Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?The view from Central Europe

Edited byAntonio Missiroli

Vladimir Bilcik, Daniel Calin, Ivan Hostnik, Andres Kasekamp, Radek Khol, Atis Lejins, Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa, Radoslava Stefanova, Rafal Trzaskowski and Gediminas Vitkus

published by

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Occasional Papers

n°34April 2002

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) became a Paris-basedautonomous agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the furtherdevelopment of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses andrecommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policies. Incarrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between experts and decision-makersat all levels. The EUISS is the successor to the WEU Institute for Security Studies, set up in1990 by the WEU Council to foster and stimulate a wider discussion across Europe.

Occasional Papers are essays or reports that the Institute considers should be made avail-able as a contribution to the debate on topical issues relevant to European security. Theymay be based on work carried out by researchers granted awards by the ISS, on contribu-tions prepared by external experts, and on collective research projects or other activitiesorganised by (or with the support of) the Institute. They reflect the views of their authors,not those of the Institute.

Publication of Occasional Papers will be announced in the ISS Newsletter and they willbe available on request in the language - either English or French - used by authors. Theywill also be accessible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss-eu.org

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Bigger EU, wider CFSP,stronger ESDP?The view from Central Europe

Edited by

Antonio Missiroli

Vladimir Bilcik, Daniel Calin, Ivan Hostnik, Andres Kasekamp, Radek Khol, Atis Lejins, Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa, Radoslava Stefanova, Rafal Trzaskowski and Gediminas Vitkus

Antonio Missiroli is currently a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies

Occasional Papers

n°34April 2002

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Contents

Introduction Antonio Missiroli 5

Estonia Andres Kasekamp 7

Latvia Atis Lejins 11

Lithuania Gediminas Vitkus 14

Poland Rafal Trzaskowski 19

Czech Republic Radek Khol 26

Slovakia Vladimir Bilcik 31

Hungary Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa 36

Slovenia Ivan Hostnik 42

Romania Daniel Calin 46

Bulgaria Radoslava Stefanova 52

Conclusions Antonio Missiroli 58

Annexes 65

a1 About the Authors 65

a2 Abbreviations 67

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Waiting for the Barbarians What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum?

The barbarians are to arrive today.

Why such inaction in the Senate?Why do the Senators sit and pass no laws?

Because the barbarians are to arrive today.What laws can the Senators pass any more?When the barbarians come they will make the laws.

Why did our emperor wake up so early, and sits atthe greatest gate of the city, on the throne, solemn,wearing the crown?

Because the barbarians are to arrive today.And the emperor waits to receive their chief. Indeedhe has prepared to give him a scroll. Therein he inscribed many titles and names ofhonour.

Why have our two consuls and the praetors come outtoday in their red, embroidered togas; why do theywear amethyst-studded bracelets, and rings withbrilliant, glittering emeralds; why are they carryingcostly canes today, wonderfully carved with silverand gold?

Because the barbarians are to arrive today, and suchthings dazzle the barbarians.Why don’t the worthy orators come as always tomake their speeches, to have their say?

Because the barbarians are to arrive today; and they get bored with eloquence and orations.

En attendant les Barbares Qu’attendons-nous, rassemblés ainsi sur laplace ?

Les Barbares vont arriver aujourd’hui.

Pourquoi un tel marasme au Sénat ? Pourquoiles Sénateurs restent-ils sans légiférer ?

C’est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd’hui.Quelles lois voteraient les Sénateurs ?Quand ils viendront, les Barbares feront la loi.

Pourquoi notre Empereur, levé dès l’auroresiège-t-il sous un dais aux portes de la ville,solennel, et la couronne en tête ?

C’est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd’hui.L’Empereur s’apprête à recevoir leur chef ; il amême fait préparer un parchemin qui luioctroie des appellations honorifiques et destitres.

Pourquoi nos deux consuls et nos préteursarborent-ils leur rouge toge brodée ? Pourquoise parent-ils de bracelets d’améthystes et debagues étincelantes d’émeraudes ? Pourquoiportent-ils leurs cannes précieuses et finementciselées ?

C’est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd’hui, etces coûteux objets éblouissent les Barbares.Pourquoi nos habiles rhéteurs ne pérorent-ilspas avec leur coutumière éloquence ?

C’est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd’hui.Eux, ils n’apprécient ni les belles phrases ni leslongs discours. ...

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Why all of a sudden this unrest and confusion. (Howsolemn the faces have become).

Why are the streets and squares clearing quickly,and all return to their homes, so deep in thought?

Because night is here but the barbarians have notcome.And some people arrived from the borders,and said that there are no longer any barbarians.

And now what shall become of us without any bar-barians?Those people were some kind of solution.

Constantine P. Cavafy (1904) translated from the original Greek

by Rae Dalven

Et pourquoi, subitement, cette inquiétude et cetrouble ? Comme les visages sont devenusgraves !Pourquoi les rues et les places se désemplis-sent-elles si vite, et pourquoi rentrent-ils touschez eux d’un air sombre ?

C’est que la nuit est tombée, et que lesBarbares n’arrivent pas. Et des gens sont venusdes fontières, et ils disent qu’il n’y a point deBarbares ...

Et maintenant, que deviendrons-nous sansBarbares ?Ces gens-là, c’était quand même une solution.

Constantine P. Cavafy (1904)Traduit du grec

par Marguerite Yourcenar et Constantin Dimaras

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Introduction Antonio Missiroli

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Last spring, the research team of the then WEUInstitute for Security Studies came up with

the idea of carrying out a targeted screening ofthe prevailing (and evolving) views on CFSP andESDP in the candidate countries. In order topreserve some homogeneity and compara-bility,the screening would be limited to the tenCentral European applicants. In fact, theMediterranean candidates (Cyprus and Malta,let alone Turkey) pose completely differentproblems, while the whole exercise was intendedto try and assess what CFSP/ESDP means to thepart of Europe that was ‘kidnapped’ for almosthalf a century – according to Milan Kundera’swell-known metaphor from the 1980s – and isnow about to ‘return’ where it belongs. In a way,however, the project was also intended to try andassess what such a ‘return’ might mean forCFSP/ESDP, and how the two processes wouldinteract and dovetail.

Accordingly, a grid with five main clusters ofquestions was handed out to the potentialauthors in order to structure their contribu-tions, answer a series of topical questions andallow an overall as well as a comparative assess-ment. The clusters were the following:

I. Enlargement and CFSP Your country has already ‘closed’ Chapters 26(Relex) and 27 (CFSP). What was the originalnegotiating position? Did the negotiators meetany special problem (and, if so, what)? To whatextent had your country already adopted CFSPcommon positions and démarches? Which ones(if any) had not been adopted, and why?

II. Enlargement and ESDP How was the launch of ESDP in 1998/99 recei-ved in your country? What factors shaped offi-cial and unofficial attitudes? Has there been any

discernible evolution of your country’s positionon ESDP ever since? If so, in what direction andwhy?

III. Enlargement and military crisismanagementDid your country ‘contribute’ to the ‘Catalogueof Forces’ exercise and the EU’s Headline Goal?If so, please give details on the units and assets‘offered’ for EU-led crisis-resolution operations,with special attention to their availability (toNATO too, if pertinent) and to the overall sizeand structure of your country’s armed forces.What is your country’s ‘record’ so far in interna-tional peacekeeping operations?

IV. Enlargement and defence procurement Is your country interested in and/or supportiveof a more coordinated European defence procu-rement policy? Is it involved in any such frame-work (e.g. WEAG)? What are your country’smain priorities in this field (modernisation ofarmed forces) and acquisition policy? Can yougive some examples and illustrate cases ofconflict between political and industrial inter-ests and/or European and American suppliers?

V. Enlargement and European securitypolicyPlease make a final short assessment on yourcountry’s general attitude vis-à-vis the EU as aninternational/global actor and your country’slikely role and self-perception within an ‘en-lar-ged’ EU. What should be, for instance, the prio-rities for CFSP, both geographically and politi-cally? Would your country accept (and, if so, onwhat terms) a more ‘flexible’ CFSP? In otherwords, what is or may be your country’s attitudevis-à-vis constructive abstention and enhancedcooperation for CFSP/ESDP? What changesand adaptations to the TEU, with respect to

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CFSP/ESDP, would your country endorse/oppose in the 2004 Treaty review?

After the terrorist attacks on the United States,however, an additional group of questions wasadded – VI. Enlargement after September 11– in order to address the main reactions to thatin the countries under consideration and theirreassessment of priorities and goals, with a viewto the decisions on the two enlargements thatare expected to be taken this autumn in Prague(NATO) and Copenhagen (EU).

The authors are mostly young researchersfrom the applicant countries who have beeninvolved in the Institute’s programmes over thepast (and coming) months, including a seminaron Enlarging Europe: CFSP Perspectives held inParis in late May 2001. The new EU Institute willcontinue to count on them as active interlocu-tors and partners for its activities. Here they havewritten in a personal capacity but tried also to

convey a balanced image of the ways in whichdomestic political and bureaucratic élites, aswell as the wider public, see the issues raised byCFSP and ESDP. The country reports are listedin geographical order – from north to south –with a view also to conveying the proximity/sim-ilarity of visions and perceptions among neigh-bours.

The EU Institute is delighted to have ‘inher-ited’ the project from its WEU predecessor andto be able to present its results. Needless to say,this Occasional Paper is bound not to be the soleproduct that the new ISS devotes to enlarge-ment and security, especially in this crucial year.

Introduction

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Estonia Andres Kasekamp

I. Estonia and CFSP

The invitation to Estonia, in 1997, to begin EUaccession negotiations with the first wave ofapplicant countries came as a surprise for nearlyeveryone. As the only state that was formerlypart of the Soviet Union, Estonia had the wea-kest starting point among fellow applicantsincluded in the first wave and, therefore, adop-ted a strategy of overcoming this handicap bytrying to be the best student in the class. Estoniahas met most EU demands quickly and reques-ted very few transitional periods (and no deroga-tion). In a way, Estonia has tried to emulateFinland in building a reputation in Brussels ofbeing a constructive and eager learner. This stra-tegy has largely paid off, with Estonia annuallyreceiving one of the most positive ProgressReports from the Commission and closingchapters at a fast pace.

In the accession negotiations, Chapter 26(external relations) of the acquis was provisio-nally closed in April 2000. The only contentiousissue was Estonia’s desire to preserve the condi-tions of its Free Trade Agreements with Latvia,Lithuania and Ukraine. Estonia was forced towithdraw from its initial position – all the moreso since the bilateral aspect with the other twoBaltic States is no longer a concern as it nowappears that they will be joining the EU at thesame time as Estonia.

In the same negotiations, Chapter 27 (CFSP)has been one of the simplest to deal with. Herethe official position, from the beginning, hasbeen that Estonia is prepared to accept the rele-vant acquis in full. Therefore, unsurprisingly,there were not any obstacles or problems innegotiating and concluding (in April 2000) theCFSP chapter.

Estonia is prepared and able to participatefully in CFSP. The country has no territorial dis-putes with its neighbours, though a bordertreaty with Russia (agreed upon in 1999) is stillawaiting ratification by the Russian Duma.Nevertheless, the border has been demarcatedand Russian and Estonian border guards coope-rate smoothly. Estonia supports the non-proli-feration of nuclear, biological and chemical wea-pons and is a party to the relevant internationalagreements prohibiting such weapons.

Right from the start of the political dialogueon CFSP, Estonia has adopted practically all EUcommon positions and démarches. The few rarecases in which Estonia has not adopted CFSPcommon positions have arisen when the EU andUnited States have held conflicting positions,e.g. on Middle East issues, where Estonia has nowell-defined interest. In some of these casesEstonia has preferred not to jeopardise its goodrelations with the United States. However, as thedate of accession has drawn nearer, Estonia hasconsistently aligned itself with all EU commonpositions, even when these have been at oddswith the US position. A notable recent exampleis that of the proposed International CriminalCourt. Estonia has also participated in severalEU joint actions, inter alia enforcing sanctionsagainst Yugoslavia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesiaand Burma.

II. Estonia and ESDP

The launch of ESDP did not receive much noticein Estonia. The initiative was met with scepti-cism as to whether it will ever succeed in trans-forming itself from an idea on paper into a rea-lity. Estonians have also been concerned that

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some EU member states, such as Germany,might seek to offer ESDP to the Baltic States as asubstitute for NATO membership. Since ESDPdoes not provide collective security, theEstonian government believes that it falls shortof Estonian security requirements. Opinionpolls have consistently shown that a muchhigher number of Estonians support NATOmembership than EU accession. This is largelyexplained by their desire for security, somethingEstonians have never enjoyed in their history.The ‘hard’ security guarantees offered by NATOare much more attractive (and easier for thepublic to grasp) than the ‘soft’ ones provided bythe EU. This said, adding a security and defenceelement to the EU can only be seen as a positivedevelopment from the Estonian perspective.Therefore, the further development of ESDP isperceived by Estonians as providing added valueto EU membership, though not as an alternativeto NATO membership.

Estonians are interested in preserving astrong transatlantic link between the UnitedStates and its European allies. Tallinn does notsupport pointless duplications of NATO andEU struc-tures that could create tension bet-ween the two organisations. More generally,Estonians would welcome any initiative thatimproved the ability of Europeans to effectivelyintervene in resolving international crises in theproximity of EU borders.

As a future EU member state, Estonia hassought from the beginning to be informed andconsulted to the highest possible degree on thedevelopment of ESDP. Tallinn has generallybeen happy with the 15+15 format for EU candi-date countries and non-EU NATO memberstates to be consulted on EU-led operations.

The Estonian government has been particu-larly interested in developing European capabi-lities not only for military but also for civiliancrisis management. In the post-Cold War envi-ronment, responding to crises should be multi-faceted and aim at a maximum of coordinationand coherence between military and civilianapproaches and instruments. Estonia has beenproactive and constructive on this particularaspect of ESDP, whose priorities and instru-ments still appear to be in the process of being

formed. Tallinn has tried, for instance, to drawmore attention to non-conventional securityrisks, against which reacting with both militaryand non-military means might prove necessary:that could apply to ecological or technologicaldisasters, with their social and political implica-tions, such as uncontrolled migration flows.Estonia is also interested in the civilian side ofcrisis management because there exists lessinternational experience of cooperation and,therefore, the contribution by a small state likeEstonia could have a bigger impact.

III. Estonia and military crisismanagementFor the fulfilment of the Headline Goal-plus,Estonia has pledged one light infantry battalion(available in 2005), one military police unit, onemine-clearance platoon, and two naval vessels.These same forces have been made available toNATO in the framework of the Partnership forPeace programme. They will therefore be putunder European command if they are notalready involved in other peacekeeping opera-tions led by the UN or NATO. At present there isone Estonian infantry company active in theSFOR in Bosnia, one military police unit inKFOR in Kosovo, and one military observer inthe Middle East with UNTSO. Estonian borderguards participated in the WEU MultinationalAdvisory Police Element in Albania (MAPE) andare still involved in the OSCE border observa-tion mission in Georgia. Additionally, Estonianpolice officers are participating in the UN-ledmission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

For Estonians, participation in internationalpeacekeeping operations has been and conti-nues to be a source of prestige. It is also worthnoting that, proportionately to the overall sizeof its armed forces, Estonia is one of the leadingproviders of peacekeepers in the world. It is alsoan important way of showing that Estonia is notsimply a demandeur or consumer but also a pro-vider of security – as an active contributor whe-never possible.

Estonia

IV. Estonia and defenceprocurementEstonia does not have an arms industry of itsown and, therefore, does not have a well-articu-lated position on the development of a morecoordinated European defence procurementpolicy. That said, Estonia welcomes any effortsin this direction. Estonia is not a member of anyframework, although it interacts with WEAGthrough the WEU Associate Partners pro-gramme. So far, there have been no cases ofconflict between political and industrial inter-ests or between European and American sup-pliers. No problems are foreseen in this areaeither, at least in the short term.

In line with the criteria for NATO member-ship, Estonia has increased its defence spendingfrom 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8 per centin 2001. With the 2002 budget it will meet thetarget of 2 per cent. In 2001 defence investmentswere directed primarily towards the develop-ment of air surveillance capabilities and furtherimprovement of the infrastructure, and themain focus of investments until 2003 willremain on construction and improvement ofinfrastructure. After that, the share of construc-tion will decrease and the share of procurementincrease. And, since Estonia is keen on participa-ting in international peace support operations,a significant share of current expenditure ondefence is allocated for this purpose.

Two main elements characterise Estoniandefence procurement: ◗ used equipment that has been made redun-dant by European and other countries; ◗acquisition of modern equipment that is usedin NATO member states or corresponds toNATO standards.

The policy adopted by Tallinn in this domainis that new equipment will be purchased if itrelies on up-to-date information technology(such as air surveillance systems, anti-aircraftand anti-tank defences). By contrast, Estoniawill settle for donations of less sophisticated

used equipment such as armoured vehicles,artillery pieces, land transport vehicles, and soon.

V. Estonia and Europeansecurity policyAs Foreign Minister Toomas-Hendrik Ilves hasstated, ‘EU membership will alter the scope ofEstonian foreign policy. Our perspective oninternational events will change, our policy willbecome more global. I believe that full participa-tion in the Common Foreign and Security Policyof the EU will make our national foreign policystronger.’1

In other words, Estonia will have a policy forthose parts of world – Africa, Asia, SouthAmerica – for which it does not presently. The(sad) fact is that Estonia will never be able tobuild up such an extensive network of foreignrepresentations as those that some bigger EUcountries have at their disposal. Here CFSPoffers a valuable opportunity for cooperation inthird countries and for common diplomatic andconsular protection.

It is somewhat premature to speculate on thepossible changes and adaptations to the TEU(with respect to CFSP/ESDP) that Estoniamight endorse or oppose in the 2004 treatyreview. The Estonian vision of how it wouldbehave as a member state is still being workedout and, honestly, all energies seem currently tobe spent on clearing the final hurdles beforeaccession and getting the support of the majo-rity of the Estonians.

What can be said at this stage is that, inTallinn’s view, CFSP/ESDP should be effectiveand credible; that it should remain an intergo-vernmental issue rather than a supranationalone; and that, whereas Estonia is not againstenhanced cooperation per se, qualified majorityvoting should not be used to outvote smallercountries.

1 ‘Enlargement and Estonia’s identity on the international stage’, remarks by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs,at the International Conference ‘Estonia and the European Union’, National Library, Tallinn, 5 November 1999.

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Andres Kasekamp

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VI. Estonia and enlargement after 11 September As mentioned above, Estonia had already drawnthe attention of EU partners to the importanceof being able to tackle non-conventional risks aswell as conventional ones. In the wake of the ter-rorist attacks against the United States, theurgency of building adequate and coherent EUcivilian crisis-management capabilities hasincreased enormously.

Like the EU, Estonia immediately showedsolidarity with the United States. However,Estonians were initially worried that theAmerican focus on Afghanistan might havenegative implications for their goal of joiningNATO. Specifically, there was concern thatRussia’s willingness to cooperate with theUnited States might come at a price – exclusionof the Baltic States from the forthcoming waveof NATO enlargement - and that the Bush admi-nistration would basically put the issue on theback burner. Luckily, all these fears have provedunfounded. President Putin’s speech in Brusselson 3 October, indicating new flexibility on theissue of NATO’s expansion to the Baltic region,marked an important turning point in thedebate.

Russia has signalled its willingness to forge acloser relationship with the West, and withNATO in particular. In this context, Russiamight also in future be interested in participa-ting in EU-led crisis-management operations interms of both military and civilian crisis mana-gement. Thus, Estonia and Russia could in thefuture find themselves part of the same process,which will help the former overcome some oldfears and test its security cooperation in prac-tice. If so, paradoxically, Estonia’s participationin ESDP might also improve Estonian-Russianbilateral relations.

As it now appears that both enlargements(EU and NATO) will turn out to be bigger thanexpected before 11 September, the jockeying forposition and the latent rivalry among the BalticStates has faded away. In fact, while Estonia wasthe first to be invited to start negotiations withthe EU, Lithuania was often tipped as having abetter chance to join NATO first. Both countrieshad tried to shed their ‘Baltic’ identity in theirpublic relations exercises, with Estonia takingup a Nordic one, Lithuania a Central Europeanone, and Latvia left alone in the middle.Fortunately, the likely simultaneous accessionof all three Baltic States to both the EU andNATO allows the harmony of the Baltic trio tobe restored.

Estonia

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Latvia Atis Lejins

I. Latvia and CFSP

Latvia closed Chapters 26 and 27 of the EUacquis very quickly after it began accessionnegotiations on 15 February, 2000. In fact,Latvia was ready to adopt EU policy without anyrequests for derogation or transitional periods.The 2001 regular Report on the candidate coun-tries by the European Commission stated that‘Latvia has continued to align its foreign policywith that of the EU and has participatedconstructively in the framework of the CFSP.’

With regard to Chapter 26 (ExternalRelations), Latvia became a full member of theWTO in February 1999 and has complied or isharmonising its legislation with that of the EUin this body as well as in the UN, especially withrespect to sanctions. There was one specificdemand in the original negotiating positionadopted by Latvia, i.e. a transitional period forthe Baltic Free Trade Agreement (whichincludes agricultural goods) if Latvia joined theEU before Estonia and Lithuania. The transitio-nal period would continue until all three BalticStates had become EU members. However, thedemand was eventually dropped and the chap-ter signed because first Estonia and thenLithuania distanced themselves from theLatvian position. In any event, at the end of 2001all three Baltic States had closed more or less thesame number of chapters, and it appeared verylikely that they would join the EU at the sametime.

Nor did Latvia request transitional periodsfor Chapter 27 (CFSP), since there were no obs-tacles with regard to national legislation. Borderagreements have been concluded with Estonia,Lithuania (they have been signed by Lithuaniabut not yet ratified by Latvia), and Belarus.

Demarcation of land borders has been comple-ted (except with Belarus, where only the Latvianside has done so). After Riga acquiesced toRussian demands in the dispute with Moscowover portions of territory taken from SovietLatvia at the end of 1944 (which became anadministrative part of Russia during the Sovietera), Latvia and Russia accordingly finalised theborder agreement in 1997. Latvia, however, isstill waiting for Russia’s final approval: Moscowhas accepted the agreement, in fact, but still notsigned it. The Russian position can be explainedas an attempt to influence Latvia’s admission toNATO.

II. Latvia and ESDP

Latvia’s position is that there is no alternative toNATO, which is a collective defence organisa-tion and plays an uncontested leadership role incrisis management. ESDP applies only to the so-called Petersberg tasks. Along with Estonia andLithuania, Latvia has a working agreement withthe United States, known as the USA-Balticcharter, which includes political, military, andeconomic cooperation. Latvia supports harmo-nious NATO-EU relations and opposes creatingparallel and competing military structures.Furthermore, the units Latvia will contribute tomeet the Headline Goal in 2003 (Catalogue ofForces) are the same ones that it has pledged forNATO operations.

The relevant Latvian ministers have partici-pated in all the EU and candidate states’ (15+15)joint meetings of defence and foreign ministerssince November 2000. Similarly, the Latvianminister of the interior is regularly involved inthe collegial meetings of the same format.

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III. Latvia and military crisismanagement Latvia has been active in supporting NATO-ledpeacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzego-vina and Kosovo. With a population of less than2.5 million it has provided peacekeepers forIFOR/SFOR almost from the outset, first pla-toon and then company-sized contributions(now attached to the Danish Battalion). Thecompanies are part of BALTBAT (the BalticBattalion) and serve on a rotational basis of sixmonths. In addition, Latvia sent six observers aspart of the Kosovo Verification Mission, andhumanitarian aid was sent to refugee camps inMacedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during theKosovo air campaign. From 1999 Latvia beganparticipating in KFOR, with an army medicalliaison team stationed in Albania, including twospecially equipped trucks attached to theBelgian contingent. Since 2000, a Latvian repre-sentative has worked in the OSCE mission inKosovo and army medical and military policeunits have participated in KFOR operationswith the British brigade. Latvian units are cur-rently involved in the Operation Joint Guardian,and Riga has sent soldiers as observers to Skopjefor border observation.

In addition to OSCE observer missions inBosnia-Herzegovina, Latvia has also contribu-ted to similar OSCE efforts in the northernCaucasus, and the OSCE border monitoringoperations in Georgia. Latvia has also participa-ted in the WEU-led MAPE mission in Albania.

