ny Āya-vai ŚeṢṢṢika theory of...
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CHAPTER-VI
NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢṢṢṢIKA THEORY OF RELATION
1. REALITY OF RELATION
Relation has an essential role in the systems of Indian philosophy.
Amongst the systems, Navya-Nyāya system gives the most importance to relation.
The Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras are the realist
philosophers who accept the real existence of relation. These philosophers opine that
without the reality of relation, it is not possible to gain knowledge. Relation has the
main role in the process of the generation of knowledge. The conception of the
pramāṇas like pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna śabda, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi
require the understanding the concept of relation.1
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas being realist uphold the separate existences of all
things which are knowable and nameable. Hence, the concept of relation is of utmost
importance to maintain the relation between the substrates (dharmī) and properties
(dharma) which are entirety different entities. Of the seven categories accepted by the
Vaiśeṣikas the sixth category i.e., samavāya is a relation. Some of the qualities are also
relational viz., conjunction, disjunction, number and separateness. Later on the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣikas developed the notion that anything can function as a relation by combining
itself to another thing. “In Navya-Nyāya further useful technical terminology was
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1. cf. Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.69
181
developed to handle relations, as their awareness of the importance of relations for
their system increased.”2
In the Nyāya system, the conception of relation is related to the Nyāya
theory of anyonyābhāva. According to them, relation is fully external. The western
philosophers opine that the relations of the things are external as well as internal. The
internal relations are created in the nature of things. In Indian philosophy, the
Sāṁkhya, Bhāṭṭas and Advaita Vedāntins state that tādātmya relation is an internal
relation. According to some point of view, relation cannot make into one unit but it is
accepted as a relation.3
In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, all relations are external. The Naiyāyikas
have used tādātmya, as a relation, but as an external relation. Naiyāyikas opine that, it
cannot be gained from the nature of a thing. It is seen that a dharma is complete
different from a dharmin, an avayavin (a composite whole) is complete separate from
its avayavas (component parts), jāti is totally distinct from vyakti. In all these cases,
there must be some relation to account for their existence in the same locus.4 “Relation
according to Alexander is the vaguest word in the philosophical vocabulary. It is used
as a symbol indicating a connection and is generally left undefined.”5 Relation is
known as contact (sannikarṣaḥ). It is the cause of the notion of qualifier and
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2. Potter, Karl H., Indian Philosophy, p. 80
3. A Primer of Indian Logic, pp. 49-50
4. cf. Ibid., pp. 50-51
5. Vide, Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.11
182
qualificand in different things.6
Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra maintains that a relation is the
object (viṣaya)bof the knowledge of being qualified (viśiṣṭa) as distinct from the
qualifierness (viśeṣaṇatā) and qualificandness (viśeṣyatā)7. Rūpavān ghaṭaḥ is the
qualified knowledge. There are three objects in this. The one object is ghaṭa as
substantive another is rūpa (colour) as attribute and the third object is samavāya
(relation) between ghaṭa and rūpa. There is viṣayatā (objectness) in these objects. The
viṣayatā which remains in the ghaṭa is in the form of substantiveness, the viṣayatā
which remains in rūpa is in the form of attributiveness. The viṣayatā which remains in
samavāya is in the form of saṁsarga that is known as relation.8
According to some Navya-Naiyāyikas, that is known as relation which is
the determining faction of a qualified knowledge (viśiṣṭadhī).9
In the Navya-Nyāya, relation is discussed in detail relation occupied a very
important place in the Navya-Nyāya. Dinesh Chandra Guha also underlines the
importance of relation in Navya-Nyāya Logic thus “The edifice of Navya-Nyāya rests
to a great extent on the conception of ‘sambandha’ or relation. Indeed the conception
of relation is so interesting and all-pervasive that on account of its application the
Navya-Nyāya can safely be called Relational Logic even in the most modern sense of
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6. sambandhaḥ sannikarṣaḥ sa ca vibhinnayovastunorviśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-
bhāvaprayojakaḥ. Navya-Nyāyabhāṣāpradīpaḥ, p.9
7. viśeṣyaviśeṣantvānyaviśiṣṭadhīviṣayatvaṁ eva sambandhatvamiti bhāvah.
