ed*

 

7OOTNOT5:

[34] A roositional fun$tion is an e%ression $ontaining a 'ariable! or undeter"ined $onstituent! and

be$o"ing a roosition as soon as a definite 'alue is assigned to the 'ariable* %a"les are: #A is A!#

#_%_ is a nu"ber*# The 'ariable is $alled the _argu"ent_ of the fun$tion*

[3] _0ogi$_! B&* III! Cha* P! Q <*

[3] _Ti"e and 7ree -ill_! * HH*

[3] _Ti"e and 7ree -ill*_ * <<*

[3H] _0o$* $it*_! Q

[The end]

Bertrand Russell.s essay: On The Notion Of Cause

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