As for the Headline Goal, the Latvian contri-bution to the European Rapid Reaction Forcewill consist of a battalion to serve on a rotationalbasis for periods up to six months, an explosiveordnance disposal unit, a MP unit, a field medi-cal unit, two minesweepers from BALTRON(Baltic squadron), and a fast patrol boat.According to Latvian officials, any futureincrease in the country’s contribution to theHelsinki Headline Goal-plus will have to be qua-litative in the first instance.

By virtue of its close military cooperationwith Estonia and Lithuania in joint militaryunits such as BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET(Baltic air surveillance system) and BALTDEF-

COL (the Baltic Defence College for the trainingof senior officers) – a cooperation that datesback to the mid-1990s – Latvia appears to be wellsuited to participation in multina-tional forma-tions.

IV. Latvia and defenceprocurement After the restoration of independence in 1991,Latvia had to start from scratch in setting upautonomous armed forces. No national unitsexisted during the Soviet occupation. Latvia wastherefore highly dependent on foreign militaryaid and training. So far the Latvian army hasbeen equipped mainly by Sweden, the aim beingto have four operational infantry battalionsoperational in the medium term. Military pur-chases have remained on a very modest scale(mostly ammunition), and several refurbishedSoviet-built helicopters for search and rescuemissions have been bought from Lithuania.Used minesweepers and patrol boats have beendonated by the Nordic countries and Germany.

Latvia does not plan to purchase fighter air-craft but next year, in a joint purchase bid withEstonia, it will make its first major militaryacquisition of modern radar equipment fromLockheed Martin in order to upgrade its contri-bution to the existing BALTNET. In fact, a wellfunctioning air surveillance system covering theBaltic States and which will eventually beconnected to NATO’s European civil and mili-tary air control system will significantlyenhance air safety in Europe.

V. Latvia and European security policyLatvia’s record and policy, as described above,clearly show that Latvia is consistent with fur-thering stability and security in Europe. Latvia’sfull membership of the EU and NATO will fur-ther enhance the consolidation of the European‘security space’. Latvia’s Parliament has alwaysstrongly supported the country’s participationin NATO-led peacekeeping operations. It has

Latvia

backed every request from the government tosend Latvian troops and observers to crisis areas.There is no reason to think that this mightchange if and when the EU calls upon Latvia toparticipate in ‘Petersberg’ operations. This doesnot mean that, as a future member of the Union,Latvia may not avail itself of the constructiveabstention clause with respect to e.g. Belarus, aneighbouring country with which Latvia (likeLithuania and Poland) has to cooperate closelyin guarding the border against illegal immigra-tion and cross-border crime.

Latvia may have an advantage in peacekee-ping in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as it hasnever been aggressive towards its neighboursand it has used peaceful means even to regainindependence. In addition, today it is able toboast a successful transition from communismto democracy, with a functioning market eco-nomy and fast economic growth.

VI. Latvia and enlargement after 11 SeptemberIn response to the 11 September attacks on theUnited States, Latvia immediately started wor-king on an Action Plan to combat internationalterrorism at the highest level that was adoptedby the Government on 16 October.

The attack has not slowed down NATOenlargement. Latvia feels that, along with

Estonia and Lithuania, it may be invited to joinNATO at the Prague summit in November 2002.Only a week before the terrorist attack, duringhis visit to Helsinki on 2 September, RussianPresident Vladimir Putin acknowledged thatjoining NATO was the Baltic States’ own choice.After 11 September, however, there was appre-hension in Riga that, through the new upgradedNATO-Russia Council, Moscow might get somesort of veto in NATO, which could adverselyaffect Latvia’s security interests. This ‘newthreat’ was allayed when the decision on the newCouncil was deferred until next May inReykjavik and it became clear that NATO wouldnot relinquish control over its policy. Latvia’sposition has always been that membership ofNATO and the EU will increase its prospects ofimproving relations with Russia. The meetingbetween the Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiburga and Putin at Innsburg, in February2001, was an attempt on the part of Latvia toestablish a direct dialogue with Russia at thehighest level.

Having closed 23 chapters in its accessionnegotiations with the EU at the end of 2001, andafter obtaining several key transitional periodsand derogation, Latvia feels confident that itwill be able to close all chapters by the end of2002 and to be in the first group of candidates tojoin the EU in 2004 – which is probably alsowhen it may officially become a member ofNATO.

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Atis Lejins

4

Lithuania Gediminas Vitkus

I. Lithuania and CFSP

Even before the beginning of the official EUaccession negotiations in February 2000,Lithuania was already an active participant inthe multilateral political dialogue with the EUin the field of CFSP. With respect to EU state-ments and declarations, Lithuania has regularlyaligned its positions with those of the Unionwhen requested to do so. According to theEuropean Integration Department of theLithuanian MFA, until 2001 Lithuania aligneditself with 611 EU statements, démarches andcommon positions through the Council’sSecretariat in Brussels as well as in the frame-work of the United Nations (its agencies inclu-ded) and of the OSCE. Only in 10 cases didLithuania decide not to do so, and most of thoseconcern the group of EU statements concerningthe OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia andreferring to the status of Russian minorities. Onthat Vilnius had different positions from theEU,1 but the issue is unlikely now to influenceLithuania’s foreseeable behaviour on CFSP afteraccession.

Lithuania and the EU provisionally closedChapter 27 (CFSP) almost at the beginning ofthe negotiations, namely on 25 May 2000. Thereason for that was that in the original negotia-ting position on the CFSP chapter Vilnius hadnot requested any transitional periods or dero-gation. Special attention was given only to thelinks between Chapter 27 and other chapters,especially those encompassing restrictive mea-sures and sanctions: yet no problems have arisenin the implementation of so-called negativemeasures either. After signing the Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel

Mines and on their Destruction (i.e. the OttawaConvention) in 1999, Lithuania conformed tothe CFSP acquis in that domain. Vilnius alsoaccepted the obligation to implement the CFSPacquis in the field of diplomatic and consularprotection, and will be ready to provide assis-tance to all EU citizens from the date of acces-sion. The necessary administrative decision-making and implementation structures –including the positions of Political Director andEuropean Correspondent – are in place. Thesecure communication system between theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat-General of the EU Council is also in operation.Negotiations on Chapter 26 (ExternalRelations) started in May 2000. The main pointsat issue were two transitional periods requestedby Vilnius:◗ a transitional period for the Free TradeAgreement between the Republics of Lithuania,Latvia and Estonia on agricultural products.Such transitional period was required if any ofthe signatories became an EU member later thanthe others, which would establish a trade regimewith that country different from that of the FTA; ◗ a five-year transitional period for the FreeTrade Agreement between Lithuania andUkraine in order to preserve the preferentialtrade regime. On 5 October 2000, however, Lithuania – aftertaking into consideration the remarks made inthe relevant EU Common Position, Estonia’sdecision to denounce the agreement between thethree Baltic States from the date of accession,and changes in the EU policy vis-à-vis Ukraine –withdrew its request for transitional measures.As a result, negotiations on Chapter 26 wereprovisionally closed on the following 24October.

1 Interview with Tomas Gulbinas, Counsellor of the Department of Multilateral Relations of the Lithuanian MFA on 10 January, 2002.

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II. Lithuania and ESDP

Since the launch of ESDP in 1998/99, theLithuanian position underwent a certain evolu-tion, notably from reserved support to a fairlyexplicit positive attitude. Of course, no doubtwas ever expressed officially by Lithuanianrepresentatives: the authorities always stressedthat they were following the development of theESDP with great attention and that they accep-ted it as a logical follow-up to the deepening ofeconomic and political integration. At the15+15 meeting of foreign and defence ministersin May 2001, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister,Antanas Valionis, diplomatically stated that ‘theresults achieved in ESDP make us sure that wewill join a European Union capable of success-fully handling crisis management operations ofdifferent nature.’2

At the same time, however, it was possible todetect a certain amount of ‘unofficial’ mistrustand a lukewarm attitude, generated in part bythe still relatively undefined nature of the wholeinitiative. Some confusion emerged, too, whendisagreement came to the fore betweenEuropean leaders and the new US administra-tion led by George W. Bush during 2001, fuellingfears that ESDP might one day undermine theexisting European security architecture basedon transatlantic cooperation, NATO and the USpresence in Europe. The speculative assumptionthat the further development of the ESDPmight mean the Americans leaving Europe andRussia having more influence was probably themain factor that created a rather ambivalentattitude towards the initiative. For instance, thegovernment programme for 2001-04 found itnecessary to maintain quite firmly thatLithuania’s participation in the structures ofCFSP and ESDP should proceed ‘with full awa-reness that the strengthening of ESDP and theestablishment of European crisis managementforces will contribute to the reinforcement of

transatlantic relations, which represent thebasis of European security.’3

After 11 September doubts and ambivalenceseem to have disappeared. According to theLithuanian Minister of National Defence, LinasLinkevicius, ‘the year 2001 with its dramatic andtragic events once again proved to all of us thatEurope must be able to cope with the varioustypes of threats on our continent and all over theworld . . . This also proved that the developmentof a European Security and Defence Policy hasto have an inclusive character. We view this deve-lopment as reinforcing the transatlantic part-nership and we urge the EU to use already exis-ting NATO planning mechanisms. We note, inparticular, that the implementation of theHeadline Goal does not mean creation of a mili-tary structure duplicating, or competing with,that of NATO.’4

III. Lithuania and military crisis managementAt the EU Capabilities Commitment Confe-rence on 21 November 2000, Lithuania declaredstrong and clear support for the Headline Goaland announced its ‘voluntary contribution’ tothe pool of EU forces. Vilnius offered threemotorised battalions, two naval vessels, onehelicopter and two military cargo aircraft, alongwith small engineer and military medical sup-port units. Two of the three motorised batta-lions are already participating in multinatio-nal/subregional units as the Lithuaniancomponents of the joint battalion for interna-tional peacekeeping (BALTBAT) and of theLithuanian-Polish battalion (LITPOLBAT), for-med for joint training, exercises and future par-ticipation in international peace support opera-tions. In addition, Vilnius offered to the EU –with immediate effect – use of two of its nationaltraining areas. In the spring of 2001, during bila-

2 Speech of the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Antanas Valionis at the EU+15 Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers Meeting,Brussels, 15 May 2001. 3 Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for 2001-2004. Available online:http://www.urm.lt/data/2/EF8475732_vyriaus-e.htm, 11 January 2002.4 Intervention by the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Linas Linkevicius at the EU Capabilities Improvement Conference, Brussels,20 November 2001.

15

Gediminas Vitkus

5 Information obtained from the Public Relations Office of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. 6 Law on Public Procurement of the Republic of Lithuania (No.VIII-1210, 3 June 1999). Available online:http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=32534&Condition2= , 11 January 2002.

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teral talks with the EU, the Lithuanian expertschanged the category of naval vessels declaredfor the EU pool of forces from Grisha III type fri-gate to Lindau class minehunters. Finally, at theCapabilities Improvement Conference in thefollowing November, Lithuania offered oneadditional helicopter.

If asked to contribute individually to NATOor EU-led peace operations, Lithuania wouldconsider deployment of one company-sizeinfantry unit for short-term deployment (6months), or one platoon-size infantry unit forlong-term deployment (12 months), or onecombat engineer platoon, or one medical sec-tion as a land component (readiness category:30 days), or one aircraft (14 days), or helicopters(30 days) as an air asset, or one naval asset (14days) from the Lithuanian list. The fact is thatthe contribution can come from one service onlyat any one given time. Finally, like many othercountries, Lithuania has made available to theEU the same operational assets that had alreadybeen identified within the PfP Planning andReview Process.

The units in question have already beenwidely involved in current peace support opera-tions. Elements of the Lithuanian component ofBALTBAT (41 personnel from 20 October 1998to 15 March 1999; 147 from 15 March 1999 to13 October 1999; 19 from 13 October 1999 to20 March 2000) participated in NATO’s SFORoperation in Bosnia within the DanishBattalion/ Nordic–Polish Brigade. Elements ofthe Lithuanian component of LITPOLBAT(30 personnel from March 2001 to March 2002,on a six-month rotation basis) are still participa-ting in NATO–led KFOR operation within thePolish Battalion. The military medical team of10 persons (including doctors, paramedics, dri-vers and an interpreter) participated in theNATO–led humanitarian aid Operation AlliedHarbour in Albania, from March to September1999, within the Czech Military Hospital.Finally, the Lithuanian Air Force Aircraft An-26,with seven crew and maintenance personnel, is

supporting KFOR/SFOR tasks (April 2001-February 2002).5

IV. Lithuania and defenceprocurement In general, as a future EU member, Lithuania isinterested in supporting a common Europeandefence procurement policy and in contributingto joint acquisition procedures. For themoment, however, Lithuania is not a member ofWEAO or WEAG, much as it would like to joinsuch programmes as Euclid, Thales, andSocrates as soon as possible. Currently, the mainLithuanian centres for research and technolo-gies participate in NATO’s Science for PeaceProgramme, NIAG, and CNAD, as well as theEU’s Framework, Eureka, Esprit, Peco andCopernicus projects and the Tempus,Copernicus, and Cost programmes.The key priorities for the modernisation ofLithuania’s armed forces are reflected in the sixmain procurement plans for the period 2001-04.The plan foresees procurement of:◗short-range air defence systems; ◗ medium-range anti-tank systems; ◗tactical communications equipment; ◗transport and ◗ logistical support for the Readiness Brigadeand, finally, ◗ medium-range radar for the airspace surveill-ance system.

As a rule, the Lithuanian National DefenceSystem provides centralised procurement. Theacquisition policy of the Lithuanian armedforces is based on the criteria of transparencyand competition, as described in the 1999 law onpublic procurement.6 It requires open interna-tional tenders and competition for goods andservices when certain price thresholds are excee-ded. This approach foresees detailed proceduresand penalties, while outlining long-term deve-lopment plans and costs evaluation for the pro-curement of weapons systems and equipment.

Lithuania

In order to manage defence resources andreorganise defence research and support tech-nologies, the Ministry of National Defence pre-pared a 2001-03 R&D programme. Over 13Lithuanian enterprises have produced equip-ment for the Lithuanian armed forces as well.Still in 2001 the Ministry of National Defence,which is allowed to spend 22 per cent of thedefence budget on procurement, negotiated twomajor purchases from European and Americansuppliers:◗ On 7 December, the National DefenceMinistry signed a contract with EADS concer-ning the purchase and delivery of a Medium-Range Radar System. The total value of the con-tract is LTL75.1 million (= $US18,775 million).Between the end of 2002 and the beginning of2004, therefore, Vilnius will receive mobile radarsystems that will help identify and monitor seaand air movements, and to analyse and processthe relevant data.◗ On 17 December, a bilateral agreement bet-ween Lithuania and the United States concer-ning the procurement of a modern MediumRange Anti-Tank weapon system was signedtoo. The Javelin system to be acquired by theLithuanian Armed Forces is being procured at acost of LTL38.5 million (= $9,625 million).7 TheJavelin system may be used for firing purposesfrom a vehicle or by a rifleman. It may also beused in built areas and is therefore a weapon sys-tem that is ideal for urban combat conditions.

So far therefore – and partially also thanks tosuch a well-balanced policy – cases of openconflict between political and industrial inter-est, on the one hand, or between European andAmerican suppliers, on the other, have notoccurred.

V. Lithuania and Europeansecurity policyLithuania’s ‘geohistorical’ experience explainsthe special importance that security and defenceissues have for the country. The famous

Lithuanian geographer Kazys Pakstas (1893-1960) noted once that ‘Switzerland could becharacterised as a country of high mountains,Italy is famous as a country of fine arts, and eve-rybody knows Finland as a country of lakes – butthe most exclusive feature of Lithuania is thefact that this country lies in an extremely unsafeplace for a small nation.’ Therefore, since thewithdrawal of Soviet troops in the summer of1993, Vilnius has been working systematicallyto make sure that the nightmare of 1940 is neverrepeated. Lithuania is working very hard to pre-pare itself adequately for NATO and EU mem-bership, and to become part of the West and arespectable member of the international com-munity.

From the Lithuanian point of view, any ini-tiative that could strengthen the Union’s secu-rity and its defence capabilities is generally wel-come. As a future EU member, Lithuania wouldnot see any political problem in sharing collec-tive defence obligations with its partners. Ofcourse, as European security policy is primarilyaimed at ‘Petersberg’-type operations, Vilniuswill continue to strive for NATO membership.New opportunities for cooperation that mightopen up within ESDP, however, are equallyessential. The Union’s ambition to become amore substantial and more visible actor on theworld stage is also welcome. It is obvious that thevoice of small countries like Lithuania will havea different echo if they are part and parcel ofCFSP. This is particularly true for relations withRussia. In fact, Russia has always been a difficultpartner for everyone in Central and EasternEurope; it will be much easier to do businesswith Moscow as part of a large and influentialEuropean family rather then on a bilateral basis.

Finally, the most recent development in theofficial Lithuanian position on the future of theEU was reflected in the address by ForeignMinister Valionis to the Seimas (Parliament) onLithuania’s EU membership negotiations, on19 December 2001. On that occasion, he presen-ted the main principles that, in his opinion,Lithuania should stick to in the forthcoming

7 More important events for Lithuanian National Defence in 2001. Available online: http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat=ekstra&sub=001,11 January 2002.

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Gediminas Vitkus

8 Address by Antanas Valionis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Discussion in the Seimas about Lithuania’s EU MembershipNegotiations on 19 December 2001, Vilnius. Available online:http://www.euro.lt/showitems.php?TopMenuID=41&MenuItemID=58&ItemID=1287&LangID=2, 11 January 2002.9 Newsfile Lithuania, 17-23 September 2001, Information and Culture Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Issue 33 (674). Availableonline: http://www.urm.lt/data/15/EF82614650_nf674.html, 23 01 2002.

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debates:◗first, without a successful enlargement therecould be no successful future for the EU;◗second, the development of the EU should evo-lutionary, not revolutionary; ◗therefore, the reform of EU institutions shouldbe gradual. Further development of the ‘com-munity’ method is in Lithuania’s interest, as itlays down equal rules for all partners. Strong ins-titutions guarantee a better protection of theinterests of smaller states; ◗fourth, the present provisions on closer coope-ration are sufficient. Closer cooperation mustbe an instrument for integration and not forexclusion or isolation; ◗finally, the principle of solidarity should alsobe maintained within the enlarged EU. Forexample, there should not be different regionalpolicies, one for current and another for newmembers. We have to be very careful in assessingany proposal to ‘re-nationalisate’ existing com-mon policies.8

VI. Lithuania and enlargement after 11 SeptemberLithuanian President Valdas Adamkus was aneyewitness of those terrible events. On11 September, he was on a state visit to theUnited States and meeting with US officials inWashington when the Pentagon was attacked.Of course, all that has sharpened the Lithuanianpublic’s general feeling that the world hasbecome less safe now. However, 11 Septemberalso triggered speculation that the terroristattack may eventually generate positive scena-rios for the enlargement of both NATO and theEU. To a certain extent, such speculation hasalso affected Lithuanian public opinion. A poll

conducted in September showed that 36.6 percent of respondents believed that the terroristactions in the United States would hastenLithuania’s entry into NATO. Another 27.1 percent thought Lithuanian NATO membershipwould be postponed for the same reason, whileonly 19.9 per cent were convinced that currentevents would play no role (and 16.4 per centdeclined to answer).9

This rather pessimistic opinion can be explai-ned by at least two factors. First of all, the terro-rist attack has created a paradoxical situationfor it has shown that small countries with ratherlimited capabilities (like Lithuania) are a relati-vely safer place than the United States. Secondly,since 11 September clear signs of a newAmerican/Western rapprochement with Russiahave emerged. Much as the rapprochement perse is a positive development, nobody in theBaltic States wants to go back Yalta-type arran-gements, with the West and Russia speakingover the heads of the Central Europeans. Thesefears have never spread too wide though, whilethe percentage of Lithuanians in favour of joi-ning NATO has risen to 63.1 per cent (inMay 2001 it was 45.5).

As seen from Vilnius, the dynamics of enlar-gement – of both the EU and NATO – appears tohave become faster, bigger and more coordina-ted than ever before. 11 September has also – inthe light of the supportive reaction of EU mem-bers – done away with doubts and ambivalenceabout the (non)inclusive nature of ESDP. Ontop of that, when the Lithuanian President wentback to Washington in January 2002 to com-plete the visit abruptly interrupted on11 September, the US President not only encou-raged Lithuania to continue the reforms neces-sary for NATO membership, but also referred toLithuania as the leading candidate country.

Lithuania

5

Poland Rafal Trzaskowski

I. Poland and CFSP

Poland was included in the first wave of candi-date countries (the so-called Luxembourggroup), which started accession negotiationswith the EU on 31 March 1998. In its negotia-ting position, Poland did not request any transi-tional periods or derogation in either CFSP orthe external relations chapter, declaring that itwould be ready to implement the acquis in bothareas on the day of accession. Since neither ofthe chapters proved to be controversial in thePolish case, both of them were already provisio-nally closed – external relations in November1999 and CFSP in April 2000.1

Regarding external relations, the Polishgovernment pledged that it would renounce alltreaties as well as bilateral and multilateralagreements to the extent necessary to removeany possible differences with the acquis. ThePolish negotiators informed the EU that thecountry was ready to assume all preferentialEuropean Community trade commitments.Warsaw made it clear from the outset that itwanted to maintain and foster economic rela-tions with its important partners from outsidethe Union (especially with CEFTA and ex-Sovietcountries). However, it was ready to do so only ina way that would not contradict the EU’s tradepolicy. Poland also declared that it would be pre-pared to coordinate its actions and positionswith the European Union in WTO and OECD inthe pre-accession period, including the adop-tion of common positions vis-à-vis third coun-tries.

Regarding CFSP, Poland has declared its fullsupport for the EU’s political goals. Eventhough Warsaw may prioritise its interests in a

different way, Polish foreign policy diverges veryrarely, if ever, from the position of the Union.Poland regularly aligns its standpoint with themost important démarches of the Union, and italso supports many of its crucial common posi-tions. The reasons for the occasional non-align-ment are in many cases commonplace. There isno official, uniform and unambiguous set of cri-teria on the basis of which the AssociatedCountries are invited to join the CFSP declara-tions. Sometimes such invitation is issued,sometimes it is not, and quite often the decisionto ask the Associated Countries to support theEU seems to be completely arbitrary. It can hap-pen that the deadline for alignment is set withinhours, putting too much strain on the Polishdecision-making structures. In most of theother cases, the reasons for divergence are of apurely legal or technical nature. For example, inApril 1999 Poland did not join the EU declara-tion on land mines because it had not ratifiedthe Ottawa Convention on the issue. The Polishgovernment also has problems with meetingshort deadlines that the EU sets for aligningwith the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions canbe implemented by EU member states directlyand almost immediately through the relevantEU regulations. In Poland, by contrast, suchsanctions do not automatically form part ofPolish law: they are implemented through reso-lutions of the Council of Ministers (or evenadministrative decisions), and that takes consi-derable time. Moreover, in certain cases, thegovernment cannot impose given measures thatnecessitate a modification of Polish law. Suchchanges can be introduced only by theParliament.

19

1 The CFSP chapter was concluded with a certain delay due to internal EU problems (Cyprus).

2 Strategia Bezpieczenstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (adopted by the Government on 4 January 2000), MOD website –www.mon.gov.pl/bezpiezcenstwo/1_1_1.htlm.

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Very rarely has the non-alignment to CFSPresulted from political reasons. A case in pointwas the crisis with Belarus (in 1998 EU diplo-mats were asked to leave their embassies there),when Poland did not support the EU declara-tion because, as the current chair of OSCE, it didnot want to alienate the Belarussian govern-ment. Poland only abstained, however, afterconsultation with the EU.

II. Poland and ESDP

Poland supports the development of ESDP.According to the official Polish Security Strat-egy,2 the future participation in EU securitystructures will be as important for Poland as itsmembership of NATO. It is very important tonote, however, that the Polish position on ESDPhas undergone considerable evolution. At thebeginning it was characterised by mistrust fuel-led by fears that ESDP could in the future under-mine NATO, which, for the majority of Poles, isseen as the only force able to guarantee securityon the European continent. Moreover, the Poleswere afraid that if Europeans chose to neglectUS positions, this could simultaneously allowRussia to gain more influence over Europeansecurity, which was anathema to Polish deci-sion-makers in the first half of the 1990s.

