October 16th, 2008

What is the difference between a fairy tale and a firehouse tale?

Fairy tales generally begin with once upon a time, while firehouse tales begin with you wouldn’t believe what happened last shift and no, this really happened. This post begins with a firehouse tale.

A crew of firefighters advances a 1 1/2 “hoseline up a stairwell in a large wood frame house. The second floor is well involved, and the smoke level is down close to the floor. The young firefighter with the nozzle indicates that it is too hot to advance onto the fire floor. The officer moves up close to the nozzle and evaluates conditions, finding that the firefighter is correct. The officer calls the incident commander and asks for ventilation to raise the smoke level and relieve some of the heat that is preventing advancement onto the fire floor and an attack on the fire. Moments later, the officer is enveloped in fire and feels himself flying backward through the air. This ends when he slams into a hard surface. Everything is black, and he is unable to see. It is not hot, and eventually, he sees a glimmer of sunlight. Attempting to remove his breathing apparatus facepiece, he experiences discomfort in both shoulders, but is able to pull the facepiece off, discovering that the darkness was caused by blackening of the exterior of his facepiece lens. The building is still well involved, the hoseline extended through the front door, but the crew of firefighters that was with the officer are nowhere to be seen. The officer pulls his facepiece back on and crawls back in along the hoseline, finding the firefighters frantically trying to make the fire floor, thinking that their officer had been blown down the hallway instead of up and over their heads, balling down the stairwell behind them and rolling out into the street. The officer withdraws his crew as other crews extend hoselines to the second floor, and extinguish the fire.

In this incident, the officer with the hoseline was unaware that significant indicators of a potential backdraft in an enclosed section of the second floor were visible from the rear of the structure (where the incident commander and the crew performing horizontal ventilation were located). The effects of the backdraft were serous but could have been much worse. The officer received minor burns, injured both shoulders, and severely damaged his facepiece and turnout coat. What made this incident worse was that it occurred during live fire training with a group of recruit firefighters.

I know that this firehouse tale really did happen as I was the officer in the story. This incident occurred in the late 1970s while I was working for the Massachusetts Firefighting Academy as a part-time instructor. Unfortunately, while academy staff investigated this incident, the outcome of this investigation did not impact substantively on training practices, and at the time, the academy staff did not widely communicate lessons learned.

How many of you have had a close encounter with extreme fire behavior? One where you said that was close or you suffered a minor injury? What did you learn and how did you share this information?

Often, as in this backdraft incident, those involved learn a valuable lesson, but do not share the information beyond the firefighters and officers they work with. Many things have changed since the 1970s. One is the existence of National Fire Protection Association 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions. While not perfect (but that is another topic for discussion), it identifies systems of work that increase the safety of participants engaged in live fire training. Another, more recent change was the development of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System. This system leverages the advantage of the World Wide Web to provide the ability to report near miss incidents and widely share our lessons learned. If you have been involved in or witnessed a near miss incident or have been told of the event, you can anonymously submit a report and share what you have learned.

The data submitted to the Near Miss Reporting System does not go into a vacuum. Following review, and removal of information which would identify the agency involved, reports are posted in a searchable database on the firefighternearmiss.com website.

This program is a tremendous resource! the Visit the site and search on flashover (38 reports), backdraft (9 reports), rapid fire progress (4 reports), or smoke explosion (33 reports). Remember, this database contains self-reported information. This does not make it less useful. In many ways it is more useful than distilled and analyzed information presented in other types of reports (particularly when the individual was involved in or witnessed the event). However, there may be technical inaccuracies (particularly with regards to extreme fire behavior phenomena) and the lessons learned by the individual who submitted the report may or may not be what you want to take away. Read the reports, think about the factors that influenced the occurrence of the event, how it could have been prevented, trapped or mitigated, and draw your own conclusions.

If you are involved in, witness, or are told about a near miss event, report it. The more information in the database, the greater the potential to identify patterns of causal factors and develop strategies for improving firefighter safety.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: Extreme Fire Behavior, lessons learned, near missPosted in Extreme Fire Behavior, Random Thoughts | No Comments »

Near Misses, Injuries, and Fatalities, Just Part of the Job?October 13th, 2008

In 2007, twenty firefighters in North America lost their lives due to extreme fire behavior while engaged in interior structural firefighting operations. The United States Fire

Administration Report 2007 Firefighter Fatalities in the United States and the NFPA Report Firefighter Fatalities in the United States-2007 provide analysis of firefighter fatalities that occurred during this year. Neither report specifically addressed the issue of firefighter fatalities as a result of extreme fire behavior. In fact the NFPA report classified a significant number of these fatalities as being the result of structural collapse (despite the fact that collapse occurred some time after rapid fire development trapped the firefighters involved).

Thus far in 2008, eight more firefighters have died due to extreme fire behavior while working inside burning buildings. This is the tip of the iceberg! Since January 2008, there have been several incidents in which rapid fire progress trapped multiple firefighters. In each of these incidents the firefighters escaped with serious injuries.

May 25, 2008 – Four firefighters trapped on the second floor by a flashover, Loudon County, Virginia

October 7, 2008 – Four firefighters trapped on the second floor by a flashover, Sacramento, California

In What’s Changed Over the Last 30 Years, Fahy, LaBlanc, and Molis state that the rate of traumatic fatalities while engaged in offensive firefighting operations inside burning building has been increasing.

In many cases, extreme fire behavior is a causal or contributing factor. It is critical that firefighters understand compartment fire behavior and can apply that knowledge to maintain situational awareness and make effective decisions on the fireground. Fire behavior training for most firefighters and fire officers is limited to a few hours during recruit academy and possibly brief mention during tactical training. This is not adequate!

At the 2008 International Association of Fire Chiefs Conference in Denver, Colorado, Chief Fire Officer Charlie Hendry of Kent Fire Rescue Service and President of the United Kingdom (UK) Chief Fire Officers Association discussed a number of significant incidents that impacted his nation’s fire service. One of these incidents was a backdraft in townhouse apartment in rural Wales that killed Firefighters Kevin Lane and Stephen Griffin. This incident and the subsequent investigation by the British Fire Brigades Union and the Health and Safety Executive identified major training deficiencies, resulting in changes in fire behavior training across the UK. For a brief overview of the incident and discussion of its impact on the UK fire service, see Blaina: A Perpetual Legacy.

Where is the recognition that the American fire service faces the same problem on an even larger scale?

What can we do, individually and collectively to address this issue? I will be writing about this topic for the next couple of weeks. Add a comment to this post with your ideas!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: Extreme Fire Behavior, Fire Behavior Training, firefighter fatality, firefighter injuryPosted in Extreme Fire Behavior, Fire Behavior Training | No Comments »

Hazard of Ventilation Controlled FiresOctober 9th, 2008

In the Grading the Fireground on a Curve, published in the September issue of Firehouse magazine, Battalion Chief Mark Emery warned of the hazards of assuming that limited volume and velocity of visible smoke indicates a growth stage fire. He correctly identified that compartment fires may enter the decay phase as fuel is consumed or due to a lack of oxygen.

Emery cites National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Death in the Line of Duty reports 98-F07 and F2004-14, in which firefighters initiated offensive fire attack in commercial buildings and encountered rapidly deteriorating fire conditions due to changes in the ventilation profile. Concluding the introduction to his article, Emery observes “Unless you know which side of the fire growth curve you are entering, advancing into zero-visibility conditions is really a bad idea”.

I agree with BC Emery’s basic premise that appearances can be deceiving. However, this article points to two interrelated issues. The hazards presented by ventilation controlled fires and the dangerous conditions presented by enclosed buildings. In Smoke

Burns,originally published on Firehouse.com I discussed the hazards of ventilation controlled fire and the relationship of burning regime to extreme fire behavior phenomena such as flashover and backdraft. The hazards presented by ventilation controlled fires are compounded when the fire occurs in an enclosed structure (a building with limited means of access and egress). Captain Willie Mora has written extensively on Enclosed Structure Disorientation on Firehouse.com.

BC Emery illustrated how appearances can be deceiving using data and still images from a full scale fire test in a warehouse in Phoenix, Arizona conducted by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST conducted these tests as part of a research project on structural collapse. However, the video footage and temperature data from this test is extremely useful in studying the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and fire behavior indicators (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF)). The full report and video from this test is available on-line from the NIST Building Fire Research Laboratory (BFRS).

As an oxidation reaction, combustion requires oxygen to transform the chemical potential energy in fuel to thermal energy. If a developing compartment fire becomes ventilation controlled, with heat release rate limited by the oxygen available in the compartment, pyrolysis will continue as long as temperature in the compartment is above several hundred degrees Celsius. Pyrolysis products in smoke are gas phase fuel ready to burn. Increased ventilation at this point, may cause the fire to quickly transition to the fully developed stage (ventilation induced flashover). However, if the fire continues to burn in a ventilation controlled state and the concentration of gas phase fuel (pyrolysis products and flammable products of incomplete combustion) increases sufficiently, increased ventilation may result in a backdraft.

I take issue with BC Emery’s illustration of the growth side of the fire development curve as the value side of the cure and the decay side of the curve as the no value side of the curve. Depending on resources, a fire on the growth side of the curve may exceed the offensive fire control capability of the fire department. Conversely, a fire on the decay side of the curve which is limited to a single compartment or series of compartments may be effectively controlled using an appropriate tactics in an offensive strategic mode. However, Emery’s discussion of the more subtle indicators of burning regime that may warn firefighters of a ventilation controlled fire is right on track. For more information on fire behavior indicators and fire development, see Fire Behavior Indicators and Fire Development Parts I and II on Firehouse.com.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: backdraft, burning regime, fire behavior, fire development, flashover, vent controlled firePosted in Extreme Fire Behavior, Reviews, Tactical Ventilation | No Comments »

Positive Pressure Ventilation: Theory and PracticeOctober 5th, 2008

Many firefighters consider Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) to be a new tactical approach, despite practical application in the United States since the 1980s. Since its inception, PPV has strong advocates and equally strong opponents. In many cases these opinions sprang from observation of inappropriate application of PPV without a sound understanding of how this tactic actually works. Early on there was little scientific research integrated with practical application of PPV tactics.

However, over the last six years the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been conducting an ongoing program of research to identify how PPC works, factors influencing effectiveness in varied applications, and best practices in the application of this tactic. Steve Kerber served as principal investigator on this project. Steve is a fire protection engineer (who also serves as a volunteer Chief Officer in Prince Georges County, Maryland). Steve authored an excellent article titled NIST Goes Back to School published in the September/October issue of NFPA Journal.

This article provides a brief overview of the NIST research on PPV to date and outlines a series of tests conducted in a two-story, 300,000-square-foot (27,871-square-meter) retired high school in Toledo, Ohio, to examine the ability of PPV fans to limit smoke spread or to remove smoke from desired areas in a large low-rise structure.Steve pointed out the effectiveness of appropriate use of PPV as demonstrated in this series of tests, observing:

In this limited series of experiments the pressure was increased sufficiently to: reduce temperatures, giving potential occupants a more survivable environment and increase fire fighter safety, limit smoke spread, keeping additional parts of the structure safe for occupants and undamaged and reducing the scale of the emergency for the fire fighters, and increase visibility, allowing occupants a better chance to self evacuate and providing fire fighters with an easier atmosphere to operate in. Positive pressure ventilation is a tool the fire service can utilize to make their job safer and more efficient.

However, Steve also provided the following cautionary advice:

Ventilation of oxygen limited or fuel rich fires, either naturally or mechanically, can cause rapid fire growth. Ventilation is not synonymous with cooling. Venting was most effective when coordinated with other operations on the fire ground.

Strong advocates of PPV and positive pressure attack (PPA) such as Battalion Chiefs Kris Garcia and Reinhard Kauffmann, authors of Positive Pressure Attack for Ventilation and Firefighting also caution against use of positive pressure ventilation under extremely ventilation controlled/fuel rich conditions due to backdraft potential.

However, there is no clear line defining when fire conditions are sufficiently ventilation controlled to preclude safe and effective use of positive pressure as a ventilation tactic. Safe and effective use of this tactic requires a sound understanding of practical fire dynamics and the potential influence of tactical operations. This reinforces the ongoing need for scientific research and integration of theory and practical fireground experience in defining best practices in tactical ventilation.

NIST Technical Note 1498, Evaluating Positive Pressure Ventilation in Large Structures: School Pressure and Fire Experiments as well as reports related to NIST’s prior PPV research are available at the Fire.Gov web site. Downloadable video footage is also available for each of these NIST PPV tests.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: fire behavior, fire research, positive pressure ventilation, ppv, Tactical VentilationPosted in Reviews, Tactical Ventilation | No Comments »

Flashover and Firefighter Survival SkillsOctober 2nd, 2008

Firefighter survival skills, MAYDAY, and rapid intervention training have received a great deal of emphasis over the last several years. These skills are critical. Firefighters must react correctly when faced with a breathing apparatus malfunction, structural collapse, or extreme fire behavior event. However, the most effective approach to survival is to prevent or reduce the probability of firefighters from facing these conditions.

My last several posts have examined the events surrounding a multiple firefighter injury incident that occurred at a residential fire in Loudoun County, Virginia on May 25, 2008. The report prepared by Loudoun County Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Management took a systems approach to examining this incident and the investigative team made 123 recommendations for improving department operations, firefighter safety,

communications, behavioral health, training, apparatus and equipment, uniforms and personal protective equipment, and other considerations. This post will examine four of those recommendations that deal with firefighter safety and training. Read the report for additional detail and to examine the other recommendations.

Recommendation: Reiterate the importance of visualizing the entire structure prior to making entry [whenever possible].

Recommendation: Develop a system-wide training program that focuses on situational awareness, particularly how to “read†interior and exterior smoke conditions to �identify the location and predicted spread of the fire.

Recommendation: Implement ongoing, mandatory, system-wide training on Northern Virginia MAYDAY procedures and self-survival techniques. In post incident interviews, all four interior personnel credited their escape from the structure with ongoing self-survival training.

Recommendation: Develop and implement system-wide, entry-level and ongoing firefighter self-survival training that at a minimum addresses RIT, flashover, MAYDAY procedures, crew integrity, ladder bails, emergency SCBA procedures, firefighter drags and carries and practical scenario-based evolutions.

These recommendations are excellent, but do not go far enough!

Visualizing the entire structure whenever possible and “reading†smoke conditions �on the exterior and interior are a critical component in developing awareness of incident conditions and predicting anticipated fire development and spread. However, smoke is only one fire behavior indicator; a more comprehensive approach integrates assessment of Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF) indicators along with a sound understanding of practical fire dynamics.

Flashover training often focuses on recognition of late (interior) indicators of this extreme fire behavior phenomena and last minute control efforts to increase the chance of escape and survival. In discussing the flashover training attended by the Loudon County firefighters and officers involved in this incident, the report states:

If flashover is imminent, firefighters are taught to practice aggressive cooling…with a 30ofog pattern to the right, to the center, and to the left…

If this tactic fails, firefighters are directed to get as close to the floor as possible, open the nozzle fully, on a wide fog pattern, and rotate the nozzle about their head in a circular pattern.

Unfortunately, many flashover training programs teach these methods, but do not substantively address use of gas cooling and ventilation tactics to control the fire

environment and prevent the occurrence of flashover or other extreme fire behavior phenomenon.

Several years ago, Phoenix Fire Department implemented an initiative that placed 75% of the effort into training to stay out of trouble and 25% into getting out of trouble if it happened. The same principle applies in addressing the hazards presented by potential for extreme fire behavior such as flashover. In addition to survival skills, firefighters must receive training and education to develop the ability to:

Understand and apply practical fire dynamics on the fireground Read critical fire behavior indicators, understand the impact of tactical operations,

and predict likely fire behavior Understand and skillfully apply fire control and ventilation strategies on a

proactive basis to mitigate hazards and control the fire environment

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: Fire Behavior Training, firefighter survival skills, flashover, practical fire dynamicsPosted in Case Studies, Extreme Fire Behavior, Fire Behavior Training | 1 Comment »

Loudoun County Flashover: Escape from Floor 2September 28th, 2008

Previous posts examined key factors and initial company operations at a residential fire involving flashover that resulted in multiple firefighter injuries at a residential fire in Loudoun County, Virginia. This post will examine the action taken by the trapped firefighters and crews on the exterior.

Reserve Engine 6 was performing fire attack on Floor 2 and Tower 6 had just completed searching the second floor when they experienced a rapid increase in temperature and thickening smoke conditions. Flames were extending from the first floor, up the open foyer and staircase, trapping the two crews on Floor 2.

When the firefighter from Reserve Engine 6 opened the nozzle, the line immediately lost pressure. The engine company officer attempted to diagnose the problem without success. Unknown to the engine crew, the hoseline had partially failed approximately 10’ from the nozzle, drastically reducing the available flow. Lacking an effective stream, the engine crew moved down the hallway towards Bedroom 2 in an attempt to find an alternate means of egress.

Partial collapse of the ceiling separated the Tower 6 firefighter and officer. The firefighter joined up with the crew from Reserve Engine 6 in Bedroom 2. The Tower 6 firefighter partially closed the bedroom door, providing some relief from the increasing temperature. The two firefighters and officer trapped in Bedroom 2 were able to escape over a ladder placed on Side Charlie by the apparatus operator of Reserve Engine 6. It is likely that this quick action by the tower firefighter in closing the door had a significant impact on the tenability of Bedroom 2 for the time required for these three individuals to escape.

Trapped in the Master Bedroom, the officer from Tower 6 attempted to break a window to escape the increasing temperature and thick smoke, but was unable to do so. He exited the master bedroom and eventually escaped through an unspecified window on Floor 2, Side Charlie.

Several factors contributed to the survival of the crews working on floor 2:

Proper use of personal protective equipment Recognition of rapidly deteriorating conditions Immediate action to locate an alternate means of egress

Availability of a secondary egress route provided by the ladders placed by the apparatus operators of the tower and engine

Closing of the door to Bedroom 2 to increase tenability during emergency egress

Read the report for additional detail on this incident.

The crews of Reserve Engine 6 and Tower 6 who were on Floor 2 had completed survival skills and flashover training. Training and quick reactions contributed to their survival, but increased situational awareness, earlier recognition of developing fire conditions, and control of the fire environment would likely have prevented this accident.

The next post will examine key issues in training focused on “reading smoke†as well� as flashover and survival skills training.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: emergency egress, fire behavior, fire behavior indicators, flashover, injury report, situational awareness, survival skills, ventilationPosted in Case Studies, Extreme Fire Behavior | No Comments »

Loudoun County Flashover: What HappenedSeptember 25th, 2008

My last post provided an overview of the factors influencing the occurrence of flashover and multiple firefighter injuries at a residential fire in Loudoun County Virginia identified in the report released by Loudoun County Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management. Let’s look at the events that occurred from the time of dispatch until flashover occurred.

Loudoun County Emergency Communications Center (ECC) dispatched four engines, a truck, rescue, ambulance and two chief officers were dispatched to a reported house fire at 43238 Meadowood Court. The caller reported a fire in the area of the sunroom on the first floor of the home at this address with smoke coming from the roof. Subsequent callers reported heavy smoke in the area. While the call taker received information about the location of the fire in the building, the dispatcher did not pass this information to responding companies.

The first arriving company, Reserve Engine 6 reported that the building was a two-story, single-family dwelling with a fire in the attic or running Side Charlie. Uncertain of the status of building occupants, the engine company officer assigned the truck to perform primary search.

As part of his size-up, the engine company officer walked from Side Alpha around Side Delta to the Charlie/Delta corner to assess conditions. Unfortunately, from this position, he was unable to observe the fire in the area of the sunroom on Floor 1; this factor would become extremely significant over the next seven minutes.

Reserve Engine 6 was staffed with a crew of three, and the firefighter and officer extended a 200’, 1 ¾†preconnected hoseline to the door on Side Alpha. As the �hoseline was being deployed Tower 6, also with a crew of three, arrived on scene and the tower officer and firefighter joined the engine crew at the front door.

When they entered the building, the crews of Reserve Engine 6 and Tower 6 encountered moderately thick smoke and no significant increase in temperature in the two-story (open) foyer. The smoke was thick enough that they had some difficulty in locating the interior staircase. There is no indication that either crew picked up on the presence of significant smoke on Floor 1 as a violation of their expectation of a fire on Floor 2 or in the attic or a potential indicator that there may be a fire on Floor 1.

As they proceeded up the stairs, the crews of Reserve Engine 6 and Tower 6 did not encounter an appreciable change in conditions. Smoke remained moderate, with no significant increase in temperature. Reaching the top of the stairs, the engine crew turned right towards the Master Bedroom. The crew from Tower 6 went left into Bedroom 1 and conducted primary search, venting a window on Side Alpha. The report does not mention if the crew of Tower 6 closed the door to the bedroom while conducting their search or

the position of the door when they completed their search of this room and continued to Bedroom 2.

Computer modeling of fire development in this incident has not yet been completed and the report does not indicate that this change in ventilation profile was a significant factor in the occurrence of flashover or extension of flames to Floor 2. However, presence or creation of an air track with crews working between the fire and exhaust opening has been a factor in other incidents. For example, see NIOSH Report 99-F21 and F2000-04 as well as NIST Reports 6854 and 6510.

Entering the master bedroom, the crew of Reserve Engine 6 encountered thick smoke, an increase in temperature, and observed flames on the opposite side of the room (Side Charlie). The officer directed the firefighter to attack the fire while he opened a window on Side Charlie. Tower 6 completed the primary search of Bedroom 2 (no mention of the tower crew making any ventilation openings in Bedroom 2) and then completed a search of Bedroom 3. After finishing the search of Floor 2, the Tower determined the need to pull ceilings for Reserve Engine 6, but doe to the height of the ceiling, did not have tools long enough to accomplish this task.

While crews were working on the interior, the apparatus operator of Tower 6 placed a ladder on Side Alpha to a window in Bedroom 3, removing approximately 2/3 of the glass from the opening. The apparatus operator of Reserve Engine 6 placed a ladder on Side Charlie to a window in Bedroom 2, which broke, but did not remove the glass.

A chief officer arrived and assumed Command on Side Alpha. Command assigned the second chief, who arrived a short time later to perform reconnaissance on Side Charlie. In

his transfer of command radio report, the officer of Reserve Engine 6 indicated that the fire was in the attic. Command confirmed that there were flames visible from the attic ridge vents and flames were visible from both sides.

On the interior, the crews of Reserve Engine 6 and Tower 6 experienced a rapid increase in temperature and thickening smoke conditions. The crew of Tower 6, who were exiting to obtain longer tools, encountered flames coming up the open foyer and staircase from the first floor.

MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY! Due to a problem with his radio, the tower officer, directed his firefighter to transmit a Mayday message. Concurrently, second arriving chief reported a collapse on Side Charlie.

As with many other incidents resulting in serious injuries or fatalities, this “appeared to be a routine incidentâ€. Companies initiated standard firefighting tactics based on their� assessment of incident conditions and the problems presented. The following three events contributed significantly to limited situational awareness:

1. Limited information provided by dispatch 2. Completing a 180 degree reconnaissance rather than viewing all sides of the

structure 3. Not recognizing key smoke indicators (location, thickness) on Floor 1

While not identified in the report, changing the ventilation profile by opening windows on Floor 2 (possibly based on the assumption that the fire was on Floor 2 or in the attic and the placement of a hoseline by Reserve Engine 6) may have had a negative influence on fire behavior. On the other hand, the placement of ladders to second floor windows by the apparatus operators of the engine and tower provided alternate means of egress for the crews trapped on Floor 2.

Read the report for additional detail on this incident.

