on the limits of the sociology of knowledge by hugo meynell

8/9/2019 On the Limits of the Sociology of Knowledge by Hugo Meynell

1/13

On the Limits of the Sociology of KnowledgeAuthor(s): Hugo MeynellSource: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Nov., 1977), pp. 489-500Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284717 .

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2/13

Discussion

Papers, ocial Studies

of

Science,

Vol.

7

(1977), 489-500

On theLimitsof theSociologyofKnowledge

Hugo

Meynell

It

seems to me

that it is an

outstandingmerit n

the

work of David Bloor and

Barry Barnes

to

have

brought out

the

problem

of the relation between

epistemology

nd

the

sociology

of

knowledge

n

a

striking ay.

However,

think

their olution

to

the

problem

s

fundamentally istaken,

nd

in

what

followswill

try

o show

why.

THE ARGUMENT

First,

their

arguments

nd conclusions

must

be

summarized.They

argue as

follows,

The

sociology of

knowledge s

often

aken to be

applicable imply o the

systems

f beliefwhich

one

happensto

think reerroneous.

his

restriction

ust

be resisted;all

systems

of belief are

the proper

concern

of the

sociologist of

knowledge,not simply

those

which ome

people in some

cultures,

ncluding he

sociologist

himself nd

his

colleagues,happen to

hold to be

inadequate or

untrue.

Whether

modernEuropean

physicists

eliefs

about electrons,or

Zande

beliefs

about

witch-substance,

re at

issue,

it must be

insisted

that

the

acquisition,

maintenance nd

transmission f

systemsof

belief are

subject to social

factors

which resimilar n kind n all cases.1

Empiricistsre liable

to

object that,

whilemodern

European

cientific eliefs

on the

whole

correspondwith the

data

of

experience,those

characteristic

f

primitives o

not do

so. It is

interestingo note

that,

beforetheatomic

theory

was

universally

ccepted

by

physicistsand

chemists,

ust the

same kind of

objection

was made

to

it

as

to

these

primitive

beliefs; atoms

were

not

observable,

nd so

ought

o formno part

of a truly

cientific heory.But

atomism

won

out, and

theempiricists

helved heir

bjections;this

was

because

acceptance

of

the theory

facilitated the

performances

haracteristic f

the professional

specialtiesconcerned. Popper s criterionof scientificmethod (that statements

should

be

falsifiable,nd

accepted as

provisionally

rueonly so far

s they

urvive

attempts

o

falsify hem) is

supposed to

constitute

cross-cultural

riterion f

Autbor s

address:

Department

of

Philosophy

and

Theology,

Leeds University,

Leeds

LS2

9JT,

UK.

489


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3/13

490

Social Studies

of

Science

truth;

but in

fact

it is

merely

a recommendation

by a ratherinfluential

person

in

one

culture.

And in

any case

it

has been shown that conscientious

adherence

to

Popper s

principles

would

in fact

have

ruled

out

from

the

start

most

of

what

are

now agreed to be the most significantdiscoveries of science, since these have been

propounded

and

maintained

in the

teeth

of

conflicting

evidence.

In the long

run,

it

must

be concluded

that

all

proof ,

justification

and validation

boil down

to

modes

of behaviour

and

ways

of speaking

which are characteristic

of the ways

of

life of particular

social

groups,

and which

cannot

be further ustified;

this was

one

of

the

outstanding

discoveries

of the

later

Wittgenstein.

The moral of

all

this

is

that

scientists,

including

social scientists,

should

simply

get on with their

job,

whether

or not

they are preoccupied

in their spare

time by

methodological

worries

which

are in

the nature of

the case incapable

of

resolution.2

People have often objected to this recognition that there are different ocieties

which

have

totally

different

theories

as to the

nature

of

the world, between

which

an unprejudiced

rational adjudication

is impossible,

on the ground

that it seems

to

entail

that

there are

as many worlds

as there

are

divergent

views

of the

world.

But

this

conclusion,

which

admittedly

is

absurd,

by no

means

follows

from

the

premises.

One

may just

as well

conclude

that, for

all

the divergent

and

incommensurable

views

that there

are of the world,

we all

live together

in

the

one

physical

wvorld;

basic

tenet

of

materialisn.3

Thus

far a summary of

the

view of

Bloor

and

Barnes.

I

strongly

agree

with

them

that

sociologists

shculd

use the same principles

to investigate

and

explain

all systems

of

belief,

whether

one

holds

them

oneself

or not.

I

further

agree

that

rational

procedures

are

not the

exclusive

monopoly

of

any

one society,

culture

or

profession.

But

I shall

argue

that true belief,

which is about

the

one real

world,

is not

merely

relative to

the social context

of

the

believer;

and

that

such

belief

tends

to

be

approached

so

far as social

factors bearing

on it

tend

to

be of

one

kind

rather

than

another,

to

contribute

to some

ends

rather than

others.

I shall try

to

show that

truth is

in a sense

trans-social

in

character,

by

demonstrating

the

self-destructive

nature of

the contradictory

proposition.

The methods

by

which,

in

general,

one approaches

to true

belief

will be

sketched,

and mention

will

be

made of those social factors which facilitate this approach, and of those which

obstruct it.

COGNITIVE

SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

What

is

involved

in the assumption

that

we can come

to know anything

at

all?

Let

us

take

an

example.

Suppose

I

come

to

know,

either

by

being

told,

or

by

working

it out for

myself

from the evidence,

that the

planet

Jupiter

is larger

than

the

earth.

