occasional paper n°60 - peace palace library · 2020. 2. 13. · in january 2002 the eu institute...

The EU in Moldova – Settling conflicts in the neighbourhood

Nicu Popescu

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Occasional Paper

n°60October 2005

In January 2002 the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) was created as a Paris-based autonomous agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Actionof 20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the fur-ther development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analysesand recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policies.In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between experts and decision-mak-ers at all levels.

Occasional Papers are essays or reports that the Institute considers should be made avail-able as a contribution to the debate on topical issues relevant to European security. Theymay be based on work carried out by researchers granted awards by the EUISS, on contri-butions prepared by external experts, and on collective research projects or other activitiesorganised by (or with the support of) the Institute. They reflect the views of their authors,not those of the Institute.

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Nicu Popescu

Nicu Popescu is Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and editor

of Eurojournal.org. He is a PhD candidate at the Central European University in Budapest working on the

EU policies towards secessionist entities. He was a Visiting Fellow at the European Union Institute for Secu-

rity Studies in Paris in April-June 2005.

Occasional Paper

n°60October 2005

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Contents

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1

4

5

6

a

2

Summary 3

Introduction 5

European Neighbourhood Policy 9

2.1 Missing links in ENP 10

The conflict in Transnistria 15

3.1 How does Transnistria survive? 17

3.2 The regional context of Transnistria’s survival 23

3.3 A changing Ukraine 26

The EU and Transnistria 29

4.1 Why more EU engagement? 29

4.2 EU thinking and policy 31

Transnistria: from deadlock to sustainable settlement 35

5.1 Altering the regional context 35

5.2 Policies towards Moldova 37

5.3 Policies on Transnistria 39

Conclusions and recommendations 43

Annexes 45

Abbreviations 45

Map of Moldova including Transnistria 46

The author is very grateful to Dov Lynch for his most useful comments on the paper and guidance while

at EUISS, as well as to Nicole Gnesotto, Judy Batt, Gustav Lindstrom and Damien Helly.

.

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Summary The EU in Moldova – Settling conflicts in the neighbourhood

A key objective of the European Union is to have a stable, secure, prosperous and democratic neigh-

bourhood. Failing an offer of accession to close neighbours in the medium term, the EU should and

can offer stronger CFSP engagement. Contributing to conflict resolution in the neighbourhood is key

to the achievement of EU objectives. However, the conflict resolution dimension of the ENP is under-

developed. It is time for the EU to focus on the conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.

Promoting the security aspect of ENP can start with the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. This

conflict is the closest geographically to the EU; at the same time, it is the most ‘solvable.’ The conflict

features high on the agenda of EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations. A settlement of the conflict in

Transnistria would attenuate the soft security challenges the EU faces on its eastern border. Settle-

ment would also assuage an irritant in EU-Russia relations, and set a positive precedent in building

the EU-Russia common space for external security. It would also be an example of positive coopera-

tion with Ukraine under ENP.

The focus of EU policy should be to alter the context in which the conflict is situated and sustained,

rather than hoping for an early agreement on the status of Transnistria. The primary objective

should be to increase Moldova’s ‘attractiveness’ while decreasing the benefits of maintaining the cur-

rent status quo. The Transnistrian separatist project is to a large degree based on false economic argu-

ments for independence. Undermining these claims will be central to efforts to reunify the country.

The EU has already appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova and is expected to

launch an EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine that would monitor the border

between the two countries, including the section controlled by the secessionist authorities of Transnis-

tria. EU border monitoring is necessary, but is not a sustainable long-term solution. The EU should

help Moldova strengthen its own capacity to control the Transnistrian section of the border by

launching an EU Police Mission to Moldova.

Building a sustainable context for the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria can be achieved

through greater support to Moldova’s Europeanisation and implementation of the ENP Action

Plan, more active support to democracy inside Transnistria and greater engagement with Ukraine

under CFSP.

1

Introduction

The European Security Strategy (ESS) statesthat enlargement brings the EU closer to

‘troubled areas’ in its neighbourhood and that it‘is in the European interest that countries on theEU’s borders are well-governed. Neighbourswho are engaged in violent conflict, weak stateswhere organised crime flourishes, dysfunc-tional societies (…) all pose problems forEurope.’1 Enlargement not only brings theUnion closer to conflicts on its periphery butalso strengthens the EU as it brings in new stateswith a greater knowledge of these conflicts andwho are equipped with a greater sense ofurgency to deal with them. Moreover, with thedevelopment of the European Security andDefence Policy (ESDP) the EU has the militaryand civilian capabilities to seek the settlement ofthese conflicts. In Javier Solana’s words, the EUis ‘the only regional organisation with such awide range of political, diplomatic, humanitar-ian, economic and financial, police and militaryinstruments.’2 Certainly, the resolution of theconflicts in the EU neighbourhood requires anintegrated approach to conflict resolution. Andin fact, the EU has little choice: ‘In its neigh-bourhood and beyond, the EU cannot (…) con-fine itself to the economic and political spheres;it also needs to be able to guarantee stability,prevent conflicts and manage crises on its owndoorstep.’3 In this context, the European Neigh-bourhood Policy (ENP) has been developed withconflict resolution as one of its priorities.

A number of unsolved conflicts in the neigh-bourhood poses problems for the EU. Theseinclude, among others, the conflicts over West-ern Sahara, Israel-Palestine, Abkhazia, SouthOssetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria.The success of the ENP requires that the EU takea position on all of these. As argued in the Euro-pean Security Strategy, EU security is inter-dependent with stability in the regions on itsborders.

The paper discusses the use of the ENP toresolve the conflict that opposes the separatistregion of Transnistria4 with the central govern-ment of Moldova. There is no apparent urgencyfor the EU to become more involved with thisconflict: there is no fighting, people are notdying and terrorists are not being trained inTransnistria. However, Transnistria matters forthe EU. The conflict poses considerable softsecurity challenges to the enlarged EuropeanUnion as the separatist region has emerged intoa hub for illicit trafficking in arms, people anddrugs, organised crime, money-laundering andsmuggling. Calm in appearance only, the secu-rity situation is far from stable and could deteri-orate at any moment. The conflict is also theclosest geographically to the enlarged EU – itstands less than 100 km from the border ofRomania, due to join the EU in 2007-2008.

Importantly, this is also the most solvable ofthe conflicts in the EU neighbourhood. Theconflict is not embedded in ethnicity, religion or

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1 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 2 Javier Solana, ‘Europe must assume its responsibility for security,’ The Irish Times, 23 September 2003.3 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Building our Common Future: Policy Challenges andBudgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013, 26.2.2004, COM (2004) 101 final/2, p. 24. 4 Transnistria is the Moldovan name of the secessionist region on the left bank of the river Nistru (Dnestr in Russian). The Russian namefor the region is Pridnestrovye, and the formal name of the self proclaimed republic is ‘Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika’, or PMR.Transnistria-Pridnestrovye-PMR are different terms designating the same region.

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history, but rather in contemporary politics andeconomics. This conflict did not feature thebloodshed seen in the wars that followed the dis-solution of the Yugoslav Federation, and it hasnone of their enmity either. Transnistria is not aclassic ethnic or religious conflict. The conflictis sustained because elites in the separatistregion benefit from the status quo. They alsoenjoy the support of powerful groups insideRussia, Ukraine as well as Moldova. These elitesbenefit from lucrative criminal businesses cen-tred on the geographic position of Transnistriaand its existence in legal limbo. For much of the1990s, Moldova’s lack of attractiveness wasanother factor sustaining the conflict. Transnis-tria could justifiably look across the DniestrRiver and argue the case for separatism.

The context around the conflict has changedfor the better. First, Moldova in 2005 is not theMoldova of 1995 or 1989. The Orange Revolu-tion in Ukraine, the prospect of Romania’sfuture EU accession and EU-Russia cooperationon the building of a common space for externalsecurity – all create an environment that is con-ducive for a greater EU contribution to conflictsettlement. Engaging in conflict settlement herewill require a coordinated and integratedapproach from the EU – both economic and Jus-tice and Home Affairs measures, the greaterintegration of ESDP instruments into the ENP,as well as enhanced political dialogue withMoldova, Ukraine and Russia. These tasks are achallenge for the EU but they are not insur-mountable.

In March 2005, the EU appointed a SpecialRepresentative for Moldova with the aim of con-tributing to conflict settlement and strengthen-ing a constructive role for the EU in conflict res-olution. This is the latest step in the evolution ofEU engagement in this conflict. Other stepshave included the negotiation in 2004 of the EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan, with a section on theTransnistria problem. Previously, the EU hadalso considered participation in a peace supportoperation in Moldova. The EU also agreed toimpose sanctions with the US against the sepa-ratist leadership because of their obstruction ofconflict settlement. These actions have beenuseful, but more is needed.

The objective of the EU’s efforts should betwofold: to increase Moldova’s attractiveness asa state and to reduce the benefits that sustainTransnistria’s de facto independence. EU policyshould be dictated by long-term considerations.Conflict resolution, entailing the reunificationof Moldova and the edification of a viable statewithout foreign troops on its territory, isunlikely under current circumstances. There-fore, the EU should seek to influence these cir-cumstances in order to slowly change elementsof the status quo that have blocked conflict set-tlement. Achieving these aims will require inter-national efforts to support democracy inTransnistria and to enhance border controls onthe Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Buildingsustainability of any settlement will requiremore than simply applying pressure on theTransnistrian leadership. Despite the apparentfragility of the Transnistrian leadership today,the structures of interests, indeed even some ofthe ideas, sustaining the conflict will not vanisheasily, and are likely to remain, even if trans-formed, should a regime collapse in Transnistriaoccur.

It is Moldova’s task to become attractive toordinary Transnistrians by becoming moredemocratic and prosperous. For this, EU sup-port is needed. The EU need not offer Moldovaaccession to the EU in the immediate future. Infact, such an offer would be difficult given thecurrent difficulties facing the Union. Failingthis, it is vital that the EU develop a stronger andmore visible Common Foreign and Security Pol-icy (CFSP) towards Moldova. To its advantage,this is both feasible and necessary. Greater mar-ket integration under the ENP and enhancedpolitical dialogue with the EU will have positiverepercussions for the conflict resolutionprocess. The EU should help Moldova to buildfunctioning security sector institutions in orderto prepare the ground for a sustainable resolu-tion of the conflict and border management tobe undertaken in the future by Moldova. Assuch, this paper argues that the EU shouldlaunch a police mission to Moldova with theobjective of enhancing the capacity of law-enforcement agencies and building an inte-grated border control system that will be able in


due course to control Moldova’s borders,including the Transnistrian segment.

This paper is divided into four parts. Thepaper starts with an overview of ENP and high-lights a number of gaps in the conflict resolu-tion dimension of the policy. Basically, the ENPrequires more ESDP and the EU should con-sider ‘exporting’ some of its foreign policyinstruments from the Balkans into the neigh-bourhood. The second part is dedicated to theconflict in Transnistria. The aim here is toexplain how the separatist region has survivedfor so long, and to review the roles of Russia,Ukraine and Moldova in the conflict. Theregional context around the conflict, particu-larly after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,has been changing dramatically, which opens a

window of opportunity to push for settlement.The third section examines the evolution of EUapproaches to the conflict. The paper concludeswith proposals on the use of EU foreign andsecurity policy instruments to secure a viablesolution to the conflict.

In short, this paper argues that EU actionsshould seek to shatter the deadlock in this con-flict by contributing to tighter border controlsaround Transnistria, by supporting democrati-sation in the separatist region and by employingsanctions and incentives for the achievement ofthese aims. Subsequently, the challenge will beto ensure the sustainability of conflict settle-ment. This will also require measures from theEU.

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Introduction

2

European Neighbourhood Policy

I n spring 2002, the need to develop a newframework of relations with the EU’s new

neighbours started to be discussed. From late2002 to 2004, a debate on the shape of the Euro-pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) took place.5

One starting premise is that in the shortterm the EU will not give the green light toneighbours to join the EU. The aim of theneighbourhood policy is to strengthen EU rela-tions with its neighbours and to promote sta-bility, democracy and prosperity on its borders.The ENP presents a vision of ‘a ring of coun-tries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values andobjectives, drawn into an increasingly closerelationship, going beyond co-operation toinvolve a significant measure of economic andpolitical integration. This will bring enormousgains to all involved in terms of increased sta-bility, security and well being’.6 These aims areto be achieved through the elaboration of‘action plans’ (AP) between the EU and each ofits neighbouring countries. In February 2005,the EU approved the action plans with seven ofthe sixteen states involved in the neighbour-hood policy (Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco,Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine).The APs provide for strengthening politicaldialogue, trade relations, and promotingreforms, as well as measures to prepare partnersfor gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’sInternal Market and in its domains of justice

and home affairs, energy, transport, and envi-ronment.

The policy’s declared objective is the creationof a semi-integrated neighbourhood around theEU and intensified co-operation between theUnion and its neighbours on a wide range ofpolicies. Initially, the EU offered integration andliberalisation to promote the free movement ofpersons, goods, services and capital between theUnion and neighbours.7 In later documents,however, the promise of the four freedoms wasreduced to the promise of a ‘stake in the EU’sinternal market’.8 Conflict resolution in theneighbourhood, while explicitly stated in all ofthe documents, is not the central objective ofENP. The priorities are trade liberalisation anddemocratisation. However, there are significantreferences to EU involvement in the resolutionof crises on its borders. A principle underlyingthe ENP is recognition of a ‘shared responsibil-ity’ for stability and security in the region, andthe need to settle its conflicts.9 The EU has avested interest in seeking the settlement of theseconflicts; this interest is also shared by its neigh-bours, if not by all of the parties to the conflicts.As the March 2003 Commission Communica-tion states:

The negative effects of conflicts on eco-nomic and political development, especiallywhere sustained over a long period, cannot

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5 See for example Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Partners and neighbours: A CFSPfor a wider Europe’, Chaillot Paper no.64 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003) and Michael Emerson, The Wider EuropeMatrix (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2004). A comprehensive list of documents on the European NeighbourhoodPolicy can be found on the website of the European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/document_en.htm 6 Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 Final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, p. 5.7 European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COMM 2003,104 Final, 11 March 2003.8 ENP Strategy Paper, op. cit., p. 3.9 ENP Strategy Paper, op. cit., p. 13.