Siddhāntalakṣana Jāgadiśī, p. 252
8. cf. Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.80
9. viśiṣṭadhīniyāmakasyaiva tathātvāt. Siddhāntalakṣana Jāgadiśī, p. 252
183
the term. Anything which has been done so with the help of relations.”10
Moreover,
Navya-Naiyāyikas are called sambandhi. All subject-matters of the Navya-Nyāya
system clarified with the help of the concept relation.
2. DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELATION
Broadly relation can be divided into two types, viz.,–
(a) Vṛttiniyāmaka (occurrence-exacting) and
(b) Vṛttyaniyāmaka (non-occurrence-exacting).
Those relations which have roughly the notion that something occurs in
something else is called Vṛttiniyāmaka relation. Vṛttiniyāmaka is also of three kinds –
(i) Saṁyoga (conjunction), (ii) Samavāya (inherence) and (iii) Viśeṣaṇatā
(attributive). Viśeṣaṇatā is again subdivided into abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā or relation
pertaining to the non-existence and kālika viśeṣaṇatā or relation of temporal
qualification.11
3. VṚTTINIYĀMAKA SAMBANDHA (OCCURRENT-EXACTING RELATION)
(i) Saṁyoga (Conjunction))
Saṁyoga is the one kind of Vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha. It is a guṇa. The
special cause the usage of two things as conjunct is known as Saṁyoga.12
In the
Dīpikā, Annaṁbhaṭṭa clarifies that when there is the usage in the form that these two
things are conjoined then the special cause of this usage is called saṁyoga.13
In the
Dīpikā, we find that the word ‘special cause’ is added in this definition of saṁyoga to
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10. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p.56
11. Ibid., p. 58
12. saṁyuktavyavahārahetuḥ saṁyogaḥ. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 18
13. Dīpikā on Ibid.
184
remove the defect of ativyāpti in case of space, time, number etc.14
He mentions two
types of saṁyoga, karmaja and saṁyogaja. The karmaja saṁyoga is arises when a
book comes in contact with the hand because of the activity of the hand in taking a
book. The saṁyogaja saṁyoga arises when as a result of the contact of the book with
the hand, there is contact of the book with the body.15
Karmaja saṁyoga is again
divided into two kinds – anyatara karmaja and ubhayakarmaja. The example of the
anyatarakarmaja is that the conjunction of the bird with mountain. In this example,
only the bird moves but the mountain remains static. The example of the
ubhayakarmaja is that the conjunction of the flying birds. In this example both birds
move.16
Viśvanātha defines saṁyoga as the contact of two things which were first
removed or separated from each other.17
That means conjunction is the relation
between two separable (yutasiddha) things. Hence, there cannot be any conjunction
between two all-pervading things which are never separate from each other. Thus,
conjunction is the relation of two relata which can exist separately when they are not
related. As saṁyoga is a quality, so there can be conjunction between two substances
only and saṁyoga resides in both these substances. According to Viśvanātha,
conjunction is of three types. Actually Viśvanātha has mentioned the two types of
karmaja saṁyoga , discussed above, as two different kinds of saṁyoga itself. In this
view, first type of saṁyoga is due to action in either of the two relata (anyatara