The

belief

that it

is so is one

that

many

men

in

many

societies

have not held,

and

which

would

have been

regarded

by

many

as

ridiculous

had

it

been

suggested

to

them;

only

some men

in some societies

have known

that Jupiter

is

larger

than the

earth.

Now,

I

want

to

suggest

-

not

yet,

at

least,

to

insist

or

to

argue

-

that,

if

we know

this,

if

we

believe

it

truly,

then

what

we know

and

believe truly

was

the

case

before there

were

any

men or societies

to know

it,

and

indeed

might

have been

the

case without

any

human individuals

or societies

ever

coming

into

existence;

and

almost

certainly

will

be the case

long

after

men

and

societies

have

perished

from

off

the face

of the earth. (We

will

consider

later

the

implications

of

the

thesis,

actually upheld

by

few but implied

by

surprisingly




4/13

Discussion

Paper:

Meynell

491

many,

that

t

is

not

really

true,

n the ast

analysis,

hat

men orsocieties ome

to

know

or

to

believe

truly

on

the basis

of

sufficient

vidence,

hat

things

re

so

whichwould have beenso even ftheyhadnever ome to knowthem.)4 propose

to call this

putative

apacity

of human

beings,

nd

the societiesof

which

hey

re

members,who

exist

at particular

places

and

times,

o know what

is

so at

quite

different

laces and

times,

nd

would have

been

so

even

f

they

had not

known t,

cognitive

elf-transcendence. 5

I

deliberatelydid not

make

my

first

xample

mathematical;

ad

I

done so

I

would

have

fallenfoul

of

certain

heories

bout

the natureof mathematics

which

can be

made

at least to sound

plausible.

wanted

to avoid the fate

which

the

unfortunate

Karl

Mannheim

recently

uffered

t the hands

of David

Bloor.6

Mannheim

was

concerned, s I

am, to

attack theview that

knowledge

nd

truth

were utterlyrelativeto the social situation of the knower; he pointed to

mathenmatical

ropositions s

examples

of truthswhich were

not

thus

relative.

n

the ight f

Mannheim s

laim,Bloor

was

able to assume

that, f the

very

paradigm

of

absolute

knowledge,

mathematics, ould be

shown to

be

subject

to

social

relativity,

he

same could be

shown a

fortiori

f

other

kinds

of

knowledge.

Bloor

argued

a

conventionalist

heory f

mathematics,

n thebasis

of

some texts

from

Wittgenstein,

nd the

ob

was

done.

But

in

myopinion

Mannheimmade a tactical

error f which

Bloor took

brilliant

dvantage.

After

ll,

one

might

e

prepared

o

swallow

the view

that

numbers

and the

relations

between them

were

social

constructions,nd yet ib at theproposition hatthestars n their ourses re so.

A

few other

examples

of

the

self-transcendence

pparently

nvolved

in

knowledgewill serve

to

push home the

point I

am

making.

uppose I

come to

find

out, by

lookingat

a

textbook

or listening

o a

university

ecturern

ancient

history, hat

the

Athenians

defeated he

Persian

rmy

tMarathon n

490

BC. On

the

usual

view

ofhistorical

nquiry,

where

elf-transcendences

involved,whether

this

happenedor not

has

nothing o

do with

nything

nyonecan do

in 1977

AD;

neither

, nor

society

as a

whole,

nor even

the

community f

professional ncient

historians,

an

bring t about that

therewas or

was not a

battle of

Marathon,

r

influence he course

of that

battle

n

anyway. However, and otherpeople can

find

out, by

consideration

of

evidence and

deference o

reasonable

authority

available in

1977, that

such

a

battle, with

the

issue I have

already

described,

actuallytook

place.

In

this nstance

s

in

the

other, t s

apparently

he case that

we can come

to

know, by dint of

experience

nd inquiry,

what

would have

been

the

case if we

had

never

xisted,

et alone had the

experience

r

made the

nquiry.

Someone

may object

as

follows: That the

planet

Jupiter s

larger han

the

earth,

that

the battle

of

Marathonas

you

describe t

really

happened, are

true

only

in and

for

some

societies;

for

others,

Jupiter s not

larger

han

earth, nd

there

was no

such

battle.The idea

that

there s

a realworld

ndependent

f the

conceptual frameworks f human communities gnores the fact that, f there

were,

we,

as

social beings

subject

to

these

frameworks,ould

have no

access to

it. 7

This

view s one

whichwe will have

to

discuss

t

length;

what want

to

point

out

about

it

now

is

that,

paradoxically,hough

t seems

to

involve he denial

that

self-transcendence

s

possible, t

does at

thesame time

assume

its

possibility nd

reality. For

it

impliesthat

we are

able

to make

assertions

bout

men of other

societies,

to

the

effect hat

their

onceptions f

andbeliefs

bout

history

nd the

cosmos

are

different

rom

our own.

Suppose

I am

an

anthropologist,

nd I

conclude from

the

evidence

available to

me

that the

planet

Jupiter s

much




5/13

492

Social

Studies

of

Science

smaller

than

the

earth

from

the

point

of

view

of

the society

I am

studying,

though

it is

larger

than

the earth

from

the point of

view

of my own

society.

Consider

this conclusion

tself.

s it true

simply

n

the

world

view

of

my

society;

or is it true of the world-view f the society in question? If the former, he

possibility

f my making ny udgment

whatever

which s

really

bout

the

beliefs

of other

societies that

s,

about

these

beliefs

themselves

s

opposed

to those

as

somehow

constitutive

f

myown

world-view)

would

seem

to

be removed.

f

the

latter,

f

follows

that self-transcendence

s possible;

by

consideration

f

evidence

available

within

my own world-view,

he

world-view

f

my society,

have

come

to a

true

onclusion

bout

what s the

case

independently

f

me and

my society

in this

nstance,

bout the

beliefs

nd conceptions

haracteristic

f the

world-view

of

another

ociety.

conclude

thatdenials

of

self-transcendence,

o

far s

they

re

arguedon anthropological rounds,nfactnecessarily resupposet.