10 EU/Israel Action Plan, p. 1; EU/Jordan Action Plan, p. 1; EU/Morocco Action Plan, p. 1 ; EU/Moldova Action Plan, p. 1; EU/PalestinianAuthority Action Plan, p. 1 ; EU/Tunisia Action Plan, p. 1 ; EU/Ukraine Action Plan, p. 1.11 See the ENP Country Reports on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon published on 02/03.2005, available at:http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/document_en.htm 12 EU/Morocco Action Plan, p. 7. 13 See the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, Brussels, 11.04.2001, COM(2001) 211 final.

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be over-estimated. These effects are not onlydomestic – so long as conflicts persist thereis a danger of spillover. Conflict and politi-cal division in the Mediterranean (WesternSahara, Palestine) over the past half centuryhas seriously retarded the development ofthe region. Unrecognised statelets such asTransnistria are a magnet for organisedcrime and can destabilise or throw offcourse the process of state-building, politi-cal consolidation and sustainable develop-ment.

This also applies to the three secessionist‘statelets’ of Abkhazia, South Ossetia andNagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus, aregion that was included in the ENP frameworkin June 2004. For the overall objective of ENP tobe attained, the EU must address the thornyquestion of settling conflicts throughout thisregion.

The ENP Action Plans agreed in 2005 all fea-ture conflict settlement as priority areas. TheAction Plans with Israel, Jordan, Morocco,Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia andUkraine all note on the first page a ‘sharedresponsibility in conflict prevention and con-flict resolution’.10 Conflict resolution is alsoconsidered a key objective of cooperation withthe countries developing action plans in late2005, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Geor-gia and Lebanon. The ENP Strategy Papers onthese countries mention the necessity to ‘shareresponsibility’ for conflict settlements and con-tain sections on ‘territorial disputes and con-flicts’.11

However, the scope of EU action varies. TheEU has appointed three Special Representativesin the neighbourhood – for the Middle Eastpeace process, for Moldova and for the SouthernCaucasus. While the EU has declared its inten-

tion to step up cooperation with other coun-tries, the Action Plan with Morocco, for exam-ple, has only a vague statement on the need to‘contribute to UN-led efforts in the resolutionof regional conflicts’.12 The nature of EU effortsdepends on the willingness of the conflictingparties to discuss the issue with the EU, and awillingness to understand the reasons drivingthe EU desire for greater engagement in conflictsettlement in its neighbourhood.

2.1 Missing links in ENP

The crisis management dimension The conflict resolution dimension of ENP hasbeen underdeveloped conceptually. This ispartly explained by the fact that ENP is a Com-mission-driven policy, and crisis management isthe prerogative of the Council, which is the mainEU institutional actor in foreign and securitypolicy issues. Through the Commission, thesecurity dimension of ENP has been mainlyfocused on conflict prevention and post-con-flict rehabilitation rather than on direct EU par-ticipation in the settlement of conflicts.13 Thisfocus also results from the reality that direct cri-sis management is more controversial than pre-vention and post-conflict rehabilitation withinthe EU and with partners such as Russia andMorocco who are weary of greater EU involve-ment in conflicts where they have importantinterests. The March 2003 Commission Com-munication does state: ‘Once settlement hasbeen reached, EU civil and crisis managementcapabilities could also be engaged in post-con-flict internal security arrangements. Additionalsources of funding for post-conflict reconstruc-tion and development would be required.’ How-ever, this pledge is hardly enough if conflict set-


tlement is a distant prospect. Most of the con-flicts in the EU neighbourhood are deadlocked;thus, the pledge to contribute to post-conflictrehabilitation is only of limited value as long asthere is no exit in sight from the current statusquo.

Geographical continuity gapIt is a paradox that EU neighbours with conflictson their territories have benefited the least fromrecent developments in ESDP. The EU isinvolved in crisis management in the WesternBalkans through military and police missions inBosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and inmore distant places, such as its consecutive mis-sions in the Democratic Republic of Congo,14 inIndonesia and in Iraq.15 The EU also has a ratherhigh level of visibility in Afghanistan. Commu-nity funds have been allocated to support secu-rity sector reform in El Salvador andGuatemala.16 The most recent example is thelaunch of an EU ESDP Aceh Monitoring Mis-sion in Indonesia on 15 September 2005. Themission consists of 226 civilian personnel deal-ing with demobilisation of the Free Aceh Move-ment and decommissioning of arms, as well asthe withdrawal of Indonesian governmenttroops in the context of a peace deal signed inAugust 2005 between the conflict parties.17

All this is in stark contrast to what is going onin the EU’s own neighbourhood. The EU hasbeen less present and less visible in conflict set-tlement in its neighbourhood when comparedto the Western Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa.In Georgia, the EU deployed a twelve person

Rule of Law mission in July 2004 and a three-manned border monitoring mission based inTbilisi rather than at the actual border.18 Theseare the sole examples of the use of ESDP tools inthe eastern neighbourhood, where so many con-flicts are deadlocked.

This EU absence may be explained by the factthat the conflicts in the neighbourhood are lessurgent and salient when compared to the con-flicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo,Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, thisunbalance in ESDP is worrying and dangerousfor the EU. The EU must tackle the conflicts inits neighbourhood as part of a consistent, com-prehensive, integrated and sustained approach.This is CFSP’s next big challenge.

More ESDPThe ENP needs more ESDP. None of the existingESDP operations is in the EU neighbourhood,despite the fact that many EU neighboursaffected by conflicts are active demandeurs ofgreater EU involvement in conflict resolution.19

The EU is a diplomatic actor in the Middle Eastconflict, Moldova and South Caucasus. But theconflict resolution dimension of ENP hasremained underdeveloped, just as the EU hasbeen reluctant to use its capabilities, even wheninvited to do so by Moldova and Georgia.

The only ESDP operation in an ENP countrywas the Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, calledEUJUST-Themis from July 2004 to July 2005.The EU has been reluctant to deploy a meaning-ful monitoring mission on the Russia-Georgianborder to replace an OSCE-mission, whose con-

14 See Fernanda Faria, ‘La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne’, Occasional Paper no. 55 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies,November 2004).15 See Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX,Official Journal of the European Union, l 62/37, 9.3.2005. 16 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, op. cit., p. 14.17 See ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, welcomes launch of Aceh Monitoring Mission’, Brussels, 15 September 2005,S299/05. 18 See Vladimir Socor, ‘France leads the EU’s Nyet to Georgia Border Monitoring,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 April 2005; available at:www.eurasiadaily.org.19 The current ESDP missions are: EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), EU Police Mission in the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia (Proxima), EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa, DemocraticRepublic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa), EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission to Iraq (EUJUST LEX), EU Mission in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (EUSEC DR Congo), EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia.

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20 See Vladimir Socor¸ op.cit. 21 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood andPartnership Instrument, op.cit.; Commission Communication on Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, Brussels, 1 July 2003,COM(2003) 393 final. 22 See Council Regulation No 381/2001, 26 February 2001, creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, 27.2.2001, Official Journal of the EuropeanCommunities L 57/5; and European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, Civilian instruments for EU crisis management,April 2003, p. 22; available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf.23 Catriona Gourlay, ‘Feasibility Study on the European Civil Peace Corps,’ International Security Information Service; available at: www.isis-europe.com.

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tinuation was blocked by Russia in January2005.20 The expected EU border assistance mis-sion to Moldova and Ukraine will not be anESDP mission and is likely to have a limitedmandate and presence on the ground.

In short, ENP needs to draw more from theEU’s ESDP toolbox, ranging from possiblepolice contingents, rule of law missions, andsecurity sector reform to civilian administrationmissions, and including military contributionto the peacekeeping operations in its neighbour-hood.

Financial aspects The main framework of financial support aresuch programmes as TACIS for the formerSoviet Union and MEDA in the SouthernMediterranean. Until 2007, these will operate asEuropean Neighbourhood and PartnershipProgrammes, and then within the 2007-2013financial perspective as a European Neighbour-hood and Partnership Instrument.21 However,there are two additional financial instruments,without geographical limitations, that shouldbe used within the ENP. These are the EuropeanInitiative for Democracy and Human Rights(EIDHR), for supporting democracy, and thefinancial Rapid Reaction Mechanism designedto respond to crisis situations calling for a flexi-ble and rapid response from the EU.22

Existing ENP instruments, especially thosedesigned to support democratisation andreform, are too slow, very complex and technical,and prevent the EU from reacting swiftly in sup-port of its own goals. With the exception of theRapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), EU fundingmechanisms ‘have not been adapted for crisismanagement operations, and even in the case of

RRM, the fact that it can only support actionsfor up to six months has limited its usefulnesssince many if not all post-conflict reconstruc-tion projects cannot be completed within such ashort time-frame, and follow-on funding is dif-ficult to secure from other budget lines’.23

The financial aspects of ENP may become anobstacle to sustained and effective EU participa-tion in conflicts settlement in the neighbour-hood.

Democratisation One of the objectives of ENP is to support part-nership based on the shared values of democracyand human rights. This applies for recognisedcountries. However, the same objectives are infact valid for the unrecognised secessionist enti-ties that are formally part of neighbouringcountries in the ENP. Including these non-recognised entities into EU policies is difficult,due to technical and political constraints on theEU. However, the development of pluralistpolitical processes, free media, and the rule oflaw in these unrecognised entities is as much anENP objective as democratisation in the recog-nised states.

Supporting democracy in the secessionistentities would not necessarily lead to greaterprospects for conflict settlement (though insome cases it might). It would however helpmake any future settlement of these conflictsmore sustainable in the long run. If the sepa-ratist regions become more democratic, any set-tlement agreement that would be reached wouldbe based more on domestic structures of interestthan external pressures or geopolitical calcula-tions. Opening up the societies in the secession-ist entities would give rise to the formulation of


varied interests groups inside these entities; cer-tain groups could be strengthened in order toachieve conflict settlement. Reducing the opac-ity and centralisation of the political and eco-nomic systems of such secessionist entitieswould serve the conflict settlement process.

Drawing lessons from Southeast Europe The ENP could also benefit from lessons the EUhas learned in the Western Balkans. While hold-ing out EU membership seems to be out of ques-tion for the time being, there are other aspects ofEU policy in the Western Balkans that can beexported to the neighbourhood.

The EU’s aim for South East Europe is ‘to cre-ate a situation where military conflict isunthinkable – expanding to the region the areaof peace, stability, prosperity and freedom estab-lished over the last 50 years by the EU and itsMember States.’24 This objective is almost iden-tical to that of the EU in the neighbourhood.

As in the Balkans, reaching EU objectives inthe neighbourhood requires ‘supporting goodgovernance, institution building and the rule oflaw; supporting development of market econ-

omy (…) investing in critical infrastructure (…)support civil society development and itsstrengthening’.25 Strengthening the statemachinery of local and central administration,the police, the judiciary, public finances, andstate utility providers is an approach worthexporting from the Balkans to the neighbour-hood. In addition, as undertaken in the Balkans,the ENP should establish a link between prefer-ential trade relations with the EU and increasedfinancial aid and technical assistance and con-flict resolution.

The EU cannot wall itself off from the coun-tries on its borders. The ENP is founded pre-cisely on the recognition of the interdependenceof the EU and neighbourhood stability. Conflictresolution is a stated objective of the ENP. How-ever, the security dimension has been less devel-oped than its economic and political aspects.Attaining ENP objectives requires a greater EUcontribution to conflict settlement in the neigh-bourhood. One conflict that will have to beaddressed, that is the most ‘solvable’ and theclosest geographically to the EU, is the conflictbetween the separatist region of Transnistriaand the central government of Moldova.

24 Website of the European Commission: ‘The EU’s relations with South Eastern Europe,’ available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/ 25 See mission statement on the webpage of the European Agency for Reconstruction; available at: http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm.

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3

The conflict in Transnistria

Transnistria is a narrow strip of land separatedfrom the main part of Moldova by the river

Nistru. Transnistria has a territory of 4,163 km2,compared to Moldova’s 33,700 km2 includingTransnistria and a population of 550,000 peoplecompared to Moldova’s 3.4 million people.Moldova’s turn towards independence in 1991provoked serious tensions with its easternregion of Transnistria, which preferred toremain part of the Soviet Union, declare inde-pendence or integrate with Russia, than becomepart of a newly independent Republic ofMoldova. In 1992, the Moldovan governmentengaged in a short and low-scale war with theauthorities in Transnistria, as a result of whichapproximately 1,500 people were killed. Hostili-ties ended after a Russian military interventionby the then Russian 14th army stationed inTransnistria.

Transnistria matters for the EU, and there aregood reasons for the EU to make its settlement atop priority of ENP.

First, the ongoing nature of the conflict posesconsiderable ‘soft security’ challenges to theenlarged European Union. Illicit trafficking inarms, humans and drugs, organised crime,money laundering and smuggling have flour-ished under the authoritarian rule of theTransnistrian leadership. The security situationthere is far from stable and it could deteriorate, astensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol persist.

Second, Transnistria will lie on the border ofthe EU. Geographically, this is the unresolvedconflict that is closest to the border of theenlarged EU – less than 100 kilometres fromRomania, soon to be a EU member.

Third, the conflict is ‘solvable.’ The conflictin Transnistria is not a classical ethnic or reli-

gious conflict. The main cleavages between theparties are not ethnic or religious divisions. Ofan approximate population of 600,000 inTransnistria, Romanian-speaking Moldovansrepresent 38 per cent, while Ukrainians and Rus-sians represent 26 and 28 percent respectively.26

Populations in both Moldova and Transnistriaare almost exclusively Orthodox Christians.This conflict does not raise the difficult prob-lems of inter-ethnic hatred or inter-communalviolence seen in other conflicts in the 1990s.This is an opportunity. What is more, theabsence of fighting now gives the EU the chanceto forge a strategy that goes to the heart of thepolitical and economic structures sustainingthe conflict.

Fourth, regional dynamics around the con-flict have become very positive, followingchanges in Ukraine and in Romania that haveopened a window to push the settlement of theconflict in line with the interests of the EU andits partners in the neighbourhood.

Fifth, Transnistria is a locus of tension in theEU-Russia strategic partnership. Addressingthis conflict is the first step to building a com-mon space on external security with Russia, andwould set a precedent for EU-Russia coopera-tion in crisis management. Thus, what mightseem a problem and irritant in EU-Russia rela-tions must be turned into a positive precedent.

Sixth, the conflict undermines Moldova’scapacity to emerge as a viable, democratic andprosperous state. As noted in the EU 2001Country Strategy Paper on Moldova: ‘TheTransnistrian dispute heavily affects Moldova'sforeign relations and economic development.Moldova can only make limited progresstowards democratic consolidation and eco-

15

26 Data retrieved from the website of the Department of Statistics of Moldova: www.statistica.md.

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nomic improvements as long as the Transnis-trian issue continues’.