The next post will examine the actions taken by Reserve Engine 6 and Tower 6 that aided in their escape from the extreme conditions encountered on Floor 2.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: fire behavior, fire behavior indicators, flashover, injury report, situational awareness, ventilationPosted in Case Studies, Extreme Fire Behavior | No Comments »

Loudoun County Virginia FlashoverSeptember 22nd, 2008

Earlier this month the Loudoun County Department of Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management releases a report flashover in a single family dwelling which resulted in injury to six firefighters and one EMS provider. Four firefighters received serous burn injuries, two sustained other traumatic injuries, and the EMS provider experienced minor respiratory distress. This extremely detailed report examines the multiple factors adversely influencing the sequence of events resulting in these injuries.

Lack of supplemental information to responding companies regarding the location of the fire within the building

Limited situational awareness based on lack of a 360o size-up and failure to recognize key fire behavior indicators pointing to potential of a first floor fire

Working above the fire by initiating fire attack on Floor 2, based on the assumption that this incident involved an attic fire based on fire behavior indicators visible from Side A

Limited staffing on the first arriving units and delay in arrival of additional resources taxed the capability of the initial companies operating at the incident, negatively influencing situational awareness

Building construction, lack of compartmentalization in the open floor plan dwelling, and significant fire load contributed to fire development and occurrence of flashover and a partial collapse on Floor 2

However, the investigation also pointed to a number of factors that positively influenced the outcome of the incident.

Quick and appropriate response to escape from the building once conditions deteriorated and water supply was lost to the attack line

Rapid placement of ladders to provide secondary egress from Floor 2 Immediate acknowledgment of the Mayday and recognition of the need to

abandon the building Completion of Mayday: Firefighter Down curriculum and Flashover training Stability of dimensional lumber supporting Floor 2 allowing members on the

interior time to escape Performance of personal protective equipment, limiting the extent of injuries

The investigators took a broad based, systems approach in examining this incident. Read this report and evaluate the applicability of the lessons learned to your own organization. The next several posts will examine fire behavior, situational awareness, and tactical factors in this incident and recommendations made by the investigative panel

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: fire behavior, flashover, injury reportPosted in Case Studies, Extreme Fire Behavior | No Comments »

On-Line Ventilation and Fire Behavior CourseAugust 31st, 2008

While fire investigators are the target audience for this course, it provides a good overall look at the influence of ventilation on fire behavior regardless of your interest in compartment fire behavior. The instructional presentation is particularly strong in its examination of building and environmental factors (e.g., wind and temperature differential effects), drawing heavily on Dr. Stefan Svensson’s text Fire Ventilation.

While solid in its examination of influences on ventilation, this course fails to adequately address the influence of unplanned and tactical ventilation on fire behavior. The course outlines potential positive effects of tactical ventilation, but discussion of potential for ventilation induced extreme fire behavior is limited to a brief mention of potential for backdraft in ventilation controlled conditions. In addition, there was no discussion of the potential impact of incorrect tactical ventilation such as establishment of positive pressure with no outlet or inadequate outlet area or failure to coordinate tactical ventilation with fire control. These issues are of more immediate concern to firefighters than investigators, the potential influence on fire behavior (and subsequent investigation) may be significant. A more detailed discussion of fuel and ventilation controlled burning regime and the potential influence of ventilation under each of these conditions would be a useful addition.

The use of multiple choice questions in the mid course and final assessment was generally effective in checking learner comprehension of the concepts presented. However, there were a few problems with the two assessment instruments. The mid-course assessment included one question addressing a topic covered in the second segment of the course. In the final assessment there were two true-false questions in which both answers are arguably correct (although it was fairly easy to discern which answer was “correct†based on course content. In addition, there were a number of �questions in the final assessment that would accurately assess learner understanding if worded differently.

Overall, this is a worthwhile training program for compartment fire behavior instructors and others interested in compartment fire behavior. However, as always you should maintain a critical perspective. This training program is offered (free) at http://www.cfitrainer.net

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: cfitrainer, fire behavior, fire investigator, hartin, iaai, ventilationPosted in Reviews, Tactical Ventilation | 1 Comment »

An Ongoing ConversationAugust 30th, 2008

This is the first post in my Compartment Fire Behavior Blog. Several other CFBT-US Instructors and I will be posting on an ongoing basis to share our observations and continued learning about compartment fire behavior.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

November 20th, 2008

Relevance, Quality, & Impact

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted a public stakeholder meeting in Chicago, IL on 19 November 2008 to hear input and recommendations on the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. Dr. Christine Branche, Acting Director of NIOSH opened the meeting by emphasizing that this program must be relevant, have high scientific quality, and impact on firefighter health and safety. Dr. Branche requested the participants to review and provide input on Draft strategic Plan for the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

Tim Firefighter Fatality Investigation Program Project Officer Tim Merinar and Dr. Tom Hales who manages the Cardiovascular Disease and Medical elements of the program provided a program overview and outlined future directions that were identified on the basis of the 2006 stakeholder meeting and other program review efforts. One key area was an increased emphasis on fire dynamics. NIOSH has taken some steps in this direction through staff training and recruitment of investigators with a fire service background. However, much more remains to be done!

Strategic Plan

Paul Moore, Chief of the Fatality Investigations Team provided an overview of the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Strategic Plan. This plan includes strategic goals (top level goals that state a specific desired change), intermediate goals (activities that NIOSH believes should be taken by stakeholders), activity/output goals (statements of NIOSH program activities), and performance measures (metrics indicating progress).

I was encouraged by a number of the goals identified in the strategic plan related to reducing deaths and injuries associated with structural firefighting.

Strategic Goal 2: Reduce deaths and injuries associated with structural firefighting operations by 2015.

Intermediate Goal 2.1: Fire Service agencies and labor organizations will develop safety interventions based on fatality investigation findings.

Intermediate Goal 2.2: Fire departments will modify training, policies and practices based on investigation findings

These goals are a good starting point. However, if investigation findings do not clearly identify causal and contributing factors, accomplishment will be difficult.

One of the intermediate goals in this section was a bit more problematic.

Intermediate Goal 2.3: Standards setting agencies will modify standards that apply to the design, maintenance, operation, and training regarding fire fighter personal protective technology based on investigation findings.

What could be wrong with this? It sounds perfectly reasonable. It is, but it does not go far enough. Standards setting agencies such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) develop standards for many aspects of our work, including those related to professional qualifications which frequently determine the content of fire service training programs. I believe that this goal should be expanded beyond personal protective technology to include professional qualifications and operational practices.

Some of the activity/output goals identified in the strategic plan were similarly encouraging:

Activity/Output Goal C: Seek peer and stakeholder input to improve the quality of products and impact of the program.

Performance Measure C.1: 75% of fatality investigation reports will be reviewed by external experts prior to finalization and 100% of other publications will be reviewed by peer and/or stakeholder reviewers prior to finalization.

Performance Measure C.2: Expert consultation and/or equipment testing will be sought on all investigations suggestive of personal protective technology malfunctions or failures.

Performance Measure C.3: Stakeholder input will be sought at least every two years through a public meeting and/or docket.

I would encourage NIOSH to examine the process by which they select peer or stakeholder reviewers for specific types of incidents to ensure the greatest technical expertise is brought to bear. In addition, it would be useful to expand Performance Measure C.2 to include more than equipment. In depth fire behavior analysis and in some

cases fire modeling would provide extremely useful information to development of effective intervention strategies. Ongoing feedback from the stakeholder community is critical. However, the turnout at this meeting was disappointing with few stakeholder presentations outside those made by national fire service organizations such as the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), IAFC Health, Safety, & Survival Section, and NFPA.

The strategic plan also spoke to the need to increase the fire service expertise of the NIOSH staff involved in firefighter fatality investigations.

Activity/Output Goal D: Increase the fire service expertise of FFFIPP personnel.

Performance Measure D.1: Each fatality investigator will take at least one fire service training course or attend a fire service conference specifically for training purposes annually.

Performance Measure D.2: Any announcements seeking to fill investigator positions will require previous fire service expertise in addition to occupational safety and health training and experience.

These are positive steps, but it would be useful to provide a bit more direction with regards to what type of fire service expertise should be developed. For example, if the investigators will be examining incidents involving structural firefighting operations, developing competence in fire dynamics and the impact of tactical operations would be a high priority. In considering the experience of potential investigators, it is essential to examine both the breadth and depth of that experience, particularly in relation to understanding of fire dynamics and influence of tactical operations on fire behavior.

Feedback on the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Strategic Plan can be submitted until 19 December 2008 via e-mail to niocindocket@cdc.gov (attachments should be formatted in Microsoft Word). I would encourage all of you to take the time to review this document and provide your input on this essential program.

Continuing Concerns

My feedback on the limitations of NIOSH death in the line of duty reports dealing with incidents where fire behavior and/or limited understanding of fire dynamics were causal or contributing factors in line-of-duty deaths was well received. In addition, my observations were supported by several of the other stakeholders, most strongly by Rich Duffy, Assistant to the General President of the IAFF.

While constrained by limited resources, the NIOSH staff is committed to serving the needs of the nation’s fire service and truly desires to provide quality information that is relevant, and most importantly has a positive impact on firefighter safety and health.

I will continue my efforts to ensure that this becomes a reality in fire behavior related incidents.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation & Prevention:

Part 2November 17th, 2008

This post is a continuation of my feedback to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health that will be presented at the public stakeholder meeting conducted in Chicago, IL on 19 November 2008. My recommendations are presented in the form of an analysis of NIOSH Report F2007-29. This incident resulted in the death of Captain Kevin Williams and Firefighter Austin Cheek of the Noonday Volunteer Fire Department.

This post continues with discussion the NIOSH reports examination of the influence of ventilation in this incident and provides specific recommendations for improvement of the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

Tactical Ventilation

The NIOSH report makes a general recommendation that “fire departments should ensure that properventilation is done to improve interior conditions and is coordinated with interior attack†[emphasis added]. However, the report is misleading and fails to �address key issues related to tactical ventilation, its effective application, and its tremendous influence fire behavior.

NIOSH Report F2007-29 indicated that positive pressure ventilation was initiated prior to the second entry by the initial attack crew (a significant difference from the information provided in the Texas State Fire Marshal’s report). However, no mention is made of any action (or lack thereof) to create an adequate exhaust opening for effective horizontal positive pressure ventilation. While advising that ventilation needs to be proper, it would be helpful to provide more specific guidance. Lack of an adequate exhaust opening prior to pressurizing the building has been a major factor in a number of incidents in which application of positive pressure resulted in extreme fire behavior such as ventilation induced flashover or backdraft. Positive Pressure Attack for Ventilation and Firefighting (Garcia, Kauffmann, &Schelble, 2006), Fire Ventilation (Svensson, 2000), and Essentials of Firefighting (IFSTA, 2008) all emphasize the importance of creating an adequate exhaust opening prior to application of positive pressure.

The NIOSH report pointed out that smoke pushed out the inlet and overrode the effects of the blower, but attributed this to the presence of an attic floor that interfered with vertical ventilation rather than the lack of an adequate exhaust opening for the initial horizontal ventilation.

The PPV fan and vertical ventilation had little effect due to an attic floor being installed. At 0231 Chief #2 had horizontally vented the window on the D side near the AD corner.

In this incident, ventilation was being performed while the interior attack crew was already inside working. When the ventilation was completed, minimal smoke was pushed out of the vented hole but dark smoke pushed out of the front door, in spite of the fact that a PPV fan was set up at the front door. Note: The dark smoke pushing out the door indicated that the conditions were worsening and the vertical ventilation was not impacting the fire.

In addition, the report fails to note that the opening made on Side D near the AD Corner placed the attack team between the fire and an exhaust opening. As with lack of an adequate exhaust opening, this has been demonstrated to have the potential for disastrous consequences (see NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty…F2004-02).

Floor Plan Illustrating the Position of Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek

Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report FY 07-02

Extreme Fire Behavior

Command ordered companies to abandon the building at 0234 hours using three air horn blasts as an audible signal. The NIOSH report indicated that heavy fire “continued to roll out the front door†but it is unclear how soon this occurred after smoke conditions at� the doorway changed.

NIOSH Report F2007-29 does not clearly identify that extreme fire behavior was a causal or even contributory factor in the deaths of Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek. It simply states that they died as a result of smoke inhalation and thermal burns.

NIOSH Recommendations

NIOSH made six recommendations based on analysis of the incident in which Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek lost their lives. Several of these recommendations focused on factors that may have contributed to these two LODD. These included radio communications equipment and procedures, accountability, rapid intervention, and the importance of mutual aid training. Two recommendations were more directly related to causal factors: The importance of ongoing risk assessment and use of proper and coordinated ventilation. However, these broad recommendations miss the mark in providing useful guidance in minimizing the risk of similar occurrences.

Ensure that the IC conducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations and continue the assessment throughout the operation.

This statement is necessary but not sufficient. Size-up and risk assessment is not only the responsibility of the incident commander. All personnel on the fireground must engage in this process within the scope of their role and assignment. Understanding practical fire dynamics is critical to firefighters’ and fire officers’ ability to recognize what is happening and predict likely fire behavior and the influence of tactical operations. To effectively address this issue, NIOSH death in the line of duty reports must be explicit and detailed with regards to key fire behavior indicators observed, subsequent fire behavior phenomena, and the influence of the action or inaction of responders on fire development.

Fire departments should ensure that proper ventilation is coordinated with interior attack.

NIOSH Report 2007-29 focused on the ineffectiveness of the vertical ventilation, but failed to recognize the impact of the sequence of action (i.e. pressurization of the building and creation of exhaust openings), inadequacy of initial exhaust openings, and eventual location of exhaust openings in relation to the operating position of Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek.

As with situational awareness, effective tactical operations are grounded in training, education, and experience. The incident commander and crews tasked with carrying out tactical ventilation must understand how these tactics influence the fire environment and fire behavior. As with size-up and risk assessment, this is dependent on an understanding of practical fire dynamics.

Other than indicating that ventilation must be coordinated with interior attack, the NIOSH report did not speak to fire control operations conducted during this incident. From the building floor plan and information presented in both the reports by NIOSH and the Texas State Fire Marshal, it appears that the fire was shielded and direct attack was not possible from the position of the first attack team nor the position reached by Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek. The Fire Marshal’s report indicated that the initial attack team “penciled†the ceiling to control flames overhead and experienced �disruption of the hot gas layer and an increase in temperature at floor level.

Just as ventilation must be appropriate and coordinated with interior fire attack, fire control must also be appropriate and coordinated with tactical ventilation. Cooling the hot gas layer is an appropriate tactic to create a buffer zone and increase the safety of the attack team as they access a shielded fire. However, penciling (use of an intermittent application of a straight stream) the ceiling is an ineffective method of cooling the hot gas layer and results in excessive steam production. In addition, cooling the hot gas layer is not an extinguishment technique; it must be integrated with other fire control methods such as a direct attack on the seat of the fire.

NIOSH death in the line of duty reports must explicitly address the effect of tactical operations, particularly where effectiveness or ineffectiveness was a contributing or causal factor in the LODD.

The Way Forward

While this assessment has been quite critical of NIOSH’s investigation of traumatic fatalities involving extreme fire behavior, it is important to emphasize that with all its faults, the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention program is a tremendous asset to the fire service.

The following recommendations are made to further strengthen and improve the quality of this program and the utility of recommendations made to reduce the risk of firefighter line of duty deaths as a result of extreme fire behavior during structural firefighting operations:

Emphasize the criticality of understanding fire behavior, causal factors in extreme fire behavior, and the influence of tactical operations such as fire control and ventilation.

Increase attention to building, smoke, air track, heat, and flame indicators when investigating incidents which may have involved extreme fire behavior as a causal or contributing factor in LODD.

Examine training in greater detail, with specific emphasis on fire behavior, situational assessment, realistic live fire training, and crew resource management.

Provide fire behavior training to all NIOSH investigators to improve their understanding of fire development, extreme fire behavior phenomena, and the impact of tactical operations.

Include a fire behavior specialist on the investigation team when investigating incidents that may have involved extreme fire behavior as a causal or contributing factor.

Initiate investigations quickly to avoid degradation of the quality of information obtained from the individuals involved in the incident and other witnesses.

References

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2008). Death in the line-of-duty… Report 2007-29. Retrieved November 14, 2008 from NIOSH http://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/FIRE/reports/face200729.html.

Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office (2008). Firefighter fatality investigation FY 07-02. Retrieved November 14, 2008 from http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/fire/documents/fmloddnoonday.pdf

Svensson, S. (2000). Fire ventilation. Karlstad, Sweden: Swedish Rescue Services Agency

Garcia, K., Kauffmann, R., & Schelble, R. (2006). Positive pressure attack for ventilation & firefighting. Tulsa, OK: Pen Well

International Fire Service Training Association. (2008) Essentials of Firefighting (5th ed). Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection Publications.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation & PreventionNovember 13th, 2008

Public Stakeholder Meeting

On 19 November 2008, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) will conduct a public stakeholder meeting to gather input on the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. This meeting has a similar focus to one held on 22 March 2006 in Washington DC. At the 2006 stakeholder meeting, NIOSH received Input from a diverse range of fire service stakeholders. Feedback was extremely supportive of the program, but provided input on potential improvements to this extremely important program. In 2006, I gave a brief presentation that focused on several key issues:

The upward trend in the rate of firefighter fatalities due to trauma during offensive, interior firefighting operations.

Failure of NIOSH to adequately address fire behavior and limited understanding of fire dynamics as a causal or contributing factor in these fatalities.

The issues that I raised at the 2006 stakeholder meeting continue to be a significant concern. In 2007, extreme fire behavior was a causal or contributing factor in 17 firefighter line of duty deaths (LODD) in the United States. Where these incidents were investigated by NIOSH, the investigations, subsequent reports, and recommendations did not substantively address the fire behavior phenomena involved nor did they provide recommendations focused on improving firefighters and fire officers understanding of practical fire dynamics.

Ongoing Challenges

In the 20 months since the 2006 stakeholder meeting, NIOSH has implemented a number of stakeholder recommendations. However, Death in the line of duty reports continue to lack sufficient focus on fire behavior and human factors issues contributing to traumatic fatalities during offensive, interior firefighting operations.

Where these reports could provide substantive recommendations for training and operations that would improve firefighter safety, they continue to provide general statements reflecting good practice. While the recommendations contained in NIOSH Death in the line of duty reports, are correct and critically important to safe and effective fireground operations, they frequently provide inadequate guidance and clarity.

In incidents involving extreme fire behavior, investigators frequently fail to adequately address the fire behavior phenomena involved and the implications of the action or inaction of responders. In addition, while training is addressed in terms of national consensus standards or standard state fire training curriculum, there is no investigation as to how the level of training in practical fire dynamics, fire control, and ventilation strategies and tactics may have impacted on decision making.

Presentation of these issues in general terms does not provide sufficient clarity to guide program improvement. Examination of a recent death in the line of duty report will be

used to illustrate the limitations of these important investigations and reports in incidents where extreme fire behavior is involved in LODD.

Death in the line of duty… F2007-29

There are many important lessons to be learned from this incident and the limited information presented in this report. However, this analysis of Report F2007-29 focuses on fire behavior and related tactical decision-making. This analysis is completed with all due respect to the individuals and agencies involved in an effort to identify systems issues related to the identification and implementation of lessons learned from firefighter fatalities.

On August 3, 2007 Captain Kevin Williams and Firefighter Austin Cheek of the Noonday Volunteer Fire Department lost their lives while fighting a residential fire. Neither this information nor any reference to the report on Firefighter Fatality Investigation FY 07-02 released by the Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office was included in NIOSH Death in the line of duty report F2007-29. This is critical to locating additional information regarding the incident. Even more importantly, it is important to remember that firefighter LODD involve our brother and sister firefighters, not simply “Victim #1†�and “Victim #2â€.�

Reading the Fire

This incident involved a 2700 ft2, wood frame, single family dwelling. The fire was reported at 0136 and the first unit arrived on scene at 0150. The crew of the first arriving engine deployed a 1-3/4†hoseline and positive pressure fan to the door on Side A. �NIOSH Report F2007-29 reported that the attack team made entry at 0151 but backed out a few minutes later due to flames overhead just inside the front door and that positive pressure was initiated at 0156 prior to the attack team re-entering the building.

However, the Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report FY 07-02 indicated the following:

Flint-Gresham Engine 1 arrived on scene at 01:50:21 positioning short of side “A†�and reported, “On location, flames visible.†�

Firefighters Joshua Rawlings and Ben Barnard of the Flint-Gresham VFD pulled rack line 2, a 200’ 1.75†line, to the front door on side “A.†Flint-Gresham VFD � �Firefighter Robles conducted a quick survey of the north side and then positioned the vent fan at the front door to initiate Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV). Robles stated that the PPV was set and operating prior to entry by the first attack team. Robles stated that he started to survey the south side and noted heavy black smoke from the top half of a broken window. He stated that he reported this to the IC…

Flint-Gresham Firefighters Barnard (nozzle) and Rawlings (backup) entered through the open front door and advanced 8-10 feet on a left hand search. This attack team noted flames rolling across the ceiling moving from their left to their right as if from the attic.

Rawlings stated that flames were coming out of the hallway at the ceiling area and around the corner at a lower level. Barnard reported the hottest area at the hallway. The interior attack team then backed out to the front doorway and discussed their tactics. After a brief conversation, Rawlings took the nozzle with Barnard backing him and they re-entered. They entered approximately 10 feet and encountered flames rolling from their left to their right. They used a “penciling technique†aimed at the ceiling to cool the �thermal layer. Rawlings reported in interview that there was an increase in heat and decrease in visibility as the thermal layer was disrupted and heat began to drop down on top of them.

There is an inconsistency between the NIOSH and Texas State Fire Marshal’s reports regarding the timing of the positive pressure ventilation. The NIOSH report indicates that positive pressure was applied between the first and second entries by the attack team. However, in the Fire Marshal’s report, Firefighter Robles is quoted as stating that positive pressure was applied before entry. This seems to be a minor point, but if effective, positive pressure ventilation would have significantly changed the fire behavior indicators observed from the exterior and inside the building. Recognition of this discrepancy along with a sound understanding of practical fire dynamics would have pointed to the ineffectiveness of tactical ventilation and potential for extreme fire behavior.

The NIOSH report did not identify the fire behavior indicators initially observed by Firefighter Robles or the attack team, nor did they draw any conclusions regarding the stage of fire development, burning regime (fuel or ventilation controlled), or effectiveness of the positive pressure ventilation.

NIOSH Report F2007-29 did not speak to the fact that none of the first arriving personnel verified the size and adequacy of the existing ventilation opening, the potential implications of inadequate exhaust opening size, and the need to verify that the positive pressure ventilation was effective prior to entry. In addition, the initial attack crew observed flames moving toward the point of entry, which would not be likely if the positive pressure ventilation was effective. However, no mention was made in the NIOSH report regarding conditions inside building and the observations of the attack team.

Window size is not specified, but it is likely that the opening was significantly less than the area of the inlet being pressurized by the fan. Inadequate exhaust opening area leads to excessive turbulence, mixing of hot smoke (fuel) and air, and can lead to extreme fire behavior such as vent induced flashover or backdraft. Recognition of this discrepancy along with a sound understanding o practical fire dynamics would have pointed to the ineffectiveness of tactical ventilation and potential for extreme fire behavior.

In reading this case study, it would be useful for the reader to be able to make a connection between key fire behavior indicators, the decisions made by on-scene personnel, and subsequent fire behavior. The NIOSH report did not identify the indicators initially observed by interior or exterior crews, nor did it draw any conclusions regarding

the stage of fire development, burning regime (fuel or ventilation controlled), or effectiveness of the positive pressure ventilation, all of which were likely factors influencing the outcome of this incident.