COMMON

FEATURES

OF

INQUIRY

Is thereanything

n

common

amongst

hese

examples

ofself-transcendence,

nd

can

we spell

out

clearly

nd

distinctly

hat

t s?

It

might

e claimed

that there

s

nothing

whatever

n

common

between

inquiries

nto what

is so in

cosmology,

history,

nd

anthropology;

erhaps

that

the

term

inquiry

s

itself

quivocal

as

appliedto theseexamples. t has in fact ometimes

een

suggested

hatthe

dea

of

any

single

et of

qualities

nd dispositions

xercised

n all inquiries,

n all

kinds

of

attempt

to come

to know,

is sheer superstition.

But

I think

it

can be

demonstrated

that there

are,

all

the

same,

such

basic

mental

qualities

and

dispositions.

n all the

examples

of

coming

to

know

which mentioned

arlier,

three

things

eemed

to be

at

issue;

attending o

a rangeof

evidence

available

to

sensation

or consciousness;

envisaging

possible

explanation

or set of

possible

explanations

which might

ccount

for that evidence;

and accepting

s

probably

or

certainly

o the explanation

so far

as it

accounted

for

the

evidence,

or

the

member

f

the

set of

explanations

which

best accounted

for

he

evidence.

It seemsas well to clarify hepoint ustmadebymore examples.Whenone is

considering

what

grounds

here

re

for

choosing

between

Rutherford s

heory

f

the

atom

and

the account earlier

advanced

by Thomson,

one

adverts

to

the

manner

of

particle

scatter when

the atoms

are bombarded;

this is

highly

unexpected

on

Thomson s

account,

but

is easily

explained

on

Rutherford s;

here

is nothing

which

similarly

ells

forThomson against

Rutherford;

o

Rutherford s

theory

s

to

be accepted

as

the

moreprobably

trueaccount

of

the nature

of

the

atom.

Here

there

s

sensory

evidence

to be adverted

o,

on photographic

lates

and

so

on;

two

incompatible

xplanations

re

available,

both

of themdealing

with

a wide range of the evidence,but only one of them accountingfor a

crucial

portion

of

t;

and

a

judgment

ccordingly

o

be made

that

one is probably

o.

Just

the

same

method

is

applied

in

a

lawcourt.

What

s

available

to

the

sense

of the

jury

are exhibits

nd

the

reports

f witnesses.

On the

basis

of

these,

he ury

will

have

to

judge

which

of two possibilities

he evidence

ends

to support

that

the

defendant

s

guilty

f

the

crime

lleged

bythe

crown,

r that

he

is not.

It

is to

be

noted

as

highly

characteristic

of

cases

of

cognitional

self-transcendence,

hat while the

evidence

vailable

to sensation

r

consciousness

in

such cases

cannot

but be

present

n time

and

space,

thatwhich

s

udged

to

be




6/13

Discussion

Paper:

Meynell

493

the

case on

the

basis

of this evidence need

by

no means

be

so.

The

court,

n

the

basis

of

evidence here and

now, is

attempting

o

judge

here

nd

now

whether

he

defendant

was

guilty

of a crime

supposed

to

be committed

here

nd

then.

f

Rutherfordwasrightnsupposing, n the basisof evidence vailableto himat the

time,

that the atom

consistedof a

comparatively iny

nucleus

urrounded

argely

by empty pace, then this

has

been

trueof atoms

ong before

human

ocieties, et

alone

the

community

of

twentieth-century

hysicists,

et alone

Rutherford

himself,

et alone this

particular

ourse of inquiry f

his, ever

came

into being.

There

is, I admit,a

sense in which the truth

or

falsity

f a

statement

may

partly

depend on

the

context withinwhich

t s

uttered, ather

han theactuality

of

the

state of affairs o which

t

refers.

o

take a

trivial

nstance the truth

f

Barry

Barnes

is in

Edinburghnow

depends

on the

time at which t is

spoken.

To take a more nterestingnd contentious xample

-

suppose one were asked,

in

a

social milieu

n which

thephlogiston

heorywas

generallyccepted,

whether

a

sample

of pure

metal

containedphlogiston;

think t

might e

lessmisleading o

say It

is true

that it contains

phlogiston

than It is false

that it

contains

phlogiston , ven

granted

he falsity

f thephlogiston

heory

tself. o far s the

scientific

heories

we

nowhold are in

future

hown to

be false,by further

xercise

of

the basic

faculties

described, he

same will be

found to

apply to

statements

made in

terms fthem.

THE NECESSITY OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

I

have

tried to

make clear by all

these

exampleswhat

would be

involved n

self-transcendence;hat s,

the

capacity to come to

knowwhat

actually s so, and

not just

so for

me or so

for themembers

f my

society .

The nextquestion s

whether uch

self-transcendences really

possible. The

notion

that one can come

to

speak the

truth, o say

what

actually s so, rather

han true

for or so for ust

oneself

or

one s

community, eems

to entailthat

there re

valid criteria

f truth

and

standards f validity

in the

sense of

methods ppropriate

orthe

arrivingt

and preservationif truth)which aretrans-socialncharacter. ut it is difficult r

impossible to see

how there could

be such

criteria

or standards; or,

even if

somehowthere

were, how

we could

haveaccess to

them.For

we are

members f

societies,

nd

affected

not

just

peripherally,

ut

through

nd

through, y

the

fact

that we

are

so.