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14. Ibid., pp. 18-19
15. Ibid.
16. cf. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 165
17. Bhāṣāpariccheda, p. 207
185
karmaja); the second is due to action in both (ubhayakriyājanya) and third is due to
conjunction (saṁyogaja). The example of the first is the contact of a bird with the
mountain. The example of the second kind is the encounter of two fighting birds,
where both move. The conjunction of a jar and a tree because of the conjunction of the
one part of the jar and the tree is the third kind of conjunctin.18
According to
Viśvanātha, karmaja saṁyoga is again of two kinds, viz., Impact (abhighātā) and
contact (nodena). Of these two the first is the case of sound, while the second is not the
cause of sound.19
Saṁyoga is a quality and it is avyāpyavṛtti (non-pervasive).20
That means
it covers only a part of the things conjoined. But Dinesh Chandra Guha opines that
saṁyoga may be vyāpyavṛtti also. He says, “This relation is generally known as a
relation of incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛtti) because when a contact takes place
between two substances (dravyas), it occurs only in a part of them, if of course, the
two substances have got parts. But there may be instances in which a contact may be
of complete occurrence (vyāpyavṛtti) also. As for example, in the case of contact
between two atoms (paramāṇu) or between the mind and the soul or in similar other
cases, the contact cannot be of incomplete occurrence, because, the atoms have got no
parts or the soul also is considered partless. So also the mind in the Nyāya system is
considered as having no part.”21
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18. Ibid., pp. 207-208
19. Ibid.
20. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 18
21. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p.59
186
From the point of Mathematical Logic, relation may be dyadic, triadic, etc.
In Navya-Nyāya, a relation is usually dyadic, although there are other types of relation
also. Saṁyoga is dyadic when it happens between two dravyas. When a dravya
becomes conjunction with two more dravyas, there may be triadic relation. In the
words of Guha “Mathematical Logic conceives relations as triadic etc. When A comes
in contact with C through B. But in the above stated causes A and B simultaneously
come in contact with C or A simultaneously comes in contact with B and C.”22
In
Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika terminology the first case may be described as A and B are saṁyoga
pratiyogī (counter-correlate of saṁyoga) and C anuyogī (subjunctive). For the latter
casse, A is pratiyogī and B and C are anuyogī of saṁyoga. There are two relations
here – direct relation (sākṣāt sambandha) and indirect relation (parāpara sambandha).
That is known as direct relation in which it directly comes in contact with two or more
dravyas. On the other hand, that is called indirect relation in which relation happens
among the component parts.
Vibhāga is the opposite of saṁyoga. Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines it as the
destroyer of the conjunction.23
It has also two kinds- karmaja and vibhāgaja. Karmaja
is the separation of a book from the hand. Vibhāgaja is the separation of the book from
the body because of the disjunction of the book from the hand.24
Moreover karmaja is
divided into two types - anyatarakarmaja and ubhayakarmaja. It is anyatarakarmaja
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22. Ibid., p. 60
23. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 18
24. ādyo hastakriyayā hastapustakavibhāgaḥ. dvitīyo hastapustakavibhāgātkāya-
pustakavibhāgaḥ. Ibid, 19
187
in which disjunction is caused due to the action of one of the two things. For example,
disjunction of a bird from the constant tree, ubhayakarmaja is that in which
disjunction is caused because of the action of the both things e.g., two flying birds.25
(ii) Samavāya
Samavāya is another kind of Vṛrriniyāmaka sambandha. Samavāya is the
most important and the corner stone of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is regarded as a
separate category by them. Samavāya is regarded as an intimate relation between two
things which are inseparable. This sambandha is found between the part and the
whole (avayava-avayavi), the generic character and the individual manifestation (jāti-
vyakti), the quality and the substance qualified (guṇa and karma) and the eternal
substance and the ultimate difference (nitya-viśeṣa).26
A composite whole remains in
its constituent parts e.g., the cloth exists in the yarns, through which it is composed. A
generic character remains in an individual e.g., manuṣyatva (manness) exists in all
men, ghaṭatva exists in all ghaṭas. A quality exists in substance e.g., colour exists in
the rose, rose is a dravya, colour is a guṇa. An action exists in a dravya, e.g., the horse
is running, horse is dravya and running is action. A particularity (viśeṣa) exists in
eternal substance (nitya-dravya).27
Samavāya can be established by the following inference:
The cognition that a thing is qualified by qualities, actions etc. depends on
three things, viz., viśeṣya (something that is qualified or substantive), viśeṣaṇa (the
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25. Sinha, J., Indian Philosophy, Vl. I., p.433
26. Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 61
27. Bhattachārya, J., Bharatiya Darsan, pp.194-195
188
qualifier or attribute) and a relation between the two, because it is the cognition of a
qualified entity, like the notion of the qualified entity daṇḍi puruṣaḥ (a man holding a
staff).28
Now, this relation cannot be saṁyoga, since saṁyoga happens between two
dravyas which are separable. But here the relation is between substance and colour or
action, i.e., between the jar and its colour or the jar and its action etc. which are
inseparable. It cannot be the relation of svarūpa (self-sameness) where the relation is
denoted by the two relata themselves without reference to a further relation. In that
case infinite numbers of relation will have to be assumed which is cumbrous. Hence,
for the sake of simplicity, inherence, which is one is to be accepted. Samavāya is
eternal relation29
and it is one.30
Samavāya establishes relation among first five categories – dravya, guṇa,
karma, sāmānya and viśeṣa. As a whole, samavāya is a unique device to make the
metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.31
In other works it may be
stated that when two different things inseparably connected like substance and
attribute, substance and karma, substance and sāmānya, cause and effect, atoms and
viśeṣa which appear as one whole or one inseparable entity (ayutasiddha) there is the
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28. guṇakriyādiviśiṣṭabuddhiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhaviṣayā
viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt ḍaṇḍī puruṣaḥ iti viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt ityanumānam.
Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p.47
29. samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvam. Ibid
30. samavāyastveka eva. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 18
31.The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga
School, p.375.
189
relation of samavāya. S.N. Dasgupta mentions that “This peculiar relation of
inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action and attribute, cause and effect
and jāti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one
and the same thing.”32
Kaṇāda gives the definition of samavāya as that relation which is the
cause of the notion that something is here (iha) as between cause and effect.33
Praśastapāda defines samavāya as that relation which is found between inseparable
entities, related as the container and the contained and the cause of the latter existing in
the former.34
If that two things are separable then the relation of that two things cannot
be samavāya e.g., a paṭa (cloth) remains in its composite tantus. The paṭa cannot be
separated from tantus. Therefore, this relation between tantus and paṭa is samavāya. It
is also self-subsistent (svātmasatta), it is marked by knowledge, effectless, causeless,
eternal and nameless as objects.35
In his bhāṣya, it is found that samavāya is one and
independent but its substance and contents are different. It exists as container and
contained. The genus of dravya remains in dravya, the genus of guṇa are found in
guṇa, the genus of karma exists in karma.36
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that there is
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32. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319
33. ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ samavāyaḥ. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 7.2.26
34. ayuta-siddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṁ yaḥ sambandha iha pratyaya-hetuḥ
sa samavāyaḥ. Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 289
35. sāmānyādīnāṁ trayānām api svātmasattvaṁ buddhilakṣaṇatyam
akāryatvam asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam nityatvam … Ibid., p.9
36. yadyapyekaḥ samavāyaḥ sarvatra svatantraḥ tathāpyādhārā-
dheyaniyamo’sti. dravyeṣu eva dravyatvaṁ, guneṣveva guṇatvaṁ
karmasveva karmatvamiti. Ibid., p.293
190
difference between the parts and the whole or a substance and its qualities etc. but the
difference of the space between these parts and the whole or the substance and its
qualities etc. cannot be accepted. Hence in such cases, relation is accepted which is
called samavāya.37
According to Srīdhara, that relation is called samavāya which exists
between two inseparable entities which are of the nature of container and content.38
This samavāya relation cannot remain between two entities which are able to be
separated and which exist in different substrates. Separable things can exist in different
substrates. A cloth remains in yarns through which it is constituted. Yarns can exist
independently apart from cloth but cloth has no independent existence apart from
them. The yarns are the container and the cloth is its content.39
He also states that
samavāya has existence, nature, it can be expressed by name. In the different states,
its essential nature can be made through the knowability and nameability.40
It is also
found in his work that samavāya is known as self-subsistent, it does not accept
community, does not relate to being. It does not remain in beings through any other
relation.41
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37. pratīti-bhedad bhedo’sti deśa-bhedastu nesyate,
tenātra kalpyate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate. Nyāyamañjarī, p.235
38. ayutasiddhayorāśrayāśrsayibhāvaḥ sasamavāyaḥ. Nyāyakandalī, 15
39. Ibid., p. 14
40. astitvaṁ svarūpavattvam.abhidheyatvamapi vastunaḥ svarupam eva.