NIOSH Report F2007-29 indicated that the attack team exited the building at 0213 due to low air and reported that the fire was knocked down, identified the location of a few hot spots, and that smoke conditions were light. The report follows to indicate that one of the chief officers did a walk around two minutes later and observed smoke in all the windows and smoke coming from the B/C and C/D corners of the structure. However the Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report 07-02 stated:

Firefighters Rawlings and Barnard penciled the rolling flames in the thermal layer until Rawlings’ low air alarm sounded…The Incident Commander, Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek met Firefighters Rawlings and Barnard at the front door and a briefing occurred… Firefighters Rawlings and Barnard reported to Asst. Chief Baldauf they had the hot spots out. Rawlings stated in a later interview that they told Williams and Cheek they knocked down the fire and only overhaul was needed.

At 02:13, Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek entered the structure as attack team 2, using the same line previously utilized by Firefighters Rawlings and Barnard…

Exterior crews from Noonday and Bullard started horizontal ventilation by breaking a window out on side “D†(north side). Noonday Chief Gary Aarant performed a walk �around, then reported heavy smoke from the “Bâ€-“C,†and “Câ€-“D†� � � �corners and at 02:15:51 asked if vertical ventilation had been started. Command then gave the order to begin vertical ventilation…

Understanding what occurred in this incident requires more than the cursory information provided in the NIOSH report. Developing the understanding of critical fire behavior indicators is essential to situational awareness. Discussion of fire behavior indicators and their significance in NIOSH reports would provide an excellent learning opportunity. For example, in this incident, the difference between “smoke†as described in the NIOSH� report and “heavy smoke†as reported in the Texas State Fire Marshal’s report is �likely a significant difference in assessment of conditions from the exterior of the building (particularly if this is a change in conditions).

NIOSH Report F2007-29 made brief mention of smoke discharge from the point of entry which was being used as the inlet for application of positive pressure. “At 0236 hours, heavier and darker smoke began pushing out of the entire front door opening and overriding the PPV fanâ€. However, the report does not speak to the significance of this �indicator of impending extreme fire behavior.

The Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report 07-02 included a series of photographs provided by the Bullard Fire Department which provided a dramatic illustration of these key smoke and air track indicators. Inclusion of these photographs in the NIOSH report

would have aided the reader in recognizing this key indicator of ineffective tactical ventilation and imminent potential for extreme fire behavior.

Photo of Conditions on Side A at 0210

Bullard Fire Department Photo/Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report

Photo of Conditions on Side A at 0217

Bullard Fire Department Photo/Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report

Photo of Conditions on Side A at 0223

Bullard Fire Department Photo/Texas State Fire Marshal’s Report

NIOSH Report F2007-29 addresses the need for the incident commander to conduct a risk versus gain analysis prior to and during interior operations. However, the report does not address the foundational skill of being able to read fire and predict likely fire behavior as a part of that process. In addition, reading the fire and dynamic risk assessment are not solely the responsibility of the incident commander. Everyone on the fireground must be involved in this process within the scope of their role and work assignment. For example, the initial and subsequent attack teams were in a position to observe critical indicators that were not visible from the exterior.

While there is no way to tell, it is likely that if Captain Williams and Firefighter Cheek recognized the imminent probability of extreme fire behavior or the significance of changing conditions they would have withdrawn the short distance from their operating position to the exterior of the building. Likewise, if the incident commander or others operating on the exterior recognized deteriorating conditions earlier in the incident it is likely that they would have taken action sooner to withdraw the crew working on the interior.

Understanding practical fire dynamics, recognition of key indicators and predicting likely fire behavior is a critical element in situational awareness and dynamic risk assessment. Fire behavior and fire dynamics receive limited focus in most standard fire training curricula. It is important that NIOSH examine this issue when extreme fire behavior is a causal or contributing factor in LODD.

My next post will continue with the analysis of NIOSH Report F2007-29 and will make specific recommendations for program improvement.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Fire VentilationNovember 10th, 2008

Fire Ventilation by Stefan Svensson was originally written to support ventilation training delivered by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Räddnings Verket). However, the English translation of this text is an excellent resource for any firefighter or fire officer.

Svensson does an excellent job of integrating practical fireground experience and the underlying science of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics that are essential to really understanding ventilation. Many of the concepts presented in this text will be familiar to firefighters anywhere in the world. Topics include:

1. Fire Ventilation 2. Fire Behavior 3. Fire Gases 4. The Spread of Fire Gases 5. Working with Fire Ventilation 6. Creating Openings 7. Safety When Working at high Altitudes 8. Openings in Different Roof Structures 9. Tactics 10. Examples of Firefighting Situations

The chapters on fire ventilation, fire behavior, and fire gases, were a necessary introduction to the topic, but other texts provide a more comprehensive examination of these important subjects. The chapters that I found most useful were The Spread of Fire Gases and Working with Fire Ventilation. Svensson’s explanation of influences on smoke movement, influence of inlet and outlet opening size, and other factors that impact the effectiveness and efficiency of ventilation operations is excellent. The narrative is simple and straightforward and shaded boxes highlight mathematical formula and calculations necessary for those who want to engage with this topic at a deeper level.For individuals without an engineering background, the mathematical explanations of the underlying principles and engineering applications may seem a bit daunting. More detailed explanation and worked examples would provide better support of this content. However, this is a minor issue which does not significantly compromise the utility of this text to a wide range of audiences.

Fire Ventilation is available for on-line purchase from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency for 120 SEK (around $16.00) plus shipping. The agency will invoice for payment Swedish Kroner after your purchase (which necessitates using a bank that can produce a check in foreign currency).

NIOSH Public Meeting

On November 19, 2008, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health will be conducting a public stakeholder meeting regarding the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. This meeting will be held at 1000 hours at the Crown Plaza Hotel at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport. My next post will provide a preview of my presentation at this meeting and written testimony submitted for inclusion in the public docket. Take a minute to review NIOSH Report F2007-29 before Thursday’s post.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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It’s the GPM!November 6th, 2008

I recently read an article in the October issue ofFire Engineering magazine titled Improving Preconnect Function and Operation. The author, LT Bob Shovald, described how his department approached the process of improving operations with small, preconnected handlines and focused on three critical factors in effective engine company operations: 1) Hose diameter and flow rate, 2) nozzle selection, and 3) hoseloads. LT Shovald made a number of good points, but misconnected on the basic science behind effective and efficient use of water for fire control.

Flow Rate

LT Shovald makes a case for high flow handlines based on changes in the built environment that influence potential fire behavior.

Primarily it comes down to one important factor, gallons per minute (gpm). Using 95- and 125-gpm attack lines is outdated and dangerous.

Because of the huge increase of synthetic materials in modern homes and businesses, including foams, plastics, vinyl, and volatile coatings, we are now experiencing fires with higher rates of release than ever before.

Because of the high cost of energy, more homes and businesses have improved insulation. In a fire, this seals that increased heat inside the structure.

As a result of more effective fire prevention programs, we arrive on-scene much sooner than in years past, in large part thanks to inexpensive smoke detectors.

What this adds up to is that we are getting on-scene sooner to hotter, more aggressive fires, often just before flashover conditions or self-ventilation. To fight the beast, today we need a bigger gun with bigger bullets – i.e., proving the greater gpm and thus more water faster at the start of our interior attacks. The gpm – not the pressure and not the steam kill the beast.

LT Shovald’s argument for high flow handlines sounds reasonable. However, there are a few problems once you look past the surface.

Fire Power vs. Firefighting Power

LT Shovald correctly makes the connection between heat release rate and flow rate necessary for fire control. All too often, firefighters think that it takes “gpm to overcome Btuâ€. However, British thermal units (Btu) like Joules (J), are a measure of �energy, not its release rate. Heat release rate is expressed in units of energy per unit of time, such as Btu/minute or watts (J/s).

Heat release rate is the most critical factor compartment fire development. If heat release rate is insufficient (e.g., a small fire in a metal trash can) the fire will not flashover or reach the fully developed stage. On the other hand, if the fire involves a recliner or couch, heat release rate is likely to be sufficient for the fire to grow and rapidly transition through flashover to the fully developed stage.

However, there is another critical factor in this scenario. Oxygen is required for the fire to release the chemical potential energy in the fuel. If doors are closed and windows are intact, the fire may quickly consume much of the available oxygen. If this occurs, heat release rate is limited by ventilation and fire growth slows.

LT Shovald states that it it “the gpm – not the pressure and not the steam†that �extinguishes the fire. Flow rate is critical, but this is not entirely correct. Water is an excellent extinguishing agent because it has a high specific heat (energy required to raise its temperature) and high latent heat of vaporization (energy required to change it from water to steam). Of these two factors, conversion of water to steam is most significant as it absorbs 7.5 times more energy than heating water from 20o C ( 68o F) to its boiling point. The firefighters power is not simply related to flow rate, but flow rate effectively applied to transfer heat from hot gases and surfaces by changing its phase from liquid (water) to gas (steam). Extinguishing a compartment fire generally involves converting a sufficient flow (gpm or lpm) of water to steam. So while the “steam†itself does not �generally extinguish the fire, the energy absorbed in turning the water to steam has the greatest impact on fire extinguishment.

Changes in the Built Environment

LT Shovald is correct that many of the synthetic fuels used in today’s buildings have a higher heat of combustion (potential chemical energy) and given sufficient ventilation have a higher heat release rate when compared to materials such as wood and paper. True to their design, modern, energy efficient buildings retain energy during fire development, speeding the process. However, this type of building also controls normal ventilation (the building is not as “leaky†as older structures) and energy efficient windows are far �less likely to fail and change the ventilation profile. As a consequence, the fire department is likely to encounter ventilation controlled fires where heat release rate is limited by the available oxygen. Early detection may also influence fire conditions as firefighters may arrive to find a pre-flashover growth stage fire when heat release has not yet peaked.

The key here is that flow rate must be sufficient to meet or exceed the fires heat release rate. Arriving earlier in the fires growth and building characteristics leading to a ventilation controlled fire, do not necessarily lead to the need for a higher flow rate, on the contrary, the required flow rate during the growth stage is actually lower than that for a fully developed fire (when heat release rate is at its maximum). However, firefighters must also consider potential increase in heat release rate that result from tactical ventilation or unplanned changes in the ventilation profile (e.g., failure of a window).

One excellent point in supporting the argument for high flow handlines that LT Shovald did not raise is the large volume (floor area and ceiling height) and limited compartmentation encountered in many contemporary homes. Older homes generally had smaller rooms and were more highly compartmented. Many new homes have spacious and open floor plans, in some cases with multi-level atriums and high ceilings. In addition to frequently having open floor plans, many of these buildings are also have an extremely large floor area. This type of structure presents a significantly different fire problem and often requires a much higher flow rate than a more traditional, highly compartmented residence.

Tactical Flow Rate

While I agree with LT Shovald regarding the value of high flow handlines, his statement that 95 and 125 gpm are “outdated and dangerous†is unsupported. Safe, effective �and efficient fire control requires:

Water application to control the fire environment as well as direct attack on the fire

Appropriate flow rate for the tactical application (cooling hot, but unignited gases may be accomplished at a lower flow rate than direct attack on the fire)

Direct attack to exceed the critical flow rate based on the fires heat release rate Sufficient reserve (flow rate) be available to control potential increases in heat

release rate that may result from changes in ventilation

Water application in a form appropriate to cool its intended target (i.e., small droplets to cool hot gases or to cover hot surfaces with a thin film of water).

Water to reach its intended target (fog stream to place water into the hot gas layer and a straight or solid stream to pass through hot gases and flames and reach hot surfaces)

Control of the fire without excessive use of water

A flow rate of 95 or 125 gpm is only dangerous if firefighters attempt to use it to control a fire which requires (or has the potential to require) a higher flow rate. While a high flow rate will quickly extinguish a small fire, this generally results in use of considerably more water as illustrated below.

Effective and efficient fire control requires that we match the flow rate to the task at hand. At the simplest level this means using 1 ½†(38 mm) or 1 ¾†(45 mm) � �handlines for smaller fires and 2†(50 mm) or 2 ½†(64 mm) handlines for larger � �fires. It may also mean placing control of flow rate in the nozzle operators hands by using a variable flow or automatic nozzle and letting the firefighter select the flow rate based on the tactical situation.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Smoke Explosion or Backdraft?

November 3rd, 2008

What is a smoke explosion? Is it the same thing as a backdraft or is it a completely different phenomenon? In one form or another I have encountered this question several times during the last week. In one case, I was asked to review a short article about an incident involving a smoke explosion that was submitted to FireRescue magazine. In another case, I was surfing the web and came across the following video titled large smoke explosion close call on firevideo.net. What happened in this incident? Was it a smoke explosion or a backdraft?

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net

What’s in a Name?

For many years, the term smoke explosion was a synonym for backdraft. In fact, if you look up the definition of smoke explosion in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 (2007) Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigation, it says “see backdraft“. However, smoke explosion is actually a different, and in many respects more dangerous extreme fire behavior phenomenon.

Smoke explosion is described in a number of fire dynamics texts including Enclosure Fire Dynamics (Karlsson and Quintiere) and An Introduction to Fire Dynamics (Drysdale). However, Enclosure Fires by Swedish Fire Protection Engineer Lars-Göran Bengtsson provides the most detailed explanation of this phenomenon. Paraphrasing this explanation:

A smoke or fire gas explosion occurs when unburned pyrolysis products and flammable products of combustion accumulate and mix with air, forming a flammable mixture and introduction of a source of ignition results in a violent explosion of the pre-mixed fuel gases and air. This phenomenon generally occurs remote from the fire (as in an attached exposure) or after fire control.

In some cases, the fire serves as a source of ignition as it extends into the void or compartment containing the flammable mixture of smoke(fuel) and air. This was the case in Evanston, Wyoming, where two firefighters died as the result of a smoke explosion in a two-story wood frame townhouse (see National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Report F2005-13). In other cases, firefighters may unintentionally provide the source of ignition. On 26 March 2008, a Los Angeles City firefighter was killed when he attempted to force entry into an electrical room filled with smoke from a manhole fire in the adjacent street. (see LAFD News and Information). Battalion Chief John Miller, Commanding Officer of the LAFD Arson/Counter-Terrorism Section reported:

This combustible smoke accumulated in the confined area of the electrical room. When Firefighter Lovrien attempted entry into the room, a spark was generated when the composite blade of the rotary saw struck the locking mechanism of the door…

Investigators have concluded that unburned combustible gases, from a fire in the electrical vault located in the street at the front of the building, accumulated in the electrical room. These products of combustion reached its explosive limit and was ignited by a spark from the forcible entry attempts

Conditions Required for a Smoke Explosion

The risk of a smoke explosion is greatest in compartments or void spaces adjacent to, but not yet involved in fire. Infiltration of smoke through void spaces or other conduits can result in a well mixed volume of smoke (fuel) and air. Smoke explosion creates a significant overpressure as the fuel and air are premixed and ignition results in a very large energy release. Several factors influence the violence of this type of explosion:

The degree of confinement (more confinement results in increased overpressure) Mass of premixed fuel and air within the flammable range (more premixed fuel

results in a larger energy release) How close the mixture is to a stoichiometric concentration (the closer to an ideal

mixture the faster the deflagration)

Potential Smoke Explosion Indicators

It is very difficult to predict a smoke explosion. However, the following indicators point to the potential for this phenomenon to occur:

Ventilation controlled fire (inefficient combustion producing substantial amounts of unburned pyrolysis products and flammable products of incomplete combustion)

Relatively cool (generally less than 600o C or 1112o F) smoke Presence of void spaces, particularly if they are interconnected Combustible structural elements Infiltration of significant amounts of smoke into uninvolved compartments in the

fire building or into exposures

Smoke Explosion and Backdraft

A smoke explosion requires a relatively cool mixture of fuel (smoke) and air within its flammable range to come into contact with a source of ignition. On the other hand a backdraft requires introduction of air to an hot, extremely ventilation controlled fire where the concentration of gas phase fuel (smoke) is high and oxygen concentration is low. Both result in an explosion, but the initiating event and indicators that may be observed by firefighters and fire officers are considerably different.

Have another look at the video and see what you think: Smoke explosion or backdraft? Remember that both of these phenomena can occur in a building, a compartment, or even a small void space. Look closely at the building, smoke, air track, heat, and flame (B-

SAHF) indicators. Check CFBT-US Resources more information on extreme fire behavior and reading the fire.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: backdraft, Extreme Fire Behavior, fire behavior indicators, reading the fire, smoke explosionPosted in Extreme Fire Behavior | No Comments »

Ventilation Tactics: Understanding and ApplicationOctober 30th, 2008

Second only to the great solid stream versus fog debate, ventilation strategies seem to create the most discussion and disagreement among fire service practitioners. Vertical or horizontal; natural, negative, or positive pressure; vent before, during or after fire control? These are all good questions (many of which have more than one answer).

The Importance of Why

BC Kriss Garcia recently published an interesting article titled Education vs. Training in Fire Space Control (Fire Engineering, September 2008) examining the difference between training and education, in particular as it relates to ventilation strategies. Kriss emphasized that we train to improve performance and efficiency, but use education to develop our ability to think and understand not only how, but when, why, and why not. Both are critical to today’s firefighters and fire officers.

Space Control

Firefighters sometimes perform ventilation operations by routine, executing tactics simply based on common practice without thought to the influence of these actions on the fire environment and fire behavior. Kriss emphasizes the importance of understanding the effect of changing the ventilation profile and its relationship to fire control, stating:

Absolute control of the space you are opening is necessary for a safe and effective fire attack. If firefighters cannot control the space with enough direct application of [British thermal unit] Btu -quenching water, they should not be opening the space, encouraging additional free burning.

The concepts included in this brief statement are critical, but could be expanded and clarified a bit.

Developing and maintaining control of the space is critical to offensive firefighting operations and the survival of civilian fire victims who may be trapped in the building.

Increasing the air supply to a ventilation controlled fire will increase the heat release rate. Heat release rate is measured in kilowatts (kW) or British thermal units (Btu)/m.

Water application in liters or gallons per minute (lpm or gpm) must exceed the critical rate of flow based on the heat release rate (kW or Btu/min) developed by the fire.

There are two key differences in this expanded outline of the importance of understanding the influence of changing the ventilation profile: 1) Recognizing and understanding the dominant influence on current fire development, fuel or ventilation. Heat release rate from a fire burning in the ventilation controlled burning regime will increase if the fire receives additional air. 2) Water application (lpm or gpm) must be sufficient to overcome the heat release rate from the fire. While it is common to hear firefighters say that gpm must overcome Btu, this is not completely correct. Btu is a measure of energy much the same as liters or gallons is a measure of the volume of water. Kilowatts (1000 joules/second) or Btu/minute are a measure of heat release rate as lpm or gpm are a measure of water application rate.

Tactical ventilation is the other element of space control. Smoke contains unburned pyrolizate and flammable products of incomplete combustion, and as such is fuel. Hot fuel gases overhead can be cooled, providing a buffer zone around the nozzle team, but only when smoke is removed through tactical ventilation is this hazard fully mitigated.

Understanding is Critical

The difficulty that some firefighters have in accepting positive pressure ventilation or positive pressure attack is frequently rooted in a lack of understanding. In some cases, this based on dogmatic attachment to other tactical approaches. In other cases, it is a result of too much training (how to do it) and not enough education (why, why not, and when). Kriss emphasizes the value of positive pressure ventilation and the need to balance training and education to develop both skills proficiency and understanding.

Friendly Criticism

The concluding paragraph of Kriss’ article Education vs. Training in Fire Space Control (Fire Engineering, September 2008) makes two strong statements.

Regardless of the approach we use to safely control fires, we must maintain as the basis of all discussions our ability to control the fire space prior to opening it. The most dramatic means of accomplishing this is through control of the interior environment with [positive pressure attack] PPA and direct water application.

I am fully in agreement with the first sentence. Maintaining control of the fire space is absolutely critical to safe and effective offensive operations. However, the second sentence, which so emphatically supports PPA integrated with direct attack without qualifying the conditions under which this tactic should or should not be used, could be a bit misleading. Under many conditions, PPA and direct attack will be extremely effective. In other circumstances, these tactics are not appropriate. For example, Positive Pressure Attack for Ventilation and Firefighting by Garcia, Kauffmann, and Schelble, identifies several contraindications to use of PPA, inclusive of victims in the exhaust opening or other area which may be threatened and extremely ventilation controlled fire conditions which may present risk of backdraft.

The metaphor of the silver bullet applies to any straightforward solution perceived to have extreme effectiveness. The phrase typically appears with an expectation that some new technology or practice will easily cure a major prevailing problem. (Wikipedia

In firefighting there are no silver bullets. Increased understanding of the theoretical foundations of fire behavior and the influence of ventilation and applied research such as that done by the National Institute for Standards and Technology are the key to effective use of ventilation strategies and improving the safety and effectiveness of fireground operations.

Firefighters should not uncritically accept current practice. Neither should firefighters accept new or different approaches without the same thoughtful and critical examination. Not just what and how, but why! Kriss’ Positive Pressure Attack website has a wide range of resources related to positive pressure ventilation and positive pressure attack. As Kris advises, both education and training are critical to safe and effective firefighting. Positive pressure attack is an extremely powerful tool when used correctly, be a student of your craft and learn not just what and how, but why!

Kris also published an article titled The Power of Negative Thinking in October issue of FireRescue magazine. This article takes a look at how pressure differences inside and outside the fire building influence ventilation. This interesting article will be the focus of a future post.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: fire behavior, positive pressure ventilation, positivie pressure attack, Tactical VentilationPosted in Reviews, Tactical Ventilation | No Comments »

Lessons Learned: The Way ForwardOctober 27th, 2008

Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis of firefighter injuries and fatalities uses statistics to describe what has occurred and identify patterns and trends. Annual reports and longitudinal (multi-year) quantitative studies provide one way to examine firefighter safety performance.

Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2007 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

U.S. Fire Service Fatalities in Structure Fires, 1977-2000NFPA

Firefighter Fatalities in the US in 2007 United States Fire Administration (USFA)

Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study USFA

Examination of firefighter fatalities and injuries over time requires consistency of method when comparing data from year to year. However, dividing fatalities and injuries into a small number of causes or injury or death provides a coarse grained picture of the problem. This is useful, but not sufficient.

Reporting system limitations in dealing with multiple causal and contributing factors also limits firefighter injury and fatality statistical analysis and reporting. Quantitative analysis is extremely useful in identifying trends and pointing to issues needing further examination. Identification of the increasing rate of firefighter fatalities inside buildings during structural firefighting is one example. However data and system limitations may preclude a fine grained quantitative analysis of this issue.

Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis of firefighter injuries and fatalities often involves examination of individual incidents, describing in detail what happened in that specific case and identifying causal and contributing factors. The limited information provided by annual reports and longitudinal analysis of firefighter injuries and fatalities can be enhanced by examining individual cases.

The NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program investigates many firefighter fatalities as a result of trauma (see the NIOSH Decision Matrix). However, they do not generally investigate non-fatal incidents and do not investigate near miss events. In addition to not examining all traumatic fatalities there is often a considerable delay in beginning the investigative process. This delay may result in the building involved being demolished and loss of important detail in witness interviews.

My last two posts looked at the US Forest Service approach to Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments and Peer Review Process to identify lessons learned. Application of

these methods in structural firefighting would provide an excellent method for improving our understanding of applied fire dynamics, tactical operations, and decision-making as well as other hazards such as structural collapse, and firefighter disorientation.