Our

concepts

of

truth and

validity ,

n

common

with all

our

other

concepts,

are

socially

determined;

hus

we cannot come

to

assert

what

absolutely

s

so,

rather han so

for

ourselves r our

society.

Thus

it

seems

that

cognitional elf-transcendence

s

impossible.

However,

he

consequences

of

denying

he

possibility

f

self-transcendence,

s

I shall now tryto show,are farmore awkward han theconsequencesofasserting

it.

To

deny

self-transcendenceas

a

possibility,

t

least)

is

not

only

to

be forced o

the most

amazing conclusions;

it

is

actually

self-destructive.

et

us take

the

judgment,

Some of the

dinosaurs

had

secondary

brains n

the rear

part

of

their

bodies ,

and assume

for

the

purposes

of argument

hat

t is

true.

This

judgment,

made

here and

now,

has

reference

o

a

state of

affairswhich

was the case

many

million

years ago.

Has

it

been so

only

within ur

culture,

ince the

experts

n

the

field

within ur culture

tarted

aying

hat

t

was

so?

Or

was it so

there nd then?

If the

former,

t

seems

to

follow

that

human

experts

iving

nd

working

n the

nineteenth

nd

twentieth

entury

made

to

be

the

case

something

whichwas the




7/13

494

Social

Studies of Science

case millions of years before they came into

existence

-

a remarkable eat of

retrospectivereation

ndeed. But if the latter,

he experts ame to believe truly

what would have

been

so

even f theyhad never ome to believe t, and thus there

is self-transcendence. pply the moral to astronomy, nd you will find that, on

the former upposition,not only dinosaurs,but

the stars n their courses, are

created by

society,or rather y the expertswithin ociety. So farfrom ts being

the

case,

as

one

mighthave supposed, that the existence of human beings and

their societies

depends on a whole series of

interlocking onditions within the

cosmos, these conditions themselves, avingno

nature and existence over and

above the

conception and affirmation f them by members of societies, are

created by thesesocieties. It seems to follow that

human society or rather hat

portion of it which

supports scientists), o far

frombeing a product of the

cosmos, is it creator. submit that this s a littlehard to swallow; particularly

when

one adds the rider

that, given

that this

portion of society has some

conception of itself nd affirms

ts own existence, t s self-creative. ut the only

alternative

osition to the

one

that

eads to these

absurdities

s

thatwhich ntails

the actuality

nd

possibility

f what we

have called

self-transcendence,

But

it

is

not

only

the

astounding onsequences

which

have ust mentioned

which

make

me

unable to

believe

social

relativism.The

position

is

actually

self-destructive.onsider

the udgment hat ocialrelativism

s

true, hat s to say,

that

no

judgment

s

true

except

in

relation

o the

social

milieu

within

which

t

is

made.

Is

this

supposed to

be

true of all

judgmentswhatever, n whatever ocial

milieu they may be

made?

If

so,

it is itself

judgment upposed to be true

universally nd

not merely n relation o some

social milieu;which s incompatible

with ts own

truth. f, however,

t is

not supposedto apply toall udgmentsn

all

contexts, hen t

is

no longer judgment o the

effect hat ocial relativisms true

in

the sense

underdiscussion.

f

would appear that this

udgment, hat social

relativism

s

true,

purchases ompletegenerality

nly

t the

ost of

elf-destruction,

like

the verification

rinciple

f the

ogicalpositivists.9

PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

I

haveargued hat elf-transcendence

ustbe

possible,

nd

must

really

occur. The

next

questions

that

rise are:

when

and

how

does it

occur:

and

what

follows

from

the

fact

that it

does

so?

In

what

circumstances,nd why,do

human

udgments

escape relativity

o

social

milieu,

n

such

a

way

that

they

are

about what

is

so,

and would

have

been so in

many

cases even f the social milieu

within

which

they

are

made had not

existed?

I

attempted

earlier

to sketch

the

three basic mental faculties

nvolved

in

cognitive elf-transcendence,

n

coming o know what

really

s

so;

these amounted

to attentiveness

o

data available

to sensation or

to

consciousness; ntelligence

n

thinking up possible

explanations

for

such

evidence;

and reasonableness

n

accepting

from

among

these

the

explanation

which is

best

satisfied

by

the

evidence.

The limits of the

sociology

of

knowledge

derive

from

he fact that

t

cannot

make

self-transcendence

mpossible

n

pain

of

self-destruction.

ts

scope

-

and

in

my view,

n

opposition

o

that of some

philosophers,

t is a

very mportant

subject

indeed

-

is

the

description

nd

explanation

of

those

features

f

societies

which foster he exercise

of

these three basic

mental

faculties,

nd so

promote

self-transcendence;

nd

of

those which on

the

contrary

end to act

against

hem.




8/13

Discussion

Paper: Meynell

495

That these basic faculties re

trans-social,

hat what

they

are and that

they

re

s

not

simply

a matter

of social

fiat,

seems to follow

from the fact that

the

consequence of their

not

being

so would be

self-destructive.

ruth

n

judgment

and validity n argument re achievedso far as attentiveness,ntelligence nd

reasonableness

re

exercised

s

far s

possible;10

thus t

appears

thatthese too

are

trans-social.

It might

be

objected

that

otherbasic

mental

perations

han the

three

which

have mentioned re nvolved

n

cognitive elf-transcendence.

oes not

imagination

have

a

place,

t

may

be

asked,

or

practical-manipulative

kills?

Imagination

eems

partly

a

matter

f

envisaging ossible

data

to which one

might ttend,

partly

f

thinking ut possible

explanations f

actual or

conceivabledata

-

and

thus

has

to

do

with

the

first nd

second

of our three

perations.

n

the

pursuit

f

knowledge,

practical-manipulativekillsare a means of producing ata and testingudgments

-

that

s, of

engaging

n

the

third.However,

t mustbe

said that the thesis

hat

t

is

just

these three basic

operations

which

are

necessarily

nvolved

in

the

acquisition

of

knowledge

s not

strictly

ecessary

or

my

case. All that s

strictly

necessary

o

it

is whatever

s

presupposed

n the

assumption

of

which

argue

hat

the

contradictory

s

self-destructive)

hat one

can

make true

udgments

or

good

reason.

The differences etween the

belief-systems

f different

ocieties,

which re

of

course a

commonplace

of

contemporary ociology

and

anthropology,

re

perfectlywell accounted for on this view. Everysociety encapsulates in its

language

and

institutions stock

of

factual

nd

value-judgments, hich

re due to

a certain

degree

of

attentiveness,

certain

degree

of

intelligence,

nd

a

certain

degree

of

reasonableness.

hort of

the

assumption

f some

such

basic

uniformity

between

human

beings

and social

groups,

t

seems

to

me,

the

anthropologist

nd

historian are

debarred a

priori

fromunderstanding uman

groups

radically

different

rom

heir wn.

But the nature

f this

basicuniformitynvolves o more

than

what

is

involved in

the

possibility

of

self-transcendence;

nd

self-transcendence

s

achieved wherever nyone

comes to make

a

true

udgment

about what

is

so.

I

think

hese

reflections nable one to get

a

clear

view of

the

virtues nd limitations f the kindofapproachto other ocietiestypified n Peter

Winch s

books and

articles. Winch

is

surely right, against

many earlier

anthropologies,

hat

a

satisfactoryccount

of

a

society

must

ndicatewhy

t

s

to

some

extent

positivelyttentive,

ntelligentnd

reasonable

n itsmembers o hold

the factual nd

moral

beliefs,

nd

engage

n the

activities,

hat theydo. But t may

also

be

the

case

that

such a

belief

or activity

may prevailonly

because certain

evidence

has not

been available or, if

available,

has not

been attended o; or that

certainpossible

explanations of the

evidencehave not

been envisaged

t all; or

that

some

of

theexplanationswhich

have been

envisaged

ave not been fairly nd

squarelyconfrontedwiththe evidence and accepted or rejectedaccordingly.

This

appiies,of

course,

ust as much

to thebeliefsand

activitieswhich

prevail n

the

anthropologist s wn

society as

to those in

the societywhich s the

object of

his

study.

That

our

concepts of

truth nd validity re

social

products does not entail

that

truth nd

validity

hemselves re

so;

thatthe concept

of the solar

system s

a

social

product does not

entail that the solar

system s

so, shortof

principles

which,

as I

have argued,

are self-refuting.ur

society puts

us in

touch with a

method

of

arriving t thetruthwhich

s

trans-social. ur

society with ts anguage




9/13

496

Social Studiesof

Science

and

institutions

provides us

with

the

fruitsof attention,

ntelligence

and

reasonableness

as exercised

so far, mixed

in with

what is

due

to failure

n

attention,

restriction

n intelligence,

defect in

reasonableness.

Each

of

us

contributes n his own way to the process,either n such a way as to tendto

advance

knowledge

of the truth n himself

nd others,

or in such a way

as

to

obstruct

or

reverse t.

Thus,

with

respectto

any

judgment

of fact or of

value

taken

for granted

one s

community

r by oneself

so far,one

can ask, on

what

evidenceit

is based,

whether

here

s some

more satisfactory

ay of accounting

for that evidence,

and so on.

Contrariwise,

ne can

suppress

ll such inquisitive

tendencies

n

oneself,

nd employ

ridicule

nd otherpunitive

measures o

prevent

them

nothers.12

It

may be

objected

that

different

ndividuals

an apply

the same

degree

of

attentiveness,ntelligencend reasonableness,nd still doptradically istinct nd

conflictingeliefs.

This

s certainly

rue

particularly

f

those

to whom

different

aspects

of the

relevant

data

have been

readily

available.

However,

t is by

no

means nconsistent

iththis,

nd I

believe

an be argued

fromwhat

have

already

said,

that there

must

in such cases

tend to

be at

least

a

convergence

owards

agreement

o far

as

the parties

concerned attempt

ttentively,ntelligently

nd

reasonably

to

pool

theirresources. To

argue

this adequately

would

require

another

paper.)

This each party

may

do by

askinghow

far the

opposed

parties

have

been

more attentive

o

therelevant

ata,

and

so on, than

they

themselves

have,

and how

far ess

so.

on matters

ver

which

there

s disagreement;

ather

than,as so oftenhappens,each engagingn a kindof gang-warfaren behalfof

their

own opinions.

What

ocial

conditions

end

to promote

the former

tate

of

affairs,

nd what

thelatter,

re

among

the mostimportant

uestions

o

be asked

by

sociologists

f

knowledge.

CULTURAL CHAUVINISM

I

think

hatsome

people

havebeen

driven

o

embrace

ocial relativism

hrough

veryproperrevulsion gainstwhat s called cultural hauvinism .Why, thasbeen

quite

rightly

sked, hould

we

assume that

our

civilized

Western

iew

ofthings

s

any

more

correct

hatthe views

of

people

who

we

see

fit o dismiss

s

savages ?

f

my

argument

ere

s

in the main correct,

we

need

make

no

such

assumption,

ut

need not

be

relativists

ust

for

that

reason.

In

considering

he beliefs

f

members

of

other

communities,

when

these

are

opposed

to our

own,

we

may

well

have

good

reason

to

wonder

whether,

n certain

matters

t

least,

they

have not

been

more

effectively

ttentive,

ntelligent,

r reasonable

than ourselves.

may

well,

after

studying

Leach

on the Kachin belief about nats ,

in

conjunction

with

Robert

Crookall s

books

on evidence

for he

existence

of

discarnate

eings,

ome

to the

conclusion

hat

the Kachinsare

ikely

o be correct n their eliefthat ome

such

beings xist,

Leach

wrong

n

his belief hat

they

do

not.1

However,

he

very

practice

of anthropology

s committed

o

at least so

much cultural hauvinism

s

is

entailed

by

the belief

that,

to a

degree

which has not

in

general

been

possible

before

and elsewhere,

we

in our

culture

may

come to understand

he beliefs

nd

the institutions

haracteristic

f other cultures.

n one

respect

t can

hardly

be

denied that

Leach

has

the

edge

on the

average

Kachin,

o

far

s

he is

in a

position

to study

and

evaluate their

beliefs,

but

they

re n

no

such

position

n

relation

o

his

beliefs.

Anthropological

tudies

may

well

issue de

jure,

even if

they

haven t




10/13

Discussion

Paper:

Meynell

497

yet

generally one so

de

facto,

n at leastas much

criticism

f our ownculture

y

comparison with

alien cultures

s

vice

versa.

By

attending

o the results f

their

attentiveness,

ntelligence,

nd

reasonablenesss,

we

are liable to

findhints

bout

the deficiencies n our own. This account, of course,so far fromtending o

relativism,

s

not even

compatible

with

it;

it

assumes that what

is so

is

to

be

known

by

the maxims nvolved n

self-transcendence,

ncluding

istening

eriously

to the

opinions of

other

people,

both insideand

outside our own

cultural

milieu.

Every

person

of every

culture,who ever

says

anything

rue,

is

capable

of

self-transcendence;

atural

and human

science,

including

nthropology

nd

the

sociology

of

knowledge,

come

into being when the

operations

involved

in

self-transcendence

re

applied with

persistence

nd

thoroughness.

t

is this

which

gives the

physicist

he

edge

over

the

ordinary

man

in what

he

says

about

the

constitutionof stars and atomic nuclei, the anthropologisthe edge over the

ordinary

man

in his

own culture

n

what

he

says

about the

beliefs

nd

customs

f

men of alien

cultures.

do

not

deny,

ndeed

I would

emphatically

ssert,

hat

a

Kachin

could be in

the

same

kind

of

position

n

relation o Leach s

beliefs

nd

customs as

Leach

is

in

relation

to

the

Kachin s, f

he

exercised

his

capacity

for

self-transcendence

horoughlynd

persistently.

I

have heard

t

claimed

that

there hould

be no

such

study

s

the

sociology

of

knowledge;

only the

sociology

of

belief.14

However,

on

the

assumption hat

knowledge

s

true

belief

backed

up by

appropriate

reasons,15

the

sociology

of

knowledgewill have

important

asksdistinct

rom

he mere

ociology

of

belief.

t

will not simplyinvestigate he question of what groupsof people hold what

beliefs

nd

why

they

do

so;

it will

attend

particularly o the

questionof

how

far

they

are due

to the

exercise of

that

attention,

ntelligence nd

reasonableness

which

is

liable to

make

these

beliefs

true.

It

will advert n

particular o the

well-documented

endency f

some

members f

institutions,ven

of

nstitutions

bearing

he

proud

title of

scientific,

o brush

aside

inconvenient

vidence,

nd

to

exert

pressure

n

thosewho

impugn

stablished

heories

or

howevergood

reason.

It will

be

value-free n

one

sense of

that much

abused

expression, ut

not at all

so in

another.

t will

be so

in

that t will

subjectto

examination,

without

ear

or

favour, he beliefscharacteristicf social groups,and attempt o determine, s

attentively,

ntelligently nd

reasonably as

possible,

how far

these

have

been

determined

y

attentiveness,

ntelligence,

nd

reasonableness,

nd

how far

by

an

irresponsible

flight

from

these

due

to

intellectual

inertia,

party

spirit,

or

unwarranted

deference

to

or

contempt

for

authority.

t

will not

be

at

all

value-free o far

as

truth s a

value,

and

since it

is

interestedn

ascertaining

he

truth n

general,

nd in

particular

hedegree

o

which

ocial

groups

foster n

their

members nd

in

others

dispositions

iableto

be

productive f

udgments

which

re

true,

s

opposed to

expressions

f

ignorance r of

positive

rror.

Sociologistsof

knowledgehave a

way

of

explicitly

denying he

possibility f

self-transcendence,ut all thesame in effect

ssuming ts

possibility

nd

reality,

as

indeed

they

must, n

relation o

their

wn

work.

Thus,

Robert

Bierstedt,

aving

clearly

and

distinctly

et

out the

difficulty,

ays that

t is

insoluble,

nd

signs

off

with a

quotation

from

Kant

to

the

effect hat

human

reason

can

raise

more

questions

than

t is

capable

of

answering.

udith

Willer

istinguishes

our

kinds

f

knowledge

the

empirical,

he

mystical, he

magicaland

the

scientific)

etween

which

she

says

that

wehave

and

can

haveno

principles

or

rational

omparison

r

choice;

however,she

concludes

her

book

witha

passionate,

and on

her

own

showing,

rrelevant,lea

for

he

scientific

ind

as

against

he

others.{6

Barnes

nd




11/13

498

Social

Studies

of Science

Bloor follow

much the same pattern. They assume

the

possibility

of

sclf-transcendence

n

what they

say about social groups

nd the manner

n which

they try

o

establish

hatwhat

they ay is so, and that

what their pponents

ay

is

not so; for all thattheir nsistence hat all criteria f truthnd validity educeto

social

conventionentails

thatself-transcendence

s impossible.

Theirclaims that

their position

is compatible with

materialism,nd that

there s just one

world

rather

than as

many

worlds

as there are

societies,provide

a nice

illustration f

the point. 7

Let us consider wo interpretations

f

materialism ;

hat

t is

merely

the

basic conventional

ssumption

of

a

certain

cultural

group,

no more true

or

false,

no more or less soundly

based, than

the basic conventional ssumptions

f

any

other

culturalgroup about how things

re; or

that t claimsto represent

ow

things asically

really re,

in a

way that

ts

rivals for

example

dealism,

heism

r

phenomenalism)do not. I dare say that most of those who call themselves

materialists

would

agree

with me thatthe atter s the

only materialism

orth

he

name;

but the former

s the only materialism

which

s

compatiblewith

the basic

assumptions

nd the

arguments

f Barnes nd Bloor.

Just

he

same

applies to

their

belief

which

share,

but for

different

easons)

thatthere s one

world .

PHILOSOPHICAL

IMPLICATIONS

The paradoxes to which I have alluded in the sociology of knowledge are

themselvesreflections,

of course,

of problems which

bedevil

contemporary

philosophy.

The empiricism

which used

to be in the

ascendant appeared

to

establish

oth the

possibility

f

self-transcendence,

f gettingt the

real facts, nd

a

method

by

which

this

might be achieved.

However,

these doctrines and

methodological

principles

re

now prettywidely agreed

to be unsatisfactory.

Recent

philosophersand sociologists

have

tended to

settle in effect for the

impossibility

of

self-transcendence,

ith each society

engaged

in its own

characteristic

forms

of life and language

games to

which reality

and the

world are internal.

8

As I have been arguing,this position, when made

self-consistentnd

thoroughly pplied, destroys

tself.

A thirdposition

s

surely

urgently

needed, and

has in fact

been advancedby

a numberof

philosophers

whose

work

s

byno

means as

widelyknown

s it should

be;

I

have tried o

sketch

its basis and

a little of its application.

Fundamentalto it is

attention o the

question of

what may be

inferred

from

the

proposition,

of which

the

contradictory

sself-destructive,hattrue udgments

re

possible.

It should be

noted

that a

position

which

s

logically

consistentmay

all the

same be

self-destructive.

hus the propositions

hat

X never ays anything

rue,

and

that X neverhas reasonablegrounds orwhat

he

says, are ogically

onsistent,

whoever tates them or impliesthem;but if it is X who states or impliesthem,

they

are

self-destructive.he

scientific

onclusion

that human

utterances

re

totally

determined

y

causes

of

a

physical

or

chemical

kind,

and are therefore

never

made for

good

reason,

s

similarly

ogically

consistent ut self-destructive.

There

is

logical

consistency

within or between

statements

or

propositions;

self-destructiveness

rises when

there s an

incompatibility

etween

tatements

r

propositions

n the one

hand,

and the

mental performances

ecessarily

nvolved

in

making

r stating hem,

or

making

r stating

hemfor dequatereason,

on the

other.




12/13

Discussion Paper:

Meynell

499

It seems

worth

dding

that t

does notseem to me

that

Marxism,

n

any

of ts

prevalent

ersions

t

least,copes

adequately

with

this

problem.

There

are,

to

put

the matter

very

ummarily,

wo

strands

n

Marxism.

On

the

one

hand,

there

s

the

scientific ealismwhichpre-supposeself-transcendence,f whichmuch nEngels

Anti-Diuhring

ay be taken

to be

representative.n

the

otherhand, there

s the

strongversionof

historical

materialism,

hich

makes all

ideas

(including

cientific

ideas, if

one is to be

fully

elf-consistent)

ore

or less

entirely

ependent

n the

material

environment

nd social

situation

of those

who

hold

them; and thus s

incompatible

with

self-transcendence.arts

of

The German

deology

present his

position

very

vividly.20

cientific

ealism

s,

however,

ompatible

with form f

historical

materialism

weak

enough

to

allow

for

elf-transcendence.ut

whatever

may

be the

case

with

Marxism, he

position

advanced

by

Bloor and

Barnes does

not allow for elf-transcendence,nd in consequence, f myarguments ave been

on

theright ines,

ought

to be

rejected.2

NOTES

I

have to thank

Erik

Millstone

or many

perceptive

nd useful

comments

n

the

first

raft f

this

paper.

1.

The works

eferred

o

in this

paper re:

S.B.

Barnes,

cientific

nowledge

nd

Sociological

Theory

(SKST) (London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul,

1974);

D.C.

Bloor,

Wittgenstein

nd

Mannheim

n the Sociology

of

Mathematics

WMSM),

Studies

in the History

nd

Philosophy

of

Science,

Vol.

4

(1973),

173-91;

D.C.

Bloor, Popper sMystificationfObjectiveKnowledge PMOK),

Science

Studies,

Vol.

4

(1974),

65-76;

D.C.

Bloor,

Rearguard

Rationalism

RR), Isis,

Vol.

65

(1974),

249-53;

and

S.B.

Barnes

and

D.C. Bloor,

Is the

Sociology

of

Knowledge

Possible?

(ISKP) (unpublished

typescript

aper, presented

o

a

meeting

f

the

British

Society

for

the

Philosophy

f

Science, Edinburgh,

eptember

1973).

At

thispoint,

ee ISKP,

2; RR,

253;

WMSM,

173-74.

2.

ISKP,

3-4,

8-9,

11;

PMOK,

66-67,

70, 75;

RR, 250;

WMSM,

181-82,

184-85;

SKST,

156.

It

should

be

mentioned

that

Barnes

also

assents

to

a

view

incompatible

with

this,

which

would

have

thought

was

closer

to

the

truth;

hat

justification

in

an

unqualified

sense

may

be approached

asymptotically

by

justificationccording osocial conventionSKST, 156).

3.

ISKP, 12;

SKST,

70, 154;

cf. Bloor s account

of the

materialist

unction

of the notion

of

truth n

his Knowledge

andSocial

Imagery

London:

Routledge

and Kegan

Paul, 1976),

36-38.

1 do

not

think hat

the

argument

f

thisbook

as

a

whole

modifies

Bloor s

earlierposition

n

a

way

relevant

o

my

argument

n

this

paper.

4.

It

is

implied,

as

I

shall

try

to

show,

by

those

who

claim

that

truth

nd

validity

are

simply

a

function

of

social

systems

within

which

people

make

statements

nd indulge

n

reasoning

nd

argument;

ven when

theyinsist

that




13/13

500

Social

Studiesof

Science

there s

all the same

a real

world,

ndependent fsocieties,

haracterized ysome

qualities

nd statesof

affairs ather han

others.

5. Cf. Bernard

Lonergan,

Method in

Theology

(London:

Dartoni,Longman

andTodd, 1971),45, 114,122, 233, 239, 243, 252, 289.

6.

WMSM

175-76, 184.

7.

I

would

expect

Bloor to

respond nsuch

terms:

ee

PMOK,

75-76.

8. For

theconception of

mutually

rreducible

forms f

knowledge , f,

P.H.

Hirst, Liberal

Education and

the Nature of

Knowledge ,

n R.D.

Archambault

(ed.),

Philosophical

Analysis nd

Education

London:

Routledge ndKegan

Paul,

1965),

113-38.

9.

On

positions

that

self-destruct ,

f. G. Grisez,

Beyond the

New

Theism

(Notre

Dame, Ind.: University

f Notre

Dame Press,

975).

10. Cf.Lonergan, p. cit.note 5, Chapter1.

11. For these pitfalls

n the

way to

knowledge, f.

Bernard

onergan,nsight

(London:

Longmans,

Green ndCo.,

1957),

Chapters and

7.

12. Cf.

the first

three papers in

the Editors

of

Pensee (eds), Velikovsky

Reconsidered

London:

Herbert enkins,

976).

13. Cf.

especially

R.

Crookall, The Supreme

Adventure

London: James

Clarke,

1961).

14.

1

have

heard

this

viewascribed o

Professor

.B.

Braithwaite.

15. TI is

is

in

effect the third

suggestion

made, and

rejected, in

Plato s

Theaetetus;

t

appears

to me

essentiallyorrect,

hough

have

no

space

to

defend

theview ndetailhere.Suffice t forthepresent o appeal to thereader s ntuition

to

confirm

he

following roposition:

the

claim

that

A

knows

X

is

contradicted

bythe

claim

either hat

X

is

false,

r thatA has

no

good reason for

believing t.

16. R.

Bierstedt, ntroduction o

JudithWiller,The

Social

Determination f

Knowledge

(Englewood Cliffs,

NJ:

Prentice-Hall,971);

also Willer,

bid., 4,

16,

141, 145.

17. SKST, 153-54. Barnes

ays that

his

position hould not be taken s

tending

to

impugn

natural science

( Sociological

Explanation

and Natural

Science ,

European

Journal

of

Sociology, Vol. XIII

[19721, 391). Certainly

t

does not

impugn science just as an activity n whichsome membersof some societies

happen to

engage;

but

it does

impugn

t

as

conceived

as

an

enterprise

oncerned

with

finding

ut

what

is the

case,

and would

have been the

case even

f

there

had

been

no scientists o

investigatet.

18.

The

main

source, though

notoriously

n

ambiguous

one,

for

this

view,

s

L. Wittgensten,

hilosophical

InvestigationsOxford:

Blackwell,

1958);

it

has

been

applied

n

detail

to social science

by

P.

Winch n

The

Idea of

a

Social Science

(London:

Routledge

and

Kegan Paul,

1965),

and

in

Understanding

Primitive

Society ,

in

D.

Z.

Phillips

ed.), Religion

and

Understanding

Oxford:

Blackwell,

1967).

19.

The

best

expositions

are the works

of

Lonergan

cited

above;

a

similar

position

has been

worked

out,

apparently

uite

independently, y

Germain

Grisez

(op. cit.

note

9).

For a

very

imple

account, cf.

H.

Meynell,

An Introduction o

the

Philosophy

f

Bernard

onergan London:

Macmillan,

976),

48-56.

20.

Cf.

Karl

Marx and

F.

Engels (ed.

C.J.

Arthur),

The

German

Ideology

(London:

Lawrence

nd

Wishart, 970),

47.

21.

The same

apples

a

fortiori

o

the

position

of H.

Collins and G.

Cox,

as

described

n

their

Recovering

Relativity:

Did

Prophecy

Fail? ,

Social Studies

of

Science,

Vol. 6

(1976), 423-44.

on the limits of the sociology of knowledge by hugo meynell

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