occasional paper n°70 - iss.europa.eu · n°70december 2007. in january 2002 the eu institute for...

The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution

Bruno Coppieters

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Occasional Paper

n°70December 2007

In January 2002 the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) was created as a Paris-based autonomous agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Actionof 20 July 2001, modified by the Joint Action of 21 December 2006, it is now an integralpart of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP.The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of useand relevance to the formulation of EU policies. In carrying out that mission, it also actsas an interface between experts and decision-makers at all levels.

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Bruno Coppieters is Professor of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free Univer-sity of Brussels). He holds a Ph.D in Philosophy from the Freie Universität Berlin and teachescourses on the history of political thought, conflict resolution and the ethics of war and secession.His published works deal mainly with federalism and conflicts over sovereignty in the Caucasusand the Balkans. He has co-edited the following books: Statehood and Security: Georgia afterthe Rose Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) and Contextualizing Secession:Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).The present paper has been written at the request of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Euro-pean Parliament. The positions expressed in this paper do not reflect the views of the EuropeanParliament.

Occasional Paper

n°70December 2007

Bruno Coppieters

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Contents

Summary 3

Introduction 5

Five options in conflict settlement 9

On EU conflict prevention policies 13

On EU conflict transformation policies 17

On EU international conflict management policies 21

On EU conflict settlement policies 23

Conclusions and recommendations 27

Annex 31

Abbreviations 31

AAcckknnoowwlleeddggeemmeennttssI am grateful to Viacheslav Chirikba, Jonathan Cohen, Michael Emerson, Céline Francis, MagdalenaFrichova, Uwe Halbach, Kristin Höltge, Andrea Huterer, Walter Kaufmann, Ghia Nodia, NicuPopescu, Elena Prokhorova, Licinia Simao, Dag Sourander and Dmitri Trenin for sharing their viewson EU policies in Georgia with me and providing me with critical comments on the first draft ofthis paper. I am also grateful to Veronica Kelly for her language corrections.

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Summary The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework obliges the EU to coordinate closelywith Georgia on its policies for conflict resolution in the breakaway entities of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia. Brussels and Tbilisi do not share the same time perspective, however.

The Georgian government is striving for a quick resolution of both secessionist con-flicts, despite the impasse reached in the negotiations on the question of status and themarked incompatibility between its positions and those of Abkhazia, South Ossetia andRussia. From the standpoint of the Georgian government, good governance cannot beexpected with unmonitored borders, and the refusal of the Abkhaz authorities toacknowledge the right of return of all displaced persons is intolerable. In these conditions,a swift succession of new initiatives increases the government’s domestic legitimacy, whileits proactive policy helps focus Western attention on the instability of this region.

The European Union supports the Georgian interpretation of the principle of territo-rial integrity, and is also prepared to increase its efforts to develop conflict resolution poli-cies in the region, but not in accordance with the Georgian time frame. For Brussels, it iscrucial to have a reasonable chance of success in the implementation of its programmes. Itdoes not want to jeopardise its already complicated diplomatic relations with Russia byconfronting it. Building trust between the parties involved in these secessionist conflictsand setting up negotiations on a mutually acceptable status will take time.

The difference between the Georgian and EU approaches to the question of timing intheir conflict resolution policies has far-reaching consequences for their mutual relations.The EU fears that Georgian impatience may be one of the factors leading to an escalationof the conflicts to a violent and unmanageable level. Georgia, on the other hand, fears thattoo much patience and moderation on the EU side may cause the conflicts to be sustainedindefinitely. These approaches can be analysed through a differentiation between forcibleand peaceful means in the realisation of particular status options and between differentobjectives in conflict resolution policies.

On the question of conflict settlement, a distinction has to be made between fiveoptions: recognition of the sovereignty of the breakaway polities; the enforced abolition oftheir statehood; their forced inclusion in a federal framework; their peaceful inclusion ina federal framework; or, finally, the status quo. Each of these options is based on thechoice between using primarily violent or peaceful means, and each approach involves adifferent time perspective. Those options that are based mainly on the use of force promisea quick solution to the question of conflict settlement. The peaceful option, in contrast,works slowly. It requires patience and continuity.

The first objective of conflict resolution is conflict prevention: the incompatibility ofpositions should not escalate to open violence. The second aim is conflict transforma-tion: the parties’ positions have to be made more compatible. Conflict transformationfails when identities and interests are driven further apart. International conflictmanagement is the third objective. External actors have to contain the escalation of con-

flicts and create incentives for a settlement, by exercising leverage on the parties or bychanging the balance of power between them. The final objective is conflict settlement:the parties should reach agreement on a common institutional framework. Joint decision-making will show that identities and interests have been made compatible.

This paper defends the following three theses: (1) the attainment of each of these objec-tives corresponds in each case to a particular time frame; (2) conflict resolution requires abalance between these various policy objectives; (3) in principle the EU supports Georgia’sefforts to restore its territorial integrity, without sharing its lack of differentiation betweenconflict resolution objectives and its views on the timetable for their realisation.

The impasse in conflict settlement negotiations is leading Georgia to a policy of con-frontation with the breakaway entities and Russia, which are accused of intransigence.This threatens the EU’s conflict prevention policies. And, owing to the Georgian desire toisolate the breakaway polities, it also places severe constraints on the EU’s transformationpolicies aimed at building lasting trust between the parties.

The EU has to avoid an imbalance between these four policy objectives. The policiesshould be clearly linked to each other, and not pursued separately. A kind of sequence inwhich conflict transformation is designed as the first stage and conflict settlement the second,for instance, would politicise trust-building programmes and create new tensions betweenthe parties. The EU should pursue its present efforts to facilitate negotiations on status, butits support for long-term transformation programmes – including second-track initiatives –should also be made independent of the ups and downs of conflict settlement. In addition, theEU should try to convince the Georgian government that its severe constraints on EU con-flict transformation policies in the breakaway territories are counterproductive.

Furthermore, in the field of conflict settlement the EU should adopt the principle of aseparation of powers as the main criterion for judging the quality of federal models forresolving the status question. This principle has as yet been insufficiently implemented inthe ‘horizontal’ division of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciaryin post-revolutionary Georgia and in its ‘vertical’ division of powers with Adjara.

In the field of international conflict management, the EU has an interest in increasingits profile in the conflicts in Abkhazia, through its inclusion in the UN Group of Friends,and in South Ossetia, through its inclusion in a renewed OSCE mediation framework,where it would have to be on a par with Russia. But it should avoid supporting one partyagainst the other, as this would lead to deeper distrust between the communities.

In the field of conflict prevention, the European Union should not confine itself to pru-dential arguments when urging restraint on Georgia. The status quo is not an option forGeorgia. The EU should, strongly and convincingly, voice its determination to find a solu-tion to these conflicts and should further deepen its dialogue with Georgia and the break-away entities on alternatives to the use of force. Conflict prevention remains a priority in thisvolatile region, and should also become a central theme in status negotiations. Internationalsecurity guarantees within a federal framework should succeed in preventing the future useof force by the central government against the Abkhaz or South Ossetian communities.


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Introduction

‘The patience of a nation is measured in cen-turies.’ This at least was the opinion of the

Tatar scholar Zufar Fartkutdinov.1 But whilesuch wisdom may be valid for Tatarstan andsome other nations, it surely does not count forGeorgia, or at least not for its president. When itcomes to resolving issues to do with secessionistAbkhazia and South Ossetia, the patience ofMikheil Saakashvili is to be measured inmonths, and sometimes only weeks.2 It wouldbe hard to say what time perspective the EU’sconflict resolution policies operate in – muchdepends on the individual member statesinvolved, and much also depends on the partic-ular crisis with which the EU is dealing. Theissues in Kosovo are not the same as in Abkhaziaor South Ossetia. But where these two break-away entities in Georgia are concerned, the EUworks on the basis of a long-term conflict reso-lution perspective, which involves a gradualstrengthening of its own role in these conflictsand additional support for projects designed tosteer them in the direction of building trust.

Differences in timing create mutual fears.The EU fears that Georgian impatience may beone of the factors leading to the escalation ofthe conflicts to a violent level. Georgia, on the

contrary, fears that too much patience andmoderation on the EU side may cause the con-flict to be sustained indefinitely. This paperdefends the thesis that these differences in timeperspective are a major feature of EU-Georgiarelations when it comes to conflict resolution,and that they can be analysed only through adifferentiation between the various objectivesof the two sides’ conflict resolution policies.

In relation to Georgia’s secessionist con-flicts, the EU’s conflict resolution policies havefour different objectives: conflict prevention,conflict transformation, international conflictmanagement and conflict settlement.3 Thefirst aim is conflict prevention. The EuropeanUnion has an interest in preventing the incom-patibility of positions from escalating to openviolence.

The European Union’s second aim is con-flict transformation. This means changing thedegree of incompatibility between the posi-tions of the parties, including those of theexternal actors. The transformation may eitherbe successful in bringing the parties closertogether in order to make their identities andinterests more compatible from the point ofview of setting up a common legal framework

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1 Quoted in Alexei Zverev, ‘“The Patience of a Nation is Measured in Centuries”. National Revival in Tatarstan and Historiography’, in BrunoCoppieters and Michel Huysseune (eds.), Secession, History and the Social Sciences (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2002), pp. 69-87, alsoavailable online at http://poli.vub.ac.be.2 This is what Ghia Nodia replied at a conference in Bruges in 2004, when the author referred to Fartkutdinov’s maxim to defend the thesisthat state- and nation-building is generally a process that encompasses several generations. Nodia was referring to the Georgian president’spolicies on South Ossetia.3 There is no consensus among scholars or practitioners on the types of distinction to be made within the field of conflict resolution, orabout conceptual definitions. The concept of conflict prevention may refer, for instance, to preventing the emergence of conflicts or topreventing existing conflicts from escalating to open violence. Some of the literature draws a conceptual distinction on the basis ofexpectations or normative considerations. Some expect a pacification of violent conflicts through conflict management, which then refersto the actions of governments, whereas others would rather focus their hopes on the involvement of civil societies in conflict transformation,expecting that this would be helpful in creating a just peace. In this case, conflict transformation processes would have to focus on the wayin which basic needs and conceptions of justice are responded to. A useful overview of some of the approaches, concepts, definitions andprescriptions in conflict resolution is to be found in Oliver Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).See also Thomas Diez, ‘“Roots” of Conflicts, Conflict Transformation and EU Inf luence’, in ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/improving/docs/g_ser_conflict-security_diez.pdf.

4 A common distinction drawn in international organisations is the one between conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Discussionson EU policies make a further distinction between negotiations on status, which are referred to here as conflict settlement policies, andtrust-building, which is one of the possible results of what is defined here as positive conflict transformation. Trust-building does not take

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and joint decision-making, or fail, when theparties’ definitions of their respective identitiesand interests show them to be growing evenfurther apart.

International conflict management is thethird objective. As one of the external actors, theEU can be helpful in containing the escalationof conflicts, and create incentives for a settle-ment, by exercising leverage on the parties or bychanging the balance of power between them.International conflict management is linked tothe attainment of the EU’s other conflict resolu-tion objectives, but it may be regarded as anobjective in its own right as it helps strengthenthe EU as an international actor.

Internationally mediated negotiations wouldhave to lead to conflict settlement through anagreement on the status of the two entities. Herethe EU supports the view that this status shouldbe of a federal type. This is the fourth aim of theEU’s conflict resolution policies.

This differentiation within the EU’s conflictresolution policies (or objectives) is necessaryfor two reasons. First of all, each of these fourconflict resolution objectives requires a differ-ent time frame. EU steps taken within theframework of conflict prevention – such as sup-port for Georgian border guards – have animmediate effect on the risk of military escala-tion with neighbouring Russia, whereas meas-ures within the framework of conflict transfor-mation – such as the project of a rehabilitationof the railway link along the Black Sea shorefrom Georgia to Russia through Abkhazia –take a long time to be implemented and aim ata long-term rapprochement between the sides,including Russia. Making a distinctionbetween different time perspectives does notmean, however, that these goals should beachieved in a kind of sequence – for instanceconflict transformation first and conflict set-tlement later. On the contrary: all these policiescan best be pursued in parallel, but each accord-ing to its own particular time perspective.

Second, differentiating between these four

policies within the broader framework of con-flict resolution should shed some light on rela-tionships, and in particular on the possiblecontradictions between them. Within the EU,conflict transformation in Georgia is the maintask of the European Commission, while theCouncil and its Special Representative (EUSR),in cooperation with those EU member statesactive in Georgian affairs, are working in allfour conflict resolution policy fields. The Euro-pean Parliament is active primarily in the fieldof international conflict management. Thisdifferentiation between the type of activities ofthe Commission, the Council and the Parlia-ment could in principle lead to a significantlack of coherence in EU policies, but this doesnot necessarily happen in practice. There is a fargreater danger that the EU may worsen its over-all prospects for conflict resolution by empha-sising some of these policy objectives at theexpense of others.

A heightened EU profile in conflict manage-ment could, for instance, weaken its stance onconflict transformation. This would happen if,for example, the EU were to give strong supportto Georgian policies aimed at isolating the defacto authorities. And a strong EU focus onlong-term conflict transformation should notbe allowed to detract from discussions on con-flict settlement. Such neglect could even makeconflict prevention more difficult, as lack ofprogress on the question of status could makeGeorgia even more impatient with the status quoand trigger violent confrontation and escala-tion. These two examples show the need for abalance between the various policies, and for anawareness of the potentially undesirable conse-quences of attaining some of these four objec-tives at the expense of others.

The objectives, priorities and time perspec-tives necessary for successfully implementingthe EU’s conflict resolution policies in Geor-gia may be described and assessed with thehelp of this analytical distinction.4 Each ofthese four objectives has to be pursued by the


EU at the intra-state level with the leadershipsof Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, at theinter-state level in its own relations with Rus-sia and the US, and also within the UN andOSCE, which are mediating in the two con-flicts. The present paper aims to demonstratethat Georgia tends to conflate the time hori-zons in which these objectives have to beachieved, by aiming to achieve all four of themin a (very) short sequence. In principle the EUsupports Georgia’s efforts to restore its terri-torial integrity, without sharing its lack of dif-ferentiation between conflict resolutionobjectives or its views on the timetable forachieving them.

In this Occasional Paper we will first analysethe various options open to the Georgian gov-ernment in terms of status and the use of force.This differentiation is relevant in order tounderstand the time perspective the Georgiangovernment is using. We will then assess theEU’s policies on conflict prevention, conflict

transformation, conflict management andconflict settlement. The order of these policiesreflects the sequence of the various stages of EUinvolvement in the conflict: first, through thelimited participation by some EU memberstates in the UN and OSCE’s conflict preven-tion activities, then, through European Com-mission programmes aimed at bringing thesides closer together through conflict transfor-mation. Major projects in this field began to beimplemented in 1997 in South Ossetia and in2004 in Abkhazia. As a result of its conflicttransformation projects in South Ossetia, theEuropean Commission was granted observerstatus at the Joint Control Commission (JCC)meetings on economic programmes. Thisraised the EU’s profile in conflict managementon South Ossetia – and it was further raised bythe decision of the EU Council in July 2003 toappoint an EU Special Representative, whobecame very active in the spheres of conflictprevention and transformation.

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Introduction

place when conflict transformation is negative. This transformation process refers then to processes of deepening distrust between theparties due to increased confrontation on issues of identity and interests. The EU has been using the term ‘conflict prevention’ in a quiteloose sense, particularly in the post-September 11 discussions on a security strategy.

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Five options in conflict settlement

There are basically five options for resolvingthe question of the status of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia. Each of these conflict settlementoptions entails a particular time perspectiveand has consequences for how to approach thequestions of conflict prevention and conflicttransformation. It also has consequences for theEU’s role in international conflict manage-ment.

The first option would be to recognise theirinternational sovereignty – as independentstates, as parts of a confederation with Georgiaor as freely associated states (with Georgia orwith Russia). Internationally recognised sover-eignty would give Abkhazia and South Ossetiathe highest degree of protection by interna-tional law and would create equal relationsbetween them and Georgia through their inclu-sion in international security organisations. Butquite apart from Georgia’s opposition to thisoption (the main reason it is unlikely the break-away entities would receive international recog-nition), the failure of the Abkhaz government torespect the right of return of a large part of thepre-war population, and the lack of democracyin South Ossetia, mean that they do not satisfythe remaining minimum standards for recogni-tion that European Union governments wouldapply in such a case.

The option of international sovereigntyaroused renewed interest with the discussion ofthe international status of Kosovo. The differ-ence between Kosovo and the breakaway terri-tories in Georgia is one of degree. Their popula-tions have all suffered severe injustice at thehands of central government, but the intensityof the violence in Kosovo was greater – and bet-ter known to Western public opinion – than inSouth Ossetia in 1991-92 or in Abkhazia in1992-93. On the other hand, the option of‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo guaran-

tees the human rights protection of its non-Albanian minorities, whereas similar guaran-tees have not yet been offered to the Georgiancommunities in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. InKosovo, such rights are seen as a guarantee offuture political stability, whereas in the case ofAbkhazia its leadership considers such protec-tion (primarily, their right to return) as a threatto its political hegemony. More important,however, is the extent of the support for theindependence of Kosovo among Western gov-ernments, making its international recogni-tion in the long term a feasible option. At best –and provided Russia was willing to move in thedirection of establishing formal diplomaticrelations with them – Abkhazia and SouthOssetia could count only on partial recogni-tion by a small number of governments. Buteven if the international community weredivided on the issue, partial recognition wouldgive them far greater protection againstattempts to subdue them by force than theirpresent de facto status. This means that the EUneeds to pay particular attention to the directrepercussions of the Kosovo issue on its Geor-gia policies.

Second, these breakaway polities could bedestroyed by the use of force, as was demon-strated by Croatia in the Krajina in 1995 and byRussia in Chechnya in 1999. This option failed,however, in Kosovo in 1999. In the Georgiancase the international community, with Russiato the fore, has always rejected such methods.Tbilisi chose such a forcible option in its failedattempt to put an end to the ‘war of laws’ overthe status of the federated entities by armedintervention in South Ossetia in 1991 and Abk-hazia in 1992. After the initiation of the Russ-ian war against Chechnya in 1994, Shevard-nadze made an appeal to the Russian govern-ment for the application of similar policies in

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Abkhazia.5 Moscow did not respond positivelyto this request to apply the Krajina or theChechnya model to Abkhazia.

Nor is there at present any support in theinternational community for the third option:the forced reintegration of the secessionistpolity into a federal framework, like the reinte-gration of the Republika Srpska into Bosniaunder the Dayton Agreement of 1995. In thiscase too, Shevardnadze immediately launchedan appeal to NATO to apply similar policies inhis own country, drawing a parallel between thesituation in Bosnia and that in Abkhazia. Hepointed out that the forced displacement of theGeorgian population from this territory by Abk-haz forces at the end of the war constituted a‘just cause’ for military action, in the same wayas ethnic cleansing had in the case of Bosnia. Butthen he also conceded that such interventionwould require the authorisation of the UN Secu-rity Council. The Georgian leadership has there-fore made repeated attempts, both before andsince the 2003 Rose Revolution, to persuade theRussian government to impose a federalarrangement on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.Moscow, however, has never been convincedthat the forced reintegration of these two enti-ties into Georgia could be in its interest. Theneed for Russia’s agreement made it thus impos-sible to apply the Bosnia model to Abkhazia.

A fourth option – the peaceful reintegrationof Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the Geor-gian federal framework – is prescribed by the UNand the OSCE. There are a number of reasonswhy this option has not succeeded. The Geor-gian government has never allowed a differenti-ated approach to conflict resolution to takeshape, particularly one whereby support for ini-tiatives in the field of conflict transformationwould not be made directly contingent uponprogress in the field of conflict settlement. A

clear separation between the two policies couldfacilitate a process in which the identities andinterests of the conflicting parties graduallydraw closer together, even if in the short termthis is not necessarily reflected in a settlement ofthe conflict.

In the case of Abkhazia, the Georgian leader-ship’s quest for a proactive policy that woulddeliver immediate results made conflict trans-formation impossible. In the case of South Osse-tia, trade links with Georgia were re-establishedunder Shevardnadze. In 2004, however, theimpatience of the post-revolutionary Georgianleadership with the lack of progress in the polit-ical negotiations, and with the high economic(and, especially, fiscal) cost of the lack of controlover the transfer of goods between Georgia andRussia through South Ossetian territory, led toharsh measures. Freedom of trade was restrictedby a number of means, notably the closing of theErgneti market near South Ossetia in June.Georgia criticised the South Ossetian leader-ship’s lack of representativeness, hoping thatthe local population would support Georgiananti-corruption policies against their de factoauthorities. But the closing of the market wasnot linked to the creation of alternative eco-nomic opportunities for the local population. Itled to an even greater distrust of the Georgianauthorities. As a consequence, this confronta-tional policy reduced the prospects for a peace-ful settlement, increased South Ossetia’sdependence on Russia, and – with the deploy-ment of Georgian troops in August 2004 – led toviolent clashes. Western pressure and the fearthat the conflict would get completely out ofhand militarily forced Saakashvili to backdown.6

The need for peaceful reunification has beenaccepted in principle by the Georgian side, butthis was done solely on a prudential basis and as


5 Shevardnadze openly supported Yeltsin’s war against Chechnya: ‘“Russia must defend its national interests and territorial integrity inChechnya”, Eduard Shevardnadze told ITAR-TASS on 18 December {1994}. Shevardnadze said Georgia supports a united and indivisibleRussia, because if Moscow will not curtail an “aggressive separatism”, it could lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation.’ VictorYasmann, RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 December 1994.6 On the conflict on South Ossetia, see International Crisis Group, ‘Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s Role’, Europe Reportno. 173, 20 March 2006, and International Crisis Group, ‘Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly’, Europe Report no. 183, 7 June2007. Both ICG publications are on the Internet at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm. See also Nathalie Tocci, The EU and ConflictResolution. Promoting Peace in the Backyard (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 137-139.

a way to accommodate the Western interest inregional stability.7 The Georgian governmenthas traditionally defended the view that it hasjust cause for the use of force. It perceives thepresent situation as an unacceptable breach ofits sovereign rights over the breakaway territo-ries. Georgia cannot accept that state-buildinghas to go ahead despite unmonitored borderswith neighbouring countries, or that the Abk-haz authorities refuse to acknowledge the prin-ciple of a right to return for the Georgian popu-lation. The unresolved status of South Ossetiahas already led to a military build-up 100 kmfrom Tbilisi.8 For Georgia, the lack of a positiveRussian role in status negotiations and the useof its military might to deter any use of force byGeorgia are the major obstacles to redressingsuch injustices. The Georgian attitude is charac-terised by an unresolved contradiction betweenprudential considerations and the convictionthat it has a just cause to defend which would inprinciple justify the military option. This moraldilemma largely explains the strongly emo-tional language – driven by anger and resent-ment – used to criticise Russian behaviour.

Georgian claims and policies in the pastshow that it still remains deeply convinced of itsmoral right to use forcible steps as a last resort.Shevardnadze has proposed the Chechnyamodel for destroying the breakaway politiesestablished in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in1994 and the Bosnia model for their forced rein-tegration into the Georgian fold in 1995. Afterthe 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian gov-ernment ended its support to large-scale under-cover operations in Abkhazia, mainly due tointernational pressure, but the use of belliger-ent rhetoric by some government members, theexistence of an even more radical opposition,the announcement of the creation of a 100,000-

strong reserve force with the explicit aim of pro-tecting territorial integrity9 and the opening, inApril 2006, of a military base in Senaki in West-ern Georgia, not far from the Abkhaz border,have further undermined the process of build-ing trust with the breakaway entities. Georgianpresident Saakashvili has presented the limitedmilitary operation in the Kodori Gorge in 2006as a first step in extending Georgia’s jurisdic-tion over the whole territory of Abkhazia.10 Thedistinction between prudential considerations– which are based on the need to accommodatethe West’s interest in regional stability – andjust cause convictions – which are based on theclaim that injustices have to be redressed – isthus crucial for understanding the Georgianmoral attitude towards the breakaway politiesand Russia, and the lack of faith in Georgianintentions in the Abkhaz and Ossetian polities.

Georgia has a certain value for NATO, and inparticular for the United States. Washingtonwould like to roll back Russia’s influence in thispart of the former Soviet Union. NATO’s poli-cies on democratising the armed forces areaimed at bringing the army under civilian andparliamentary control. It can apply the mecha-nism of conditionality thanks to Georgia’s aspi-ration to membership of this military-politicalorganisation. NATO does not intervene directlyin the issue of the frozen conflicts and has noofficial plans to do so. Georgia’s gradual inte-gration into the NATO framework is, however,having a decisive impact on the relationsbetween the conflicting parties. On the positiveside, NATO – in coordination with individualWestern governments – has been a strongrestraining influence on Georgia in recent yearswhen its conflicts with Abkhazia, South Ossetiaor Russia risked escalating to an unmanageablelevel. Reforms in the defence sector have been a

7 Prudential criteria can be part of a moral assessment. In the just war tradition, the principles of likelihood of success and proportionalityare used to assess the practical consequences of a decision to go to war. 8 Nicu Popescu, ‘Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours. The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, CEPS Working Document no. 260, March 2007,p. 16, available at : http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1476.9 ICG, ‘Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly’, op. cit. in note 6, p. 13.10 On Saakashvili’s justification of the Kodori operation, see United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situationin Abkhazia, Georgia, 28 September 2006, S/2006/771, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm. Saakashvili has argued thathe had to restore law and order in that region against Georgian rebels, a justification that is similar to the one given by Shevardnadze forthe military intervention in Abkhazia in August 1992.

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Five options in conflict settlement

11 See Remarks – H.E President Mikheil Saakashvili to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 26 January 2005, available at:http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=120&id=153.12 According to Putin, ‘Extremely difficult relations have formed between these peoples. What we need is patience. We need carefully totry to restore [their] confidence toward one another and build up a common state. This is what we are calling for, this is what we want.’Quoted in Vladimir Socor, ‘Putin’s Logic on Georgia and the Frozen Conflicts’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 3, no. 196, 24 October 2006,available at: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371568.

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further positive outcome of integration intoNATO. On the negative side, however, Georgia’slong-term prospect of joining an organisationwith extensive experience of military interven-tion in intra-state conflicts – ranging fromBosnia to Kosovo and Afghanistan – hasincreased the military threat to the breakawayentities. The negative consequences for conflicttransformation, and consequently for conflictsettlement, of Georgia’s integration into NATOshould not be underestimated.

The lack of effective international guaran-tees in all the blueprints for constitutionalarrangements put forward by the Georgian gov-ernment or by international mediators is a fur-ther explanation for the difficulty of introduc-ing federalism in the region. The population ofthe breakaway territories and their leadershipsare not convinced that a federal frameworkcould prevent future injustice, and in particularthe use of force by the central government. Fed-eral proposals, generally based on the mostpeaceful practices in European countries, do notaddress the need for strong international safe-guards against any attempt by the central gov-ernment to use force against federated states.

Russia has advanced its own proposals forconflict settlement, such as the 1997 proposal toGeorgia and Abkhazia by the then Minister forForeign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, to create a‘common state’. According to Moscow, Russiaitself would provide all the necessary guaranteesfor the stability of this federal construct. Geor-gian views are no less one-sided. When the Geor-gian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, describedthe basic principles of a settlement of the SouthOssetian conflict in January 2005, he proposedthat the EU would function as a ‘peace guarantor’without leaving Russia any role in this respect.11

It will be difficult for the parties to come to anagreement while they have such unbalancedviews on the role of international guarantors in

conflict prevention in a post-settlement situa-tion. Such views also make it more difficult toargue in favour of the federal option for unifyingstates that have been divided by the use of force.

Positive European experiences in the peace-ful resolution of secessionist conflicts are lack-ing. The experience is far richer when it comes tothe fifth option. The preservation of the statusquo in states that have been divided by massiveviolence is characteristic of Cyprus, Azerbaijanand Moldova. Breakaway polities can cope withthe status quo as a lesser evil – it gives them thefeeling that they can preserve their statehood inthe expectation of its international recognition.

Moscow claims that it takes a long-term viewof conflict settlement, with the argument thatthere should first be sufficient trust between thesides for the building of a ‘common state’.12 Butit does not do much to build this trust, taking noinitiatives at all in conflict transformation. Rus-sia is supportive of EU conflict transformationprojects only insofar as they are in its own inter-ests, such as a railway link with Georgia andArmenia through Abkhaz territory. Moscow hasceased to launch initiatives in the field of con-flict settlement where Abkhazia is concerned,and has never made any status proposals forSouth Ossetia. It has strong views, however, onconflict prevention and international conflictmanagement, where it is engaged in a con-frontation policy with Georgia. The lack of acoherent Russian conflict resolution policyleads to its defence of the status quo. The inclu-sion of Abkhazia in the preparations for theWinter Olympics in Sochi in 2014 fits in withthe Russian ‘wait and see’ approach. This isentirely unacceptable for Georgia.

Thus not only the actors’ political and moralconsiderations, but also their time perspectives inrelation to conflict settlement, are very far apart.In such a situation, it will be extremely difficult toprevent an escalation of violent conflicts.


3

On EU conflict prevention policies

The EU is finding it increasingly difficult tocope with the serious discrepancy between

Russia and Georgia concerning time perspec-tives in conflict resolution. The EU is aware thatRussia will not bow to Western pressure whereits support to the breakaway territories is con-cerned, but it is understandably also fearfulthat conflict prevention may become ever moredifficult to handle when there is no progress inthe other fields of conflict resolution. BothRussia and Georgia can derive certain advan-tages from conflict escalation: the former canreasonably expect Western governments torestrain unilateral Georgian initiatives, whilethe latter can hope that this would result intheir concerns being put more prominently onthe international security agenda. The EU is infact responding positively to both expectations:it restrains Georgian actions when they are con-sidered to be destabilising, and it is giving thequestion of Georgia’s breakaway territories –and more particularly, conflict preventionissues – an increasingly prominent position inits dialogue with Russia.

The contradiction between just cause andprudential considerations in Georgia’s moralview of the use of force has led to certain ten-sions in its relations with Western govern-ments regarding conflict prevention. Thesetensions arise even in cases where Tbilisi doesnot mention the war option. For example, in2007 the Georgian government organised asummer sports camp in the Georgian village ofGanmukhuri in the security zone just next to

the border with Abkhazia. The camp wasintended to arouse patriotic feelings amongGeorgian youth.13 Music and dance were toreflect the peaceful attitude of the participantsand their firm resolve concerning reunifica-tion with Abkhazia. This initiative was stronglycriticised by the UN Secretary-General and theGroup of Friends, which includes Russia, theUS, France, Germany and the UK,14 on thegrounds that it would constitute a risk that vio-lence might be provoked and should thereforebe relocated away from the security zone. Geor-gia refused to yield to this criticism. On 6 Sep-tember 2007, in a speech to the participants ofthe Ganmukhuri camp, Saakashvili railedagainst this ‘amoral and miserable advice’.15

The camp was held, fortunately without seri-ous incident. The row shows clearly howstrongly Georgia’s proactive policy remainsfuelled by moral arguments. It also shows thatGeorgia is prepared to go against Western con-flict prevention policies.

The European Union – in particular its par-liament – could address this clash between justcause and prudential arguments. First, the EUhas made only a very partial historical and moralassessment of the secessionist conflicts in Geor-gia. It has never engaged in a dialogue with theparties on the origins of the wars, on theirrespective responsibilities or on the war crimescommitted by all the sides. A public discussionof this kind would help clarify what type of sta-tus would be required in order to prevent andredress these injustices. It would also lend moral

13

13 Nino Narimanishvili, ‘Georgian ‘Patriots’ Camp Sparks Controversy. Inside Georgia’s youth camp on the de facto border with Abkhazia’,Caucasus Reporting Service, no. 404, 2 August 2007, available at: http://iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=337607&apc_state=henh.14 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 18 July 2007, S/2007/439,http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm.15 Malkhaz Alkhazashvili, ‘Saakashvili unwisely prefaces international address by dressing down the UN’, The Messenger, 11 September 2007(Georgia News Digest, 12 September 2007, distributed by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies).

14

strength to the European Parliament’s appeal tothe parties to resolve these conflicts using peace-ful means.16 At present, this appeal can still beinterpreted as being based on exclusively pru-dential considerations or, even worse, as adefence of the status quo.17

Such a proposal for reconsidering previouswrongs could be countered with the argumentthat it is far too soon to revisit the historicalrecord. At the present stage, such a discussionon historical responsibilities would tend ratherto reopen wounds or lead to a sterile exchange ofpolemical arguments. According to thiscounter-argument, more time would have topass before historical reflection could lead toproductive forms of self-criticism. There isindeed a risk that such discussions might fail,but it remains one that can reasonably be taken.Much depends, of course, on how the historicaldebates are moderated. Dialogue should takeplace preferably at the second-track level. Butthis counter-argument shows how importanttiming may be in the resolution of violent con-flicts. The question of how the authorities failedto prevent violence in the past is absent from thepresent political process, and this is one of themain reasons why it is so difficult to have nego-tiations on how to prevent violence in thefuture.

Second, conflict prevention is a prominenttheme in discussions on conflict settlement.The EU has, rightly, put pressure on Tbilisi todo more to make its views on an ‘asymmetricfederalism’ more concrete, and the present dis-cussions in Georgia on the status of SouthOssetia are partly the result of this pressure.The EU has further declared that it would inprinciple be prepared to send peacekeepingforces to both regions.18 This would requireacceptance of joint operations by the other par-ties, including Russia. The EU has, however,never made clear what kind of political mecha-

nisms would be needed in the security sphere tode-escalate post-settlement conflicts. Peace-keeping forces and pledges on the non-use offorce, presently envisaged as part of futurepeace settlements, would not be sufficient. Asstated in the previous section, specific securitymechanisms for federated states need to be pro-vided, which would allow them to turn to inter-national diplomacy and security organisationswhen force is used, or even in the event of seri-ous political tension with the central govern-ment. This would require a reform of the inter-national security institutions, whose member-ship has traditionally been restricted to sover-eign states.

Such a reform may be crucial. Moscow hasderived its strength in the conflicts in Georgiafrom its ability to provide the secessionist enti-ties with security. In the future it will, moreover,have a key role to play in the provision of inter-national guarantees to the Abkhaz and Osset-ian communities, but there is no reason why itshould continue to bear full responsibility fortheir long-term security concerns.

This discussion would also have to involveother organisations, such as the OSCE andNATO. The European Union’s division of taskswith NATO on the question of Georgia’s demo-cratic reforms (the crucial question of thereform of its armed forces remains outside theEU’s policies) has made the EU’s policies onGeorgia largely dependent on the AtlanticAlliance. As stated previously, Georgia’s long-term prospects of NATO membership may havepositive consequences for conflict preventionand Western conflict management, but thisrequires far more clarity about NATO’s poten-tial role in Georgian intra-state conflicts. Geor-gia’s integration into NATO – in particular, itsprospective membership – is inevitably having anegative impact on conflict transformationand conflict settlement, and the lack of clarity


16 ‘European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in South Ossetia’, 26 October 2006, available at: www.europarl.europa.eu.17 Such a debate on moral responsibilities would, moreover, be in line with the principles used to argue in favour of supervised independencefor Kosovo. This status provides for the most solid international security guarantees. The EU came to this conclusion on the basis of itsassessment of the responsibilities of the Serbian state in its conflict with Kosovo.18 Andrew Rettman and Renata Goldirova, ‘Solana raises prospect of EU soldiers in Georgia’, EUobserver, 27 February 2007, available at:http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches.php?idp=1554.

surrounding these issues can only be perceivedby the breakaway polities and Russia as beingeven more threatening. This reflects negatively

on the EU, particularly as most of its membersactive on Georgia are generally also active mem-bers of NATO.

15

On EU conflict prevention policies

4

On EU conflict transformation policies

T he European Union is not a weak actor inGeorgia. It would be difficult to imagine a

conflict settlement for Georgia’s two breakawayregions without its contribution, particularly inthe field of conflict transformation. The EU isthe largest donor in conflict areas, even whencompared with Russia,19 and its efforts in reha-bilitation and reconstruction are needed toimprove the climate of trust between the con-flicting parties and improve the living condi-tions of the population, including internallydisplaced persons (IDPs).20

But there are several limitations to the EU’spolicies when it comes to bringing the identitiesand interests of the various communities closertogether. These limitations result largely fromthe nature of conflict transformation in seces-sionist conflicts. This policy is designed to bringthe sides closer together, on the assumption thatthey are unable to do this on their own. Butbreakaway polities do not have the same poweras the central government to influence suchtransformation policies. To implement theirtransformation policies, external actors aremade dependent on receiving authorisationfrom all the parties, but primarily from thelegally recognised government. This means thatthe policies designed to bring the sides’ differentidentities and interests closer together will beheavily dependent on the views of one of the par-ties to the conflict.

The EU is therefore far from free to deter-mine the contents of its policies by itself, and has

to remain extremely cautious in its contactswith de facto authorities. This caution makes itdifficult to coordinate larger projects on infra-structure.21 EU support for NGO activitiesrather than for official structures is promptedlargely by Georgian fears that a transformationprocess could end up legitimising the break-away entity, more than by efficiency criteria forconflict transformation. The Georgian govern-ment is trying to gain some control over the EU’sconflict transformation policies, particularlythrough its inclusion in the European Neigh-bourhood Policy (ENP) framework. The nega-tive consequences, and the EU’s chances of min-imising them, may be described as follows.

First, the restraint prompted by Georgia’sfears has negative consequences for the EU’sability to influence the attitudes of the politicalelites in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU’sactions are perceived by the de facto authorities asbeing in line with Georgian identities and inter-ests. This then entails risks for Abkhaz andOssetian recipients of EU support who, as theyreceive external support agreed by the Georgiangovernment, may wrongly but easily be criticisedby political opponents for being disloyal tonational interests. Again because of its fears ofupsetting Georgia, the EU is also unable to sup-port state reforms in the two entities, despite theimportance of such reforms for issues such asdemocratisation, the rights of minorities or thenegotiations with the central government. Norcan the EU stipulate precise conditions – such as

17

19 Military support aside, Russia’s contribution to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is mainly in the areas of pensions and private investmentand only marginally in infrastructure. None of these contributions is in the sphere of conflict transformation. On EU conflict resolutionactivities in Georgia, see http://www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/rehabilitation.html.20 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Georgia, National Indicative Programme 2007-2010’,pp. 14-15, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_georgia_en.pdf; European Commission, ‘EuropeanNeighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Georgia, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013’, pp. 34-35, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf.21 Tocci, op. cit. in note 6, p. 142. On the impact of EU conflict resolution policies, see ibid., pp. 141-149.

18

the participation of the displaced population –under which it would regard local elections asmeeting European standards of democracy.Georgia would not accept such conditionsbefore the re-establishment of its control of thebreakaway territories. The Georgian attitudethus makes it impossible for the EU to increasethe legitimacy or political resources of somedomestic actors in these communities, or to con-strain others. EU conditionality is thus weak,particularly when compared with Russia’s.Moscow retains a right of veto on most key deci-sions to be taken in both entities.22 ExcessiveGeorgian pressure on the EU to curb its engage-ment with the breakaway communities is thusleading to suboptimal transformation policies,leaving Russia a free hand in these territories.23

The EU has a strong interest in convincing Geor-gia that such pressure is not productive.

Second, the EU has no interest in followingGeorgia’s time frames for conflict transforma-tion. Such a policy needs a long time perspectivein order to show positive results, unlike, forinstance, conflict prevention policies, whichhave not only to create a framework capable ofproviding security in the long term but also towork on present crises. A kind of linkage thatoverlooks the diversity in the types of policiesand time spans needed for one of these policiesto achieve positive results can indeed onlyencourage negative responses from the otherside, increase frustration on both sides and dis-courage the international community.

The proposals by Georgian prime ministerZurab Nogaideli at the OSCE Permanent Coun-cil of 27 October 2005 on South Ossetia envis-aged a ‘full-scale conflict settlement’24 within afew months. According to Nogaideli, radicalmeasures in international conflict management(such as the creation of a new international

framework for dealing with the conflict), con-flict prevention (such as ensuring the demili-tarisation of the region) and positive conflicttransformation measures (such as the distribu-tion of pensions to elderly people in South Osse-tia and the creation of economic incentives ordirect contacts between Ossetian and GeorgianNGOs) could be expected to lead, within a singleyear, to the signing and implementation of anagreement on the status of the territory. Theparticular conflict transformation proposalsput forward by the Georgian government hadbeen welcomed by the South Ossetian authori-ties, but they rejected the other conflict resolu-tion proposals. Tskhinvali did not want toembark on status negotiations that would implyits reintegration into Georgia. This intransi-gence is not acceptable, but it is also difficult tosee how a conflict transformation programmelasting a couple of months could re-establishhistorical ties and trust between communitiesthat have been devastated by war, violent expul-sions and confrontational policies.

Conflict transformation programmesshould be supported regardless of setbacks inother conflict resolution policies – because theyneed time to work, and cannot be suspended onaccount of failures in other areas. Informaldiplomacy aims to create equal opportunitiesfor the members of communities in conflict todiscuss new prospects for conflict resolution.Their work cannot be detached from the upsand downs of the official negotiations, but itscontinuity should not be made contingent onthem.

Third, many activities funded by the Euro-pean Commission take place within rather thanamong the communities.25 This situation is indanger of being reinforced by the creation bythe Georgian authorities of a temporary


22 The fact that Raul Khajimba, who received strong support from Moscow, lost the 2004 Abkhaz presidential elections to Sergei Bagapshhas correctly been seen as reflecting the limits of Russia’s influence on Abkhazian politics. But Moscow still managed to impose a power-sharing agreement on the two candidates, and it retains the power to veto crucial political decisions.23 According to Nicu Popescu, these EU programmes increase the possibility that the population of breakaway entities will find alternativesoutside Russia and promote knowledge about Europe and its values. See Popescu, op. cit. in note 8, p. 14.24 Zurab Nogaideli, ‘South Ossetia Conflict Resolution Plan’, presented at the 575th Special Meeting of the Permanent Council of the OSCEon 27 October 2005, available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2005/10/16791_en.pdf.25 ICG, ‘Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly’, op. cit. in note 6, p. 20.

administration in South Ossetia and theremoval of the so-called ‘Abkhaz government-in-exile’ to the Georgian-controlled KodoriGorge inside Abkhazia. In the case of SouthOssetia, the European Union has been asked tosupport projects in the mainly Georgian-popu-lated territory controlled by the administrationof Dimitri Sanakoev, an Ossetian politicianloyal to Tbilisi. On the other side of the cease-fire line, the de facto authorities in Tskhinvalireceive substantial support from Moscow. Thecompetition between the two authorities maybenefit the small population of South Ossetiain economic terms, but, according to the Inter-national Crisis Group, it does ‘not promotetrust, rather the opposite’.26 Instead of enteringinto the cycle of unilateral steps, EU financialsupport should continue to be used to achievethe original objectives of conflict transforma-tion – in other words, to bring the identities andinterests of the conflicting parties closertogether through cooperative projects. The EUshould, moreover, refrain from supportingprojects created in a spirit of confrontation.Strengthening the administration in the partsof Abkhazia and South Ossetia controlled byGeorgia cannot become the main focus of atransformation policy, as Tbilisi never had anyconflict with them.

Fourth, the European Union has activelypropagated the thesis that Georgian reformsshould make the country more attractive to thebreakaway communities. The anti-corruptionpolicies adopted after the Rose Revolution,impressive growth rates and the implementa-tion of the rule of law should eventually be ableto convince the Abkhaz and Ossetian popula-tions that they have a strong interest in remain-ing within Georgia. But impressive economicgrowth is not the key mechanism for turning aconflict that springs from issues of identity intoa cooperative arrangement, particularly when

the breakaway entities remain isolated and theRussian economy is part of the competition.The secessionist conflicts in Georgia are firstand foremost about grievances, not about greed.Increasing Georgia’s political and economicattractiveness should thus remain an importantobjective of EU policies for its own sake, and as anecessary condition for reunification, but itshould not be regarded as a sufficient conditionfor or even as the main key to success in conflicttransformation.

It may be concluded that through its trans-formation policies in South Ossetia and Abk-hazia the EU has demonstrated that it is willingin principle to take a balanced approach to itsdealings with the parties, despite structural lim-itations due to the very nature of external inter-vention in a secessionist conflict. The ENPframework obliges the EU to accept strict con-trol by the Georgian government over its trans-formation policies, if it wants ENP to be appliedalso to the population of the breakaway polities.It has to coordinate its policies closely withGeorgia, thereby creating an imbalance betweenthe parties. The EU needs to prevent this lack ofevenhandedness from undermining the build-ing of trust between the conflicting parties or,even worse, from becoming part of a confronta-tion policy.

The issue of conflict transformation policiesdoes not only affect intra-state conflicts inGeorgia. At the inter-state level, diverging iden-tities and interests are also characteristic ofGeorgian-Russian and EU-Russian relations.EU projects in the breakaway territories havestriven for a high degree of coordination withinternational organisations and external actors,and the EU has an interest in concentrating itsefforts on Russia’s involvement in such projects.Such an approach may help persuade Russia tohave its own conflict transformation policies onGeorgia’s secessionist conflicts.

19

On EU conflict transformation policies

26 Ibid., p. 23.

5

On EU international conflict management policies

Georgia has always had a strong interest ininternationalising its conflicts with the

breakaway territories, in the hope that thiswould put additional pressure on Russia torefrain from supporting them. But Georgia alsofears that internationalisation could make iteven more difficult to regain control over whatare in principle defined as domestic policies.External actors involved in the management ofan internal conflict may be tempted to engagethe breakaway communities in the process ofconflict transformation, or even to recognisesome of their claims as legitimate instead of iso-lating them. This means that Georgia has aninterest in stepping up the EU’s role in interna-tional conflict management, but also in limitingits consequences in the other fields of conflictresolution.

The appointment by the Council of the Euro-pean Union of an EU Special Representative forthe South Caucasus in July 2003 was an impor-tant step towards playing a more prominent rolein international conflict management.27 TheSpecial Representative’s mandate was expandedin 2006, and included tasks in the field of con-flict transformation (according to its 2003 man-date, ‘to assist’ the countries of the South Cau-casus in carrying out democratic reforms) andconflict prevention (‘to prevent conflicts in theregion’) and an indirect role in conflict settle-ment (‘to prepare the return of peace, includingthrough promoting the return of refugees andinternally displaced persons’ in the 2003 man-date, ‘to assist in creating the conditions forprogress on the settlement of conflicts’ accord-ing to the 2006 mandate).

The EU can raise Georgia-related issues withRussia in various ways. For instance, the EU andRussia have a Common Space of Cooperation inthe Field of External Security, in which they haveagreed to ‘strengthen EU-Russia dialogue onmatters of practical cooperation on crisis man-agement in order to prepare the ground for jointinitiatives … in the settlement of regional con-flicts’.28 With its member states, the EU mayhelp to de-escalate Georgian-Russian tensions,but it is not in a position to have a decisiveimpact on Russia’s position vis à vis the break-away entities. It is, moreover, difficult for the EUto mediate in disputes between Georgia andRussia that involve the terrain of national iden-tity and history, when some of its member statesare themselves involved in similar disputes withRussia.

While the confrontational policies of Russiaand Georgia promote their internal consolida-tion, they have the opposite effect on the Euro-pean Union. The lack of agreement among EUmembers concerning the importance of theSouth Caucasus region in the EU’s overallneighbourhood policies, and the fear thatMoscow may perceive some EU steps as provoca-tive, make any decision in the field of interna-tional conflict management – such as the cre-ation of a Border Support Team in 200529 – con-tingent on complex negotiations among themember states.

The Group of Friends, which supports UNactivities in Abkhazia, could be enlarged toinclude the EUSR. The European Commissionis currently involved in the OSCE mediation onthe South Ossetian conflict through rehabilita-

21

27 Popescu, op. cit. in note 8, pp. 15-16.28 Quoted in International Crisis Group, ‘Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s Role’, op. cit. in note 6, p. 10.29 On the EUSR Border Support Team, see Popescu, op. cit. in note 8, pp. 11-12.

22

tion initiatives, which has led to its participationin Joint Control Commission (JCC) meetings oneconomic programmes.30 A step that wouldraise the profile of the EU more decisively wouldbe the participation of the EUSR in the media-tion of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Thiswould require a new international formatwithin the OSCE, something the Ossetians andRussians would find it difficult to agree to.31

A clash between international conflict man-agement and conflict transformation has to beavoided. During their visits in Georgia, Euro-pean Parliament members and delegations haveheld meetings with the de facto authorities.32

Such visits are part of the usual practice of repre-sentatives of EU member states and interna-tional organisations and are aimed at obtainingfirst-hand information on the negotiations andat communicating the proper views to theseauthorities. Having contacts with both sides isentirely in line with the EU policy of conflicttransformation, and the meetings do not implyany form of formal recognition of the de factostate institutions. But in 2007 the EuropeanParliament decided to go beyond this dialogueby giving widely publicised support to the cre-ation by the Georgian government of a provi-sional administration in South Ossetia. It gaveits head, Dmitri Sanakoev, the opportunity toaddress the 9th session of the EU-Georgian Par-liamentary Cooperation Committee on 26 June2007.33

In terms of recognition of democratic andlegal representativeness, the significance of anaddress to this cooperative body of the Euro-pean and Georgian parliaments is very differentfrom that of a simple meeting with EuropeanParliament members. For this reason, the de factoauthorities of South Ossetia would not receivean invitation to address this body. Yet the Euro-pean Parliament decided to invite Sanakoevdespite the fact that his democratic representa-tiveness is actually no less questionable thanthat of the de facto authorities. Such a policy bythe European Parliament – striving to raise itsown profile in Georgia – would fit formally intoa policy of international conflict management,where an external actor might have to supportthe positions of one of the parties in order to cre-ate incentives for an agreement. In order to con-tribute to conflict resolution, however, such apolicy would also have to fit in with a policy ofconflict transformation, which aims at bringingthe sides closer together. But the European Par-liament has failed to reach this particular objec-tive. The invitation was perceived by the interna-tional media and by public opinion in Georgiaand South Ossetia as a clear indication of sup-port for a unilateral move by the Georgianauthorities, aimed at demonstrating the inter-national diplomatic isolation of Tskhinvali.This lack of balance on the part of the EuropeanParliament clashes with the EU’s objectives inconflict transformation.


30 ICG, ‘Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly’, op cit. in note 6, p. 20.31 Ibid., p. 11.32 In September 2007, for instance, a delegation from the European Parliament travelled to Tskhinvali and met with the South Ossetianpresident Eduard Kokoity.33 The EU-Georgian Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was set up in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreementbetween the EU and Georgia and comprises parliamentarians from both the Georgian and European parliaments. It covers all aspects oftheir bilateral relations.

6

On EU conflict settlement policies

At present the European Union is confrontedwith three main problems in its support for

negotiations on the international status of Abk-hazia and South Ossetia. First, the negotiationshave to overcome the incompatibility betweenthe positions of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia. Like all foreign actors supportinga breakaway entity – e.g. Turkey in the case of theTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) orWestern governments in the case of Kosovo – theRussian authorities have a basic interest in a typeof status that would not subordinate this entityto the central government. Equality in statusbetween the parties creates optimal conditionsfor conflict resolution. Such equality can beachieved either through independence orthrough other forms of international sovereignty(the option chosen by Turkey when it recognisedthe TRNC or by Western governments in regardto Kosovo), or by the creation of a federation inwhich the minority has a very high status or evenequal status with the majority (Turkey’s backingof the Annan plan for Cyprus).

Where the conflicts in Georgia are concerned,the first option is the preferred one for the break-away communities themselves but it is not aviable one for Russia insofar as it would isolate –and thus weaken – Russia’s position. The secondoption has been proposed by Russia for Abkhazia

(the ‘common state’ proposal of 1997). Georgia,by contrast, defends a model of state-buildingthat has been repeatedly described as ‘a supra-presidential system’ in which the branches ofpower are not sufficiently separated.34 The diffi-culty experienced by Georgian democracy individing powers ‘horizontally’ between the execu-tive, the legislature and the judiciary do not bodewell for its ability to divide powers ‘vertically’between the federated entities and the federallevel. Back in 2004, in fact, according to criticismfrom the Venice Commission and the Council ofEurope, the lack of separation of powers –reflected in the excessive power of the central gov-ernment in the affairs of Adjara – was already amajor fault in the constitutional arrangementsfor this Autonomous Republic.35

There are several federal options compatiblewith the principle of territorial integrity. Theyrange from a federation, in which Abkhaziaand South Ossetia would all receive the samepowers, to a type of devolution whereby Abk-hazia and South Ossetia would become subor-dinate autonomies within the Georgian state,with many options in between. There is thus awide range of alternatives, but one of the mainprinciples that the EU should bear in mindwhen assessing their value is the separation ofpowers.36

23

34 See among others Mariam Gabedava, ‘Division of Authority in Georgia’, Reports of the International Commitments AssessmentProgramme, Transparency International, October 2006, available at: http://www.transparency.ge/f iles/215_273_232939_Division%20of%20Authority%20Eng.pdf.35 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law of Georgia on theStatus of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 59th Plenary Session (Venice, 18-19 June 2004)’,Strasbourg, 21 June 2004, CDL-AD(2004)018, available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)018-e.asp. Theserecommendations have been endorsed by the Council of Europe.36 Concerning the Abkhaz conflict, in 2001 the Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia agreed on the so-called ‘Boden document’,setting out the distribution of powers between Tbilisi and Sukhum(i) that should serve as a basis for future negotiations between the Georgianand Abkhaz sides. In terms of the separation of powers, this UN document defines Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within the sovereign stateof Georgia. The sovereignty of the federal parliament and federal government may not infringe on the constitutional powers of Abkhazia.Both levels of government will derive their powers from the federal constitution and both will be equally subordinate to it. The Bodendocument prescribes that both sides ‘shall not amend or modify the Federal Agreement, nor terminate or invalidate it in any way, other than

by mutual agreement’. On the Boden document, see Bruno Coppieters, ‘The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict’, in Bruno Coppieters et al.,‘Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery’, published in 2004 as a special issue of the Journal onEthnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1/2004, available online at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/, and reproduced in 2004 as a book byAcademia Press, Ghent, 2004, pp. 191-232.37 EUobserver.com, 28 June 2007, http://euobserver.com/9/24389.

24

Second, the discussions on various modelsfor settling conflict in Georgia will have to takeinto account the international negotiations onKosovo. The European Union has tried to min-imise the negative consequences of its pro-inde-pendence position on secessionist conflicts else-where by pointing out that this position wasbased on unique circumstances. Such an answeris very unsatisfactory if the breakaway Abkhazand Ossetian communities ever have to be con-vinced that they should compromise and accepta federal option as a lesser evil. The EuropeanUnion will have to clarify the principles onwhich it has based its rejection of federalism inthe case of Kosovo. It will have to support anopen debate on the right to secession, and willalso have to demonstrate that a federal optionwould not necessarily include fewer benefits forAbkhazia and South Ossetia than the option ofinternational sovereignty and independence, forinstance in the field of international securityguarantees.

A third problem with which the EuropeanUnion is confronted is the question of the legiti-macy of the parties who have to negotiate a set-tlement, particularly where South Ossetia isconcerned. The authorities of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia are taking part in the UN- andOSCE-mediated negotiations on the basis oftheir de facto control of a population and a terri-tory. The stalling of the negotiations on politicalstatus has prompted the Georgian governmentto look for alternatives, particularly as regardsSouth Ossetia. Since 2004 Georgia has made aseries of attempts to regain control over this ter-ritory. All have been based on a denial that theconflict with South Ossetia is identity-based orthat the authorities of this breakaway territoryrepresent its population. The de facto statehoodof South Ossetia is depicted as an instrument ofeconomic privilege and the imperial interests ofRussia. This discourse aims to delegitimise theenemy. It further reinforces the historical myththat identity conflicts never took place in Geor-

gia and that the Georgian majority nation hascoexisted harmoniously with its minorities overthe centuries. The main problem with thisapproach is that it reduces the conflict overSouth Ossetia to the creation of economicopportunities for local élites and strategicopportunities for outside powers, and overlooksthe question of historic injustices, security andnational identity.

The key element in the latest attempt toapply this logic was the creation of a pro-Geor-gian administration to govern the part of theterritory not under the control of Tskhinvali, ashas already been mentioned in the previous sec-tion. Parallel to the presidential elections thattook place in the breakaway entity of SouthOssetia in November 2006, leading to the re-election of Eduard Kokoity, elections were heldamong the population not controlled by the defacto regime. They chose Dmitri Sanakoev as‘their’ president. In May 2007, Saakashviliappointed him head of the newly-created SouthOssetian Provisional Administrative Entity.Sanakoev is a member of the State Commissionon the Determination of the Status of SouthOssetia, set up by the Georgian government inJuly 2007 to draw up the status of the regionwithin Georgia, and which operates without theparticipation of Tskhinvali. In an interview,Sanakoev expressed his conviction that SouthOssetia would again be part of Georgia beforethe end of 2007.37 That ‘secession would be overby Christmas’ is an expectation fully in line withthe time frame of the Georgian leadership.

It would be difficult to say which of the twocompeting administrations could be consideredmore representative of the multi-ethnic SouthOssetian population. Both presidents claimedto have won more than 90 percent of the votes.Whereas the total population of South Ossetiais estimated to be no greater than 60,000 or70,000, Tskhinvali claims that 98 percent of the55,163 registered voters expressed their prefer-ence for Kokoity, while the alternative poll


organisers claimed that 96 percent of about57,000 registered voters participated and gaveSanakoev 94 percent of the votes.38

It would be even more difficult to knowwhich status option the Ossetian community inSouth Ossetia would vote for, given the chanceto express their real opinion. The referendaorganised at the same time as the presidentialelections in both parts of South Ossetia left noroom for an open and pluralistic debate on thisissue. The referendum organised by Tskhinvaliproduced more than 99 percent in favour ofindependence, and the referendum organised bythe parallel authorities 94 percent of the votes infavour of reintegration within Georgia on thebasis of a federal arrangement. No arguments infavour of federalism are permitted in Tskhinvaliand secession is expressly forbidden by the Geor-gian constitution. Sanakoev himself stated in aninterview in Brussels that his preference forautonomy within Georgia was based on the

argument of a lesser evil. He would personally bein favour of South Ossetia joining the RussianFederation if this could be done peacefully.39

The lack of democratic representativeness ofthe South Ossetian leadership and the difficultyof conducting an open political debate on thestatus option are indeed major obstacles to con-flict resolution, but this problem is not resolvedby the creation by the central government of anadministration ‘representative’ of the SouthOssetian community, or by unilateral decisionson its future status. Negotiations on conflictsettlement will have to start as soon as possible,but they cannot result from administrative deci-sions taken by one of the sides. Despite their lackof democratic representativeness, the de factoauthorities of South Ossetia are defending aposition on Ossetian identity and interestswhich has to be taken into account no less thanthose of Sanakoev or other pro-Georgian Osset-ian leaders.

38 ICG, ‘Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly’, op. cit. in note 6, pp. 2-3.39 EUobserver.com, 28 June 2007, http://euobserver.com/9/24389.

25

On EU conflict settlement policies

7

Conclusions and recommendations

The Georgian central government and theauthorities of the two breakaway polities of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not tied to eachother through a common legal framework.Their conflicts are not regulated by constitu-tional or international law. There is no jointdecision-making. The secessionist conflicts inGeorgia are, moreover, part of an intractableinternational situation: the conflicting partiesin Georgia are unable to reach a settlement with-out external support, while relations betweenthe international actors are themselves charac-terised by incompatible identities and interests.

The first objective of conflict resolution isconflict prevention: the incompatibility of posi-tions should not escalate to open violence. Thesecond aim is conflict transformation: the posi-tions of the parties have to be made more com-patible. Conflict transformation fails whenidentities and interests drive the sides fartherapart. International conflict management is thethird objective. External actors have to containthe escalation of conflict and create incentivesfor a settlement, by exercising leverage on theparties or by changing the balance of powerbetween them. The final objective is conflict settle-ment: the parties should reach agreement on acommon institutional framework. Joint deci-sion-making will show that identities and inter-ests have been made compatible.

The achievement of each of these objectivescorresponds to a particular time frame. Conflictresolution policies may fail if there is no balancebetween these various policy objectives.

On the question of conflict settlement, a dis-tinction has to be made between five options:recognition of the sovereignty of the breakawayentities; the forcible abolition of their state-hood; their forcible inclusion in a federal frame-work; their peaceful inclusion in a federal frame-work; and, finally, the status quo option.

Each of these options is based on a clearchoice between the use of violent or peacefulmeans. Each approach involves a different timeframe. Those options that are based on the useof force promise a quick solution to the questionof conflict settlement, without, however, beingable to resolve the issue of conflict transforma-tion. The peaceful option necessitates positiveconflict transformation, which works slowlyand requires continuity and a finely balancedapproach on the part of external actors. There isthus a clear link between time frames and thechoice of exclusively peaceful means or the useof force in the search for a solution to the con-flicts in Georgia on the issue of sovereignty.

Owing to Russian intransigence, Georgia isincapable of enforcing the right of a large part ofthe Georgian population of Abkhazia to returnto their homes or to regain control over Geor-gia’s own external borders. There are no negotia-tions on the political status of Abkhazia orSouth Ossetia. Russian military might alsomake it impossible for Georgia to use force as alast resort. Georgia is forced to accept the princi-ple of the peaceful integration of the secession-ist entities without having the option of usingforce as a last resort if the negotiations shouldstall. This creates a risk that conflict settlementmay be postponed indefinitely. The Georgiangovernment fears that the EU and the US maybecome indifferent to its fate, and it responds toRussian intransigence with a policy of con-frontation, hoping for increased internationalattention. Involved in a never-ending series ofclashes with Russia, Georgia has pinned itshopes of recovering its lost territories to its inte-gration into the West, and particularly to theprospect of NATO membership.

Georgia’s conflict resolution policies makeno basic distinction between the specific tasks ofconflict prevention, conflict transformation,

27

28

international conflict management and con-flict settlement. These four tasks within a con-flict resolution policy become conflated into asingle approach. Georgia considers that all thesetasks need to be carried out simultaneously andin very swift order. But crash programmes inconflict resolution do not seem to work. Whilein principle a differentiated, patient approachallows positive results to be achieved in both thelong and the short term, an undifferentiatedand impatient perspective has so far resulted in aquick succession of failed initiatives.

In the field of conflict prevention, the EUhas to work in a highly volatile region with ahigh level of military mobilisation. Instabilitycould lead any day to violent confrontations inSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia. The degree ofantagonism between Georgia and Russia makesit difficult for the EU to contain conflict escala-tion, one of the main tasks of conflict manage-ment.

Conflict transformation is currently takingplace, but only in a negative form, as the identi-ties and interests of the parties are drifting far-ther and farther apart. The EU needs to be awarethat its conflict transformation policies cannotbe based on an evenhanded approach to the con-flicting parties. As an external actor in a seces-sionist conflict, it can only engage in the break-away territories to the extent and on the condi-tions defined by the local authorities and thecentral government. But the EU has to cope withsevere restrictions imposed on its conflict trans-formation policies by Tbilisi, particularly in theimplementation of the European Neighbour-hood Policy in the breakaway territories. The EUcan, however, lessen the negative consequencesof its lack of impartiality in a number of ways.

First, it has to respond to the Georgian fearthat strong engagement with the breakawaycommunities may lend a kind of legitimacy tothe act of secession. The EU can point out that apolicy of engagement does not entail any formof diplomatic recognition and that excessiverestraint has the worst possible results. Second,the EU has to make it clear that it cannot sharethe time perspective of the Georgian govern-ment with regard to conflict transformation.Programmes in this field cannot be expected to

lead to spectacular changes in the short term,and supporting them should not be made con-tingent on progress in other fields of conflictresolution such as conflict settlement. Third,nor should the EU engage in an economic com-petition between the de facto authorities in SouthOssetia and the newly created provisionaladministration loyal to Tbilisi. Such competi-tion would inevitably lead to new forms of con-frontation, not reconciliation.

In the field of international conflict manage-ment, the EU has an interest in raising its profilein the conflicts on Abkhazia, through its inclu-sion in the UN Group of Friends, and on SouthOssetia, through its inclusion in a renewedOSCE mediation framework where it wouldhave to be on a par with Russia. But it is difficultfor the EU to agree on a strengthened role inconflicts involving Russia. Whereas the con-frontational policies of Georgia and Russia pro-mote their own internal political consolidationand increase the domestic popularity of theirleaders, the European Union is deeply dividedon the question of how to respond to Russia’sincreasing assertiveness. Some of its membersconsider that they have more urgent priorities intheir relations with Moscow, while others areengaged in disputes with Russia that are similarto Georgia’s. These concern the difficult ques-tions of historical injustice and national iden-tity. Whether or not the EU should be moredeeply involved in Georgia’s unresolved con-flicts is a further divisive issue for the EU, andone that is partly linked to Georgia’s integrationinto the EU and EU enlargement.

In the field of conflict settlement, the Euro-pean Union should not confine itself to pruden-tial arguments when exercising restraint onGeorgia. The status quo is not an option for Geor-gia. The EU should, strongly and convincingly,voice its determination to find a solution tothese conflicts and further deepen its dialoguewith Georgia and the breakaway regions onalternatives to the use of force. The EU hasdeclared that it is willing in principle to sendpeacekeepers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Itshould be able to define the role it could take inproviding security to the Ossetian and Abkhazcommunities in a post-settlement situation, in


cooperation with Russia and the US and withthe support of the OSCE and NATO.

In the field of conflict settlement, the EU hasto adopt the principle of a separation of powersas the main criterion for judging the quality offederal models for resolving the status question.This principle has as yet been insufficientlyimplemented in the ‘horizontal’ division ofpowers between the executive, legislature andjudiciary in post-revolutionary Georgia and inits ‘vertical’ division of powers with Adjara.

The EU needs to make explicit the principleson which it has based its position in favour of‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo. Arational discussion on the choice between full

and shared sovereignty for the breakaway com-munities has to be based on costs and benefitsfor the various communities.

There is no reason to postpone negotiationson status, but patience will be needed if progressin conflict transformation, conflict preventionand international conflict management are tocreate more favourable conditions for bringingconflict settlement to a successful conclusion.There are no short-cuts to a decision on status,either by expecting that Georgia or its provi-sional administrations may become so econom-ically and politically attractive that secessionistarguments will wane among the Abkhaz andOssetian communities, or by the use of force.

29

Conclusions and recommendations

a

31

Annex Abbreviations

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

EUSR European Union Special Representative

IDP Internally Displaced Person

JCC Joint Control Commission

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UN United Nations

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