Once Europe’s ambitions were clarified, theywere met in Warsaw with much greater under-standing. Ever since, Poland has voiced itsgenuine support for ESDP. However, the Polishattitude towards the whole concept is characte-rised, even today, by a certain ambivalence. ThePolish political élite is still not at all certainwhere the European defence path will actuallylead, and shows a lack of understanding for thefull implications of ESDP, which is quite oftenperceived along the lines of the ESDI concept(where the stress is on strengthening theEuropean pillar of NATO, not on creating anautonomous security entity). It should also bepointed out that, as the Polish political classtends to focus on ‘hard’ security guarantees and

its grasp of the importance of ‘soft’ security mea-sures is limited, so is its interest in a strongEuropean defence capability.

Obviously, as a new member of the AtlanticAlliance, Poland is eager to prove its credentials,but at the same time it does not want to be per-ceived by Europeans as a US Trojan horse.Warsaw would thus back all of the initiativesaimed at strengthening ESDP as long as they donot lead to the creation of a collective defencemechanism and full emancipation from theAlliance. Whenever, in official declarations,Poland voices its acceptance of ESDP, it is alwaysaccompanied by statements declaring that theEU should never strive to substitute for NATO.

The Polish military élite, for its part, is notovertly enthusiastic about ESDP, though not forideological reasons. The Polish military is quiteoften doubtful about Europe’s ability to musterenough political will to develop fully effective,independent operational capabilities. It shouldalso be pointed out that NATO membership hasalready produced certain important ‘socialisa-tion’ effects, whereas Polish officials in both theMOD and MFA still feel quite detached fromactive EU policy-making.

Support for ESDP has not prevented Polandfrom voicing its dissatisfaction with the degreeof involvement offered by the EU. As the MFAdocument concerning Poland’s attitudetowards ESDP puts it, ‘consultation and dia-logue will not substitute cooperation’. Warsawtends to treat institutional issues very seriously,sometimes losing sight of the strategic raisond’être of the whole concept. Poland expectedgreater participation of the non-EU NATOmembers in ESDP decision-making. The gene-ral feeling is that associate status in WEU wasmore satisfactory for Poland than the statusnow proposed in the realm of ESDP. The non-EU NATO members were especially disappoin-ted when the EU decided in Helsinki that, asregards operations not having recourse toNATO assets, their position was to be equal toall the other countries willing to participate inEuropean-led operations. Poland also thought

Poland

that after a decision to embark on a given opera-tion, consultation should be at 15+6 and on anequal footing. At the EU Feira summit, Polandeven submitted its own proposals aimed at grea-ter participation in the ESDP decision-makingand planning through regular and wide-rangingcooperation in the 15+6 format.3 Poland, as afuture EU member, generally expects to have atleast some influence on the definition of thePSC’s agenda, as well as more transparency andopenness in the workings of the new EU securityorgans.

III. Poland and military crisismanagementIn 2000 Poland embarked on a path of radicalrestructuring of its military. The Programme ofRestructuring and Technical Modernisation ofPolish Armed Forces in the years 2001-064

assumes a continuation of the process of scalingdown of the Polish military. Such a reduction isindispensable in order to secure the funds nee-ded to finance the upgrading of a ‘crucial num-ber of military units to an average Europeanstandard’.5 The goal of the Programme is to aimat least at full interoperability of troops dealingwith crisis management, as it would be unrealis-tic to expect the territorial defence units tobecome compatible with NATO in the nearfuture.

At the Capabilities Commitment Conferencein November 2000, Poland declared its contri-bution to the ‘Catalogue of Forces’ exercise andthe EU’s Headline Goal. Warsaw declared that itwould be ready to contribute one frameworkbrigade, one airborne search and rescue group,one navy support group and a section of militarypolice. These forces will be earmarked for parti-cipation in either NATO or EU missions, underthe so-called ‘double-hatted’ formula. Initially,

Poland did not want to specify the exact numberof troops committed, in order to maintain a cer-tain flexibility. Warsaw simply had the ambitionof providing the European Rapid ReactionForce with the biggest contingent from EasternEurope. In May 2001, former Defence MinisterKomorowski declared that for European-ledmissions Poland would probably set aside the21st Brigade of Highland Riflemen, composedof 1,500 to 2,500 soldiers. At the same time,Poland proposed the inclusion of a Ukrainianbattalion (750 men) in the brigade. Tighteningcooperation with its eastern neighbours is oneof the Polish government’s strategic priorities.6More recently, the new Polish government clari-fied what it meant by a ‘framework’ brigade. TheDeputy Defence Minister, Janusz Zemke, decla-red that Poland was ready to commit the 18thRapid Reaction Battalion and the 7th AirCavalry Battalion (a total of 1,300 soldiers) tothe EU Headline Goal.

What are the implications for ESDP of thecharacteristics of the Polish Armed Forces?Financial constraints and strategic considera-tions have created a Polish military that is muchbetter suited to non-Article 5 missions.Therefore, all of the units interoperable withtheir European counterparts will be mostvaluable for the European Rapid ReactionForce. Poland has a solid tradition of peacekee-ping, and its performance has always been veryhighly appreciated by its partners. The peace-keeping experience of Polish troops has beenput to good use in both international andEuropean contexts. So far, when it comes to themissions in former Yugoslavia, Poland hasalways been amongst the staunchest allies of theEuropean States involved, convincing them thatit could always be relied on.

Even though Poland’s attitude towardsESDP is not devoid of doubts and reservations,once Polish troops are engaged, their loyalty

3 ‘Initial Proposals for Practical Development of Feira Decisions Concerning the EU Co-operation with non-EU European Allies’. Polish MFAwebsite – www.msz.gov.pl/english/unia/position_18082k-ang.html.4 Published by the Polish MOD in March 2001, passed as a bill by the Polish Parliament in May 2001.5 The Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006. Polish MODwebsite – www.mon.gov.pl. 6 Europap News Service, 15 May.2000. euro.pap.com.pl.

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Rafal Trzaskowski

7 Poland achieves a roughly comparable level of defence expenditure to its European partners, i.e. close to 2 per cent of GDP. Unfortunately,along with the severe budgetary crisis that Poland is currently undergoing and the radical slow-down of economic growth (to 2 er cent ofGDP) it may be increasingly difficult to keep up with declared commitments. 8 The German Bundeswehr submitted a free offer of Leopard 2 main battle tanks.9 Estimated worth of the procurement is between e2 and 3.5 billion.

22

would be unquestionable. There can be nodoubt about either the commitment or thevalue of the forces that Poland will earmark forEU missions. However, here optimism mustend. Obviously, the biggest problems that thePolish military face are financial in nature.7Poland has problems even in fulfilling theNATO goals, namely providing at least two bri-gades for a single NATO mission. Therefore, itshould not be expected that the country wouldbe ready, and indeed capable, of committingtroops solely for the purposes of Art. 17-typeoperations. Unfortunately, in the future itmight be problematic for Poland to meet the sti-pulated financial ‘convergence criteria’ forESDP.

IV. Poland and defence procurement Without upgrading equipment, which is one ofthe most important priorities of the Pro-gramme for the Restructuring of the PolishMilitary, it will not be possible for Warsaw tomeet even the declared NATO objectives.Equipment is purchased through standardisedpublic procurement procedures that (alongwith other criteria characterising civil-militaryrelations, such as civilian control of the Ministryof Defence, legislative supervision and publiclyknown defence policy) are to prove the democra-tic and fully Westernised character of the Polishmilitary. At least two important tender proce-dures have already taken place: one (in 1999) forhowitzers, and the other resulting in the pur-chase of the Spanish CASA C-295 aircraft in2001, which will provide the Polish military withstrategic medium-lift capability. The tender foran attack helicopter worth around e1 billion –for which initially US Bell Textron, Italy’sAgusta and the Franco-German Eurocoptercompeted – was called off because of lack of fun-

ding. Consequently, a new, much more modesttender procedure was initiated for an upgrade(avionics, communications and missile system)of the Soviet Mi-24 helicopter that is currently inuse in the Polish Air Force. Other tenders, to fol-low in the near future, will be concerned withupgrading T-72 tanks (and maybe obtainingnew tanks)8, new anti-tank missiles and newships (especially corvettes and frigates).

The Polish government is currently facingthe most important tender for a multirole figh-ter (MRF) which is of absolutely fundamentalimportance for the future of the Polish military.Without the modernisation of its Air Force,Poland will not be able to meet the NATO requi-rements to contribute at least two fighter squa-drons to the Alliance Reaction Forces.Moreover, the tender for MRF is perceived as anacid test of Poland’s ability to meet high Westernstandards in the field of public procurement.

There are three contenders in the procure-ment bid for the MRF:9 European consortiumBAE Systems (Swedish Saab/British Aerospace)with the Gripen, American Lockheed Martinwith F-16, and French Dassault with the Mirage2000-5. The bids made by Lockheed and BAESystems are the most serious, and the condi-tions offered by BAE Systems seem to be the bestsuited to the Polish needs. However, it is not atall certain that the MRF will be chosen solely onthe basis of the technical merits of the given pro-posals put forward, since political considera-tions may weigh quite heavily in the final out-come.

On the one hand, Poland wants to prove tothe Americans that it is the most reliable ally; onthe other, it does not want to be regarded by theEuropean as an American proxy. BothAmericans and Europeans have engaged inaggressive lobbying: European politicians haveindirectly hinted at a link between the MRF dealand Poland’s efforts to prove its European cre-dentials – a statement that should not be unde-

Poland

restimated in the context of the accession nego-tiations which are currently under way.However, European lobbying efforts cannot becompared to a full-blown diplomatic campaignlaunched by the Americans, who have even goneas far as to conduct high-level political meetingswith a leading theme ‘F-16 for Poland’.10

It goes without saying that the most impor-tant part of the deal is connected with thefamous ‘offset package’. The so-called OffsetBill, passed by the Polish Parliament inSeptember 1999, clearly states that the equiva-lent of any armaments deal of a value higher thats5 million has to be invested in the Polish eco-nomy, half of it directly in the defence industry.The sum of s2-3 billion (the approximate valueof the MRF contract) would have a significantimpact on the Polish economy. Poland cannotafford to waste its potential and it should makethe best use of the investment.

During the communist era Poland had adynamic defence industry. During the transi-tion, many of the defence industry companieswent bankrupt as the export market progressi-vely shrunk. Most of the others, which still exist,have serious problems in sustaining the pres-sure of the free market, as they are equipped withobsolete machinery. Their only chance of survi-val is heavy investment in infrastructure. Thereare companies in Poland that have potential –such as WSK Rzeszów, which produces jet-engines for Pratt and Whitney, PZL Mielec (theonly factory with the capacity to build new air-craft),11 Mesco (ammunition), and Swidnik,which produces helicopter parts for Agusta andEurocopter. However, they are in great need offoreign investment.

In 2000 Poland became a member of WesternEuropean Armaments Group. This opened upthe possibility for the national defence industryto participate in programmes concerning

research and development in defence techno-logy. However, in reality, practical cooperationin that field is very limited. As a top ForeignMinistry official put it: ‘The process of loweringthe production costs results from the consolida-tion of European defence industries. Today wecan clearly see the formation of a division intoproducers and buyers. A permanent allocationto the group of buyers may hamper our ability tobecome in the future a constructive participantof ESDP.’12 To become an interesting partner inthat field, Poland will need to modernise itsindustry. However, without large investmentthat will be quite difficult. With the strength-ening of the ESDP, European defence industrieswill undergo further consolidation. Europeaninitiatives in the field of defence are expected togo in the direction of joint planning and jointacquisition policy. Therefore, if Poland is to be aserious partner in the European enterprise itmust be fully involved in such initiatives asWEAG. Two conditions have to be met: thePolish industry must be in a position to offersome added value to its partners, and the mem-bers of the EU have to be seriously interested insuch cooperation.

V. Poland and European security policyPoland supports the development of coopera-tion and the deepening of integration in thefield of European security as long and in so far asit does not duplicate NATO. Poland has theambition of being a constructive member of theEU, contributing to the further strengtheningof its foreign and security policies, as these havea stabilising influence on Poland’s immediateenvironment. Polish specialists ask themselves,however, whether Poland, having limited capa-

10 Madeleine Albright and her successor Colin Powell vocally presented the American arguments in bilateral contacts with the membersof the Polish government.11 BAE Systems already placed in Mielec the working package worth over e100 million. Mielec is now producing parts for Airbus, wingsfor Regional Jet Avro and tails for Gripen.12 Roman Kuzniar, the director of the Planning and Strategy Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his presentation onthe future of European security at the Conference ‘The Perspectives of European Security’ organised in Warsaw on 21 September 2000 bythe Euro-Atlantic Association and Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

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bilities in the field, will be able to influence thefuture development of European security policyto the extent it would like to. Having said that,the current Polish attitude towards the futuredevelopment of European security policy can begenerally described as superficial. The vastmajority of the Polish political élite still haveproblems in projecting Poland as a futureconstructive EU member.

The security issues in the EU context are nota subject of debate within Poland and, whenthey are addressed, they are discussed within acomprehensive security context, where Polishélites are primarily focused on defending thecountry’s status as a non-EU NATO member.The majority of the political élite do not fullyrecognise the political potential of ESDP andthe positive consequences it might have in thelonger run. Not much consideration is given tothe role that Europe should play globally in thefuture, with the notable exception of the EU’sfuture Eastern policy. The quality of Polishreflection on the future of Europe has beenslowly improving only in the last months, alongwith the beginning of the debate on EU institu-tional reform, which is organised by thePresident’s office, NGOs and think tanks.However, most of the current discussions donot concern the future of European securitypolicy.

Unfortunately, the Polish position on thefuture of Europe is generally defensive in its cha-racter. The attitude towards enhanced coopera-tion in the realm of CSFP is a very good case inpoint. Polish thinking in this respect is domina-ted by the fear of being marginalised – if deci-sions on who can join the closer cooperation inthe security field were to be made dependent on the fulfilment of ‘convergence criteria’.Moreover, Polish experts are convinced that ifdefence were never to be a subject of enhancedcooperation, it would never develop along thelines of collective defence, which would be unac-ceptable for Poland. Therefore, Poland is whollysatisfied with the present provisions and theconstructive abstention mechanism, whichallows countries that are not interested in agiven action or geographical priority to abstainfrom participating.

Although the Polish position on the futureof European security has not been developedvery much yet, once in the Union Poland wouldnot become a force that hampered Europeanambitions in the field. In short, Warsaw is readyto take its responsibilities seriously, to contri-bute to the development of ESDP and some-times even to punch above its weight. Poland hasno general problem in getting involved inactions aimed at peacekeeping, even if that wereto mean out-of-area operations. Poland sharesmost of the EU’s foreign policy priorities,although it will aim at revamping the EU’sEastern policy by giving it much more muscle.All Polish political parties stress that closecooperation with Eastern neighbours consti-tutes one of the most vital Polish interests.Therefore, Poland will be actively involved inshaping EU policy towards Russia, Ukraine andother ex-Soviet republics, contributing its ownvast experience in the field and providing itsEastern partners with a good example of suc-cessful transition.

VI. Poland and enlargement after 11 SeptemberAfter the terrorist attack on the United States inSeptember 2001, Poland supported fully the EUposition concerning a coordinated fight againstterrorism (recently in the declaration signedafter the Gent summit). Poland was also fully infavour of evoking Article 5 within NATO. ThePolish government believes that the terroristattack on New York and Washington will have abeneficial effect on the EU enlargement.According to the Polish position, since enlarge-ment will strengthen stability on the Continent,the tragic events in the United States shouldhave the effect of speeding up the whole process.

In the Polish case, support for the anti-terro-rist coalition was manifested in practical terms:in November 2001 Polish President AleksanderKwasniewski organised a conference, includingmost of the countries from Central and EasternEurope, in which all of the participants declaredtheir strong commitment to the fight againstterrorism.

Poland

Immediately after the terrorist attack,Warsaw pledged additional forces for deploy-ment in the Balkans, in order to relieveAmerican and British troops which might beneeded elsewhere. In October 2001, just after theUnited States started its action in Afghanistan,former Polish Minister of Defence BronislawKomorowski declared that, if the United Stateswere to ask for any direct military support forfighting the Taliban, Poland was ready to send‘Grom’, its best special unit. At the end of theyear 2001, the new Polish government declaredthat it was ready to send troops to Afghanistan

or any other place if the United States requestedsuch support. It seems that there might be agreater need for Polish anti-biological and anti-chemical weapons units or for logistical or engi-neering support than for special forces, espe-cially since the ground operation in Afghanistanitself is virtually over. Poland is ready to providesuch troops, although the United States is unli-kely to request more than just a symbolicalPolish presence (not exceeding 100 soldiers).Anyhow, in January 2002, the Polish contingentwas put on a state of permanent alert in case theanti-terrorist campaign continued.

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Czech Republic Radek Khol

I. The Czech Republic and CFSPThe Czech Republic has already closed Chapters26 and 27 of the EU accession negotiations: nei-ther presented major problems. The initialnegotiating position in Chapter 26 (ExternalRelations) envisaged a possible transitional per-iod for the customs union with Slovakia. Lateron, however, such a measure was consideredunnecessary, as Slovakia may join the EU eithertogether with the Czech Republic or soon after-wards. It was also understood that the EU is notparticularly keen on transitional periods in thisarea. Otherwise, all necessary institutionalinfrastructure for the implementation andenforcement of EC legislation in this area is orwill be in place and operational by the date of theaccession of the Czech Republic to the EU.Continuing screening did not bring any clashover Czech commercial policy, sanctionregimes, and so on.

The Czech Republic is prepared and able toparticipate fully and actively in CFSP, as there isno conflict with its national legislation. Thereare no territorial disputes between the CzechRepublic and any EU member or betweenPrague and other neighbouring AssociatedCountries. The Czech Republic supports thenon-proliferation of nuclear, biological and che-mical weapons and is a signatory to all relevantinternational agreements. It has introduced andexercises strict control concerning dual-useitems and technologies and is a member of themajor existing export control regimes.

Due to its own historical experience, theCzech Republic is highly interested in enhan-cing stability on the Continent and fulfilling theother political objectives of CFSP as articulatedin the Treaties. The Czech Republic has partici-pated in a number of peacekeeping and peace

support operations, namely in the NATO-ledIFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR inKosovo and Operation Essential Harvest inMacedonia – which demonstrates both its inter-est in the region and capacity to contribute tosimilar activities under the EU flag.

Whenever invited to join CFSP commonpositions and démarches it does so, which hasbeen made even easier since the introduction ofthe Associated Countries Network (ACN) inDecember 1999. In only two instances did theCzech Republic not join a specific EU position,namely in an overly positive assessment ofUNIDO activities in 1999 and, earlier on, regar-ding elections in the Baltic States. It is worthnoting, however, that the EU does not invite can-didate countries to join all its positions.Exceptions may apply to EU positions concer-ning other candidates but, interestingly, alsoconcerning the Middle East and former SovietUnion (until 2000 Yugoslavia was also includedin this ‘no-go’ group).

The consultation process, the communica-tion of EU plans and policy, and the resultinginvolvement of the Czech Republic (as well as ofother candidates) were significantly improvedduring the 2001 Swedish presidency, with refe-rence also to the political dialogue with thirdcountries. Good examples of cooperationalready existed in several international organisa-tions, such as the UN and OSCE.

II. The Czech Republic and ESDPThe initial reaction of the Czech Republic to theemergence of ESDP was to wait cautiously for aclear outline of the project to emerge while stres-sing the need not to undermine NATO as aneffective security institution. Initially, the EU

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and its military efforts were perceived as a sup-plement to existing NATO capabilities in crisis-management operations. This pragmaticapproach, focused on better European capabili-ties, was combined with two basic conditions forCzech support: transparent and strong coopera-tive relations between the EU and NATO, andappropriate forms of participation for non-EUEuropean allies (including the Czech Republic).Gradually, it became clear that Czech expecta-tions were perhaps unrealistic and that the EUwould try and play a basically autonomous role(in its decisions and, at least in appearance,structures) vis-à-vis NATO. This reality is nowunderstood, if not wholeheartedly welcomed.Nevertheless, the example of EU-NATO coope-ration in Macedonia shows that the two ambi-tions can be harmonised. A strong interest inkeeping the EU-NATO link vital is therefore aconstant priority of Czech policy, and is likely toremain so even after Czech entry into the EU.

As for the issue of participation of ‘thirdcountries’ in ESDP, Czech policy has also evol-ved. The initially strong position, which prefer-red a complete transfer of the model practised inWEU through Associate Membership, was latermodified in favour of a substantive 15+6 format.Although there is continuing interest in the ori-ginal WEU format, the Czechs can now see thatit has serious limitations from the EU view-point. Also, the tangible perspective of EU mem-bership (or at least the conclusion of negotia-tions) moderates certain objections. From theCzech standpoint, however, the relevance of the15+6 format should be strengthened in bothformal and substantive points. The AccessionAgreement which is expected to be signed at theend of 2002 or the beginning of 2003 couldsecure for the Czech Republic an observer posi-tion, similar to the country’s experience withparticipation in NATO activities before it gai-ned formal membership. In the meantime, the15+6 format could be improved, for examplethrough a timely distribution of the agenda andall the relevant documents and the distributionof minutes and conclusions of COPS meetingthrough the ACN. Also better access for Czechdiplomats to EU buildings on a regular ratherthan case-by-case basis would improve the

atmosphere and move it somewhat away fromthe present exclusive ‘club mentality’ (the modeladopted by NATO in SHAPE through thePartnership Coordination Cell is often conside-red as best practice). Better information-sharingabout COPS meetings would be welcomed byCzech officials in both Brussels and Prague.Czech policy also supports the openness of thisprocess as a preparation for dealing with thosecandidate countries that may join NATO beforethe EU and thus find themselves in the sameposition as the Czech Republic today.

This optimistic approach, combined withthe qualifications mentioned above, is now sha-red by most political parties and is advocatedespecially by the Czech MFA. Czech MOD offi-cials are more reserved, preferring clear decision-making structures à la NATO, as little duplica-tion as possible and joint defence planning. Onepolitical force that is still very sceptical of theESDP rationale, and its current and potentialfuture shape, is the right-wing ODS, the party offormer Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Its mem-bers often criticise the practical steps taken bythe EU and their alleged negative impact on thetransatlantic link and the future of NATO,including the prospects of a continuing US pre-sence in Europe.

III. The Czech Republic and military crisis management The Czech Republic declared its contribution tothe Helsinki Headline Goal on the second day ofthe CCC in November 2000. It consists of amechanised infantry battalion, a special forcescompany, a helicopter unit, a field hospital ormedical battalion, a chemical protection com-pany, and a centre for humanitarian and rescueoperations. These units are fully professionaland also represent a portion of the Czech unitsassigned to the NATO Rapid Reaction Forcesintegrated in the ARRC. As a general principle,these units are ‘double-hatted’ for NATO as wellas EU operations. In addition, some of theseunits can also be used for peacekeeping missionsunder UN command. The total size of the Czechcontribution is over 1,000 men, with long-term

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rotation ensured for the mechanised infantrybattalion. All other declared forces are of specia-lised nature and their participation in an opera-tion can presently be sustained for only sixmonths.

Given the allied status of the Czech Republic,these units have priority for NATO tasks orNATO-led peace support operations. Their size,too, reflects the level of interoperability of theCzech armed forces and the economic capacityof the country to afford several simultaneousmilitary deployments abroad. The recently ini-tiated reform of the Czech armed forces set tar-gets for long-term participation of a maximumof 1,000 men in peace operations, includingthose of the EU, and a short-term deployment of250 men in a less demanding role (humani-tarian or search and rescue operations). The pro-portion of Czech units available for operationsoutside the national territory and in non-Article5 tasks will grow to the desired level of5,000 men out of an expected overall size of 34-36,000 persons for the Czech armed forces.

For the moment, however, the deployment ofCzech military units for EU missions is slightlymore complicated than in the case of NATO orUN operations. Czech laws require the priorapproval of the Czech parliament for any mis-sion with a duration of over 60 days, if carriedout by an international organisation of whichthe Czech Republic is not a full member. Untilaccession to the EU, in other words, parliamen-tary approval will be a precondition for any mili-tary contribution to ESDP operations.

So far, the Czech armed forces have not parti-cipated in any multinational formations, exceptthe ARRC structures. This has changed with therecent signature of an agreement establishingthe joint Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade for inter-national peacekeeping operations, and may alsoaffect a potential deployment of the unit inpeace support operations under NATO, UN orEU command. In addition, starting in 2002,another similar unit will be deployed withinKFOR, namely a joint Czech-Slovak infantrybattalion. The results of this cooperation mayinfluence future joint deployment plans for pea-cekeeping operations by both states.

IV. The Czech Republic and defence procurement Czech policy supports more structuredEuropean defence procurement policy if the EUcan better coordinate current European effortsand stimulate further specialisation of defenceindustries across Europe. In November 2000 itbecame a full member of WEAG, which is seen ashelpful, but only as a secondary structure fordefence cooperation, if compared with suchNATO structures as CNAD (Conference ofNational Armaments Directors).

The most expensive and also the mostcontroversial procurement item in the ongoingmodernisation of the Czech military is the cur-rent government’s plan to buy 24 or 36 superso-nic aircraft as the future backbone of the CzechAir Force. This should be combined with thedomestically developed subsonic multipurposejet fighter L-159 Alca, produced at AeroVodochody, which is majority-owned by Boeing.For this and other reasons, there is strong inter-est in Prague in supporting trends that wouldhelp the transatlantic character of defenceindustries: this could also prevent clashes bet-ween European and American suppliers. Thefinancial sources for the project, however, arestill unclear and there is no cross-party supportyet for the procurement plan and some of its keyparts. The crucial factor will be the financing ofthe project, given the recent negative experiencewith the procurement of 72 L-159’s, which (dueto a poor contract that lacked insurance againsta significant exchange rate drop) cost the MODalmost twice as much as expected and represen-ted a serious financial drain for all militaryinvestment projects. A potentially differentapproach can be seen in the current biddingcompetition for the supersonic aircraft, forwhich the Czech government required a sub-stantial offset programme (up to the value of150 per cent of the contract) to be included inthe contract applications for an expected sumthat could amount to Kc100 billion ($3 billion).This condition may be an advantage forEuropean suppliers, who have a positive atti-tude towards offset programmes, experience in

Czech Republic

it and better conditions for realising it. The bid-ding competition, however, was seriously under-mined when all but one company stepped downfor an alleged lack of transparency. US firms alsocomplained that there was strong high-level lob-bying in favour of a European supplier (alsocombining political considerations of future EUmembership) which created unfair conditions.The remaining bidder is BAE Systems with itsJAS 39 Gripen. If chosen, the latter would bring acombination of European and US arms indus-tries to the Czech Air Force for many years tocome.

V. The Czech Republic and European security policyThe Czech position inside the enlarged EU in thefield of CFSP will most likely support measuresleading to its effectiveness while improving its‘common’ features. Prague’s approach can bequite flexible, since most foreseeable CFSP issuesdo not touch upon vital interests or areas that aresensitive for the Czech Republic. Geographically,Czech activism may be higher in Eastern Europe,including the CIS and Russia, the Balkans andthe Eastern Mediterranean, down to theCaucasus. Given that the Czechs have no legacyof colonial or long-term presence in territoriesoutside the greater European area, presentingand communicating CFSP actions in distant ter-ritories (and potential Czech direct participationin them, or at least support of them by othermeans) may prove challenging at times. It wouldbe definitely easier with areas where at least limi-ted Czech interests are at stake.

The Czech Republic’s profile is unlikely to bethat of a troublemaker blocking EU actions.Prague may rather use the ‘constructive absten-tion’ clause in cases where advocating a substan-tial use of Czech resources would be difficult forthe Czech public. Flexible and effective struc-tures can be seen as more important than strictformal representation as long as a certaininfluence is maintained and the overall cohe-sion of the EU action is not undermined. Theremight also be Czech support for a more rational,

simpler structure even at the expense of a certainduplication of NATO structures and capabili-ties, which now seems inevitable. By contrast,there might be more hesitation on the widerapplication of QMV in CFSP decisions withmilitary implications and on the possible trans-formation of ESDP into a supranational ratherthan intergovernmental EU activity. Yet Czechsupport for strengthening certain communitytools available for the civilian dimension ofCFSP/ESDP, such as emergency funds forhumanitarian aid and conflict prevention, islikely.

Speculation on the Czech attitude towardsfuture revisions of the TEU is quite premature.One thing that can, however, be said concernsthe possible inclusion of Art. 5-type commit-ments in the TEU. The Czech Republic alreadyparticipates in NATO and therefore in principledoes not have any psychological problems withsharing collective defence obligations. Inconclusion, not only Czech diplomats but also amajority of the Czech political élite share thevision of a stronger EU in the internationalarena, which requires the entire spectrum ofpolitical, economic, financial and also secu-rity/military tools. Even the more scepticalviews of the ODS are likely to be moderated byits coalition partners, if it finds itself in charge ofputting together a new government after theparliamentary elections due in June 2002.

VI. The Czech Republic and enlargement after 11 SeptemberIn the wake of the terrorist attacks, the Czechpolitical élite and the wider public shared an ini-tial reaction of shock and solidarity with theAmericans. Several weeks afterwards, however,the focus of the Czech public debate shifted in away that very much reflected other complicatedand topical issues (policy towards the EU inclu-ded). In fact, a rather heated debate opposed thedefenders of ‘pure’ capitalism and Western civi-lisation on the one hand, and the critics of glo-balisation (or the negative side of the marketeconomy) on the other. In somewhat overzea-

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lous fashion, the debate then moved to a discus-sion of the general roots of terrorism, theconcrete motives for the attacks on the UnitedStates, the measures to be taken in response tothem, and the long-term improvement of theconditions that breed the phenomenon.

As a member of NATO, the Czech Republicimmediately gave its full support to the UnitedStates and the activation of Art. 5. Prague alsooffered various means for the international anti-terrorism campaign, inter alia an NBC protec-tion company, a special services unit, a field hos-pital and a transport aircraft. At the same time, itdeclared a state of security alert for its internalsecurity forces, from military to police and intel-ligence services. One aspect of the special mea-sures adopted in the Czech Republic was avisible upgrading of protection around theRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty building inthe heart of Prague.

The attacks on the United States also par-tially changed the perception of security amongthe Czech public, demonstrating the general

vulnerability to asymmetric threats and the use-fulness of professional, well-equipped and well-trained military forces. At the same time, as amember of the Western world, the CzechRepublic saw itself as a potential target of simi-lar attacks. An effective defence against them,however, is considered possible only throughinternational cooperation.

Finally, there has been no serious linkage bet-ween the current security situation and theexpected NATO/EU enlargements. So far theseare considered as two separate agendas which donot necessarily impinge upon each other. Theonly concern openly expressed has been aboutthe increasing role of Russia and the potentialconcessions to be made by the West on NATOenlargement in exchange for Russian supportfor the anti-terrorism campaign.

Czech Republic

7

Slovakia Vladimir Bilcik

I. Slovakia and CFSPIn preparation for EU membership, CFSP hasplayed a formative role in shaping the bounda-ries and the focus of Slovakia’s foreign and secu-rity policies. Slovakia, as an Associated Country,has taken an active part in the forms of coopera-tion within the CFSP framework. It has consis-tently aligned itself with the declarations,démarches, common positions and joint actionsof the EU. Clear exceptions have been specificdémarches or common positions adopted indirect relation to one or more fellow candidatecountries. In certain cases – e.g. during theKosovo conflict – Slovakia has imposed sanc-tions adopted by the Union vis-à-vis third coun-tries. Cooperation and coordination of posi-tions (whenever possible) take place ininternational forums and inside multilateralorganisations such as the United Nations. TheCFSP framework has encouraged good-neigh-bourly relations, especially between Slovakiaand Hungary. It has also emphasised adhesionto and compliance with non-proliferation andexport controls regimes.

Formally, the negotiations on CFSP haveposed very few problems to Slovakia. Theexplana-tion for that lies, in part, with the limitsof CFSP itself as an essentially intergovernmen-tal policy. Compliance with CFSP provisionsdoes not demand extra financial or institutionalresources on the Slovak side, and the characterof cooperation in this area does not requiremajor changes to domestic legislation. TheCFSP domain may indeed become sensitive –with possible future implications for nationalsovereignty – but this has not been an issue inSlovakia thus far. On the whole, the CFSP chap-

ter has been among the easiest parts of the acces-sion and negotiation process. Slovakia was ableto close it provisionally (along with the chapteron External Relations) at the beginning of theprocess, and Bratislava expects to be ready toparticipate fully in the formulation, adoptionand implementation of all CFSP instrumentsupon its accession.

II. Slovakia and ESDP

ESDP has added a completely new dimension tosecond-pillar issues. Whereas CFSP has so farbeen largely an exercise in political and bureau-cratic integration, the development of ESDPencompasses a wider range of functional andoperational tasks. The fact that ESDP is no lon-ger just about political, economic and legislativeintegration, however, seems not to have beenfully understood in Slovakia. To the extent thatit exists, the domestic debate on ESDP has lar-gely reflected more general uncertainties overthe policy’s future role inside the EU. It has mostvisibly focused on the relations between NATOand the EU, and it has also addressed the ques-tion of the country’s participation in the presentand future developments of ESDP.

Official statements about ESDP have tendedto be rather reserved and general. Slovakia hasbeen ‘monitoring the developments related tothe European Security and Defence Policy inconnection with the building of autonomousdecision-making capacities and, where NATO asa whole will not be engaged, supports possibleEU-led peacekeeping operations.’1 On thewhole, although it has given political backing toESDP, Slovakia seems to lack an operational

31

1 The quote originates from the Slovak official negotiating position on the CFSP chapter.

2 Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, approved by the Council of the Slovak Republic on 27 March 2001.3 F. Heisbourg et al., ‘European defence: making it work’, Chaillot Paper 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, September 2000).

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structure that could help both understand thepolicy process (and its problems) and outline amore constructive contribution to the currentdebate. Instead, some confusion persists. Muchas the domestic debate has been vague andESDP as such has received a general welcome bythe governing political parties, it is worth notingthat it was the Slovak National Party (SNP –right-wing nationalists) that openly endorsedthe idea of autonomous European defence capa-bilities. Its motivation was simple: it was notNATO and it did not involve the Ameri-cans.

In a broader sense, the SNP’s simplistic atti-tude is a side effect of the relative lack of clarityof the official policy. At the policy-making level,ESDP is still perceived only as a part of the EUagenda and not necessarily viewed, instead, as apart of a wider security and defence policyagenda. The Slovak MFA European Corresp-ondent handles the ESDP matters virtuallyalone. Policy is limited to the established insti-tutional structures in the CFSP context, and theprimary concern rests with the existing modali-ties of dialogue and cooperation with the EU. Abroader strategic vision, including wider secu-rity matters and issues of planning and coordi-nation, is lacking. Although the EU itselfremains unclear about some aspects of ESDP,current Slovak arrangements contrast sharplywith institutional and policy-making structuresin EU member States, where the new policy ishandled more comprehensively.

ESDP touches upon and in some ways com-petes with other security and defence prioritiesand initiatives that shaped Slovakia’s foreignpolicy goals throughout the 1990s. Theseinclude, first and foremost, a desire to joinNATO, motivated by the collective defence gua-rantees that are not covered by ESDP. In its offi-cial statement(s) Slovakia understands ESDP as‘a complementary process to the system of col-lective defence of the North Atlantic Alliance’.2Despite the varying degrees of domestic éliteand public consensus, NATO membership hasbeen the top security policy priority in Slovakia.The country was not invited to join the Alliance

at the NATO Madrid summit in 1997 princi-pally because of unstable and questionabledomestic political developments under the coa-lition government led by Prime MinisterVladimir Meciar (1994-98). The present coali-tion government, led by Prime Minister MikulasDzurinda since late 1998, hopes that an invita-tion to join the Alliance will be issued at theNATO Prague summit scheduled for November2002. For Slovakia, therefore, membership ofthe Alliance represents a more urgent prioritythan membership of the EU. Paradoxically,while most EU member states and NATO alliesare principally concerned with the ESDP andcrisis-management operations, Slovakia is focu-sing most of its energies on gaining admissionto an alliance for collective defence. From theviewpoint of the current Slovak governing élite,the endurance of the transatlantic link is of cru-cial importance.

Finally, although Slovakia is going tobecome a fully-fledged participant in ESDPupon enlargement, the present modalities ofparticipation of candidate countries as laiddown in Feira and Nice are not seen as adequate.The current structures imply both a certaindegree of exclusion and a certain lack of access todecision-shaping for the applicants. For thesake of comparison, Slovakia is included inNATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP)that operates under the Partnership for Peace(PfP) programme. Furthermore, Slovakia’s par-ticipation in the Membership Action Plan(MAP), which represents a more advanced ver-sion of the PfP, entails a good degree of jointdefence planning with the Alliance.3 Presently,EU member States ‘invite’ and ‘welcome’ addi-tional contributions of forces by candidatestates, while the PfP programme explicitly callsfor a contribution of forces. As the example ofthe Kosovo crisis demonstrated, a commoninclusive framework for both members andnon-members of NATO was an important fac-tor in preventing any spillover of violence ontoneighbouring states.

Slovakia

Although participation of candidate coun-tries in NATO (or WEU) structures neverimplied actual involvement in the decision-making process, it has certainly allowed a com-paratively greater involvement in the prepara-tion of decisions. The current modality ofpolitical participation in ESDP, with regularministerial meetings of EU members and candi-dates, is somewhat reminiscent of the Union’sStructured Dialogue initiated by the GermanPresidency in 1994.4 Devised and implementedat the start of the enlargement process, theStructured Dialogue soon proved both ineffec-tive and insufficient in giving a voice to theapplicants and addressing their concerns.Whilst ESDP is an evolving policy area, it shouldbe in the EU’s interest to include the soon-to-bepartners under a more encompassing umbrellaof partnership. Moreover, experience withNATO’s operational structures seems to suggestthat, for the applicants, ESDP should have adefinite Euro-Atlantic dimension. From theSlovak standpoint, one of the preconditions foractive inclusion in ESDP is NATO’s involve-ment and a satisfactory agreement between theEU and NATO on strategy, assets and capabili-ties, and structures of consultation.

III. Slovakia and military crisismanagementAt the Capabilities Commitment Conferenceheld in November 2000, Slovakia – like othercandidate states – pledged its contribution tothe ‘Catalogue of Forces’ exercise and the EU’sHeadline Goal. The pledge included the follo-wing forces and equipment:5

MILITARY CAPABILITIES◗One mechanised company (including supportelements); ◗ Four Mi-17 transport helicopters (available bythe end of 2002);

◗ One engineering mine-clearance unit (cur-rently operating within KFOR);◗ One military police unit (available by the endof 2001);◗ One multi-purpose field hospital with surgerycapabilities (available by the end of 2003).

CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES◗ One detection group for chemical and radioac-tive substances◗ One mobile laboratory;◗ Emergency re-deployable capacity for long-term accommodation of up to 400 persons intents in the event of humanitarian disasters(including service personnel).

As the details of the pledge indicate, the com-mitment exists on paper: in reality, it is questio-nable if and to what extent Slovakia can sustainand finance the contributions it has pledged.Realistically, the numbers are likely to be smal-ler. Slovakia already has some forces that are ser-ving in various peacekeeping missions. In 1999,for instance, approximately 150 Slovak Armymembers participated in UN operations6 andother peace support operations. Of these, 40participated in KFOR and 8 in SFOR. From theSlovak standpoint, additional available inter-operable forces are likely to be limited andexpensive to support over a long period of time.At the same time, while EU expectations of big-ger defence and military contributions shouldremain modest, Slovakia’s peacekeeping recordso far solidly places the country in the positionof being a reliable participant in future crisis-management operations.

IV. Slovakia and defenceprocurementSlovakia – like other candidates for EU andNATO membership – is undergoing a wide-ran-ging reform of its armed forces. On 30 October

4 B. Lippert and P. Becker, ‘Structured Dialogue Revisited: the EU’s Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. III(1998), no. 3.5 Based on the official information from the Slovak MFA.6 V. Bilcik et al., ‘Foreign and Defense Policy of the Slovak Republic’, in G. Meseznikov et al. (eds.), Slovakia 2000. A Global Report on the Stateof the Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2001), p. 257.

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Vladimir Bilcik

7 Interview with a representative of the Mission of the Slovak Republic to NATO, 4 November 2001.8 Lecture by Rastislav Kacer, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica,15 November 2001.

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2001, at the meeting of the NATO StrengthenedPolitical Committee (SPC), the Deputy Ministerfor Defence Jozef Pivarci presented The SlovakRepublic’s Defence Reform Long Term Plan – SRForce 2010. The general aim of the reform is tomake the armed forces slimmer, more flexibleand – most importantly – fully professional.Thus far Slovakia has not come across majorconflicts or tensions between US and Europeanbidders in the context of the modernisation ofits military equipment. Due to their potentialpolitical sensitivity, such conflicts are highlyunlikely before the decision on enlargement tobe taken during the NATO Prague summit inthe autumn of 2002. Slovakia cooperates withWEAG in Panel I, where a Slovak representativeattends plenary sessions. More generally,Slovakia is supportive of a more coordinatedEuropean defence procurement policy.7

On the whole, although the issues of defenceprocurement and arms modernisation repre-sent important medium- and long-term goals,Slovakia is primarily concerned with its politicalparticipation in the development of defencepolicy in Europe. In a recent speech, MOD StateSecretary Rastislav Kacer maintained that poli-tical reasons prevailed over military ones inSlovakia’s motivation to enter NATO: ‘conside-ring the number of planes the Alliance has, theissue of 18 or 23 jet fighters for the Slovak Armyis not interesting. NATO membership is a ques-tion of consensual responsibility for maintai-ning of and pushing for joint values. It is a moredifficult path than the one of non-participation,but it offers more prospects.’ According toKacer, membership in the Alliance is of vitalimportance for the country, as remaining outwould also mean no membership of the EU.Slovakia would welcome it if the EuropeanUnion took a positive and unambiguous stancetowards NATO enlargement too. In this sense,Slovakia would also welcome better coordina-tion between NATO and EU policies.8

V. Slovakia and European security policyOver the past ten years Slovak foreign policypriorities have encompassed mainly NATO andEU membership as well as the development ofsuch forms of subregional cooperation as theVisegrad group. Clear and comprehensive policytowards the East has been largely lacking –except for the general aim of distinguishing one-self from it, of not being part of it any longer.Intellectual, political, economic and financialresources have been used almost exclusively toget closer and closer to Western institutions andstructures. Although transatlantic andEuropean integration are going to remain cen-tral priorities for some time to come, preciselyaccession to the EU may soon place the countryin a better position gradually to shift the focusof relations with its Eastern neighbours. In hel-ping to formulate a more comprehensive andmultifaceted EU Eastern policy, Slovakia canadd new value to future specific initiatives. Itscomparative advantage stems from commonhistorical ties and geographic and linguisticproximity, as well as the shared experience ofpost-Communist transition. Actually, accessionper se will immediately confront Slovakia with adouble challenge, namely, how to combine aneffective Eastern strategy with compliance withEU trading rules, visa regimes and bordercontrols.

There are limits, however, to the policy initia-tives that small states like Slovakia can take.Furthermore, in an enlarged Union consensuson policy will be generally more difficult toachieve. It has been so even among candidatestates, as the example of the Visegrad group’srelations with Ukraine illustrates. DuringFebruary and March 2000 the Czech Republicand Slovakia decided to introduce visas forUkrainians from 28 June 2000. Poland andHungary instead remained committed to imple-

Slovakia

menting their visa regimes in relation toUkraine at the latest possible date.9

The future success of ESDP will largelydepend on the coherence, flexibility and readi-ness of an enlarged EU in taking action effecti-vely. Currently and for the years to come, Slovakdomestic stability per se contributes to the sta-bility of the EU neighbourhood and widerEuropean space. Bratislava is likely to be a com-mitted small contributor to peacekeeping ope-rations. In the institutional and practicalcontext of decision-making and -shaping – espe-cially if Slovakia manages to get an invitation tojoin NATO in 2002 – EU enlargement is likely toenhance the Euro-Atlantic dimension of ESDPeven more visibly. Besides, Slovakia has alsoconsistently favoured moves towards the har-monisation of asylum policy and more openpolice cooperation.

VI. Slovakia and enlargement after 11 SeptemberAlthough it is still too early to evaluate fully theimpact of the events of 11 September 2001, fromthe Slovak standpoint there could be – along-side several concerns – also some positive effects.In a broad sense, Slovakia – as a candidate coun-try for NATO membership – is closely monito-ring the consequences of the attacks against theUS for the nature and structure of the NorthAtlantic Alliance. Recent developments inNATO’s relations with Russia and US-Russiancooperation in the war against terrorism shouldnot affect Slovakia’s bid to join the Alliance,though in some respects the new situation couldinfluence the decision on NATO enlargement toother candidate countries, especially the Balticstates. The better state of relations betweenRussia and the West has created potentially

favourable conditions for NATO’s enlargementto a larger group of countries. At the same time,the threat of terrorist attacks, combined withnew US military commitments in Asia, givesadditional reasons for an enhanced EU capacityin security matters and for more EU cohesionand action in cases of regional instability inEurope. EU enlargement as a policy tool thatfosters stable developments in the European‘neighbourhood’ and helps extend the Union’sframework of rules and norms to the candidatestates should become an increasingly urgentpriority for the Fifteen.

On the strictly domestic front, the events of11 September 2001 have brought together themain players in Slovak politics. Since the attackson the United States there has been a broad ver-bal consensus between the current governmentand the main opposition party (the Movementfor Democratic Slovakia, led by Meciar) on theactions undertaken by the United States, NATOand the EU in the fight against terrorism. Theattitudes have been different from what theywere during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, whenMeciar and his Movement openly criticised theair campaign against Yugoslavia. At the sametime, unlike then (when public support forSlovakia’s membership in NATO dropped tosome 35 per cent), the US military action inAfghanistan has not affected that variable: morethan 50 per cent of the Slovak population cur-rently supports the country’s entry into theAlliance.10

Membership of NATO and EU remains themost important Slovak foreign policy priority.International events since 11 September 2001have not altered this fact: if anything, they haveprovided more reasons for achieving full mem-bership of both NATO and the European Unionat the earliest possible date.

9 A. Duleba, ‘Ukraine, Central Europe and Slovakia’s Foreign Policy’, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, vol. I (2000), no. 2, p. 86.10 By contrast, public support for EU membership has hardly fluctuated. It has been fairly stable over the past four years and is currentlyaround 70 per cent.

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Vladimir Bilcik

8

Hungary Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa

I. Hungary and CFSP

As one of the first Central European countries tosign an Association Agreement with the EU inDecember 1991, and then a member of the so-called Luxembourg group of candidates,Hungary has been among the front runners ofEastern enlargement. During the accessiontalks that started in late March 1998, both theEU and Hungary aimed to close swiftly thosechapters that did not present any major pro-blem. External relations and CFSP were amongthem.

Chapter 26 (External Relations) was provi-sionally concluded on 5 October 2000.Although in some special cases (trade imports) atransitional period was requested, on the wholeHungary is ready and able to terminate all thoseobligations that are inconsistent with the acquis.As of 1 January 2001, free trade betweenHungary and the European Union has been inplace. External relations altogether have beenbrought within the competence of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs.

Hungary provisionally concluded Chapter27 (CFSP) on 6 April 2000. During the screeningprocess and the negotiations no problems arose,nor were any expected. The result of the scree-ning in the case of Hungary was positive, sincethe country shares the basic values, objectivesand principles underpinning CFSP, and is pre-pared and able to participate fully and actively init. Since Hungary’s foreign policy is mostly har-monised with CFSP, Budapest did not requestany derogation or transitional period on anyissue belonging to the scope of this chapter.Hungary participates in the implementation ofCFSP as an Associated Country and considers

the possibility to align itself with the jointactions, common positions and statements ofthe European Union as an important part ofpreparation for membership. Since 1995, whenthe EU started to invite the associated states toalign themselves with such actions, positionsand statements, Budapest has done so in allcases. During the screening it became obviousthat Hungary found acceptable even thosedeclarations and documents that it had notbeen invited to join earlier. There were no EUregulations/prescriptions in the modalities ofcooperation vis-à-vis third countries or withininternational organisations that could causetrouble. Hungarian foreign policy structureshave been shown to be capable of carrying outthe tasks originating from CFSP, although someminor technical changes will have to be imple-mented before accession. Budapest reported theneed to carry out ‘structural changes in theMinistry of Foreign Affairs enabling it to fullyparticipate in the formulation and implementa-tion of CFSP [the establishment of a PoliticalDirector’s post]. The technical capacity for elec-tronic communication of the Ministry will alsobe stepped up.’1 Meanwhile, technical facilitieshave improved, whereas the post of PoliticalDirector has not yet been established: for now atleast, the EU accepts the present MFA structureas long as it is always the same person who repre-sents the country at the Political Directors’ mee-tings

Due to historical experience, the changedenvironment – three of its neighbours no longerexist as they were (the Soviet Union,Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the latter after aseries of civil wars) – and the country’s uniquesituation (there are Hungarian national minori-

1 ‘Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Chapter 27, 8 September 1998’, in P. Dunay, Boxes: Why CFSPand CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries; see note 4, p. 9.

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ties in a number of neighbouring countries), sta-bility in Central Europe and in Europe at large isof vital importance to Hungary. It has thereforeparticipated in a number of peacekeeping andpeace support operations, in NATO-ledIFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR inKosovo and Operation Essential Harvest inMacedonia, manifesting its interest and capa-city to contribute to these and similar EUactions. Budapest also plays an active role inCFSP cooperation within different internatio-nal organisations (such as the UN and theOSCE) and between foreign missions accreditedin third countries.

Hungary has no territorial disputes with anyof its neighbours, but the question of minoritiesbeyond its borders has caused some concernwith regard to the Schengen regulations, espe-cially in the case of Romania, where approxima-tely two million ethnic Hungarians live. WithRomania on its way to being removed from thelist of visa-bound states, and with neighbour-ing countries negotiating their accession to theEU as well (some of them may even join at thesame time as Hungary), the problem is perceivedto be of a transitory character.2 However, it willremain one with respect to Ukraine andYugoslavia, where the number of ethnic Hun-garians is much lower, but so also is the likeli-hood of EU membership.

Budapest supports the non-proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and is a party to allthe treaties prohibiting such weapons. Hungarywas the country whose accession triggered theentry into force of the Chemical WeaponsConvention. Hungary is a member of all theinternational export control regimes (ZanggerCommittee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, AustraliaGroup, Missile Technology Control Regime,Wassenaar Arrangement) and has introducedinto national legislation all the relevant exportcontrol lists. The combination of these lists andthe upgrading of the combined list have been

carried out according to EU regulations, aimingfor conformity from the outset. Therefore, nodifficulty in switching over to the communityregime is expected.

II. Hungary and ESDP

Ever since the launching of the ESDP in 1998-99, it has been a firm belief among Hungarianauthorities that, firstly, there is and should beno contradiction between NATO obligationsand support for the development of a Europeandefence capability, even less so as the UnitedStates has seemed to back the idea and to bewilling to reduce its military forces in Europe;secondly, NATO and the US presence are a pre-condition for Hungary’s security.

The EU’s military efforts have been seen as asupplement to existing NATO capabilities as‘European security might face challenges thatdo not directly affect the interests of the UnitedStates’,3 especially in crisis management. As aresult, participation in it has been considered apriority for Hungary, as the potential criticalspots in Europe are located mostly in areas veryclose to or in the immediate neighbourhood ofthe country.4 Crisis management, therefore, hasbeen and is especially important for Hungary:the civil war that went on for years in formerYugoslavia posed manifold concerns andthreats, from having ethnic Hungarian minori-ties in Serbia to being exposed to the danger of apossible spillover and to waves of refugees (notonly ethnic Hungarians, but also Serbs). In therecent establishment of the European RapidReaction Force, however, Hungary has expres-sed its firm support but also stressed the neces-sity not to undermine NATO. In this respect,there has been no difference between officialand unofficial attitudes, and the public has notbeen interested in this issue at all. Ever since,there has been no perceivable evolution in the

2 ‘It seems as if the monster of Schengen was less frightening than a year ago.’ János Martonyi, opening press conference on 3 January 2001.http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2001/MartonyiJ/0103mjevk.html.3 János Martonyi in Financial Times, http://www.kum.hu/Szovivoi/2001/MartonyiJ/mjftcikk.htm. Interview with the Head of the DefencePolicy Dept. in the Ministry of Defence (October 2000): ‘ESDP is the Petersberg Tasks, is it not?’4 Csaba Kõrösi: Biztonságpolitika az ezredfordulón (Security policy on the turn of the millennium), TLI Policy Papers, no. 22, 2001, p. 11.

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Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa

5 János Martonyi at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jagland with the participation of the foreign ministersof the 6 non-EU European NATO countries and High Representative Javier Solana, New York, 14 September 2000.6 ‘Magyar felderítõ alakulat a Balkánra?’ (Hungarian reconnaissance unit to the Balkans?) in Népszabadság, 30 October 2001, p. 1.7 A miniszterelnök a feladatszabó értekezleten /The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning Conference of the Hungarian Defence Forces/, 1March 2001, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=717.

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Hungarian position. Therefore EU-NATOcooperation in Macedonia was most welcome,since it proved for Hungary and others thatNATO and the EU can cooperate well.

As a consequence, the second preconditionfor NATO member Hungary was the establish-ment of some form of appropriate participationfor non-EU European allies in the shaping of thefuture European military decision-making.‘Hungary was not unhappy with the Feira deci-sions, which were a minimum for 15+6 coopera-tion. The objectives must be to make EU-NATOcooperation effective and to make contribu-tions of the 6 effective. This required parliamen-tary approval and hence information provingthat the 6 were involved in decision-making.Many of the 6 were geographically close to thecrisis regions, thus their involvement might beneeded anyway.’5 During the period prior to itsaccession, Budapest would like to see 15+6 mee-tings on a ministerial level as well as quasi-per-manent consultation on crises and an informa-tion flow at the level of experts. At the same time,Hungary participates in the dialogue betweenthe 6 non-EU European NATO members.

III. Hungary and military crisismanagementParticipating in peacekeeping and peace-enfor-cement missions is not new to the Hungarianmilitary. There have been several missionsacross the world where Hungarian forces parti-cipated or are still participating, albeit in limitednumbers. Hungarians have served in a numberof UN missions: UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait –6 observers), UNIFICYP (Cyprus – 121 armedpeacekeepers), UNOMIG (Georgia – 8 militaryobservers), MINOURSO (Western Sahara –6 military observers), UNMIK (Kosovo –1 mediator between UN and KFOR), altogether142 persons. In the OSCE missions in Georgiaone military observer, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2

military observers, on the Georgian-Chechenborder 2 military observers (one of whom diedrecently in a helicopter crash), in Nagorno-Karabakh one military observer, on the SinaiPeninsula 41 armed peacekeepers. In KFOR, 308Hungarian soldiers provide protection for mili-tary bases (the British Headquarters) and, inSFOR, the 200 military technical personnel’smain task is to build bridges. As regards peace-keeping in the Balkans, planning has started inthe Defence Staff for possible bigger and morevaried Hungarian participation. Although suchplanning is at an early stage as yet, it foresees therestructuring of the units already operating inthe Balkans and will most probably aim at asmaller unit performing exclusively such mili-tary tasks as reconnaissance.6 An approximately50-strong unit participated in Macedonia in thecollection of arms (they have already returned toHungary). Sending a smaller ground force unitto Macedonia to perform NATO-led tasks is alsoon the agenda.

At the 21 November 2000 Capabilities Confe-rence, the Hungarian Minister for Defence offe-red a 350-strong force including an air defenceunit equipped with Mistral missiles and a mecha-nised infantry battalion. According to the state-ments made by the Prime Minister, these units(or parts of them) will be offered to both NATOand the EU: he maintained in fact that ‘Hungarywill not participate in any decision that wouldcreate duplicated capacities and thus would putsuch burdens on the Hungarian Army, which wecannot meet at the moment.’7

Budapest puts the reinforcement of its natio-nal capabilities, required to carry outPetersberg-type missions, in the context of theongoing reform of the armed forces. Militaryreform, i.e. the modernisation and restructuringof the Hungarian armed forces, started in 1999,when at the same time Hungary joined NATO,the Kosovo crisis erupted and it became impos-sible to finance adequately the Hungariandefence sector from the funds then allocated in

Hungary

the budget. The modernisation of the army tooktwo main directions. First, the HungarianDefence Forces were (re-)integrated into theMinistry of Defence and the command struc-ture was changed, so that the number of head-quarters was reduced and the personnel wererelocated to different units. Secondly, the size ofpeacetime personnel in the Ministry of Defencewas cut down from 63,000 to a maximum of45,000 (the actual figures would amount to42,900 in accordance with the resolution passedby the Hungarian Parliament in June 2000).8These changes were for the most part made in2000, and completely by June 2001. Accordingto the estimates of the Ministry of Defence, war-time personnel strength will be approximately50 to 60 per cent higher than the authorised pea-cetime personnel strength of the HungarianDefence Forces.9 While the conscript systemcannot be fully eliminated for the time being, inthe long run the Hungarian armed forces maywell be transformed into an even smaller profes-sional rapid reaction force. Recruiting troops toparticipate in peacekeeping missions in theBalkans has been relatively well received by thepublic, in part because those missions provideda safe and morally acceptable living for many.More recently, however, a targeted and well orga-nised campaign has taken place in the mediawith the explicit aim of recruiting qualified per-sonnel for a future professional army.

IV. Hungary and defence procurementThe modernisation of the armed forces hasmade the upgrading of military equipmentequally unavoidable. The debate on defence pro-curement has been driven by two essential ele-

ments: the limits of the country’s financialresources and the determination that any newpurchase be based on Western technology. Inaccordance with the obligations taken on ente-ring NATO, and thanks to the relatively gooddevelopment of the economy, the defence bud-get has been increased to 1.81 per cent of GDP(from the previous 1.61). However, in the fore-seen ten-year cycle of transformation of thedefence forces, the beginning of the acquisitionof new equipment has been set for the secondphase only (until 2006), leaving the bulk of itsmodernisation for the third phase (2007-10).

Between 2000 and 2001 it became apparentthat there was one major exception where theacquisition of new equipment could not be fur-ther delayed: a resolution of Parliament ruledthat ‘the structure of the Air Force must bemodernised in a way that allows the entire airdefence system to operate as a part of NATO’sintegrated air defence system, and aviation unitsmust be capable to assist pursuing operationsrequired by collective defence.’10 A first decisionhad to be made on whether to upgrade the MiG-29 aircraft currently in service or to replace themby modern Western aircraft. It was soon decidedthat although Hungary was ‘to keep equipmentoriginating from a former period temporarilyand due to lack of finances... these (planes) arenot the final solution.’11 Accordingly, themodernisation of MiG-29s was gradually aban-doned and it was decided that Western planeswould be leased instead. The relevant decision-making process was heavily weighed down bydomestic and foreign policy considerations.Five bids were made to the Hungarian govern-ment: F-16s were offered by the United States,Belgium, Turkey and Israel, while Sweden pro-posed the Gripen. The decision was made by theNational Security Cabinet and, in spite of a diffi-

8 62/2000 (VI.21. OGY határozat a fegyveres erõk részletes bontású létszámáról szóló 124/1997 (XII.18.) határozat módosításáról/Resolution 62/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on modification of Resolution 124/1997 (18 December) of the Parliament regarding thedetailed personnel strength of the armed forces. (Officers: 8,600, warrant officers and NCOs: 10,230, contract soldiers: 6,700, conscripts:12,610, students from higher educational institutions: 1,200, civilians: 4,010.)9 Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, p. 4. http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=582. 10 61/2000 (VI.21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszú távú átalakításának irányairól /Resolution 61/2000 (21 June) of theParliament on the long-term transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces/, point 4b11 A miniszterelnök a feladatszabó értekezleten /The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning Conference of the Hungarian Defence Forces/,1 March 2001, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=717.

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Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa

12 ‘Új amerikai ajánlat F-16-osokra’ (New American proposal for F-16s) Népszabadság, 25 October 2001, p. 1.13 János Martonyi, in his opening press conference on 3 January 2001. http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2001/MartonyiJ/0103mjevk.html.

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cult internal debate, the Swedish proposal wasaccepted on 10 September 2001. That proposalhad an important plus, namely that the amountof the lease would be reinvested in theHungarian economy. There are still some termsof the contract to be negotiated – the frameworkagreement was signed by the HungarianDefence Minister and his Swedish counterpartin December 2001 – as regards especially theexact price of the lease and the date of delivery,which the Hungarian government would like tobe as early as 2004. The Swedish party under-takes to train pilots and technical staff as well.Interestingly, during the negotiations betweenthe two parties, which were taking longer thanexpected, the newly-appointed US Ambassadorto Budapest handed in a new American proposalto the Minister of Defence, noting that ‘had theHungarian government made the decision after11 September, probably another decision wouldhave been made.’12

It should be added, however, that after all adecision was made in the National SecurityCabinet on the modernisation of the MiG-29s,which without upgrading could not be kept inservice after the summer of 2002. Of 27 MiG-29s, 14 will be upgraded at a cost of HUF5 bil-lion, the rest are in such poor condition thatupgrading them would be too expensive.

V. Hungary and European security policyBudapest supports the further extension ofNATO both on the basis of its national interestsand out of moral considerations. Hungary sup-ports its neighbours in the Euro-Atlantic inte-gration process (in the Alliance and the Unionalike) on the understanding that the security ofHungary can be fully guaranteed only if itsneighbours are integrated into the EU andNATO as well. It is the firm belief of theHungarian government that the accession of

those states in its area that are well prepared formembership will strengthen its security envi-ronment.

So far, the enlargement process has had a sta-bilising effect in Central Europe, whereHungary itself is perceived and conceived by theGovernment as a state that has a stabilisinginfluence over the entire region. The Hungarianminorities abroad play an important role in thisprocess: they are seen as a bridge, an essentiallink between a Hungary that is already in NATOand at the doorstep of the EU, and its neigh-bours who are following in line. ‘The ethnicHungarian minorities and their political organi-sations in all the neighbouring countries sup-port those forces that had initiated the reformprocess, and which are interested in the streng-thening of the Euro-Atlantic and the Europeanintegration process, and are successful in suchsupport. These common interests make thecooperation of Hungary with its neighboursrelatively easy and successful ... The most impor-tant element of the Hungarian strategy is tounite the Hungarians in a practically and econo-mically increasingly integrated Europe.’13

As security is understood in a broad sense(including the economic dimension, especiallyin the case of the EU) by Hungarian politicalélites, the further extension of enlargementwould have an important economic side-effectfor the region, namely that successful regionalcooperative frameworks (e.g. Visegrad) shouldnot be scrapped but could simply be broughtinto the EU.

VI. Hungary and enlargement after 11 SeptemberThe transatlantic debate between Europe andthe United States on ESDP seems outdated after11 September. While ESDP was being imple-mented further, European states rushed to sup-port the United States and immediately joined

Hungary

the US-led coalition. The centre of decision-making and action is again, and remains, theUnited States, thus vindicating Hungarianforeign policy-makers who feel justified in theirdeclarations on the importance of the Americanpresence in Europe.

NATO’s Article 5 was invoked, yet it is notNATO where decisions have been made andmilitary actions carried out. NATO is not eventhe place for partial consultations. 11September could have an impact on the futuredevelopment of the Alliance in such aspects asdefence planning, strategic doctrines or the geo-graphic scope of NATO operations. It is inHungary’s best interests, however, that NATOsticks to its basic functions and remains a rele-vant defence against any attack and firmly relieson its set of values. NATO should also play a rele-vant role in peace-support operations and regio-nal conflict management.

No one knows as yet how 11 September willaffect EU and NATO enlargement. It is worthnoting, however, that the two decisions will bemade approximately at the same time and byalmost the same actors. While the accession cri-teria cannot be circumvented, the main lesson ofthe conflict in Afghanistan is that no region thatcould become a source of instability should beneglected.14 Keeping the enlargement processopen meets the Hungarian foreign policy aim tohave as many of its neighbours integrated intoWestern organisations as possible. This wouldhelp ease the tension between those who are inand those who are (temporarily) left out. Asregards Hungary’s accession to the EU,Budapest is sticking to its original schedule: thecountry will be ready to close the accession nego-tiations in the year 2002.

It is clear that Hungary will never have a roleto play in Afghanistan, except maybe for peace-keeping activities: the country’s importance willdepend on its usefulness. Hungary should startto specialise on functions that are lacking in pea-cekeeping operations, as for instance theconstruction of bridges, which it has alreadydone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.15

When ESDP was conceived, both militaryand non-military elements were taken intoconsideration. The number of peacekeepingmissions is probably going to increase, whileconflict prevention and non-military tasks willbe further emphasised. The strengthening ofCFSP and European capabilities is endorsed byHungary, provided (once again) it does not wea-ken NATO’s defence role.

Furthermore, it is in Hungary’s interests thatRussia be closely linked to Europe. A Europeansecurity system should involve Russia in thelong run, but perhaps not too soon. The Ameri-can/Western-Russian rapprochement after 11September, in fact, might bring about a situa-tion familiar to that of the states of CentralEurope from the NATO accession negotiationsperiod, namely that the West and Russia speak‘over our heads’.

Finally, the official Hungarian position isthat the use of WMD is not yet in within thepower of terrorist organisations.16 Non-prolife-ration regimes should be strengthened.Hungary has always been active on non-prolife-ration for all WMD categories, but especially inthe domain of the prohibition of biological wea-pons: Ambassador Tibor Tóth has chaired thead hoc Group on the Protocol to the BWC forthe past six years.

14 Csaba Kõrösi, Deputy State Secretary, MFA, in his lecture at the Foreign Policy Association on 24 October 2001.15 Hungary used to be a major producer of pontoon bridges in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation until 1998, and its engineering units forassembling them are still proficient.16 Csaba Kõrösi, Deputy State Secretary, MFA, in his lecture at Foreign Policy Association on 24 October 2001.

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Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa

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Slovenia Ivan Hostnik

I. Slovenia and CFSP

Accession to the EU is a major priority andundoubtedly a major challenge for Slovenia. It isalso a historic opportunity: in fact, by harmoni-sing its legislation with the acquis communau-taire, Slovenia is accelerating the process ofstrengthening its economy and improving itscompetitive position. Actual negotiationsbegan in March 1998. Slovenia has set itself thegoal of being internally prepared for theassumption of obligations deriving from mem-bership by the end of 2002. The signature of theaccession agreement is expected at the samedate. By 2004, Slovenia hopes to be a member ofboth the EU and NATO.

Slovenia accepted the acquis in the CFSPchapter without requesting any transitional per-iods. Slovenian legislation allows integrationinto the second pillar and is fully in compliancewith the acquis, including the field of diplomaticand consular protection, cooperation with thirdcountries and international institutions, imple-mentation of negative measures, and the signa-ture of international contracts and treaties. Theonly problem related to this chapter could be theintroduction into Slovenian legislation of a sys-tem allowing prompt implementation of broa-der EU measures (e.g. enforcement or abolitionof sanctions against third countries). This is stilllacking at the moment.

As an EU Associated Country, Sloveniaalready actively participates in the formulationof CFSP. Within the framework of the enhancedpolitical dialogue conducted by the EU withcandidates, Slovenian officials attend the twice-yearly meetings of Political Directors andEuropean Correspondents. Ljubljana, however,proposes that the Associated Countries shouldstart to take a more active part in the formula-

tion of EU common positions and joint actions.Since 1999 Slovenia has been connected to thetelecommunications Associated CountriesNetwork (ACN) that links the AssociatedCountries to the Secretariat-General of the EUCouncil, thus making it easier for the country tojoin the démarches, positions, declarations andjoint actions of the Union. Thanks to the ACN,every Associated Country can also inform otherstates in the network on its foreign policy activi-ties.

Good-neighbourly relations are crucial forstability and security. Slovenia has made consi-der-able progress in forging good bilateral rela-tions. None of its neighbours poses a militarythreat, although a few unsettled issues in thearea may have an impact on economic and poli-tical stability. Of Slovenia’s neighbours,Hungary has already become a full member ofNATO, and relations are very good also in so faras respective national minorities across the bor-der are concerned. Some issues have remainedunresolved with Croatia since the dissolution ofYugoslavia, but the two countries have a stronginterest in cooperating closely. Relations withAustria and Italy are good, although they aresometimes troubled by domestic pressure onthe other side of Slovenia’s border.

II. Slovenia and ESDP

Slovenia attaches great importance to ESDPand follows its development with interest. InLjubljana’s view, participation in ESDP does notmean that the role of NATO will be diminished,since the Union and the Alliance are seen as com-plementary. Of course, Slovenia remains com-mitted to the transatlantic security componentas embodied by NATO.

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Slovenia is not entering the new EU mechanismsunprepared, for it is already involved in manysecurity forums. It is an active participant inNATO’s Partnership for Peace programme andin the operations set up by the internationalcommunity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania,and Kosovo. In June 2001, Ljubljana concludedits participation in the UNFICYP mission inCyprus.

Slovenian officials attend the regular ses-sions of the enhanced political dialogue with theEU in the 15+15 format. Ljubljana particularlywelcomed the decisions taken at Feira and Niceregarding the involvement of third (and espe-cially associated) countries in crisis manage-ment.

Slovenia wishes to contribute actively to buil-ding a new European security and defence iden-tity. From the Slovenian perspective, the interac-tion between the EU and NATO and thepreservation of the Euro-Atlantic connectionare the key issues related to the development ofESDP. The shaping of the security and defencepolicy of the European Union is perceived as acomplementary process to the system of collec-tive defence of the Atlantic Alliance. If the EUwants to ensure operational autonomy and actindependently in a given crisis, i.e. without theactive assistance of the United States, a certaindegree of duplication of means and capabilitieswill be necessary, especially in the fields of stra-tegic intelligence, advanced communications,tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, strate-gic and tactical lift and logistics.

It was also of particular importance toLjubljana that the European Council in Niceadopted a document on mechanisms of coope-ration of the Fifteen with the other EuropeanNATO members and with the candidates for EUmembership, thus enabling them to participateactively in EU crisis-management operations. Asa small country, however, Slovenia can contri-bute much more to the civilian side of crisismanagement than with substantial militarymeans.

III. Slovenia and military crisismanagementSlovenia participated in the CapabilitiesCommitment Conference held in Brussels inNovember 2000. On that occasion, Sloveniamade its ‘voluntary contribution’ to the cata-logue of forces for the so-called Headline-Goal-plus. Ljubljana offered an infantry company, amilitary police squad, a transport helicopter/airforce unit, the ROLE 1 medical unit and officers,and NCOs for work in headquarters. Thesecapabilities have already been tested in variousNATO and UN-led peace support operations.

The table below shows the number of person-nel of the Slovenian Army participating invarious peace support operations as of 2000.

Slovenian Army personnel in PSO (2000)

current numberoperation UN NATO/PfP TOTALUNFICYP 29 29UNTSO 2 2UNMIK 1 1SFOR-AF 41 41SFOR-MP 26 26SFOR-ME 12 12KFOR 6 6Total 32 85 117Source: General Staff of the Slovenian Army, G-7 (internationalcooperation), April 2000

The forces that Slovenia has committed tothe Headline Goal-plus are not the only contri-bution that the country would like to make. Thecountry is also involved in setting up multina-tional units with neighbouring countries – mostnotably the Italo-Slovenia-Hungarian LandForce (MLF) – and in organising joint borderpatrolling with Italy and Germany.

Besides, Ljubljana is interested in taking anactive part in the civilian aspects of crisis mana-gement and conflict prevention proper. This isparticularly true for South-Eastern Europe,where Slovenia advocates pacific solutions tointerethnic conflicts: while supporting the inte-grity of Macedonia, for instance, Slovenia is alsothe biggest single foreign investor in Bosnia-

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Herzegovina. Furthermore, in the first half of2001 it co-chaired Working Table 1 of theStability Pact, dealing inter alia with the esta-blishment of the International Centre for Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Protection ofMinorities. Slovenia is also active in some othersubregional activities (Trilateral Cooperation,Adriatic-Ionian Initiative and Alpe Adria).Another regional programme, the InternationalTrust Fund for Demining (ITF), was launchedjointly by Slovenia and the United States in1995: although technically available to theentire Balkans, it has actually focused mainly onBosnia, and with some success.

IV. Slovenia and defence procurementSince it is not a member of either the EU orNATO, Slovenia is not directly involved inEuropean defence procurement policy. Nor isthe country a member of WEAG, although it isvery interested in becoming one and intends toapply for membership as soon as possible.Ljubljana is well aware of how useful functionalcooperation is for a small country, since it haspartner-nation status within NATO’s PfP andparticipates in those of the Alliance’sConference of National Armaments Directors(CNAD) activities that are open to partners. Atthis year’s CNAD meeting Slovenia was alsogiven the opportunity to introduce its defenceindustry, which is rather small at present andcapable of producing much less than before thedisintegration of former Yugoslavia. It expectsbetter times with EU and NATO membership.On the whole, Slovenia strongly supports amore coordinated European defence procure-ment policy.

In terms of future acquisitions, Slovenia willhave to continue to finance the Swiss-built air-craft already purchased, Bell helicopters andCougar transport helicopters, while it is conside-ring an advanced air control radar system. Ashort-lived domestic discussion about whetherto buy F-16s or other similar combat aircraftappears to have decided against this option, inview of Slovenia’s limited budgetary means and

geography. Other major acquisition projects innear future lie in the areas of tactical telecom-munication systems, logistic vehicles and inte-grated air defence systems.

Ljubljana is currently in a process of fastreorganisation and modernisation of its armedforces. The Slovenian Army is being set up andrefurbished through the acquisition of weaponsystems and equipment that are available on theforeign market. The domestic defence industryis involved especially in the (partially licensed)development and production of the LightWheeled Armoured Vehicle (VALUK) and ofsome items of the XXI Century Warrior equip-ment. Almost 90 per cent of the new equipment,however, is acquired abroad. If and when pos-sible, according to the tender procedures,Slovenia aims at a kind of trade-off/balance bet-ween American and European suppliers. As arule, the government also requires contractapplicants to offer a substantial offset pro-gramme: actually, offsets are understood as oneof the most important instruments for stimula-ting cooperation between domestic and foreigndefence industries.

V. Slovenia and European security policySlovenia is a small European country that, inorder to provide its citizens a safe and stable geo-political framework, has given priority to mem-bership of multilateral (security) structures. As aconsequence, it believes that its position will bebetter if the EU grows stronger. The EU will bestronger if it is more united. Ljubljana thereforesupports further European integration, ‘evercloser union’. The necessary flexibility is ensu-red by enhanced cooperation, which shouldremain within the framework of the provisionsof the Nice Treaty.

Slovenian officials are pleased with theresults of the EU’s Laeken summit. The resolu-tions are in line with expectations, althoughwhat is most important is that the ten candi-dates (including Slovenia) that may concludenegotiations by the end of this year have beennamed individually. For Slovenia it is also

Slovenia

important that the enlargement roadmap adop-ted in Nice remain unchanged. The EuropeanCommission must therefore draft the negotia-ting standpoints for the chapters on agriculture,regional policy and budget on the basis of theEU’s existing budget, which was agreed at theBerlin summit in 1999.

Slovenia has welcomed the possibility forcandidate countries to participate in the debateabout the future of the enlarged EU. Sloveniaalso hopes that alternative solutions adopted bythe Convention will only be formed uponconsensus among EU members and candidatecountries alike. For Ljubljana it is importantthat in an enlarged EU its national interests bebest fulfilled and protected. It is also worthunderlining that the prospect of eventual mem-bership of the EU has already had and a positiveinfluence per se on the overall security ofSlovenia and its citizens.

VI. Slovenia and enlargement after 11 SeptemberAccording to opinion polls, the events of11 September are seen as unlikely to slow downor speed up the EU enlargement process signifi-cantly. The political pressure for enlargement as

a means of stabilising countries to the East hasbeen increased, but new requirements for mem-bership are being added as well.

The process of NATO enlargement also gai-ned momentum when the fight against terro-rism was placed at the top of the foreign anddefence policy agendas of all European coun-tries and the United States. What happened was,in a way, logical, but it would probably not havehappened had it not been for the terroristattacks. Solidarity between East and West wasdeclared, particularly with Russia and someMuslim countries. These changes may have aninfluence on NATO too, although they are unli-kely to alter its nature and mission.

Slovenia is well aware of the problem of inter-national terrorism. The day after the brutalattacks on the United States, the Republic’sNational Security Council decided that Sloveniawould support and actively contribute to inter-national counter-terrorism efforts with all itsavailable resources. It also tasked all the relevantauthorities with a further strengthening of theactivities that guarantee domestic security.Ljubljana is also following the Action Plan of theEuropean Union and is implementing UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373, which repre-sents the main basis for the current internatio-nal action against terrorism.

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Romania Daniel Calin

I. Romania and CFSP

Accession negotiations with Romania were offi-cially launched on 15 February 2000. Among thefive chapters opened, there were also Chapter 26(External Relations) and Chapter 27 (CFSP). Thenegotiations on both were provisionally closedduring the Accession Conference Romania – EUon 14 June 2000.

In its position paper, Romania declared itselfready to accept the acquis under Chapter 26 andto implement it by 2007. Romania’s statementwas that at the date of accession it would ensurethat all its agreements and treaties (in particulartrade, economic and technical cooperation andinvestment accords) complied with the obliga-tions of membership. The EU welcomedRomania’s statement to encourage the develop-ment of economic relations between the EU andthe Republic of Moldova, in the framework ofthe Common Commercial Policy, afterRomania’s accession. The conclusion was thatthis chapter did not require further negotiations.

In the same context, Romania declared itsacceptance of the existing acquis in the CFSP areaand did not require any transitional period orderogation. The necessary structures for itsimplementation are in place, while Romania’sforeign and security policy is based on the sameprinciple and has the same orientation as thepolicy pursued by the EU. Romania will be readyto apply the existing acquis at the moment ofaccession. Due to the peculiarities of the CFSPacquis, the screening process earmarked four dif-ferent domestic aspects to be tackled in order tocomply fully with EU standards: the system ofrestrictive measures vis-à-vis the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during theMilosevic regime; Afghanistan; the embargo onarms and military equipment against Ethiopiaand Eritrea; and the visa restriction regime for

persons involved in the military junta inBurma/Myanmar. Romania aligned itself withall the démarches, common positions and jointactions in the four above-mentioned areas forwhich it was invited to do so. Bucharest alsodeclared its readiness to examine the furtherdevelopment of the acquis and on a regular basisto inform the Accession Conference and theAssociation Council on the progress made in itsadoption and implementation.

Relations with neighbouring countries arenormal. Relations with FRY have taken a normalpath now. As for those with Hungary, the bilate-ral difficulties created by the Status Law (promo-ted last year by the Hungarian Government inorder to offer a special status to Hungarianminorities in such neighbouring countries asRomania and Slovakia) were overtaken by thesignature of a memorandum between the tworespective prime ministers. In addition, there areongoing negotiations with Ukraine on the‘Treaty on the State border regime’ and the‘Agreement on delimitation [of] the maritimezones between Romania and Ukraine’, as well aswith Bulgaria on a similar agreement. In spite ofthe Romanian proposals, there has been no res-ponse so far from the Ukrainian side. There wereno new developments in the negotiations withBulgaria in 2001 either.

In the future, Romania will continue to deve-lop an active policy of good-neighbourliness –making use inter alia of the problem-solvingpotential of bi- or trilateral cooperative frame-works – with the goal of bringing stability to theregion. Last year the Romanian Chairmanship ofOSCE, together with the main internationalactors in Skopje (especially the EU and NATO),was deeply involved in the management of thecrisis in Macedonia and the conclusion of asound settlement along the principles laid downin the Ohrid Agreements.

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At the EU summit in Laeken, in December2001, Romania was not mentioned among thefirst ‘wave’ of countries expected to be able totake part in the European Parliament electionsin 2004 as EU members. That decision was in linewith the realistic objective set by the Romaniangovernment, i.e. to open negotiations on allchapters in 2002 with the aim of being in a posi-tion to join the Union by 2007.

II. Romania and ESDP

Although Romania has had the highest level ofpopular support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration among the candidates (80per cent for the EU and 85 per cent for NATO,according to the latest opinion polls, includingthe Eurobarometer of November 2001), ESDPdid not attract much public attention when itwas launched. This could be explained by a lackof information and by the fact that NATO enlar-gement was much more fashionable at thattime. At the political level, however, ESDP wasdealt with as an important development in theprocess of the EU asserting its identity on theinternational scene.

The European and Euro-Atlantic integrationprocesses are essential national objectives ofRomanian foreign policy. Consequently,Bucharest considers the political and militaryintegration into the EU and NATO as comple-mentary, contributing to the modernisation ofRomanian society. Yet the opposition parties(especially the far right party, ‘Great Romania’)consider this dual-track approach as counter-productive and against the national interest.

Romania welcomed the decisions adopted bythe European Councils in Cologne andHelsinki. It has expressed its willingness andstrong interest in actively participating in thearrangements for cooperation with third coun-tries and becoming a fully-fledged participantin ESDP once it joins the EU. At the same time,Romania has been against unnecessary duplica-tion with NATO, decoupling of Euro-Atlanticsecurity and structures, and discrimination vis-à-vis European allies involved in the develop-ment of ESDP. In Romania’s view, much as the

EU and NATO should act as complementaryorganisations in the field of crisis management,they should remain different in nature, at leastin the medium term. NATO remains the cor-nerstone of European security and the funda-ment of collective defence in the Euro Atlanticarea. The development and implementation ofESDP should build on the principles approvedat the North Atlantic Council in Berlin (1996).The process of development and implementa-tion of ESDP should aim at strengthening theEuropean Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)within NATO and preserving the transatlanticlink as a prerequisite for an effective securityarchitecture. The development of cooperationbetween the EU and NATO has to be fullyconsistent with the principle of autonomousdecision-making capacity. The creation of theERRF has to be put in place in accordance with the NATO concept of ‘separable, but notseparate’ forces.

At the operational level, ESDP should drawon the experience acquired within thePartnership for Peace (PfP) and the develop-ment of an evaluation mechanism should buildon the achievements of its Planning and ReviewProcess (PARP).

Initially, Romania insisted on the transfer ofthe WEU acquis to the EU’s ESDP. It soonbecame apparent, however, that ESDP was desi-gned especially for the EU member states andthat the third countries should be content to beassociated with this process. Yet the Romanianperception of the Feira and Nice deliberationswas that the EU pays more attention to the 15+6format than to the 15+15 one. That is whyRomania will promote a non-discriminatoryapproach towards all the 15 countries virtuallyassociated to ESDP, starting with the Union’smilitary exercises policy.

III. Romania and military crisismanagementAt the Military Capabilities CommitmentConference in Brussels (November 2000),Romania made its offer of additional forces forthe ERRF. That offer was in line with the forces

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made available for WEU and consisted of landand maritime forces (about 1,000 military per-sonnel and four vessels). During the CapabilityImprovement Conference in Brussels(November 2001), Romania made a new, signifi-cantly increased offer in order to enhance itscontribution to the achievement of the HelsinkiHeadline Goal-plus. The new offer also includedforces with some experience in peace supportoperations (PSO). All these forces are ready tomeet the interoperability requirements for theexecution of EU-led missions. The SupremeCouncil of National Defence decided that theseforces should be the same as those made avai-lable for NATO-led PSO. This approach wasbased on the financial and logistical capabilitiesrequested for training and sustaining suchforces in a theatre of operations, and on the cri-teria set by the EU bodies. The offer includes: ◗land forces: 5 infantry battalions and 1 infantrycompany, 1 paratroop company, 1 mountaintroops company, 1 military police company,1 engineer company, 1 mine-clearance detach-ment, 1 reconnaissance platoon, 1 transportplatoon; ◗ maritime forces: 6 maritime and river vessels (of which 2 rescue tugs, 1 minesweeper and a fri-gate); ◗air forces: 4 MiG-21 Lancer combat aircraft and1 C-130B cargo aircraft.

The Romanian offer amounts to approxima-tely 3,700 military personnel, probably the mostimportant contribution from all the candidatecountries (bar Turkey) All these forces meet theEU’s requirements (ready to be deployed in fullwithin 30 days, sustainable for 1 year and avai-lable from 2001). Moreover, at the CIC,Romania announced its readiness to contribute75 police officers to the European PoliceHeadline Goal.

Meanwhile, the Romanian MOD has plan-ned a more compact, higher performance, moreefficient and flexible force structure, compatiblewith NATO standards, to be operational by theend of 2003. It will include 112,000 military per-sonnel (18,000 officers, 40,000 NCOs and war-rant officers, 22,300 contract-enlisted sergeantsand 31,500 conscripts) and 28,000 civilians. Inthe planning blueprint, Romania’s basic secu-

rity and defence interests were considered, joi-ning NATO being a wish, not an end in itself. Asa Membership Action Plan (MAP) country, theprocess of reforming and restructuring theRomanian armed forces benefits from politi-cally agreed financial support, so that thedefence budget will be maintained at a level of atleast 2 per cent of GDP. It was 1.9 per cent in2001, and will be around 2.4 per cent in 2002,with a simultaneous growth of GDP anddefence expenditure. The budget for 2001 allo-cated: 57 per cent of expenditure for personnel,33 per cent for equipment (including foreigncredit reimbursement) and around 10 per centfor operation and maintenance, infrastructureand other expenses. The goal is to reach NATOstandards: 40 per cent personnel costs, 35-40 percent equipment acquisition, 20-25 per cent ope-ration and mainte-nance.

Since 1991 Bucharest has been actively invol-ved in a large number of PSOs, gaining a signifi-cant experience in the field: 9 UN operations,3 NATO-led peace support operations and4 missions under the OSCE umbrella. Theyinclude Angola (UNAVEM III and MONUA);Albania (ALBA); Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR,SFOR I and II); Kosovo (KFOR); Afghanistan(ISAF); Iraq–Kuwait (UNIKOM); Congo(MONUC); Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE); andOSCE missions in Georgia, FYROM andKosovo. More than 6,500 Romanian militarypersonnel have already been involved. Presently,Romania’s main efforts are directed to its parti-cipation in SFOR (120 military personnel),KFOR (210) and ISAF (48 and a C-130B trans-port aircraft).

Currently, Romania is also taking part in thefollowing regional politico-military cooperativeinitiatives: Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)/South-EasternEurope Brigade (SEEBRIG); Black Sea NavalCooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR);Romanian-Hungarian Joint PeacekeepingBattalion; Multinational Engineer Battalionbetween Hungary, Romania, Slovakia andUkraine (Tisa Battalion); and MultinationalStand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UNOperations (SHIRBRIG). Furthermore, nego-tiations are taking place for the establishing of

Romania

the Central European Nations Cooperation inPeace Support (CENCOOP).

IV. Romania and defence procurementRomania considers that European cooperationin the field of defence industry plays an essentialrole in improving the EU’s military capabilities.Bucharest is also keen on participating inWEAG: negotiations are in hand in order toconclude a memorandum of understandingbetween Romania and WEAG, allowing the par-ticipation in the programmes launched throughthe EUROFINDER mechanism.

Romania’s current and projected inventoryof CFE-accountable equipment is below theestablished ceilings. Actually, during theCommunist regime Romania had an importantand well-developed defence industry sector.Romanian arms exports were directed to variousconflict areas in the world. After 1989, the tradi-tional arms export markets went lost once andfor all and domestic demand, too, shrankbecause of the lack of resources. As a conse-quence, the defence industry has undergonemajor restructuring. At the beginning of the1990s there were approximately 130,000employees in the sector: presently they amountto only 60,000 (according to some sources, thereal figure is 45,000). The restructuring processwas limited to downsizing personnel andvarious compensatory measures. Since 2001, ithas been managed by the Ministry of Industryand Resources along with the MOD. Accordingto official sources, in 2002 a further 26,500employees may have to be laid off, while recoveryprogrammes and other protection measures areenvisaged. The government committed itselfnot to close any of the existing defence factoriesbut either to convert them to civilian produc-tion or transform them into modern militaryequipment producers.

In the past, several scandals have exploded indefence procurement policy. Probably the mostfamous is that related to the privatisation of IARBrasov, once the pride of the Romanian defenceindustry. According to the initial contract, the

acquisition by Romania of 96 attack helicopters(close to the figure allowed by CFE Treaty and ata cost far exceeding the defence budget) was acondition set by Bell Helicopters for taking overthe firm. One of the arguments used by the for-mer government to support the takeover wasbased on the fact that it would have enhancedRomania’s chances of NATO membership. Inthe end, after a long and controversial publicdebate, the Government had to abandon itsposition. Meanwhile, there have been negotia-tions with the European group Eurocopter, butnothing concrete has happened so far.

According to the declared priorities and tothe financial resources allocated for the defencesector, the restructuring process of the armedforces was to be undertaken in two stages. In thefirst stage (2000-03), the process includes resizingthe armed forces and establishing the new forcestructure; the professionalisation of the person-nel; the modernisation and standardisation oftraining practices. During this stage, only acqui-sition programmes whose funding is ensuredwill be implemented, all others being reschedu-led. Still, while the new structures are put inplace, the partial modernisation of certain ope-rational components will be carried out. In thesecond stage (2004-07), progress towards theplanned operational capability will continueand major procurement programmes aimed atthe modernisation of the Romanian forces withsupport equipment and protection of the com-bat equipment typical of the twenty-first cen-tury battlefield will be concluded. In otherwords, no major procurement programme willbegin before 2004.

V. Romania and European security policyRomania’s view of the role of an enlarged EU isto have a Union with a more coherent and defi-ned vision vis-à-vis the main internationalactors, i.e. the United States, Russia, and China.In the medium term, CFSP should function onan intergovernmental basis, especially as aconsequence of the development and imple-mentation of ESDP. The European Commis-

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sion, however, should be increasingly involvedin this field. The EU is a regional power, but inmany areas it acts as a global one. In Bucharest’seyes, the place of Europe in the international sys-tem could be defined as follows: the most faith-ful allies of the United States, Russia’s anchorwithin the community of democratic and freesocieties, and a powerful global actor in the fieldof trade and finance (via the euro). In the longerterm, the emergence of ESDP could constitutethe necessary incentive to transform the EU intoa global actor and fully assert its identity on theinternational scene. The Union should stick toits traditional way of promoting its values, i.e.through preventive actions. The EU seems tobenefit from the advantage that there is nodominant country inside it. On the contrary, themember states, especially the small andmedium-sized ones, should focus on the areas offoreign policy where they have experience andinterests. With enlargement, these CFSP fea-tures are set to become stronger.

Geographically, for Romania, the prioritiesof CFSP should be the Balkans, the CIS andRussia, probably the Caucasus. Romania deemsit necessary to pay more attention, during thenext IGC, to the definition of the geographicallimits of the EU. This would contribute to thedefinition of a strategic approach to its easternneighbours, i.e. the Republic of Moldova,Ukraine and Belarus.

In the foreseeable future, the constructiveabstention clause represents for the EU perhapsthe only possible way to function on a normalbasis in an intergovernmental area such asCFSP/ESDP. As for the application of enhancedcooperation to CFSP/ESDP, Romania has sup-ported the idea from the beginning and sugges-ted using the ESDP concept as an avant-garde ofenlargement (there have been proposals toextend the Association Agreement to thedefence sector). The QMV procedure, bycontrast, should not be used as a means toignore or marginalise small and medium-sizedcountries. Finally, given the progress that hasbeen and will be made in the CFSP/ESDP,Bucharest will probably support the establish-ment of a Council of Ministers of Defence on themodel of the General Affairs Council.

Romania is in favour of the review of the Treatiesand backs the idea of a European Constitutionor a Constitutional Treaty on the Union. Therole of the European Parliament should becomemore important and it should also be givensome authority over defence expenditure as rela-ted to Art. 17 TEU-type operations. A Commit-tee of National Parliaments, on the model of theEconomic and Social Committee and theCommittee of the Regions, could also be set up.There would be two possible options: a minimalone, with the Committee having only a consulta-tive role (thus also solving the problem of thefuture of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly);and a maximal one, with it receiving some compe-tencies and a right of co-decision with the pre-sent European Parliament.

The future of the EU-NATO relationshipdepends, in a decisive way, on the finalisation ofthe arrangements allowing the Union access toNATO assets and capabilities. Romania sup-ports the EU’s efforts in this domain as well asthe prospect of harmonising the two organisa-tions’ exercise policy, along the pattern of pastWEU-NATO relations. The efforts of the EU inthe field of ESDP should not – at least in themedium term – lead to the creation of aEuropean Army.

VI. Romania and enlargement after 11 SeptemberAfter the tragic events of September 2001,Romania became aware that security is indivi-sible and that ignoring aggression may meaninviting aggression. For the first time since theend of the Cold War, the whole world was unitedagainst a common enemy – terrorism. As aconsequence, Romania has immediately decla-red itself a de facto NATO member and actedaccordingly. A concrete step was to offer NATOforces free access to all land, maritime and airfacilities identified in this context.Furthermore, Romania announced its contri-bution to ISAF.

Although the initial general reaction was oneof shock and solidarity with the United States, afew weeks later Romania found itself once again

Romania

immersed in its economic and social problems.It also became obvious that the country is notseen as a potential target for similar attacks. YetBucharest considers that the impact of11 September has been directly felt by South-Eastern Europe as a region. First, because it isstill an area with a very high potential forconflict. Second, because terrorists have beenactive within its borders. Third, because a shiftin political attention away from here might haveunpredictable consequences, at a time whenunfinished business still requires the involve-ment of the international community. Andfourth, because further disintegration in thisregion could have a disruptive effect on thenecessary coordination efforts of the anti-terro-rist campaign. That is why the US decision tostick to its commitments in the Balkans was wellreceived in Romania.

In the new circumstances, some countries ofSouth-Eastern Europe decided to launch a newinitiative on ‘Counterproliferation, BorderSecurity and Counterterrorism’. Romania

intends to play an active role in it. By assumingthe chairmanship of SEDM CoordinationCommittee (SEDM-CC) and Political-MilitarySteering Committee (PMSC)/MPFSEE in 2001and of SEEGROUP, as well as the Co-Presidencyof the Stability Pact for South-Eastern EuropeWorking Table III in 2002, Bucharest will bringits contribution to the coordination processamong the various cooperative initiatives in theregion. In this endeavour, it will most certainlytake stock of the experience gained while chai-ring the OSCE in 2001.

Finally, Romania does not see any immediatelinkage between the enlargement of the EU, thatof NATO and the present security situation.Although the NATO-Russia relationship hastaken a new and positive path and put the BalticStates altogether in a better position thanbefore, Romania has important assets and thereis still a good chance that it will be invited to joinNATO.

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Bulgaria Radoslava Stefanova

I. Bulgaria and CFSP

Since 10 December 1999, Bulgaria has openednegotiations on 23 chapters, having depositedofficial positions on 26. It is about to deposit theremaining three positions soon. To date, 13chapters have been preliminarily closed.Negotiations on Chapters 26 and 27 wereamong those that presented least problems:both were officially opened for negotiation inMay 2000 and closed in November 2000 andJune 2000 respectively. Bulgarian foreign andsecurity policy is enshrined predominantly inthe 1991 Constitution, more specifically in itsArticles 5, 24, 85, 98, 100, 106, 49 and 158, whichconstitute the legal norms to be examined inrelation to CFSP. All three of the EU Com-mission’s Progress Reports since 1999 haveunderlined the compliance of Bulgarian legisla-tion with the CFSP acquis, and both Brussels andSofia expect that Bulgaria will be fully able toadopt the entire CFSP acquis at the time of acces-sion. Due to the normative scope of the legisla-tion linked CFSP, Bulgaria’s negotiating posi-tion was the only one submitted for discussionand approval to Parliament, which adopted itunanimously on 26 May 2000.

Since 1994, i.e. even before filing its officialapplication for EU membership (in late 1995),Bulgaria has been invited to join various EUcommon positions and démarches. It has done soconsistently, including support for negativemeasures against third countries/areas (FormerYugoslavia) that had significant economicrepercussions. The Bulgarian side puts particu-lar emphasis on its support for the EU’s Code of

Conduct on arms exports, as well as on the gene-ral lack of requests for derogation or transitio-nal periods on both sides.

In its relationship with third countries,Bulgaria stresses its role in promoting regionalcooperation and stabilisation in South-EasternEurope, where it is part of virtually all subregio-nal and multilateral initiatives and bodies, sup-porting and joining all important missions andprojects. Officials at the Foreign Ministryemphasise the important stabilisation and paci-fication role Sofia has played during the prolon-ged Balkan crises, which is likely to reinforce theUnion’s ability to cope with similar crises in thefuture, once the country becomes a fully-fled-ged EU member.1 Bulgaria also underlines itsexcellent relations with all its neighbours, a factnot to be taken for granted in what is still quite aturbulent region.

As for the other provisions covered inChapter 27, Bulgaria has put in place all relevantlegislation for the safeguard of foreign diplo-mats and consular relations in general. It hasalso concluded the technical preparation for theinstallation of U3 mail common communica-tion system and considers itself ready for fullparticipation in the Courtsey system.

In the field of control of foreign trade inarmaments and dual-use items and technolo-gies, Bulgaria is also harmonising its legal sys-tem in accordance with the update and review ofthe relevant EU acquis. The Parliament is cur-rently discussing amendments to the existinglaw on Control of Foreign Trade Activity ofArms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,likely to be adopted by the end of November. The

1 Private interviews with officials from the European Integration Directorate, MFA, Sofia, November 2001. Unless otherwise indicated, allthe quoted statements and reported data in this paper are taken from RFE/RL Newsline (2001-02).

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new bill should bring Bulgarian legislation inline with the EU Council Regulation1334/22.06.2000 as well as incorporating anupdated list of banned items in accordance withthe Wassenaar Arrangement. A list of countriesand organisations to which exports are to be res-tricted was adopted by the Government on 9April 2000. In other words, there is no reason tothink that there will be problems with the coun-try’s ability and willingness to adopt fully allCFSP decisions at the time of accession – whene-ver that happens.

II. Bulgaria and ESDP

According to a recent statement by the newBulgarian Foreign Minister, Solomon Passy,‘Bulgaria welcomes and supports the emergingESDP as a policy to reinforce the Union’s contri-bution to peace and stability on the continent.Our support stems from Bulgaria’s strategicgoals – EU and NATO membership. We sharethe view that being able to deliver on an effectivesecurity and defence policy is essential for theEU credibility.’2 In addition, Passy underlinedthat EU’s increased crisis management capabili-ties under ESDP were ‘a vital element in ourcommon coalition against terrorism’.

It should be noted, however, that Bulgaria’scurrent foreign minister has a personal pro-NATO background, having been for almost 10years the president of Bulgaria’s Atlantic Club.As a result, his vision certainly has a strongAtlantic orientation (similar to that of the threeCentral European NATO non-EU members),favouring a limited development of an autono-mous European defence capability but with anemphasis on placing all EU activities within aNATO framework. In fact, Passy stresses that hesees the aim of ESDP as ‘the creation of “valueadded” to the existing NATO potential [while]collective defence has to remain NATO’s func-tion.’ By and large, however, it is fair to say that

ESDP’s linkage with NATO was also advocatedby the Kostov government.3 If the current atti-tude in Bulgarian foreign policy-making circlespersists until accession, Bulgaria is very likely toside with the more pro-US group of EU mem-bers.

III. Bulgaria and military crisismanagementFollowing the Capabilities CommitmentConference of November 2000, on 19 April 2001Bulgaria officially declared its willingness tocontribute to the EU’s Rapid Reaction Forcewith one mechanised battalion, one engineeringbattalion, one radioactive and chemical recon-naissance brigade, two Mi-17 cargo helicopters,four military Mi-24 helicopters, a sea-based roc-ket launcher to be used in the Black Sea, and twoliaison officers for employment in the frame-work of CIMIC. Bulgaria also advocates conve-ning a Capabilities Improvement Conferenceand a first Police Conference in 15+15 format. Itis now considering also a possible further contri-bution to the Headline Goal through specificcommitments for civilian crisis management.

More generally, Sofia supports the Union’soverall approach to both the military and civi-lian dimensions of conflict prevention and crisismanagement, and has repeatedly stated itswillingness to contribute to future EU militaryoperations and to participate in its industrialdefinition and development. Bulgaria views itsleading role in the setting up, in 1998, of themultinational peacekeeping force in South-Eastern Europe (SEEBRIG), headquartered inPlovdiv, as evidence of its engagement and abi-lity to contribute to such arrangements.Building on the fact that SEEBRIG was declaredoperational in May 2001, at the 6th South-EastEuropean Defence Ministers meeting held inAntalya last December, US Defence SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld proposed that the SEEBRIG

2 Speech delivered during Passy’s visit to Brussels for a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the EU and the candidatecountries, 20 November 2001.3 Private interviews with officials from the European Integration Directorate, MFA, Sofia, November 2001.

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4 In fact, the SEEBRIG’s rationale has been that the peacekeepers would be deployed in regions other than South-East Europe.5 Interview with Agence France Presse, 26 November 2001 as quoted in RFE/RL Newsline vol. 5, no. 223, Part II, November 2001.6 Private interviews with a former Ministry of Defence official, Sofia, November 2001.

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replace some of the SFOR troops in Bosnia(which he suggested should be downsized by 60per cent by the end of 2002). Bulgarian DefenceMinister Nicolai Svinarov, however, replied thatSofia was against involving its forces in neigh-bouring countries, even for peacekeeping mis-sions.4

Bulgaria has participated in internationalpeacekeeping missions since 1992, havingcontributed with military forces to missions inCambodia, Angola, Croatia, and Tajikistan.Current commitments include a transport bri-gade and a sequence of nine military enginee-ring detachments of 30 men each to SFOR inBosnia-Herzegovina since 1997; a sequence ofthree 40-men military engineering detachmentsand 48 police observers to the UNMIK missionin Kosovo as well as the running of a 2,000-bedmilitary hospital in the Radusha refugee campin FYROM. In addition, Bulgaria has committedtroops and a decontamination shower facility tothe British-led ISAF in Afghanistan, to bedeployed by mid-February.

Bulgarian armed forces currently numberaround 65,000, divided between infantry andartillery troops, the Air Force and the Navy – anumber still too high in terms of both militaryefficiency and defence spending, despite theefforts of the Kostov government to reduce itover recent years. While significant progress hasbeen achieved in pushing through some of thetoughest reforms (such as lay-offs and early reti-rement of officers), further efforts are needed tobring the Army in line with NATO require-ments. The new Defence Minister, NikolaiSvinarov, recently announced a radical restruc-turing of the Army, code-named Plan 2004,which envisages a reduction of 20,000 men by2004 and the formation of small, more mobileunits. Part of Plan 2004 is also the decommissio-ning of 800 tanks, 500 armoured vehicles, 40radar stations, and 27 naval units. With regardto weaponry upgrading in accordance withNATO standards, Svinarov does not expect

resources to be available before 2003.5 However,he pledged that the Army’s communicationssystem would be compatible with that of NATOmembers in time for the 2002 Prague summit. Interms of strategy, Svinarov called for the revisionof both the National Security Concept and theofficial military doctrine, although he conside-red the reforms already undertaken in 2001 withthe purpose of streamlining the armed forcesand initiating the structural reforms of Plan2004 a success. This has also been confirmed byGeneral Jeremy Mackenzie, a former deputySACEUR and now a consultant on militaryreform, who has given a positive overall assess-ment of Svinarov’s Plan 2004. Plan 2004 still hasto be approved by the Council of Ministers.Currently the defence budget is 3 per cent ofGDP.

IV. Bulgaria and defence procurementSince the Kostov government, Bulgaria hassought membership of the WEAG group, andhopes to achieve it soon. While supporting amore coordinated European procurementpolicy, however, the Kostov administration’sprocurement preferences seemed to lie with theUnited States (in so far as they are financiallyaffordable): relations with European suppliershave begun to be explored only recently,although already in 1999 the Government inSofia signed a contract with Marconi for theimprovement of the army’s communicationssystem.6

The most pressing procurement problemconcerns the Air Force, which has two squa-drons of MiG-29s consisting of 21 planes intotal, only three of which are airworthy due tothe lack of spare parts. The problem stems fromRussia’s refusal to pay back half of its $100 bil-lion debt to Bulgaria in spare MiG parts or, moregenerally, to make them available in any marke-

Bulgaria

table way. However, Russia has recently agreedto repay its debt in the form of other militarysupplies, such as nuclear fuel. Throughout 2000there were repeated leaks to the media (neverdenied by the then Defence Minister BoikoNoev) that Bulgaria was negotiating the acquisi-tion of F-16s, which further exasperatedMoscow. Sofia did indeed acquire 6 US Bell heli-copters, while it is not clear whether and how thenew government intends to pursue the purchaseof F-16s.

On 12 December 2001 the new DefenceMinister Nokolai Svinarov officially announcedan international tender for the upgrading of theMiG-29s to bring them in line with NATO stan-dards. The tender is estimated to be worth some$300 million. The bidders are required to repairthe planes at Bulgaria’s aviation repair plantGeorgi Benkovski and to be licensed byMikoyan, Russia’s chief construction bureau.Accordingly, five foreign companies havealready expressed interest, among them theRussian MiG and an unspecified Israeli com-pany. Like his predecessor, Svinarov has alsospeculated on the possibility of selling the MiGsafter their upgrading in order to finance the pur-chase of Western-made military aircraft,although he has not ruled out retaining some ofthe MiGs once they are sufficiently modernisedto meet NATO standards.

Another procurement aspect promptednotably by Bulgaria’s NATO membership aspi-rations has been the dismantlement of the coun-try’s Soviet-made SS-23 medium-range missilesand their replacement with more modern items.Again, the United States is being considered asthe main possible supplier, as it is also pledgingconsiderable financial assistance in both the dis-mantlement of the SS-23s and the delivery ofmore up-to-date US missiles to boost Bulgaria’sposition for the 2002 Prague NATO summit. On18 December 2001 the Bulgarian Parliamentapproved the SS-23s dismantlement timetable,whereby the SS-23s are to be destroyed by 30

October 2002. As agreed with the US StateDepartment, the destruction of the SS-23s willbe carried out by an American company speciali-sed in the destruction of Scud missiles.

V. Bulgaria and European security policyMost of Bulgaria’s progress in the area of enlar-gement and CFSP had to do with the govern-ment led by Ivan Kostov until June 2001. Thenew government of Simeon Saxecoburggotski7that took over last July started out on a vagueforeign policy platform, but it has recently reaf-firmed Bulgaria’s aspirations to EU and NATOmembership. Several months after taking officethe new Foreign Minister, Solomon Passy, pled-ged to deliver by early 2002 an ‘AccelerationStrategy’ for Bulgaria’s EU accession, which theprevious administration expected would occurin 2006. The delivery of the new strategy by thenew government was also prompted by a num-ber of remarks made by EU diplomats in the run-up to the Laeken Euro-pean Council.

Sofia’s relatively late start in pursuing EUand NATO membership and in implementingthe necessary and required reforms accounts forthe ever more resolute approach taken by thepresent and past governments. Even the formerCommunist Party, whose leader was recentlyelected President, seems to be committed tothese same foreign policy priorities. Despite theslowly rising but still relatively low standard ofliving, public support for Euro-Atlantic institu-tions is among the highest among candidatestates.

One of the reasons why it is unlikely thatBulgaria’s general attitude towards the securitydimension of the EU will change significantly inthe future is that the obstacles to membershipare mostly of an economic nature, which makesthe prospect for membership rather speculative.In the CFSP/ESDP field Bulgaria is likely to

7 For purposes of clarity, it should be noted that while the Premier’s royal relatives throughout Europe are usually known under theirdynasty’s name, Saxe Coburg-Gotha, when Simeon took up Bulgarian citizenship in the early 1990s his passport was issued using theBulgarianised version of his original family name, Saxecoburggotski. This is the name under which he registered to run for the generalelections, and this is the name that he now uses as Prime Minister.

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8 Notizie Est, no. 470, www.ecn.org.9 http://www.government.bg/Priorities/ForeignPolicy/2001-10-18/367.html.

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become a constructive member of the Union,duly assuming and fulfilling its obligations interms of crisis management or relevant foreignpolicy initiatives. It is still quite realistic toexpect that stability in South-Eastern Europeand close ties with the United States and NATOwould be Bulgaria’s foreign policy priorities atthe time of membership. Aware of the manystructural limitations that may take Bulgariainto very long transitional periods, the govern-ment has hinted that it favours increased flexibi-lity for CFSP as well as use of the constructiveabstention clause, while also supporting enhan-ced cooperation in principle. Given the substan-tial convergence between Bulgaria’s foreignpolicy and that of the EU, it is unlikely that thecountry would seek any significant change tothe TEU in the field of CFSP/ESDP, even if itmight be very interested in the proceedings ofthe 2004 IGC in other key areas, such as thesocial or the economic ones.

VI. Bulgaria and enlargement after 11 SeptemberThe domestic debate on the new meaning ofsecurity and its preservation in the Balkans inthe wake of the terrorist attack on the UnitedStates was far from one-dimensional. To startwith, Premier Sakskoburggotski’s first declara-tion was ambivalent and stirred up controversyin the press. In fact, he declared that sinceBulgaria was far away from what was happening,the country should not worry about adoptingspecific measures.8 By contrast, Foreign Minis-ter Passy said that NATO’s Art. 5 should beapplied in response to the terrorist attacks, andthat he considered Bulgaria bound by thatarticle even if the country was not a member ofthe Alliance. Defence Minister Svinarov statedthat Bulgaria would be ready to make availableto the United States both air corridors and sup-port troops and equipment. On 13 Septemberthe Parliament approved a declaration of

condemnation of the terrorist attacks, adoptingafter some discussion a formula whereby ‘theUnited Stated has a leading role in the develop-ment of democracy’.

On 13 September some newspapers publi-shed articles critical of the United States and therole of NATO, questioning the security offeredto the Balkans by the EU. The political analystIvan Krastev told the daily Dnevnik on12 September that NATO was losing credibility,and that it was to be expected that South-Eastern Europe would fade away from the USpolitical agenda. As a result, the EuropeanUnion – volens nolens – would have to take up thetask of guaranteeing security in the Balkansmuch more comprehensively, a task for which itstill had to prove its readiness. Also the dailyKapital was worried about the EU’s not beingable or willing to take up peacemaking in theBalkans in the wake of 11 September.

After the controversy had abated somewhat,however, the Government decided to makesome concrete moves which would prop upBulgaria’s credibility as an ally and strengthenthe country’s chances for membership of the EUand NATO. In mid-October the Governmentsubmitted to Parliament a proposal to waiveBulgaria’s reservation on the European Conven-tion on terrorism that the country signed in1998. The reservation has to do with the right torefuse extradition of a terrorist offender reques-ted by another country if it is considered that theoffence had political motivations. On this occa-sion, Justice Minister Anton Stankov arguedthat ‘in the context of the events ofSeptember 11, we cannot make any reservationfor terrorist activities. Terrorism has entered anew era, so global and so overreaching, that ithas to be fought at all levels.’9 And in his recentvisit to Brussels, Foreign Minister Passy onceagain made the link that Bulgaria perceives bet-ween the strengthening of the CFSP throughenlargement and a more effective countering ofinternational terrorism explicit.

On 14 November the Parliament in Sofia

Bulgaria

ratified a deal signed with the United States thatallows US forces to transit through or stay in thecountry as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.The deal also allows the use of Bulgarian airs-pace for overflights and the storage of militaryequipment for the duration of the whole cam-paign against international terrorism. On23 November six USAF KC-135 Stratotanker air-craft serviced by 200 ground personnel arrivedin Burgas: the operation was terminated on27 December 2001. During their visit to Brusselsin mid-November Passy and Svinarov also madean offer of similar logistical support to theBritish troops leading the ISAF force inAfghanistan.

Finally, as far as EU enlargement proper isconcerned, on 19 November French ForeignMinister Hubert Védrine suggested that all 12candidates (the ten Central Europeans plusMalta and Cyprus) should be taken in as mem-bers together, thus emphasising the politicaldimension of enlargement.10 On 6 Decemberthe French Minister for European Affairs, PierreMoscovici, said that ‘Bulgaria should not be leftout of the [EU] accession talks’, and that he sup-ported ‘the idea that the European enlargementproject must be looked at from a political pers-pective and that there must be no dividing linesamong the [candidate] countries.’ NeitherFrench Prime Minister Lionel Jospin norPresident Jacques Chirac dissociated themselvesfrom these statements, which seem to reflect a

concerted policy adopted by France with regardto enlargement in general. Highly encouragedby these statements, and clearly in anticipationof the Laeken summit, on 11 December 2001 theBulgarian Foreign Minister Passy declared thatBulgaria had decided that 2003 was the expecteddate for closing the accession negotiations witha view to joining the EU in 2004 – a decision thatreportedly had been taken several months pre-viously, but that the Premier refused to confirmat the Laeken summit. By contrast, EnlargementCommissioner Günther Verheugen repeatedlysaid that Bulgaria’s attempt to join the EU withthe other candidates was a ‘Harry Potter’approach, and that it was advisable ‘not to createexpectations [among Bulgarians] that are toohigh and cannot be met, because that could leadto disappointment.’ The Laeken Council’s deci-sion, in fact, confirmed the fact that Bulgariaand Romania would probably be left out of the‘Big Bang’ enlargement expected to take place in2004. On 19 December, however, the Bulgarianparliament approved the Accelerated Strategywith an overwhelming majority, building alsoon remarkable public support for a fast track toaccession. While the Strategy has triggered scep-tical reactions by European officials, the DanishParliament’s European Affairs Committee sug-gested that Bulgaria’s accession – by virtue of theprogress made so far – could be separated fromRomania’s.

10 Védrine’s statement was immediately welcomed by Passy as ‘visionary’, in line with Jean Monnet’s thinking. The Belgian presidency,however, followed by Enlargement Commissioner Günther Verheugen, expressed strong doubts as to the plausibility of Védrine’s claims.

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12

Conclusions Antonio Missiroli

The enlargement of the European Union is asecurity policy in itself. It is a security policy

by other means, so to speak, and a security policyin its own right. By other means, because extend-ing the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities andconstraints to the applicants makes instabilityand conflict in the region much less likely,although such adjustment may entail elementsof risk. And it is a security policy in its own right,too, because the entrants bring in interests andskills that broaden the scope of the commonexternal policies.1 This was the case with thefirst enlargement of the European Community,with the British (and partially also Danish) out-reach overseas and gradual Anglo-Irish détentevia Brussels. All the more so with the Southernenlargements of the 1980s, which paved the wayfor the successful completion of post-authori-tarian transitions, a significant reinforcementof the Community’s presence in theMediterranean basin and an equally significantextension of European influence in theAmericas. Finally, the 1995 enlargement of therecently created EU brought more stability tothe Baltic ‘rim’ and strengthened the Union’sdrive to cooperate with the UN and the OSCE. Itmarginally altered the internal balance betweenallied and non-allied member states, but it alsofavoured – albeit indirectly, as a sort of compen-sation for those EU members who felt penalised

by the Central and Northern ‘drift’ of the Union– the launch of the Barcelona process.

The current enlargement, however, isnothing like the previous ones. It is fundamen-tally different in size, scope, and character. Andit is likely to change quite radically the institu-tions, the policies, even the nature of the Union.2To what extent and exactly how will it affect theway in which the EU projects itself externally? Inother words, what CFSP and ESDP will theenlarged Union end up with? Needless to say,answering such questions always entails astrong element of guesswork. In fact, actualmembership per se may alter the expectations,the priorities and, ultimately, the behaviour ofthe former applicants. To a certain extent, thefact that membership is closer now than it was afew years ago has already altered their attitudeand influenced their foreign policy decisions.Moreover, in a Union of more than 20 members,alliances and coalitions may easily shift accor-ding to the contingencies and the issues at stake.What can be assessed at this stage, therefore, isonly what priorities, preferences, general atti-tudes and specific interests the current appli-cants will bring into the present Union ofFifteen. What will happen from day one afteraccession is bound to remain a guessing game.

In this respect, much as nuances persistamong the ten Central European3 candidates

1 See my introduction to A. Missiroli (ed.), ‘Coherence for European Security Policy: Debates – Cases – Assessments’, Occasional Paper 27(Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 2001), especially pp. 6-7. On enlargement as ‘risk management’, see P. Cecchini, E. Jonesand J. Lorentzen, ‘Europe and the Concept of Enlargement’, Survival, vol. XLIII (2001), no. 1, pp. 155-65.2 For an overview see G. Avery and F. Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). On thespecific procedures and the use of ‘conditionality’ see K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1999). See also F. Draus, ‘Un élargissement pas comme les autres. Réflexion sur les spécificités des pays candidats d’Europecentrale et orientale’, Etudes et recherches 11 (Paris: Notre Europe, 2000). For the significantly different issues raised by the two Mediterraneancandidates (Cyprus and Malta) see M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (eds.), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

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(due also to their different historical experience,geopolitical position, sheer size, and availablere-sources), some discernible common featuresemerge from the contributions collected in thisOccasional Paper.

■ CFSP and ESDP

First, the negotiations on the CFSP-relatedchapters (26 and 27) of the acquis went rathersmoothly and came to a quick end for all. Theonly issues that stirred up some controversy – beit through requests for transitional periods (26)or through non-alignment with CFSP commonpositions or démarches (27) – were those thatinvolved relations with fellow applicants and/orneighbours. As long as the enlargement processappeared to proceed in different gears for thetwo main groups invited to the negotiating table– the Luxembourg Six (1997) and the HelsinkiSix (1999) – the most advanced candidates wereafraid of dismantling bilateral or subregionalarrangements that had proved effective inimproving relations and security at all levels.However, once it became clear recently thatalmost all ten countries under considerationmight accede to the Union at roughly the sametime, that worry disappeared. Similar fears wereaired with respect to such countries as Ukraineand, to a lesser extent, Belarus. In so far as theyare still on the table, they will be dealt with eitherin the final round of negotiations on the indivi-dual Accession Treaties or in the broader EU fra-mework after enlargement.

On the whole, however, it is arguable thatenlarging the CFSP acquis has hardly raised anyproblems, thanks to its primarily declaratory

nature, the limited domestic adjustments it hasrequired, and the substantial lack of budgetaryburdens: ‘conditionality’ has not played anysignificant role.4 The good news, therefore, isthat the process of legal adaptation and policyconvergence is already well advanced here. Thepossibly less good news is that the real negotia-tions between old and new partners over whatthe Commission officials in charge call ‘thefuture us’ have not taken place at all on foreignpolicy and will probably take place elsewhere: onagriculture, structural funds, justice and homeaffairs, taxation.

As for ESDP, all applicants from CentralEurope reacted late and defensively to its launchin 1999. On the one hand, they hardly unders-tood its rationale and, above all, feared that itcould undermine NATO’s internal cohesionand, more generally, drive the Americans out ofEurope. On the other hand, some of the appli-cants suspected that involvement in ESDPmight come as an alternative to NATO member-ship or, worse, as a consolation prize for notbeing admitted into the Alliance – which insteadwas (and remains) their main security policygoal. By contrast, for those candidates who werealready fully-fledged NATO members, the keyissue was notably the establishment of a clearlydefined relationship with the Alliance wherebyall relevant decisions would be taken at 15+6(EU members plus other European allies). Inmany ways, and with varying emphasis, Warsaw,Prague and Budapest considered ESDP accep-table only as ESDI within (or under the supervi-sion of) NATO. Over time, however, such atti-tudes have evolved towards a warmer acceptanceof the ESDP blueprint as eventually spelt out inNice – on condition that its implementation

3 The notion of ‘Central Europe’ as applied to the countries considered in this paper is still controversial. In fact, they amount to what duringthe Cold War was called ‘Eastern’ and later on ‘East-Central’ or ‘Central-Eastern’ Europe. WEU adopted it officially in the mid-1990s butthe EU has not, preferring not to label the candidates geographically. Even among the ten, the scope of the term varies considerably – allthe more so when it hints at past historical experiences (e.g. Mitteleuropa). ‘Central or Middle Europe’, however, covers quite well the oldGerman idea of a Zwischeneuropa lying between Western Europe proper (Germany included) and Russia. For a broader discussion see J.Rupnik, The Other Europe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); G. Schöpflin and N. Wood (eds.), In Search of Central Europe (Cambridge:Polity Press, 1989); J. Le Rider, La Mitteleuropa (Paris: PUF, 1994); S. Medvedev, ‘ “Zwischeneuropa”: Historic Experiences, National Viewsand Strategic Alternatives’, UPI Working Papers 6, Helsinki, 1998; K. Henderson (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the EuropeanUnion (London: UCL Press, 1999); C. Lord (ed.), Central Europe: Core or Periphery? (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2000).4 The applicants’ attitude is well analysed in P. Dunay, ‘Boxes: Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries’,RSC Policy Papers 01/5 (S. Domenico di Fiesole: European Univerity Institute, 2001).

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5 There are no official figures available on the ‘voluntary contributions’ to the ‘HG-plus’. Those given in this Occasional Paper were collectedindividually country by country, although they convey a reliable overall picture. To be added are those offered by Norway (approx. 3,500men plus support elements) and Turkey (an infantry brigade, two air squadrons and two transport aircraft, one amphibious infantrybattalion plus seven ships and one submarine); see A. Missiroli, ‘Sicherheitspolitische Kooperation zwischen EU und NATO: Der türkischeVerdruss über die ESVP’, Integration, vol. XXIV (2001), no. 4, pp. 340-55. At the Capability Improvement Conference of November 2001, sixof the 15 non-EU countries further increased their initial pledge to the ERRF.6 See the discussion paper recently delivered by King’s College Centre for Defence Studies, Making Sense of the Helsinki Headline Goal, London,November 2001.7 For a comprehensive overview see H. J. Giessmann and G. E. Gustenau (eds.), Security Handbook 2001 – Security and Military in Central andEastern Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001).

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turns into a positive-sum (rather than zero-sum) game between the Union and the Alliance.

■ Crisis management and defence procurement

In spite of their relatively short record of free-dom of action (and, for some, independence) onthe international scene, over the past few yearsall ten Central European applicants have beenincreasingly engaged in peacekeeping operations,mostly – but not exclusively – in the WesternBalkans. As a rule, they have done so as modularcomponents of bigger multinational units andunder foreign command. Much as their contri-butions have been limited in absolute numbersand restricted in their functions, they have pro-ved the willingness and ability of the applicantsto participate and perform in Art. 17 TEU-typeoperations. As a result, in late November 2000the candidates committed forces and capabili-ties to the so-called ‘Headline Goal-plus’.Modest as they are, therefore, the ‘voluntarycontributions’ by EU applicants5 display aremarkable degree of political goodwill. What isworth noting is not only the fact – quite normalalso among current EU members – that all theforces earmarked for the HG-plus are ‘double-hatted’ (i.e. answerable to both NATO and theEU), but also that in most candidate countriesparticipation in NATO-led or EU-led missions isseen as a driving factor towards some sort of rolespecialisation. Such specialisation, of course, isabout making virtue out of necessity: financial,technical and human resources are scarce andhave to be concentrated and focused on viableobjectives – all the more so since all the countries

under consideration are in the process of ove-rhauling and modernising their military forces.Nevertheless, functional role specialisation(military as well as civilian) is a path that couldalso soon prove necessary for current EU mem-bers.6

Finally, similar constraints (and opportuni-ties) apply also to the ten candidates’ defenceprocurement policy proper. While most countriesare still substituting or upgrading old equip-ment from the Soviet era, the need to becomemore interoperable with NATO allies and, in thefuture, EU partners is putting additional pres-sure on public budgets and decision-makers.7What is worth noting here, too, is that some evo-lution has occurred throughout CentralEurope. Whilst in the late 1990s tenders werealmost systematically won by American firms(partly as a side effect of the candidates’ willin-gness to gain Washington’s support in their bidsfor NATO membership), lately officials seem tohave adopted a more balanced attitude. As aresult, European companies have more chancesnow, for reasons that are linked in part to theprospect of EU membership but in part also tothe more credible offset programmes they maybe able to offer. Procurement policy, in otherwords, remains largely driven by political consi-derations (the two enlargements) but takesincreasingly into account the added value ofdomestic job creation in high-tech sectors thatmay prove crucial in the future.

■ European security in the twenty-first century

At the present stage, the main issue for mostCentral European candidates still seems to be

Conclusions

that of participation. This is apparent at differentlevels. They want to be adequately consulted andinvolved in decision-shaping via the official for-mats envisaged since Nice and also more infor-mal ones. They also want to be considered part-ners-in-the-making and therefore listened to asprospective subjects, rather than objects, ofcommon foreign policy. This is particularly trueof the process of institutional reform (theConvention, followed by another Treaty review)to be completed in 2004 – i.e. the target date forthe accession of the first new entrants – yet itcould also be extended to CFSP and ESDP atlarge.8 Prospectively, participa-tion also meansbeing on an equal footing with the current mem-bers in an enlarged Union in which decision-making may become increasingly (even expo-nentially) complicated. This may help explainthe apparently strange dichotomy that is discer-nible across all ten applicants, namely betweentheir latent opposition to more majority votingand extended ‘enhanced cooperation’ inCFSP/ESDP (which may render them less rele-vant or even marginal in decision-making) andtheir openness vis-à-vis the use of ‘constructiveabstention’ (which would instead preserve theirformal status, but without confronting themwith responsibilities that may challenge theirresources or internal cohesion). More generally,they all seem to realise that a more effectiveUnion will be in their best interests yet hesitatein the face of the possible institutional implica-tions – just another attitude that is present alsoamong the current EU members, with the cru-cial difference that most of the CentralEuropean candidates have (re)gained their full

national sovereignty only lately and, therefore,may feel particularly uncomfortable with theprospect of ‘pooling’ it right away.

Another important issue is the scope andoutreach of CFSP/ESDP. For historical as well asgeographical reasons, none of the countriesunder consideration has overseas interests orextensions, let alone a colonial past. Unlike pre-vious enlargements, therefore, the forthcomingone will not entail a significant widening of thehorizons of the Union’s external policies.However, all current applicants will have astrong interest in the formulation of those exter-nal policies of the enlarged Union that mightaffect their immediate vicinity. After all, most ofthem will become the new external frontier (ifnot the ultimate limes) of the EU: the perme-abi-lity and safety of the Eastern borders and allcommon ‘direct neighbourhood’ policies9 willbecome their vital interests and will presumablyshape their behaviour on second-pillar andother issues. The fate of national minorities,cross-border trade and visa regulations, energyand environmental issues, Balkan stability, rela-tions with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, ofcourse, Russia will be cases in point – as theyhave already been, albeit marginally and indi-rectly, in the accession negotiations. In thissense, the applicants’ impact on CFSP andESDP will be geographically limited but inten-sely focused. For further evidence one only hasto look at the speech made by Czech PresidentVaclav Havel in Bratislava last May, in which hewas plainly so keen on drawing lines vis-à-visRussia,10 or to the suspicious reactions in mostCentral European countries to the rapproche-

8 The main precedents in these domains are those of Spain and Portugal in 1985-86 – both attended the proceedings of theIntergovernmental Conference that led to the Single European Act (albeit without voting rights), which occurred a few months after the endof their accession negotiations and before their actual entry – and of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in 1994. All four countries hadalready finalised their Accession Treaties and were expected to join the Union from 1 January 1995. In anticipation of that, they were invitedto participate in CFSP activities from the spring of 1994, namely before the ratification referendums of the following months. Norway,therefore, was a partner in CFSP for a few months although it has in the end not become a full EU member: in November 1994, in fact, the‘No’ to adhesion was to prevail (as it had already done in 1972). 9 On all these issues see G. Amato and J. Batt (eds.), The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border, EUI, Florence,1999; H. Grabbe, ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Security Implications of Extending EU Border Policies Eastwards’, Occasional Paper 13 (Paris,Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2000); H. Grabbe, ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards’, InternationalAffairs, vol. LXXVI (2000), no. 3, pp. 519-36; J. Batt and K. Wolczuk, ‘Keep an Eye on the East’, Financial Times, 23 February 2001; J. Monar,‘The JHA Dimension of EU Enlargement’, The International Spectator, vol. XXXVI (2001), no. 3, pp. 37-46; and the papers presented at the jointCEPS-Batory Foundation Conference on ‘New European Borders and Security Cooperation: Promoting Trust in an Enlarged EuropeanUnion’, Brussels, 6-7 July 2001.

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Antonio Missiroli

10 See http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/2001/1105_uk.html11 See A. Missiroli, ‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, vol. XXXIII (2002), no. 1,pp. 9-26.12 See for instance L. Freedman, ‘The Transformation of NATO’, Financial Times, 6 August 2001; W. Hopkin-son, ‘Enlargement: a newNATO’, Chaillot Paper 49 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001); A. Forster and W. Wallace, ‘What is NATO for?’, Survival, vol.XLIII (2001), no. 4, pp. 107-22; R. de Wijk, ‘Perpetual Partners’, Atlantisch Perspectief, vol. XXV (2001), no. 4, pp. 4-9.

62

ment between Washington and Moscow in thewake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September.Yet again, this may not necessarily mean thatthere will be a sort of Central European ‘bloc’ on,say, relations with Russia (or Belarus). Countrieslike Slovakia or Bulgaria have different histori-cal and cultural sensitivities from the BalticStates or Poland, while geographical proximityand cross-border trade or minority issues maycondition the approach to Russia, Ukraine orformer Yugoslavia in several and diverse ways.

Last but not least, NATO and transatlantic rela-tions. Needless to say, all ten candidates fromCentral Europe are pushing for a clear unders-tanding between the Alliance and the Union:whether NATO members or just applicants,they do not want to be forced to choose betweenWashington and Brussels on security matters. Itis therefore to be expected that they will wel-come the finalisation by the EU and NATO ofthe tentative deal that was negotiated withTurkey last December.11 Their markedly‘Atlanticist’ orientation – as is also abundantlyclear from opinion polls – will add next tonothing to the spectrum of existing positionsamong the current EU members. After acces-sion, however, it may tip the internal balance ofthe Union in that direction, although – asalready hinted – actual membership may changethe perception of national interests and shapenew loyalties, especially if the EU is to take upmore direct responsibilities in the WesternBalkans. Besides, seven out of the ten CentralEuropean applicants are also candidates to joinNATO, and their chances have increased lately.Once in, the pressure to join gone and the reali-ties of membership apparent, their attitude mayshift towards a more balanced assessment ofpriorities and goals, as has partially happenedwith Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republicsince 1999. In other words, there may not be a

Central European ‘bloc’ on CFSP/ESDP either. That said, it is worth noting that the terrorist

actions of 11 September have had a tangibleimpact on the applicants’ perception of securityand vulnerability but have hardly altered theirperception of NATO’s role. By contrast, amongthe current EU and NATO members (especiallythe most ‘Atlanticist’ ones) the sudden activa-tion of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, followedby its modest implementation, is still sendingshock waves and raising fundamental questionsover the nature and future of the Alliance.12

How credible are its traditional security guaran-tees now? Will it become, if anything, a sort ofplanning and C3 agency (and ‘deterrent of lastresort’, so to speak) for EU-led or joint opera-tions? There has been no trace of such questions,so far, in Central Europe.

■ The two enlargements

In the early 1990s, the general expectation wasthat ‘Europe’ would eventually be reunitedunder the joint aegis of the Union and theAlliance. The process would have taken sometime, perhaps, due inter alia to the fundamen-tally different entry requirements of the twoorganisations, but it would have been comple-ted – Russia permitting – in a decade or so. In1997, however, the two enlargement processesseemed to take divergent paths: a relativelyquick but selective enlargement of the Alliancewas followed by a slower and still only planned(though almost equally selective) enlargementof the Union.13 For the former, the driving fac-tors were of a quintessentially geopoliticalnature, for the latter of a typically function-al/administrative character. Yet the fact thatNATO and the Americans did ‘deliver’ – whilethe EU and the Europeans did not – still plays a

Conclusions

role in the perceptions of the Central Europeanpublic. As a result, the Alliance is still morepopular than the Union among both allied andnon-allied applicants, although it must be saidthat the domestic costs and administrativehurdles of preparing for NATO membershiphave been (and still are) disproportionatelylower than those of preparing for the EU.

More recently, however, the two processesappeared to have become more similar. Theexpansion of the Alliance started followingmore stringent functional criteria (as laid downin the Membership Action Plan), partly as aconsequence of the technical problems causedin particular by the limited preparedness of theCzech Republic and Hungary.14 By contrast, theUnion started thinking strategically and wei-ghing the geopolitical and security implicationsof successive waves of entrants.15 Both pro-cesses seemed also to have lost some momen-tum, due perhaps in some measure to the luke-warm support they were finding in Westernpublic opinion. On top of that, the candidatesfor NATO enlargement went further than thosefor the EU, thus potentially increasing the geo-graphical (and functional) mismatch betweenthe two organisations: indeed, the NATOWashington Communiqué of April 1999 –issued in the middle of Operation Allied Force inKosovo – listed Albania and Macedonia along-side the seven Central Europeans.

11 September has changed all that because ithas shown dramatically the importance of stabi-lising the peripheries of Western ‘homelands’and forging wide coalitions against new poten-tial threats posed by non-state actors. What haschanged, however, is not the similarity of thetwo processes but only their pace. It looks

increasingly likely, in fact, that the summits inPrague (NATO, November 2002) andCopenhagen (EU, December 2002) will issueinvitations and set accession dates for a muchhigher number of Central European candidatesthan would have been imaginable only a fewmonths ago: up to five for the Alliance (Slovenia,Slovakia and the Baltic States), up to eight/tenfor the Union (the same five and the three NATOallies, plus Malta and Cyprus). If so, in a coupleof years NATO will count 24 members and theEU 25, 19 of which will be in common. In organisa-tional terms, the most obvious benefit would bethe return to a situation of almost overlappingmemberships – lost since the mid-1990s – but ona larger scale than ever before. The most obviouscost would be the increasing complexity ofconsensual decision-making within each orga-nisation. The two Western ‘security communi-ties’ would cover almost the whole continentbut would be internally ever less manageable – asituation that does not seem to worry the cur-rent applicants but may become a serious pro-blem for all later on. A strategic gain, in otherwords, might be offset by a functional loss.

For the scope of this paper, however, themain implication of a double ‘Big Bang’ in late2002 could be – as things stand now – thatBulgaria and Romania would probably remainout of both the Alliance and the Union, at leastfor some time. In fact, it is not unlikely that aftersuch a robust intake of new members the EUwould wait some time before reopening itsdoors. If adequately prepared and presented,such a gap may not create major difficulties. Ifnot, it may generate a domestic backlash ineither country (or both) and end up drawing adangerous dividing line on the South-Eastern

13 Among the few studies that have tried to compare the two dynamics see S. Croft et al., The Enlargement of Europe (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1999); M. A. Smith and G. Timmins, Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); A. Hyde-Price, ‘The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of the EuropeanOrder’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. XXI (2000), no. 3, pp. 139-67.14 See especially the study by T. S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping (SantaMonica-Arlington: RAND, 2001). For a Western European viewpoint see F. Pflügler, ‘An Atlantic Anchor for all of Europe’, International HeraldTribune, 5 December 2000. For a Central European perspective see the excellent analysis by J. Sedivy, ‘The Puzzle of NATO Enlargement’,Contemporary Security Policy, vol. XXII (2001), no. 2, pp. 1-26.15 Curiously enough, the case for a more coordinated and parallel expansion of the two organisations was first made by the father of thegeopolitical approach, namely Zbigniew Brzezinski (‘NATO and the EU Need to Grow Together’, International Herald Tribune, 17 May 2001).

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Antonio Missiroli

16 In the light of the academic literature on ‘transitology’, Romania and Bulgaria (let alone most of the Balkan States that have not appliedfor EU membership) are still in the phase of ‘transition’ to democracy, whereas the other eight are already in the phase of ‘consolidation’(with a remaining question mark for Slovakia, due to Vladimir Meciar’s persisting political role). See J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), Problemsof Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1996); K. von Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke-London: Macmillan, 1996); K. Müller, ‘Countries inTransition: Entwicklungspfade der osteuropäischen Transformation’, Osteuropa, vol. LI (2001), no. 10, pp .1146-67.

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‘rim’ of the enlarged Union, which also happensto be the most unstable. While eight out of thecurrent ten Central European applicants wouldat last become subjects, the other two would riskremaining objects of CFSP/ESDP (and probablyalso waiting in the antechamber of NATO) andsliding off ‘Central Europe’ proper.

At root, such time and policy gap has muchto do with the different pace and depth of demo-cratic transition in Bulgaria and Romania: itstarted later, from a more backward point ofdeparture, with less momentum and more reser-vations. The legacy of the Communist past isheavier and more durable there, and the twopolitical systems look more volatile and uns-table than the others.16 For the Union (and theAlliance), finding the right mix of encourage-ment and support, on the one hand, and condi-tionality and rigour, on the other, will be a cru-cial challenge, hovering as it will between a‘direct neighbourhood’ and a classical inte-gration policy. In a way, what happens withBulgaria and Romania is going to be crucial forthe Western Balkans as well – from Croatia(which may soon join the two countries on thewaiting list) to all the remaining formerYugoslav Republics (plus Albania) – and will setan important precedent for the further expan-sion of both the Union and the Alliance.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, theEU and the NATO that the Central Europeancandidates may soon end up joining will proba-

bly be very different organisations from the onesthat they set out to join a decade earlier. Over thepast years, in fact, both have become moving tar-gets. The Union has acquired a much moreambitious foreign and security policy – inclu-ding a specifically defence dimension – and isgradually becoming a single-currency area: infact, diplomacies, armies and currencies (howe-ver ‘pooled’) are quintessential features of sove-reignty, well beyond the constraints and oppor-tunities of a protected free-trade area and asingle market. For its part, the Alliance has firstgone to (limited) war in Kosovo, then has refrai-ned from making serious use of its Art. 5 gua-rantees, which have long been seen as its mainraison d’être. Instead of serving two distinct andseparate (albeit mutually compatible and evenreinforcing) purposes – economic prosperity vs.hard security – the EU and NATO increasinglycover the same tasks in the same geographicalarea, and CFSP/ESDP lies exactly at the functio-nal juncture of the two organisations. This iswhy there is ample scope for cooperation, ofcourse, but also for a fundamental redefinitionof their respective goals and roles – acrossWestern and Central Europe as much as acrossthe Atlantic.

Conclusions

1

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a1

Vladimir Bilcik has worked as an analyst at the Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association sinceSeptember 1999, after completing an M.Phil. degree in European Politics at St Antony’s College,Oxford. He was a guest researcher at the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) and aresearch assistant to the PfP Consortium Study Group at the Austrian Institute of EuropeanSecurity Policy (AIES). Since February 2002 he has also been external adviser to Jan Figel,Slovakia’s chief negotiator and the government’s representative to the Convention on the Futureof Europe.

Daniel Calin has worked as an expert at the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, Department for Euro-Atlantic Integration, since 1999. After studying as an engineer, he recently earned an M.A.postgraduate degree in European Studies from the College of Europe in Natolin (Poland). In 2001he was awarded a NATO individual research fellowship for a project on ‘NATO and the EU in theBalkans – a comparison’. He has been awarded a visiting research fellowship by the EU ISS for2002.

Ivan Hostnik is policy adviser to the Slovenian government and heads the Division for International Security atthe Centre for Strategic Studies of the Slovenian Ministry of Defence. He graduated from theFaculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana, where he studied sociology and strategicaffairs. His field of expertise encompasses defence management and policy as well as internationalsecurity organisations.

Andres Kasekampis Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn and Associate Professor of PoliticalScience at the University of Tartu. He graduated from the University of Toronto in 1989 andearned a Ph.D. in Modern European History from the School of Slavonic and East EuropeanStudies of the University of London in 1996. He has written extensively on Estonian contemporaryhistory and on CFSP. He is the current editor of the Journal of Baltic Studies.

Radek Khol joined the Institute of International Relations in Prague in 1996 and became the Director of itsCentre for Security Analysis in 2001. He is a graduate of the Department of War Studies at King’sCollege, London, and the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciencesof Charles University in Prague. He has held research fellowships at Clingendael Institute in TheHague, NATO Defence College in Rome, and the WEU ISS in Paris. He has published extensivelyon NATO enlargement, security policies and civil-military relations in Central Europe, and ESDP.

Atis Lejinsis the founder and current Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, established in1992. He lived in exile (Germany, Australia, USA, Sweden) – where he also graduated and was anactivist for national independence – until 1991. His research work focuses mainly on the future ofNATO and relations with Russia, but he has also published on EU enlargement and itsimplications for Latvia and the entire Baltic area.

Annexes About the authors

66

Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies of the Teleki Laszlo Institute inBudapest. She has a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Budapest University of Economics.In 1992-94 she held a fellowship at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt. Her main fields ofresearch include security issues, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theMediterranean, and the wider Middle East.

Radoslava Stefanova is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the European University Institute in Florence, after having workedfor some time as a researcher and project manager at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) inRome. She graduated from the American University in Paris, the School of Advanced InternationalStudies of Johns Hopkins University, and Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. She haspublished extensively on conflict prevention and transatlantic relations.

Rafal Trzaskowski is currently a research fellow at the European Centre in Natolin and a Ph.D. candidate at theDepartment of International Relations of the University of Warsaw. In 2000-01 he was adviser tothe State Secretary for European Integration, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. He graduated from theUniversity of Warsaw and in 1997 gained an M.A. degree in European Studies from the College ofEurope in Natolin, where he also led a research project on the political foundations of theenlargement process. He has received a research award from the EUISS.

Gediminas Vitkus is Head of the Political Science Department of the Lithuanian Military Academy and AssociateProfessor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University ofVilnius (from which he also obtained a Ph.D. in 1993). His research interests include Europeanintegration and security issues, along with Lithuania’s foreign and security policy.

annexe 1: About the authors

a2

67

15+6 the Fifteen (EU member countries) plus six non-EU European NATO member countries

(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey)

15+15 the 15+6 plus nine other EU candidate countries :

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

(there are 13 applicants for EU membership: the nine above plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey)

ACN Associated Countries Network

ARRC Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps

BALTBAT Baltic Battalion

BLACKSEAFOR Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force

CCC Capabilities Commitment Conference

CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement

CENCOOP Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIC Capability Improvement Conference

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors

EADS European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company

ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force

ESDI European Security and Defence Identity

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

EUCLID European Cooperative Long-term Initiative for Defence

EUROFINDER a procedure allowing industry to make proposals for R&D projects for inclusion in the EUCLID programme

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HUF Hungarian forint (currency)

IFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia)

IGC Intergovernmental Conference

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISS EU Institute for Security Studies

Kc Czech koruna (currency)

KFOR Kosovo peace implementation Force

LITPOLBAT Lithuanian-Polish Battalion

LTL Lithuanian litas (currency)

MAP Membership Action Plan

Abbreviations

MAPE (WEU) Multinational Advisory Police Element

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MLF (Italo-Slovenian-Hungarian) Multinational Land Force

MOD Ministry of Defence

MONUA UN Observation Mission in Angola

MONUC UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MP Military Police

MPFSEE Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe

MRF Multi-Role Fighter

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NIAG NATO Industrial Advisory Group

ODS Civic Democratic Party

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PARP Planning and Review Process

PSC Political and Security Committee

PSO Peace Support Operations

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

R&D Research and Development

RELEX External Relations

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SEDM South-East European Defence Ministerial

SEEBRIG South-Eastern Europe Brigade

SEEGROUP South-East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group

SFOR Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)

SHIRBRIG Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations

TEU Treaty on European Union

UN United Nations

UNAVEM UN Angola Verification Mission

UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNIDO UN Industrial Development Organisation

UNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine

WEAG Western European Armaments Group

WEAO Western European Armaments Organisation

WEU Western European Union

WTO World Trade Organisation

68

annexe 2: abbreviations

n°33 A new European Union policy for Kaliningrad March 2002Sander Huisman

n°32 Managing separatists states: a Eurasian case study November 2001Dov Lynch

n°31 Aspects juridiques de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense Novembre 2001Lydia Pnevmaticou

n°30 Reconciling the Prince’s Two ‘Arms’. Internal-external security policy coordination in the European Union. September 2001Ferruccio Pastore

n°29 The challenge of Belarus and European responses July 2001Ramunas Davidonis

n°28 Developing the ‘Moral’ arguments: Russian rhetorical strategies July 2001on security post-KosovoCharlotte Wagnsson

n°27 Coherence for European security policy. Debates - cases - assessments May 2001Edited by Antonio Missiroli

n°26 Le MTCR face à la prolifération des missiles Mai 2001Mathieu Grospeaud

n°25 A common European export policy for defence and dual-use items? May 2001Burkard Schmitt

n°24 Realigning neutrality? Irish defence policy and the EU March 2001Daniel Keohane

n°23 Cold war dinosaurs or hi-tech arms providers? The West European land armaments industry at the turn of the millenium February 2001Jan Joel Andersson

n°22 The Nordic dimension in the evolving European security structure and the role of Norway November 2000Bjorn Olav Knutsen

n°21 South-Eastern Europe revisited. Can economic decline be stopped? October 2000Daniel Daianu

n°20 Leading alone or acting together? The transatlantic security agenda for the next US presidency September 2000Edited by Julian Lindley-French

n°19 Evaluating Serbia/L'évaluation de la Serbie September 2000Edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

n°18 National Missile Defence and the future of nuclear policy September 2000Edited by Burkard Schmitt and Julian Lindley-French

Occasional Papers

All Occasional Paperscan be accessed via the institute’s website:

www.iss-eu.org