frede - the original notion of cause

8/13/2019 Frede - The Original Notion of Cause

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6 Doubt n Dogmtsm

were re, ctu obects But ther phenomenoogy ws pererte for wht s trgey but portry n metre of thesuerngs of men who stn me t etern thngs (EpctD 46)

We ony free oursees from one presentton by submttngto nother Longus pstor oers us not the nsght gne from

trgey, but the trnquty of the ex oto n pce of the pssonof the House o f Atreus t presents n empe, borrowe perhpsfrom the toc Do Chrysostom, of n nitton nto oe whchknows no scor n no jeousy The gtton of the oers sste by the course of the sesons they ern the mor from theocks commtte to ther cre he st prgrph ets us see thtphysc theory hs been teste gnst the pthoogy of oe nthe gmes of shephers Wth the st sentence of the nrrtie,the ntton comes to n en the oers he gen the emonstrton ther se of ppro

61 See W Schmd nd Stahln, Gchichte der grechischn Literatur ( Munich920) 361-7 Do Chrysostom ws Stoc, pupl of Musonus nd one of theledng eesenttves of the Second Sophstc; he comosed a Eboikos, psngthe vtous smplcty of rstc fe

THE ORIGINAL NOTON OF CAUSE*

Mchae Frede

INTRODUCTON

Howeer mue our noton of cuse my be t s cer thtwe wou he cutes n usng the term cuse for the knsof thngs Arstote cs cuses We mght een n t msengto tk of Arstoten cuses n woner whether n trnstngthe reent pssges n Arstote we shou not o the termcuse together For n en, form, or mtter o not seem tobe the rght kns of tems to cuse nythng, et one to be cusest s much ess cer wht our cutes re ue to We mightthnk tht cuses re eents ometmes ths s regre s most trusm An, nee, phosophers snce Hume, who sttest n hs nguges werng on the mtter, he tene to

thnk of cuses s eents But oubt tht our cuty wthArstoten cuses s ue to the fct tht ens, forms, n mttercery re not eents or nythng ke eents For prt from thefct tht one my he oubts bout the gener thess tht cusesre eents, we o not he ny cuty n unerstnng Knt,eg , when he tks s f substnce, n obect, cou be the cuseof somethng n nother object Crtque Pue Reason B s f the sun cou be s to be the cuse of the wrmng up of thestone or the metng of the butter. An the reson why we o nothe ny cuty n unerstnng ths kn of nguge seemsto me to be the foowng physc object ke the sun or br-b cn nterct wth other thngs, t cn ect them n

ct on them so s to prouce n eect n them Qute genery ouruse of cus terms seems to be strongy cooure by the notontht n custon there s something whch n some sense oessomethng or other so s to prouce or brng bout n eectEen f we o thnk of cuses s eents the prgms we ten to

* I would lke to thnk the membes of the coference fo he useful comments m ptcully gteful to Robet Bolton Myles Bunyet, Doothe Fede,Thoms Rosenmeye, nd Rchd Sobj who wee knd enough to pode mewth wtten comments whch wee vey helpful n evsng ths e.


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8 Doubt and Dogmatism

thnk of, and certanly the paradigms Hume and ant thought of,are events in which something does something or other; and wefee that we have to expain that it is ony in a very metaphoricasense that an event could be sad to produce an eect Thus,though we may want to get away from such a noton, there s astrong tendency to conceve of causes as somehow actve. And tseems that our dcuty wth the Arstotean causes s due to thefact that they cannot even be conceved of n ths way. A goodpart of the unfortunate history of the notion of a nal cause hasts origin in the assumption that the na cause, as a cause, mustact and in the vain attempt to expan how t coud do so. It sony with Arstotles moving cause that we thnk that we readiyunderstand why t shoud be caed a cause. But t woud be amstake to thnk that Arstotle with hs noton of a movng causetres to capture our noton of cause or at least a noton we wouldreadily recognize as a notion of cause, though t is signicant thatpeope have tended to think that among the Aristotean causesit is ony the moving cause which s a cause reay. For Arstotlen more theoretca contexts wl tel that it is not the scuptor

workng on his scupture who s the movng cause, but the art ofscupture And with the art of sculpture we have the same probems as with ends, forms, and matter.

Arstotes noton of cause, then, s quite derent from ours.But it s by no means pecular to Aristotle. The same dcutieswe have wth Arstotle and the Perpatetics we also have withPato or Epicurus deas do not seem to be the knd of thng thatcoud cause anythng, nor does the vod (cf. Epicurus n DL X But how dd t come about that peope got to thnk that acause has to be the knd of tem whch can do something or otherso as to brng about an eect ?

From a remark n Sextus Empiricus t is clear that t was

aready in later antiquity that the notion of a cause had beennarrowed down to t the notion of an actve cause For in hisdiscusson of causaty Sextus tes us P II 1 that dspte althe derences among phlosophers concernng causalty we stmght assume that they agree on the following generacharacterzation of a cause the cause is that because of which invirtue of its being active the eect comes about1 Sextus, then,caims that t s generaly agreed that causes are items whch

1 , vepyo0v ylver 7o-Aeu.

The Orignal Noton of Cause

somehow are actve and through their actvty brng about aneect Ths clam would be puzzng, indeed, gven what we havesad earier about Plato, Arstotle, and picurus, unless it reected a genera shift in the noton of cause. But we have goodreason to accept Sextus cam Frst of a Sextus shows hmsefto be qute aware of the fact that even nonactive tems get calledcauses For in the precedng paragraph he tels us that he nowwants to turn to a consideraton of the actve cause in general toenerkon aton There woud be no point n adng the adectveactve f Sextus were not aware that non-active items, too, arecaed causes So Sextus must assume that though phiosophersgo on to cal such tems as Platonic ideas or Arstoteian causescauses, they nevertheless are agreed that, strctly speakng, onyactive tems are causes. Secondy, there is ndependent evdencethat Sextus had good reason to thnk so. Cement, eg., tels usStrom I 17, 82, 3 we say that the cause s conceved of asproducing, as active, and as dong something (cf. also StromVII 9 2 5, 5 . As we earn from Simplcus commentary on theCateores 32, 6 ., ambchus explained a passage in Patos

Plebus teng us that it s that whch s producng somethngto pooun which s, strctly speaking, the cause, whereas matterand form are not causes at al, but auxiaries sunaa, and theparadgm and the end only qualedy are causes. We nd siiarremarks throughout the eoplatonic tradtion Damascius, eg.,tels us that every cause is dong somethng drastron, n PlebI, 6 W The Perpatetic distinction of knds of causes sadapted to the shft by claimng that t is the moving cause whchis most stricty speakng the cause aton to kurtaton leomenon,as we can see from a passage in Smplcus n Ps 3 26, 5 ..The shft n termnoogy from causa movens to causa eciensmay be another reection of the change in noton cf. eg Smp

n Ps 326, 25 vdence of ths knd is easly mutipied, andthus we have good reason to beleve that the notion of a causeby Sextus time had changed n such a way as to be restrcted toitems which can do s omethng or oher and thus cause something.t aso seems to be fary cear how this change in the notion of acause dd come about. Seneca Ep XV ; cf 2 . sticriticzes Pato for assuming the ve knds of causes we ust sawIambichus takng about on the grounds hat there s ust one

2 v . - nov T 7Otev K vepyeiv K pv ve8c


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0 Doub and Dogas

knd of cause, ha whch acs so as o produce he eec: TheSocs ake he vew ha here s jus one cause, ha whch doessoehng act) (LXV 4). In general s he Socs who nssha causes are acve, and so sees o be her nuence whchhas brough abou he change n queson

Bu Soc nuence on hough abou causes s no resrced ohs pon hen we look, e.g., a Sexus' dscusson of causes nhe Ounes ofPyrronsm urns ou ha he dsncons of kndsof auses Sexus akes are all of Soc orgn. And hence ghbe worh whle o revew our evdence concernng he Socdocrne of causes, no jus n order o nd ou why he Socswould nss ha causes have o be acve, bu n he hope ofgeng soewha clearer on he hsory of he noon of a causen general.