The Way Forward

Fire service organizations should examine all events that involve structural fire entrapment, collapse entrapment, and disorientation. There are no commonly accepted definitions for these types of events. However, the US Forest Service definition for wildland fire entrapment could serve as a starting point for defining entrapment and disorientation in the structural environment.

Structural Fire Entrapment: a fire behavior related event involving compromise of normal (planned) means of egress; or thermal exposure resulted in, or had significant potential for death, injury, or damage to personal protective equipment.

Collapse Entrapment: A structural failure related event involving compromise of normal (planned) means of egress, or impact resulting from structural failure (load bearing or non-load bearing) that resulted in, or had significant potential for death, injury, or damage to personal protective equipment.

Disorientation Entrapment: Loss of spatial orientation while operating in a hazardous atmosphere that resulted in, or had significant potential for death or injury.

Note that like the US Forest Service definition of wildland fire entrapment; these events are inclusive of fatalities, injuries, and near miss events.

Investigating a near miss or accident involving a serious injury or fatality may present significant challenges to an individual agency in terms of resources and expertise. Individuals and organizations also filter information through cultural norms which define “the way we do thingsâ€. Use of a multi-agency team reduces these potential �challenges. However, as in emergency response, it is important to define the process and develop effective working relationships prior to facing a serious injury or fatality investigation.

Who should be involved? Adapting from the US Forest Service Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments individuals with the following skill sets should be involved in structural fire, collapse, or disorientation entrapment events.

Command Officer Safety Officer Fire Behavior Specialist Structural Specialist (collapse entrapment) Fire Investigator Personal Protective Equipment Specialist (may be an external resource) Photographer/Videographer

There are a number of considerations in determining the makeup of the investigative team. Depending on the nature of the investigation, some of these skill sets may not be as critical or a single individual may fill more than one role (e.g., fire investigator and photographer). Unlike the wildland community, there is considerably less clarity to specialization in structural fire behavior. In some cases this may be a fire investigator with specific training in fire dynamics and fire modeling, in others it may be a compartment fire behavior instructor. This will depend on the nature of the incident and available resources. In addition, the technical complexity of assessing personal protective equipment performance (particularly self-contained breathing apparatus) may require specialized external expertise.

As in wildland incidents, there is also great value in peer review of structural incidents. Like the more formal investigation, peer review is a team based process, but the team is comprised of a small group of experienced firefighters and fire officers who are known to be insightful, fair, just, and honest.

A Call to Action

There is not a simple cookbook approach to developing processes for entrapment investigation and peer review. The first step is to identify how your organization can effectively identify and communicate lessons learned. While serious accidents and injuries present a significant challenge, near miss events occur much more frequently and provide an opportunity for individual and organizational learning as well as an opportunity to develop the entrapment investigation and peer review processes. The following two actions provide the opportunity to improve firefighter safety while operating offensively at structure fires:

Members submit near miss reports to the National Firefighter Near Miss Program Agencies use a team based, multi-agency approach to investigate structure fire,

collapse, and disorientation entrapments (inclusive of near miss events). Agencies widely share their lessons learned with other fire service agencies and

organizations

Please post your thoughts on this process and how we can best develop and communicate lessons learned from entrapment events occurring during structure fires.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: accident investigation, Extreme Fire Behavior, fire investigation, firefighter fatality, firefighter injury, near missPosted in Extreme Fire Behavior, Random Thoughts | No Comments »

Peer Review & Lessons Learned

October 23rd, 2008

In May 2006 US Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management published a briefing paper onPeer Review Process. Later that year, a peer review team used the process to investigate a near miss incident in the Shoshone National Forest and issued a report titled Little Venus Fire Shelter Deployment. This report provides an interesting look at the peer review process and potential benefits of a similar approach to identifying and communicating lessons learned in the structural fire service.

The stated purpose of the peer review process is:

..to reduce errors by correcting or reinforcing upstream behaviors and other factors. Peer reviews provide a means to learn from a variety of situations including close calls, significant events, and other routine performance evaluations. The objective is to create a culture that expects and values peer reviews as an important means to discover subtle indictors of potential future errors and as a catalyst for positive change.

Peer Review and Accident Investigation

Peer review is not limited to investigating accidents and near miss events; it examines organizational performance in a variety of circumstances. However, a peer review and formal accident investigation may run concurrently. As stated in the US Forest Service Peer Review Process Briefing Paper, “this approach helps to segregate human error from intentional disregard of rules and gives the opportunity to identify positive behaviors and decisions even when bad outcomes occur.†�

It is important to emphasize that peer review goes well beyond the context of accident and near miss investigation. This process applies to a broader range of significant events.

Key Process Elements

Like entrapment investigation, peer review is a team based process, but the team is comprised of “a small group of operators known for their ability to perform the particular mission in the particular environment, and also known to be insightful, fair, just, and honestâ€. This approach is consistent with the focus of peer review on �developing lessons learned.

Key questions addressed in peer review examine individual observations and perceptions and include:

Action Plan and Leaders Intent Situational awareness Actions Taken and Not Taken Personal Lessons Learned

In many respects the peer review process gathers the same types of information as the National Firefighter Near Miss Program. However, there is a significant difference. In peer review, team members are encouraged to “continue questioning in areas where the reviewers feel disconnect, discomfort, confusion, or curiosityâ€.�

Communicating Lessons Learned

The peer review team develops a report that provides a look from outside the element of the organization involved in the accident, near miss or significant event. This written report identifies the story of the event, reasons the situation developed as it did, and lessons learned. The Peer Review-Purpose and Process Briefing Paper outlines a number of potential benefits:

Provides feedback on performance and potential areas of improvement Assists supervisors in employee development Helps guide training strategies, organizational policy, and operating guidelines Develops data higher level lessons learned analysis Promotes long-term positive shifts in organizational culture

Peer review reports such as the Little Venus Fire Shelter Deployment take a middle ground between a comprehensive organizational assessment seen in some agency reports (see reports from Loudon County Fire and Emergency Management and Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue) and more limited information provided in National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Death in the Line of Duty reports.

Obstacles

Peer review requires a bit of organizational and individual courage and commitment. One element of the deliberate practice required to develop expertise in any field is feedback on results and engaging with that feedback to refine and improve performance. Individuals and organizations must have the courage to ask for feedback and accept performance related feedback, which may be uncomfortable or difficult when things do not go well.

A more fundamental and underlying challenge lies with our underlying assumptions about the nature of fire, firefighting, and the business that we are in. Future posts will address at these important issues.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Entrapment Investigation & Lessons Learned

October 20th, 2008

Structural firefighting agencies can draw some valuable lessons from the wildland firefighting community. Fire behavior training in many structural agencies often begins and ends in recruit academy. For wildland firefighters, fire behavior training involves an extensive, multi-level curriculum (S-190, S290, S-390, S-490 and so on). The wildland community is also more substantively engaged in analysis of fatalities, accidents, and near miss events with the intention of impacting policy, procedure, and performance. This is not to say that they have a perfect safety record, far from it. However, this ongoing effort to identify and implement best practice based on lessons learned is worthy of emulation.

The US Forest Service Technology & Development Program produced a document titled Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments which outlines the process that should be used and documentation required for entrapment related incidents. Entrapments are:

A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes and safety zones are absent, inadequate, or have been compromised…These situations may or may not result in injury. They include “near missesâ€. �

The concept of entrapment applies equally in the structural firefighting environment. I read news accounts of extreme fire behavior related events (e.g., flashover, backdraft) from around the United States on a weekly basis. Flashover, backdraft, or other extreme fire behavior often results in a near miss or minor injury and less frequently in serious injury or fatality. Some (actually very few) of these incidents are documented in the National Firefighter Near Miss Program. As discussed in my last post, the near miss program uses self-reported data. This is extremely useful in determining the individual’s perception of the event and what lessons they took away from the experience. However, the individual reporting the event may or may not have the training or education to recognize what actually happened, determine multiple causal factors, and provide a reasonably objective analysis.

Formal Investigation

If a significant injury occurs, some level of investigation is likely to take place (even if it is limited to a cursory examination of circumstances and conditions by the individual’s supervisor). Traumatic fatalities result in more significant and in many cases multiple investigations by the agency involved, law enforcement agencies, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (state or federal), and potentially the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose of these various investigations is different and not all focus on identifying lessons learned and opportunities for improving organizational performance. However, some reports by the agencies involved, state fire service agencies, and NIOSH take positive steps in this direction. For example:

Prince William County (Virginia) Department of Fire & Rescue Line of Duty Death (LODD) Report for Technician I Kyle Robert Wilson

Texas State Fire Marshal’s LODD Investigation Program New Jersey Division of Fire and Life Safety Firefighter Fatality and Serious

Injury Report Series NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

Limitations

Near miss events and events involving extreme fire behavior resulting in minor injuries or damage to equipment frequently are not or are inadequately investigated to identify causal factors and lessons learned. Investigation of serious injuries and fatalities in many cases do not adequately address fire behavior and interrelated human factors that may be directly or indirectly related to the cause of the incident. This results in lost opportunities for individual and organizational learning.

Two interrelated challenges make investigating extreme fire behavior events or structural fire entrapments difficult. First is the lack of a formal process or framework for this specific type of investigation and second is potential for investigators lack of specific technical expertise in the area of fire behavior.

A Solution

The US Forest Service uses a team approach to investigating entrapment incidents. The team may include (but is not limited to):

Fire Operations Specialist (Operations Section Chief level) Fire Safety Officer Fire Behavior Analyst, with experience in the incident fuel type Fire Weather Meteorologist Fire Equipment Specialists who develop the personal protective equipment

(including fire shelters) used on wildland fires Technical Photographer Fire Information Officer

This team is established and begins the investigation as soon as possible after the occurrence of the event to ensure that critical information and evidence is not lost. The investigative process and documentation focuses on accurately describing what happened, when it happened, causal and contributing factors, and recommendations to reduce the risk of future occurrence.

What might this look like in the structural firefighting environment?

Communicating Lessons Learned

Lessons learned must be integrated into appropriate training curriculum to ensure that the lessons are built into organizational culture.

Some agencies have taken steps in this direction. Following the line-of-duty death of Technician Kyle Wilson, Prince William County Department of Fire & Rescue conducted an in-depth investigation which integrated use of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling to describe likely fire conditions and the influence of wind on fire behavior. Following the conclusion of this investigation, the report and related presentations have been distributed widely.

Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments identifies timeliness as being essential in dissemination of the lessons learned. This presents a significant challenge when faced with a complex event involving a major injury or fatality. However, it is likely that timeliness in communicating lessons learned can be improved without compromising the thoroughness and quality of the investigation.

My next post will examine the US Forest Service’s less formal Peer Review Process which may be used following near miss events or significant events regardless of outcome (possibly concurrently with a formal investigation). Like the entrapment investigation procedure, there are likely some lessons here for the structural firefighting community!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

December 25th, 2008

Special Thanks to NIOSH

I would like to extend my thanks to Steve Berardinelli and Tim Merinar of the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program for their assistance in developing the Case Study based on NIOSH Report F2008-06. Just prior to my first post regarding this incident, I forwarded a request for additional information to the NIOSH staff and received a quick response from Tim that he would forward my request to the investigators. This morning I had an excellent conversation with Steve and obtained additional information that was extremely helpful in refining the case.

I will be revising Developing & Using Case Studies: Pennsylvania Duplex Fire Line of Duty Death (LODD) and Pennsylvania Duplex Fire: Firefighting & Firefighter Rescue Operations based on additional information provided by NIOSH. Changes include addition of information related to the ventilation profile, initial fire conditions, and occupant actions.

Analysis and Critique

It is important to note that the observations in this post regarding the contributory factors identified in NIOSH Report F2008-06 are made as a critical friend. Most firefighters and fire officers who read this (or any) NIOSH report will agree with some of the recommendations, may disagree with others, and undoubtedly would make additional recommendations based on their individual assessment of the incident. Analysis of contributing factors and recommendations (rather than simply accepting them) is an important element in the learning process. Dig a bit deeper and build an understanding of why events may have unfolded the way that they did. Identify the critical points at which the outcome could have been changed (there are likely more than one). Think about how these recommendations might apply to you and your department.

As discussed in my earlier post; Criticism Versus Critical Thinking, the intent of this analysis and critique is to share what I have learned from this case, with all due respect to those involved. The firefighters and fire officers involved in this incident were faced with a difficult situation to begin with, having an occupant reported trapped in the building. This was compounded by challenging water supply problems due to multiple frozen hydrants. It is far easier to examine incident information in a comfortable environment with no time pressure than to deal with these issues in the cold, early morning hours.

My original intent was to examine both the contributory factors and recommendations in NIOSH Report F2008-06. However, due to length, this critique will be divided into two separate posts.

A Brief Review of the Incident

On February 29, 2008 The Grove City Fire Department, Pine Township Engine Company, and East End Fire Department responded to a fire in a two-story, wood frame duplex in Grove City, Pennsylvania. Initial dispatch information and the initial size-up indicated that a female occupant was trapped in the building. When the Chief and first engine company arrived, the unit on Side D was substantially involved with smoke in the unit on Side B. Several hoselines were placed into operation for fire control, but fire conditions precluded an offensive attack in the involved unit. Pine Township Engine 85 was assigned to search and rescue of the trapped occupant. Firefighter Brad Holmes and Lieutenant Scott King were tasked with primary search of Exposure Delta. Firefighting operations were hampered by two frozen hydrants, necessitating support of initial operations using only apparatus tank water while an operable hydrant was located. During their search, water supply was interrupted and rapidly deteriorating conditions trapped the search crew. After being rescued by the Rapid Intervention Team, both members were transported to Pittsburgh’s Mercy Hospital Burn Unit. Firefighter Brad Holmes had burns over 75% of his body, and died from his injuries on March 5, 2008. Lieutenant King suffered less serious injuries and was treated and released. A 44 year old female occupant of the dwelling also died.

Figure 1. 132 Garden Avenue-Side Alpha

Note: Fire Department Photo - NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-06. This photo likely illustrates conditions after 0635 (approximately 19 minutes after arrival of the first fire unit, Chief 95).

Additional detail is provided in Developing & Using Case Studies: Pennsylvania Duplex Fire Line of Duty Death (LODD) and Pennsylvania Duplex Fire: Firefighting & Firefighter Rescue Operations. In addition, readers should review NIOSH Report F2008-06.

Contributory Factors

NIOSH Report F2008-06 identifies seven contributory factors in the injury of Lieutenant King and death of Firefighter Holmes. While each of these factors may have had some influence on the outcome of this incident, this analysis provides insufficient clarity and misses several key factors.

Inadequate water supply. Two hydrants in the vicinity of the burning structure were frozen from the cold weather.

The victim and injured Lieutenant did not have the protection of a charged hoseline during their search for the trapped occupant.

Inadequate training in defensive search tactics. Non-use of a thermal imaging camera which may have allowed the search and

rescue crew to advance more quickly through the structure. Ventilation was not coordinated with the interior search.

Size-up information about the structure was not relayed to the interior search crew. The interior crew was searching in the wrong duplex for the trapped occupant and did not realize they were in a duplex.

The incident commander was unaware of the search crew’s location in the building. He did not receive any interior reports and was concentrating on resolving water supply issues.

Water Supply: The lack of a continuous water supply likely influenced the loss of the structure and loss of water supply to handlines was in all probability a causal factor in the injury of Lieutenant King and death of Firefighter Holmes. However, the volume of tank water available on apparatus that arrived prior to the search team becoming trapped on Floor 2 (5000 gallons) was likely adequate to support search of the uninvolved areas of the building and confine the fire to the unit of origin for the time required to search uninvolved areas of the building. Anticipation that a continuous water supply would be established may have influenced the tactics and water application used by initial arriving companies.

Protection of the Search Team: Failure to protect the search team with a hoseline was a significant factor in this incident. However, the outcome would likely have been the same if the search team had a hoseline as fire extended from below to cut off their means of egress. A backup line should also have been in place to protect the search team’s egress while they were working above the fire. There was an additional hoseline initially deployed to the doorway on Side A, however, the position and operation of this line while the search team was on Floor 2 was not specified in the report. Without additional tactical changes, the loss of water supply would have precluded effective hoseline support of search operations.

Training in Defensive Search Tactics: Identifying a lack of training in “defensive search tactics†is too narrowly focused. The issue here is significantly broader than �stated in the report and should be restated as lack of situational awareness. This causal factor fails to identify the lack of situational awareness on the part of the search crew, the incident commander, and others on the fireground to developing and potential fire conditions and water supply limitations. This lack of situational awareness is likely due to inadequate training in fire behavior and applied fire dynamics (rather than simply inadequate training in defensive search tactics).

Use of a TIC: Undoubtedly effective use of a TIC can speed search operations. However the NIOSH report indicated that visibility was not excessively compromised during the initial stages of search on both floors 1 and 2. Reducing the time required to complete the search could have been influenced by use of a TIC, by assigning a separate crew to perform fire control on Floor 1 of Exposure B and allowing Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King to focus on primary search or by both of these actions. While technology may useful in improving firefighter safety, it is important to not simply look for a technological solution to a problem which can be substantively related to human factors such as situational awareness, communications, and decision-making.

Tactical Ventilation: The location, sequence, and lack of coordination in ventilation was likely a causal factor (along with failure to protect the means of egress with a hoseline and loss of water supply) in the injury to Lieutenant King and death of Firefighter Holmes. Creation of exhaust openings above the fire created a clear path of travel for hot gases and flames from Floor 1 to Floor 2 via the interior stairs and increased air supply to a fire which was likely ventilation controlled (resulting in an increase in heat release rate (HRR) sufficient to result in flashover. This contributory factor also points to the need for training on the influence of tactical operations (particularly ventilation) on fire behavior.

Communication of Size-Up Information: Size-up information related to the building and possible victim location could have been a significant factor in focusing the location of the search. However, the civilian occupant was not in either unit, but was located (after fire control) behind the door in the foyer. If it was known that the trapped occupant was from the fire unit, it may have appeared that there was no savable life (due to the extent of fire involvement). But this does not preclude the assumption that she may have been confused and gone into the other unit.

Note: There is some difference of opinion between the fire investigator and operational personnel as to the likely location of the victim prior to structural collapse. It is possible that the victim died on Floor 2 of the fire unit and fell to the position where she was found due to structural collapse.

Accountability and Situation Status: Accountability and communication of situation status is critical to the safety of everyone operating on the fireground. Clear communication in advance of the loss of water supply could have influenced the outcome of this incident. When operating off tank water, it is essential to follow a similar philosophy as the Rule of Air Management and retain sufficient water to exit from the hazardous environment. However, it does not appear that the lack of accountability regarding the search team significantly delayed the rescue effort.

My next post will examine the recommendations made in NIOSH Report F-2008-06 and will provide a link to a detailed, written case study based on this incident in PDF format.

Happy Holidays,Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Pennsylvania Duplex Fire LODDFirefighting & Firefighter Rescue Operations

December 22nd, 2008

This post continues examination of NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-06. My previous post, Developing & Using Case Studies: Pennsylvania Duplex Fire Line of Duty Death (LODD) emphasized the importance of case studies to individual and organizational learning and presented initial information about the incident which resulted in injury to Lieutenant Scott King and the death of Firefighter Brad Holmes of Pine Township Engine Company.

Figure 1. 132 Garden Avenue-Side Alpha

Note: Fire Department Photo - NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-06. This photo likely illustrates conditions after 0635 (approximately 19 minutes after arrival of the first fire unit, Chief 95).

Firefighting Operations

Command assigned Engine 95 (officer and five firefighters) to fire suppression. They deployed a 1-3/4†(45 mm) line to the door on Side A, but were unable to make entry �due to the volume of fire in the involved unit. Engine 95 also deployed a 2-1/2†(64 �mm) handline to the A/D corner. Both lines were immediately placed into operation. NIOSH Report F2008-06 indicated that the 1-3/4†line stretched to the door on Side A �was “unable to make entry due to heavy fire conditionsâ€. However, exact placement �and operation of the 2-1/2†handline was not specified. This line may have been used to �protect Exposure D (a wood frame dwelling approximately 20’ from the fire unit), for defensive fire attack through first floor windows, or both.

Figure 2. Fire Unit and Exposure Bravo Floor 1

Note: This floor plan is based on data provided in NIOSH Report F2008-06 and is not drawn to scale. Windows shown as open are based on the narrative or photographic evidence. Door position is as shown based on information provided by NIOSH Investigator Steve Berardinelli (this differs from the NIOSH report which includes the fire investigators rough sketch showing all doors open). Windows shown as intact are not visible in the available photographs, but may be open due to fire effects or firefighting operations (particularly those in the fire unit).

Second due, Engine 95-2 performed a forward lay from a nearby hydrant and supplied Engine 95 with tank water while waiting for the supply line to be charged.

Engine 85 (chief, lieutenant, and three firefighters) was assigned to primary search and rescue of the trapped occupant. Tasked to conduct primary search in Exposure B, Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King were performed a 360o reconnaissance prior to making entry. While this was being done other members of the company placed a ladder to a window on Floor 2 Side B (see Figure 3). The NIOSH Report does not specify if the search team was aware of ladder placement.

The Officer of Engine 95 vented the window on Floor 1 Side A of Exposure Bravo and observed that the ceiling light was on (indicating that there was limited optical density of the smoke on Floor 1 of the exposure). Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King entered through this window (see Figure 2) to conduct primary search of the exposure and observed that the temperature was low and there was limited smoke on Floor 1. Engine 95 passed the search team a 1-3/4†(45 mm) handline through the window and the �search team knocked down visible fire extension and completed their search of the first floor. At this point, Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King left the hoseline on Floor 1, went up the stairs to Floor 2 and began a left hand search.

Figure 3. Fire Unit and Exposure Bravo Floor 2

Note: See the prior comments regarding windows and door position.

The Officer of Engine 95 noticed that the search crew had finished their search on the first floor and were advancing to the second floor. He placed a ladder and broke the window on Floor 2, Side A (See Figure 3). He stated that there was not much heat on the second floor because the plastic insulation on the window was not melted, but he did notice heavy black smoke beginning to bank down. The NIOSH Report did not specify the depth of the hot gas layer (down from the ceiling) or the air track at the window that was vented or Floor 1 openings (windows and door).

The hydrant that Engine 95-2 laid in from was frozen as was the hydrant several houses beyond the fire buildingFirst alarm companies used tank water to support initial firefighting operations. The crew from Engine 95-2 began to hand stretch a 3†line to a �working hydrant on a nearby cross street.

After Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King partially completed their search of Floor 2, Lieutenant King’s air supply was at one half and Firefighter Holmes was unsure of his air status, so the Lieutenant decided to exit. At approximately the same time, Engine 95 ran out of water and the Command ordered companies to abandon the building with

Engine 85 sounding its air horn as an audible signal to do so. The Accountability Officer called for a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR), but received no response from Lieutenant King or Firefighter Holmes.

Almost immediately after Engine 95 ran out of water, conditions changed rapidly decreasing visibility and increasing temperature on Floor 2 of Exposure B and fire involvement of Floors 1 and 2 of both units. With deteriorating conditions on the second floor, Lieutenant King became disoriented and separated from Firefighter Holmes. He radioed for help at 0638 hours. “Help! Help! Help! I’m trapped on the second floor!†In a second radio transmission, Lieutenant King indicated he was at a window on� Side D.

Firefighter Rescue Operations

After hearing radio traffic that the search crew could not find their way out and they were by a window the Engine 95 officer accessed a window on Side B Floor 2 (using a ladder previously placed by Engine 85-2). He broke out the window to increase ventilation and attempt contact with the search team.