bhāvasvarupam avasthābhedena jñeyatvamabhidheyatvaṁ cocyate. Ibid., p.16
41. teṣāṁ sattvaṁ na sattāyogaḥ. Ibid., p.19
191
Śivāditya42
and Keśava Miśra43
give similar definition. In the
Bhāṣāpariccheda, Viśvanātha states that samavāya is the relation of a jar etc. With its
two parts etc., the relation of the substance with quality and action and relation of the
generic attribute with these three i.e., substance, quality and action.44
He also defines
in his Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, that samavāya is an eternal relation.45
The relation
which exists between the parts and the whole, genus and the individual, quality and
qualified, action and moving thing, particular and eternal substance is known as
samavāya.46
He also mentions that samavāya can be inferred from the substance,
quality and relation between them. The svarūpasambandha between the cause (part)
and the effect (whole) undermine the doctrine of asatkāryavāda. According to this
doctrine the effect is a new beginning (arambha), it is different from its cause. The
whole exists in its parts from which it is different. Hence, samavāya is not
svarupasambandha.47
Annaṁbhaṭṭa gives the definition of samavāya as an eternal relation.48
Samavāya has no production and destruction, so, it is eternal. He also states that
samavāya exists in inseparable pairs (ayutasiddha). He then proceeds to explain the
term ayutasiddha. Two things are said to be ayutasiddha (inseparable) if one of them
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42. nityasambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Saptapadārthī, p. 51
43. ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Tarkabhāṣā, p.513
44. ghatādīnāṁ kapālādau dravyeṣu guṇakarmanoḥ/
teṣu jāteśca saṁbandhaḥ samavāyaḥ prakirtitaḥ// Bhāṣāpariccheda p. 13
45. samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvam. Nyayasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 47
46. Ibid
47. na ca svarūpasambandhena siddhasādhanamarthāntaraṁ vā. Ibid., p. 48
48. nityasaṁbandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Tarkasaṁgraha, p.61
192
exists as contained in other so long as it is not destroyed. This means that the things,
which are in the relation of inherence, cannot be separated without one of them being
destroyed49
, e.g., threads and a piece of cloth. Here, threads are the parts; the cloth is
the whole. Threads are independent of the cloth, but the cloth is not independent of
threads as the cloth exists only in the threads till it is not destroyed. These two things
are called ayutasiddha and the relation between these two ayutasiddha things is
samavāya. Similarly, the relation between the quality and the qualified, like the red
colour which is a quality existing in a substance like a flower is inherence. Though a
substance can exist independently, quality cannot exist apart from the substance. So,
they are ayutasiddha in as much as a quality, as long as it lasts, has to subsist in a
substance. Similar is the relation between action and substance of which it is an action.
The ayutasiddha relation between jāti and vyakti is the fourth one. Individual cows
cannot exist independent of the universal cowness which can exist independent of
particular cows. Therefore, they are ayutasiddha. Lastly, the relation between viśeṣa
and eternal substance is inherence.50
In his Dīpikā, Annaṁbhaṭṭa points out that the
word nitya is added in the definition to avoid over-pervasion to conjunction. Because
conjunction is also a relation, but it being non-eternal, then is no over-pervasion. The
word sambandha is given here to avoid over-pervasion to ākāśa etc. Ākāśa etc. are
eternal substances, but ākāśa is not a saṁbandha.51
Annaṁbhaṭṭa also forwards the
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49. yayordvayormadhye ekamavinasyadapara’śritamevavatiṣṭhate
tāvayutasiddhou. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 62
193
same argument as given by Viśvanātha to prove the existence of samavāya. In his
view, the cognition in the form of ‘blue jar’ which is a qualified cognition is based on
the qualifier, the thing qualified and the relation of the two, as it is a qualified
cognition like the cognition of ‘the man with a staff’. From this inference the existence
of samavāya can be proved.52
According to Naiyāyikas, samavāya is perceptible but Vaiśeṣikas state that
samavāya is not perceptible, it is atīndriya and anumeya.53
If the dravyas are
perceptible then the samavāya sambandha between those dravyas can be perceived.
But all dravyas are not perceptible. Then their sambandha is also not perceptible.
Samavāya does not possess a jāti as there is jātibādhaka called asambandha in case of
samavāya. According to the Vedāntins and Sāṁkhya philosophers, samavāya is not
acceptable as a padārtha, because they believe in svarūpasambandha or tādātmya-
sambandha but do ot believe in the five pairs of ayutasiddha things.54
Prābhākaras state about samavāya, in which two separateless dravyas
(yutasiddha) are intimately connected with each other, that is samavāya.Its eternality
depends upon the dravyas, if the dravyas are eternal, it is also eternal and when the
dravyas are non-eternal, it is also non-eternal. Naiyāyikas opinion that samavāya is
nitya and one. The Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins accept the samavāya as tādātmya-
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52. nīlo ghaṭa iti viśiṣṭapratītiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasaṁbandhaviṣayā viśiṣṭapratyayatvādaṇ-
ḍīti pratyayavaditi samavāyasiddhiḥ. Ibid
53. samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varṇanaṁ nyāya-matena, vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo’
tīndriyaḥ. Tarka-kaumudī, p. 8.
54. Vide., Gajendragadkar, A.B. and Karmakar, R.D., Tarkasaṁgraha, p.33.
194
sambandha.55
Samavāya and Causation
The reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is dependent upon their
theoryof causation which is called the asatkāryavāda. According to this theory, the
effect does not exist in the cause, the cause and the effect are two separate substances,
e.g., threads and cloth are two different things. These two separate substances exists in
the same place by this samavāya relation.56
In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the
material cause is known as samavāyi-kāraṇa that means the cause remains in its effect
by samavāya relation. Therefore, samavāya relation is the basis of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. It is to be noted here that the theory of samavāya has at
first, been postulated as a relation of cause and effect. Kaṇāda tries to explain the
subsistence of an effect in its cause with the help of samavāya. In fact the problem for
the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas is to explain how two things, viz., cause and effect, which has
separate realities, can remain occupying the same space. Kaṇāda takes resort to the
concept of samavāya in order to explain the subsistence of one substance in another in
such a way that both of them occupy the same space. However, Kaṇāda has not
mentioned about qualities, actions and universals residing in substances in the relation
of samavāya. Later on the scope of this samavāya relation spreads to the existence of
qualities, movement or universals in their substances. The viśeṣa also exists in atoms
or eternal substance through this relation.57
____________________________________________________________________
55. A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 33
56. The Philosophy of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga
School, pp. 376-378
57. Ibid.
195
Athalye and Bodas mention that “The conception of samavāya is in fact a
key to the whole theory of causation as viewed from the Nyāya standpoint and
consequently the doctrine has been strongly animadverted by writers of the Sāṁkhya
and Vedāntic schools who hold different views”.58
The cause and the effect are
connected together inseparably, this union is called samavāya.59
Saṁyoga and Samavāya
There are some distinction between saṁyoga and samavāya –
(a) Saṁyoga exists between two substances. But samavāya exists between two
substances which remain as cause and effect, between one substance and one other
non-substance like quality, movement etc. between two non-substances like qualities
and universals as also movement and its universal.
(b) Saṁyoga is relation between two things which can be separated. Samavāya exists
between those things which cannot be separated. For example, the saṁyoga between a
man and a stick can be separated, but in case of the samavāya relation between the
effect and the cause, the effect cannot be separated from the cause.
(c) Samavāya relation exists between two things as container and contained (ādhāra –
ādheya bhāva). Saṁyoga relation also abides between two substances. But in this
relation, the container and the contained (ādhāra – ādheya bhāva) sambandha is not
necessary. “That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained
(ādheya), and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the
substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in
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58. Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 98
59. cf. Ibid.
196
which they reside is the container or the substratum.”60
In case of saṁyoga, the
substance are not necessarily connected in the relation of container and contained. That
means there may be the relation of container and contained, but this is not the
necessary condition, as in the case of samavāya.
(d) Samavāya is one but the saṁyoga is many.
(e) In saṁyoga, the two related objects are distinctly perceived as two, but in
samavāya, although the relata are two, they appear as one
(f) Samavāya is eternal because it has no production and destruction, but saṁyoga is
non-eternal.61
(g) Samavāya relation is internal but saṁyoga relation is external.
(h) Samavāya is a separate category. But saṁyoga is not a separate category; it is a
division of guṇa.
Samavāya is One and Eternal
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas generally accept samavāya as one. Though the
substrates where samavāya resides are different, samavāya is the same in all cases. It
is Praśastapāda who first established refuting the opponents view that samavāya is one
only. The opponents argue that if samavāya is one, then there will be cross-division
(saṁkara) among the categories of substance, quality, action etc. the relation of
dravya, guṇa and karma with dravyatva, guṇatva and karmatva being one and the
____________________________________________________________________
60. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga
School, p. 379
61. Sinha, Jadunatha, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 372
197
same.62
He refutes this view by the argument that though dravyatva and guṇatva have
the same samavāya, yet there is the different potentiality of manifestation (vyaṅgya –
vyañjaka – śakti) on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the
container (ādhāra) and the contained (ādheya).63
Though samavāya is one, yet there is
some restriction for the different ādhāra and ādheya. The genus of substance exists in
substance. The genus of guṇa exists in guṇa. The genus of karma exists in karma.64
Viśvanātha also refers to the view of the opponents and says that it can be contended
that since inherence is one, so it will give rise to the notion that air has colour. But this
argument is not tenable, for although there is the inherence of colour in air, yet there is
no colour in it.65
The reason is that in the notion of a qualified thing, the knowledge of
the relation as well as of the qualifier is necessary. This relation is, therefore, not mere
inherence, but the inherence of colour. The inherence of colour is absent in air and as
such there is no inconsistence in accepting samavāya as one.
(iii) Viśeṣaṇatā Sambandha (Attributive Relation)
Viśeṣaṇatā sambandha is a kind of vṛttiniyāmaka relation. It has two
kinds - abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha and kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-
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62. nanu yadyekaḥ samavāyo dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ dravyatva-guṇatva-
karmatvādi-viśeṣaṇaiḥ saha saṁbandhaikatvātpadārthasaṁkaraprasaṅga.
Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 293
63. dravyatvādīnāmapi samavāyaikatvepi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedādādhā-
rādheyaniyama. Ibid., 294
64. yadyapyekaḥ samavāyaḥ … ādhārādheyaniyamo’sti … dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṁ,
guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṁkarmasvev karmatvamiti.
Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 293
65. tatra rūpasamavāyasattve’pi rūpa’bhāvāt. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p.49
198
sambandha. The abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha is found in the case of the
event of an abhāva. The kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha is found in the case of
the event of objects in a part of time (khanda-kāla) or universal time (mahākāla).66
Abhāviyaviśeṣṣṣṣaṇṇṇṇatā-viśeṣṣṣṣa-sambandha (Relation Pertaining to the Non-existence)
It is known as abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā because it is the same as the abhāva of
a viśeṣaṇa (qualifier) as in the cognition bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti. In this, ghaṭābhāva
(absence of jar) is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the ground and bhūtala is the object
qualified (viśeṣya).67
This sambandha (relation) is called to be abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-
sambandha as viśeṣaṇata is established through abhāva, it is also called viśeṣa
(particular) as there is some special feature for which this sambandha (relation) differs
from other sambandhas (relation).68
Kālika- viśeṣṣṣṣaṇṇṇṇatā – sambandha (Temporal Relation)
Kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha has a important role in the Navya-Nyāya
system. Because this sambandha is establish in the Navya-Nyāya system. According to
the Naiyāyikas all things are produced in relation to kāla. Hence, kāla is considered to
an efficient cause of things which are produced. It is also considered as the substratum
of all. Kāla brings about the relation between all things with the motion of the sun as is
perceived by all. The notion that eternal substances like ether etc. exist always, is
possible only because of their relation with kāla only because of their relation with
kāla. At the time of dissolution, all eternal categories remain in Mahākāla by the
kālika relation.69
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66. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p. 64
67. Virupakshananda, Swami, (ed.), Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 195
68. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, pp. 64-65
69. cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 6
199
4. VṚṚṚṚTTYANIYĀMAKA-SAMBANDHA (NON-OCCURRENT-EXACTING
RELATION)
Vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandhas are countless. Through the viśiṣṭa-jñāna
(qualified knowledge), this sambandha is known.
Abheda-sambandha or tādātmya sambandha
In the Navya-Nyāya, the relation of tādātmya and abheda are used in the
same sense. Tādātmya relation is that relation by which something remains in the
thing determined by itself or by its asādhāraṇa dharma (uncommon property). For
example the subsistence of a jar in what is determined by ghaṭatva is called tādātmya.
Hence, the relation of something with that thing itself.70
Vyabhicāritatva-sambandha
Literally vyabhicāritatva-sambandha means deviated-ness relation. When
one object becomes deviated from another, the relation between these is known a
vyabhicāritatva-sambandha. For example, vahni (fire) deviates from dhuma (smoke).
It may also be stated that vahni remains in the adhikaraṇa of the atyantābhāva of
smoka.71
Vyabhicāritatva is also known as svābhāvavadvṛttitva sambandha. This
sambandha is seen in the adhikaraṇa of the atyantābhāva of the self. In this
sambandha generally the pronoun sva (self) is used in the beginning of the name of the
sambandha. This vyabhicāritatva is also known as avyāpyatva. When an object is not
pervaded by another thing, it is known as avyāpya.72
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70. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, pp. 74-78
71. Ibid., p. 80
72. Ibid., p. 81
200
Vyāpakatva-sambandha and Vyāpyatva-sambandha
The term vyāpaka means pervader and vyāpya means pervaded. Hence,
vyāpakatva means pervaderness and vyāpyatva is the state or condition of being
pervaded, when one entity is pervaded by another. The pervaded one is called vyāpya
and one which pervade is called vyāpaka. A vyāpaka is that which is not the counter
correlate of the absolute negation remaining in that thing. In simple term that is called
vyāpaka whose non-existant is never found in each substratum e.g., the fire is the
vyāpaka of smoka. The relation which connects fire with smoke is called vyāpakatā
relation. Again smoka is pervaded by fire. Hence, the smoke is connected with fire in
the relation of vyāpyatva.73
Pratiyogitā-sambandha
In the case of non-existence the thing which is non-existent in its
substratum is called pratiyogī (counter co-relate) e.g, the ghaṭa is the counter co-relate
of the absence in the form of ghato nāsti. The relation which connects the jar with its
absence is called pratiyogitā sambandha or pratiyogikatva sambandha.74
Anuyogitā-sambandha
Anuyogi is the locus of absence. As for example, in case of
ghāṭābhāvavad bhūtalam or bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti (there is no jar on the tract of land),
the tract of land is anuyogi. The relation which connects this tract of land with the
negation is called anuyogitā-sambandha.75
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73. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 2
74. Ibid., p.2;
Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p. 85
75. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 2
201
Svarūpa sambandha
When, a thing is related by itself with another thing without having any
other relation for being related, that relation is called svarūpa-sambandha. The
svarūpa-sambandha is sometimes of the nature of its pratiyogī and sometimes of the
nature of anuyogī, e.g., in gagane rūpābhāva (there is no colour in ether), the relation
is the relation of ether with rūpābhāva is svarūpa-sambandha and is of the nature of
the ether itself which is the anuyogī here. In case of samavāya also the relation
between samavāya and its relata is regarded as svarūpa-sambandha. Here no other
relation is accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas since that will lead to infinite regrace.76
Other Vṛttyaniyāmaka Relations
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept many other Vṛttyaniyāmaka relations. These
relations are: viṣayatva, viṣayitva, prakāratā, prakārita, avayavatva, svāmitva,
kāryatva, kāraṇatva etc.
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76. Ibid., p. 5