Before we go no he deals, hough, should be poned ouha he Socs see o dsngush a leas hree uses of cause' ofncreasng narrowness There s rs of al a very general use ofcause'. I sees o be hs use we have o hnk of when Sobaeus(E , p. 3 8, 2 3) says Chrysppus says ha a cause s a because

of whch (d o) Jus ke he Engsh preposon because of'and he Geran ween he Greek da wh he accusave cancover such a varey of explanaory relaons ha would rahercoforably accoodae anyhng ha had been called a cause,n ordnary dscourse or by phlosophers, ncludng heArsoelan causes (cf Ps 98 5 .

One ay, of course, doub wheher Chrysppus' characeraon of a cause s supposed o be so generous as o allow us o callall he hngs causes whch acuay are called causes In hs caseone would have o assue ha da here s used n a narrowerechncal sense Bu here s evdence ha he Socs were wlngo allow for such a generous use of cause', hough, a he sae

e hey also nssed on a narrower use. hen, hen Cleen(VIII 9 2 3) says s he sae hng, hen whc s a causeand whch s producve; and f soehng s a cause and producve nvarably also s a because of whch; bu f soehngs a because of whch s o nvarably also a cause' and hengoes o n o gve aneceden causes as exaples of hngs whch arebecause of whch, bu no causes n hs sense, s naural oassue ha he s relyng on a conras beween a ore generalnoon of a cause accordng o whch any because of whch

he Orgnal Noon of Cause

couns as a cause, and a narrower noon whch he wans o adop,accordng o whch a cause no ony has o be a because of whch,bu also producve Hence sees ha when Chrysppuscharaceres he cause as he because of whch he allows for avery general noon of a cause

Then here s he narrower noon of a cause, whch Cleen

n he passage quoed refers o, accordng o whch causes areresrced o hose hngs whch acually do soehng or ohero brng abou an eec I s hs noon of an acve cause ofwhch Sexus clas ha al phlosophers are agreed on I sno us he because of whch, bu he because of whch hroughwhose acvy he eec coes abou, o use Sexus' characeraon Bu even hs narrower noon of an acve cause coversderen knds of causal relaons whch he Socs wl dsngushby dsngushng varous knds of causes And aong hese kndshey wl sngle ou ha whch s he cause, srcly speakng,aely he perfec (autotees) or conanng (sunektkon) causeSnce he os general noon of a cause s no speccally Soc Iwll n he followng dscuss rs he general Soc noon of an

acve cause and hen he varous knds of causes dsngushed,n parcular causes n he narrowes and srces sense

THE GENERAL NOTION OF AN ACTIVE CASE

e sad ha one had o explan n wha sense Arsoelan causescould be called causes. Ends or fors do no see o be he rghknds of es o be causes. And, as we have seen, one reasonfor hs ay be ha hey are enes, whereas causes, one ghhnk, are evens, facs, hngs one does, n shor, es of heknd I wl ca proposonal es ( ake all hese es o beproposonal es n soe very narrow sense, bu for ou

purposes here wll do o ake he er n a very generous senseNow s rue ha a leas fro he fh cenury Bc onwardssuch proposonal es, oo, coe o be caled causes, ata Buhroughou anquy, as far as I can see, s non-proposonales lke Arsole's causes whch are referred o when causes aredscussed syseacally hs s no o deny ha phlosopherswhen hey sae he cause of soehng soees refer o proposonal es (The cause of hs s ha '. n hs hey jusfollow he shf n ordnary language enoned above Arsole


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Doubt and Dogatis

soeties even refers to propositiona ites when he givesexapes of his kinds of causes. But in other passages it is cearthat when he dstinguishes kinds of causes he has entities, nonpropositiona ites in ind. And the ater tradition quitedenitey treats Aristotean causes as nonpropositona SiaryEpcurus treats causes as non-propositona when he regards theatos and the void as the utiate causes of everythng (DL X The sae is true of the ve causes of the Midde Patonists(Sen. Ep LXV 78) and of the six causes of the Neopatonists(cf. Sip n P 23 Oyp n Paed 207 27 . ; Phiop.De ae mund I 9, . . And it is certainy true of the Stoics whorequire a cause to be a being, an entity, a status they deny topropositiona ites.

The facts of the atter becoe cearer if we take into accounta ternoogica dstinction which Stobaeus attributes toChrysippus E I, p 39 3 f. W. . This ditinction has a basis nthe origina use of the word cause' which distinguished betweenan aon and an aa But this distinction is not preserved byAristote; and as a resut it is uch ess cear than t woud

otherwise have been whether we are consdering propositiona ornonpropositiona ites when we tak about causes Chrysippus'distinction is the foowing Having expained that an aon, acause, according to Chrysippus is an entty, Stobaeus goes on tosay, But an aa he says, i s an account of theaon or the accountabout the aon as aon) We ght have doubts as to theprecise eaning of this short characterzation of an aa, if wedid not hav a fragent of Dioes of Carystus (frag. Welann preserved by Gaen. Dioes discusses aetioogy,expanaton, n edicine, and in this discussion he uses theaccount about the aon interchangeaby wth the aa in thesense of the reason' or the expanation' Obviousy the idea is

that the aa the reason or expanaton, is a oo a proositionate of a certan kind, naey a stateent or a truth about theaon, the cause, or rather the reevant truth about the cause, thetruth n virtue of whch it s the cause. And this sees to beexacty the characterization o an aa Stobaeus is attrbuting toChysippus.

By Chrysippus' tie ordinary usage of aon and aa noonger foowed that dstinction. But there was soe bass for the

3 a-lav ' vaL Oyov aTlo, Oyov T0v 7pi roV ahou Ws alo.

The Origina Notion of Cause

ternoogca distinction in the origina use of these words.on is ust the neuter of the adective ao whch originayeant cupabe, responsbe, bearing the bae', whereas theaa is the accusation, what soebody is charged with havingdone such that he is responsbe for what happened as a resut.And if we ook at Pato's rearks on expanation in the Paedowe see that such a stinction in use between aon and aa isst preseved. In spite of its ape use both of the adjective andthe noun the passage resees the adective for entities keAnaxagoras' Nous and Socrates' bones and sinews, whereas anaa throughout sees to be a propositiona ite, the reason orexpanation why soething is the way it is. It is true thatAristote does not preserve the ternoogica distinction. AndGaen in one pace tes us explcity that he uses aon and aanterchangeaby (IX 8 , 7 But even if the terinoogicadstinction was not generay accepted, the stinction itsefbetween causes on the one hand and reasons and expanations,the truths about causes in vrtue of which they are causes, on theother, was generay accepted. n fact, for the very reasons for

which the Stoics reected, e. g., Aristotelan na causes as causes,propery speakng, they aso had to reject propositiona tes ascauses. Since, on the Stoic vew, propositona tes are notentities, but ony eka, soethings, they are not ites of the rightkind to cause anythng. How woud an event go about causngsoething?

So there woud be genera agreeent that causes are nonpropositona tes. And there woud be genera agreeent thatthe notion of a cause is cosey tied to the notion o f an expanationFor an te is a cause ony in so far as soething is true of it invirtue of which it is the cause. f Brutus is a cause of Caesar'sdeath h is a cause insofar, e.g., as it is true of hi that he stabbed

Caesar And it is exacty these truths about the causes of soething which wil be regarded as aordng an expanaton of whatthe causes are causes of

t s at this point, though, that the disagreeent aong ancientphiosophers wl start. For reasons which w becoe apparent,the question wl arise to whch of the two notions, cause orexpanation, we shoud gve priority. t sees fairy cear that theopponents of the Stoics give prority to the noton of expanationThey are ooking for an account of soething and they wi just


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cal causes those items which have to be referred to in the accountIf it is the presence of the idea of justice which accounts for thefact that something is just, then the idea of ustice will be a causeIt is clear that on this view the notion of a cause competey osesits connotation of responsibility The Stoics, on he other hnd,are not so much interested in explanation as they are inresponsibiity

Though this is a matter which would need a good deal ofeaboration, the following statement by Strabo about Posidoniusdoes seem to me to reect the Stoic attiude in general wellenough With him [sc. Posidonius] we nd a lot of aetioogy anda lot of Aristotelizing which the members of our school shyaway from because of the obscurity of the causes (I 3 8)According to Strabo, then, the Stoics in genera are hesitant toengage in aetioogy because the rea causes are so hidden andobscure; Posidonius is an excepon, and in this respect he israther more like a Peripatetic There is abundant evidence tosupport Strabos testimony. Later Stoic physics, presumabyunder the inuence of Posidonius recognizes aetioogy as a

separate part of physics (DL VI 32) It in turn is divided intotwo parts, one whose subject matter the phiosopher shares withthe physician, namey physiology and psychology, and anotherpart whose subject matter the philosopher shares with themathematica sciences, namely natural, in particuar meteorological, phaenomena As to the second part of aetiology we notony know how much of an eort Posidonius made to ndexplanations for particuar phaenomena lke the tides Therelevant part in Diogenes exposition of Stoic physics (V 5 35 6 ) e.g, refers again and again to Posidonius In fact theonly other authority that is mentioned in the whoe section isZeno But we also know from a passage in Seneca (Ep LXXXVII

26-7) and a precious excerpt from Gemnus Eptome ofPosidonius Meteorooca (preserved through Alexanders commentary on the Pscs by Simpicius, n Ps 29 2 . thatPosidonius held views concerning causation and expanationwhich would deserve separatetreatment. He took, e.g., the viewthat ony the natura philosopher can have knowledge of the trueaccount of the cause of a phaenomenon, whereas the mathematicascientist can ony provide us with hypotheses or possibe explanations, as Heracides Ponticus provided us with a possible

The Original Notion of Cause

expanaion of the apparent motion of the sun by assumng asomehow stationary sun and a somehow revolving earth (ibid292 203) The other part of aetiology which concerns itsef withpsychology and physioogy among other things deals with thepassions of the soul (cf DL VI 58) Of Posidonius views onthis particular topic we are well informed by Galen Galen in his

De pacts ppocrats et Patonsgoes to considerable lengths to

criticize Chrysippus views on the matter, and in doing so hereies heaviy on Posidonius criticism of Chrysippus which heaso sets out in some detai. It i s characteristic that it is a recurringcomplaint that Chrysippus fais to state the cause or caims thatthe true expanation i s uncertain or too dicult to gure out ( cf348 6 . Mueler; 3 9 5 2 ; 400 2 . 401 9 .; 439 4 toust mention the Posidonian passages. It is evidence of this kindwhich supports Strabos testimony that Posidonius is an exceptionand that Stoics in general were hesitant to concern themseveswith aetioogy, with the explanation of particular phaenomena

Hence it woud seem that the Stoic interest in causes does notarise from an interest in actual expanation. The evidence rather

suggests that the Stoic interest in causes arises from their interestin responsibity For when we ook at the actual use to which theStoics put their theory of causes it always seems to be a matter ofaotting and distributing responsibiity For example, whateverthings do is determined by fate, but fate is a mere heping cause(suneron The real cause, the things which really are responsible,are the things themseves ; they do what they do out of their ownnature or character Or the wise man may say what is fase. Butif, as a resut, somebody beeves it, it is not the wise man who isthe cause, but the person who beieves it has ony himsef tobame Ony dumb and wicked peope beleve fasehoods. t is incontexts of this sort that the Stoics introduce their doctrine of

causes. Moreover, as we wi see later, the Stoic distinction ofvarious kinds of causes is a renement on an ordinary intuitivedistinction of various kinds of responsibiity.

So for the Stoics the notion of a cause still has a connotation,however tenuous, of responsibility. But for the notion of responsibilty to have any content at all that which is responsible mustin some sense or other have done something and thus becomeresponsibe t is utimately for this reason, take it, that theStoics insist that causes are acive, that they must be the kinds of


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6 Dout and Do gmatsm

tems that can cause somethng. But n estctng causes to actvetems the Stocs seem to loosen the te etween causes andexplanaton Fo to state the causes of somethng wll no longee a matte of statng all the eevant tuths aout a the elevantfactos whch have to ente nto a compete explanaton, ut amatte of efeng to just those factos whch actvely contuteto the eect. And the elevant tuths aout these wl not amountto a complete expanaton, o so t woud seem. We wl see late,though, that the Stocs conceve of the cause n the naowestsense n such a way that t ecaptues the explanatoy foce causesseem to ose due to the estcton to actve causes. evetheesst s mpotant to eaze that the shft n the noton of a causetheatens the smpe and staghtfowad conceptual lnk etweencause and explanaton

But why shoud someody who dd not shae the Stocs' vewthat what matteed st of all was the queston of esponsltyaccept the clam that causes, popely speakng, have to e actve?The Stocs mght ague n the folowng way when the questonWhat s the aition ? was a queston of egal, moal, o poltca

esponsty t may have een dcut to come up wth theanswe n patcula cases, ut t woud have een clea that thepeson esponse woud e a peson who had done somethngo othe wich he should not have done such that as a esult ofhs dong t somethng has gone wong fo whch he s esponse.(The queston of esponsty ognaly s estcted to cases o fame It s then extended to al notewothy cases, ncudng casesn whch pase s to e estowed. It s only then that the questonof esponsty gets extended eyond the sphee of human opesona acton, whch s, of couse, facltated y an unwlngnessto detemne the mts of pesonal agency n a naow way so asto excude ut human actons Who knows aout the wnds

and the sea ? When then the use of ation was extende} such thatwe coud ask of anythng What s ts aition ?' ths extenson o f theus of aition must have taken place on the assumpton that foeveythng to e explaned thee s somethng whch pays wthefeence to t a ole analogou to that whch the peson espons lepays wth efeence to what has gone wong; .e. the extensonof the use of aition acos the oad s ony ntelgle on theassumpton that wth efeence to eveythng thee s somethngwhch y dong somethng o othe s esponse fo t

The Ognal Noton of Cause

This would seem to e a athe questonale assumpton venn the case of eal esponslty we have to constue the notonof dong somethng qute geneously such that fogettng to dosomethng and n geneal falng to do somethng whch onecan e expected to do count as dong somethng. But f we extendthe noton of esponslty acoss the oad we no longe havea set of expectatons such that any volaton of these expectatonscounts as a dong. As a esut thee ae consdeale dcutes ndetemning exactly what s to count as dong somethng and aseng actve If columns suppot a oof ths, pesumaly, countsas a case of dong somethng, ut why ? evetheless we do haventutons n this matte whch go fa eyond, and to some extentcoect, the gammatcal actvepassve dstncton. We have asmia dcuty n deteminng what s to count as the anaogueof the thng esponse n a case of eal esponslty. In thsespect thee had een consdeae dcultes even when we usthad to dea wth cases of eal esponslty We had, e.g., todecde that the thng whch s esponsle has to e a peson,athe than an oject o an anma But f the noton of espons

lty s to e extended acoss the oad t seems that we need anew set of nstuctons as to how one nds what s esponsle nths extended sense. To the extent, though, that the Stocs wclam that the common noton of a cause does povde us wthsuch nstucton and that they wll povde us wth futhenstucton the pont may have some weght afte al

We nd anothe agument to the eect that causes should econceved of as actve n Seneca, . LXV. It seems that wth theexcepton of the Epcueans n the case of the sweve all phlosophes would have ageed that fo any patcula thng a competeexpanaton of that patcua thng w nvove efeence tosomethng whch did somethng o othe, .e. efeence to a

movng cause n the vuga sense of movng cause' But once ts ageed that n evey case a movng cause s nvoved whyshoud we extend the noton of cause to aso cove whateveothe tems do ente nto ou expanaton ? Why should we notuse Platos dstncton n the Paedo etween causes and necessaycondtons (o athe necessay tems, ememeng that ou nthe phase aneu ou at Pd 99 does not ange ove popostonaltems and count the othe tems, e.g . matte, among the necessaycondtons? That the pesence of somethng s a necessay


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8 Doubt nd Dogmtism

condition does not yet men tht it is cuse. This seems to be theine Senec tkes in Ep. X. He cims tht there is ust onekind of cuse the ctive cuse nd tht if the oponents ssumemore kinds of cuses it is becuse they think tht the eect woudnot obtin if it were not for the presence of certin other kinds ofitems in dtion to n ctive cuse. In X 4-6, e.g. when hests nd expins Aristote's four cuses in ech of the rst threecses he expins why the presence of ech of them is necessrycondition for obtining the resut And hving expined thefourth cuse he dds the rhetoric question or don't you thinktht we hve t count mong the cuses of ny work broughtbout nything such tht if tht thing hd been removed the workwoud not hve been brought bout?' (X 6. And gin inX I he suggests tht the reson why Aristote nd Pto posit whoe bunch of cuses (turb cusrum' is tht they think thtthe presence of items of these vrious kinds is required for resut to come bout. But if this is the reson why these thingsdeserve to be ced cuses Senec rgues the four or ve kindsof cuses of the Periptetics nd the Ptonists do not suce in

the estNow prt from the thret of proifertion of cuses thisrgument w ony hve force if it is redy grnted tht themoving cuse does hve privieged sttus nd is not us t nothernecessry condition. Hence it does presuppose some otherrgument ike the one from the bsic mening of aton presentedbove Another rgument to the gp eft by Senecs rgumentcoud hve been the foowing We hve to remember tht thevrious cuses supposey invoved in prticur cse re notnecessry condtions the conunction of which is sucient. Theyrther re items the necessry conditions re truths bout. Whtis it then tht hs to be true of the vrious cuses for te resutto come bout ? In some sense they w hve to be presentBut this wi not be sucient to ccount for the resut. "For in thecse of the moving cuse it wi not ust be its presence which isrequired It wi so be necessry tht it does or hs done something or other And this dos seem to set it o from the othercuses for which we ony require their mere presence.

Tht ctve cuses come to be ccorded privieged sttus myso be mtter of chnge of perspective. It my or my not bethe cse tht Pto nd Aristote hd commtted themseves to

The Origin Notion of Cuse

position from whch it foowed tht everythng is determned byntecedent cuses. Even if Aristote ws concerned boutdetermnsm his reections on the mtter seem to hve been ofitte inuence o n his doctrine in gener. Certiny the quesionhd not been preoccuption of theirs But with the Stoics'insistence tht everything tht hppens incuding our ctions isntecedenty determned this probem strts to occupy centrestge And the whoe technc mchinery of expntion getspped to cses for which it ws not rey designed nmey toprticur events to nd out whether they dmitted of nexpntion which ws comptibe with the ssumption tht noteverytng is ntecedenty determined The probem of determinsm mkes one ook t prticur events s the concrete eventsthey re hppening t the prticr time they do rther thnust s instnces of some gener pttern of behviour As suchthey coud be ccounted for in terms of the nture or form of theting invoved But if we hve to sk why this prticur thingbehved in this prticur wy t this prticur time it seems certht reference to the geer nture of the thing or its end or

its mtter or its prdigm w not do In fct it seems tht thesewith whtever their presence entis ony form the more or essstbe bckground on which we hve to expin the prticurevent by referring to some prticur ntecedent chnge whichgiven stbe bckground mkes the reevnt dierence. Andhence the item invoved in tht chnge does seem to be in privieged position nd if nythng it seems to be it whichdeserves to be ced the cuse.

Once it is dmitted tht cuses hve to be ctive hve to dosomething or other in order to brin g bout the eect it foowsesiy for the Stoics tht cuses hve to be bodies. For onybodies cn do something nd cn be ected ony bodies cn

interct. At this point it is importnt to remember though thtfor the Stoics not ust physic obects but so stus nd qutiesnd mxtures thereof re bodies So quity coud qufy s cuse.

Cuses propery speking then for the Stoics re bodies whichdo something or other such tht the fct tht they do wht theydo is t est n importnt ingredient in the expntion ofwhtever it is tht the cuses re cuses of.

But wht is it tht the cuses re supposed to be cuses of? We


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0 Doubt and Dogatis

so fa have been talkng as if t were geneay ageed that t spopositonal tes, facts, events, and the lke, that are caused orexplaned And ths sees to t the coon use of ata andaton It s true that in coon use aton or ato, eg, can beused wth a noun n the genitive as in the ato of the urder', iethose responsible fo the urder' (Hdt IV 200, 1 But t s cearthat n such cases the noun is the nonaliation of an underying

sentence It is also tue that Aistote oten taks as if causes werecauses of entities lke a statue, a an, or heath But again, weight be inclned to say that this is just a way of speaking; causesof a statue are cause for there beng a statue or fo soething'sbeng a statue

Nevetheless thee does see to have been soe disagreeentFor Cleent trom VIII 9, 26 I = SVII 345) reports that soephosophes assue that causes ae causes of bodes Fro Sextus(IX 2 1 2) we earn ore speccay that accodng to Epicuusthe atos ae the causes of ther copounds, wheeas theincorporeal ropetes umbebkota are the causes of the ncorpoeal poperties of the coesponding copounds It is not cear,

though, whether we should assue that ths eects a seriousdsageeent about the notion of a cause, or whether we owe thsbt of doxography to soebody who was looking vey had tond soebody on who he could pn the view that causes can becauses of copoeal tes as well as of incoporeal ites After a,even f Epicuus had said what s attibuted to h, ths way ofspeakng adts of so any constuctons that ltte can be adeof these words, uness one assues that Epcurus chose thisanner of speaking because he had taken a postion on the issueBut ths s hardy plausible, for t woud see that ths is exactlythe knd of queston whch Epcurus would regad as sophistical

We coud leave the atter at that, f we dd not have additionalevdence whch suggests that there actualy was a dspute ovethe question what causes are the causes of This s a dsagreeentboth Ceent and Sextus report on Sextus (PHill I 4) dstinguishesbetween what we know to be the Stoc vew, naely the vew thatcauses ae causes of a pedcte's beng true of soething, and theview that causes are causes of appellatons proora CleentStrom VIII 9 26, 4) attrbutes the latter view to AistotleUnfotunately t s far fo cea what the contrast between thetwo vews is supposed to be, and Sextus' exaple does not ake

The Orgna Notion of Cause

the atte any cearer On the rst view, accodng to Sextus, thesun's heat is the cause of the wax's being eted tou ceta,wheeas on the second view t is the cause of the etng of thewax t cue .

It s faly clea that the contast is supposed to be indcated bythe use of a verb n the st case and a coresponding noun in thesecond Ths would aso t the exaples given by Ceent whosays But Aistote thinks that causes ae causes of appelatons,ie of ites of the foowng sort a house, a shp, a bunngkau, a cut tom, whereas exapes of what is caused on theothe view see to be soething's being cut temneta orsoethng's coing to be a ship neta naun Also t woudt the fact that nouns n Geek gaar ae called appelatons'o appelatves' the appellatives in Greek graar are a wordcass whch copises both ou nouns and our adjectives Fnayt s presuably reevant that the ter we have endered bypredcate', naey kateorma, soetes is restrcted to what ssigned by vebs or even is used synonyously with verb'rma

Now t is hardy plausibe that accoding to the vew in questoncauses are causes of expressons of whatever knd To akereasonabe sense of the position we have to assue ether thatwhat s eant is that causes are causes of soething's bengpropery caed soething or other o that appeaton' hee doesnot efer to a cetan kind of expession, but to what s signedby an appelatve Thee s a passage n Stobaeus (E , p I 37,5 W) in which appeation is used in the second way, but thisay be due to a confusion on Stobaeus' pat Hence it woud bepeferabe f we got by on the assuption that appeation' herehas its usual eanng as a gaatica te But what woud bethe pont of sayng that a cause is a cause of soethng's being

propery caled (a) Xwhere 'X is a noun or an adective? Gventhe lack of evidence the answer has to be quite specuative Itight, e g , be the case that verbs are assocated wth processes orcong-intobengs as opposed to the being of soething; hence,perhaps, the contast n Cleent between a ship or the beng of aship or soethng's being a ship and the cong-nto-being of aship o soething's cong to be a shp But if ths s the intendedcontrast we have to assue that the nouns coresponding to theverbs are taken not to sgnify the pocess sgned by the vebs


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4 Doub and Dogmasm

depend on he naure and sae of he hng aeced. I has o behe rgh knd of body. And hrdy, we have o remember hahoug we wan o see how one expans parcular facs we alsowan o have genera explanaons whch e us wha n generacauses a ceran predcae o be rue of somehng.

The general noon of a cause, properly speakng, accordng oe Socs, hen, seems o be e foowng a cause s a body whchdoes somehng or oher and by dong so brngs abou haanoher body s aeced n such a way ha somehng comes obe rue of . may very we be he case ha he Socs hnkha hs s jus a caracerzaon of he common noon of acause.

KS O CASS A TH CAS H SRC SS

The Socs rejec he swarm of causes (urba causarum, Sen. .LXV I of her opponens and aow only for an acve causeBu whn he noon of such an acve cause as we have ouned so far hey, oo, alow for deren knds of reaon beween

cause and eec and hence for deren causes As Alexander pus, hey ave a whoe swarm of causes (snos atn, Fat I92, 8=SVF II, p. 273, I8).

Unforunaey our sources concernng hese varous knds ofcauses are raher unclear. Hence may be bes o sar wh whaseems o be a quoaon from Chrysppus n Ccero's De jato 4,n whch Crysppus dsngushes wo knds of causes Ccerosays abou Chrysppus For of causes, he says, some are perfecand prncpa (perfecae e prncpales'), ohers auxary andproxmae (aduvanes e proxmae'). Hence, when we say haeveryhng happens by fae hrough aneceden causes, we do nowan hs o be undersood as sayng hrough perfec and

prncpal causes', bu n he sense of rough auary andproxmae causes'.The pon of he dsncon, f one ooks a he conex, woud

seem o be e followng. Chrysppus wans o manan haeveryhng ha happens s faed, s deermned by anecedencauses. On e oer hand he aso wans o manan ha hs doesno rue ou uman responsbliy, because, houg human aconsare deermined by aneceden causes, s neverheess he humanbengs hemselves, raher han e aneceden causes, wo are

Te Orgna Noon of Cause

responsbe for hese acons. Que generaly, hough wha ahng does s deermned by an aneceden cause, s no heaneceden cause bu raher he hng sef or somehng abouha hng whch s responsbe for wha does, hough, of course,no necessary moraly responsble; for only wh bengs of aceran sor and under ceran furher condons s responsblymoral responsbly.

We are gven wo knds of exampes o llusrae he pon,one from human behavour and one from he beavour ofnanmae objecs. Suppose we perceve somehng and ge somempresson (e.g e mpresson ha here s a pece of cake overere or he mpresson ha woud be nce o have ha peceof cake now) Now wl depend on us wheher we accep orgve assen o hs mpresson. If we do, we wl hnk ha heres a pece of cake over here or a would be nce o have hapece of cake now and wll fee and ac accordngy And f we dohnk so and fee and ac accordngly wl have been e mpresson whch broug s abou and hence was he anecedencause of our acon Bu he mpresson by sef does no neces

sae a we shoud nk, feel and ac ha way. Oher peopeor e ourseves a oher mes woud no accep or gve asseno he same mpressons. And hence wha decdes he maer sno e mpresson; s no e mpresson, bu somehng abouhe person whch makes he person accep he mpresson, ouge person woud no accep he mpresson and ac accordngyf he dd no have a mpresson, and hough here s a sen se nwhch he mpresson does brng abou or cause whaever aconhe person akes as a resul.

Chrysppus' pon abou causes, hen, as usraed by sexample s s everyhng does have an aneceden cause ; ouracons, e.g., have as er aneceden cause an mpresson. Buese aneceden causes are no e knd of cause a necessaehe resu ey are ony causae aduvanes e proximae' Thecausa perfeca e prncpals' whc necessaes e resu es nourselves, s ha abou us wch makes us accep he mpressonand ac accordngy.

Te exampes from he behavour of nanmae obecs aremoons of a cylnder and a cone or spnop. They coud nosar o move uness hey receved a pus. Bu once ha asappened he hnks a, for he res, s by her own naure a


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6 Doub nd Dogmsm

he cynder rolls nd he spnop urns (42 fn) he de hereseems o be h he person who gve he cynder or he column push s he neceden cuse. Whou he push he cylnderwould no roll bu he fc h he person gve push doesno ye ccoun for he fc h s rolng. Wh mkes ro ssomehng bou he cynder self. nd s h whch s heperfec nd prncp cuse of s rollng.

s mporn h he exmples should no be msnerpreedn he followng wy we mgh hnk h hrysppus only wnso pon ou h f one gves n objec push wll depend verymuch on he knd of objec s how wl be eced cynderw rol one wy cone noher nd cube wl no roll llBu cero does no us sy n 42 h he cylnder rols n vrueof s own peculr nure (supe nur) he lso es us n 43h boh n he cse of humn behvour nd he cse of hecylnder once he hng hs receved n mpulse wll move forhe res supe v e nur by s own force nd nure. hsmpes h here re wo forces wo ves nvoved : no jus heexernl vs of he neceden cuse he person who gves push

( cf. null v exrnsecus exc n 42 ) bu lso vs on he nsdend seems o be h vs on he nsde whch keeps he cylnderrolng once hs goen s n mpuse. s suggess hhere so s somehng cve somehng whch exers force onhe nsde of he cynder when he cylnder s rolng. nd gvenwh we sd bou he generl noon of cuse hs s nosurprsng f cuses re cve nd f n he cse of he cylnderwo cuses re supposed o be nvoved here shoud be wo hngsnvved boh of whch do somehng or oher o brng bou heresu h he cynder s rong.

he pcure whch we hus ge so fr s he foowng wheneversomehng does somehng or oher here re es wo kndsof cve cuses nvolved n neceden cuse whch !s clsseds n uxlry nd proxme cuse nd n nern cuse whch scssed s cus perfec e prncps hough boh ofhem cn be sd o brng bou h he hng does whever does rely s he ner cuse which by s cvy sresponsbe for wh s done

hs s no o sy h whenever somehng hppens o somehng sy here w be wo cuses nvoved one necedennd one nernl o mere pssve econ of does no

he Orgn oon of use

requre he cvy of n nern cuse s cer from he wycero ses ou his exmples h he neceden cuses do hven eec on he objec wch s no produced by n nerncuse he person who gves he cylnder push does gve hecylnder begnnng of moon nd he exern sgh or objecdoes produce n mpresson n us (43) whch s no due o nnern cuse seems h he need for second cuse ony

comes n when we wn o expn wh he hng does how heng recs s resu of beng eced hs wy. s n urnsuggess h he cus perfec e prncps s no essenllyn nernl cuse s we my hve hough For he cus perfece prncpls of mere pssve econ of n objec wl leousde h objec n he obec whch ecs . nd hs lsoseems o be requred by wh we know bou cuse perfecefrom oher sources

here seems o be no doub h cus perfec s j us cerosrenderng of aton autoteles We d o no hve ex which clmso gve us he Soc denon of s knd of cuse Bu we hvevrous exs whch dsngush beween () n autoteles aton ()

sunaton, nd () suneon (G D ed XX 393 K lemSto V 9 3 3 p. 2 25 ) nd snce we re oldn vrous pces h autoteles aton nd sunektkon aton reused nerchngebly (lem. Sto V 9 33 2 = p. 2 27 V 9 25 3 = p I Z O , 2 f.) we my so drw on exslike G. D ed p. 3923 K SE PH 5 nd G. Hstphl 9 whch dsngush () sunektkon aton () sunaton nd () suneon Snce Sexus els us h mos phosophers gree onhs dsncon we cn be resonby cern h consderonof hese exs wl ge us ner enough o he Soc noons ofhese knds of cuses n fc s lmos cern h hs s bscy Soc dsncon of Soc orgn. nd s so obvouslyhe rgh dsncon o ook n our conex snce he cus

duvns wh whch he cus perfec s conrsed n ceroclerly s sunaton or suneon

Wh hen s he dsncon? he nuve de behnd sfry smpe lwys mus hve been cer h ofen hequeson Who or wh s responsbe for hs ? does no dmof smpe srghforwrd nswer becuse here s no sngeperson or hng o be mde responsbe bu sever ngs hveo be referred o nd mong hem one woud ofen wn o


13/22

8 Doub nd Dogmsm

dvde e resonsbly nd dsngus mong vrous degreesof . Hence n ordnry lnguge bu lso n more ecncdscourse we soon ge suc erms s sunatos etatos, suneosf we wen by ordnry usge we woud guess e Socdsncon mouned o e foowng: wenever ere s excyone ng wc s resonsble for w ens s s eautoteles aton f ere re wo or more ngs wc no

ndvduly bu colecvely ve broug bou e eec eyre sunata f someng us n some wy conrbues o neec wc s broug bou oug by someng else s suneon

e dcules rse wen comes o e ecncl denonsof ese nds. For we re od of ree nds of cuses ey brng bou e eec cf G. D ed) We re so old e erfec cuse does brng bou e eec by sef GD ed XX 393 ; cf. sue v e nur n c. Fat 43)n fc seems o be s feure of e erfec cuse o wc owes s nme : 'autoteles As lemen (Sto V 9, 33 , 2 =S . 2 , 2 7 . ells us : ey lso cl autoteles, snce roduces

e eec by sef reyng on nong else. Fnly we now fromvrous sources (eg. lem Sto V 9, 33 S F . 2 ,3 5 . sunea cn er n conjuncon w e erfeccuse o el o roduce e eec. Bu n s cse seems eerfec cuse does no brng bou e eec by sef ere s so suneon wc cn be sd o brng bou e eec oo. Aferl s s wy oo s cled cuse of s eec

lely e ony wy ou of e dculy cn see s efollowng: we dsngus beween src sense of roducng orbrngng bou n eec nd weer sense. s rue of reends of cuses ey someow brng bou e eec f erewere no sense n wc e mresson could be sd o brngbou our ssen nd our con nd f ere were no sense nwc e erson wo used e cylnder could be s o vebroug bou e cynders rolng ese ems could no besd o be cuses of er resecve eecs n e rs lce. Buen our consderon of cylnder cse so s sown ere s srcer nrrower sense of brngng bou n wc s no e erson wo gves e us bu e erfec cuse wc

Th wy h pu though ugg f ymoogy: a Ka9 aT7OLDVv -fAos

e Orgnl oon of use

brngs bou e rolng moon of e cylnder sue v enur. Once we me s dsncon s esy o see ow we gee reefold clsscon. Of ose ngs wc cn be sd obrng bou n eec n e weer sense some so cn be sd obrng bou n eec n e nrrower sense nmely e erfeccuses nd e sunata, weres n nrrow sense e suneacn ony be sd o e o brng bou e eec Bu mong

ose ngs wc brng bou n eec n e src sense somedo brng bou by emselves nmey e erfec cusesweres oers only brng bou n conjuncon nd cooeronw oer cuses ese re e sunata

W mes erfec cuse erfec or comee en s does no deend for s cus eccy on e gency of some oercuse ousde s conro. A oen sunaton needs noersunaton, oenl suneon needs erfec cuse or sunata wcmy or my no be vbe s s wy e neceden cuse ndence fe by emselves do no necesse e eec. Forweer e neceden cuse does brng bou e eec deendson e cvy of e erfec cuse nd weer e erfec cuse

does c s ousde of e conrol of e neceden cuse oug s deermned.So muc for e dsncon beween autotel sunata, nd

sunea ress on n nuve dsncon wc dvdes resonsby. Wen rysus sys neceden cuses re noautotel, bu ony sunea, e rees on e fc nuvely wewll undersnd s s menng s no e necedencuse wc bers e full resonsby. A wors s somenge n ccomice. Gven e ecnc undersndng of edsncon rysus cm mouns o syng srcyseng s no e neceden cuse wc brngs boue eec s someng wn e ng sef wc roducese eec ll by self

Gven s s esy o undersnd wy e cus erfecwoud be ced cus erfec e rncs. We my ssume e Gree underyng ceros For of cuses some reerfec nd rnc . . . s someng le s : . . . of cusessome re autotel nd kua (or kutata) s e erfec cusewc s e cuse srcy seng or n e srces sense. slso seems o be broug ou by e Gree nmes of ese reends of cuses : autoteles aton, 'sunaton, nd 'suneon We


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240 Doubt and Dogmatsm

never get the phrase 'sunergon aition (whch also mght reect thefact that sunerga, as opposed to aitia and sunaitia, do not brngabout the eect strctly speakng).

ow before we have a closer ook at the nature of ths perfectcause let us brey turn to the second knd of cause dstngushedby Chrysppus accordng to Ccero : the auxary and proximatecauses (causae aduvantes et proxmae) So far I have been

assumng that these are the sunerga But from what has been sadt s clear that auxilary cause could be a translaton ether ofsunergon or of sunaition hs ambguty s apparent n Cceroscasscaton of causes n the Topics (58 .) where Ccero refersto the sunaitia as those whch stand n need of hep and to thesunerga as helpng (aduvanta). evertheless t s cear that herewe are talkng about sunerga For among the causes of somethngwe can ether have sunaitia or a perfect cause but not bothoreover we know ndependently that t was a pont of Stocdoctrne that fate the chan of antecedent causes ony provdes asunergon for what tngs do (cf. Cc Top 5 8 ). nd ths seems tobe exacty what Chrysppus s clamng n our passage when he

says that the antecedent causes whch somehow consttte fateare not causae prncpales but causae auvantes.But ths rases the queston how an antecedent cause can be

conceved of as a sunergon, f a sunergon s the knd of tem whchhelps to brng about the eect by makng t easer for the eectto be brought about he exampes Sextus and Clement eggve of a sunergon are of ttle hep. If somebody fts a heavyweght and somebody ese comes aong and gves a hepng handthen the second person s a sunergon n so far as he ust helps tobrng about the eect by makng t easer. But the antecedentcause s precsely not the knd of thng whch comes n whensomethng s aready happenng anyway It s not the case that thecynder was rong anyway and that the push just ade therolng easer.

Presumably the dea rather s that the ease wth whch thecylnder rolls depends on the knd of push t got he push hasto be of a sucent se for t o be easy enough for the cyinderto roll at all and any ncrement n se of the push w make therong easer he dcuty about ths s that to appy generalyths presupposes some general physcal theory accordng to whchthe antecedent cause contrbutes somethng to the force wth

he Orgnal oton of Cause 241

whch the eect s brought about by somehow ntensfyng thatforce But that some such theory of forces and ther ntenscatonactually s presupposed seems to be clear enough from ourtestmones Ccero as we have seen talks about the externa andthe nterna vis, ps.-Gaen and Sextus charactere sunaitia as eachexertng an equa force to brng about the result whereas thesunergon s sad ony to contrbute a minor force. Sextus PH III

I ) taks of the ntenscaton and remisson of the perfect causeand a correspondng ntensty of the eect. Clement tels us thatthe sunergon heps to ntensfy the eect (VIII 9 33 7; 3 3 9) Inany case we know ndependenty that fate .e the antecedentcause s supposed to hep n the producton of the eect even f ts not the perfect cause (cf. Josephus II 6 3 ) .

ow the second knd of cause to be dstngushed s not ustcharactered as a helpng cause but aso as a proxmate cause.Causa proxma could be a renderng of 'aition proseches, aitionprogoumenon, or aition prokatarktikon I assume that t rendersaition prokatarktikon and that the causae antecedentes are the aitiaprogoumena

If we take the testmony of Sextus Clement and othersserously the cass of sunerga and the cass of aitia prokatarktikaw not concde snce not a sunerga are antecedent causes. Butthere s aso no evdence that the class of aitia prokatarktika wasarrved at by further subdvson of the class of sunerga hsstrongy suggests that the dstncton ofaitia prokatarktika s partof a dvson of causes qute ndependent of that nto autote/,sunaitia, and sunerga nd ths seems to be conrmed by the factthat the prokatarktika are usualy contrasted wth the socaedunektica, a knd of cause to which Ccero n 44 of the De jatorefers as the causae continentes and of which we know fromGalen that t along wth ts name was ntroduced by the StocsDe causis cont p. 6, z ; IX 458 . K.). In fact ps.Galen nDefnitiones medicina/es (XIX 392) says that cause s threefold one vs the prokatarktikon, the other the progoumenon, and the thrd thesunektikon nd t s only after dentons of these three knds thathe turns to the dstncton nto autote/, sunaitia and sunergaPossby ths threefold dstncton s of Stoc orgn For Galen nDe causis continentbus (p 8 8 ) tels us that thenaeus the

5 K( T? ' p0TTLV Q lKta Ka f Ka 'Q Airov 71 TO 8ptS KE8,ohv 1 S


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increasing compexity there wi be an increasing number ofranges of such states. Some of these states wi be active states'such that being in those states the pneuma wi act in a certainway. Whether a state i s active and how precisey the pneuma wact in such a state wi depend on the precise nature of thepneuma, the modications it has undergone, the dispositions ithas acquired, and the other states it is in

We coud, e.g., try to imagine that the pneuma is characterizedby a compex set of interdependen tensions in some more or esscomfortabe equibrium such that, if certain of these tensions areintensied to a certain degree, we have an active state of thepneuma and a certain kind of action resuts. Moreover, we mghtimagine that, if an object is aected, one or more of these tensionsare aected and hence, as a resut, the whoe system of tensionsis aected. So we might imagine that if an anima receives acertain impression at east one of these tensions gets intensied.If the whoe system of tensions is such that as a resut an actionproducing tension gets sucienty intensied, this action woudbe due to the whoe system of tensions, but it sti mght be

thought to be iteray true that the impression, or more generaythe antecedent cause. had contributed some of the force withwhich the action was executed, in so far as the increased force ofthe intensied action producing tension in part was the force ofthe tension intensied by the impression

But whatever the mechanics of the aition sunektikon may haveben supposed to be it is cear that most peope woud not havesubscribed to the physica theory underying it. They mght, eg.,deny that the primary active cause for a thing's behaviour was tobe found in the thing itsef. Even if they accepted the view thatthe pneuma payed an important roe in the expaation of thebehaviour of things, they mght not, as e.g. Gaen did not,accept the view that such a pneuma was needed to account for the

existence of obects as that which hods them togther (cf. Decausis cont V and VII). evertheess, they mght want to havesome kind of cause which on their physica theory in some way orother pays a roe anaogos to that of the sunektikon aition andwhich they hence woud ca by the same name. And i this caseit woud be cear that the name coud no onger be interpreted asreferring to the fact that this kind of cause is that which hods theobject aected together.

The Origina Noton of Cause 245

And, as a matter of fact, we do nd a sorts of nonStoic usesof 'sunektikon aition. One of them, in Cicero's eJato 44 seems tohave puzzed editors and commentators no end Von Arnim, e g,prints a text (S II, p 283 34 .) whch makes Chrysippusconcede that the antecedent cause is the sunektikon i.e the perfectcause. Cicero refers to a doctrine accordng to which the proxmate and containing cause (proxima ia et continens causa')

woud be the impression, if somebody gave assent to it. It is cearthat here the causa continens is the aition sunektikon But it isequay cear that this term now is not used in the Stoic senseFor the Stoics specicay deny that the antecedent cause is thecontaining cause. Moreover the positon Cicero describes envisages the possibiity that the impression, though it is the containing cause of the assent, aso might not have brought about theassent (I take it that the subunctive of movat' is not just thesubjunctive of indirect speech). This again, as we wi see shorty,seems to be incompatibe with the Stoic notion of a containingcause. Hence it is not surprising that Cicero shoud go on to sayChrysippus wi not admt that the proximate and containng

cause of the assent ies in the impression and hence he wi asonot admt that ths cause, i.e the impression, necessitates theassent.'

Cicero's remarks in De Jato 44 very much suggest thatChrysippus thought that if something were the containng causeof something it woud necessitate its eect. And this I actuaytake to be Chrysippus' view But in what sense coud the containing cause be thought to necess itate its eect? In thsconnection it is presumaby reevant to refer to Stobaeus'characterization of Zeno's notion of a cause E I, p 38, 14 W). According to Zeno a cause is such that its presence necessitates the eect. And ths principe is iustrated by the foowingexampes it is wisdom which brings about being wise, the sou

whch brings about iving. This rends one not just of theunreformed giants of Pato's Sophist (247 b .), with whom theStoics were very much in sympathy (cf. SVF II, p 2 3 , 6 .=Soph 246 a ), but aso of Socrates' safe causa accounts in thePhaedo and Aristote's forma causes

The connection between wisdom and bing wise and sou andbeing aive mght seem to be triviay necessary in so far as it ustis with reference to somebody's wisdom that we ca him wise


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46 Doubt d Domtism

But this cot be wht Zeo hs i mid, for he seems to thkof somebodys bei wise s eect produced by wisdom, s ifoes wisdom ivriby d ecessrily brouht it bout thtoe is wise Perhps the ide is the followi. It is true tht ourcommo otio of wisdom does ot tell us how it is tht wisdommkes somebo dy wise. But if we hd compete techic uderstdi of wht wisdom rely is, the we woud so uderstd

tht wisdom by its very ture bris it bout tht those whopossess it ivriby re wise Looked t i this wy the ecessityivoved still c be rerded s some kid of coceptuecessity (This is ot to ttribute to the Stoics distictiobetwee loic or coceptu d physic or empiricl ecessity)Give the correct complete techicl otio of wisdom whichreects its ture i ll deti, oe sees how wisdom cot fito produce its chrcteristic eect. It my be lo these lies thtthe Stoics thik tht the cotii cuse ecessittes its eects.If oe uderstds the ture of soul s chrcteried by wisdomoe sees tht it cot fil to produce the eect tht so mebody iswise. I this cse the ecessity ivolved would just be the

ecessity which chrcteries Chrysippe coditio whosecosequet is the sttemet tht the perso is wise d whosetecedet is the reevt truth bout his soul.

This bris us bck to expltio To simplify mtters let uscocetrte o cses i which somethi does somethi or other,exhibits certi piece of behviour The Stoics ssume drue tht othi hppes without cuse More specicly,they ssume tht othi hppes without tecedet cused rue, e ., tht if this hppeed without tecedet cusesthe cotiuity of the uiverse woud be iterrupted. Bu they sossume tht referece to the tecedet cuse is ot oi toexpi why somethi does somethi or other. To expi thiswe hve to refer to the sunektikn, d we do ot hve_to refer toythi ese. For truth bout the sunektikn wi etil the truthbout the object to be explied, wheres o truth bout thetecedet cuse by itsef wi be the tecedet of trueChrysippe coditiol wih the fct to be expied s thecosequet.

These coditios wil be isttitios of uiversl coditios of the form if the sunektikn of is su chd-such the is or does) so-d-so. We my ssume tht it is sets of such

The Oriil otio of Cuse 4

coditios which specify the ture of ech kid of sunektikn,d hece it would be tur to rre these coditiosccordi to the kids of sunektika Sice these coditios reuivers d sice they c be of y deree of eerity we cso drw o them for eerl expltios.

ow these coditios wil cover wht hppes withi thethi, so to spek They tel us how thi, ive its kid of

ture, the modictio of its ture d the sttes it is i, wilbehve. But, thouh this i some sese ives us competeexpltio of wht the thi doesfor otherwise the correspodi coditio woud ot be truewe will thik tht were missi somethi if we do ot et the tecedet cuse itothe picture. ter , the thi would ot hve doe wht we retryi to expi if there hd ot bee tecedet cuse whichi some sese hd brouht it bout tht the thi would behvei certi wy. I fct, we re very much tempted to thik thtthe re expltio of wht the thi did would be i terms ofwht the tecedet cuse did d some eer w whichcoects wht the tecedet cuse does with wht the object

does. Ad it seems cer tht our coditiols do ot provide uswith such ws. Accordi to Ciceros e Jat it seems thtChrysippus cims tht there c be o true coditios whichcoect truths bout tecedet cuses with fcts they re thetecedet cuses of evertheess, it seems tht for the purposeof expltio we wil ot eed eer lws i dditio to thecoditiols which we lredy hve.

It is true tht for other purposes, e divitio d predictio,we miht wt to formulte such eer ws Give his viewso cosmc sympthy Chrysippus is ot oi to dey tht evetsdo ot occur i i sotio of ech other, i fct he is oi to stresstht there is coectio betwee y two this tht hppeHe lso is ot oi to dey tht by observtio we could detectreulrities, costt couctios, d tht it woud be worthwhile to formulte d colect correspodi rules or ws forpredictio But he does dey tht such rues s if somebody isbor t the rise of the Do-str he wl die t se oer yexptio for somebodys deth t se eve if the perso wsbor t the rise of the Do-str d there i fct is costtcojuctio For i spite of the fct tht he believes i divitioi eerl d does ot obect to stroloic rues s such he


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0 Do nd Dogmism

The argest collection of texts bearing on Stoicism is Arnim, H. von Soioum Veeum agmena 4 vols Leipzig,

190324) ndices in Vol iv.See also 1 2 delstein, ., and Kidd, . osidonius Vol. i : The agmens

ambridge, 1972).

For picreanism there are three s efl collections :[13 Usener, H Epiuea eipzig, 1 88 7 Rome, 196 3) ncldes

materia on the picrean Schoo generally 14 Baiey, . Epiuus} he Exan Remains Oxford, 1 926) . ncdes

ngish transation and notes.1 5 Arrighetti, G. Epiuo} Opee 2nd edn., Trin, 1973). ncdes

papyrs fragments of picrs, On Naue, and taian translation.

An invalabe aid to stdy is6 Usener, H. Glossaium Epiueum Rome, 1977)

The papyrs text of Philodems' On Signs is edited, with transationand commentary, by17 acy, P H. de, and Lacy, A de hilodemus: On Mehods of

nfeene Philadelphia, 1 941 ; 2nd edn. Naples, 19 78)

2 GEERA

Genera acconts of Helenistic philosophy may be fond in 1 8 Zeler, . Die hilosophi de Giehen in ihe geshihlihe

Enwiklung iii, Abt. 1 and 2 Die nahaisoelishe hilosophi 4th edn, Leipzig, 1 903 9) ;ngish translation of the st section of iii Abt. : Reichel, 0. ].Zeller, The Sois Epiueans and Sepis London, 18 7); ng tr ofthe 2nd secton of iii Abt. 1 Alleyne, S F. Zeler, A Hiso ofEleiism in Geek hilosop London, 1883).

19 Hicks, R. D Soi and Epiuean New York, 1910; repr 1962)2 ong, A. A. Hellenisi hilosop London, 1974)

A special stdy of the notion of a criterion of trth is[21 Striker, G. prp rf S dOL Gttingen, 1974) Nahihen

de Akadeie de Wissenshafen in Gingen Philhist. kase, 1974,Nr. 2, 47

There is mch t o be earned abot physical and intelectal aspects ofancient schoos of phiosophy frm 22 larke, M. . The Garden

ofpicrs', hoenix 27 19 73), 3 867

23 Lynch, P. Aisole's Shool Berkeey, 1972)[24 Sedey, D Diodors rons an d Helenistic Philosophy',

oeedings of he Camb idge hilologial Soie 203 .s 23) 1977),74120.

: Zur soschen Erkennns

heore, Wurzbrger Jahrbcher fr die Altertumsissenschaft NF. 3 (I977), 83-92

[92] Goud J. B . Deducon n Soc Loc, n Corcoran [4o],

I 5 I68.[93 Goue, R. La cascaon socenne des proposons smpes,n Brunschw 8I], I7I98.

[94 Graeser, A. Les caores socennes, n Brunschw 8 I ] ,I9922I

[95] mber, C. Thore de a reprsenaon e docrne oque,n Brunschw [8I], 223-49

[96] Kererd, G. B. The Probem o Synkatatheis and Katelpsis nSoc Docrne, n Brunschw 8 I], 2 5 1-72

[97] Kdd, . G. Posdonus and Loc, n Brunschw 8 I ] , 273-83 [98 Lacy, P. de The Soc Caeores as Mehodooca Prncpes,

Transactions the American Phi/ological Association 76 (I 94 5 ), 246-6 399] Loyd, A. C . Grammar and Meaphyscs n he Soa, n Lon

[82], 58-74

[ Ioo] Acvy and Descrpon n Arsoe and he Soa, Proceedings of the British Academ 56 (I97o), 22 7-40

[ IO I ] Dene Proposons and he Concep o Reerence, mBrunschw [ 8 I , 28 595 .

[Io2] Lon, A. A. Carneades and he Soc Teos, Phronesis I 2(I967), 5 99

[Io3] The Soc Concep o Ev, PhilosophicaQuarter( I8 ( 1968) ,329-43

[Io4] Soc Deermnsm and Aexander o Aphrodsas De Fato(xv), Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 52 (I97o), 24768

Io 5 ] The Loca Bass o Soc Ehcs, Proceedings of theAristotean Socie 7I (I97o/7), 85I04.

1o6 Freedom and Deermnsm n he Soc Theory o Human

Acon, n Lon 82, I7399

Io7] Lanuae and Thouh n Socsm, n Lon [ 82 , 75I I3 [Io8] The Soc Dsncon beween Truh and he True, n

Brunschw 8 I], 297-3 15 [Io9] Daecc and he Soc Sae, n Rs 83], I OI-24[I Io] Maes, B. Soc Loc and he Tex o Sexus Emprcus,

American Journal ofPhilolo 70 (I949), 290-8[I I I Mnucc, M. Sur a oque modae des socens, n

Brunschw [8 I], 3 I 746

Slct Bbgrphy

[I 1 2] Mueer, Ian Soc and Perpaec Loc, Archiv fr dieGeschichte der Philosophie 5 I ( I969), I 7387.

[ I I 3 ] Pache, P 'La deixis selon Znon et Chrysippe, Phronesis 20(I975), 24I6

[I I4] Pembroke, S G. Okess, n Lon 82], I I4-49[I I 5] Pnbor,. Hsororaphy o LnuscsCassca Anquy

Greece, Current Tren in inguistics I 3 ( I975) , 69126 [I I 6 Pohenz, M. Zenon und Chryspp, Nachrichten vonder Akademie

der Wissenschaften zu Gtingen, Ph.-hs. Kasse, N , 2 (I938),I732IO

I I 7] Reesor , M. Fae and Possby on Eary Soc Phosoph y,Phoenix I9 (I965), 28597.

I I8 Rs, . M. Caeores and Ther Uses, n Lon [82, 3 857.[ 1 I9 Zeno and he Orns o Soc Loc, n Brunschw 8 I ] ,

387400[I2o] Sandbach, F H. Ennoa and Propss, Cassical Quarter( 24

( I 9 3 o), 44-5 I ; repr. wh uppemenay noes n Lon 82],2237[ I 2 I Phanasa Kaapk, n Lon 82, 9-21.[ 122 ] Verbeke, G. La phosophe du sne chez es socens, n

Brunschw 8I, 40I24.

6. EPCURENIM

Books

I23 ] Furey, D. . Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Prnceon, I967).[124 Lemke, D. Die Theologie Epikurs (Munch, I973).[ I 2 5 ] Manuwad, A. Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs (Bonn, I972)

ticles

[ I 26] Bara, A pcur e e Scepcsme, Association GuiaumeBud Actes due VJe Congrs I969, 28692

[I27] Furey, D. ]. Knowede o Aoms and Vod n Epcureansmn Anon, J., and Kusas, G., edd., Esss in Ancient Greek Philosop

(Abany, I97I), 6o7I9 128 Godschmd, V. Remarques sur orne pcurenne de aprnoon, n Brunschw 8 I ] , I 5 569 .

I29] Lon, A. A. Ashess, Proepss and Lnusc Theory nEpcurus, Buetin ofthe Institute assical Studies I 8 (I97 I), I I4-33

qo Sedey, D . Epcurus, On Nature Book XXV, Cronacheercolanesi 3 (I 973 ), 5-8 3

I 3 1 ] Epcurus and hs Proessona Rvas, Cahiers de philologie I(I976), I I959

frede - the original notion of cause

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