A crew from Engine 77 was tasked as a second search team and preparing for entry when the IC ordered companies to withdraw. However, when they heard the Lieutenant’s call for help, they immediately went to Side D, not seeing the Lieutenant at the window, they continued to Side B. The officer from Engine 77 climbed the ladder they had placed earlier to attempt contact with the initial search team. There was heavy black smoke coming from this window, but no fire. He straddled the window sill attempting to hear any movement, a PASS device, or voices. He banged on the window sill as an audible signal to the search team, but received no response. He also attempted to locate the search team using a TIC, however, it malfunctioned.

Flames now pushing out the first floor windows of both the unit originally involved in fire as well as Exposure B. Lieutenant King managed to find his way to the staircase, stumbled down the stairs and out the door on Side A. His protective clothing was severely damaged and smoldering. He collapsed in the front yard and told the other firefighters that the victim was trapped on the second floor. The RIT (R87) made entry supported by a hoseline operated from the entry point by Engine 85-2. Firefighter Holmes was located approximately 10’ (3 m) from the top of the stairs (as illustrated in Figure 3). He was semi-conscious and on his hands and knees. The RIT removed Firefighter Holmes via the stairway to Side A. Lieutenant King and Firefighter Holmes were transported to a local hospital where they were stabilized prior to transport to the Mercy Hospital’s Burn Unit in Pittsburgh.

Questions

The following questions provide a basis for examining the second segment of this case study. While limited information is provided in the case, this is similar to an actual incident in that you seldom have all of the information you want.

1. What was the stage of fire development and burning regime in the fire unit when the search team entered the exposure?

2. What Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF) indictors can be observed in Figure 1?

3. What was the stage of fire development and burning regime in Exposure B when the search team entered?

4. What type of extreme fire behavior event occurred in the exposure, trapping Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King? What leads you to this conclusion?

5. What were the likely causal and contributing factors that resulted in occurrence of the extreme fire behavior that entrapped the Firefighter Holmes and Lieutenant King?

6. What self-protection actions might the search team have taken once conditions on Floor 2 of Exposure B began to become untenable?

7. What action could have been taken to reduce the potential for extreme fire behavior and maintain tenable conditions in Exposure B during primary search operations?

8. What was the tactical rate of flow for full involvement of a single unit in this building? (The tactical rate of flow is the flow required for fire control and does not include the flow rate for backup lines.)

9. What factors may have influenced the limited effectiveness of the 1-3/4†and 2-�1/2†attack lines deployed by Engine 95? �

10. What tactical options might have improved the effectiveness of fire control operations given the available water supply?

My next post will examine the contributing factors and recommendations made in NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-06 and will include a link to a more detailed written case study of this incident in PDF format.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Developing & Using Case StudiesPennsylvania Duplex Fire LODDDecember 18th, 2008

Developing & Case Studies

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recently released Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-06 on an incident that occurred in February 2008

in Grove City, Pennsylvania. As I read through the narrative and recommendations I began to ask myself how other firefighters and fire officers might use these reports and how much time they would spend engaged with a particular case. Talking with a number of colleagues, we came to the conclusion that many people would read the summary and recommendations and quickly skim through the detailed information to get a sense of what happened. A smaller number of firefighters and fire officers would really dig into the report to identify lessons learned that go beyond or differ from the NIOSH recommendations.

Developing, teaching, and learning using case studies can be an effective element in deliberate practice (see Outstanding Performance). However, as published NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty reports are not necessarily effective case studies. In most cases, reports involving traumatic fatalities need additional clarification or detail and recommendations may need to be removed or at least separated from the description of the incident. When using a case study, it is essential to have the learners make sense of what happened and develop their own conclusions. However, it is often useful to follow this process with a detailed examination of the NIOSH recommendations to determine points of agreement and disagreement and engage in discussion of why.

I have started developing a case study using NIOSH Report F2008-06. Over the last two weeks, I have invested roughly 35 hours in this process (not completely finished). Development has included producing a comprehensive timeline based on data provided in the report as well as from other sources, a narrative designed to assist learners in drawing key lessons from the case, and developing supporting graphics.

This case study will serve as a foundation for a series of posts over the next few weeks. The case will be presented in the following segments: Initial response and size-up, tactical operations, extreme fire behavior and firefighter rescue, water supply, and analysis of NIOSH recommendations.

The Case

On February 29, 2008 Firefighter Brad Holmes and Lieutenant Scott King were assigned to perform primary search of Exposure Delta at a fire in a wood frame duplex in Grove City, PA. During their search, rapidly deteriorating conditions trapped the search crew. After being rescued by the Rapid Intervention Team, both members were transported to Pittsburgh’s Mercy Hospital Burn Unit. Firefighter Brad Holmes had burns over 75% of his body, and died from his injuries on March 5, 2008. Lieutenant King suffered less serious injuries and was treated and released. A 44 year old female occupant of the dwelling also died attempting to rescue a pet.Figure 1. 132 Garden Avenue-Side Alpha

Note: Fire Department Photo - NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2008-6. This photo likely illustrates conditions after 0635 (approximately 19 minutes after arrival of the first fire unit, Chief 95).

Building Information

The fire originated in the D Side unit of a two-story, wood frame duplex at 132 Garden Avenue in Grove City, Pennsylvania. The building was originally built in the 1930s and remodeled into two separate dwelling units in the 1960s.

Figure 2. Fire Unit and Exposure Bravo Floor 1

Note: This floor plan is based on data provided in NIOSH Report F2008-06 and is not drawn to scale. Windows shown as open are based on the narrative or photographic evidence. Door position is as shown based on information provided by NIOSH Investigator Steve Berardinelli (this differs from the NIOSH report which includes the fire investigators rough sketch showing all doors open). Windows shown as intact are not

visible in the available photographs, but may be open due to fire effects or firefighting operations (particularly those in the fire unit).

Figure 3. Fire Unit and Exposure Bravo Floor 2

Note: See the prior comments regarding windows and door position.

As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the floor plan of each unit was a mirror image of the other. The first floor had a living room, dining room and kitchen and a deck on Side C.

The units shared a common entry on Side A. The second floors had two bedrooms and a bathroom.

The 36’ x 30’ structure was of balloon-frame construction and had a basement. Interior construction was plaster over wood lath with carpeting over hardwood floors. The unit on Side D (fire unit) had wood paneling throughout the first floor. Exterior construction was wood clapboards over wooden framing. The building was not insulated and did not contain a rated fire wall between the units. The roof covering was asphalt shingles over an undetermined type of wood sheathing.

Dispatch Information

The initial call reporting this incident was 0606 hours, but was disconnected prior to communication of the nature of the emergency. A law enforcement unit was initially dispatched to the address to investigate the interrupted call. A second call was received from an occupant of the fire unit (Side D) at 0609 reporting the fire and that his wife was trapped.

Station 95 (Chief 95, Accountability Officer (POV), Engine 95, Engine 85-2, Squad 95) and Ambulance 100 were dispatched at 0609 followed by Stations 85 (Engine 85, Engine 85-2, Squad 85) and 87 (Rescue 87) at 0611.

The law enforcement officer initially dispatched to the disconnected call arrived at 0612 and reported a working fire with entrapment. Based on this report, the Station 95 Assistant Chief (unit not specified) requested an additional engine prior to arrival. Station 77 (Engine 77, Brush 77, and Water Tender 77) was dispatched at 0614.

Weather Conditions

The temperature was 6o F (-14o C) with no wind.

Conditions on Arrival

Chief 95 arrived at 0616 and established Command. Fire was showing from the first floor unit on Side D extension and there was significant involvement of Floor 2 of the same unit. The IC did a quick 360o size-up and determined the structure was a duplex by the two separate decks at the rear of the structure. However, this information was not communicated to the responding companies. The IC spoke to law enforcement and confirmed that there was an occupant trapped, but received no information about the occupant’s last known location.

Questions

The following questions provide a basis for examining the first segment of this case study. While limited information is provided in the case, this is similar to an actual incident in that you seldom have all of the information you want.

1. What stage(s) of fire and burning regime do you believe existed in the involved unit when Chief 95 arrived? (Remember that Figure 1 illustrates conditions considerably later in the incident than Chief 95’s arrival.)

2. What building factors are likely to influence fire development and extension? 3. What information should Command communicate to responding companies based

on his size-up and assessment of the situation?

What impact might weather conditions have on firefighting operations?

4. Chief 95 was on-scene for four minutes prior to the arrival of the first arriving engine company. If you were Chief 95, what actions would you take during this time (and why)?

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Reading the Fire 2December 15th, 2008

Deliberate Practice

As discussed in my posts on Outstanding Performance and Reading the Fire improving proficiency requires sustained deliberate practice!

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire.

Commercial Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 8 seconds of the following video of conditions on Side C of a commercial fire. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have?How could you obtain it?

2. What state(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)? Remember that fire in adjacent compartments can be in a different stage of development?

3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)? 4. What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? Is this likely to be

a survivable environment for unprotected occupants? For firefighters? 5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes?

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net Back the video up to the beginning, watch the first 15 seconds, and review your answers on the B-SAHF worksheet. Did any of your answers change based on the additional information provided by the view of Side A?After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Did you successfully predict the fire behavior that occurred? This video provides excellent examples of smoke and air track indicators. However, sometimes the indicators of potential for extreme fire behavior might not be so obvious. Under these circumstances, you will need a higher level of skill to anticipate fire development.

Make it a Habit!

As Geoff Colvin emphasizes in Tallent is Overrated the quantity and quality of deliberate practice is the major determinant in expertise at all levels from novice to expert. Developing skill in reading the fire requires practice. Additional B-SAHF exercises will be posted on a regular basis at cfbt-us.com. Also check the CFBT-US Resources page for additional information on Reading the Fire!

Consider making B-SAHF exercises a regular part of your training schedule. During a recent Compartment Fire Behavior Training (CFBT) Instructor course conducted at Tualatin Valley Fire & Rescue we used B-SAHF drills each morning to help the participants develop skill in reading the fire. However, these drills are equally appropriate for recruit firefighters. Understanding fire behavior and the ability to read the fire and anticipate changes in fire development are critical for everyone working on the fireground!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Outstanding PerformanceDecember 11th, 2008

Exptertise

Knowledge and skill are critical to safe and effective performance during emergency operations and firefighters and officers who perform well on the fireground are respected by their peers. What does it take to develop a high level of expertise?

Believing that they are masters of their craft, some firefighters resist engaging in practice of basic skills such as door entry, nozzle technique, and hose handling (even when their demonstrated skill is far from proficiency). Others engage in this type of practice enthusiastically, serving as their own critic and identifying potential areas of improvement.

In the fire service, years of service is often perceived as a measure of experience. But is this really true? In The Making of an Expert, Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely observe that “living in a cave does not make you a geologist. Not all practice makes perfectâ€. �Developing proficiency requires deliberate practice that focuses not on specific areas in need of improvement or development of new knowledge and skill.

Is Going to Fires Enough?

Can a firefighter or fire officer develop the knowledge and skills necessary for a high level of performance on the fireground predominantly from going to fires? Actual performance is important, but it is not sufficient.

Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely use learning to play golf as an example of the need for deliberate practice. In the early stages of learning the game, players often begin by learning individual skills and then playing on the course. This generally leads to rapid development of a fundamental level of skill. However, additional time on the course will not necessarily lead to improved performance. Why?

You don’t improve because when you are playing a game, you get only a single chance to make a shot from any given location. You don’t get to figure out how you can correct mistakes. If you were allowed to take five to ten shots from the exact same location on the course, you would bet more feedback on your technique and start to adjust your playing style to improve your control.

Firefighting is similar, probationary firefighters spend considerable time practicing individual skills and learning to integrate them into the team context of company operations. However, after they leave the academy, how much time is spent in deliberate practice? Working on the fireground, you don’t get the opportunity for repetitive practice, and seldom have the opportunity to think about how to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of your work until after the fact. This often becomes even more difficult when individuals advance to the officer’s role.

Deliberate Practice

In his recent book Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else, Geoff Colvin explores the mystery of where great performance really comes from. This text provides a straightforward examination of current research on expertise the application of deliberate practice and examines how these concepts can be applied in a variety of contexts.

Colvin identifies that deliberate practice may involve activities specifically focused on performance improvement and practice that is integrated with actual work performance. He describes direct practice using three types of activity as models, music, chess, and sports.

In the music model, you practice application of the skill and receive immediate feedback from a teacher or by reviewing a recording (audio or video) of your performance.

The chess model involves examination of prior performance by others (i.e., studying the games of chess grand masters). In other domains such as business and the law, this model involves the use of case studies.

Effective performance may include both physical and mental elements. The sports model involves conditioning. This is readily applicable to physical skills, but applies to cognitive demands as well. Conditioning in this case may involve developing a deeper level of knowledge or use of simulations to practice decision skills.

When applying the concept of deliberate practice to work activities it is important to identify your goals, what aspect of performance are you trying to improve. During work activity, pay attention to your performance. After the work feedback is critical. This may involve self-reflection, feedback from others, or preferably a combination of both.

Each of these approaches has direct applicability to the fire service. However, it is necessary to approach deliberate practice in an intentional manner by identifying areas of performance that can be improved and developing a plan that includes direct practice and integrates practice and work activity.

Coaching

We can’t necessarily improve our performance without help. Even highly accomplished performers have teachers, coaches, or mentors to help design practice programs, provide feedback on performance and help maintain the motivation and commitment necessary to continued improvement.

Teachers, coaches, and mentors are important to both individual and organizational performance. It is important to identify who will serve in this role as individual needs change and evolve as performance improves. What role do you serve; learner, coach, or (hopefully) both?

Time & Commitment

Developing expertise takes time and effort. World class performers in most any discipline generally need a minimum of 10,000 hours of intense training and practice before reaching that level. There are no shortcuts! It is difficult to develop and maintain the motivation and commitment to sustain this level of effort.

It is easy to look at our current performance level and think that we do quite well and take pride in our accomplishments. However, is this the best we can do? I would contend that good enough isn’t (good enough).

The greater the time invested in deliberate practice, the greater the improvement in performance. Be a student of your craft, seek out feedback, and work diligently to improve your performance.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Situational Awareness is CriticalDecember 8th, 2008

Photo by Mark E. Brady, Prince Georges County Fire/EMS Department

Experienced Judgment

Firefighters frequently base their expectations of how a fire will behave on their experience. Wildland fire scientist Harry Gisborne’s1948 observations about wildland firefighters experienced judgment can be paraphrased to apply to structural firefighters as well:

For what is experienced judgment except opinion based on knowledge acquired by experience? If you have fought fires in every type of building with every different configuration and fuel load, under all types of conditions, and if you have remembered exactly what happened in each of these combinations your experienced judgment is probably very good

Unfortunately this is rarely the case. Firefighters and fire officers often have limited experience and do not have sufficient understanding of fire dynamics to recognize potential for extreme fire behavior.

Riverdale Flashover

Two firefighters from the Riverdale Volunteer Fire Department in Prince Georges County Maryland recently were surprised by a flashover in a small, single family dwelling. Probationary Firefighter Tony George captured initial operations in a series of four photos taken over a period of two minutes.

In the first photo, firefighters from Engine 813 and Truck 807 prepare to make entry. Note that the front door is closed, the glass of the slider and windows are darkened, and smoke can be observed in the lower area of the front porch.

What can be inferred from these observations? What is the stage of fire development and burning regime?

Six seconds later it appears that the front door has been opened, flames are visible through the sliding glass door, and the volume of smoke in the area of the porch has increased. However, the smoke is not thick (optically dense).

Has your perception of fire conditions changed? Why did fire conditions change after the door was opened?

Forty eight seconds later, as the crew from Truck 807 makes entry to perform horizontal ventilation the volume of smoke from the front door increases and thickens (becomes more optically dense). The crew from Engine 813 experiences a burst hoseline, delaying fire attack.

If the fire was ventilation controlled prior to opening the door, how are fire conditions likely to change?

If the truck crew increases ventilation by opening windows, how will this influence fire development?

What is the potential impact of the delay in deployment of a hoseline to attack the fire?

Two minutes after the first photo, and shortly after the crew from Truck 807 made entry, flashover occurred.

According to a press release from Prince Georges County Fire/EMS Department Chief Spokesperson Mark Brady:

The engine from Riverdale Heights arrived first and advanced a hoseline to the front door and paused to don their personal protective equipment (PPE) and self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The house was vacant and a small fire could be seen in the front living room. The ladder truck from Riverdale Fire/EMS Station #807 was the second to arrive, almost at the same time as Riverdale Heights. The crew from Truck 807 donned their PPE and SCBA and entered the structure to begin ventilation by removing windows. As the engine crew from Riverdale Heights prepared to enter the structure and extinguish the fire their hoseline sustained damage from glass or debris and was cut; rendering it useless. As additional arriving firefighters stretched another hoseline into position, a flashover occurred.

Two firefighters involved in this incident were seriously injured, FF Johnston was treated and released. FF Blazek was admitted to the MedStar Burn unit. Visit the Riverdale Volunteer Fire Department Web Site for updates on FF Blazek’s condition.

Things to Think About

Near misses and injuries such as occurred during this incident happen all too frequently. All too often, firefighters and officers consider this to be part of the job. Fire behavior is extremely predictable. It will do the same thing every single time under the same conditions. The problem is that the conditions are seldom exactly the same and our experienced judgment is not perfect.

What can you do to reduce the risk of being surprised by extreme fire behavior? Become (or continue to be) a student of your craft and develop an improved understanding of fire dynamics and the influence of tactical operations on fire behavior. Practice reading the fire (see my earlier post Reading the Fire: B-SAHF) using photos, video, and every fire you respond to.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Criticism Versus Critical ThinkingDecember 4th, 2008

A few days ago I watched a video clip of a fire officer performing a vent enter search (VES) operation on firevideo.net. Shortly after the officer made entry into the second floor, the room flashed over and he was forced to make emergency egress over a ladder.

Yesterday, I came across the same video clip on vententersearch.com and saw that the Captain involved in the incident had posted his perspective on the event. There were quite a few posts related to this video and it took me a few minutes to find the Captain’s comments. Reading through the posts, I began to think about the nature and purpose of criticism.

Some firefighters can be quite judgemental, particularly when commenting on decisions or actions taken by someone else. This is often painfully evident when reading comments on fire service blogs or forums. I frequently use video clips and written case studies as learning and instructional tools. Often, these involve mistakes or errors in judgement on the part of the participants. However, it is important to remember that it is quite different to sit around the coffee table or in a classroom and discuss an incident than it is to be faced with a parent screaming that their child is trapped on the second floor of a burning building.

Firefighters and fire officers are faced with the need to rapidly assess the situation and make decisions under dynamic conditions and with limited information. Sometimes the outcome is good and in other cases, the outcome is injury or death in the line of duty. These injuries and deaths are unacceptable, but as long as humans are involved in fighting fires, we will occasionally make errors in judgement. The key is to work together to reduce the probability and frequency of these events.

Criticism

A critic is a person who offers reasoned judgment or analysis, value judgment, interpretation, or observation. While is it possible for a critic to agree with what is being criticized, the term is more frequently applied with someone who disagrees.

Criticism can be constructive or destructive. Constructive criticism is compassionate and respectful. This is often the case when we receive useful feedback from a trusted colleague, friend, coach, or teacher. Constructive feedback is essential to participatory learning. Destructive criticism on the other hand serves to derogate and destroy someone’s work, reputation and self-esteem on whatever level it might be. Destructive criticism might be intentional or done out of ignorance and foolishness.

When criticism is raised, some firefighters say if you weren’t there you have no room to comment (negatively) or take offense when questions are raised about the appropriateness of the actions taken by firefighters who have been injuured or died in the line-of-duty. I strongly disagree with this position. It is essential that we examine these events from a constructively critical perspective to identify the lessons learned.

Decisions made under stress are influenced by many factors, including individual values, organizational culture, experience, training, and education. Photographs and video clips of fireground operations do not lay this foundation nor do they provide situational context such as reported information (e.g., persons trapped) or conditions outside the view of the camera.

VES and Emergency Egress

When using Vent, Enter, and Search (VES); firefighters make entry directly into threatened compartments from the exterior and isolate that compartment by closing the door and then conduct a primary search of that single compartment and exit throught the entry point/ventilation opening. This is a potentially high risk tactic that requires an ability to read the fire and experienced judgment related to both fire conditions and potential for rapid fire progression into the compartment to be searched. The following incident involved VES at a residential structure where rapid fire progress required the Captain conductin the search to perform emergency window egress from a second floor window onto a ladder.

Companies were dispatched to a residential fire at 0400 hours with persons reported. On arrival, cars were observed in the driveway and neighbors reported the likely location of a trapped occupant on the second floor.

Given fire conditions on Floor 1, the Captain of the first in truck, a 23 year vetran, determined that Vent, Enter, and Search (VES) was the best option to quickly search and effect a rescue. In his vententersearch.com post, Captain Van Sant provided the following information about his observations and actions:

When we vent[ed] the window with the ladder, it looks like the room is burning, but the flames you see are coming from the hallway, and entering through the top of the bedroom doorway. Watch it again and you’ll see the fire keeps rolling in and across the ceiling.

When I get to the window sill, the queen-sized bed is directly against the window wall, so there is no way to “check the floor†… Notice that you continue to see my feet going� in, because I’m on the bed.

Believe me, in the beginning, this was a tenable room both for me and for any victim that would have been in there…

My goal was to get to the door and close it, just like VES is supposed to be done. We do it successfully all the time.

When I reached the other side of the bed, I dropped to the floor and began trying to close the door. Unfortunately, due to debris on the floor, the door would not close.

Conditions were still quite tenable at this point, but I knew with the amount of fire entering at the upper level, and smoke conditions changing, things were going to go south fast….

I kept my eyes on my exit point, and finished my search, including the closet, which had no doors on it. Just as I was a few feet from the window, the room lit off…

The following video clip illustrates conditions encountered at this residential fire:

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net

Things to Think About

Incidents in which persons are reported present considerable moral pressure to take action. The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting and Acceptability of Risk states:

All firefighting and rescue operations involve an inherent level of risk to firefighters.

A basic level of risk is recognized and accepted, in a mesured and controlled manner, in efforts that are routinely employed to save lives and property. These risks are not acceptable in situations where there is no potential to save lives or property.

A higher level of risk is acceptable only in situatios where there is a realistic potential to save known endangered lives. This elevated risk must be limited to operations that are specifically directed toward rescue and where there is a realistic potential to save the person(s) known to be in danger.

If you were faced with the circumstances described by Captain Van Sant and observed in the video clip:

In general, do you feel that VES an acceptable tactic when there are potentially savable lives? Why or why not?

Would you have initiated VES operations in this situation? Why or why not? Based on conditions observed prior to entry, would you have committed to

entering the room as Captain Van Sant did? Why or why not? If you were the firefighter on the ladder outside the window, what action would

you take while your crew member conducted the search?

The safety of firefighters or officers engaged in VES is dependent in part on the ability to close the door to the room being searched. This use of anti-ventilation changes the ventilation profile, permitting smoke to clear from the room, but reducing potential for fire exension into that compartment. In many cases this can be accomplished quickly, but in other situations the door cannot be closed (as occurred in this incident) or there may be no door present.

If you encountered this situation, what action would you take? Under what circumstances would you discontinue the search to immediately exit

the compartment? What other strategies might be appropriate under these circumstances

Each of these questions focuses on what you would do if faced with this situation. It is important not to criticize simply for the purpose of pointing out others errors. The value in thinking critically is to help ourselves and others become more skilled at our craft. As Theodore Roosevelt observed:

Criticism is necessary and useful; it is often indispensable; but it can never take the place of action, or be even a poor substitute for it. The function of the mere critic is of very subordinate usefulness. It is the doer of deeds who actually counts in the battle for life, and not the man who looks on and says how the fight ought to be fought, without himself sharing the stress and the danger.