Much has been done already in terms of seek-ing conflict settlement. A complex tangle ofmechanisms has been created to this end sincethe early 1990s. These mechanisms include a tri-lateral peacekeeping operation consisting ofRussian, Transnistrian and Moldovan troops,tasked to monitor a demilitarised security zoneseparating the territory controlled by theMoldovan government from the territory con-trolled by the Transnistrian authorities. Thepeacekeeping operation is guided and super-vised by a Joint Control Commission (JCC), cre-ated in July 1992, composed of the two conflict-ing parties, and Russia, the OSCE and Ukraineas observers. All JCC decisions must be taken byconsensus of all the parties, which means thatthe separatist voice has veto rights.

In parallel, a political process of negotiationson the status of Transnistria has occurred, con-sisting of Moldova and Transnistria as well asRussia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators.The negotiation mechanism is often referred toas the ‘five-sided format’.

Table 1: Conflict settlement mechanismsin Transnistria


1) Five-sided format

• Composition: Russia, Ukraine and OSCE

as mediators; Moldova and Transnistria as

parties.

• Objective: Negotiate the status of

Transnistria.

• An eventual solution would have Russia

and Ukraine as external guarantors.

• Consensual decision-making.

2) Joint Control Commission (JCC)

• Composition: Russia, Moldova and

Transnistria.

• Functions:

– Supervise the security situation in the

demilitarised zone between Moldova and

Transnistria.

– Supervise the Peacekeeping troops.

• Consensual decision-making.

3) Peacekeeping Operation

• Composition: Russian, Transnistrian and

Moldovan troops (2:1:1 proportion).

• Under the direction of the JCC.

• Ukrainian and OSCE Military

Observers.

Both the peacekeeping operation and the‘five-sided’ format have come under increasingpressure. They may have been effective in theearly 1990s, but in the years that followed theclashes, by 2005, they have become problemsrather than solutions. Designed to reflect thegeopolitical reality of the early 1990s, thesemechanisms are now outdated. Most impor-tantly, they have failed to help settle the conflictfor more than a decade, because Transnistria haspreferred to consolidate independence ratherthan agree to a new status within Moldova.These mechanisms have supported rather thanchallenged the status quo. Indeed, the peace-keeping and negotiating formats have con-tributed to sustaining Transnistria’s de factoindependence, while providing de facto legiti-macy to the status quo through the formal pur-suit of negotiations, which have done nothingto halt Transnistrian separatism.

3.1 How does Transnistria survive?

The secessionist authorities in Transnistria havemanaged to build a more or less functioningstatelike entity. Transnistria has an organisedpolitical leadership, control over a defined terri-tory and seeks international recognition. Anyattempt to settle the problem must start withtackling the structures that help sustain the sta-tus quo around Transnistria. The pillars of sur-vival of the Transnistrian entity are economic,political and security.

There are deeply entrenched interest groupsthat benefit from the continuation of the con-flict. These groups are not only in Transnistria,but also in Chisinau, Kyiv and Moscow. To alarge extent, Transnistria falls within the cate-gory of conflicts whose major aims are accumu-

lating resources and suppressing political oppo-sition. Keeping the conflict unsolved assists theachievement of these aims better than peace,which means that prolonging the conflict for aslong as possible may be a higher priority thanwinning it for significant groups inside and out-side Transnistria.27 Remaining outside theinternational legal system provides benefits,because Transnistria’s status is conducive forillegal activities, which have flourished in theregion, with spillover effects in Moldova,Ukraine, Russia and the EU.

Economic factorsEconomically, Transnistria has survived bytrade – legal at times, but mainly semi-legal andillicit. Transnistria’s economic survival has beenassured by Russian gas, which is never paid forby Transnistria, and amounts to a significantunderwriting of Transnistrian separatism. Theregion has exported steel and textiles mainly toEU member states and the United States. In fact,the competitiveness of Transnistria’s exports isbased on lower tariffs for gas and electricity, pos-sible because of Russia’s support.28 By theregion’s standards, these factors have created arather solid basis for the separatist leadership toclaim that economically Transnistria is a func-tioning entity.

Controlling a considerable part of Moldova’sborder with Ukraine, as well as trade routes fromMoldova to Russia and Ukraine, coupled withinvolvement in arms trade and all forms of traf-ficking – all of these factors have created a strongincentive structure to maintain the statusquo.29 The decision to grant Moldovan customsstamps to Transnistrian authorities in 1996 andthe creation of a ‘common customs area’ meantthat Transnistria could export legally withMoldovan stamps any goods that it produced orre-exported without being subject to the control

27 David Keen, ‘War and Peace: What’s the Difference?’, in A. Adebajo and C. Lekha Sriram (eds.), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century(London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 2. 28 See the Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy: critical appraisal (Chisinau: October 2001); availableat: www.cisr-md.org.29 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

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30 See Memorandum on the basis of normalisation of relations between the republic of Moldova and the Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic, 8 May 1997,Moscow.31 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 19 April 2005.32 Interview with Igor Smirnov, ‘We have to assume responsibilities’ (‘My dolzhny brat na sebja otvetstvennosti’), Pridnestrovie, 21 April 2005. 33 See Anatoly Gudym, Vladislav Kutyrkin, Galina Shelari, Transnistrian Economy: Initiatives and Risks, June 2003: available at: http://www.cisr-md.org/reports/cont-transnis.html.

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of the Moldovan authorities, without payingtaxes to the Moldovan government and benefit-ing from Moldova’s Most Favoured Nation sta-tus with the US and System of Generalised Pref-erences with the EU. The customs stamps weregranted as part of a package deal in the conflictresolution process; Transnistria did not deliveron its part of the agreement30 as it effectivelyblocked the creation of five common spaces –legal, economic, customs, defence and cultural –with Moldova. The granting of the customsstamps to Transnistria has also benefited cor-rupt officials in Moldova. This was partly haltedin September 2001 when Moldova, as a result ofits accession to the World Trade Organisation,withdrew the right to use Moldovan customsstamps. However, Moldova’s decision could notbe enforced because Russia and Ukraine havestill been accepting Transnistrian goods as ifthey were Moldovan while the EU has keptaccepting them as ‘goods of non-specified ori-gin’, which did not benefit from Moldova’s tradepreferences with the EU, but were nonethelessaccepted into the single market.31

The region is highly dependent on externaltrade, particularly with the EU, conducted by asmall number of companies. This situationpotentially gives external actors significantleverage over the region. Transnistria is depend-ent on the West more than any other authoritar-ian entity, recognised or unrecognised, in theformer Soviet Union. Transnistria’s self-pro-claimed president states that 38% of Transnis-tria’s trade flows are with Russia while ‘the restgoes to the West’.32 The main Transnistriancompanies, such as Moldavizolit, Moldavkabel,Tighina, Floare, Tirotex, Odema, MoldovanMetal Works (MMZ), and Vestra all have estab-lished relations with Western partners. There

are at least eighteen Transnistrian-German jointventures set up in Transnistria. The Chambersof Commerce and Industry of Tiraspol andLeipzig have direct ties.33

So, Transnistrian ‘statehood’ is moredependent on economic forces than any of theexisting secessionist regions in Eurasia. Moreimportantly, the primary concern of the busi-ness sector is to ensure that businesses operatesmoothly rather than to defend Transnistrian‘statehood’ at any price. There is room formanoeuvre here.

Political environment Politics in Transnistria has been determined bythe imperative of its elites to retain power. Theseelites benefit politically and economically fromthe status quo. The leadership of Transnistriahas suppressed any form of political non-loy-alty, let alone opposition to the government.The entity is dominated by an elite that thatdoes not play according to the democratic rulesof the game. Nor can it be considered represen-tative of the population of Transnistria, as noneof the elections in Transnistria over the lastdecade have met even minimal standards of fair-ness and freedom. Igor Smirnov, the presidentof Transnistria and a Russian citizen, is anauthoritarian leader whose regime is based onthe suppression of any dissent. Human rightsabuses are frequent, and the Russian language isbeing imposed to the detriment of Moldovan/Romanian and Ukrainian. Political parties oractors that display even the slightest degree ofdisloyalty are harassed and even banned. AnOSCE report on Transnistria mentioned that‘the situation of the independent media is verydifficult, with different methods of pressure


applied on those few journalists who do not fol-low the official line’.34 In such a context, it is notsurprising to read in the official newspaper ofthe Transnistrian government that ‘if Transnis-tria was democratic and non-militarised, letalone liberal, it would not exist’.35

Civil society is extremely weak and underpressure in the region. The few NGOs that arenot dependent on the government try to avoidpolitically-contentious issues, and are subject togovernmental pressure. Openness and the circu-lation of ideas and people is discouraged. Thehead of the Transinstrian Ministry of StateSecurity (MGB), Vladimir Antiufeev, stated:‘The West, or more exactly the US, considers ittimely to liquidate the Transnistrian statehood.The many NGOs are to be used as an instrumentof accomplishing a coup d’état (…) Youth arebrainwashed (…) For example, students of theTransnistrian State University are invited tointernational conferences, they receive grantsetc … We are following this and we know that90% of the funds provided by the West forfinancing agents of influence are being misman-aged. This is good. Otherwise we would have hadmore troubles’.36 The separatist governmenthas already sponsored the creation of a ‘counter-revolutionary’ youth group called ‘Proryv’(‘Breakthrough’). Its aim is to prevent an‘Orange Revolution’ from occurring inTransnistria and to protect Transnistria fromthe ‘orange plague’.37

Despite the anti-Western rhetoric prevalentin Transnistria, government-sponsored demon-strations have started to use EU flags and refer

to EU norms.38 Even ‘president’ Igor Smirnovstates that the tensions in the region are not ‘astruggle of ideas, and it is not about the fact thatMoldova is desperate to join the EU (I am sureRussia would not mind joining the EU either)’.39

The implication is that the Transnistrianauthorities, even if they have the support of Rus-sia, cannot deny or oppose the attractiveness ofthe EU.

Security factors Transnistria’s survival in security terms hasbeen assured by Russia. Russia maintains mili-tary forces in Transnistria. They number some1,500 people and some 25,000 tons of arma-ments. Compared to Moldova’s geographicallydispersed, poorly trained and equipped army ofsome 7,000 soldiers, the Russian military pres-ence is not a negligible factor affectingMoldova’s security. The military presence ismaintained despite Russia’s own internationalobligations and despite Moldova’s strong objec-tions. Article 11 of Moldova’s constitution stip-ulates that Moldova is a neutral state and for-eign troops cannot be stationed on its territory.Officially, Moldova’s position is that: ‘The pres-ence of Russian troops on the territory of theRepublic of Moldova is against the political willof Moldovan constitutional authorities anddefies the unanimously recognized interna-tional norms and principles, being qualified byMoldovan authorities as a foreign military occu-pation illegally deployed on the territory of thestate’.40

34 OSCE, Assessment Visit to the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova: Observations and Recommendations, Representative on Freedomof the Media, Miklós Haraszti, 10 March 2005, available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2005/03/14036_en.pdf.35 ‘Vzgljad is Moskvy,’ Pridnetsrovie, 20 April 2005. 36 Vladimir Antiufeev, ‘The West decided to liquidate Transnistrian statehood’ (‘Zapad reshil likvidirovati pridnestovskujugosuderstvennosti’), Vremya Novostei 24 May 2005, available at: http://www.vremya.ru/2005/89/5/125787.html.37 See ‘Pridnestrovskii “Proryv!! – Molodezh” Pridnestrovya namerena demokratizirovat’ Bessarabiju’, Olvia-Press, 1 June 2005, availableat: http://olvia.idknet.com/ol06-06-05.htm.38 See the website of the Transnistrian authorities’ news agency website Olvia Press depicting two government-inspired demonstrations inwhich the EU f lag is used along with the f lags of Russia, Ukraine and Transnistria, on 5 March 2005, available at:http://olvia.idknet.com/ol37-03-05.htm and 1 June 2005: http://olvia.idknet.com/ol06-06-05.htm.39 Interview with Igor Smirnov, ‘We have to assume responsibilities,’ Pridnestrovie, 21 April 2005. 40 Statement by Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova at the 12th OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Sofia,6-7 December, 2004, MC.DEL/21/04, available at: http://www.mfa.md/En/PressReleases/AStratanStatementOSCE.pdf.

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41 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, Speech addressed to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 7 June 2005.42 Igor Smirnov states that ‘there are 100, 000 Russian citizens [living in Transnistria], and if there was a Russian consulate [in Tiraspol],there would be more,’ See interview for Politicheskij Zhurnal reprinted in Pridnestrovie, 21 April 2005, available at: http://www.pridnestrovie-daily.net.

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Russian diplomatic support, active lobbyingon the international stage and direct materialand financial assistance have been critical forTransnistrian consolidation. Before the 1992war, Transnistrian militias were trained andarmed by Russian troops stationed in theregion. The Russian peacekeepers halted thecivil war in 1992, but while effective in keepingthe peace, they have now become more of anobstacle to conflict settlement. Today, thepeacekeepers serve more as de facto borderguards for the Transnistrian self-proclaimedstate. The presence of the peacekeeping troopsfreezes the situation, while failing to address realproblems on the ground. In fact, it would seemthat Russia’s aim is to secure a continued mili-tary presence in Moldova rather than addressconflict settlement.

Conflict settlement mechanismsThe failure to settle the conflict is also partly theresult of an ineffective and unfair ‘five-sided’negotiating format. This structure consists ofRussia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators,and Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities asparties to the conflict. According to its logic,Russia and Ukraine are to be external guaran-tors of any agreed solution.

The particular format has helped to blockconflict settlement. With each party having aveto, and important forces benefiting from thestatus quo around Transnistria, the format infact was doomed to fail from the start. TheOSCE has always been in a weak position, due tothe internal constraints imposed by some mem-ber states and its own lack of capabilities. Rus-sia’s primary interest has been to either main-tain the status quo or secure a settlement agree-ment that would preserve Russia’s decisiveinfluence over a reunified Moldova, and whereRussian troops would be maintained, the Russ-ian language would be an official language, and

Russia would stand as the arbiter of possible dis-agreements between Transnistria and Moldova.The Russian objective here would be to create a‘common state’ composed of two equal con-stituent entities. Such a solution would preserveTransnistria in its current state, with the sameleadership and behaviour.

Moldova’s assessment of the negotiating for-mat is straightforward. President VladimirVoronin has argued: ‘The five-party negotia-tions and the existing peacekeeping mechanismproved their ineffectiveness, and are not able tolead to a long-lasting solution. The dragging ofthe settlement process contributes to the con-solidation of the separatist regime, and the pro-motion of certain mafia-type geopolitical inter-ests, which are foreign to the interests of thepopulation on the two banks of the Dnestrriver’.41

Moldova’s weaknessMoldova’s weakness as a state and its lack ofattractiveness for ordinary Transnistrians isanother touchstone of Transnistria’s survival.While the economic situation in Transnistria ispoor, it is not significantly or obviously worsethan that of Moldova. Thus, while manyTransnistrians are not satisfied with their situa-tion, Moldova is not an alternative that wouldencourage significant parts of the population inTransnistria to actively support reunification.In fact, with many Transnistrians holding Russ-ian or Ukrainian passports, the idea of joiningRussia as a second Kaliningrad or Ukraineseems a more attractive option.42 Worryingaspects of Moldovan democracy and economicdevelopment have always been used by theauthorities in Tiraspol to justify Transnistrianindependence.

Significant actors in the Republic ofMoldova have contributed to the strengtheningof the Transnistrian entity in its current state.


The corruption of elites in Moldova as well asincoherent policies towards Transnistria madeit possible to strengthen the economic basis ofthe Transnistrian regime. Transnistrian compa-nies have been exporting goods as Moldovanentities with Moldovan custom stamps, benefit-ing from Moldovan trade regimes with othercountries and using the Moldovan railways. TheTiraspol Airport, through which some of thealleged arms exports have been conducted, has alicence of the Moldovan Aviation Authority thatallows it to operate international flights.43 Sig-nificant amounts of goods are smuggled intoMoldova (as well as into Ukraine) throughTransnistria. All this would not have been possi-ble without the complicity of influential politi-cal and economic actors inside Moldova. Whilesince 2001 the situation has been changing andthe Moldovan government has been trying toreduce Moldova’s implicit support for Transnis-tria, there remain many loopholes that have notbeen eliminated by the government of Moldova.

The ‘legitimacy’ of TransnistriaTransnistria’s state building project is a compre-hensive endeavour, the main aim of which is tobuild a ‘Transnistrian identity’. Due to the natureof Transnistrian demography, this cannot bebased on ethnic or religious lines, which has onlyincreased the importance of invoking, manipu-lating and inventing historic, political and eco-nomic arguments in favour of Transnistria’sindependence. Because the ideological founda-tions of Transnistrian independence have alwaysbeen shaky, the authorities have always beeninterested in strictly controlling the formulationof political views inside Transnistria. Thisexplains why Transnistria is the least democraticsecessionist entity in Europe. Abkhazia, SouthOssetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus orKosovo are not functioning democracies, but dis-senting views and civil society groups have morespace for political and social activity.

Over time, a sophisticated discourse justify-ing Transnistrian independence has emerged.This discourse seeks to strengthen support forindependence in the region and also to convinceits population that the economic and politicalsacrifices they suffer as a result of embarking ona secessionist path are well worth the difficulties.

At the start, Transnistria’s separatist projecthad language issues at its core. The Transnis-trian population was mobilised in 1989 as aresult of greater assertion by the Moldovans inthe Soviet Union of their own language rights, aproject that was not shared, and was evenopposed by the active, urban and russified partsof the population in Transnistria.44 The Soviet,and subsequently Russian, authorities alsoemployed Transnistria as a leverage againstMoldova’s independence in order to keep the‘near abroad’ firmly under Russian control.With Moldova’s declaration of independencefrom the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, thedesire to stay within the Soviet Union or Russia,and fear of Moldova’s unification with Romaniacame to join the ‘language problem’ at the fore-front of Transnistria’s justifications for inde-pendence.

However, with time, these justifications havelost relevance. Moldova did not unite withRomania. Minority rights in Moldova properare reflecting international standards and prac-tices. History, demography, fears of Romania ordiscrimination remain part of the official dis-course of the Transnistrian authorities, buttheir credibility, both internally and externally,has significantly reduced since the beginning ofthe 1990s. This was evident with the coming topower in Moldova of the Communist Party,which shared with the Transnistrian authoritiesvery similar views on history, language issues,the demise of the Soviet Union, the attitudetowards Romania etc. As a result, Transnistria’slegitimisation discourse has shifted mainly toeconomic arguments. This decreasing validityof initial justifications also led to increasing

43 Interview in Chisinau, November 2004.44 For a detailed account of mobilisation for independence from Moldova see Ghenadii Kodreanu, ‘Dnestrovskij Razlom: Pridnestrovskiikrizis i rozhdenie PMR;’ available at: http://olvia.idknet.com.

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45 Igor Smirnov states that ‘in pushing Transnistria towards a union with economically bankrupt Moldova, one should give us reliableguarantees that our enterprises will not be given away to repay [Moldova’s] debts.’ Interview with Kommersant Moldovy, 21 September 2001;available at: www.zatulin.ru/institute/sbornik/039/10.shtml.46 Interview with Igor Smirnov, ‘We have to assume responsibilities,’ Pridnestrovie, 21 April 2005. 47 Ibid.48 US Department of State, Background Note on Moldova, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5357.htm.49 Igor Smirnov, Press conference dedicated to the ‘Independence day’ of Transnistria, 31 August 2005, http://olvia.idknet.com/ol97-08-05.htm.50 Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Research Paper on Transnistria (Chisinau: November 2003), p. 28; available at: http://www.cisr-md.org/pdf/0311%20transn-research.pdf.51 See Yoshiko M. Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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authoritarianism, centralisation and mobilisa-tion in the separatist region, because economicarguments for independence are not enoughand do not correspond to reality. It has becometherefore all the more important that they arenot challenged inside Transnistria.

Still, economic arguments have been centralin building ideological support for Transnis-trian independence from Moldova. The eco-nomic argument has several dimensions. A firstone is that Transnistria is richer than Moldova,and once it is independent it will be even betteroff. A second is that if Transnistria joinsMoldova it will have to participate in the repay-ment of Moldovan debts to international insti-tutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Athird point is that Moldova wants Transnistria‘back’ in order to privatise Transnistria’s indus-try and benefit from these profits45 and thatMoldova wants Transnistrian companies to paytaxes in Chisinau, from which ordinaryTransnistrians would not benefit. Transnistria’sself-proclaimed president argues these pointsbluntly: ‘Why do we need Moldova? (…) We havea gross domestic product per capita which isthree times higher than in Moldova (…) That iswhy Moldova is so interested in our property,that is why they always shout about privatisa-tion’.46 Smirnov again: ‘We are entirely self-suf-ficient (…) Moldova does not have enoughpotential for a self-sufficient existence’.47 Infact, Moldova GDP per capita in 2004 wasUS$760 per capita48, while that of Transnistriawas US$750 per capita.49 Transnistrian debt percapita is indeed higher than that of Moldova.The Republic of Moldova (without Transnis-

tria) has 3.5 million people and a debt of 1.1 bil-lion (US$1.3 billion), while Transnistria with apopulation of 550,000 people has a debt of 1 bil-lion (US$1,2 billion), two thirds of which arewith Russia.50 Thus, despite all the claims of theauthorities, Transnistria is slightly poorer, notricher than Moldova; and far more indebted.

Transnistria’s economic arguments for inde-pendence do not reflect reality, but are aninstance of ‘imagined economy’,51 where thevery belief that they live better, or would live bet-ter than the state they secede from, and notactual economic facts, mobilises populations infavour of secessionism. In such a context, under-mining and disputing the economic argumentsin favour of secession is key to reducing supportfor Transnistrian secessionism and undermin-ing the credibility of the authorities. This, how-ever, is very difficult given Transnistria’s author-itarian system. There are two ways to circumventthis: by pressurising Transnistria to democratiseand by developing a Moldova that is so visiblystronger than Transnistria that no amount ofpropaganda and centralisation can hide it, espe-cially as the circulation of populations betweenthe two parts of Moldova is intense.

Challenging authoritarianism What is more, Transnistrian authoritarianism isincreasingly challenged from within. As a resultof the Orange revolution, the Ukrainian govern-ment has put democratisation of Transnistria atthe core of its approach to conflict settlement.Important internal actors in Transnistria havestarted to discuss the possibility of alternatives


to the current situation. In April-May 2005, asignificant group of deputies led by EvgheniShevchuk, deputy speaker of the TransnistrianSupreme Soviet, launched a series of initiativesto limit the powers of the Smirnov-led executive.These initiatives included a change in the consti-tution that would enhance the powers of the leg-islature, introduce the post of Prime Minister(Smirnov being currently both President andPrime Minister), and enhance the independenceof the judiciary. The constitutional amend-ments were approved by 29 out of 43 deputies,with only 3 deputies voting against and the restabstaining. In parallel to the changes to the con-stitution, the deputies proposed the creation ofa public television service52 independent of theauthorities, and voted a law whereby the leadersof local councils would be elected by secret bal-lot, in order to reduce control over local councilsby the Tiraspol authorities.

One explanation of the constitutionalreform is that business groups have recognisedthat they have much to lose economically fromthe continuing deterioration of the regional sit-uation and obstruction to the negotiationprocess as well as from Smirnov’s authoritarianexcesses and human rights abuses (such as dur-ing the ‘schools crisis’ in 2004)53 – all of theseactions have led to the greater international iso-lation of Transnistria, and ultimately resulted ingreater economic pressure being placed onTransnistrian exports, including through thedouble-checking mechanism in steel, and thecall on Ukraine to strengthen border controlswith Moldova. Transnistrian authoritarianismhas thus started to hurt real businesses. In thesecircumstances, these deputies have realised thatgreater checks and balances were needed to

ensure that the authoritarian domination isreined in.

Another explanation of the constitutionalreform is that under international pressure todemocratise, the Transnistrian authorities havelaunched a controlled democratisation processto decrease international pressure while mim-icking pluralism.

In any case, Transnistrian politics is movingtowards more pluralism. The fact is tellingenough. Unlike other authoritarian entities likeBelarus, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe or Cuba,Transnistria’s response to international pres-sure has not been to choose greater isolation andcentralisation but measures that mimic demo-cratisation. Put simply, Transnistria cannotafford isolation and lacks external support andinternal coherence to survive as a closed dictato-rial system. Transnistria is too vulnerable.

And yet, one should not disregard the factthat big businesses still remain the pillars ofTransnistrian ‘statehood’, and their oppositionto the Smirnov regime should not be taken forgranted. Broadly speaking, they still remaincommitted to the current authorities, even ifthis support is less solid than it used to be.

3.2 The regional context of Transnistria’s survival

The regional context surrounding Transnistriahas also supported the consolidation of its sepa-ratism. Transnistria is not geographically or eco-nomically isolated from the region around it.Quite the opposite in fact: it is relatively openeconomically to the outside world. Moldova,

52 See ‘V Pridnestrovye obsuzhdaetsja proekt sozdanija obschestvennogo televidinija,’ Pridnestrovye, 26 May 2005; available at:http://www.pridnestroviedaily.net/gazeta/articles/view.aspx?ArticleID=595.53 In July 2004 Transnistrian militia attempted to forcibly close down the only five Moldovan schools in the region that were using Latinscript. This has affected some 4,200 children who were deprived of their right to study in their mother tongue. The Transnistrian securityforces stormed an orphanage in Tighina and a school in Rybnitsa. The OSCE qualified this as ‘linguistic cleansing’. These events prompteda serious diplomatic crisis with security and economic implications. Moldova tried to apply economic pressure on Transnistria, a dangerousstandoff between Moldovan police and Transnistrian militia took place in Tighina/Bender. Still the conflict was not an expression of ethnictensions, but rather of an incident of human rights abuse with broad political implications. The crisis ended with Transnistria accepting,under international pressure, the functioning of the schools for another year. For a detailed account of the crisis see Gottfried Hanne andClaus Neukirch, ‘Moldovan schools in Transnistria: an uphill battle against “linguistic cleansing’”, June 2005, OSCE Magazine. For the EUreactions to the crisis see Chapter 4.

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54 European Court of Human Rights, Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘Grand Chamber Judgment in the Case of Ilascu and Others vMoldova and Russia’, 349, 8 July 2004; available at: http://echr.coe.int.55 See Stuart Kaufman, ‘Spiralling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,’ International Security, vol. 21, no. 2,1996, pp.108-38; and Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in CIS (London and New York: RIIA and Macmillan, 2000).56 Mihai Gribincea, The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova (Cogito: Oradea, 2001), p. 236.57 Istanbul Summit Declaration, article 19, page 49-50; available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf.58 See Regional tensions over Transdniestria (International Crisis Group, no. 157, 17 June 2004), pp. 16-19.

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Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE have all played arole in the strengthening of Transnistrian ‘state-hood’.

Russia-TransnistriaThe European Court of Human Rights con-cluded in July 2004 that the TransnistrianRepublic ‘remained under the effective author-ity, or at the very least under the decisive influ-ence, of Russia, and in any event that it survivedby virtue of the military, economic, financialand political support that Russia gave it’.54

Transnistria could not have emerged withoutRussia, nor could it have survived.

As a patron state, Russia has not only encour-aged Transnistrian secessionism, it has also pro-vided Transnistria with the resources to fight,including military assistance and training, aswell as economic subsidies.55 The followingexample illustrates this. On December 2, 1994,the Russian Federation Government issued adecree No. 1341 according to which theTransnistrian army received from the Russiantroops stationed in the region some thirty ninetechnical units as well as one hundred and sixtytons of material goods. By April 1998, Russiantroops stationed in Transnistria had transferredto the separatist authorities one hundred andfifty technical units and some three thousandtons of material goods.56

The Russian-led peacekeeping operation hasde facto guarded the borders of the secessionistentity, freezing a status quo that is favourable toone side. In effect, the peacekeeping format haschanged the balance of power in the region infavour of those standing against efforts to settlethe conflict. In addition, Russia maintains a mil-itary force (Operative Group of Russian Troops)in Transnistria – a de facto military base with

some 1,500 soldiers, which was to be withdrawnby the end of 2002 according to the OSCE Istan-bul summit commitments undertaken by Rus-sia.57

The nature of Russian interests is manifold.On the one hand, Russia is locked into support-ing Transnistria due to a combination of domes-tic factors and distorted perceptions about theWest. Russia has business interests in Transnis-tria, and important actors in Russia have bene-fited from corrupt links with the Smirnovregime. Russian support for Transnistria is theresult of a coalition of interested actors insidethe Russian Federation. This coalition is neitherhomogenous nor permanent, however inter-ested groups have emerged in Moscow over thelast decade determined to maintain support forTransnistria.

The most vocal supporters of Transnistriahave been nationalist and communist deputiesin the Russian State Duma58 as well as national-ist political activists. While not necessarily influ-ential on the Russian executive, they have cre-ated a climate in which Transnistria has beenencouraged to pursue its secessionist project.The State Duma has also placed public pressureon the government to adopt tougher policiestowards Moldova.

Less visible but no less important, elementsof Russia’s military-industrial complex havecooperative relations with certain Transnistrianfactories, which have been crucial in sustainingthem. Russia is also the largest investor inTransnistria, heavily subsidising the Transnis-trian economy.

Geopolitical calculations also determineRussian views of Transnistria. Close links toTransnistria and keeping troops in the regionallows Russia to exert leverage over Moldova.This matters, because many Russian decision-


makers view the world through a geopoliticalprism in which the balance of power, spheres ofinfluence and geopolitical vacuums are drivingforces of international politics.59 The Russiangovernment perceives many of the changesoccurring in Europe as directed against itsspheres of interests. Should Russia retreat fromMoldova, the vacuum left would be filled by‘unfriendly’ forces. The chief of Russia’s FederalSecurity Service (FSB) has argued: ‘Our oppo-nents are steadily and persistently trying toweaken Russian influence in the Common-wealth of Independent States and the interna-tional arena as a whole (…) The latest events inGeorgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan unambigu-ously confirm this.’60The mainstream Councilon Foreign and Defence Policy argues similarly:‘The EU is more and more on the offensive in itsrelations with Russia (…) it acts as a tough adver-sary and competitor (…) The EU is starting tobecome a competitor for Moscow already on theRussian territory itself ’,61 let alone in the post-Soviet space.

Thus, Russia’s view of itself is that of a coun-try under siege. Such views influence Russiandecisions to support such authoritarian leadersas Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus, IslamKarimov in Uzbekistan and Igor Smirnov inTransnistria. Geopolitical thinking has also putRussia on the side of Kuchma in Ukraine andMilosevic in Serbia, even if such ‘allies’ haverarely been fully embraced in Moscow.

Ukraine-TransnistriaUkraine, along with Russia and the OSCE, is amediator in the negotiations on the status ofTransnistria inside Moldova. It has a number ofmilitary observers in Transnistria, and has beeninvited to send peacekeeping troops, which itcan do at any point. Transnistria is situatedbetween Ukraine and Moldova, and the seces-

sionist region controls 452 km of the Moldova-Ukraine border (See Map in Annex 2). Thisallows it to conduct external trade throughUkraine, and also be a transit point for smug-gled goods into Moldova.

Ukraine has traditionally played a ratherambiguous role in Transnistria. It would seemthat Ukraine has great interest in settling theconflict. The endurance of the conflict onUkraine’s border does not contribute toregional stability nor to Ukraine’s long-termEuropean and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.Ukraine is not interested in having a Kalin-ingrad-type Transnistria on its border, whereRussian troops are stationed.

And yet, Ukraine’s record on Transnistria isnot straightforward. Transnistria could not sur-vive without Ukraine’s implicit support. All ofthe alleged Transnistrian smuggling, traffick-ing and export of arms passes mainly throughUkraine: by sea, through the Odessa and Ili-chiovsk ports, or by land. Serious interestgroups in Ukraine have gained benefits fromsuch activities in Transnistria, especially duringthe Kuchma era.

The Moldova-Transnistria-Ukraine borderhas been vital for Transnistrian survival. Afterthe introduction of new Moldovan customsstamps in 2001, Ukraine still accepted exportsfrom Transnistria. Moldova has urged Ukraineto accept only those goods which bearMoldovan stamps, such stamps being grantedonly to Transnistrian companies registered aslegal entities in Chisinau. But Ukraine has longrefused to comply with Moldovan requests notto accept Transnistrian goods not covered bydocumentation according to Moldovan legisla-tion. The Ukrainian argument was that it wouldnot take part in economic pressure on Transnis-tria, because, as a mediator to the conflict, it hadto remain neutral. Kyiv also argued that suchmeasures would affect Ukrainians (ethnic

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59 See Andrei Zagorski, ‘Russia and the shared neighbourhood’, in ‘What Russia sees’, Chaillot Paper no. 74 (Paris: EU Institute for SecurityStudies, 2005), p. 71.60 Steve Gutterman, ‘Security chief: Russia prevents U.S., other foreign spy activity under cover of NGOs,’ Associated Press, 12 May 2005. 61 Russian Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, Situation Analysis on EU-Russia Relations, under the direction of Sergei Karaganov,February 2005, Moscow; available at: www.svop.ru.

62 See Vladimir Socor, ‘Kwasniewski, Tarasyuk urge a European Solution in Transnistria,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 18 February 2005; availableat: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369285, and ‘New Ukrainian Foreign Minster Speaks on Transnistria,’Infotag/Moldova Azi, 14 February 2005, available at: http://www.azi.md/news?ID=33033.63 The Ukrainian Plan on the Settlement of the Transnistrian conf lict may be found at: http://www.eurojournal.org/more.php?id=186_0_1_0_M.

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Ukrainians and Ukrainian citizens) living inTransnistria. Thus, Moldova has requestedUkraine to create joint border posts on thewhole Moldovan-Ukrainian border, and espe-cially on the 452 km section controlled by theTransnistrian authorities. However, for a longtime Ukraine was resistant to this notion,although now it is increasingly coming aroundto this point of view.

3.3 A changing Ukraine

The situation is changing, and the Ukrainiandimension of the Transnistria problem isquickly transforming. The following sectionwill explore some of these changes in detail, asthey open real opportunities for the EU and theinternational community to positively influ-ence the conflict settlement process.

The Youshchenko administration had for-mulated a new approach to Transnistria. For-eign Minister in the Timoshenko governmentBoris Tarasyuk stated in February 2005, soonafter assuming his functions, that Transnistriasettlement is ‘one of the most important tasks ofthe Ukraine's national security’, that Transnis-tria is ‘Europe’s black hole, where very few getfabulously rich while hundreds of thousand ekeout a hand-to-mouth existence’. Tarasyuk alsostated that ‘Transnistrian and other puppetregimes are obstacles to the edification of aunited Europe (…) It is high time to acknowledgefrankly that authoritarian enclaves persist inEurope, and to finally tackle these problems.The illegitimate, corrupt regimes in these unrec-ognized republics have nothing in commonwith the rights of the populations there’.62 Thestage has been set for a new Ukrainian approach.

In April 2005, President Youshchenko putforward a Ukrainian settlement plan, entitled

‘Towards a settlement through democracy’. InMay 2005, a more extended and modified ver-sion of a plan was presented. Its main idea is tohave internationally observed free and fair par-liamentary elections in Transnistria in Decem-ber 2005, which would bring to power more rep-resentative leaders in Transnistria with whomChisinau would then negotiate a new status forthe region.63 In addition, a new peacekeepingformat, and greater involvement of the UnitedStates and the EU, is envisaged in all the aspectsof conflict settlement. Ukraine also agreed toinvite an EU monitoring mission to its borderwith Transnistria.

The new Ukrainian government has pro-posed to organise democratic elections inDecember 2005 for the Transnistrian SupremeSoviet under international – EU, US and OSCE –monitoring. This was the most controversialpoint of the Ukrainian initiative, as it opens thepath to the international legitimisation ofTransnistrian elections and some of its institu-tions. In itself, this is not problematic. Transnis-trian people have the right to be represented bylocal institutions, including a local parliament.The problem is twofold.

First, in the time span proposed by Ukraine,it is unrealistic to organise democratic electionsin Transnistria. Transnistria lacks civil society,independent media, independent political par-ties and any trace of credible opposition. Thiscannot change in a few months. Thus, the resultof such elections would most likely strengthenthe existing ruling elite in Transnistria, with aslightly modified internal power balance. Earlyelections without democratisation would createa Belarus-type regime in a secessionist entitywith internationally recognised leaders.

Second, even if a new parliament (SupremeSoviet) is democratically elected and starts tonegotiate with Moldova on Transnistria’s sta-tus, there is no guarantee that such negotiations


would not drag on for another decade – and thistime, the Transnistrian authorities would belegitimate and internationally recognised asrepresentatives of the population of the regionand with a strengthened mandate to ask forindependence.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian plan is use-ful in that it raises the issue of Transnistria’sdemocratisation, as well as the perspective ofshifting the balance on negotiations from theauthoritarian executive power headed bySmirnov towards a more representative sampleof politicians in the Supreme Soviet, many ofwhom have links with the business communityand are more pragmatic and moderate andmight see an interest in having the Transnistrianproblem settled rather than aggravated.

At the same time, these changes in the Ukrain-ian position occur against the backdrop ofentrenched existing Ukrainian interests inTransnistria. These should be clearly understood,as the Ukrainian position, even that of the newgovernment, remains far from unambiguous.

First, Ukraine has serious investment inter-ests in Transnistria. Even if the structure ofTransnistrian companies is very opaque, it isclear that there are strong Ukrainian interestsin the region. For example, the most importantcompany in Transnistria, the ‘Rybnitsa SteelMill’, which provides more than 50% of theTransnistrian budget, and allegedly changesthe formal holders of the company every sixmonths, de facto belongs to very important offi-cials from Russia and Ukraine.64 Ukraine’s eco-nomic presence inside Transnistria provides itwith leverage; leverage which can be used tosustain the status quo or to help settle the con-flict.

Second, corrupt officials in Ukraine (as wellas in Moldova) benefit from smuggling throughTransnistria. The former first deputy chairman

of the Ukrainian Customs Service, NikolaySalagor, appointed already after the Orange rev-olution, stated in September 2005 that there are‘huge holes’ at the Ukrainian border, ‘throughwhich enormous uncontrolled contrabandflows have been passing (...) President[Youshchenko] has requested that the customsput an end to smuggling from Transnistria. Nomeasures have been taken to solve the problem(...) People having important relations inTiraspol, have long ago established a network todeliver smuggled goods’.65

Third, Ukraine has economically benefitedfrom the fact that practically all of Transnistriantrade goes through Ukrainian customs, terri-tory and seaports. This means revenues not onlyfor corrupt officials but also for the Ukrainianbudget. They are not enormous, but they areimportant for the Odessa region. There are fewincentives for Ukraine to undermine this tradewithout seeing any benefits in return or for thesake of a vaguely stated commitment to regionalstability.

Ukrainian officials understand that it isimportant to change policies on the Transnis-tria issue. However, it is difficult for them torenounce short-term benefits in the name of adistant prospect of a vague rapprochement withthe EU.66 The perception is still that Ukraine ismaking unilateral concessions, while what is onoffer from the EU falls short of a serious engage-ment. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan falls farshort of Ukrainian aspirations, as do the addi-tional ‘Ten points for closer cooperation’ putforward in the aftermath of the Orange Revolu-tion.67

One of the tests of the long-term credibility ofUkraine’s new foreign policy will be the Transnis-tria conflict settlement process. At the EU-Ukraine summit in Yalta on 11 September 2001,Ukraine declared that in order to ‘reflect its for-

64 Interviews in Chisinau April 2005, and Brussels, June 2005.65 Interview with Nikolay Salagor, Zerkalo Nedeli 35 (563), 10-16 September 2005. Also see OSCE Mission to Moldova News Digest,12.09.2005.66 Interview with OSCE official, Paris, 11 May 2005.67 Interview with Ukrainian diplomat, Brussels, April 2005; for the Ten Points, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/

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68 Ukraine currently seeks to participate in the drafting of CFSP statements, which would also allow Ukraine to sign CFSP statements alongwith EU candidate countries. Interview in Brussels, April 2005.69 Press office of the President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, ‘Ukrainian-Moldovan negotiations, headed by the Presidents of Ukraine andMoldova, ended in the Odessa oblast,’ 2 June 2005, http://www.prezident.gov.ua/en/news/data/1_827.html.70 Interview with Ukrainian official, Chisinau, April 2005.

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eign policy orientation, Ukraine recalled its uni-lateral alignment with EU CFSP statements’.68 AEuropean Ukraine cannot do without a Euro-peanised foreign policy on Transnistria. A keyindicator of Ukraine’s willingness to ensure theinvolvement of the EU in conflict settlement willbe ensuring that its entire border with Moldovais secure and transparent.

With the Youshchenko government, therehas been significant progress on the issue. InMay 2005, the Moldovan and Ukrainian PrimeMinisters agreed to form joint custom points onthe Moldovan-Ukrainian border in order toenhance its transparency. This has been a con-tentious issue for years, requested by Moldovaand supported by the EU. On 2 June 2005, theMoldovan and Ukrainian presidents addresseda joint letter to the EU High Representative forCFSP, Javier Solana, and the Commission Presi-dent, Jose Manuel Barroso, requesting EU sup-port for an international mission for the ‘con-trol and monitoring’ of the Transnistrian seg-ment of the Moldova-Ukraine border.69

Overall, the Ukrainian position towards con-flict resolution in Transnistria has been affectedby internal infighting inside the Youshchenkoadministration. Divergences between Petro

Poroshenko, former head of the National Secu-rity and Defence Council (NSDC), and formerPrime Minister Youlia Timoshenko, havemarked domestic politics as well as the Ukrain-ian approach on Transnistria. The dismissal ofthe two officials by President Youshchenko inSeptember 2005 raised certain questions aboutthe continuity of the Ukrainian policy towardsthe conflicts. Youlia Timoshenko’s governmentwas an advocate of a tougher approach towardsTransnistria than the NSDC, and it is not clearhow the increasing rift between Youschnekoand Timoshenko will affect Ukrainian policy-making on the Transnistria conflict.

Thus, considering the internal constraints ofUkrainian domestic politics it is crucial to getUkraine on board to move towards conflict set-tlement. Thus far, Ukraine’s steps on Transnis-tria have been inspired by concerns aboutUkraine’s image abroad.70 Ukraine sees its con-tribution to conflict resolution in Transnistriathrough the prism of its rapprochement withthe EU. This gives the EU considerable leveragein dealing with Ukraine. However, muchdepends on the capacity of the EU to alter theway Ukraine perceives its interests in Transnis-tria as part of broader EU-Ukraine relations.


4

The EU and Transnistria

The thinking, assessments and policies of theEU towards the conflict in Transnistria have

evolved quickly. The turning point towards amore active role occurred in late 2002. Sincethen, the EU has stepped up its attention andactions. The EU now constantly raises theTransnistria issue in relations with Russia andUkraine. The Union has also used an array ofCFSP instruments to support the conflict reso-lution process – these have included appointingan EU Special Representative, introducing atravel ban against the Transnistrian leadership,as well as envisaging common actions under itsENP Action Plans with Moldova and Ukraine onconflict resolution in Transnistria.

4.1 Why more EU engagement?

First, because of enlargement. A 2002 Commis-sion paper on EU approaches to Moldova stated:‘Moldova’s stability clearly matters to the EU.Within a few years, Moldova will be on the bor-ders of an enlarged EU. It has been destabilisedby weak government, armed conflict and seces-sion, near economic collapse, organised crimeand emigration (…) The EU needs to helpMoldova address these problems’.71 Indeed, itwas enlargement that stimulated the EU todevelop a neighbourhood policy.

Second, developments in CFSP and ESDPmean that the EU not only can look East, but thatit can also potentially act in the East. What ismore, by 2002, the Balkan region had been setmore or less on the path towards stabilisation.Serbia’s authoritarian leader Slobodan Milose-

vic was ousted, the FYR of Macedonia had sta-bilised after the 2001 clashes between the Slavicand Albanian communities and the EU wasbeginning to pay more attention to its Easternneighbourhood.

Third, by 2003, after more than a decade ofnegotiations, the conflict settlement mecha-nisms had become discredited in the eyes ofMoldova and the international community. Thefive-sided mechanism and the peacekeeping for-mat have not worked and are no longer accept-able as negotiations were stalled, and Moldovadid not trust Russia and Ukraine, and the peace-keeping operation was perceived as sustainingthe status quo rather than solving the conflict.With every passing year of negotiation, theTransnistrian separatist state consolidated.Steps undertaken under pressure from themediators as part of the conflict settlementefforts, such as granting Moldovan customstamps to Transnistria, were only contributingto a more economically independent Transnis-tria. Instead of altering the incentive structuressustaining the conflict, the negotiation formatwas, in fact, legitimising them. The UK Govern-ment memorandum on the appointment of anEU Special Representative to Moldova is clear:‘After another year without progress on the five-sided settlement talks (…) there is recognitionwithin the EU of the need for greater engage-ment in Moldova. This has become more press-ing following the recent enlargement of the EU,which has put the EU’s external border closer toMoldova, and with the prospect of Romania’saccession in 2007, which will put Moldovadirectly on the EU’s border’.72

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71 EU approach on Moldova (Unpublished, 2002).72 Information from the Committee on European Security of the United Kingdom Parliament, House of Common, Eleventh Report of Session2004-2005, Point 12 ‘FCO (26397) EU Special Representative for Moldova’.

73 See ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, writes to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on deteriorating situation inTransnistria,’ Brussels, 30 July 2004, S0208/04; ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, sends diplomatic mission to Moldova,’Brussels, 9 August 2004 S0210/04; ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the denial of access to Transnistria of the OSCEMission in Moldova,’ 19 August 2004; ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the continuing deterioration ofthe situation in Moldova,’ 26 August 2004. All these documents can be found on: www.eurojournal.org.74 The text of the Russian Draft Memorandum on the basic principles of the state structure of a united state in Moldova (Kozak Memorandum) can befound at: http://eurojournal.org/comments.php?id=P107_0_1_0_C; for relevant commentaries see Michael Emerson, ‘Should theTransnistrian tail wag the Bessarabian dog?’ CEPS Commentary, 11 January 2004, available at: http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=133&; and John Lowenhardt, ‘The OSCE, Moldova and Russian Diplomacy in 2003,’ Eurojournal.org, 16 April 2004,http://eurojournal.org/more.php?id=139_0_1_6_M5.75 Interview with EU official, Brussels, April 2005.

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Fourth, the Transnistrian authorities havedriven the EU towards greater involvement inthe conflict resolution process. Transnistriaopposes any Western involvement in theprocess, and is profoundly distrustful ofEurope. Transnistria obstructionism in negotia-tions, which were employed by the separatistleaders to prolong the status quo, in fact, dis-credited the mechanism in the eyes of mostobservers and gave the Moldovan governmentcredible arguments to insist on greater EU andUS involvement in negotiations.

This was reinforced by a series of tensionsbetween Moldova and Transnistria in 2003-2004 that revealed the flaws not only of thenegotiation format but also of the peacekeepingmechanism. A brutal attempt to close down theonly six Romanian-language schools (one ofthem an orphanage) using the Latin alphabet inTransnistria in the summer of 2004 prompted aseries of EU statements, an extension of thetravel ban on more Transnistrian officials, and avisit in early August 2004 by Robert Cooper,Director General for External and Politico-Mili-tary Affairs of the EU Council to Transnistria.73

The crisis led to a direct and dangerous standoffbetween Moldovan police and Transnistrianmilitia, in which the peacekeeping forces did notinterfere. Nor could the Joint Control Commis-sion, composed of Russia, Transnistria andMoldova and the body supervising the securitysituation, intervene because of a Transnistrianand Russian veto. This revealed the biases of thestructures, which, designed to maintain peace,now entrenched the conflict. Transnistrianactions, therefore, served to undermine the cred-ibility of the Russia-led negotiating and peace-keeping formats and to encourage thinking in

the EU, the US and Moldova on how the situa-tion could be changed.

Fifth, Russian policies towards Moldovaencouraged and even accelerated greater EUattention to the issue. Russia’s unilateral diplo-macy, witnessed with the ‘Kozak memorandum’and Russian pressure to weaken the OSCE, hasundermined the five-sided format in this con-flict. In November 2003, Dmitri Kozak, Putin’sspecial envoy, developed a unilateral settlementplan that would have opened the way to a Russ-ian military presence until 2020 and Transnis-tria’s de facto domination of the whole ofMoldova. This became known as the ‘Kozakmemorandum’.74 In addition, Russia failed towithdraw its troops and armaments before theend of 2002 in accordance with its OSCE Istan-bul commitments. Russia has not ceased sup-porting Transnistrian separatism even after aninitially pro-Russian communist governmenttook power in Moldova. So assertive was Russ-ian policy towards Moldova that even Moldova’scommunists turned away from Russia as themain ‘strategic’ partner. In 2004-2005, Russiaalso tried to undermine a common EU policy onTransnistria and sideline EU institutions whileat the same time intensifying bilateral discus-sions on Transnistria with some EU memberstates to show that it consults with Europeanpartners.75

Sixth, the EU-Russia dialogue on securityissues, especially the launch of a road map for acommon external security space in May 2005,has started to create a proper basis for coopera-tion on the conflicts in the former Soviet Union.A key objective of the common space is to‘strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on matters ofpractical co-operation on crisis management in


order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives(…) in the settlement of regional conflicts, interalia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian bor-ders’.76 This document clears ground in whichthe EU could increase its contribution to conflictresolution in Transnistria, which, after all, is anadjacent region only to the EU and not Russia.

Seventh, the Orange Revolution and changesin Ukrainian policy have made greater EU con-tribution to conflict resolution more welcome;these changes also increased the EU’s potentialto act in stronger cooperation with Ukraine.

Taken together, these factors led memberstates and the EU to recognise that the statusquo had to and could be changed. A new pushwas required. With the OSCE in crisis, NATOlooking beyond Europe towards global respon-sibilities, and the United States deeply involvedin the Middle East, the obvious candidate todrive the conflict resolution process is the EU.

4.2 EU thinking and policy

Most importantly, EU thinking about Moldovahas changed. The Moldovan conflict remains farfrom the most salient problem the EU faces, butsince 2003 the conflict in Transnistria has giventhe EU a great deal of food for thought. In addi-tion, the EU has used a wide array of CFSP instru-ments to support the settlement of the conflict.It is worth reviewing these actions before consid-ering new ideas for EU engagement.

Diplomatic actionsThe EU has moved relatively quickly to become adiplomatic actor in the Transnistrian conflictresolution process. During 2003-2004, the EU

became an ad hoc diplomatic actor in Moldova,periodically sending diplomatic missions toMoldova, raising the Transnistria problem withRussia and Ukraine and expressing opinions onthe conflict resolution process. The most dra-matic instance of such diplomatic activism wasJavier Solana’s declared lack of EU support forthe ‘Kozak Memorandum’ in November 2003,which weighed in Moldova’s decision to rejectthe Russian plan. In early 2005, a decision wasmade to increase the profile and to streamlineEU diplomacy and in March the EU appointedan EU Special Representative (EUSR) forMoldova. A senior Dutch diplomat, AdriaanJacobovits de Szeged, who served as the specialenvoy of the OSCE Dutch Chairman-in-Officein 2003 on the Transnistria problem, wasappointed. His mandate is to ‘strengthen the EUcontribution to the resolution of the Transnis-tria conflict (…); assist in the preparation (…) ofEU contributions to the implementation of aneventual conflict settlement’.77 In this way, theEU sent a message that its interest in theTransnistria problem is serious, and that theEUSR would be the main EU interlocutor withwhom the problem should be discussed.78 TheEUSR appointment was designed to provide forgreater EU internal coherence and external visi-bility. However, the fact that the EUSR is basedin The Hague has reduced his visibility on theground.

Trade-related actions In September 2004, the EU introduced a double-checking system for the steel exported fromMoldova without imposing any quantitativelimitations.79 In fact, this was a measure toenhance the transparency of steel exports fromTransnistria to the European Union. Such

76 EU-Russia Road Map for the Common Space of External Security, p. 43.77 Council Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 appointing a Special Representative of the European Union for Moldova, OfficialJournal L 081 , 30/03/2005 P. 0050 – 0052.78 Interview with EU official, Brussels, April 2005. 79 Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Republic ofMoldova establishing a double-checking system without quantitative limits in respect of the export of certain steel products from the Republic of Moldova to theEuropean Community, Brussels, 7 September 2004, 11511/04, SID 28, COEST 126.

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exports could no longer happen withoutMoldovan certificates confirming the origin ofthe steel. This meant in effect that the Transnis-trian steel factory in Rybnitsa would not be ableto export steel without Moldovan customstamps or supervision by Moldovan authorities.The impact has been felt in Transnistria, whichhas had to redirect exports towards the East andChina, in particular.

Participation in negotiations The EU has been involved in the negotiationsalso. During the Dutch chairmanship of theOSCE in 2003, the EU was present in the JointConstitutional Commission, composed ofMoldovan and Transnistrian deputies, to draft anew constitution for a reunified Moldova. TheCommission ultimately failed in its task, but itmarked a symbolic change in the conflict resolu-tion mechanisms with the EU being involved forthe first time in negotiations on the status ofTransnistria.

The EU is not formally included in any of theformally institutionalised conflict managementformats in Transnistria. It is not part of the five-sided negotiation format, the joint control com-mission, or the peacekeeping mechanism. TheEU rather than seeking to join these mostly dis-credited and deadlocked formats, has beenbuilding new frameworks of cooperation inwhich it could bring an added value to the con-flict resolution process. This included activediplomacy by the EUSR for Moldova and thelaunch of the EU Border Assistance Mission. Infact, the main thrust of conflict settlementefforts in Transnistria has shifted away from thefive-sided format towards direct dialoguebetween the EU and other concerned actors andefforts to increase the transparency of theMoldova-Ukraine border.

Since September 2003, Moldova has con-stantly called for the EU (and the US) to becomea full mediator in the conflict. The propositionis supported by Ukraine, and Transnistria haseven decreased its objections to the idea in 2005.It is increasingly likely that the EU, as well as theUS, will become involved in the negotiatingprocess at some point. As the failure of the

‘Kozak memorandum’ showed, no solution tothe conflict is likely without EU support. All ofthis highlights the importance of the EU role inthe negotiations, even if it is not formally a medi-ator yet.

Political dialogue with Ukraine andMoldova Starting in March 2003 at the initiative of theEuropean Commission, a series of trilateral con-sultations between Ukraine, Moldova and theEU were held in Brussels on the issue of jointborder controls on the Moldovan-Ukrainianborder, including its Transnistrian segment.The ENP Country Report on Moldova fromMay 2005 mentions that ‘a key element in anyeffort to achieve a settlement relates to ensuringMoldova’s control over its entire customs terri-tory’. The Report states also that ‘without effec-tive customs control on the goods crossingTransnistria, smuggling is flourishing with seri-ous consequences on the government budgetand the rule of law’. The EU, thus, supportedMoldova’s proposals for the creation of a jointborder control on the Ukrainian territory toensure control over all of Moldova’s externalborders. The EU also pledged funds to supportthe development of border infrastructurebetween Moldova and Ukraine. On 7 June 2005,the European Commission announced that thisassistance would increase to 22 million euro pri-marily for strengthening border controlsbetween Moldova and Ukraine.

In February 2005, the EU and Moldovasigned their ENP Action Plan for increasedcooperation. The Action Plan is a set of meas-ures to advance economic and political relationsbetween Moldova and the EU. Besides economicand technical issues, the Action Plan has a sepa-rate section on Transnistria. The documentunderlines the ‘continuing strong EU commit-ment to support the settlement of the Transnis-tria conflict, drawing on the instruments at theEU’s disposal,’ and states that ‘the EU is ready toconsider ways to strengthen further its engage-ment’. One should note also that the EU willopen a Commission delegation in Chisinau inSeptember 2005.


Transnistria has been prominent in the bilat-eral EU-Ukraine dialogue. The EU-UkraineAction Plan also states the necessity of enhanc-ing cooperation in ‘working towards a viablesolution to the Transnistria conflict inMoldova, including addressing border issues’.In addition, the Transnistria issue is raised per-manently in the EU-Ukraine dialogue, andTransnistria is often perceived as one of the testsof post-Kuchma Ukraine.

Border monitoring In response to the Moldovan and Ukrainianinvitation to monitor the border between thetwo countries, in August 2005, the EU presenteda memorandum on the creation of an EU BorderAssistance Mission that would monitor cus-toms and border controls on the whole frontierbetween Moldova and Ukraine, including itsTransnistrian sector. It is expected that the mis-sion will start its activity in November 2005 andwould last for two years with the possibility ofextension for another year. It would be a Euro-pean Commission led mission (not an ESDPoperation), dealing with both border and cus-toms monitoring, without any executive func-tions. The EU monitoring mission will be able tooperate at all border crossing points but will notbe permanently located at these points.

Sanctions In February 2003, the EU and the US introducedtargeted restrictions in the form of a travel banagainst representatives of the Transnistrianleadership. The joint statement said: ‘The lead-ership of the secessionist Transnistrian regionhas continually demonstrated obstructionismand unwillingness to change the status quo,

thereby impeding meaningful negotiations’.80

The EU statement noted also: ‘The EU reservesthe right to consider additional targeted restric-tive measures at a later date. The EU will reviewits position in the light of further develop-ments, in particular steps taken by the Transnis-trian leadership to make substantial progress innegotiations’.81 In August 2004, indeed, thetravel ban was extended to an additional tenofficials from Transnistria who were responsi-ble for the attempt to close down the Latin-script schools, which was considered a humanrights violation.82 However, the effectiveness ofsanctions is diminished by a number of factors.Firstly, Ukraine has not associated itself withthe travel ban. The Ukrainian authorities claimthat as a neutral mediator in the conflict resolu-tion process they cannot exert pressure on oneof the conflict parties. This makes it possible forTransnistrian officials to travel easily inUkraine and Russia, thus reducing the negativeimpact of sanctions. Second, the sanctions aretoo limited in scope to impose a serious burdenon the leadership and make it reverse its poli-cies. They target a limited number of officials,but not key supporters of the regime such assenior executives of the most important indus-tries or business groups that provide crucialsupport to the regime.83 Third, the objective ofthe sanctions is somewhat vague, and there is noclear request for some concrete steps towardscompliance on the part of the Transnistrianauthorities.

Crisis management In the summer of 2003, the EU discussed thepossibility of contributing to a peace-supportoperation in Transnistria. The idea was firstraised officially in an OSCE food-for-thought

80 ‘Moldova: Council adopts restrictive measures against the Transnistrian leadership,’ Brussels, 27 February 2003, 6679/03 (Presse 56),Annex 1 ‘Joint Statement of the European Union and the United States on Sanctions against the Transnistrian leadership.’ 81 ‘Moldova: Council adopts restrictive measures against the Transnistrian leadership,’ Brussels, 6679/03 (Presse 56).82 ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the continuing deterioration of the situation in Moldova,’26 August 2004. 83 On the effectiveness of ‘smart’ sanctions, see Anthonius W. de Vries, ‘European Union Sanctions against the Federal Republic ofYougoslavia from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting’, and ‘Introduction’ in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Smart Sanctions:Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

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84 Food-for-Thought-Paper: Peace Consolidation Mission Moldova (Unpublished, July 2003).85 Interview, Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, London, October 2003.

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paper84 and discussed in the EU Political andSecurity Committee and in the EU Militarystaff.85 In the end, the proposal was put asidebecause of Russian opposition, EU-Russia dis-agreements over the ‘Kozak memorandum’ andbecause of a lack of clarity in the prospects for asettlement in Transnistria. However, the idea ofthe need for a different type of peace supportoperation in Moldova is not off the agenda, andthe EU will resume such discussions in thefuture.

This discussion has highlighted instances ofincreased EU engagement in the Transnistriaproblem. In a context where the conflict resolu-

tion mechanisms are discredited and ineffective,Transnistria’s de facto independence is strength-ening, the OSCE lies in deep crisis, and whereUkraine is moving closer to the EU while Russiawants closer cooperation on security matterswith the Union, the EU becomes a central focusof international efforts to address the Transnis-trian conflict.

The question now is: what should the EU do?How and where should the EU seek greaterengagement? The EU has made significantprogress in thinking about the Transnistriaproblem. Now, it is time for actions to catch upwith thoughts.


5

Transnistria: from deadlock to sustainable settlement

Moldova is not attractive for Transnistrians,but they are also disappointed about the

performance of their own region and its rulers.Apathy and absenteeism in the March 2005 localelections in the separatist region were an indica-tion of this sentiment. Attempts at constitutionalreform by a majority of deputies in the Transnis-trian parliament in April and May 2005 areanother indicator. The key objective now must beto shatter the status quo in this conflict by build-ing an attractive and Europeanised Moldova thatwould present a serious option for reunification.How should the EU pursue this objective?

The answer lies in a combination of EUactions aimed at supporting a politically andeconomically attractive Moldova, and support-ing pluralism inside Transnistria to allow a newstructure of economic and political interests toemerge. The EU must act at three levels: theregional level, Moldova and Transnistria.

5.1 Altering the regional context

The main objective of EU actions at the regionallevel must be to break the structures of intereststhat help sustain the status quo around Transnis-tria. Altering the external conditions that sustainTransnistria will require actions at the Europeanlevel, continued EU dialogue with the UnitedStates and a coherent EU policy on Russia andUkraine, particularly on the border question, aswell as on the existing conflict resolution mecha-nisms and the withdrawal of Russian troops.

The European level With the failure of the Constitutional Treatyratification, the EU needs a stronger CFSP in itsneighbourhood, especially for countries like

Moldova and Ukraine whose EU membershipaspirations are not likely to be satisfied in theshort to medium term. Internal problems in theEU should be compensated with a more activepursuit of the EU’s commitment to stability inits neighbourhood.

Developments in the EU’s eastern neigh-bourhood are paving the way for the EU to play adecisive role in the region. The Black Sea regionis emerging as a more coherent entity and ismore present on the EU agenda. Importantdevelopments here are Romanian and BulgarianEU accession in 2007/2008, the revolutionarychanges in Ukraine and Georgia, and Turkey’scontinued Europeanisation. The borders of theEU will extend to the Black Sea, and it will beexpected by its partners in the region to play amore active role. A Black Sea dimension of EUpolicies is likely to emerge.

Certainly, Romania’s future EU accession,coupled with the reinvigorated Romania-Moldova partnership after a change in govern-ment in Romania in December 2004, can signif-icantly strengthen the EU’s capacity to supportconflict resolution in Transnistria and also sup-port wider ENP objectives in Moldova.

At the European level, it is important to workfor greater coordination on Transnistria on thepart of EU member states. Politically, such coor-dination is already present and relatively effec-tive. However, more can be done. The EU is oneof the biggest trading partners of Transnistria,which gives it significant leverage over the con-flict resolution process. This potential must beactivated by greater coordination between EUmember states.

Transatlantic cooperation Transnistria has been an issue of almost exem-plary transatlantic cooperation, as both the EU

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86 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia, COM(2004) 106, Brussels,9 February 2004.

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and US share the objective of solving the con-flict. Romania’s integration into NATO in 2004,and the prospect of its future integration intothe EU, has made the two institutions moreinterested in stability in their new neighbour-hood. The effects of the Transnistrian conflicton Moldova’s capacity to emerge as a viable anddemocratic state, as well as arms proliferationdangers from Transnistria, have worried the EUand US. Thus the EU, together with the US, hasintroduced sanctions in the form of a travel banagainst the Transnistrian leaders. Both the EUand US presented a united diplomatic frontwhen they called on the Moldovan president toreject the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ in November2003. EU member states and the US havepledged not to ratify the Adapted ConventionalForces in Europe Treaty until Russia fulfils itsobligations on military withdrawal fromMoldova and Georgia. Moldova also invitedboth the US and the EU to become part of thenegotiating format, as both are indispensablepartners for achieving a sustainable solution tothe conflict.

Thus, transatlantic cooperation has beenvery positive and useful. This cooperation hasreinforced the EU position in efforts to settle theconflict. Further transatlantic cooperation willremain crucial for EU efforts to support a settle-ment of the conflict, as well as in the EU dia-logue with Russia and Ukraine.

The EU-Russia dialogueEU policy towards Russia should pursue EUinterests as they are stated in the ENP. As a Euro-pean Commission report in 2004 on relationswith Russia stresses ‘The EU should make fulluse of its influence with Russia to promote anddefend EU interests and to ensure a balancedrelationship. This means bringing togetherissues in which Russia is anxious to see progresswith our own goals’.86 The Communication alsostates that ‘the EU should demonstrate its readi-ness to engage with the NIS on the basis of its

own strategic objectives, cooperating with Rus-sia whenever possible’. The EU’s primary inter-est in Transnistria is to settle the conflict. Work-ing with Russia on the creation of a commonspace for external security provides the frame-work where a cooperative approach can becrafted on this conflict. The EU-Russia RoadMap on a Common Space for External Securityadopted in May 2005 explicitly mentionsamong its objectives the need for ‘practical co-operation on crisis management in order to pre-pare the ground for joint initiatives (…) in thesettlement of regional conflicts, inter alia inregions adjacent to EU and Russian borders’.Eliminating Transnistria as an irritant from EU-Russia relations is in the interest of both part-ners. Two issues are key in this dialogue – thewithdrawal of Russian troops and the reform ofthe current peacekeeping mechanism.

First, maintaining the withdrawal issue highon the agenda is crucial. The Russian troops area security pillar for the Transnistrian regime(willingly or not). Breaking the status quo isunimaginable without a full withdrawal. Russ-ian peacekeeping forces may remain, of course,for conflict settlement purposes if under inter-national mandate and in a new multilateralframework. However, maintaining a militarybase – the OGRT – in Moldova creates an obsta-cle to conflict settlement, which throws doubtsover Russia’s status as a neutral mediator.

Second, a discussion with Russia on thepeacekeeping mechanisms in Transnistriawould be useful. The current peacekeeping oper-ation cannot address many of the non-militaryissues that arise around this conflict. They didnot prevent the deployment of Transnistrianmilitias in the supposedly demilitarised SecurityZone. They did not prevent clashes betweenTransnistrian military and police forces and resi-dents of villages in the region under the author-ity of Chisinau. In fact, the military nature of thepeacekeeping operation tends only to furthermilitarise the region while failing to address seri-ous questions that arise on the ground.


One way to alleviate these problems would beto strengthen the civilian dimension of thepeacekeeping operation by increasing the num-ber of international civilian observers and evengendarmerie-type forces, which could in timereplace the current peacekeeping forces. Takinginto consideration the fact that several EU mem-ber states are working on the development of aEuropean gendarmerie force (EUGENFOR), aEU-Russia-Ukraine gendarmerie-led peace sup-port mission should be considered to replace thecurrent operation. A mission of civilianobservers or a gendarmerie-led operation wouldalso provide reassurances to Russia that once itstroops withdrew, no other foreign militaryforces would be deployed. One should also notethat Russia is less prickly with regard to civiliancrisis management operations, which opens theway for the EU to act in an area where it can beuseful, and where it can provide clear valueadded.

The EU-Ukraine dialogueThe EU dialogue with Ukraine on the Transnis-tria problem should have two pillars. One is toenhance EU-Ukraine cooperation on CFSP andESDP matters and the second is to monitor theUkraine-Moldova border with EU support.

First, in the context of Ukraine’s efforts toassociate itself with the CFSP, greater realign-ment of Ukraine with the EU policy on Transnis-tria should be sought, including with regard tothe sanctions and the travel ban against theTransnistrian leadership. This would be a diffi-cult step for Ukraine, but it would help drive theEuropeanisation of Ukraine’s foreign policy.CFSP coordination with Ukraine is an essentialpart of breaking the deadlock.

Second, EU support for solving the borderproblem around Transnistria is crucial. Con-trolling the border would eliminate some of thesecurity challenges that arise from the separatistregion. It would also weaken the vitality of theauthoritarian and corrupt regime in Tiraspol.Without effective control of this border,Moldova will face serious constraints on its abil-ity to benefit from more openness in trade withthe EU under autonomous trade preferences

(asymmetric trade regime), because it would notbe able to enforce a clear control of the origin ofgoods, which is a precondition for increasedtrade with the EU. Thus, indirectly, the widersuccess of the ENP project with Moldovadepends to a large extent on the border issue.

There are two aspects to ensuringtransparency on the Transnistrian segment ofthe Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The first step oflaunching an EU border monitoring mission hasbeen taken. The next step is to have jointMoldova-Ukraine border posts on the whole bor-der between the countries. On the Transnistriansegment, these joint posts would be situated onUkrainian territory, thus allowing Moldovanauthorities to monitor exports and imports intoTransnistria with their Ukrainian counterparts.Combining these two levels – EU border moni-toring and Moldo-Ukrainian joint border posts –would ensure transparency and reliability of theborder, which is a problem that concerns the EU,and not only Moldova and Ukraine.

5.2 Policies towards Moldova

The main objective of EU policy should be help-ing to make Moldova attractive for all of its citi-zens by strengthening its institutions.

How? In the person of the EUSR, the EU hasa channel for undertaking coherent and sus-tained initiatives on the conflict resolutionprocess. The EUSR is, thus, the EU’s principalactor in the conflict itself. In addition, the EU ispresent with a Commission delegation that isresponsible for the implementation of theAction Plan and the management of ENPI pro-grammes. The question is how to make the exist-ing EU actors – the EUSR Moldova and theCommission delegation – work togethertowards a sustainable resolution of the conflict?

Making the Action Plan workMoldova’s current lack of attractiveness is a keyelement sustaining the status quo. Pursuingeconomic reform, designing a good business cli-mate and ensuring deeper and faster democrati-

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sation of Moldova are central conflict-resolu-tion tools with regard to Transnistria. The EU-Moldova Action Plan is important for the trans-formation of Moldova along these lines, butwider EU support is crucial for creating anattractive Moldova.

The Action Plan is too ‘thick’ on Moldova’scommitments and too ‘thin’ on EU responsibil-ities. The balance should be redressed by offer-ing more EU and member states’ support forMoldova for the implementation of the AP. TheAP should not be just a technical exercise for theMoldovan government, and its wider politicaland security aims should be well understoodand supported.

More openness from the EU in allowing forthe circulation of Moldovan citizens, particu-larly students, businessmen and civil societyactivists, would be important. As would greateropenness of markets. All of these measures havean impact on the conflict resolution process inTransnistria. A European perspective forMoldova is likely to have effects on Transnistriaas well. Such measures would not provoke aflood of Transnistrians willing to rejoinMoldova, but they would build an understand-ing of the benefits of rapprochement withMoldova for the most important and activegroups of Transnistrian society. Of course, EUsupport in making Moldova attractive will notbear fruit without a clear commitment fromMoldova to democracy, decentralisation andeconomic reform.

Negotiating the status of Transnistria Negotiations on solving the conflict are impor-tant. The Republic of Moldova needs a betterimage in the Transnistrian region, and needs totalk to potential forces inside Transnistria, prin-cipally within business circles, that wouldfavour a settlement of the conflict. The conflictcannot be settled by unilaterally designing a lawon Transnistrian autonomy inside Moldova – anapproach favoured by many in Chisinau. Whilethere are indeed significant questions about thelegitimacy of Transnistria’s leaders, the strengthof the separatist entity should not be underesti-mated. Even if the current leadership in Tiraspol

led by Igor Smirnov collapses (not an unlikelyscenario), many of the ideas and structures ofinterests sustaining the separatist entities willremain in place. These will need to be addressedby Moldova and the international communityeven if the Smirnov regime collapses.

However, negotiations, particularly in thefive-sided format, should not be the main focusof international efforts to support conflict reso-lution in Transnistria. The main issue is to alterthe structures of conflict – making Transnistriauntenable and Moldova attractive, rather thanseeking an early agreement on the status ofTransnistria. Thus, the main priority of theinternational community should be to alter theconflict environment. No power-sharing agree-ment between Moldova and Transnistria will fixthe problem, if its provisions are not based onthe positive interests of citizens in Moldova andthe Transnistrian region. And these will taketime and international efforts to build.

More ESDP for Moldova It is not enough to alter the status quo, thischange must be sustained. This will requireactions that strengthen the institutional capac-ity of Moldova to ensure control over its bor-ders and the effectiveness of Moldovan law-enforcement agencies in general. The use ofESDP civilian capabilities in Moldova underthe guidance of the EUSR would be crucial inthis respect.

At the invitation of Moldova and Ukraine,the EU is working on the deployment of a bor-der-monitoring mission on the Transnistriansegment of the border. However useful, this isnot a long-term solution. In parallel, the EUshould strengthen Moldova’s capacity to under-take this monitoring and control on its own. Atthe same time as ensuring that the border will bemonitored by the international community inthe initial stages, the EU should launch a policemission inside Moldova. This mission shouldhave two objectives – building an integrated bor-der management system and strengthening thecapacity of Moldovan law-enforcement agen-cies. Both are priorities noted in the AP, whichmentions the necessity for Moldova to trans-


form the ‘Border Guards into a law enforcementagency’ and declares the need to ‘enhance theMoldovan law enforcement authorities (police,border guards, customs) through the provisionof modern equipment, facilities and training inorder to increase in particular the effectivenessof border crossing checkpoints’.87

An EU police mission to Moldova wouldenhance Moldova’s capability to deal with secu-rity problems through the reinforcement of law-enforcement agencies. More importantly, thismission would be a conflict resolution mecha-nism. The EU has experience of this kind ofoperation already. For example, the mandate ofthe EU Police Mission PROXIMA in the FYR ofMacedonia has objectives that are applicable toMoldova, namely that ‘the mission will supportthe development of an efficient and profes-sional police service and promote Europeanstandards of policing (…) EU police experts willmonitor, mentor and advise the country’spolice, thus helping to fight organised crimemore effectively and consolidate public confi-dence in policing’.88 In Moldova, as in FYROM,the border issue is directly relevant for the stabil-isation of the country. The positive EU experi-ence acquired in FYROM is relevant forMoldova, where there is a direct link betweenconflict resolution and strengthening the insti-tutional capacity of the state, better border man-agement and more effective law-enforcementagencies.

Deploying a EU police mission in a pre-settle-ment environment would be innovative, and itsaim would be to help create conditions for thesettlement of the conflict. The EU should notwait until Transnistria decides to reunite withMoldova. This will not happen without addi-tional measures that induce it to reconsidersome of its positions, including an EU PoliceMission. The police mission should be under-taken in parallel with the international bordermonitoring mission, and would be designed to

prepare the Moldovan agencies to replace theinternational monitoring of the border in two orthree years. A possible date for the launch of thepolice mission will be March 2006 when themandate of the EUSR is to be renewed andextended.

5.3 Policies on Transnistria

The main objectives of EU policy should be tomake the situation unattractive for those whobenefit from the current situation and to pro-mote the greater openness of Transnistria.These aims may be contradictory at times, asthey can bring into conflict the need for greatersanctions against parts of the Transnistrianelites with the need to engage in dialogue withsegments of the same elite. A fine balancing actwill be needed. But such balance is not out of thereach of the EU. With Ukraine willing to comecloser to the EU, Transnistria cannot affordgreater isolation and centralisation as it lacksresources for self-sustainability and its funda-mental source of legitimacy is economic and notethnic. Thus, Transnistria’s response to interna-tional pressure to democratise is unlikely to begreater centralisation and self-isolation, as is thecase in Belarus and Uzbekistan.

Supporting pluralism Transnistrian authoritarianism should not betolerated. There is no cultural, historical, geo-graphical or other excuse for Transnistrianauthorities not to comply with universal humanrights. Supporting pluralism will mean sup-porting capacity building for NGOs in theregion because Transnistria will be a clear situa-tion where in the aftermath of a dictatorialregime ‘local NGOs are unlikely to have thecapacity to apply for funding from Brussels’.89

87 EU-Moldova Action Plan, pp. 21-22. 88 General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 September 2003. 89 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rightsand Democratisation in Third Countries, Brussels, 8 May 2001, COM(2001) 252 final, p. 16.

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90 See the website http://www.peacebuilding.md/91 ‘Bender’ is the Russian and ‘Tighina’ is the Romanian name of the same city situated on the right bank of the river Nistru, but under thecontrol of the secessionist authorities in Tiraspol. 92 This can be done through international volunteer organisations, such as ‘Learning Enterprises’, which have been engaged in teachingEnglish language and computer skills all over the world. Another model is not-for-profit English-language teaching by organisations likePrep2Go working in East Asia.

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Considering Transnistria’s dependence onexternal trade and Ukraine, the Tiraspol author-ities are in no position to seriously clamp downon civil society under current conditions. Waysof engaging Ukrainian NGOs in the efforts tosupport pluralism and democracy in Transnis-tria might be considered.

The measures proposed to support civil soci-ety would require limited dialogue with theTransnistrian authorities. This is happeningalready. The United Kingdom’s Department forInternational Development (DFID) is financingprojects in Transnistria.90 On similar lines, theEU itself is already engaged in South Ossetia andAbkhazia in Georgia. EU and member statesshould follow a similar path of strengtheningcivil society in Transnistria and engaging withmoderate elements in the Transnistrian author-ities and business groups. With pressure onTransnistria growing, the region’s elites arediverging more and more on what pathTransnistria should take. International actionsshould seek to strengthen moderates. Businessgroups already see the effects of Transnistria’sisolation, and some, despite pressures from theexecutive, might consider a diversification oftheir options rather than supporting the exist-ing regime.

Investing in the future European Initiative for Democracy and HumanRights (EIDHR) funds should be made avail-able for programmes in Transnistria. In thisrespect, greater EU visibility in Transnistria isimportant. The EU should consider opening aEuropean Information Centre in Bender/Tighi-na.91 Such a measure would facilitate directengagement and support for civil society inTransnistria, under the conditions when theTransnistrian authorities are increasingly try-

ing to limit civil society dialogue across the riverNistru and access of Transnistrian NGOs toforeign funding.

EU assistance to developing frameworks ofdialogue between civil society, mass media andprofessional associations in Moldova andTransnistria should be expanded.

Support for education in Transnistria couldhave a positive impact. Priority areas would beEnglish-language teaching92 and developinggreater knowledge about the EU across theregion. The lack of language skills in Transnis-tria at all levels – official, civil society and univer-sity– is a major obstacle to efforts to transformTransnistria.

Supporting the development of courses onthe EU, its history, institutions and policies inTransnistrian universities, the same way as inMoldova (with TACIS funding) would be aninexpensive and effective long-term investment.In addition, Transnistrian students should haveguaranteed access as Moldovan citizens to EU-Moldova student and academic exchange pro-grammes envisaged in the Action Plan such asErasmus, and Tempus Mundus and Intas.

Sanctions Transnistria is very vulnerable to economic sanc-tions. The most credible pillar of its ideology is theeconomy, and it is also a very open economy witha high degree of trade with the EU and the US.

Targeted sanctions against certain individu-als and companies could be expanded to main-tain the momentum of international pressureon Transnistria to democratise. Considerationmight be given to freezing the accounts of com-panies involved in illicit trading, particularlywith regards to weapons. Such measures asfreezing bank accounts held in the West byTransnistrian leaders, key supporters of the


regime and the ‘state’ institutions of the region,should also be considered. The travel ban has tobe extended to some representatives of businesscircles that form the ‘inner circle’ of the regime.Economic elites in Transnistria should be con-vinced that supporting the current regime is toocostly.

Incentives Sanctions are necessary to break the deadlockand make the status quo unattractive and unten-able. At the same time, incentives are necessary tobuild the basis for a sustainable solution. Oncesettlement is achieved, the main incentive wouldbe trade opportunities with the EU for Transnis-trian companies that have legalised their statuswith the Moldovan authorities and cease to sup-port the secessionist authorities. Promisinggreater business opportunities after a settlementis achieved will make business groups interestedin supporting a settlement.

The Transnistrian pro-independence eco-nomic arguments should be countered.Moldova should state clearly that Transnistriawill not participate in the repayment ofMoldova’s international debts once reunifica-tion happens. A dialogue with the current inter-national investors in Transnistria on theprospects of conflict resolution should belaunched. This is a delicate issue, but effortsshould be made to ensure that these are notstakeholders in the separatist project.

Europeanising Transnistria Ways of integrating Transnistria into the ENPframework and associating Transnistria withthe implementation of the EU-Moldova ActionPlan should be explored. The idea of implement-ing the Action Plan in Transnistria could be putforward by Moldovan and Ukrainian authori-ties as part of the conflict settlement process.Such a measure would serve the two centralobjectives: democratising Transnistria andreuniting Moldova.

Efforts to make implementation of the ENPAP in Transnistria one of the elements of theconflict resolution process could have a numberof positive effects. Firstly, it will set clear bench-marks for the democratisation of Transnistriain line with widely accepted standards in the EUneighbourhood. Moreover, it will not be easy forTransnistrians to dismiss such pressure onpolitical reform as if it were a case of Moldovaimposing democracy on Transnistria. Secondly,progress in this direction would also prepare theground for greater convergence between theMoldovan and Transnistrian political, eco-nomic and legal systems and support the effortto reunite the two parts of a divided country onthe basis of European norms.

While the Transnistrian executive is likely tobe opposed to such measures, open partners canbe found in the region’s parliament (SupremeSoviet). In fact, the Supreme Soviet could adoptsome of the legislation required in accordancewith the Action Plan; this would be in line alsowith the Transnistrian parliament’s own initia-tives on the reform of the political system.

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6

Conclusions and recommendations

Akey objective of the European Union is to havea stable, secure, prosperous and democratic

neighbourhood. Failing the possibility of offer-ing accession to close neighbours in the mediumterm, the EU should and can offer stronger CFSPengagement in the region. Contributing to con-flict resolution in its neighbourhood is key to theachievement of EU objectives. However, the con-flict resolution dimension of the ENP is underde-veloped. It is time for the EU to really focus on theconflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.

Promoting the security aspect of ENP canstart with the Transnistrian conflict inMoldova. This conflict is the closest geographi-cally to the EU; at the same time, it is the most‘solvable.’ The conflict features high on theagenda of EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations.A settlement of the conflict in Transnistriawould attenuate the soft security challenges theEU faces on its Eastern border. Settlementwould also assuage an irritant in EU-Russia rela-tions, and set a positive precedent in buildingthe EU-Russia common space for external secu-rity. It would also be an example of positivecooperation with Ukraine under ENP.

Settling the conflict requires an interna-tional effort. The focus of EU policy should be toalter the context in which the conflict is situatedand sustained, rather than hoping for an earlyagreement on the status of Transnistria. The pri-mary objective should be to increase Moldova’s‘attractiveness’ while decreasing the benefits ofmaintaining the current status quo. TheTransnistrian separatist project is very muchbased on false economic arguments for inde-pendence. Undermining these claims will becentral to efforts to reunify the country.

In order to achieve a sustainable settlementof the conflict, the EU should consider actionsat a number of levels.

The European levelLaunch an EU Police Mission to Moldovaunder the political guidance of the EUSRwith a mandate to construct an integratedborder management system;Set up the EUSR headquarters in Chisinau,Moldova;Continue transatlantic cooperation on allissues related to Transnistria, including thewithdrawal of Russian troops;Develop joint benchmarks and standards forEU companies that have dealings withTransnistria.

EU-RussiaDiscuss the demilitarisation of the currentpeacekeeping operation;Maintain the Russian troops withdrawalissue high on the agenda;Explore ways for greater cooperation onTransnistria under the Road Map of a Com-mon Space for External Security.

EU-UkraineSecure greater alignment between Ukraineand the EU on CFSP joint statements andactions, including sanctions against theTransnistrian leadership;Deploy an EU Border Monitoring Mission tothe Moldova-Ukraine border that would bepresent at all border crossing points;Support the creation of joint Moldovan-Ukrainian border posts on the whole perime-ter of the border;Involve Ukrainian NGOs in the efforts tosupport democracy in Transnistria.

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EU-MoldovaIncrease Moldova’s attractiveness throughtrade liberalisation and facilitation of thevisa regime for certain categories of citizensin line with areas of flexibility in the Schen-gen acquis;Increase EU and member states’ support forthe implementation of the ENP Action Plan.

EU-Transnistria Seek possibilities to start implementingsome of the provisions of the EU-MoldovaAction Plan in Transnistria as well, with aparticular focus on political and democracy-related issues; Support capacity building of the civil sectorin Transnistria; support dialogue betweenMoldovan and Transnistrian civil societies;Facilitate access of Transnistrian NGOs toEU funds under EIDHR and ENPI by provid-

ing more information about existing EU pro-grammes; Expand targeted sanctions to key supportersof the regime from the business community,as well as against individuals and companiesinvolved in criminal activities and humanrights abuses in the region;Revise the objectives of sanctions. The EUshould request democratisation in Transnis-tria with clearly set benchmarks, rather thanlink the travel ban to the continuation ofnegotiations on conflict settlement;Open a European Information Centre inBender/Tighina; Support English-language training inTransnistria and greater access to the inter-net;Fund development of EU-related courses inTransnistrian universities;Involve Transnistrian students and academ-ics in EU-Moldova exchange programmes.


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Annexes

Abbreviations

AP Action Plan

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

DFID Department for International Development, United Kingdom

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

EUSR European Union Special Representative

FSB Federalnaja Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Russian Federal Security Service)

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IMF International Monetary Fund

JCC Joint Control Commission

MGB Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Ministry of State Security of Transnistria)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NSDC National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine

OGRT Operative Group of Russian Troops

OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PCA Partnership and Co-operation Agreement

RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism

SSR Security Sector Reform

TACIS Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States

Map of Moldova including Transnistria

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Source: CIA World Factbook, October 2005

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