Entering a burning building to attempt a rescue takes courage. Not doing so, in the face of tremendous moral pressure when conditions and circumstances preclude savable lives also takes courage. Act on the basis of your knowledge, skill, and experience.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Posted in Case Studies, Extreme Fire Behavior, Tactical Ventilation | 1 Comment »

Choose Your Weapon: Part 2Fire Stream Effectiveness & EfficiencyDecember 1st, 2008

This post continues my examination of fire stream effectiveness and efficiency with a look at factors influencing nozzle selection and a recap of factors influencing the effectiveness and efficiency of fire streams.

LT Bob Shovald’s article Improving Preconnect Function and Operation in the October issue ofFire Engineering magazine and FF Armand Guzzi/s article Analysis of Effective Fire Streams-Part I published on Firehouse.com advocated the use of high flow handlines equipped with low pressure nozzles. As pointed out in my previous posts It’s the GPM†� and Choose Your Weapon: Part I, flow rate is critical and nozzle reaction is an important consideration, but there is a bit more to this puzzle.

Nozzle Selection

In the conclusion of his article, FF Guzzi states that “nozzle reaction should be a primary factor in determining what flows are needed by the department†[emphasis �added]. I disagree. Heat release rate of the fire determines what flow rate is required. Nozzle reaction is one factor in determining the flow rate that a particular crew can deliver.

LT Shovald and FF Guzzi place a high priority on low nozzle reaction in the selection of low pressure nozzles for handline operations. However, when gas cooling is used to address the three dimensional threat presented by the hot gas layer in a compartment fire, low pressure nozzles are considerably less effective and efficient than those using a higher pressure. As illustrated in the following photo, use of nozzles having a 100 psi (700 kPa) nozzle pressure results in small droplets (0.3 mm average diameter) that have excellent hang time allowing effective cooling of the hot gas layer.

Croatian Firefighters Practice Gas Cooling Nozzle Technique

In addition, when adjusted to straight stream, these nozzles also provide effective penetration and reach within the context of offensive, interior firefighting operations.

Good hose handling skills and nozzle technique allow a two person crew to work effectively with 1-3/4†(45 mm) to 2†(50 mm) handlines with flow rates up to 200 � �gpm (760 lpm) for offensive, interior firefighting operations (even with a nozzle pressure of 100 psi (700 kPa)). However, the flow rate required is often less than the upper end of the flow range. For example, when working in a compartmented residential fire, effective cooling of the hot gas layer can frequently be quite effectively accomplished with of a flow of 30 gpm (115 lpm) to 60 gpm (230 lpm). How can we address these diverse flow requirements during firefighting operations?

Both variable flow and automatic nozzles can be used effectively to adjust flow rate based on tactical requirements. However, this task is accomplished through somewhat different methods.

Automatic Nozzle: An automatic nozzle varies flow through a specified range using a variable orifice controlled by a spring to maintain nozzle pressure in a narrow range. For example, a nozzle such as the Task Force Tips mid-force nozzle has a flow range of 70 gpm (265 lpm) to 200 gpm (760 lpm). At 70 gpm (265 lpm) the nozzle pressure is

approximately 85 psi (593 kPa). As flow increases towards the upper end of the flow range, the orifice size becomes larger and nozzle pressure increases slightly. For example, at a nozzle pressure of approximately 110 psi (758 kPa) the TFT mid-force nozzle reaches its maximum designed flow of 200 gpm (760 lpm). The apparatus operator determines the maximum flow rate by setting the line pressure at the pump. The nozzle operator can achieve that flow rate by opening the nozzle fully or can use a lower flow rate (while still maintaining correct nozzle pressure) by only opening the nozzle part way.

TFT Mid-Force Nozzle Pressure and Flow Rate

However, as illustrated in the preceding graph, the nozzle pressure at the lower end of the flow range is lower (with resulting larger droplet size). Performance of automatic nozzles is best when the nozzle pressure is at or above 100 psi.

Variable Flow Nozzle: Variable flow nozzles also have a variable size orifice. However, with this type of nozzle changes in orifice size must be made manually. Most users don’t change the flow rate. However, pumping the line for the maximum desired flow and then reducing flow rate at the nozzle provides an excellent performance. Unlike the automatic, nozzle pressure does not remain the same when flow rate is reduced. Reducing flow rate while maintaining the same discharge pressure increases nozzle pressure. However, as flow rate is reduced, nozzle reaction does not increase (and in many cases is substantially less). This is because nozzle reaction is influenced to a far greater extent by flow rate than nozzle pressure. The other advantage of using this approach to flow control

is that the lower flow rate (usually used for gas cooling) at higher nozzle pressure produces extremely small droplets which are highly efficient at absorbing energy in the hot gas layer. On the down side, variable flow nozzles are slightly more complex to operate as there is a separate control for flow rate.

Things to Think About

Selection of hoseline diameter and nozzle design involves consideration of multiple factors. Each fire department must consider their particular circumstances in making these decisions. Remember that there is more than one way to safely and effectively achieve fire control. As Sir Eyre Massey Shaw, first chief of the Metropolitan London Fire Brigade observed in 1876:

From the remotest periods of antiquity to the present time, the business of extinguishing fires has attracted a certain amount of attention; but is a most curious fact that, even now, there is so little method in it in that it is a very rare circumstance to find any two countries, or even any to cities in one country, adopting the same means, or calling their appliances by the same name.

It is essential that firefighters and fire officers understand both fire dynamics and the tools of their craft. When evaluating effectiveness and efficiency, keep the following key points in mind:

Each type of nozzle has different performance characteristics and will perform well under specific conditions and less optimally under others.

No single nozzle will perform well under all conditions Flow rate is a critical factor in fire control, but a higher flow rate will not always

provide more effective and efficient performance Low nozzle pressure provides less nozzle reaction but results in larger droplet size Higher nozzle pressure provides smaller droplet size but results in higher nozzle

reaction Smaller droplets are more effective at cooling the hot gas layer Large droplets penetrate well and are effective at cooling hot surfaces Effective and efficient fire streams put water on target in the correct form and at

an appropriate flow rate based on heat release rate of the fire Weight of the hoseline, flexibility, and nozzle reaction have significant impact on

the effectiveness and efficiency of hoseline deployment.

Web Site Additions

CFBT-US has been working on a glossary of terms that are important to CFBT Instructors and other students of fire behavior. This is a work in progress, but have a look and feel free to provide your input or feedback on what we have accomplished so far. A link to the is provided on the CFBT-US Resources page.

In addition to the glossary, a link to the Fire Behavior Indicators Concept Map (version 5.2.1) has also been posted on the CFBT-US Resources” page.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Choose Your Weapon: Part 1Fire Stream Effectiveness & EfficiencyNovember 27th, 2008

Nozzle Pressure

In my previous post It’s the GPM†� I discussed the importance of matching flow rate to tactical application. This post was in part a response to LT Bob Shovald’s article Improving Preconnect Function and Operation which was published in the October issue ofFire Engineering magazine. More recently, I read an article by FF Armand Guzzi on Firehouse.com titled Analysis of Effective Fire Streams-Part I. Both LT Shovald and FF Guzzi advocate the use of low-pressure, high flow nozzles on 1-3/4†(45 mm) hoselines �based in large part on the reduction in nozzle reaction when compared with a nozzle operating at the same flow rate with 100 psi (700 kpa) nozzle pressure.

I have no argument with LT Shovald’s and FF Guzzi’s observation that lower nozzle pressure makes handlines easier to handle. As illustrated below the nozzle reaction from combination nozzles set for a straight stream pattern have considerably less nozzle reaction at 75 psi (525 kpa) or 50 psi (350 kpa) than at 100 psi (700 kpa).

As the preceding table illustrates, lowering nozzle pressure from 100 psi (700 kpa) to 75 psi (525 kpa) reduces the force of nozzle reaction by roughly 16%. If nozzle pressure is reduced further to 50 psi (350 kpa), nozzle reaction is reduced by approximately 24%.

However there are other consequences of lower nozzle pressure. Lower nozzle pressure increases potential for kinking. This can to some extent be addressed through good hose

handling, but if kinks are not removed, flow rate is reduced. Lower nozzle pressure also results in larger droplet diameter. What difference does that make? As discussed in It’s the GPM†� conversion of water into steam is what does the majority of the work in fire control. A given volume of water in large droplets has less surface area than the same volume of water in smaller droplets as illustrated below.

When applying water in a direct attack, water is used to cool surfaces and the principal concern is that the stream has sufficient reach and penetration to get to the intended surface. In this application, droplet size has limited effect, since the objective is to put water directly on the burning fuel or hot surface and develop a thin film. A thin film of water will quickly convert to steam, taking energy away from the fuel surface, reducing pyrolysis and achieving extinguishment or cooling the unignited surface.

However, when water is used to cool the hot gas layer, droplet diameter is extremely important. Droplets must be large enough to have sufficient reach, but be small enough to vaporize while passing through the hot gas layer. Large droplets will either pass through the hot gas layer vaporizing on contact with compartment linings (resulting in excessive steam production) or falling out of the hot gas layer before vaporizing. The following photos illustrate application of a short pulse at a flow rate of 150 gpm (568 lpm) at both 50 psi (350 kpa) and 100 psi (700 kpa).

Effectiveness & Efficiency

How exactly do effectiveness and efficiency apply to hoseline operation and fire streams? An action is effective when it is adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the intended or expected result. It is efficient when performing or functioning in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and effort. An effective fire stream quickly accomplishes the task at hand, whether this is controlling the fire through direct or indirect attack, cooling hot gases overhead, or cooling exposed, but unignited surfaces. An efficient fire stream absorbs the greatest amount of energy with the lowest volume of water.

As applied to hoseline deployment, effectiveness and efficiency of application are dependent on the hoseline being quickly stretched to the appropriate location for water application.

Hoseline deployment and water application must be effective and efficient. However, Guzzi’s fire stream triangle, confounds these concepts and misses several key influencing factors. The following graphic disentangles these concepts and expands on Guzzi’s simple graphic representation.

While water application must exceed the critical rate of flow, continuing to increase flow rate brings diminishing returns (in fire control speed) while increasing the total volume of water use discussed in It’s the GPM†�

Maximizing both effectiveness and efficiency requires a handline with high flow capability with a nozzle that can be used to adjust the flow rate based on conditions and the task at hand. Both automatic and variable flow nozzles provide this capability.

Discussion of fire stream effectiveness and efficiency will continue in my next post with an examination of nozzle selection considerations.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Reading the Fire: B-SAHFNovember 24th, 2008

Surprises are Bad!

I frequently observe that surprises on the fireground are bad. Unexpectedly worsening conditions can place firefighters at risk and often result in injuries and fatalities. However, event unexpected success can be problematic, as we don’t know why we were successful (and will likely attribute it to our mastery of the firefighting craft). When we are surprised by fire development or the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of our tactical operations, we really don’t know what is going on! Recognizing critical fire behavior indicators and being able to predict likely fire behavior is a critical skill for firefighters and fire officers at all levels.

B-SAHF: A Systematic Approach

In his paper Reading the Fire Station Officer Shan Raffel of Queensland Fire Rescue observed:

Every fire sends out signals that can assist the firefighter in determining the stage of fire development, and most importantly the changes that are likely to occur. This skill is essential to ensure the correct firefighting strategy and tactics are employed. Being able to “read a fire†is the mark of a firefighter who is able to make decisions based on �knowledge and skill, not guess work or luck.

Shan developed a scheme for organizing critical fire behavior indicators that focused on Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (SAHF). As we worked together in refining this system, I found that one element was missing, the building. Adding building factors that influence fire behavior provides a reasonably comprehensive approach to reading the fire to identify the stage of fire development, burning regime, and likely fire behavior. The simple mnemonic B-SAHF (Building-Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) can be used to remember this simple approach to reading the fire.

B-SAHF Indicators

The fire behavior indicators should not be considered as a checklist as key indicators will vary with incident conditions. Look at fire behavior indicators from a holistic perspective as illustrated by the following concept map:

Note: This concept map only illustrates the second level of detail in examining the B-SAHF indicators. It is important to extend this map by adding additional detail in each of the categories. For example, in building factors, size may be expanded to include building area and height, number of stories, internal compartmentalization, etc. For a more detailed look at B-SAHF, down load a copy of the full version of B-SAHF Version 5.2.1 in PDF format.

Building: Many aspects of the building (and its contents) are of interest to firefighters. Building construction influences both fire development and potential for collapse. The occupancy and related contents are likely to have a major impact fire dynamics as well.

One of the key factors related to building factors is that they are present before the fire starts. Fire behavior prediction (at least in general terms) should be a key element in pre-incident planning. Look at the building and visualize how a fire would develop and spread based on key building factors.

Smoke: What does the smoke look like and where is it coming from? This indicator can be extremely useful in determining the location and extent of the fire. Smoke indicators

may be visible on the exterior as well as inside the building. Don’t forget that size-up and dynamic risk assessment continue after you have made entry!

Air Track: Related to smoke, air track is the movement of both smoke (generally out from the fire area) and air (generally in towards the fire area). Observation of air track starts from the exterior but becomes more critical when making entry. What does the air track look like at the door? Air track continues to be significant when you are working on the interior.

Heat: This includes a number of indirect indicators. Heat cannot be observed directly, but you can feel changes in temperature and may observe the effects of heat on the building and its contents. Remember that you are insulated from the fire environment, pay attention to temperature changes, but recognize the time lag between increased temperature and when you notice the difference. Visual clues such as crazing of glass and visible pyrolysis from fuel that has not yet ignited are also useful heat related indicators.

Flame: While one of the most obvious indicators, flame is listed last to reinforce that the other fire behavior indicators can often tell you more about conditions than being drawn to the flames like a moth. However, that said, location and appearance of visible flames can provide useful information which needs to be integrated with the other fire behavior indicators to get a good picture of conditions.

It is important not to focus in on a single indicator, but to look at all of the indicators together. Some will be more important than others under given circumstances.

Exercising Your Skills

Learning to read the fire takes practice and a solid understanding of practical fire dynamics. This post introduces the concept of B-SAHF and the B-SAHF exercise as a method for improving your skill in reading the fire.

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 45 seconds of the following video of an apartment fire in New York City. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have> How could you obtain it? 2. What state(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth,

fully developed, or decay)? Remember that fire in adjacent compartments can be in a different stage of development?

3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)? 4. What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? 5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net

After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Did you successfully predict the fire behavior that occurred? What conditions do you think the firefighters encountered on the interior of the structure?

Now What?

Developing skill in reading the fire requires practice. Additional B-SAHF exercises will be posted on a regular basis at cfbt-us.com. If you have a video clip or photo that you would be willing to share for a B-SAHF exercise, please visit the Contact Us page and send me an e-mail. Also check the CFBT-US Resources page for additional information on Reading the Fire!

Additional Information on Loudoun County Flashover

Previous posts examined an incident in which a number of Loudoun firefighters were injured in a flashover. See Loudoun County Virginia Flashover, Loudoun County Flashover: What Happened, and Loudoun County Flashover: Escape from Floor 2. Several weeks ago Loudoun County Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Management released a presentation including video shot by a civilian bystander during the incident. Print a second copy of the B-SAHF Worksheet and view the Meadowood Court Video, using the worksheet to examine the fire behavior indicators visible from the exterior.

Loudoun County Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Management has also made this video available for download: Meadowood Courth Video Download.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

January 29th, 2009

Water and Other Extinguishing Agents by Stefan Särdqvist was originally published (in Swedish) in 2001 by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (now the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) and is used for training in practical firefighting operations. The English translation released in 2002 is an excellent resource for any firefighter or fire officer.

Särdqvist  has a PhD in Fire Protection Engineering, and his passion for this aspect of our profession is readily aparent in this text (and I mean this in the most positive way). Like Fire Ventilation by Stefan Svensson, Water and Other Extinguishing Agents effectively integrates science with the practical aspects of firefighting. Topics addressed in this text include:

1. Overview of Firefighting Operations 2. Water 3. Foam 4. Powder [Dry Chemical Agents] 5. Gaseous Extinguishing Agents

6. Extinguishing Theory

In the opening chapter, Särdqvist  states:

The fire triangle is sometimes used to describe the components needed to start a fire. The fire triangle has three sides: fuel, oxygen, and heat. In some cases an uninhibited chain reactin is added to the triangle to turn it into a four-sided tetrahedron. However, this approach is far too simple to explain why fires go out. It describes the ingredients needed for combustion, but not the mechanisms which cause fires to occur or to be extinguished. For this reason, the fire trinangle cannot be used in discussions about exthinguishing fires.

Sacrilege! For most of us the concept of the fire triangle and the fire tetrahedron are fundamental concepts applied to both occurence of fire and fire control. Ah, but things are not as simple as we originally thought. The dominant method involved in fire extinguishment is cooling (with a few minor exceptions). Right at the start, this text challenges some commonly heald (but scientifically incorrect) assumptions. 

In the chapter addressing water as an extinguishing agent, Särdqvist addresses water application methods including surface and smoke (gas) cooling. This chapter provides a sound explanation of why steam produced by water changing phase in the hot gas layer does simply add volume and lower the level of the hot gas layer. This is supported by a mathematical explanation of the expansion of steam and contraction of the hot gases as they are cooled. My colleague, Lieutenant Felepe Bazea Lehnert of the Valdivia Fire Department observed that “it is easier to explain this if you understand calculus”. However, Särdqvist does an excellent job of making these concepts accessable to a diverse fire service audience.

Water and Other Extinguishing Agents is available for on-line purchase from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency for 335 SEK (around $45.00) plus shipping. The agency will invoice for payment Swedish Kroner after your purchase (which necessitates using a bank that can produce a check in foreign currency).

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Tags: Add new tag, Fire ControlPosted in Reviews | No Comments »

Myth of the Self-Vented FireJanuary 26th, 2009

When fire is showing from one or more windows or other opening on arrival, firefighters and fire officers often observe that the fire is “self-vented”. While this is true, this unplanned ventilation often increases heat release rate and does not have the desirable effects resulting from effective tactical ventilation.

Effects of Horizontal Ventilation

Effect of Positive Pressure ventilation on a Room Fire   (Kerber & Walton, 2005) describes a series of experiments performed at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to determine the effect of horizontal ventilation using a window and door under natural and positive pressure conditions. These experiments involved a compartment with a single window and doorway as illustrated in Figure 1. The room was furnished as a bedroom with a limited fuel load consisting of a bunk bed, bookcase (without books), chair, and desk with computer monitor.

Figure 1. Horizontal Ventilation Test Floor Plan

 

 As illustrated in Figure 2, with natural ventilation the heat release rate (HRR) spiked immediately after the window was vented. As heat release rapidly increased, so too did temperature with peak temperature at the ceiling in excess of 1000o C (1832o F).

Figure 2. Heat Release Rate with Natural Horizontal Ventilation

Note: Adapted from Effect of positive pressure ventilation on a room fire, (NISTIR 7213) by S. Kerber & W. Walton

After establishing natural horizontal ventilation by opening the window, a bi-directional air track developed at both the window and door to the compartment as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. If this compartment was at the end of  a long hallway, what impact would the air track and temperature conditions have on firefighters working their way to the seat of the fire?

Figure 3. Air Track at the Door

Figure 4. Air Track at the Window

Click on the link to view video providing interior and exterior views: NIST Natural Horizontal Ventilation Test . Additional information on natural and positive pressure ventilation tests is also available on the NIST PPV web page. 

Horizontal ventilation is often performed to lower temperature and raise the level of the hot gas layer in the fire area. While increased ventilation may accomplish this, failure (or tactical ventilation) of a single window is unlikely to have significant impact on compartment temperature.

Researchers from the University of Texas and the Austin Texas Fire Department (Weinschenk., Ofodike,& Nicks, 2008) performed a computer simulation of the impact of variation in the size of the exhaust opening when performing horizontal ventilation using a window and door. The compartment size was slightly smaller than in the NIST study (Kerber & Walton, 2005) and the fire was considerably smaller (2 MW). In this simulation they examined conditions varying from the window being closed to fully open. As illustrated in Figure 5, even with the window fully open, the temperature in the doorway of the compartment dropped only slightly.

Figure 5. Influence of Opening Size on Doorway Temperature

 

It is essential to recognize that unplanned ventilation caused by failure of window glazing due to the effects of the fire are unlikely to result in sufficient exhaust opening size to have a significant positive influence on conditions inside the fire compartment and adjacent spaces.

What smoke, flame, and air track indicators would point to ventilation controlled conditions? Take a look at Figures 3 and 4! How might tactical anti-ventilation and/or tactical ventilation be used to positively influence fire conditions and the environment in the compartment?

So What?

Horizontal ventilation is an excellent tool when used correctly. However, not understanding the influence of changes to the ventilation profile when the fire is

ventilation controlled, can have disastrous consequences. Ventilation direction (horizontal or vertical), size and location of inlet and exhaust openings, and coordination with fire control are critical to safe and effective fireground operations.

References

For more information, see the following NIST report and journal article.

Kerber, S. & Walton, W. (2005). Effect of positive pressure ventilation on a room fire, (NISTIR 7213). Retrieved January 26, 2009 from http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire05/PDF/f05018.pdf

Weinschenk, C., Ofodike, E., & Nicks, R. (2008) Analysis of fireground standard operating guidelines/procedures for compliance for Austin fire department. Fire Technology, 44(1), 39-64.

Remember the Past

I am involved in an ongoing project to assemble and examine narratives, incident reports, and investigations related to extreme fire behavior events. Unfortunately many of these documents relate to line of duty deaths. As I read through the narratives included in the United States Fire Administration line of duty death database and annual reports on firefighter fatalities, I realized that every week represents the anniversary of the death of one or more firefighters as a result of extreme fire behavior.

While some firefighters have heard about the incidents involving multiple fatalities, others have not and most do not know the stories of firefighters who died alone. In an effort to encourage us to remember the lessons of the past and continue our study of fire behavior, I will occasionally be including brief narratives and links to NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty reports and other documentation in my posts.

January 28, 1994Firefighter Vencent Acey, 42, CareerFirefighter John Redmond, 41, CareerPhiladelphia Fire Department, Pennsylvania

On January 28, Firefighters Vencent Acey and John Redmond, both of the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department, died when he became trapped and overcome by smoke by a rapidly moving fire in the basement of a church. Several firefighters re-entered the church against orders to rescue the firefighters, and were able to pull one of them from the basement. Eight other firefighters were injured, including several involved in the rescue efforts.

January 28, 1995Firefighter Victor Melendy, 47, CareerStoughton Fire Department, Massachusetts

On January 28, Firefighter Victor Melendy of the Stoughton (MA) Fire Department died when he was caught in a flashover while searching for victims on the third floor of a rooming house.

January 27, 2000Captain Walter Harvey Gass, 74, VolunteerSealy Volunteer Fire Department, Texas

Captain Gass and other members of his department were dispatched to a residential structure fire that was caused when lightning struck a house. The first two firefighters on the scene, the Assistant Chief and the Fire Chief, confirmed a working fire with dark smoke and fire visible from the attic and dormers. Captain Gass and his crew were the first fire company to arrive at the scene. Captain Gass and two firefighters entered the structure through the front door to perform an aggressive attack on the fire. Shortly after entering the structure, the two firefighters who were with Captain Gass were attempting to feed more hose into the structure. There was a rapid buildup of heat and the hoseline seemed to drop. The firefighters exited the building and reported this situation to the Chief. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) were formed and, after four attempts, the second team was successful in recovering Captain Gass. Captain Gass was equipped with full structural protective clothing and a manually activated PASS device. The PASS was found in the “off” position. Captain Gass was located about 18 feet inside the front door of the structure. Captain Gass was removed from the structure approximately 20 minutes after his arrival on the scene. The cause of death was listed as smoke and soot inhalation with greater than 80 percent total thermal injury. Additional information about this incident may be found in NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation F2000-09.

Seeking Information

If your department experiences (or has experienced) an extreme fire behavior event and you would be willing to share information about the incident or lessons learned, please contact me by e-mail or telephone.

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Tags: self-vented fire, Tactical Ventilation, ventilation controlled firePosted in Tactical Ventilation | No Comments »

Fire ExtinguishmentA Historical PerspectiveJanuary 22nd, 2009

Broken Links

Thanks to Lieutenant Matt Leech of Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue for letting me know that there are a number of broken links in my earlier blog posts. A fix is in the works and hopefully all links will be functional by next Monday.

Historical Perspective

While researching the Iowa Fire Flow Formula, I came across some interesting information (trivia?) related to the use of water fog for firefighting. In The Safe and Effective Use of Fog Nozzles: Research and Practice, John Bertrand and John Wiseman observed that fog nozzles have been in existence for more than 100 years.. Early versions of this type of nozzle were imported to the United States from Europe.

In 1924, Glenn Griswold, a firefighter from Colorado Springs moved to California and joined the newly formed Los Angeles County Fire Protection District. He quickly rose to the rank of Captain and was assigned to Station 17 in Santa Fe Springs. Captain Griswold applied his prior education as a hydraulic engineer to the practice of firefighting and experimented with development of a nozzle to break water into small droplets. Eventually he patented the design under the name Fog Nozzle.

Subsequent innovations in the design of combination nozzles resulted in nozzles that could maintain the same flow rate regardless of pattern, adjustable flow nozzles could be set to provide different flow rates while maintaining consistent flow for all patterns, and finally automatic nozzles that maintained a relatively constant nozzle pressure through a specific flow range.

However, there was a reference to the January 1877 issue of Scientific American in Nelson’s Qualitative Fire Behavior that intrigued me. He stated that this article extolled the virture of little drops of water and the latent heat of steam and that it attempted to point out in a scientific manner that spray or fog nozzles could greatly increase the efficiency of the fire service.

I located a copy of the magazine in the archives of the Portland State University library. The article that Nelson referenced, was actually a letter to the editor written by Charles Oyston of Little Falls, NY.

Scientific American, January 1877

To the Editor of the Scientific American

In our issue of December 30, you recommend discharging water through perforated pipes in the form of spray for extinguishing fire. If water in the form of spray be a good extinguisher, as it undoubtedly is, as numbers of proofs exist in our factories and picker rooms, why do not our fire departments use it in that form in all cases where they can? Leaving firemen to answer that question, I will proceed to adduce a few facts in support

of the theory that a spray is the true method of applying water wherever the burning object can be reached by it.

Water operates, in extinguishing fire, by absorbing the heat and reducing the temperature of the burning substance so low that fire cannot exist; and as the amount of heat that water will absorb depends on the amount of surface of water in contact with the fire, the more surface we can cover with a given amount of water the better. As flame is the principle propagator of fire, to arrest it is the first thing to do; and as it is more than three thousand times lighter than water, and in most cases a mere shell or curtain, a fraction of an inch thick, the extreme absurdity of trying to subdue it with solid streams of water will be apparent. If a man in the character of a sportsman were to fire an inch ball into a flock of humming birds, with the intention of killing as many as possible, he would be regarded as a fool; but if he were to melt the inch ball up, and cast it into shot one thirtieth of an inch in diameter, he would have twenty-seven thousand such shot, and their aggregate surface would be thirty times greater than the inch ball. If he were to load his gun with this shot and fire into the flock, at proper distance, the slaughter of the little beauties would be terrible; and if a fireman would divide up his stream into spray, so that he could cover thirty times more flame, he might expect a corresponding result. The globules of water would be so small that a large portion of them would be heated through and converted into steam; and as steam contains five more heat (latent) than boiling water, we gain a great advantage in this. Steam is also an excellent extinguisher, and this is an additional advantage. As a large portion of this water is converted into steam when applied in the form of a pray, a small amount serves, and the damage by water is very small.

If the first two engines that reached the burning Brooklyn theater could throw five hundred gallons of water each minute, and divide every cubic inch of water into sixty thousand drops, in two minutes the smoke and heat would have been sufficiently subdued to have enabled outsiders to enter and rescue the unfortunate inmates. I am well aware that this statement may seem extremely absurd to firemen who have never experimented in this line; but before they condemn it, let them take out a couple of engines and try the experiment. The barbarous system now in use that so frequently desolates portions of our cities, fills our houses with mourning and our cemeteries with new-made graves, must give way to the dictates of Science. Humanity demands it, and I call on the scientists and chemists throughout the land to aid in introducing this needed reform.

Little Falls, N.Y. Charles OystonScientific American Vol. XXXVI No. 4, Page 52January 27, 1817

The Rest of the Story

Oyston does not mention that he holds a patent for a device called Improvement in Nozzles which used a series of movable hooks inside a relatively standard solid stream nozzle to create a broken stream pattern of broken droplets. In the Fire Stream

Management Handbook, David Fornell astutely observes that attempting to introduce change in the 19th century was apparently as difficult as it is today.

While it is obvious that Oyston is not a firefighter or fire protection engineer with a sound understanding of the tactical applications of straight streams and water fog in firefighting operations, he did have a reasonable grasp of the basic physics involved in the use of cooling for fire control and extinguishment.

His call for scientists and chemists to weigh in on the issue resonated strongly with me as firefighters stand across a chasm from scientists, engineers, and researchers. Much progress has been made in this regard in other nations such as Sweden and in the US by the work of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and others. However, this integration of science with the practical experience of firefighting needs to continue and be expanded.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: Add new tag, Fire Control, fire streamsPosted in Fire Control, Random Thoughts | 2 Comments »

Fuel & VentilationJanuary 19th, 2009

Warning! Science Ahead

This post attempts to bring some clarity to a few scientific concepts that are often overlooked or oversimplified in fire behavior training for firefighters and fire officers. I have made an effort to make this information accessible, but not to reduce it to the point where it no longer makes sense from a scientific perspective.

Fire Power

In physics, power is the rate at which work is performed or energy expended for a given unit of time. For combustion, power is the energy released per unit of time or heat release rate (HRR). So what? Why is this important to firefighters?

It is relatively easy to describe how big a compartment or building is based on its dimensions (i.e., length, width, height) in meters (or feet). However, describing how big a fire is requires different units of measure. Likely the best way to describe the “size†�of a fire is on the basis of the rate at which it is releasing energy.

In Heat Release Rate: A Brief Primer, Dr. Vytenis Babrauskas observes that Heat Release Rate (HRR) is the driving force that influences many other dimensions of the fire

environment. As HRR increases, temperature and the rate of temperature change both increase, accelerating fire development. In addition, increased HRR results in reduced oxygen concentration and increased production of gaseous and particulate products of incomplete combustion. For firefighters, it is also important that HRR directly relates to flow rate required for fire control.

Measuring Energy and Power

Energy is often defined as the ability to do work or cause change. Thermodynamic work is the transfer of energy from one system to another. This is sometimes, but not always accompanied by an increase in temperature (more on this in a bit).

In the United States, the traditional units of measure for energy were the British thermal unit (Btu). A Btu is the amount of energy required to raise the temperature of one pound of water from 60o F to 61o F. Adding additional Btu will continue to raise the temperature of the water until it reaches its boiling point. Changing phase from liquid to gas requires input of a large amount of energy, but there is no change in temperature!

The standard international (SI) unit for energy is the Joule (J). The joule is defined in terms of mechanical energy. However, in our context, it is useful to describe the Joule in terms of transfer of thermal energy. 4186 J will raise the temperature of 1 kilogram (kg) of water from 20o C to 21o C. For readers who are more comfortable with Btu, one Btu is equal to 1055 J (slightly more than one kilojoule (kJ)).

Power is the rate at which work is performed or energy is transferred. This necessitates a measure of the amount of energy (i.e., Btu or J) and a unit of time (generally minutes or seconds). Using traditional units, power could be described in terms of Btu/minute or Btu/second. Watts are the SI unit for power, with a Watt being a Joule/second (J/s)

To keep things simple, the remainder of this post will stick to the SI units (Joules, Watts, and oC).

Potential Energy of Fuel

Energy that is stored is known as potential energy. Fuel has chemical potential energy that is released as the fuel is oxidized in the combustion process. The energy that is released through complete combustion of a given mass of fuel is known as the heat of combustion. Heat of combustion is dependent on the chemical makeup of the fuel. Heat of combustion is usually expressed in kilojoules/gram (kJ/g) or megajoules/kilogram (MJ/kg).

Generally (hydrocarbon based) synthetic fuels have a higher heat of combustion than cellulose fuels such as wood as illustrated in the following table:

 

Note: Data in this table is from the Society of Fire Protection Engineering (SFPE) Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering.

When fuel burns, the total energy that can be released is dependent on its heat of combustion and fuel mass (e.g., kg of fuel)

Heat of combustion is important, but as Dr. Babrauskas points out, the rate at which that energy is released is even more important. Heat release rate is influenced by a number of different fuel characteristics such as surface area to mass ratio, orientation (e.g., horizontal, vertical), arrangement, and geometry.

The concepts of heat of combustion and heat release rate help explain changes in the built environment that impact firefighting. Increased use of synthetic materials has increased the chemical potential energy of building materials and contents and higher heat release rates shorten time to flashover.

Oxygen and Combustion

Release of chemical potential energy from fuel depends on availability of adequate oxygen for the combustion reaction to occur. Interestingly, while the heat of combustion of various types of organic (carbon based) fuel varies widely, the amount of oxygen required for release of a given amount of energy remains remarkably consistent.

In 1917, British scientist W.M. Thornton discovered that the amount of oxygen required per unit of energy released from many common hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon derivatives is fairly constant. In the 1970’s, researchers at the National Bureau of Standards independently discovered the same thing and extended this work to include many other types of organic materials and examined both complete and incomplete combustion.

Each kilogram of oxygen used in the combustion of common organic materials results in release of 13.1 MJ of energy. This is referred to as Thornton’s Rule.

However, the concentration of oxygen in the atmosphere is only 21%. Examining the relationship between consumption of atmospheric oxygen and energy release requires adaptation of Thornton’s Rule based on oxygen concentration. Multiplying 13.1

MJ/kg of oxygen by 21% gives a value of 2.751 MJ/kg of air. The Society of Fire Protection Engineering (SFPE) Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering rounds this value to 3.0 MJ/kg of air. While it is easy to understand that air has mass, it is a bit more difficult to visualize a kilo of air! The density of dry air at sea level and at a temperature of 20o C is 1.2 kg/m3 (0.075 lbs./ft3). Air density decreases as temperature or moisture content of the air increases, but this provides a starting point for visualizing the relationship between volume and mass at normal temperature and pressure.

All this is very interesting, but how does it relate to compartment fires and firefighting?

Fuel and Ventilation

In a compartment fire, combustion occurs in an enclosure where the air available for combustion is limited by 1) the volume of the compartment and 2) ventilation.

Consider a 2.4 m x 3.7 m (8’ x 12’) compartment with a ceiling height of 2.4 m (8’). A compartment of this size has a volume of 21.312 m3. Based on a potential heat release of 3 MJ/m3 of air, the volume of the compartment would provide sufficient air for release of 63.936 MJ. A fire burning in this compartment with a steady heat release rate of .5 MW would consume the air in the compartment in just over two minutes (127.8 seconds). However, this is an extreme oversimplification as fires generally begin with a low heat release rate and grow until they become limited by the availability of fuel or oxygen. In this case, the fire would burn for a bit longer and would then cease flaming combustion, but surface combustion may (depending on the type of fuel involved) continue for some time after the oxygen concentration drops below 15%.

It is unlikely that a fire would occur in a compartment that had no openings (or at least potential openings) such as a door and one or more windows. Even if these openings are closed, there will likely be some leakage that will influence the amount of air available to support combustion. If they are open, a substantially greater amount of air will be available to support fire growth. However, as the fire develops and a hot gas layer forms and begins to fill the compartment, exiting smoke reduces the size of the opening serving as an inlet for additional air. As this occurs, the fire becomes ventilation controlled and heat release is limited by the amount of oxygen in the air available to support combustion.

 

Note: Photos adapted from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ISO-Room/Living Room Flashover.

Hazard of Ventilation Controlled Fires

Many if not most fires that have progressed beyond the incipient stage when the fire department arrives are ventilation controlled. This means that the heat release rate (the fires power) is limited by the ventilation profile, in particular, the existing openings.

If ventilation is increased, either through tactical action or unplanned ventilation resulting from effects of the fire (e.g., failure of a window) or human action (e.g., exiting civilians leaving a door open), heat release rate will increase.

Ventilation is a complex strategy as it can have both positive and negative effects. Releasing smoke can make the interior environment more tenable by raising the level of the hot gas layer and removing energy and fuel (hot smoke) from the compartment or building. However, increasing the air supply to a ventilation controlled fire will increase the heat release rate, potentially resulting in a ventilation induced flashover.

It is essential that firefighters and fire officers understand the effects of tactical operations on fire behavior and coordinate their efforts to maximize the positive impact while limiting the negative consequences.

Chief Pete Lamb recently wrote a blog post titled Vent Early in which he emphasizes the need for firefighters to understand the application of ventilation strategies and to use them effectively. I suggest that we vent wisely in coordination with fire attack after

considering fire behavior and building factors! Understanding compartment fire behavior and practical fire dynamics is critical to safe and effective ventilation operations.

If you found this post interesting or useful (or not), please leave a comment with your feedback.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: heat release rate, oxygen consumption principle, Tactical Ventilation, Thornton's rulePosted in Tactical Ventilation | 1 Comment »

Residential Fire Backdraft Kernersville, North CarolinaJanuary 15th, 2009

The Incident

Kernersville Fire Rescue and responded to a residential in the 1300 block of Union Cross Road shortly after 0200 hours on January 14, 2009. Occupants had been evacuated by two civilians returning home from work at a nearby Dell computer plant. First arriving units initiated offensive operations and began primary search to ensure that all occupants were out of the residence.

Less than 15 minutes into initial operations, an explosion occurred resulting in partial collapse of the building. Kernersville Firefighter Jay Coleman and three firefighters from the Winston-Salem Fire Department were caught in the collapse, but were able to self-extricate. Firefighter Coleman suffered minor injuries.

Chief Walt Summerville of Kernersville Fire Rescue reported “as we entered the building and began to ventilate and to flow air by moving hose lines, the heated gases got the air it needed†Chief Summerville believes the explosion was a backdraft, which was �caused by a build-up of smoke in the crawl space of the home.

Explosion Captured on Video

A Kernersville police officer’s dashboard camera caught a burning home as it suddenly exploded. The police car was (appropriately) positioned a considerable distance from the house and provides a view of Side A from the Alpha/Delta corner. Watch the video several times to get a general sense of what happened Then download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and identify any key indicators that might have be visible in the video.

Post fire video and an interview with Firefighter Coleman are available on the WGHP Fox Channel 8 web site.

At this point, information available about this incident is limited to news reports and video. However, we will be in touch with Kernersville Fire Rescue in an effort to obtain more detailed and fire behavior focused information about this incident. More to follow!

Important Lessons

An initial look at the limited information available about this incident points to several important considerations:

Conditions can vary widely in different compartments. In this incident (like many others) flaming combustion is visible in one location, while extremely under-ventilated backdraft conditions exist elsewhere.

Backdraft can occur in an entire building, one or more habitable compartments, or in a void space.

Backdraft indicators may be pronounced, they may be subtle, or may not be visible from firefighters working positions.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: backdraft, Extreme Fire Behavior, reading the fire, residential firePosted in B-SAHF Exercises, Extreme Fire Behavior, Random Thoughts | No Comments »

Reading the Fire 3January 12th, 2009

Deliberate Practice

As discussed in my posts on Outstanding Performance and Reading the Fire improving proficiency requires sustained deliberate practice!

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire.

Residential Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 45 seconds of the following video of conditions on Side C of a residential fire as the crew of Toronto

Pumper 223 makes entry into a window on Floor 2, Side A to check for extension from a fire in the basement. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have> How could you obtain it? 2. What state(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth,

fully developed, or decay)? Remember that fire in adjacent compartments can be in a different stage of development?

3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)? 4. What conditions would you expect to find on Floor 2? Is the environment tenable

for properly protected firefighters? 5. Is it likely that the fire has extended to Floor 2? Why or why not? 6. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net

Back the video up to the beginning and then watch the first three minutes of the clip and consider the following questions:

1. What changes in indicators did you observe prior to the egress of the crew of Pumper 223 from Floor 2?

2. What changes in indicators did you observe following their egress from Floor 2? 3. What might have caused the change in conditions while the crew of Pumper 223

was checking for extension 4. Were there significant indicators of worsening fire behavior visible from the

exterior prior to the egress of the members working on Floor 2? 5. What indicators of changing conditions would you have expected on the interior

of Floor 2? 6. What tactical options might have reduced the probability of developing untenable

conditions on Floor 2? 7. Review your answers on the B-SAHF worksheet. Did any of your answers change

based on the additional information provided by the second segment of the video clip? Did you successfully predict the fire behavior that occurred?

After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Placement of the tip of the ladder above the window sill made egress from Floor 2 a bit more difficult. However, Captain Mark Fitzsimmons and Firefighters Geoff Mortimer and Mark Ashcroft from Toronto Pumper 223 escaped without serious harm because they recognized changing conditions and quickly made the decision to exit.

As noted in my earlier post on Flashover & Survival Skills it is essential to train on emergency procedures, but it is even more important to ensure that firefighters and officers are proficient at reading the fire and managing the fire environment to reduce the probability that emergency procedures will be required.

Comments Fixed!

Thanks to Dr. Stefan Svensson for alerting me to a problem with the comments feature of the blog. The problem has been fixed and you can now provide feedback on the posts in the CFBT Blog. Please feel free to do so!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Tags: B-SAHF, deliberate practice, FBI, fire behavior indicators, reading the firePosted in B-SAHF Exercises | No Comments »

Estimating Required Fire Flow: The Iowa FormulaJanuary 8th, 2009

As discussed Estimating Required Fire Flow: The National Fire Academy Formula, there are a number of ways to estimate required (total) fire flow or tactical rate of flow (required for fire attack). This post examines the groundbreaking work of Keith Royer’s and Floyd W. (Bill) Nelson’s work in development of a method to identify the volume and flow of water necessary for fire control with water fog.

The fire service often accepts (or rejects) concepts, theories, and practices based on what is written in training manuals, trade magazines, or presented by well known speakers. Others take the message and pass it along, trying to improve or simplify the message. Much can be lost in the translation. While we are strongly influenced by tradition, we occasionally forget history, and valuable work that was done by our predecessors is forgotten or misinterpreted. This is particularly true in the case with regard to Royer’s and Nelson’s volume and rate of flow formulas.

Origins of the Iowa Formula

In 1951, Keith Royer and Floyd W. (Bill) Nelson were hired by Iowa State University to manage the Engineering Extension Service Firemanship Training Program. Royer and Nelson both became involved in the Exploratory Committee on the Application of Water, a research team comprised of fire service, fire protection engineering, and fire insurance

representatives. The principal work of the Exploratory Committee was investigation of the use of water fog for firefighting.

One critical question faced by Royer and Nelson was how much water was necessary to control a fire with water fog? In his book Qualitative Fire Behavior (1989), Nelson observed: “In principle, firefighting is very simple. All one needs to do is put the right amount of water in the right place and the fire is controlled.†Royer and Nelson �recognized that heat release from the fire must be balanced by the energy required to heat water to its boiling point and change it to steam. Through their research, they discovered that too little or too much water was considerably less effective than the right amount.

Note: While math is considerably simpler when using standard international (SI) units, Royer and Nelson did their work in traditional units (e.g., feet, gallons, British thermal units, degrees Fahrenheit). For now, I will stick with traditional units to illustrate how the Iowa Formula was developed. Safe and Effective Use of Fog Nozzles: Research and Practice (Wiseman & Bertrand, 2003) includes adaptation of the formula to the use of SI units.

Based on the results of their research on extinguishing compartment fires, Royer and Nelson developed the following formula to determine the volume of water (in gallons) required to control a fire in a given size compartment.

Royer and Nelson based this formula on the following two concepts:

1. Water converted to steam expands at a ratio of 1700:1, as a result one gallon of water (0.13 ft3) produces 221 ft3 of steam. However, in practical application it is unlikely that all of the water would be converted to steam. Royer and Nelson estimated the efficiency of this conversion at 90%, resulting in production of 198.9 ft3 of steam per gallon. They rounded this value to 200 to simplify calculation.

2. In 1955 the Factory Mutual Laboratories determined that oxidization of ordinary fuel with 1 ft3 of oxygen (at standard temperature and pressure) resulted in release of 535 British thermal units (Btu) of energy. Based on an atmospheric oxygen concentration of 21% and substantive reduction or cessation of flaming combustion at 15% concentration, Royer and Nelson estimated that seven percent (of atmospheric concentration of oxygen) was available to support flaming combustion. This led them to estimate that combustion of ordinary fuel with 1 ft3 of air would result in release of 37 Btu. Combustion of ordinary fuel with 200 ft3 of air (would therefore release 7,400 Btu. One gallon of water, raised from a temperature of 62o F to 212o F and completely converted to steam will absorb 9330 Btu. As with their calculation for steam production, an efficiency factor of 90% can be applied, resulting in absorption of 8397 Btu. This illustrates that a

single gallon of water converted to steam will absorb the energy released by combustion of ordinary fuel with 200 ft3 of air.

Note: There are a few problems in using volume when discussing the energy released based on the quantity of oxygen or air in the combustion reaction. Chief of which is the variation in volume based on temperature. It would be more appropriate to speak to the mass of oxygen or air. However, Royer and Nelson based their approach on volume, so we will follow this line of reasoning (recognizing that while it is simple to understand, it has significant limitations).

Royer and Nelson used these concepts to support their formula to determine the volume of water required to control a fire with water fog.

Volume and Flow Rate

The volume formula, while a good start, still did not identify the required flow rate. The required volume could be delivered over various periods of time and still control the fire. If water was applied over a one minute period, the volume formula could be used to determine flow rate directly. However, Royer and Nelson estimated if water was applied in the right place, most fires could be controlled (but not necessarily extinguished) with water fog in less than 30 seconds. Given this timeframe, the volume formula translated into the rate of flow formula as follows:

Limitations

The Iowa Rate of Flow Formula is designed to estimate the flow rate required to control a fire in a single open area of a building with a 30 second application of water fog. This approach requires foreknowledge of the building and made the Iowa rate of flow formula most suited for preplanning, rather than tactical application.

That said, this does not mean that you cannot apply this formula (or its concepts) tactically based on the estimated area of involvement in a building that has limited compartmentation (e.g., multiple, interconnected compartments, open doors, unprotected shafts). However, it is essential to remember that Royer and Nelson based their formula on a 30 second application (potentially from multiple points) outside the compartment, and not working your way from compartment to compartment as is typically done in offensive, interior firefighting operations.

Additional Considerations

The concept that water applied to the fire compartment will turn to steam and fill the space, displacing air and hot smoke is a foundational principle of the indirect and combination attack as discussed by Lloyd Layman, Keith, Royer and Bill Nelson. This physical reaction is also commonly accepted as fact within the fire service. However, the science is a bit more complicated.

Royer and Nelson are correct in assuming that at its boiling point water converted to steam will expand 1700 times and not increase in temperature. However, water converted to steam while passing through the hot gas layer does not increase the total volume of gas and vapor in the space. The expansion of steam is more than counterbalanced by contraction of the hot gas layer due to cooling. On the other hand, water that passes through the hot gas layer (without taking energy from the gases) and converts to steam on contact with compartment linings (walls, ceiling) results in addition of the volume of steam to the volume of air and smoke in the compartment. This is not commonly understood and will be the subject of a later post. Steam formed at 212o F (100o C) can continue to absorb energy if the temperature of the fire environment is above 212o F (100o

C) and will continue to expand (while the hot gases correspondingly contract).

One of the fundamental assumptions central to the Iowa formula is that the oxygen available to the fire is limited to that contained within the volume of the fire compartment. However, this is unlikely. If smoke is visible, ventilation (i.e., exchange of the atmosphere in the compartment with outside air) is taking place to some extent. In addition, if the compartment is not totally isolated from the remainder of the building, air track (movement of smoke and air) will provide additional oxygen to the fire. However, Royer and Nelson did identify an extremely important and often overlooked point. The Iowa tests showed that the heat release rate from actual compartment fires was less than the value based on the potential heat release from the fuel involved due to limitations in ventilation.

In a compartment fire, heat release rate is often (except in the incipient and early growth stage) limited by ventilation. One of the most important lessons that can be learned from Royer’s and Nelson’s work is that the flow rate and volume of water required for fire control is related not only to the method of attack, but also to the ventilation profile of the compartment or building involved.

Building on the Past

The National Fire Academy Fire Flow Formula (see Estimating Required Fire Flow: The National Fire Academy Formula is based on synthesis of the experience of a group of experienced fire officers. On the other hand, the Iowa Formula is based on analysis of extensive empirical evidence developed during live fire tests. These formula each have different assumptions and are designed for different purposes. However, both provide useful information if they are used as intended. Future posts will examine the topic of fire

flow from an international perspective, looking at the approaches taken by Cliff Barnett from New Zealand and my colleague Paul Grimwood from the United Kingdom.

For more information on Fire Flow, visit Paul Grimwood’s website www.fire-flows.com. Paul has amassed a tremendous amount of information on this topic from around the world.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Estimating Required Fire Flow:The National Fire Academy FormulaJanuary 5th, 2009

Application of the appropriate flow rate is critical to fire control. However, how can we estimate the flow rate that is necessary?

There are a number of methods that can be used to estimate or calculate required flow rate for fire control. One method is to simply use your experience (which may work quite well if you have been to a large number of fires and paid attention to flow rate). However, if you do not have a large base of experience to draw on or need to apply flow rate estimation in a preplanning context, other methods are necessary. One of the most common methods used in the United States is the National Fire Academy (NFA) Fire Flow Formula.

Development of the NFA Formula

In the mid 1980s the development team for the National Fire Academy Field course Preparing for Incident Command developed this formula to provide a simple method for estimating the flow requirements for offensive, interior operations where a direct attack was used to control and extinguish the fire.

Interestingly enough the NFA Fire Flow Formula is not based on science (at least not physical science). The developers tapped into another valid source of information, knowledge of experienced fire officers.

The course developers designed a number of plot and floor plans showing different sizes of building with different configurations (e.g., rooms, doors, windows) with varied levels of involvement. These drawings were distributed to students attending the academy and they were asked how their fire department would control the fire (with the emphasis on the number, placement, and flow rate of hoselines).

There are three major parameters used for the scenarios based on these plot and floor plans.

All scenarios were designed to involve offensive, interior firefighting operations and as such, fire involvement was limited to 50% or less of the total floor area of the building.

Operations were to be conducted as they normally would, with initial operations started by the first arriving company and additional tactics implemented as resources arrive.

Primary search and ventilation tactics would be performed concurrently with fire control operations.

The student’s responses were collected and analyzed. For each scenario, when the floor area of the involved area in square feet (ft2) was divided by the total flow rate in gallons per minute (gpm) for all hoselines used for attack, backup, and exposure protection; the average result was three. Turning this around, flow rate in gpm can be determined by dividing the area of involvement in ft2 by three.

In that the exterior of the building can be determined more easily than the area of involvement, the formula was adapted to determine the flow rate based on building size and approximate percentage of involvement as illustrated below:

Note: This method does not translate easily into standard international (SI), simply converted the formula would be lpm = M2/0.07.

The course development team extended the application of this formula to include estimated flow required for exposure protection by adding 25% of the flow rate required for fire control (as determined by the basic formula) for each exposure. The full formula as used in preplan development is as follows:

The development team believed that this formula would also be applicable to defensive attack for levels of involvement above 50%. However, this was not validated using the same type of methodology as used to develop the base fire flow formula.

Limitations

It is important to remember the limitations of this fire flow estimation method:

The NFA Fire Flow Formula is designed for offensive, interior operations involving direct attack.

The formula becomes increasingly inaccurate if the level of involvement exceeds 50% or the resulting flow is greater than 1,000 gpm.

This method is not designed for defensive, master stream operations (even though the developers believed that it would provide a reasonable estimate of required flow rate for defense.

The formula is based on area, not volume. If the ceiling height exceeds 10’, the flow rate may be underestimated.

The NFA Formula does not take into account the potential heat release rate of the fuel. Fuel with extremely high heat release rate may require a higher flow rate

The developers of the NFA Formula made the assumption that the building was well ventilated (tactically). Increased ventilation can (if the fire is initially ventilation controlled) result in increased heat release rate.

It may be tough to do the math at 0200 hours when faced with a rapidly developing fire! This method is best used in advance of the fire when developing preplans or working on tactical problems

Total Versus Tactical Rate of Flow

The most common application error is the belief that the formula determines the flow rate required for fire attack. This is incorrect! The formula determines the total flow rate required for attack, backup, and exposure protection lines. Use of this formula to determine the flow rate for the initial attack line (or lines) will greatly overestimate the required tactical rate of flow.

As discussed in It’s the GPM! and Choose your Weapon Part I, substantially exceeding the required tactical rate of flow has diminishing returns on speed of extinguishment and substantially increases the amount of water used. If excessive, water that is not used efficiently (i.e., turned to steam) increases fire control damage).

Using the NFA Base Fire Flow Formula (no exposures), roughly half of the flow rate is used for attack lines and the remainder is used for backup lines. The NFA formula provides an excellent method for estimating total flow rate requirements (which impacts on water supply and resource requirements). However, it must be adjusted (reduced by half) to determine the tactical rate of flow necessary for direct attack on the fire.

Other Approaches

As outlined in this post, the NFA Fire Flow Formula is intended for estimating the total flow rate required when making a direct attack and has a number of specific parameters that must be considered. Prior to introduction of the NFA formula, the Iowa Fire Flow Formula developed by Floyd W. (Bill) Nelson and Keith Royer. The Iowa Formula was developed quite differently, has substantially different assumptions, and will be the subject of my next post.

For more information on Fire Flow, visit my colleague Paul Grimwood’s website www.fire-flows.com. Paul has amassed a tremendous amount of information on this topic from around the world.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

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Looking Forward to 2009:10,000 Hours to Master Your CraftJanuary 1st, 2009

LODD in 2008

In 2008, six firefighters in the United States lost their lives in extreme fire behavior events occurring while they were engaged in interior firefighting operations. In 2008 there was only one multiple fatality line of duty death as the result of extreme fire behavior. Of this six, three were career, two were volunteers, and one was paid on call. They ranged in age from 19 to 54 years of age with an average age of 34.8 years. However, this does not give us the real picture, it is important to look at each of these events.

Firefighter Rick Morris (54, Career), Sedalia, Missouri: Firefighter Morris died April 8, 2008, nine days after being burned in a flashover that occurred while attempting to locate the fire in a small single family dwelling He was survived by his wife and four children.

Firefighter Bret Lovrien (35, Career), Los Angeles, California: Firefighter Lovrien died and Engineer Anthony Guzman was seriously injured March 26, 2008 from traumatic injuries occurring as the result of a smoke explosion while forcing entry into a commercial building to investigate smoke from a fire in a utility vault. Firefighter Lovrien was survived by his brother, parents, stepmother, and grandfather.

Firefighter Justin Monroe (19, Paid On-Call) and Firefighter Victor Isler (40, Career), Salisbury, North Carolina: Firefighters Monroe and Isler died March 7, 2008 of thermal insult and carbon monoxide exposure following rapid fire progress (likely flashover) in a commercial fire. Three other firefighters also suffered burns in this incident. Firefighter Monroe was survived by his parents and brother. Firefighter Isler was survived by his wife and two children.

Lieutenant Nicholas Picozzi (35, Volunteer), Linwood, Pennsylvania: Lieutenant Picozzi died March 5, 2008 as a result of injuries received due to rapid fire progress (likely flashover) while searching for the seat of the fire in the basement of a small single-family dwelling. Assistant Chief Kenny Dawson Jr., Assistant Chief Chris

Durbano, and Firefighter Tom Morgan Jr. were injured while attempting to rescue Lieutenant Picozzi. Lieutenant Picozzi was survived by his wife and two children.

Firefighter Brad Holmes (21, Volunteer) , Grove City, Pennsylvania: Firefighter Holmes died three days after he and and Lieutenant Scott King were burned as the result of flashover while conducting primary search on the second floor of a small two-family home on February 29, 2008. Firefighter Holmes is survived by his parents and brother.

Two of these incidents have been documented by an investigative report. NIOSH Report F2008-06 examines the incident in which Firefighter Brad Holmes died. The Post Incident Report on the Salisbury Millwork Fire by the Salisbury Fire Department examines the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Firefighters Justin Monroe and Victor Isler (NIOSH Report F2008-07 is pending). NIOSH is also investigating the deaths of Lieutenant Nick Pilozzi (NOSH F2008-08) and Firefighter Brett Lovrien (NIOSH F2008-11). The status of these reports is listed on the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Pending Investigations page.

Similarities and Differences

Three of these fatalities occurred in small residential structures. Of these, one occurred on the second floor, one on the first floor, and the other in the basement. Two of these fatalities occurred in an exposure, not initially involved in the fire. Three of these fatalities occurred in commercial occupancies. Two of the fatalities occurred at a major, greater alarm fire. In one of these incidents, firefighters were searching for a trapped occupant, in all other cases; the firefighters were searching for the fire.

It is critical to remember that extreme fire behavior can occur in any type of structure. In some cases, severe fire conditions are evident on arrival, but in others, there is little evidence of a significant fire. The sense of urgency resulting from persons reported, or a rapidly developing fire can result in tunnel vision and reduce focus on key fire behavior indicators (B-SAHF). It is essential to ensure that members have adequate training so that reading the fire is both second nature and a conscious part of their size-up and dynamic risk assessment process.

Are We Making Progress?

This number is considerably lower than the 18 firefighters who died in 2007 where extreme fire behavior was a causal or contributing factor (four events accounted for 15 of the 18 fatalities). Does this reduction indicate that we are doing a better job of recognizing potential for extreme fire behavior and are controlling the fire environment more effectively to reduce risk during offensive operations? Examining not only line of duty deaths, but department incident reports, data submitted to the National Firefighter Near Miss Program and news reports of fire incidents involving extreme fire behavior I have the feeling that this reduction is not completely due to improved safety and operational performance.There have been a number of incidents over the last year that point to the need for

continued efforts in the improvement of fire behavior training. Incidents in Loudoun County, Virginia (see Loudon County Virginia Flashover, Loudoun County Flashover: What Happened, Loudoun County Flashover: Escape from Floor 2, and Flashover & Survival Skills Training); Sacramento, California and Edmonton, Alberta resulted in multiple firefighters being trapped by rapid fire progress while working above the fire. In these incidents, a slight variation in circumstances or any delay in the action of those involved might have resulted in multiple line of duty deaths.

These threee incidents do not necessarily make a trend, but examining near miss, injury, and line of duty death data points to lack of or loss of situational awareness as a factor in this type of incident. Situational awareness is inclusive of the ability to recognize key fire behavior indicators, prediction of likely fire development, and recognizing the impact (or lack of impact) of tactical operations on fire progression.

The Way Forward

In an earlier post, Outstanding Performance I discussed the importance of deliberate practice in developing expertise. Numerous studies have identified that world class performance requires 10,000 hours of intensive and deliberate practice. While engaging in deliberate practice several hours a day, every day for ten years might seem a bit excessive to the average firefighter, performance is strongly correlated with an individual’s level of deliberate practice. Hard work pays off!

Regardless of your level of knowledge and skill, I challenge you to increase your efforts to engage in deliberate practice. As a student of your craft it is critical to deepen your knowledge of fire behavior, examine incidents you respond to with a critical eye, and use case studies to gain insight into fire behavior, building construction, and the effect of tactical operations. Engage in safe and effective live fire training to provide an opportunity to apply your knowledge and skill in a realistic context.

CFBT-US is using the following logo to identify training materials and activities that promote deliberate practice.

Resolutions

Many people make New Year’s Resolutions to lose weight and exercise more. Given the firefighter fatality statistics related to heart disease and stress, these are important

goals. I share these goals with many of you. However, I have a few other professional resolutions for 2009 (and beyond):

Continue to be a student of my craft as a fire officer and educator, finding the time to engage in an increased level of deliberate practice.

Continue working to reducing firefighter injuries and deaths due to extreme fire behavior by increasing firefighter’s knowledge of practical fire dynamics.

Work to improve the quality of NIOSH Firefighter Death in the Line of Duty Reports by continuing to be a critical friend of the program.

Work to improve the quality and focus of fire service training curriculum and training materials in the area of fire behavior.

Work to ensure that professional qualifications and other consensus standards adequately identify the requisite fire behavior knowledge and skills for safe and effective operation on the fireground.

Work to ensure that live fire training instructors have the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct safe and effective training.

I encourage you to join me in this effort. These improvements will not happen overnight, but we can accomplish a great deal if we persist and work together. It is easy to complain and find fault. It is much more difficult to step up and do the right thing to make things better, but that is what is needed.

Thanks for reading the CFBT Blog and best wishes for a safe and happy 2009.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO

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Pennsylvania Duplex Fire LODDAnalysis of NIOSH RecommendationsDecember 29th, 2008

Applying NIOSH Recommendations

NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty reports generally contain two types of recommendations, those that focus on specific contributory factors and others that address general good practice. As when examining contributory factors, it is important to read the NIOSH recommendations critically. Do you agree or disagree and why? What would you change and what additional recommendations would you make based on the information presented in the report?

Brief Review of the Incident

NIOSH Report F2008-06 examines a fire in a wood frame duplex that resulted in injury to Lieutenant Scott King and the death of Firefighter Brad Holmes of the Pine Township Engine Company. The fire occurred on February 29, 2008 in Grove City, Pennsylvania.

When the fire department arrived, the unit on Side D was substantially involved and a female occupant was reported trapped in the building. Initial operations focused on fire control and primary search of Exposure B. Rapid fire development trapped Lieutenant King and Firefighter Holmes while they were searching Floor 2 of Exposure B.

The following photographs are part of a series of 37 pictures taken during this incident and provided to NIOSH investigators during their investigation.

Additional detail on this incident is provided in Developing & Using Case Studies: Pennsylvania Duplex Fire Line of Duty Death (LODD) and Pennsylvania Duplex Fire: Firefighting & Firefighter Rescue Operations . In addition, readers should review NIOSH Report F2008-06.

Recommendations

NIOSH Report F2008-06 contains 11 recommendations. Several of these recommendations are well grounded in the contributory factors identified in the report. Others have a more indirect relationship to the factors influencing the injury to Lieutenant King and death of Firefighter Holmes.

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should be prepared to use alternative water supplies during cold temperatures in areas where hydrants are prone to freezing.

In preparation for potential issues, fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for temporary water sources to be dispatched like tankers, water shuttles, or portable drop tanks.

While this recommendation is valid and good practice, it has little to do with loss of water as a contributory and likely causal factor in the injury to Lieutenant King and death of Firefighter Holmes. Had Command been notified immediately of the frozen hydrant and implemented alternate water supply strategies, the outcome would have likely been the same if tank water had been used as it was in this incident to sustain initial operations.

However, it is critical for fire departments to have a plan to respond to respond to water supply problems. In this case, apparatus had substantial tank water which was used to support initial firefighting operations. In addition, there was sufficient hose available on first alarm companies to stretch to other hydrants (such as the one eventually used east of Garden Avenue on Craig Street). Use of a reverse lay to establish water supply allows the apparatus operator to continue the lay to the next hydrant (hose capacity permitting) or another apparatus to continue the lay and establish a relay. Depending on the distance to the next operational water source, this could be considerably more efficient and rapid than waiting for greater alarm resources to establish a tender shuttle.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that search and rescue crews advance or are protected with a charged hoseline.

This recommendation is critical. However, the discussion fails to speak to the need for backup lines to protect the means of egress when crews are working above the fire. Recent incidents in Loudoun County, Virginia and Sacramento California, resulted in crews with a hoseline working above the fire without a backup line having their hose burn through, and means of egress cut off, necessitating emergency egress via second floor windows.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure fire fighters are trained in the tactics of a defensive search.

While training in search under marginal circumstances is important, this recommendation fails to speak to the need to understand fire behavior and applied fire dynamics as a foundation for maintaining situational awareness on the fireground. This applies to command personnel, company officers, and individual firefighters. While there are a number of points in the sequence of events that lead to Lieutenant King’s injury and Firefighter Holmes’ death, all are dependent on this. Failure to recognize the potential for extension and rapid fire progress, the influence of creating ventilation openings on Floor 2, and recognition of developing fire conditions were likely the most significant causal factor in this incident. Had this not been the case, the firefighters and officers involved would have had the opportunity to adjust their tactical operations or exit the building prior to the occurrence of the extreme fire behavior that trapped the search team.

NIOSH Report F2008-06 quotes Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn regarding flashover indicators:

There are two warning signs that may precede flashover: heat mixed with smoke and rollover. When heat mixes with smoke, it forces a fire fighter to crouch down on his hands and knees… As mentioned above, rollover presages flashover.

This statement is scientifically incorrect. Heat is simply energy in transit due to temperature difference. It is not a substance and cannot mix with anything else. Increasing temperature is an indicator of potential for flashover, but perception of a rapid increase in temperature is not certain to give adequate warning to take corrective action

or escape from the hazardous situation. In addition, rollover does not always precede flashover (it is an important indicator, but only one of many).

The report also quotes Chief Dunn regarding defensive search tactics.

Three defensive search tactics are as follows:

1. At a door to a burning room that may flashover, fire fighters should check behind the door to the room and sweep the floor near the doorway. Fire fighters should not enter the room until a hose line is in position.

2. When there is a danger of flashover, fire fighters should not go beyond the “point of no return.” The point of no return is the maximum distance that a fully equipped fire fighter can crawl inside a superheated, smoke-filled room and still escape alive if a flashover occurs. The point of no return is approximately five feet inside a doorway or window.

3. When searching from a ladder tip placed at a window, look for signs of rollover if one of the panes has been broken. If rollover is present, do not go through the window. Instead, crouch below the heat and sweep the interior area below the windowsill with a tool. If a victim has collapsed there, you may be able to crouch below the heat enough to pull him to safety.

While these tactics have validity, making for search without without protection of a hoseline even to Chief Dunn’s “point of no return†presents a significant risk. �Further, I am uncertain that there is any scientific evidence supporting the concept of the point of no return as described by Chief Dunn. There are numerous examples of situations where firefighters thought they had time to complete a search, but were trapped by extremely rapid fire development. The risk of searching under marginal conditions requires firefighters to effectively read the fire and mitigate hazards in the fire environment through effective use of gas cooling and control of the ventilation profile (either tactical ventilation or anti-ventilation as appropriate) and establishing fire control in addition to primary search.

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting an interior search have a thermal imaging camera.

The thermal imaging camera is a tremendous technological innovation which can significantly speed search operations and provide visual indication of differences in thermal conditions. However, implementation of this recommendation would not necessarily have impacted on the outcome of this incident.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure ventilation is coordinated with interior fireground operations.

In the discussion of this recommendation, the NIOSH Report F2008-6 states “By eliminating smoke, heat, and gases from the fire it will help minimize flashover conditions†�

This statement is not always true. The influence of ventilation on fire development is dependent on burning regime (fuel or ventilation controlled) and the location of the inlet and exhaust openings. Heat release rate from a ventilation controlled fire will increase as ventilation is increased, potentially taking the fire to flashover (rather than the reverse as indicated by the statement in this NIOSH report). In addition, creation of an air track that channels the spread of hot gases and flames to additional fuel packages can result in fire extension and subsequent flashover. Both of these factors were likely to have been significant in this incident. Coordination of ventilation and search or ventilation and fire attack (as frequently stated in NIOSH reports related to incidents involving extreme fire behavior) requires knowledge of fire dynamics and the influence of ventilation in fire behavior.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday protocols are developed and followed.

This recommendation is important, but fails to address other individual level survival skills that must be integrated with these procedures. For example, in this incident, the Lieutenant and Firefighter might have been able to take refuge in one of the bedrooms, closing the door to provide a barrier to hot gases and flames. A ladder was initially placed to a window in the bedroom on Side B (in close proximity to the location where Firefighter Holmes was found). Ladders were subsequently placed to the bedroom windows on Side A. While it may have been difficult to accomplish this under conditions of extreme thermal insult, if developing conditions had been recognized soon enough (see my earlier observation on situational awareness), this may have bought critical seconds and allowed the trapped search team to escape or be rescued.

Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander receives pertinent information during the size-up (i.e., type of structure, number of occupants in the structure, etc.) from occupants on scene and that information is relayed to crews upon arrival.

Had the Incident Commander received more specific information from the occupants or law enforcement, this may have shifted focus in search operations as survivability in the original fire unit was doubtful. Despite this, the civilian casualty was later located outside the fire unit, behind the door in the front foyer that served both dwelling units.

Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters communicate interior conditions and progress reports to the Incident Commander.

This is a key element in maintaining situational awareness (on the part of the Incident Commander). However, it is equally important for Command to communicate with interior crews regarding conditions observed from the exterior or situations (such as water supply limitations) that will impact interior operations.

Recommendation #9: Fire departments should develop, implement, and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for fireground operations.

This recommendation focuses on general good practice, but is not tied to specific contributing factors related to the injuries and fatality that resulted in this incident. This type of recommendation should likely be included, but placed in a separate section so as not to dilute the focus on lessons learned.

Recommendation #10: Fire departments and municipalities should ensure that local citizens are provided with information on fire prevention and the need to report emergency situations as soon as possible to the proper authorities.

Recommendation #11: Building owners and occupants should install smoke detectors and ensure that they are operating properly.

If implemented prior to this incident, Recommendations #10 and #11 would likely have had a positive impact on its outcome, particularly with regards to the civilian casualty and the severity of conditions encountered by the firefighters.

However, these two recommendations do not go far enough. Citizens must also recognize the need for rapid egress and the value of closing doors to confine the fire and limit inlet of air required for continued fire development and increasing heat release rate.

Detailed Case Study

CFBT-US has developed a detailed case study based on this incident and the data contained in NIOSH Report F2008-06. Download the Grove City, Pennsylvania Residential (Duplex) Fire Case Study in PDF format.

Now What?

Over the last two weeks we have spent considerable time with a NIOSH Report F2008-06. NIOSH has completed 335 investigations during the first 8 years that this program has been in existence. 49 more investigations are pending. The information contained in these reports provides a vast reservoir of data that can be used to deepen understanding of your craft and improve decision-making and risk management skills.

Make a commitment to developing your expertise as a firefighter or fire officer in the new year and for the rest of your life. Look for the this logo (more information to follow)!

Have a safe and happy new year!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO