Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures

for Antiterrorism

Joint Pub 3-07.2

17 March 1998

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

This second edition of JointPub 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forAntiterrorism," represents asignificant improvement in the keyarea of force protection.

Joint Pub 3-07.2 provides tactics,techniques, and procedures for theconduct of US antiterrorismoperations in joint operations. Itdiscusses US national policy,explains key responsibilities forantiterrorism actions, and covers keycommand and control relationships.

The guidance contained herein provides joint force commanders with the knowledgeneeded to organize, plan, train for, and conduct antiterrorism operations.

Experience has shown that force protection must be a high priority forany commander. Antiterrorism is essential to a force protection program.Commanders must understand the content of this publication and bring itto bear during joint and multinational operations. Please ensure the widestdistribution of this and other joint publications, and promote their use atevery opportunity.

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication sets forth the tactics,techniques, and procedures governing thejoint conduct of US antiterrorism operations.It provides a basis for understanding USnational policy and general objectives relatingto antiterrorism and explains importantDepartment of Defense and US Governmentagency command and control relationships.In addition, it outlines basic US militaryantiterrorism capabilities and providescommanders with guidance on how toorganize, plan, and train for the employmentof US forces in interagency and multinationalantiterrorism operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine andselected tactics, techniques, and procedures forjoint operations and training. It provides militaryguidance for use by the Armed Forces inpreparing their appropriate plans. It is not theintent of this publication to restrict the authorityof the joint force commander (JFC) fromorganizing the force and executing the mission

in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate toensure unity of effort in the accomplishment ofthe overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics,techniques, and procedures and guidanceestablished in this publication apply to thecommanders of combatant commands,subunified commands, joint task forces, andsubordinate components of these commands.These principles and guidance also may applywhen significant forces of one Service areattached to forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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Preface

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Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Purpose..................................................................................................................... I-1• Force Protection and Antiterrorism Relationship....................................................... I-2• Overview of DOD Responsibility............................................................................. I-2• DOD Role................................................................................................................. I-3

CHAPTER IITERRORIST THREAT

• Overview................................................................................................................. II-1• Terrorist Tactics........................................................................................................ II-1• Terrorist Groups....................................................................................................... II-5• Terrorist Organization.............................................................................................. II-6• Terrorist Targets — Americans................................................................................. II-9• Domestic Terrorism................................................................................................ II-10• Terrorism Against the US Military......................................................................... II-10

CHAPTER IIILEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• US Policy............................................................................................................... III-1• Lead Agencies....................................................................................................... III-2

SECTION A. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: AUTHORITY.................................. III-3• Criminal Actions.................................................................................................... III-3• Jurisdiction............................................................................................................ III-4• Commander’s Authority......................................................................................... III-4

SECTION B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OFMILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES.............................................. III-4

• General.................................................................................................................. III-4• Statutory Authorizations Allowing the Use of the Military...................................... III-4

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SECTION C. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITYFOR HANDLING TERRORIST INCIDENTS...................................................... III-6

• Jurisdictional Status of Federal Property in the United States, Its Territories,and Its Possessions.............................................................................................. III-6

• Federal Authority in the United States, Its Territories, and Its Possessions.............. III-8• Federal and State Concurrent Authority................................................................. III-8• Jurisdictional Authority.......................................................................................... III-8

SECTION D. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THEMILITARY ............................................................................................................ III-8

• Overview............................................................................................................... III-8• The National Security Council............................................................................... III-8• The Committee to Combat Acts of Terrorism......................................................... III-9• Department of Justice............................................................................................. III-9• Federal Bureau of Investigation.............................................................................. III-9• Department of Defense........................................................................................... III-9• Military Authority .................................................................................................. III-9• Military Installation Commander’s Responsibilities.............................................. III-11

CHAPTER IVANTITERRORISM PROGRAM; INSTALLATION, BASE, SHIP, UNIT, AND PORT

• Overview of Program Concept............................................................................... IV-1• Implementing the Concept..................................................................................... IV-7• Threat Conditions.................................................................................................. IV-9• Combatant Commander’s Responsibility................................................................ IV-9

CHAPTER VINTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND THREAT ANALYSIS

SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE....................... V-1• Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support.......................................................... V-1• Sources................................................................................................................... V-1• Responsibilities of US Government Lead Agencies................................................. V-2• Information Requirements....................................................................................... V-5

SECTION B. THREAT ASSESSMENT................................................................... V-5• Preparation of Threat Analysis................................................................................ V-5• Preparation of Criticality and Vulnerability Assessments.......................................... V-8• Drills and Exercises................................................................................................ V-9

CHAPTER VICRISIS MANAGEMENT EXECUTION

• General.................................................................................................................. VI-1• Initial Response...................................................................................................... VI-1• Response................................................................................................................ VI-2• Special Considerations........................................................................................... VI-5

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CHAPTER VIIPREVENTIVE MEASURES AND CONSIDERATIONS

• Commander’s Responsibility................................................................................ VII-1• AT Force Protection in High-Risk Areas............................................................... VII-1• Tactical Force Protection........................................................................................VII-9

APPENDIX

A Vulnerability Assessment.................................................................................. A-1B Personal Protective Measures Against Terrorism................................................ B-1C Very Important Person and Senior Officer Security Measures............................ C-1D Building Security Procedures............................................................................ D-1E Lock Security.................................................................................................... E-1F Telephone Call Procedures................................................................................. F-1G Crisis Management Plan Format....................................................................... G-1H Crisis Management Plan Checklist.................................................................... H-1J THREATCON System........................................................................................ J-1K Explosive Device Procedures............................................................................ K-1L Jurisdictional Authority for Handling Terrorist Incidents.................................... L-1M Public Affairs Checklist.................................................................................... M-1N Military Working Dogs..................................................................................... N-1O References........................................................................................................ O-1P Administrative Instructions................................................................................ P-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Antiterrorism & Counterterrorism................................................................. I-1II-1 Examples of Terrorist Objectives.................................................................. II-1II-2 Common Terrorist Tactics............................................................................ II-2II-3 Categories of Terrorist Groups...................................................................... II-6II-4 Structure Pyramid of a Typical Terrorist Organization.................................. II-7III-1 Lead Agencies for Terrorist Incidents......................................................... III-2III-2 Federal Territorial Jurisdiction Categories.................................................. III-7III-3 Approval for Use of Military Force........................................................... III-10IV-1 Antiterrorism Program Concept.................................................................. IV-2IV-2 Operations Security Antiterrorism Objectives............................................. IV-4IV-3 Antiterrorism Program Functions for Installation Commanders.................. IV-8IV-4 Crisis Management Participants.................................................................. IV-9IV-5 On-Site Operational Response Structure................................................... IV-10V-1 Sources of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.......................................... V-1V-2 Information Requirements........................................................................... V-6V-3 Threat Level................................................................................................ V-8

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VI-1 Crisis Management Execution Considerations............................................ VI-2VI-2 Terrorist Incident Phases............................................................................. VI-3VI-3 Response to a Terrorist Incident.................................................................. VI-4VI-4 Special Considerations............................................................................... VI-5VII-1 Fortification Materials............................................................................... VII-3VII-2 Security Force Equipment......................................................................... VII-4VII-3 Principles of Riot Control.......................................................................... VII-9L-1 Jurisdictional Authority for Handling Terrorist Incidents.............................. L-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Discusses US National Policy and General Objectives

Explains Important Department of Defense and USGovernment Agency Command and Control Relationships

Outlines Basic US Military Antiterrorism Capabilities

Provides Guidance for the Employment of US Forces inAntiterrorism Operations

Explains Legal Considerations Affecting the Implementationof Successful Programs

Describes Sources of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Combatting terrorisminvolves actions taken tooppose terrorismthroughout the entirethreat spectrum.

The Department ofDefense is responsiblefor protecting its ownpersonnel, bases,deployed forces,equipment, andinstallations.

Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures govern the jointconduct of US antiterrorism operations. Combattingterrorism is an element of force protection — a securityprogram designed to protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, and equipment inall locations and situations. Combatting terrorism involvesactions (including antiterrorism and counterterrorism)taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threatspectrum. Antiterrorism involves defensive measures usedto reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts, as opposed tocounterterrorism which consists of offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Every commander, regardless of echelon of command orbranch of Service, has an inherent responsibility forplanning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executingantiterrorism measures to provide for the security of thecommand. Likewise, every military Service member,Department of Defense (DOD) employee, DODindependent contractor, and local national hired by theDepartment of Defense, regardless of rank, has an inherentresponsibility to maintain vigilance for possible terrorist

Combatting Terrorism

Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities

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Executive Summary

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The Department ofDefense assists leadagencies in combattingterrorism.

Understanding theterrorist threat enablesthe commander toproperly create andemploy antiterrorismprograms.

Terrorists have a varietyof objectives and tactics.

actions and to ensure that, where applicable, familymembers understand and employ antiterrorism tactics,techniques, and procedures. Specific DOD offices andagencies have been assigned specific responsibilitiespertaining to combatting terrorism.

The Department of Defense is not the lead agency forcombatting terrorism. The Department of Defense isresponsible for protecting its own personnel, bases,ships, deployed forces, equipment, and installations.The Department of Defense is also responsible forproviding technical assistance or forces when requestedby the National Command Authorities. The lead agencyis the Department of State for incidents outside the UnitedStates, the Department of Justice for incidents within theUnited States, and the Department of Transportationand/or Federal Aviation Administration for certainaviation incidents. The US Coast Guard is responsible forreducing the risk of maritime terrorist incidents and formanning the National Terrorism Hotline (1-800-424-8802)for reports of actual and/or potential domestic terrorism.All other Federal agencies possessing resources forresponding to terrorism are linked together through agencycommand centers and crisis management groups to ensureeffective coordination of the US response.

Terrorists frequently claim affiliation with causes orpolitical organizations to give their actions a claim torespectability. News media coverage is important toterrorists who are attempting to incite public fear or gainattention for their cause. A determinant of tactics andtarget selection is the role the terrorist group perceivesitself as playing. Terrorism can also be used as either anovert or a covert aspect of a political movement engagedin a power struggle within an existing political system. Aterrorist group’s selection of targets and tactics is also afunction of the group’s affiliation, level of training,organization, and sophistication.

Examples of objectives of a terrorist attack are: to attractpublicity for its cause, demonstrate the group’s power, showthe existing government’s lack of power, extract revenge,obtain logistic support, or cause a government to overreact.Just as a terrorist incident may have several objectives, thetactics used may also be combined. The more common

Terrorist Objectives and Tactics

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Executive Summary

There are policy andjurisdictionalresponsibilities that applyto the Armed Forces.

The antiterrorismprogram stressesdeterrence of terroristincidents throughpreventive measurescommon to all combatantcommands and Services.

tactics employed by terrorist groups are assassination,arson, bombing, hostage taking, kidnapping, hijacking,seizure, raids, sabotage, hoaxes, use of special weapons,and environmental destruction. Information systems andinformation infrastructures may also become targets ofterrorist sabotage.

A command judge advocate participates at all levels offoreign and domestic antiterrorism program planning andimplementation. The commander of a combatantcommand, subunified command, joint task force, orcomponent command must coordinate with the commandjudge advocate to determine the commander’s authority incombatting terrorism and to provide a basic understandingof the legal considerations affecting the implementationof an effective antiterrorism program. In addition, statutoryand regulatory restrictions may limit the type of assistanceinstallation commanders may provide to civilian lawenforcement officials investigating terrorist incidents andother crimes. Commanders should coordinate all proposedassistance with the Staff Judge Advocate to ensurecompliance with such restrictions.

The antiterrorism program concept represents anintegrated, comprehensive approach within combatantcommands and the Services to counter the terrorist threatto military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, andpersonnel. The concept has two phases; proactive andreactive. The proactive phase encompasses the planning,resourcing, preventive measures, preparation, awarenesseducation, and training that take place before a terroristincident. The reactive phase includes the crisis managementactions taken to resolve a terrorist incident.

Counterterrorism (CT) is a highly specialized, resource-intensive mission. Certain special operations forces unitsmaintain a high state of readiness to conduct CT operationsand possess a full range of CT capabilities. Combatantcommanders maintain designated CT contingency forcesto respond to CT situations when national assets are notimmediately available.

Legal Considerations

The Antiterrorism Program

Counterterrorism

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Executive Summary

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An effective intelligence and counterintelligenceprogram is essential in order to identify the terrorist threat.Additionally, counterintelligence provides warning ofpotential terrorist attacks and provides information forcounterterrorism operations. Effective intelligence andcounterintelligence support requires effort, planning anddirection, collection and analysis, production,investigations, and dissemination. The entire process isnecessary to provide decision makers with informationand timely warning upon which to take antiterrorismactions. The primary sources of intelligence andcounterintelligence for the antiterrorism program are open-source information, criminal records, governmentintelligence, and local information.

The installation, base, ship, unit, or port antiterrorism planprovides the mechanism to ensure readiness againstterrorist attacks. The degree of the protection requireddepends on the threat in a given location. Commandersmust constantly evaluate security against the terroristthreat in order to effectively evaluate security requirements.

This publication sets forth the tactics, techniques, andprocedures governing the joint conduct of US antiterrorismoperations. It provides a basis for understanding USnational policy and general objectives relating toantiterrorism and explains important DOD and USGovernment agency command and control relationships.In addition, it outlines basic US military antiterrorismcapabilities and provides commanders with guidance onhow to organize, plan, and train for the employment of USforces in interagency and multinational antiterrorismoperations.

Intelligence andcounterintelligence arethe first line of defense inan antiterrorismprogram.

Preventive and protectivesecurity measures shouldbe taken by military unitsand individual Servicemembers.

Prevention

CONCLUSION

Intelligence and Counterintelligence

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

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1. General

The term “terrorism” is defined as “thecalculated use of violence or threat ofviolence to inculcate fear; intended tocoerce or to intimidate governments orsocieties in the pursuit of goals that aregeneral ly pol i t ica l , re l ig ious, orideological.” This definition is the foundationthroughout this publication for the guidanceto combatant commanders, subunifiedcommanders, joint task force (JTF)commanders, and component commanders.Specific policy, directive guidance, standards,and procedures for the Department of Defense(DOD) combatting terrorism program iscontained in DOD Directive (DODD)2000.12, “DoD Combating TerrorismProgram,” DOD Instruction (DODI) 2000.14,“DoD Combating Terrorism ProgramProcedures,” DODD O-2000.12-H,“Protection of DoD Personnel and ActivitiesAgainst Acts of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence,” and DODI O-2000.16, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program Standards.”

2. Purpose

Combatting terrorism involves actionsincluding antiterrorism (AT) (defensivemeasures used to reduce the vulnerability toterrorist acts) and counterterrorism (CT)(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,and respond to terrorism) taken to opposeterrorism throughout the entire threat

“There is another type of warfare — new in its intensity, ancient in its origin— war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambushinstead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory byeroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It preys onunrest . . . ”

John F. KennedyAddress to the Graduating Class,

US Naval Academy, 6 June 1962

spectrum. This publication addresses onlyAT. The following definitions, also shown inFigure I-1, are provided to assist inunderstanding the difference between AT andCT:

a. Antiterr orism is defensive measuresused to reduce the vulnerability of individualsand property to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces.

ANTITERRORISM &COUNTERTERRORISM

ANTITERRORISM

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

used to reduce thevulnerability to terrorist

attacks

COUNTERTERRORISM

OFFENSIVE MEASURES

taken to prevent, deter, andrespond to terrorism

Figure I-1. Antiterrorism &Counterterrorism

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b. Counterterr orism is offensivemeasures taken to prevent, deter, and respondto terrorism. Sensitive and compartmentedCT programs are addressed in relevantNational Security Decision Directives,National Security Directives, contingencyplans, and other relevant classified documents.

3. Force Protection andAntiterrorism Relationship

As discussed throughout this publication,AT is a sub-element of combatting terrorismwhich is one of the four pillars of a broaderconcept called force protection (FP). FP is asecurity program designed to protect Servicemembers, civilian employees, familymembers, facilities, and equipment in alllocations and situations, accomplishedthrough planned and integratedapplication of combatting terrorism,physical security, operations security(OPSEC), and personal protective servicesa n d s u p p o r t e d b y i n t e l l i g e n c e ,counterintelligence, law enforcement, andother security programs.

4. Overview of DODResponsibility

Every commander, regardless of echelonof command or branch of Service, has aninherent responsibility for planning,resourcing, training, exercising, andexecuting AT measures to provide for thesecurity of the command. The importanceof this responsibility is obvious in view of thevarying levels and types of terrorist threatsfaced by US forces worldwide. Likewise,every military Service member, DODemployee, DOD independent contractor, andlocal national hired by the Department ofDefense, regardless of rank, has an inherentresponsibility to maintain vigilance forpossible terrorist actions and to ensure that,where applicable, family members understandand employ AT tactics, techniques, andprocedures. The Department of State (DOS)has also created a $2 million reward programto encourage this vigilance and the reportingof possible terrorist actions. Information onthis program can be obtained through eachService’s respective law enforcement agency.

Every commander has a responsibility for the security of the commandagainst varying levels and types of terrorist threat.

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Introduction

5. DOD Role

The Department of Defense is not thelead agency for combatting terrorism;however, the Department of Defense isresponsible for protecting its own personnel,bases, ships, deployed forces, equipment, andinstallations. At times, the Department ofDefense is responsible for providing technicalassistance or forces when requested by theNational Command Authorities. Normally,the DOS is the lead agency for incidentsoutside the United States. However, on theArabian Peninsula, the Department of Defensehas been established as the lead agent in amemorandum of understanding (MOU)between the DOS and Department of Defenseon the security of the Arabian Peninsula. TheDepartment of Justice (DOJ) is the lead agencyfor incidents within the United States, and theDepartment of Transportation (DOT) and/orFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) serveas lead agency for certain aviation incidents.The following DOD offices and agencies havebeen assigned specific responsibilitiespertaining to combatting terrorism:

a. The Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition and Technology (USDA&T)shall:

• Provide a member to the DOD ATCoordinating Committee (ATCC) (andsubcommittees as required), and arepresentative to the DOD Worldwide ATConference.

• Ensure that the Defense FederalAcquisition Regulation (current edition)reflects current DOD AT and FP policyand addresses AT and FP securityrequirements for Defense contractors.

• Be the DOD official responsible for ATand FP technology development andexpedite the application of newtechnology to meet AT and FP needs.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller) shall:

• Provide a member to the DOD ATCC(and subcommittees as required).

• Provide information and guidance toDOD components on displaying AT andFP resources within Planning,Programming, and Budgeting System(PPBS) p rogram and budge tsubmissions.

• Provide reports on AT and FP funds asrequested by the Secretary of Defenseand the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS).

c. The Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy shall:

• Provide appropriate members to theDOD ATCC (and subcommittees asrequired), the DOD Worldwide ATConference, and an observer to theOverseas Security Policy Group(OSPG).

• Ensure that the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) issupported in issuing the travel securityadvisory (TSA) message.

d. The Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Command, Control, Communicationsand Intelligence (ASD[C3I]) shall:

• Provide policy and guidance for physicalsecurity programs, security andinvestigative matters, counterintelligence,DOD foreign counterintelligence, andinformation operations programs andwork in conjunction with the ASD(SO/LIC) on matters pertaining to otherelements of combatting terrorismprograms.

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• Review the DOD intelligence,counterintelligence, security, andinformation operations support providedin DODD 2000.12, “DoD CombatingTerrorism Program,” for compliance withDODD 5240.1, “DoD IntelligenceActivities,” and DODD 5240.1-R,“Procedures Governing the Activities ofDoD Intelligence Components thatAffect United States Persons.”

• Monitor Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) execution of AT and FPresponsibilities listed in DODD 2000.12,“DoD Combating Terrorism Program.”

• Promulgate policy and provide oversightto DOD intelligence, counterintelligence,security, and information operations insupport of AT and FP intelligencestandards.

• Provide appropriate members to theDOD ATCC (and subcommittees asrequired), the DOD Worldwide ATConference, and an observer to theOSPG.

e. The Assistant Secretary of Defense forForce Management Policy (ASD[FMP]),under the Under Secretary of Defense forPersonnel and Readiness, shall:

• Provide a member to the DOD ATCC(and subcommittees as required), and arepresentative to the DOD Worldwide ATconference.

• Establish an AT and/or FP program forthe Department of Defense DependentSchools System.

• In coordination with Service Secretaries,commanders of the combatant commandswith geographic responsibility, and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,address AT and FP considerations in

establishing tour lengths and determinewhether restrictions should be placed onaccompanying family members forpersonnel assigned to overseas activities.

• With the USDA&T, establish policy forinclusion in the Defense FederalAcquisition Regulation to require thatDefense contractors who operateoverseas or whose employees traveloverseas shall:

•• If the contractors are US companies,affiliate with the Overseas SecurityAdvisory Committee;

•• Ensure their personnel who are USnationals register with the US embassyand third country nationals comply withthe requirements of the embassy of theirnationality;

•• Prior to their travel outside the UnitedStates, provide AT and FP awarenessinformation to personnel commensuratewith that which the Department ofDefense provides to the military, DODcivilian personnel, and their families tothe extent such information can be madeavailable; and

•• Receive the most current AT and FPguidance for personnel, and comply withthe Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), asappropriate.

f. The ASD(SO/LIC) shall:

• Serve as ATCC - Senior Steering Groupco-chair.

• Provide a Deputy Assistant Secretary-level co-chair for the ATCC.

• Monitor programs to reduce thevulnerability of DOD personnel and theirfamily members, facilities, and other

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Introduction

DOD material resources to terrorist attackwith the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff and other DOD components.

• Ensure compliance with DODD 2000.12,“DoD Combating Terrorism Program,”by having all DOD activities (other thancombatant commands) report directly tothe Secretary of Defense.

• Provide an Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) representative to theInteragency Working Group onTerrorism and an observer to the OSPG.

• Provide membership on ATCCsubcommittees, as required.

• Provide policy oversight and guidanceto the DOD components in support ofrespective counterterrorism programefforts and work in conjunction withcommand, control, communications, andintelligence on matters pertaining to othercombatting terrorism program elements.

• Develop, publish, and maintain DODDO-2000.12-H, “Protection of DoDPersonnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence,” andDODD 5025.1-M, “DoD DirectivesSystem Procedures,” consistent withPublic Law 99-399, “OmnibusDiplomatic Security and AntiterrorismAct of 1986,” to provide standards andguidance on protective measures thatserve to reduce the vulnerability of DODpersonnel and their family members toterrorist acts.

• Sponsor the DOD Worldwide AT and FPConference.

• Coordinate DOD combatting terrorismprogram issues before the DOD PhysicalSecurity Review Board, the DODPhysical Security Equipment Steering

Group, and other relevant security boardsand committees.

• Coordinate with the USDA&T on ATand FP technology development and theapplication of new technology to meetAT and FP needs.

• Coordinate on Combatting TerrorismReadiness Initiative Fund (CTRIF)requests.

• Identify DOD-designated high andpotential physical threat countries insupport of DOD travel security policyand issue the TSA message incoordination with the Assistant Secretaryof Defense (International SecurityAffairs), and the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (International Security Policy),as appropriate.

g. The Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments shall:

• Institute combatting terrorism programsand support them with adequateprogramming, planning, and funding.

• Incorporate AT and FP into Servicedoctrine.

• Institute AT and FP training programs inaccordance with DODD O-2000.12-H,“Protection of DoD Personnel andActivities Against Acts of Terrorism andPolitical Turbulence.” Ensure that ATand FP and information on currentsecurity technology is incorporated inappropriate Service schools and trainingcommensurate with the level ofresponsibility or command for which theschool is designed.

• Provide AT resident training to personnelassigned to high-risk billets and others,as appropriate.

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• Provide prompt dissemination ofintelligence information on terroristthreats, including specific warning ofthreats against DOD personnel and theirfamily members, facilities, and otherDOD material resources, in accordancewith DODD 5240.1, “DoD IntelligenceActivities,” DODD 5240.1-R,“Procedures Governing the Activities ofDoD Intelligence Components thatAffect United States Persons,” andDODD 5240.6, “CounterintelligenceAwareness and Briefing Program.”

• In coordination with the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of thecombatant commands with geographicresponsibility, and the ASD(FMP),address AT and FP considerations inrecommending tour lengths anddetermine whether restrictions should beplaced on accompanying familymembers for personnel assigned tooverseas activities.

• Ensure that current AT and FPtechnology is incorporated into allacquisition of new facilities, systems, andequipment, where appropriate.

• Establish military constructionprogramming policies to ensure that ATand FP protective features for facilitiesand installations are included in theplanning, design, and execution ofmilitary and minor construction projects.

• Ensure that all Service installations andactivities are assessed in accordance with(IAW) DODD O-2000.12-H, “Protectionof DoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence.” Ensure that installationsdevelop, maintain, and implement ATand FP Service-specific standards inconcert with Service, commander of acombatant command (CINC), and DODstandards as appropriate.

• Identify the resources programmed toimplement and maintain AT and FP forthe Services as part of the PPBS process.

• Ensure that Service personnel and theirfamily members comply with the DODFCG. Ensure that personnel are awareof any TSAs in effect at the time of travel.Ensure that all DOD personnel andfamily members scheduled forpermanent change of station to foreigncountries receive appropriate andrequired training in accordance withDODD O-2000.12-H, “Protection ofDoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence.”

• Ensure that existing physical security,base defense, and law enforcementprograms address terrorism as a potentialthreat to Service personnel and theirfamily members, facilities, and otherDOD material resources.

• Provide a Military Service representativeas a member to the DOD ATCC (andsubcommittees as required), and arepresentative to the DOD Worldwide ATConference.

• Ensure that Service componentcapabilities exist to collect, receive,evaluate, and disseminate all relevantdata on terrorist activities, trends, andindicators of imminent attack.

h. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff shall:

• Serve as the principal advisor to theSecretary of Defense for all DOD AT andFP issues.

• Prepare joint doctrine and assist theASD(SO/LIC) in development andmaintenance of AT and FP standards.Review Service doctrine and CINC and

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Introduction

Service standards. Review, coordinate,and oversee (on behalf of the Secretaryof Defense and in conjunction with theDOD components) AT and FP trainingfor all DOD personnel and their familymembers.

• Direct the Joint Requirements OversightCouncil (JROC) to address AT and FPrequirements. Include in the Chairman’sprogram review and the Chairman’sprogram analysis a summary of AT andFP requirements, determined by theJROC and derived in the CINC-integrated priority lists.

• Assess AT and FP as an element of anyforce deployment decision. Periodicallyreassess AT and FP of deployed forces.

• Assess with the DOD components theirpolicies and programs for the protectionof DOD personnel, their families,facilities, and other material DODresources in compliance with DODD2000.12, “DoD Combating TerrorismProgram, ” and IAW DODDO-2000.12-H, “Protection of DoDPersonnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence.”

• Annually (as part of the budget cycle)review the adequacy of resourcesproposed by the Services to determinewhether they meet DOD AT and FPobjectives. Advise the Secretary ofDefense of any changes that are neededto meet AT and FP requirements.

• In coordination with the ServiceSecretaries, the ASD(FMP), and thecombatant commanders, address AT andFP considerations and recommendappropriate tour lengths. Advise theSecretary of Defense as to whetherrestrictions should be placed onaccompanying family members for

personnel assigned to overseasactivities.

• Review the impact of DODD 2000.12,“DoD Combating Terrorism Program,”on the Unified Command Plan, issued bythe President, and the Secretary’s “Forcesfor Unified Commands” Memorandum(current edition). Recommend revisionsto these plans or DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program,” asrequired.

• Assess the implementation of terroristthreat conditions (THREATCONs) foruniform implementation anddissemination as specified by DODDO-2000.12-H, “Protection of DoDPersonnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence,”DODD 5025.1-M, “DoD DirectivesSystem Procedures,” and DODD2000.12, “DoD Combating TerrorismProgram.”

• Provide flag and/or general officers asco-chairs for the ATCC Senior SteeringGroup and ATCC, and providerepresentatives to the InteragencyWorking Group on Terrorism, the DODWorldwide AT Conference, and anobserver to the OSPG.

• Coordinate with ASD(C3I) andASD(SO/LIC) on sharing of terrorismintelligence and counterintelligence dataand information on AT and FP. Thisincludes threats posed to DOD personneland assets by domestic and foreignterrorists.

• Assess the Services’, CINCs’, andDefense intelligence organizations’capability to collect, evaluate, anddisseminate all relevant data on terroristactivities, trends, and indicators ofimminent attack.

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• Manage and administer the DODCTRIF.

• Review the CINCs’ informationoperations and psychological operations(PSYOP) programs for antiterrorismcontent.

i. CINCs with geographic responsibilitiesshall:

• Establish command policies and acombatting terrorism program for theprotection of all assigned forces and forthose DOD elements and personnel underthe FP responsibility of the CINC asestablished by MOU. This includesfamily members, resources, and facilities.This program shall include specificprescriptive standards derived fromDODD O-2000.12-H, “Protection ofDoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence,” that address variousgeographic settings and specific terroristthreat capabilities.

• Assess and review all CINC-assignedmilitary forces and/or activities within,and DOD forces and/or activitiesdeployed into, their geographic areas ofresponsibility (AOR), including DODfield activities and agencies that concludecontracts within their AOR and not underthe security responsibility of the DOS.This review may be conducted by Servicecomponent commands or othersubordinate commands reporting to theCINC. Relocate forces as necessary andreport pertinent actions taken for FP tothe Secretary of Defense via theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Coordinate with the Department of StateChiefs of Mission (COMs) in the AORto ensure security of all non-CINCassigned forces by way of an MOU asnecessary.

• Provide updates to the DOD FCG statingcommand travel requirements and theaterentry requirements.

• Provide AT and FP training in accordancewith DODD O-2000.12-H, “Protectionof DoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence.” Ensure that: personneltraveling comply with the FCG;personnel are aware of any TSAs in effectat the time of travel; and all DODpersonnel and family members scheduledfor permanent change of station toforeign countries receive appropriate andrequired training IAW DODDO-2000.12-H, “Protection of DoDPersonnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence.”

• In coordination with Service Secretaries,ASD(FMP), and the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, address AT and FPconsiderations in establishing tourlengths and determine whetherrestrictions should be placed onaccompanying family members forpersonnel assigned to overseas activities.

• In accordance with PPBS procedures,identify the requirements necessary toachieve the AT and/or FP for each activityunder the CINC’s combatant command(command authority) or for which theCINC otherwise has AT and/or FPresponsibility. These requirements willbe identified in such a way as to permittheir identification as the AT and/or FPresource requirements.

• Establish command relationships andpolicies for each subordinate commandto ensure effective mechanisms are inplace to protect and defend againstterrorist attack. For JTFs, report to theSecretary of Defense via the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff any decisionto vest operational control for AT and

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FP matters outside the JTF commander,and detail the reasons for the decision.Periodically, as directed by the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reassess theappropriateness of command relationshipsof existing JTFs to ensure that adequateAT and FP measures are in place.

• Identify and disseminate to the forceproviders specific area pre-deploymenttraining requirements that all personnelmust complete prior to arrival in theater.Provide training requirements to Servicesand agencies for all DOD personnel andfamily members scheduled forpermanent change of station to thetheater. Ensure that all personnel assignedto the headquarters receive appropriateAT and FP training.

• Assess the terrorist threat for the theateraccording to DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program,” andprovide threat assessment information tothe Service components and Defenseagencies in theater. On the basis of thethreat assessment, identify andrecommend to the appropriate authoritythose incumbents of high-risk billets andspouses requiring AT resident training.

• Keep subordinate commanders andCOMs informed of the nature and degreeof the threat. Ensure that commandersare prepared to respond to threat changes.

• Ensure that AT and FP countermeasuresare coordinated with host-countryagencies at all levels. Ensure that theCOMs are fully and currently informedof any liaison activities relating to thesecurity of those DOD elements andpersonnel under the securityresponsibility, but not the command, ofthe CINC.

• Assist DOD elements, within theirgeographic regions, in implementing

programs developed under DODD2000.12, “DoD Combating TerrorismProgram.”

• Ensure that THREATCONs are uniformlyimplemented and disseminated asspecified by DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program,” DODD5025.1-M, DoD Directives SystemProcedures,” and DODD O-2000.12-H,“Protection of DoD Personnel andActivities Against Acts of Terrorism andPolitical Turbulence.”

• Within the theater, through the UnitedStates Defense Representatives andCOMs, serve as the DOD point of contactwith host-nation officials on mattersinvolving AT and FP policies andmeasures.

• Provide a representative to the DODATCC (and subcommittees, as required)and to the DOD Worldwide ATConference.

• Ensure that a capability exists to collect,evaluate, and disseminate all relevantdata on terrorist activities, trends, andindicators of imminent attack.

• For unanticipated emergency AT and FPrequirements that Services cannot fund,forward requirements for submission tothe CJCS CTRIF.

• Use information operations and PSYOPto support antiterrorism programs.

j. CINCs with functional responsibilitiesshall:

• Establish command policies and acombatting terrorism program for theprotection of all assigned forces. Thisincludes family members, facilities, andother material resources. Coordinate thisprogram with the appropriate CINC for

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the geographic area. The geographicCINCs’ programs shall take precedencewhen a conflict in policy or programsexist.

• Ensure all facilities are assessed incoordination with the geographic CINCsand Services in accordance with DODDO-2000.12-H, “Protection of DoDPersonnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence.”

• Ensure that all personnel assigned to theheadquarters receive appropriate AT and/or FP training.

• For unanticipated emergency AT and/orFP requirements that Services cannotfund, ensure subordinate commandsforward requirements for potentialsubmission to the CJCS CTRIF.

k. Directors of other Defense Agenciesand Field Activities, OSD Principal StaffAssistants, and those that report directlyto the Secretary or Deputy Secretary ofDefense, shall:

• Utilize DODD O-2000.12-H, “Protectionof DoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence,” and DODD 5025.1-M,“DoD Directives System Procedures,”for the AT and FP planning and

execution for their headquarters and allactivities under their cognizance:Consider mission, characteristics of theactivity, geographic location, and threatcondition. Establish prescriptivestandards for installations and facilitiesnot located on Service installations. Asappropriate, coordinate with theapplicable CINC or Service.

• Ensure that all assigned personnelcomply with the DOD FCG. Ensure thatpersonnel are aware of any TSAs in effectat the time of travel. Ensure that all DODpersonnel and family members scheduledfor permanent change of station toforeign countries receive appropriate andrequired training in accordance withDODD O-2000.12-H, “Protection ofDoD Personnel and Activities AgainstActs of Terrorism and PoliticalTurbulence.”

• Provide members to the DOD ATCC(and subcommittees as required), andrepresentatives to the DOD WorldwideAT Conference.

• Identify to the Secretary of Defense, withan information copy to the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the resourcesrequired to implement and maintain ATand FP for their respective offices andpersonnel.

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COMBATTING TERRORISM

From the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the United States wasconcerned about possible terrorist attack. Consultations and exchanges ofinformation among Coalition partners and other members of the UN led to theexpulsion of over 200 Iraqi diplomatic personnel, embassy staff, andintelligence personnel from their posts throughout the world. This undoubtedlyhad a disruptive effort on Iraqi terrorist operations.

Within the US Government, the National Security Council took the lead inproducing a well-founded, coordinated policy. Throughout the conflict theOffice of the Secretary of Defense met frequently in the interagency arena toconsult and formulate policy options, including employment of specialoperations forces. These policy determinations involved both components ofcombatting terrorism: antiterrorism, which involves defensive measures toreduce vulnerability or individuals and property to terrorist acts; andcounterterrorism, which involves offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,and respond to terrorism.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress,Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IITERRORIST THREAT

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1. Overview

A critical factor in understandingterrorism is the importance of theemotional impact of the terrorist act on anaudience other than the victim. This chapterprovides background information concerningthe terrorist threat to enable the commanderat any echelon to create and employ AT tactics,techniques, and procedures outlined in thispublication. Terrorism has become a mediaevent and, as such, a phenomenon of ourtime. The terrorist of today will exploitinformation operations against the UnitedStates as much as the media will allow. Newsmedia coverage is important to terrorists whoare attempting to incite public fear or gainattention for their cause. Another determinantof tactics and target selection is the role theterrorist group perceives itself as playing.Terrorism can also be used as either an overtor a covert aspect of a political movementengaged in a power struggle within an existingpolitical system. Terrorists frequently claimaffiliation with causes or politicalorganizations to give their actions a claim torespectability. Operations to meet the threatmay fall in both the CT and AT arenas.

2. Terrorist Tactics

Terrorist tactics vary in sophisticationaccording to the level of training the individualor group has received. Categories of trainingare trained (entire group has had formaltraining), semi-trained (a few members havebeen trained and have passed that training onto the rest of the group), and untrained (nomembers have had formal training).

“This country swarms with vile outrageous men / That live by rapine and bylawless spoil.”

Christopher MarloweTamburlaine the Great, ii, 2, 1587

Examples of objectives with which aterrorist attack may be associated, but notlimited to, are shown in Figure II-1. Just as aterrorist incident may have several objectives,the tactics used may also be combined. Themore common tactics employed bycontemporary terrorist groups are listed inFigure II-2 and discussed below.

a. Assassination. A term generally appliedto the killing of prominent persons andsymbolic enemies as well as traitors whodefect from the group.

EXAMPLES OFTERRORIST

OBJECTIVES

Attract publicity for thegroup's cause

Demonstrate the group'spower

Show the existinggovernment's lack of power

Extract revenge

Obtain logistic support

Cause a government tooverreact

Figure II-1. Examples ofTerrorist Objectives

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b. Arson. Less dramatic than most tactics,arson has the advantage of low risk to theperpetrator and requires only a low level oftechnical knowledge.

c. Bombing. The improvised explosivedevice (IED) is the terrorist’s weapon ofchoice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produceand, because of the various detonationtechniques available, may be a low risk to theperpetrator. (However, suicidal bombingcannot be overlooked as an employmentmethod.) Other advantages include theirattention-getting capacity and the ability tocontrol casualties through time of detonationand placement of the device. It is also easilydeniable should the action produceundesirable results. From 1983 through 1996,approximately half of all recorded terrorist

incidents worldwide involved the use ofexplosives.

d. Hostage Taking. This usually is anovert seizure of one or more individualswith the intent of gaining publicity or otherconcessions in return for release of thehostage. While dramatic, hostage and hostagebarricade situations are risky for theperpetrator.

e. Kidnapping. While similar to hostagetaking, kidnapping has significant differences.Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure ofone or more specific persons in order toextract specific demands. The perpetratorsof the action may not be known for a longtime. News media attention is initially intensebut decreases over time. Because of the timeinvolved, successful kidnapping requireselaborate planning and logistics. The risk tothe terrorist is less than in the hostage situation.

f. Hijacking or Skyjacking. Sometimesemployed as a means for escape, hijacking isnormally carried out to produce aspectacular hostage situation. Althoughtrains, buses, and ships have been hijacked,aircraft are the preferred target because of theirgreater mobility and vulnerability.

g. Seizure. Seizure usually involves abuilding or object that has value in the eyesof the audience. There is some risk to theterrorist because security forces have time toreact and may opt to use force to resolve theincident, especially if few or no innocent livesare involved.

h. Raids or Attacks on Facilities. Armedattacks on facilities are usually undertaken forone of three purposes: to gain access to radioor television broadcast capabilities in orderto make a statement; to demonstrate thegovernment’s inability to secure criticalfacilities or national symbols; or to acquireresources (e.g., robbery of a bank or armory).

COMMON TERRORISTTACTICS

Assassination

Arson

Bombing

Hostage Taking

Kidnapping

Hijacking or Skyjacking

Seizure

Raids or Attacks on Facilities

Sabotage

Hoaxes

Use of Technology

Figure II-2. Common Terrorist Tactics

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i. Sabotage. The objective in mostsabotage incidents is to demonstrate howvulnerable society is to terrorist actions.Industrialized societies are more vulnerableto sabotage than less highly developedsocieties. Utilities, communications, andtransportation systems are so interdependentthat a serious disruption of any one affects allof them and gains immediate public attention.Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilitiesis one means of identifying the target whilemaking a statement of future intent. Militaryfacilities and installations, informationsystems, and information infrastructures maybecome targets of terrorist sabotage.

j. Hoaxes. Any terrorist group that hasestablished credibility can employ a hoaxwith considerable success. A threat againsta person’s life causes that person and thoseassociated with that individual to devote timeand effort to security measures. A bomb threatcan close a commercial building, empty atheater, or delay an aircraft flight at no cost tothe terrorist. False alarms dull the analyticaland operational efficiency of key securitypersonnel, thus degrading readiness.

k. Use of Special Weapons. Chemicalweapons have been used by terrorists to date

and there is potential for the use of bothchemical and biological weapons in the future.These types of weapons, relatively cheap andeasy to make, could be used in place ofconventional explosives in many situations.The potential for mass destruction and thedeep-seated fear most people have ofchemical and biological weapons could beattractive to a group wishing to make theworld take notice. Although an explosivenuclear device is acknowledged to be beyondthe reach of most terrorist groups, a chemicalor biological weapon or a radiologicaldispersion device using nuclear contaminantsis not. The technology is simple and the costper casualty (for biological weapons inparticular) is extremely low — much lowerthan for conventional or nuclear explosives.This situation could change as the competitionfor headlines increases.

l. Environmental Destruction. Althoughthis tactic has not been widely used, theincreasing accessibility of sophisticatedweapons and explosives to terrorists hasthe potential to threaten damage to theenvironment. Examples would beintentional dumping of hazardouschemicals into a city’s water supply or thedestruction of an oil tanker.

Port facilities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist sabotage.

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m. Use of Technology. Technology hasimportant implications for the terrorist threatfaced by DOD personnel. Infrastructuretechnologies provide attractive targets forterrorists who can apply a range ofrudimentary and advanced attack techniquesto disrupt or undermine confidence in a rangeof systems. Key elements of the nationalinfrastructure, such as transportation,telecommunications, energy, banking, publichealth, and water supply are becomingincreasingly dependent on computerizedsystems and linkages.

• These systems provide targetingopportunities for adversaries who possesseven limited technological capabilities,and who have the ability to identifycritical system choke points. Terroristscan apply computer generated attacks ormore traditional means such as bombsor physical destruction to cause system-wide malfunctions. Interdependenciesof systems, such as power andtransportation, exacerbate thisvulnerability. Significant disruption ofpower grids can have a devastatingimpact on air traffic control, railwayoperations, port operations, andemergency services such as fire and/orrescue and police. Attacks such as poweroutages also impact a wide segment ofthe population, command significantmedia attention and consequentlyprovide an effective means for theterrorist to reach a “captive” audience.

• A range of technologies can also beemployed effectively by terrorists toconduct operations. Although terroriststo date have not demonstrated significanttechnological innovation and havelargely relied on traditional attackmethods such as bombing, hostagetaking, and assaults, several factors pointto an increased likelihood of greater useof more sophisticated technologies. First,the wide scale proliferation of military

weapons and technologies that hasfollowed the collapse of the formerSoviet Union has increased the range ofweapons available on international armsmarkets. Stand-off weapons such asshoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons,light anti-tank weapons which have beenused in attacks against US targets in thepast, are attractive means of attack for aterrorist since they reduce vulnerabilityand increase chance of escape. Increasedavailability of more powerful explosives(such as the plastic explosive Semtex,which is easily concealed and difficultto detect), when combined with moresophisticated timing devices, detonators,and fuses, have provided the terrorist withmuch more lethal bombing capabilities.

• Increasing availability of nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) material,components, and weapons raises thespecter of terrorists using these weaponsin an attack against civilian populationsor military facilities. The 1995 Tokyosubway Sarin nerve gas attack by theAum Shinrikyo cult, resulting in thedeath of 12 and injury of 5,500 people,is the most vivid example of the threatfrom NBC weapons. Many chemical-biological (C-B) weapons ingredients arecommercially available, and there arenumerous reports throughout Europe offissile material availability on the blackmarket. This raises the possibility notonly of terrorist use of nuclear weapons,but of radiological bombs that use fissilematerial to contaminate targets.

• A range of commercially availabletechnologies can dramatically enhanceterrorist operational capability. Theseinclude communications equipment,encryption capabilities, surveillanceequipment, weapons, a range ofcomputer and information managementtechnologies, weapons components, andthe Internet. The ability to acquire or

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adapt technologies can give terrorists anedge in choosing targets and conductingattacks as well as significantly expandingtheir range of attack options.

• Technological advances also enhanceantiterrorism capabilities. Recentresearch and development efforts havefocused on the following areas:

•• detection of explosives and otherweapons;

•• detection of, and defense against, C-Bagents;

•• physical protection (e.g., alarms,barriers, access control);

•• incident response; and

•• data analysis and dissemination.

• Explosive detection technologies can beapplied for both airline security and forfixed facilities. They detect physical,chemical, or mechanical properties ofbombs using a variety of technologies,from x-rays and radio waves to dogs and“sniffer” technologies.

• Detection of C-B agents poses asignificant challenge, since almostanyone that can brew beer canmanufacture a biological agent, and toxicchemicals are widely available on thecommercial market. Laser technologieshave shown promise in detection of C-Bagents, and research and developmentwork on personnel protective equipmentand vaccines is being pursuedaggressively.

• A range of technologies is currently beinginvestigated to enhance physicalprotection capabilities. Access controltechnologies, which include a range ofpersonnel identification systems, metal

detectors, and closed circuit surveillancedevices are being researched and fieldedon a regular basis. Barrier technologiesare also being fielded, and enhancementsin building design to enhance bombresistance are being incorporated intonew and existing DOD buildings in highthreat areas.

• Incident response technologies aredeveloped to assist in responding toassaults on facilities, hostage taking, orcriminal activities. Incident responseactivities include disrupting the attack,defending targets, aiding persons injuredin an attack, rescuing hostages, andapprehending attackers. A broad rangeof technologies are included in thiscategory such as fiber-optic and low-lightcamera technologies, highly accuratesensors , non le tha l weapons ,incapacitating agents, and software toolsfor profiling terrorists and supportingresponse planning.

• Effective data dissemination is a keymeasure to improving antiterrorismawareness and preparedness. The rapidevolution of information technology hasfacilitated the transfer of accurate terroristprofiles (to include photographs) and theability to transfer the informationanywhere in the world quickly. Otherkey AT data, such as protectiontechnologies and procedures, can also betransmitted to field locations quickly andeffectively. Recent efforts have reducedbarriers between agencies on the fusionand dissemination of AT data.

3. Terrorist Groups

A terrorist group’s selection of targets andtactics is also a function of the group’saffiliation, level of training, organization, andsophistication. For several years, securityforces categorized terrorist groupsaccording to their operational traditions —

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national, transnational, and international.National groups operated within theboundaries of a single nation. Transnationalgroups operated across international borders.International groups operated in two or morenations and were usually assumed to receivedirection and support from a foreigngovernment. Terrorist groups arecategorized by government affiliation tohelp security planners anticipate terroristtargets and their sophistication of intelligenceand weaponry. Three general terrorismcategories are shown in Figure II-3.

While the three categories broadly indicatethe degrees of sophistication that may beexpected, it is important to examine eachterrorist group on its own terms. The vastfunds available to some narco-terrorists affordthem the armaments and technology rivalingsome nation-states. Messianic religious cultsor organizations have features from all threeof the listed categories. They may be “non-state-supported” (e.g., Japan’s Aum Shinrikyocult or the Abdul-Ramman group that

perpetrated the World Trade Center bombing),“state-supported” (e.g., extremist factions ofHAMAS who believe violence serves theirconcept of religious servitude), or “state-directed” (e.g., Hizballah is both the “Partyof God” and a religious cult organization thatemploys violence in support of both religionand politics).

4. Terrorist Organization

As with any organization, terrorist groupsdevelop organizational structures that arefunctional for the environment in which theyoperate. Because terrorists usually operate ina hostile environment, security is theprimary consideration. As a result, theorganization of terrorist groups is usuallycellular, with each cell relatively isolatedand performing specific functions such asintelligence gathering or logisticoperations. This type of organization protectsmembers of the group. In the event ofdefection or capture, no one member canidentify more than a few of the others. Somegroups have multifunctional cells thatcombine several skills in one operationalentity, while others create cells of specialiststhat come together for an operation on an adhoc basis. The latter procedure is similar totailoring or task organizing military forces.

a. Larger terrorist groups (100 or moremembers) normally have a centralcommand and control element with one ormore subordinate elements based ongeographical regions. The regionalcommands direct the actions of the operationaland support cells in their region. Smallergroups (50 or fewer members) may have asingle command element that directlycontrols all of the operational and support cellsregardless of where they are established.

b. Terrorist groups often structurethemselves in a manner similar to militaryorganizations, but groups vary as to thedegree of discipline and lines of authority and

CATEGORIES OFTERRORIST GROUPS

Non-State-SupportedA terrorist group that operatesautonomously, receiving no significantsupport from any government

State-SupportedA terrorist group that generally operatesindependently but receives support fromone or more governments; e.g., PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine

State-DirectedA terrorist group that operates as anagent of a government, receivingsubstantial intelligence, logistic, andoperational support from the sponsoringgovernment; e.g., Abu Nidal organization

Figure II-3. Categories of Terrorist Groups

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function. Such organizations have historicallyhad well-defined, organized structures thatmade penetration difficult. In other instances,group dynamics, egos, and philosophicaldifferences override organizational principlesand create opportunities for security forces toidentify members, penetrate the organization,and/or prevent terrorist actions. Thesepersonal factors often cause such terroristgroups to splinter into new faction(s) (e.g.,Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Democratic Front forthe Liberation of Palestine), adding to thegrowing list of organizational titles in worldterrorism. Along with the commonly useddeception technique of claiming credit for anaction in the name of a previously unknowngroup, splintering complicates securityforce intelligence efforts and createsconfusion in determining the decisionmakers, thus making the organizationsgenerally hard to break.

c. In a broader context, terroristorganizations, especially those with little orno access to government resources, need asupport structure. As shown in Figure II-4,a typical organization consists of operationalmembers who are functionally organized asoutlined above and have several categoriesof supporters.

• At the top is the leadership that definespolicy and directs action. Typically,leaders are completely committed to thecause that the group purports to serve andmay be charismatic figures. If the groupis state-supported or state-directed, theleadership will include one or moremembers who have had extensivetraining or education by the sponsoringstate.

• The active, operational cadre are thedoers — the men and women who carryout terrorist attacks and train others. As

STRUCTURE PYRAMID OF A TYPICALTERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Passive Support

Active Support

Active Cadre

Hardcore

Leadership

Figure II-4. Structure Pyramid of a Typical Terrorist Organization

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in the planning and leadership elements,many doers are deeply committed to thegroup’s cause. The professionals whomay or may not be ideologicallymotivated are also part of the active cadre.

• Active supporters do not actuallycommit violent acts but assist theterrorists by providing money,intelligence, legal or medical services,and/or safe houses or forgeddocuments. This includes supportersboth within the country and in othercountries. Active supporters arefrequently ideologically in agreementwith all or some of the terrorist group’sgoals but may be ambivalent concerningthe use of violence. Terrorist groupsrecruit most of their cadre from the ranksof the active supporters because thosepeople have proven their loyalty and, tosome extent, their skills over a period oftime.

• Passive supporters are the mostdifficult to define and identify. Most ofthese people are sympathetic to theterrorist group’s cause, but will notassume an active role due to fear ofreprisal if exposed or identified. Familyand acquaintances of activists sometimesfall into this category, especially incultural environments where family andregional loyalties are strong. Often,passive supporters are not sympatheticto the terrorist cause but do not believethat the government can or will protectthem. Thus, fear rather than sympathygenerates support for the terrorist.Passive supporters may be ignorant to thecause’s intent and use of their support;consequently, they may unwittinglyprovide anonymous funding. Theterrorist group relies on passivesupporters for financial assistance,displays of public support, and minorlogistic or operational tasks. Passivesupport is extremely important to the

politically-motivated terrorist who relieson popular support to survive.

d. Membership in terrorist organizationsbrings together people who commit terroristacts for different motivations. Not allterrorists are committed to their cause byideology. Many terrorist groups areaugmented by criminals (professionals) whoare opportunists seeking personal rather thanpolitical gain or by individuals who arementally disturbed. Many individualsresponsible for terrorist acts could fit intoone of three categories; crusaders,criminals, or emotionally disturbed.Although the criminal or emotionallydisturbed person may not fit the strictdefinition of a terrorist, the varied motivationsand ambiguities of terrorism necessitate theirinclusion in the same context with thecrusader. A specific individual may exhibittraits from more than one category. Terroristslook like ordinary citizens and come from allwalks of life.

• Crusaders are ideologically inspiredindividuals or groups (e.g., politicalterrorists). They believe that their causeis so noble or worthy that it may bepromoted by any means, including theuse of terror.

• Criminals or professionals committerrorist acts for personal gain rather thanideology. Although they often mimic thecrusader’s ideological conviction, theirdevotion to the cause is not the primarymotivation. Crusaders often recruitcriminals for their knowledge,background, and criminal skills.

• Emotionally or mentally disturbedpeople who commit terrorist acts oftenbelieve that they have some specialmandate from a deity. They can range incharacter from compulsive, minuteplanners to impulsive, unpredictabledoers. Additionally, emotionally

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disturbed people often obtain some levelof enjoyment in the terrorist act. Theemotionally and mentally disturbed areoften used by terrorist organizations asthrowaway or disposable terrorists. Theyusually drive the truck bomb or becomemartyrs for a cause.

5. Terrorist Targets —Americans

It is sometimes difficult for Americans tounderstand why terrorism seems to thrivein the environment that offers the leastjustification for political violence (e.g.,democracies and ineffective authoritarianregimes). Equally puzzling is the relativeabsence of terrorism in those societies withtotalitarian and effective authoritariangovernments. The reasons for this apparentparadox can be summarized as being a matterof social control. The terrorist operatescovertly. In societies where little is donewithout the knowledge of internal securityagencies, covert activity for any appreciableperiod of time is difficult. The sameprinciple applies to acquisition of weapons,communications equipment, and explosives.Another factor is public information. Becausethe terrorist’s objectives usually includegaining the attention of a target audiencethrough a violent act, the terrorist can easilybe denied that objective in an environmentwhere information media are tightlycontrolled. Finally, in controlled societies, theability of terrorist organizations to createfunctional networks or to move funds withinthe financial system are severely hindered.

a. The reasons US interests are a target forso many terrorist groups around the world arecomplex and must be understood in order toeffectively combat terrorism in the long term.One reason some terrorist groups target theUnited States and its citizens is ideologicaldifferences. The United States is a leadingindustrial power and the leading capitaliststate. These reasons are enough to incite the

animosity of some groups that are committedto different social systems.

b. Of greater importance is theperception that the US Government candictate courses of action to othergovernments. Terrorists think that bypressuring the United States through acts ofterror, the US Government will bring pressureto bear on the targeted government to complywith terrorists’ demands. Although USinfluence is substantial in the worldcommunity, this is not a policy of the USGovernment.

c. Mere presence is another factor.Americans are all over the world in capacitiesranging from diplomatic service to tourists.This availability makes targeting Americanseasy even for relatively poorly trained non-state-supported groups. It also adds to thechances of Americans being killed or injured

The American soldier is a symbol of US powerand presence and is consequently an invitingtarget for terrorists.

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unintentionally. These same considerationsapply to members of the US military forceswith the added factor of “symbolic value.”The Armed Forces are clearly visible symbolsof US projection of power and presence; thus,terrorists find military personnel andinstallations appealing targets.

6. Domestic Terrorism

a. Despite recent bombings in New York,Oklahoma, and Atlanta, the United States hasa low rate of terrorism compared to Europe,Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. Atradition of violence for political purposeshas not been a dominating means ofachieving political power. There is nohistory of deep ideological commitmentjustifying the taking or sacrificing of life.Although there have been limited exceptionsto this observation — such as some PuertoRican independence groups — they have notgained political acceptance at the nationallevel. The relatively open US political systemallows minority groups to voice concernslegitimately through the political process.Recently, however, groups of domesticseparatists have targeted federal institutionsfor violence. These attacks indicate a growingwillingness to attack symbols of the USGovernment, despite the relatively open USpolitical system which allows minority groupsto voice concerns legitimately through thepolitical process.

b. Caution must be exercised in drawingconclusions exclusively from pastexperiences. Although low levels ofdomestic terrorism have occurred in theUnited States to date, terrorism is still athreat here. Radicals and religious extremistorganizations and the rise of militias constitutea growing threat to public order. Racialsupremacists as well as the violent fringe ofenvironmental and antiabortion movementshave also attempted to use terrorism. Agentsof external causes and foreign powers pose apotential threat that needs only a transoceanicflight or border crossing to become active.Additionally, computer hackers anywhere inthe world can send viruses via the Internet.

7. Terrorism Against the USMilitary

a. Terrorism is a major factor across therange of military operations. In the contextof peacetime military operations, terrorismattracts a great deal of attention and fewquestion its actual and potential capacity tokill and destroy. The same can be said ofterrorism as an aspect of military operationsother than war (MOOTW); however, in warthe threat of terrorism is only one of many FPissues the commander must consider. Thesame types of acts that gain attention inpeacetime military operations can hindermilitary operations in war (e.g., espionage,sabotage, vandalism, or theft).

TERRORISTS AND TOURISM

The most effective fear that the terrorist can generate for the tourist is that hewill never arrive at his destination — or will never return home alive. Convincedof this, a supply of tourist visitors could suddenly dry up. Expensive touristinfrastructures, depending on a constant flow of customers — margins in thetourist industry are often surprisingly slender — then lie idle. The industry isvery labor intensive so a considerable unemployment problem is created . . . Apistol pointed at a hostage in an aircraft, then, could be a pistol pointed at acountry’s economic heart.

SOURCE: G. Norton, quoted in Chris Ryan, Tourism, T errorism and V iolence Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, September 1991

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b. All acts of violence against the USmilitary are not necessarily terroristactions (e.g., murder or robbery). Themeasures contained within this publicationprovide guidance that will help protect themilitary unit and Service member from theseacts of violence as well as those committedby terrorists. In peacetime militaryoperations, there is no definitive method ofdifferentiating terrorist acts from other violentcrimes because the perpetrator’s intent maybe the only discriminator. A rule of thumbthat can be applied is if the act is obviouslyrelated to personal gain (robbery of money

or high-value items) or personal motivation(hatred, love, revenge) it is a crime, butprobably not terrorist-related. On the otherhand, if the act appears to adversely affectmilitary operations (communicationsfacilities, fuel storage areas) or has a highsymbolic value (headquarters, particularindividuals), the crime probably hasterrorist implications even when no claimis forthcoming. Recognizing the differencebetween acts of violence and terrorist acts isvital in order to properly understand thethreat’s intent and determine requireddefensive measures.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIILEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

III-1

1. General

This chapter explains the importance andnecessity for participation of a commandjudge advocate at all levels of foreign anddomestic antiterrorism program planning andimplementation. It is designed to provide tothe commander of a combatant command,subunified command, JTF, or componentcommand a basic understanding of relevantlegal considerations in implementing anantiterrorism program. The policy andjurisdictional responsibilities generallyapplicable to the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates are outlined below.

2. US Policy

Over the last decade, the US Governmenthas developed a policy regarding terrorismthat encompasses acts against Americans both

“US forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security partners, using allmeans authorized by the President and the Congress to counter internationalterrorism at home and abroad.”

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997

at home and abroad. The policy issummarized as follows.

a. All terrorist actions are criminal andintolerable, whatever their motivation, andshould be condemned.

b. All lawful measures to prevent suchacts and to bring to justice those whocommit them will be taken.

c. No concessions to terrorist extortionwill be made, because to do so will merelyinvite more terrorist actions.

d. When Americans are abductedoverseas, the United States will look to thehost government to exercise itsresponsibility under international law toprotect all persons within its territories, toinclude effecting the safe release of hostages.

Joint forces must take lawful measures to prevent terrorist attacks.

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The United States has made the services ofthe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)available to assist in these situations.

e. Close and continuous contact withhost governments will be maintainedduring an incident. Intelligence andtechnical support will be offered to themaximum extent practicable.

f. International cooperation to combatterrorism remains a fundamental aspectof US policy because all governments,regardless of structure or philosophy, arevulnerable; all avenues to strengthen suchcooperation will be pursued.

3. Lead Agencies

See Figure III-1.

a. The DOS is the lead agency forresponse to terrorism outside the UnitedStates, other than incidents on US flagvessels in international waters. Theexception to this is on the Arabian Peninsulawhere the DOS and Department of Defensesigned an MOU transferring responsibility forsecurity of forces on the Arabian Peninsulato the Department of Defense.

b. The DOJ is the lead agency fordomestic terrorism; the FBI is the lead

LEAD AGENCIES FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS

Department of State

Department of Justiceand/or Federal Bureauof Investigation

Department ofTransportation and/orFederal AviationAdministration

US Coast Guard

Outside the United States

Within the United States

Aboard aircraft in flight

Antiterrorism planning inUS ports

Figure III-1. Lead Agencies for Terrorist Incidents

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Legal Considerations

agency within the DOJ for operationalresponse to terrorist incidents.

c. The DOT and/or FAA serve as thelead agency for terrorist incidents thatoccur aboard an aircraft in flight withinUS jurisdiction. They are also responsiblefor investigating and preventing aircraft piracyand for informing commercial air carriers andtheir passengers regarding any terrorist threatinformation.

d. By public law, the DOJ (specifically theFBI) is responsible for all search and recoveryoperations involving nuclear weaponsconducted in the United States, District ofColumbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,and US possessions and territories, includingthose conducted on military installations. TheDOS is the lead agency for acts not under FBIresponsibility.

e. The US Coast Guard (USCG) isresponsible, within the limits of USterritorial seas, for reducing the risk of amaritime terrorist incident by diminishingthe vulnerability of ships and facilities throughimplementation of security measures andprocedures. The FBI is the lead agent forresponding to terrorist actions that occur inmaritime areas subject to US jurisdiction.Further, the USCG is responsible for ATplanning in US ports and the implementationof a foreign port assessment program todetermine the vulnerability to terrorist attackin certain high and medium risk ports. TheUSCG is a provider of port security unitswhich can be employed by the CINC as ATand FP assets. The National Terrorism Hotlineis manned by the USCG’s National ResponseCenter (NRC) 24 hours a day. NRC operatorstake reports of actual and/or potential domesticterrorism and link emergency calls with theChemical and Biological Defense Commandfor technical advice on dealing with weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) and with the FBI

to initiate the federal response actions. TheNRC also provides reports and notificationsto other federal agencies as necessary.Additionally, the USCG and FBI haveinteragency agreements to cooperate witheach other when coordinating CT activitiesand general law enforcement activities.Guidance regarding the USCG’s roles can befound in Commandant Instruction 16000.12,“Marine Safety Manual,” Volume VII - “PortSecurity,” and Volume X - “InteragencyAgreements and Acronyms.”

f. All other Federal agencies possessingresources for responding to terrorism arelinked together through agency commandcenters and crisis management groups toensure effective coordination of the USresponse.

SECTION A. LEGALCONSIDERATIONS:

AUTHORITY

4. Criminal Actions

Terrorist acts are criminal acts, whethercommitted during MOOTW or war; however,jurisdiction varies in wartime. By definition,terrorists do not meet the fourrequirements necessary for combatantstatus (wear uniforms or other distinctiveinsignia, carry arms openly, be undercommand of a person responsible for groupactions, and conduct their operations inaccordance with the laws of war). Onlycombatants can legitimately attack propermilitary targets. For this reason, capturedterrorists are not afforded the protectionfrom criminal prosecution attendant toprisoner of war status. However, ArticleIII of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, whichrequires that noncombatants be treated in ahumane manner, also applies to capturedterrorists.

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5. Jurisdiction

In peacetime, terrorist acts are normallypunishable only under domestic (local) law.However, in an internationally recognizedwar or MOOTW involving the use of force(regional or global), terrorists can be triedunder local criminal law or under militaryjurisdiction by either a courts-martial ormilitary tribunal .

6. Commander’s Authority

A commander’s authority to enforcesecurity measures and to protect persons andproperty is paramount during any level ofconflict. Commanders must coordinate withtheir judge advocates to determine the extentof their authority to combat terrorism.

SECTION B. LEGALCONSIDERATIONS:

PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OFMILITARY SUPPORT TO

CIVIL AUTHORITIES

7. General

Legal and policy restrictions on the useof active duty DOD military personnel, DODcivilian employees, and contractors such asDOD security police for direct enforcementof civil laws in the United States or itspossessions are contained in the PosseComitatus Act (18 USC 1385), other federalstatutes (10 USC 371-382), DODDs (DODD5525.5, “DoD Cooperation with Civilian LawEnforcement Officials”), and applicableService Directives (such as SECNAVINST5820.7 series for the Navy and Marine Corpsand AFI 10-801 and AFI 10-802 for the AirForce). These laws and policies provide ageneral prohibition against the use of theuniformed Services of the Department ofDefense, either as part of a Posse Comitatusor in a military role other than as provided bystatute, to assist local law enforcement officers

in carrying out their duties. The sameprohibitions apply to the use of troops toexecute Federal laws (See 41 Op. Atty. Gen.330[1957]; 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 162[1878]).The purpose of this restrictive legislationis to maintain congressional control overthe manner and circumstances underwhich military power could be used indomestic affairs. Although statutoryexceptions allow the use of military forces insome contexts, prior to committing their forcesfor these purposes commanders shall consultwith their judge advocates and refer toapplicable DOD and Service Directives,including DODD 3025.1, “Military Supportto Civil Authorities (MSCA),” DODD3025.12, “Military Assistance for CivilDisturbances (MACDIS),” DODD 3015.15,“Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” andDODD 5525.5, “DoD Cooperation withCivilian Law Enforcement Officials.” TheUSCG is also a law enforcement agency. TheUSCG is authorized to enforce or assist in theenforcement of all Federal laws applicable on,over, and under the high seas and waterwayssubject to US jurisdiction (14 USC 2).

8. Statutory AuthorizationsAllowing the Use of theMilitary

Congress, pursuant to its constitutionalauthority, has provided a broad range oflegislation authorizing the President to useregular and National Guard forces called intofederal service to enforce the laws. Toillustrate, the President is currentlyempowered to use military forces for thefollowing purposes:

a. To restore and maintain public order.

• To respond to requests for aid fromstate governments (10 USC 331).Whenever the President considers thatunlawful obstructions, combinations,assemblages, or rebellion against theauthority of the United States make it

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Legal Considerations

impracticable to enforce the laws of theUnited States in a state or territory bythe ordinary course of judicialproceedings, Federal armed forces maybe used as deemed necessary to enforcethose laws or to suppress the rebellionunder the statute (10 USC 332).

• To protect constitutional rights undercertain conditions (10 USC 333). TheFourteenth Amendment to theConstitution forbids any state to denyequal protection of the laws to any personwithin its jurisdiction. Congress hasimplemented this provision by providingthat a state will be deemed to deny equalprotection of the laws if the authoritiesof the state are unable, fail, or refuse toprovide such protection wheneverinsurrection, civil violence, unlawfulcombinations, or conspiracies in the stateoppose, obstruct, or hinder the executionof state and US laws so that any of thepopulation of the state are deprived ofrights, privileges, and immunities namedin the Constitution and secured by laws.Thereupon, it becomes the duty of thePresident to take such measures, byintervention with Federal armed forcesor by other means necessary, to suppresssuch disturbances.

• Whenever the President considers itnecessary to use the National Guard orFederal armed forces under the authorityof the intervention statutes discussed above,the President must immediately issue aproclamation ordering the insurgents todisperse and retire peaceably to their abodeswithin a limited time (10 USC 334). If theproclamation is not obeyed, an executiveorder is then issued directing the Secretaryof Defense to employ the Federal militaryforces necessary to restore law and order.(DODD 3025.12, “Military Assistance forCivil Disturbances [MACDIS],” paragraphV.C.2a, as amended).

• To protect Federal property andfunctions (18 USC 231 and 1361 and50 USC 797).

b. To meet specified contingencies.

• To assist the US Secret Service inprotecting the President, VicePresident, major political candidates,and foreign dignitaries (Section 6 of thePresidential Protection Assistance Act of1976, Public Law No. 94-524, 90 Stat.2475 [18 USC 3056 note 1988]).

• To assist Federal magistrates incarrying out magisterial orders relatingto civil rights violations (42 USC 1989).

• To assist the Attorney General inenforcing drug abuse prevention andcontrol (21 USC 873[b]).

• To assist the administrator of theEnvironmental Protection Agency inwater pollution control functions (33USC 1314[k][1]).

• To assist the FBI in investigations ofcongressional assassination, kidnapping,and assault (18 USC 351[g]).

c. To cope with domestic emergenciesand to protect public safety.

• Emergency Rule. When immediateaction is necessary to save lives, preventhuman suffering or mitigate greatproperty damage and when conditionsand time do not permit awaiting priorapproval from higher headquarters, acommander may take whatever action thecircumstances reasonably justify.However, the commander must complywith the following:

•• Report the military response to higherheadquarters;

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•• Document all the facts andsurrounding circumstances to meet anysubsequent challenge of impropriety (i.e.,who, what, when, where, how, and why);

•• Retain military response under themilitary chain of command; and

•• Limit military involvement to theminimum demanded by necessity.

• Emergency situations include, but are notlimited to, the following:

•• Providing civilian or mixed civilianand military firefighting assistance wherebase fire departments have mutual aidagreements with nearby civiliancommunities;

•• Providing emergency explosiveordnance disposal (EOD) service(DODD 3025.15, “Military Assistanceto Civil Authorities”; and

•• Using military working dog (MWD)teams in an emergency to aid in locatinglost persons (humanitarian acts) orexp los i ve dev ices (domes t i cemergencies).

• To assist the Attorney General inemergency situations involving chemicalor biological WMD (10 USC 382, 18USC 175, and 18 USC 2332c).

SECTION C. LEGALCONSIDERATIONS:JURISDICTION AND

AUTHORITY FORHANDLING TERRORIST

INCIDENTS

9. Jurisdictional Status ofFederal Property in theUnited States, Its Territories,and Its Possessions

In determining whether a Federal or statelaw is violated, it is necessary to look notonly to the substance of the offense but towhere the offense occurs. In many cases,the location of the offense will determinewhether the state or Federal Government willhave jurisdiction to investigate and prosecuteviolations. There are four categories ofFederal territorial jurisdiction: exclusive,concurrent, partial, and proprietorial.These are shown in Figure III-2 anddiscussed below:

a. Exclusive jurisdiction means that theFederal Government has received, bywhatever method, all of the authority of thestate, with no reservations made to the stateexcept the right to serve criminal and civilprocess. In territory that is under the exclusivejurisdiction of the United States, a state hasno authority to investigate or prosecuteviolations of state law. However, the

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Legal Considerations

Assimilative Crimes Act (18 USC 13) allowsthe Federal Government to investigate andprosecute violations of state law that occurwithin the special maritime and territorialjurisdiction of the United States.

b. Concurrent jurisdiction means that theFederal Government and the state each havethe right to exercise the same authority overthe land, including the right to prosecute forcrimes. In territory that is under the concurrentjurisdiction of the United States and a state,both sovereigns have the authority toinvestigate or prosecute violations of Federaland state law respectively. In addition, theFederal Government may prosecute violationsof state law under the Assimilative CrimesAct.

c. Partial jurisdiction refers to territorywhere the Federal Government exercisessome authority, and the state exercises someauthority beyond the right to serve criminaland civil processes, usually the right to tax

private parties. In territory that is under thepartial jurisdiction of the United States, a statehas no authority to investigate or prosecuteviolations of state law, unless that authority isexpressly reserved. Unless the state hasreserved the right to exercise criminaljurisdiction over the property concerned, theFederal Government may prosecute violationsof state law under the Assimilative CrimesAct.

d. Proprietorial jurisdiction means thatthe Federal Government has acquired aninterest in or title to property, but has nolegislative jurisdiction over it. In territory thatis under the proprietary jurisdiction of theUnited States, the United States has theauthority to investigate and prosecute non-territory-based federal offenses committed onsuch property, such as assault on a federalofficer. This authority does not extend toinvestigations and prosecution of violationsof state laws under the Assimilative CrimesAct and Federal Crimes Act of 1970. The

FEDERAL TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONCATEGORIES

The Federal Government has received all of the authority of the state

The Federal Government and the state each have the same authority

The Federal Government exercises some authority and the stateexercises some authority

The Federal Government has acquired an interest in, or title to,property but has no legislative jurisdiction over it

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Partial Jurisdiction

Proprietorial Jurisdiction

Figure III-2. Federal Territorial Jurisdiction Categories

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state has the authority to investigate andprosecute violations of state law that occuron such territory.

10. Federal Authority in theUnited States, ItsTerritories, and ItsPossessions

There are several Federal criminal statutesthat may apply to terrorist activities. Somedeal with conduct that is peculiar to terrorism,and others prescribe conduct that is criminalfor anyone but in which the terrorist mayengage to accomplish his or her purposes. TheFederal law contains no special prohibitionagainst terrorist acts or threats, as do somestate codes. However, the AssimilativeCrimes Act will allow the FederalGovernment to investigate and prosecuteviolations of state law regarding terrorist actsor threats that occur within the exclusive,concurrent, or partial jurisdiction of the UnitedStates, thereby giving the Federal Governmentinvestigative and prosecutorial jurisdictionover a wide range of criminal acts. Once aviolation of Federal law occurs, theinvestigative and law enforcement resourcesof the FBI and other Federal enforcementagencies become available, and prosecutionfor the offense may proceed through the Officeof the United States Attorney General.

11. Federal and StateConcurrent Authority

In some cases, terrorist acts may beviolations of state law as well as Federallaw. In this situation, both state and Federalenforcement authorities have power undertheir respective criminal codes to investigatethe offense and to institute criminalproceedings. If a terrorist act is a violation ofboth Federal and state law, then the FederalGovernment can either act or defer to the stateauthorities depending on the nature of theincident and the capabilities of localauthorities. Even where the Federal

Government defers to state authorities, it canprovide law enforcement assistance andsupport to local authorities on request. Thechoice between Federal or state action ismade by the prosecuting authority.However, successive prosecutions arepossible even where Federal and state lawproscribe essentially the same offense, withoutcontravening the Fifth Amendmentprohibition against double jeopardy. Tworelevant factors regarding law enforcementresponsibility for a given incident are:

a. The capability and willingness of stateor Federal authorities to act; and

b. The importance of the state or Federalinterest sought to be protected under thecriminal statute.

12. Jurisdictional Authority

The matrix in Appendix L, “JurisdictionalAuthority for Handling Terrorist Incidents,”provides a summary of FBI, host-nation, andcommanding officer authority and jurisdictionin investigating or resolving terrorist incidents.

SECTION D. LEGALCONSIDERATIONS:

FEDERAL AGENCIES ANDTHE MILITARY

13. Overview

The primary Federal organizationsdealing with terrorism management are theNational Security Council (NSC), DOS,and DOJ.

14. The National SecurityCouncil

The NSC assists the President informulating US policy for dealing withterrorist acts and advises the President onterrorist threats that endanger US interests.

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Legal Considerations

15. The Committee to CombatActs of Terrorism

This committee was reorganized in 1977to coordinate, through its working groupexecutive committee, the activities of 31Federal organizations. The working groupfocuses primarily on the protection offoreign diplomatic personnel in the UnitedStates as well as American officials workingand traveling abroad. The 31 memberagencies, including the Department ofDefense, may provide assistance in the formof terrorist incident information, technicalassistance about security precautions, publicinformation, and participation in educationseminars. Because the DOS has the primaryresponsibility for dealing with terrorisminvolving Americans abroad, it chairs thiscommittee. Although a foreign nation hasresponsibility for responding to incidentsoccurring on its territory, the Department ofDefense or other US agencies may be invitedto provide assistance if American interests areinvolved. In such cases, the US COMoversees the activities of US agencies.

16. Department of Justice

The DOJ is responsible for overseeing theFederal response to acts of terrorism withinthe United States. The US Attorney General,through an appointed Deputy AttorneyGeneral, makes major policy decisions andlegal judgments related to each terroristincident as it occurs.

17. Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

The FBI has been designated the primaryoperational agency for the management ofterrorist incidents occurring within theUnited States. When a terrorist incidentoccurs, the lead official is generally the specialagent in charge (SAC) of the field officenearest the incident and is under thesupervision of the Director of the FBI. The

FBI maintains liaison with each governor’soffice. Because of the presence of concurrentjurisdiction in many cases, the FBI cooperateswith state and local law enforcementauthorities on a continuing basis. Inaccordance with the Atomic Energy Act of1954, the FBI is the agency responsible forinvestigating a threat involving the misuse ofa nuclear weapon, special nuclear material,or dangerous radioactive material. In thiseffort, the FBI cooperates with theDepartments of Energy and Defense, theNuclear Regulatory Commission, and theEnvironmental Protection Agency as well asseveral states that have established nuclearthreat emergency response plans.

18. Department of Defense

DODD 2000.12, “DoD CombatingTerrorism Program” prescribes that theASD(SO/LIC) has the lead role within theDepartment of Defense in counteringdomestic terrorist incidents where US forcesmay be used. However the Attorney General,through the FBI, will remain responsible forcoordinating:

• The activities of all Federal agenciesassisting in the resolution of the incidentand in the administration of justice in theaffected area; and

• These activities with those state and localagencies similarly engaged.

19. Military Authority

See Figure III-3.

Upon notification of Presidential approvalto use military force, the Attorney Generalwill advise the Director of the FBI, who willnotify the SAC at the terrorist incident scene.The Attorney General will also notify theSecretary of Defense, who will advise themilitary commander. The militarycommander and the SAC will coordinate the

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transfer of operational control to the militarycommander. Responsibility for the tacticalphase of the operation is transferred tomilitary authority when the SACrelinquishes command and control of theoperation and it is accepted by the on-sitemilitary commander. However, the SACmay revoke the military force commitmentat any time before the assault phase if theSAC determines that military intervention isno longer required and the militarycommander agrees that a withdrawal can beaccomplished without seriously endangeringthe safety of military personnel or othersinvolved in the operation. When the militarycommander determines that the operation

is complete and military personnel are nolonger in danger, command and control willbe promptly returned to the SAC.

For the military planner in the United States,its territories, and its possessions, thisrelationship between the DOJ andDepartment of Defense requires thedevelopment of local memorandums ofagreement or understanding between theinstallation, base, unit, or port and theappropriate local FBI office to precludeconfusion in the event of an incident. Becauseof military turnover and reorganization, theselocal agreements should be reviewed andtested annually.

APPROVAL FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Presidential App roval

Attorney General

Director of theFederal Bureau of

Investigation

Secretary ofDefense

SpecialAgent inCharge

MilitaryCommander

Jointly coordinatetransfer of controlfor the operation

Figure III-3. Approval for Use of Military Force

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Legal Considerations

20. Military InstallationCommander’sResponsibilities

a. Domestic Incidents. Although the FBIhas primary law enforcement responsibilityfor terrorist incidents in the United States(including its possessions and territories),installation commanders are responsiblefor maintaining law and order on militaryinstallations. Plans should address the useof security forces to isolate, contain, andneutralize a terrorist incident within thecapability of installation resources. In theUnited States, installation commanders willprovide the initial and immediate responseto any incident occurring on militaryinstallations to isolate and contain theincident. The FBI takes the following steps.

• The senior FBI official will establishliaison with the command center at theinstallation. If the FBI assumesjurisdiction, the FBI official willcoordinate the use of FBI assets to assistin resolving the situation (e.g., hostagerescue team, public affairs assets).

• If the FBI assumes jurisdiction, theAttorney General will assume primary

responsibility for coordinating theFederal law enforcement response.

• If the FBI declines jurisdiction, the seniormilitary commander will take action toresolve the incident.

• Even if the FBI assumes jurisdiction, themilitary commander will take immediateactions as dictated by the situation toprevent loss of life or to mitigate propertydamage before the FBI response forcearrives.

• In all cases, command of militaryelements remains within militarychannels.

• Response plans with the FBI and Serviceagencies should be exercised annually atthe installation and base level to ensurethat the plans remain appropriate.

b. Foreign Incidents. For foreignincidents, the installation commander’sresponsibilities are the same as for domesticincidents — with the added requirementto notify the host nation and DOS.Notification to the DOS is made at thegeographic combatant commander level. In

Department of State embassies have the primary responsibility fordealing with terrorism against Americans abroad.

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all theaters, existing plans provide guidanceto the installation commander regardingnotification procedures. The DOS has theprimary responsibility for dealing withterrorism involving Americans abroad. Theinstallation’s response is subject toagreements established with the hostnation. In addition, under standing rules ofengagement, the inherent right of self-defensestill applies in situations off-base in foreignareas. If US forces (or members thereof) areactually under attack, they retain the inherentright to respond with proportionate, necessaryforce until the threat is neutralized. This isproviding that the host nation is unwilling orunable to respond to the threat in sufficienttime or with the appropriate means.

• The response to off-installation foreignincidents is the sole responsibility ofthe host nation. US military assistance,if any, depends on the applicable status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) or MOUsand is coordinated through the USEmbassy in that country. Military forceswill not be provided to host-nationauthorities without a directive from theDepartment of Defense that has beencoordinated with the DOS. The degreeof DOS interest and the involvement ofUS military forces depend on the incidentsite, nature of the incident, extent offoreign government involvement, and theoverall threat to US security.

• AT plans will:

•• Be implemented by geographiccombatant commands, subunifiedcommands, JTFs, and componentcommands, IAW responsibilities andprocedures established in DODD2000.12, “DoD Combating TerrorismProgram,” DODI 2000.14, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program

Procedures,” DODI O-2000.16, “DoDCombating Terrorism ProgramStandards,” and DODD O-2000.12-H,“Protection of DoD Personnel andActivities Against Acts of Terrorism andPolitical Turbulence;”

•• Be coordinated with and approved bythe geographic combatant commander ora designated representative;

•• Address the use of installation securityforces, other military forces, and host-nation resources (In many situationsthrough agreement with host-nationauthorities, the plan will probably evolveinto the installation having responsibility“inside the wire or installation perimeter”and the host nation having responsibility“outside the wire or installationperimeter.” The wide dispersal of workareas, housing, support (medical, childcare, exchange, morale, welfare, andrecreation), and utility nodes (powergrids, water plants) may require USresponsibility for certain fixed-sitesecurity outside the wire. This could beaccomplished by a quick reaction force);

•• Be coordinated by the CINC with bothhost-nation and DOS officials; and

•• Be exercised annually with host-nation resources to ensure that the planremains appropriate.

• Although the installation commander maynot have security responsibility “outside thewire,” he still maintains a security interest.The installation commander must includeexterior terrain, avenues of approach, andhost nation security processes whendeveloping security plans for theinstallation, regardless of who providesexterior defense.

CHAPTER IVANTITERRORISM PROGRAM; INSTALLATION,

BASE, SHIP, UNIT, AND PORT

IV-1

1. Overview of ProgramConcept

To meet the terrorist threat, an integratedand comprehensive AT program must bedeveloped and implemented at everyechelon of command. The program isdesigned to foster a protective posture inpeacetime (i.e., units performing normalduties and serving in security assistanceorganizations, peacekeeping missions, ormobile training teams) that will carry over toa wartime environment. Antiterroristmeasures are intended to identify and reducethe risk of loss or damage of potential targetsand to develop procedures to detect and deterplanned terrorist actions before they takeplace, thereby reducing the probability of aterrorist event. The measures also encompassthe reactive or tactical stage of an incident,including direct contact with terrorists to endthe incident with minimum loss of life andproperty. Antiterrorism programs should beincorporated and integrated with DODD5160.54, “DoD Key Asset Protection Plan(KAPP),” planning, coordination, communitycooperation, and synchronization, which isrequired for every Service, installation, base,ship, unit, and port.

a. Command and Control. Whenterrorists attack DOD property orpersonnel, the National MilitaryCommand Center becomes the operationscenter for the Joint Staff and the Secretary

“Night and day we chased an enemy who never awaited our approach but toharm us, was never found sleeping. Each tree, each hole, each piece ofrock hid from our unseeing eyes a cowardly assassin, who, if undiscovered,came to pierce our breasts; but who fled or begged for mercy if we foundhim face to face.”

Unknown Creole during the Haitian War for Independence, 1793

of Defense. The command, control, andreporting responsibilities for foreign terroristattacks on DOD property or personnel belongto the geographic combatant commanderwithin whose AOR the attack has occurred.For assets under the control of a functionalcombatant commander (e.g., Commander inChief, United States Special OperationsCommand) the functional combatantcommander will coordinate with the affectedgeographic combatant commander for anappropriate division of responsibilities.Combatant command reporting will use theNational Military Command System.Domestic terrorist attacks on DOD propertyor personnel will be reported by the Serviceor agency in command of the targetedinstallation.

b. AT Program Elements. The ATprogram stresses deterrence of terroristincidents through preventive measurescommon to all combatant commands andServices. The program addresses:

• Threat analysis;

• Installation or unit criticality andvulnerability assessments;

• Creation of a threat assessment based onthe threat analysis and friendlyvulnerabilities;

• Information security;

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• OPSEC;

• Personnel security;

• Physical security;

• Crisis management planning;

• Employment of tactical measures tocontain or resolve terrorist incidents;

• Continuous training and education ofpersonnel; and

• Public affairs planning.

c. AT Program Concept. The ATprogram concept represents an integrated,comprehensive approach within combatant

commands and the Services to counter theterrorist threat to military installations, bases,ships, facilities, equipment, and personnel.Figure IV-1 illustrates this concept as itgenerically applies in the Services. Theconcept has two phases; proactive andreactive (crisis management). Theproactive phase encompasses the planning,resourcing, preventive measures,preparation, awareness education, andtraining that take place before a terroristincident. During this phase, consideration isgiven to research (information andintelligence gathering), development, andimplementation of preventive measures; in-depth installation or facility planning (toinclude consideration of installation,infrastructure, and industrial targets,integration of their physical assets, force

ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM CONCEPT

Planning & Training Action

ThreatAnalysis

Criticality &VulnerabilityAssessments

Key AssetProtectionProgram

THREATASSESSMENT

OperationsSecurity

PersonalSecurity

PhysicalSecurity

AwarenessEducation& Training

Authority &Jurisdiction

PlanningCrisis

Management

PerformingCrisis

Management

ADJUSTMENT& TRAINING

PREVENT

ON

Incident

(Proactive) (Reactive)

I

After-Action Report

Figure IV-1. Antiterrorism Program Concept

IV-3

Antiterrorism Program; Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, and Port

protection funding requirements, and securityforces to detect, assess, delay, and respond toa threat); and awareness education andtraining (specialized skills, proficiencytraining, and exercising plans). The reactivephase includes the crisis managementactions taken to resolve a terrorist incident.

d. Six-Step Concept. The following is abrief description of the six steps in the concept.Proactive steps are discussed in moredetail in Chapter V, “Intelligence,Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis.”The crisis management phase is discussed inChapter VI, “Crisis Management Execution.”

• Step 1. Threat Assessment (ThreatAnalysis). A threat analysis must becurrent; as data for the estimationchanges, so does the risk. Of criticalimportance in the threat assessmentprocess is the analysis of criminalin format ion and in te l l igencesimultaneously. Considering thisinformation within the context of thesocial, economic, and political climate ofan area provides a basis to determine theterrorist threat to an installation or unit.Following are the basic steps in thecriminal information and intelligenceprocess:

•• In consonance with DODD 5240.1-R,“Procedures Governing the Activities ofDoD Intelligence Components thatAffect United States Persons,” collecting,evaluating, processing, and disseminatinglaw enforcement in format ion,intelligence, and counterintelligencefrom all sources, including open literatureand local personnel. This is a continuousprocess.

•• Formulating plans that includepreparing for on-site collection anddissemination during an incident.

• Step 2. Threat Assessment (Criticalityand Vulnerability Assessments). Thethreat assessment brings together thethreat analysis and the criticality andvulnerability assessments. The threatassessment concerns people or itemsessential to the mission or function of theinstallation, base, ship, unit, or port. Italso applies to people or facilities that,by virtue of their symbolic value to aterrorist group (as determined by thethreat assessment), are probable targets.The threat assessment is provided bythe supporting counterintelligences t a f f e l e m e n t o r S e r v i c ecounterintelligence analytical elementpertaining to international terrorism.Based on the threat assessment, thecommander and staff should identify andprioritize critical personnel, facilities, andequipment, and should conduct avulnerability assessment (VA) for each(see Appendix A, “VulnerabilityAssessment ” ) . Assess ing thevulnerability of a unit, installation, base,facility, material, or personnel to theterrorist threat helps uncover and isolatesecurity weakness. Steps can then betaken to reduce or eliminate theweakness. Once the VA is completed,steps should be taken (planning,training and, if necessary, design orredesign of construction projects) tocorrect or reduce these vulnerabilities.The installation commander and staffshould review this VA at least annuallyto ensure that it remains accurate in viewof the changing threat, installationmakeup, and unit missions.

• Step 3. Prevention. The preventionportion of the concept consists of fourseparate but related elements thattogether provide a synergistic effect inreducing the vulnerability of aninstallation, base, facility, unit, or

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personnel to terrorist attack. Theelements are OPSEC, personalsecurity (including travel), physicalsecurity, and awareness education andtraining.

•• Operations Security. A threatassessment may reveal securityweaknesses in day-to-day operations.The security of communications systems,information activities, and personnelmust be examined and weaknesscorrected to include countersurveillancetechniques when necessary. Informationgleaned from communications canprovide terrorists with detailedknowledge about potential targets.Communications security is an integralpart of OPSEC. Terrorists are nothampered by regulations and fully exploitopportunities presented to them. Theobjectives of OPSEC as they pertainto AT are shown in Figure IV-2.

•• Personal Security. All militarypersonnel and family members, as wellas civilians connected with the militaryor US Government (including contractpersonnel) are potential victims ofterrorist attacks and should take thebasic security precautions outlined inAppendix B, “Personal ProtectiveMeasures Against Terrorism.” A VAmay identify specific personnel who, byvirtue of their rank, position, travelitinerary, or symbolic value, may becomeparticularly attractive or accessibletargets. Prevention of such attacksdepends on the planning and the use ofthe personal protection measures outlinedin Appendix C, “Very Important Personand Senior Officer Security Measures.”The most important measure is ineducating persons who are likelytargets in recognition of threat andtaking appropriate actions to reducetheir risk. Personal protection,education, and training must emphasize

how to deny the opportunity for an attackor to elevate the risk to the attacker. Theobjective of personal protection is to usepersonal protection measures tailored tothe level of the threat.

•• Physical Security. Physical securitymeasures for an installation, base, ship,unit, or port reduce the probability forterrorist attack by making an attack moredifficult and increasing the risk to theterrorist. The installation, base, ship,unit, or port should be assessed interms of defensive capability. Theintegrated use of intrusion detectionsystems, barriers, structural hardening,access control, and response forces arecritical to the detection of a threat,assessment of the threat, and delaying thethreat until arrival of the security forces.These measures are designed to prevent

OPERATIONSSECURITY

ANTITERRORISMOBJECTIVES

Deny intelligence andinformation to terrorists

Be familiar with techniques usedby terrorists to collect

information

Develop essential elements offriendly information to facilitate

and focus efforts to denyinformation to terrorists

Avoid rigid operational routines

Integrate operations securityinto physical security and

personal protection programs

Figure IV-2. Operations SecurityAntiterrorism Objectives

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Antiterrorism Program; Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, and Port

unauthorized access to installations,bases, facilities, equipment, materiel,and information as well as to safeguardagainst espionage, terrorism, sabotage,vandalism, and theft. The more anarea’s physical security is enhanced,the greater the delay to the terroristtrying to reach the objective and themore time security forces have todetect, deter and/or intercept theterrorist. Measures that enhancephysical security include intrusiondetection systems; proper use oflighting and fences; restricting accessto an installation, base, ship, unit, port,or facility; secure sensitive storagelocations; structural hardening; andwell-trained security personnel.Appendix D, “Building SecurityProcedures,” Appendix E, “LockSecurity,” and Appendix F, “TelephoneCall Procedures,” provide detailedsuggestions for physical securitymeasures. The objective of physicalsecurity as it pertains to antiterrorismis to identify physical vulnerabilitiesof installations, personnel, and materielto terrorist attacks and to takeappropriate actions to reduce oreliminate those vulnerabilities.

•• Awareness Education and Training.(See DODI O-2000.16, “DoDCombating Terrorism ProgramStandards,” for specific guidance on ATtraining standards.) The key to aneffective AT program is to develop anawareness that is both sustained andreinforced as the Service memberprogresses from initial entry totermination of a military career.Appendix B, “Personal ProtectiveMeasures Against Terrorism,” listspersonal protective measures that shouldbe widely disseminated periodicallythroughout the Services. To complementthis, the member must be trained in thetechniques of personal protection andsecurity commensurate with the threat inhis or her locale. (1) FunctionalTraining. Personnel whose dutiesrequire special security skills must alsobe trained. For example, the followingpersonnel cannot perform their missionwithout specialized training: membersof the reaction force; hostage negotiators;members of the protective services(especially those assigned to the close-in protective service detail and teamleaders); drivers for high-risk personnel;installation, base, or unit AT planners;

Physical security forces are designed to intercept terroristsbefore they are able to reach their objective.

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and personnel responsible for the terroristanalysis input to the installation, base, orunit threat analysis. In addition,appropriate members of the installationplanning team should be trained ininstallation and facility physical securityplanning; such training is offered by theUS Army Corps of Engineers and the USArmy Military Police School(USAMPS). (2) High-Risk Positions.These are key and essential positionsthat, because of grade, assignment,travel itinerary, or symbolic value,may make them especially attractiveor assessable terrorist targets.Reporting to higher headquarters is animportant element in any threat orterrorist situation. High-risk positions areidentified and so designated by thecombatant commander based on thefollowing considerations: (a) Location;and (b) Security situation with respectto work area, housing, areas of travel,assessment of criminal threat, evaluationof host-nation security, positionsensitivity and visibility, and anticipatedpolitical environment. Combatantcommanders annually aggregate the listof high-risk positions, forwarding themthrough the appropriate Servicepersonnel channels to enable eachService to input training requirements by30 June. All personnel and adult familymembers en route to high-risk positionsshould attend the Individual TerrorismAwareness Course conducted by USArmy John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.During this 1-week course, personnelwill receive instruction in defensivedriving techniques and survival shootingas well as individual protective measuresand hostage survival. These individualsshould also attend the appropriateRegional Orientation Course (MiddleEast, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, orAfrica) offered at the US Air Force

Special Operations School, HurlburtField, Florida. Before assuming duties,the Service member who will be requiredto frequently operate a vehicle shouldattend the Evasive Driving for SeniorOfficers Course conducted by USAMPS,Fort McClellan, Alabama, or (for AirForce members) the Senior OfficerSecurity Seminar, Air Force SpecialInvestigations Academy, Bolling AFB,Washington, DC. (3) ProtectiveTraining. Personnel en route to potentialhigh threat areas should attend one of thefollowing courses: (a) The Dynamics ofInternational Terrorism Courseconducted at the US Air Force SpecialOperations School at Hurlburt Field,Florida. During this 1-week course,personnel will receive lectures on threatsby region (Europe, Middle East, LatinAmerica, Asia-Pacific, and Africa), thehistory and psychology of terrorism,personnel AT measures (vehicle,personal, airline, and physical security),and hostage survival. (b) A RegionalOrientation Course (Middle East, LatinAmerica, Africa, Asia-Pacific) at the USAir Force Special Operations School atHurlburt Field, Florida. These coursesprovide instruction in cultural, political-military, and individual security factorsassociated within the specific region. (c)Training may also be given byinstallation security personnel who havebeen trained at the AntiterrorismInstructor Qualification Course at FortBragg, North Carolina, or the ForceProtection Unit Advisors Course at FortMcClellan, Alabama.

• Step 4. Authority and Jurisdiction.Because an understanding of who hasauthority and responsibility is an essentialpart of any plan, this publication includesauthority and jurisdiction as a programelement. Chapter III, “Legal Considerations,”outlines the responsibilities of the

IV-7

Antiterrorism Program; Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, and Port

Department of Defense, DOJ, DOT,USCG, and DOS in terrorist incidents.

• Step 5. Planning Crisis Management.The establishment of a mechanism torespond to a terrorist incident is anessential element of the AT program.Normally, the installation, base, or unitcommander identifies an office or sectionor designates personnel from varioussections who act as the principal planningagency for special threats, and whocomprise the operations center during anactual crisis. This office creates a crisismanagement plan to meet the threat (seeAppendix G, “Crisis Management PlanFormat”). Crisis management planningmust address the activation andresponsibilities of local resources andprovide mechanisms to obtain the supportof resources not under local control (e.g.,public affairs officer [PAO], legal,medical, and aviation resources, andEOD). A detailed checklist is providedin Appendix H, “Crisis ManagementPlan Checklist.”

• Step 6. Performing Crisis ManagementOperations. As the threat increases,a series of graduated DODTHREATCONs dictate prescribedactions (DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program”).

2. Implementing the Concept

a. Installation Commanders. Commandersdirectly responsible for operating bases, ships,ports, stations, facilities, and centers in theUnited States and foreign areas are termedinstallation commanders. These individualsare responsible for the overall security andprotection of the installation and personnelby establishing AT programs. Thisresponsibility includes the security ofpersonnel, equipment, materiel, and facilities.To implement the AT program, the installation

commander directs functions to be performedas shown in Figure IV-3.

b. Preventive Planning. Installationcommanders with tenant commandrepresentation form a preventive planningorganization. The planning organization isnormally composed of those individuals whocompose the operations center during crisismanagement, as well as additional staffrepresentation from special offices such as thebudget or civilian personnel offices. Theplanning organization will establish a threatcommittee to assess current threat information.A threat assessment should be conducted atleast annually. These individuals areresponsible for the security and protection ofthe installation, and an effective AT programis a critical element of this effort. Thepreventive planning organization shouldinclude staff from operations, intelligence,counterintelligence, law enforcement and/orsecurity forces, engineers, legal, public affairs,and an NBC representative to the preventiveand crisis management committee. Thisorganization should consider the installationfrom an AT perspective to assess the threat,integrate the installation’s physical featureswith its security force capabilities, developplans to compensate for weaknesses, andrecommend enhancements (includingeducation and awareness programs) thatreduce installation vulnerabilities and improvedetection and assessment capabilities.

c. Crisis Management Planning.Installation commanders designate a specificoffice or selected staff members (often themilitary law enforcement authority oroperations staff agency) to form anorganization to plan and coordinate thecommand’s AT efforts during training andto serve as the operations center duringtraining exercises and actual crises. Becausethe members of this organization are alsomembers of the preventive planningorganization, the organization knows the key

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infrastructures and assets critical to theinstallation’s operation. To be successful,members must be predesignated, traintogether, and be prepared to performindividual and collective crisis managementmissions under the control of the installationcommander or the designated representative.Tenant commanders may also serve or havestaff representation in this organization. Themost common participants in the crisismanagement organization are listed in FigureIV-4.

• Operational Control andCoordination Center (OperationsCenter). A predesignated location for

the operations center must be readilyavailable. The operations centerfunctions by predetermined standingoperating procedures (SOPs). Asdictated by these SOPs, predeterminedand adequate communications systemsmust be made available at the location.Operational SOPs can be stressed andvalidated during normally scheduled ATevaluation exercises.

• Operational Response Forces. Theinstallation commander predesignatesand trains personnel to serve as aresponse force at the incident location.This force is trained and equipped to

ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM FUNCTIONSFOR INSTALLATION COMMANDERS

Crisis Management Planning

Communications

Command

AwarenessTrainingLogisticsAwareness

Training

Preventive Planning

AwarenessTrainingPersonal

Protection

AwarenessTraining

PhysicalSecurity

OperationsSecurity

AwarenessTraining

Drills andExercises

Awareness Training

InitialResponse

Force

Awareness TrainingPost-IncidentProcedures

Command

SpecialResponse

ForceAugmentation

SpecialResponse

ForceCommitment

OperationalControl

Figure IV-3. Antiterrorism Program Functions for Installation Commanders

IV-9

Antiterrorism Program; Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, and Port

isolate and contain the incident untilrepresentatives from the FBI or host-nation forces arrive at the scene and, ifnecessary, resolve the incident. Forceprotection funds are available within theDepartment of Defense for installationsto train and equip these response forces.

Respec t i ve Serv i ce resourcemanagement offices will provide pointsof contact for coordinating access to thesefunds. Figure IV-5 illustrates normalfunctions performed by the operationalresponse force.

d. Tenant and Transient Commanders.Commanders who are not under the controlof the installation commander but are assignedor attached to the installation are tenantcommanders. If all forces are from oneService, then Service doctrine for base defensewill apply. If the installation has tenants frommore than one Service, the provisions of JointPub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear AreaOperations,” Chapter II, Paragraph 3b apply.Tenant commanders are still responsible fortheir command’s physical security and forterrorism planning not provided by theinstallation or base commander. If the forcesconcerned meet the definition of transientforces, the provisions of Joint Pub 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”Chapter IV, Paragraph 1b apply.

3. Threat Conditions

The mechanism by which the AT programoperationally increases or decreases protectivemeasures is the DOD THREATCONSystem (Appendix J, “THREATCONSystem”). As a DOD-approved system, theterms, definitions, and prescribed securitymeasures are intended to facilitate inter-Service coordination, reporting, and supportof US military AT activities. Selection of theappropriate response to terrorist threatsremains the responsibility of the commanderhaving jurisdiction or control over threatenedfacilities or personnel.

4. Combatant Commander’sResponsibility

The geographic combatant commanderdesignates a staff office, usually in theOperations Division, law enforcement, or

CRISIS MANAGEMENTPARTICIPANTS

-Personnel-Intelligence and/or Security-Operations-Counterintelligence-Logistics-Civil Affairs-Special Staff Sections:

--Military Law EnforcementAuthorities

--Legal--Public Affairs--Transportation--Aviation--Communications--Engineers and/or Utilities--Medical Activity and/or Red

Cross--Chaplain--Psychologist--Explosive Ordnance

Disposal-Major Tenant Commands-Local Investigative FieldOffice (e.g., CriminalInvestigation Division,Naval Criminal InvestigativeService Command

-Civilian Authorities and/orRepresentatives

-Federal, State, Local,or Host-Nation Police

-Host-Nation Militaryand IntelligenceActivities at OverseasLocations

Figure IV-4. Crisis ManagementParticipants

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security section, to supervise, inspect,test, and report on the base AT programswithin the theater. This staff section alsocoordinates with host-nation authorities andUS embassies. Simultaneously, theIntelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2),under the combatant commander’s authority,

ON-SITE OPERATIONAL RESPONSE STRUCTURE

SECURITY REACTION/MANAGEMENT

SUPPORT

Military Police/SecurityForces (on duty/on call)

Control Staff LogisticsPersonnelIntelligenceCounterintelligence

Police Reaction/AssaultForce

Negotiations Personnel Fire Department

Guard Forces Liaison Personnel Explosive OrdnanceDisposal

Auxiliary SecurityForces

Public Affairs Medical Personnel

Staff Judge Advocate CommunicationsPersonnel

Figure IV-5. On-Site Operational Response Structure

disseminates intelligence on terrorist activitiesto the subordinate commands to ensure thatthe AT measures are appropriate to the threat.The manner in which the geographiccombatant commander places importance onthese staff functions usually has a direct affecton the AT readiness of subordinate commands.

CHAPTER VINTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,

AND THREAT ANALYSIS

V-1

SECTION A.INTELLIGENCE AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence andCounterintelligence Support

Intelligence and counterintelligence are thefirst line of defense in an AT program. Awell-planned, systematic, all-sourceintelligence and counterintelligence programis essential. The role of intelligence andcounterintelligence is to identify the threat,provide advance warning, and disseminatecritical intelligence in a usable form for thecommander. Additionally, counterintelligenceprovides warning of potential terroristattacks and provides information for CToperations. This chapter provides thereader with the elements of the intelligencecycle that have particular importance in aviable AT program. Effective intelligenceand counterintelligence support requireseffort, planning and direction, collectionand analysis, production, investigations,and dissemination. The entire process isimportant in providing decision makerswith information and timely warnings uponwhich to recommend AT actions.

2. Sources

The primary sources of intelligence andcounterintelligence for the AT program areopen-source information, criminal records,government intelligence, and localinformation . (See Figure V-1.)

“. . .we must recognize the appearance of a new and particularly dangerousform of attack. I refer to subversive insurgency, supported from the outsideagainst legitimate free governments.”

General Maxwell Taylor

a. Open-Source Information. Thisinformation is publicly available and can becollected, retained, and stored without

SOURCES OFINTELLIGENCE AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

News media, hearings,publications, referenceservices, private data services,Internet

OPEN-SOURCEINFORMATION

Distributed on a need-to-knowbasis throughout the Services

GOVERNMENTINTELLIGENCE

Collection, retention, anddissemination regulated by lawenforcement channels

CRIMINALRECORDS

Service member, civil servant,family member, individuals withregional knowledge

LOCALINFORMATION

Figure V-1. Sources of Intelligenceand Counterintelligence

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special authorization. The news media areexcellent open sources of information onterrorism. The news media report many majorterrorist incidents and often include in-depthreports on individuals, groups, or variousgovernment counterstrategies. Governmentsources include congressional hearings;publications by DIA, FBI, the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), and DOS; and thenational criminal justice reference services.Additionally, there are private data servicesthat offer timely information on terroristactivities worldwide. Terrorist groups andtheir affiliates may also have manuals,pamphlets, and newsletters that reveal theirobjectives, tactics, and possible targets. Opensources are not a substitute for classifiedcapabilities, but they can provide a valuablefoundation and context for rapid orientationof the analyst and the consumer and for theestablishment of collection requirementswhich take full advantage of the unique accessprovided by classified sources.

b. Criminal Records. Both military andcivil law enforcement agencies collectcriminal records. Because terrorist acts arecriminal acts, criminal records are a majorsource for terrorist intelligence. Commandersmust work through established lawenforcement liaison channels because thecollection, retention, and dissemination ofcriminal records are regulated. Local militarycriminal investigative offices of the US ArmyCriminal Investigations Command(USACIDC), Naval Criminal InvestigativeService (NCIS), Air Force Office of SpecialInvestigations (AFOSI), and Headquarters,US Marine Corps, Criminal InvestigationsDivision, maintain current information thatwill assist in determining the local terroristthreat.

c. Government Intelligence. TheCommunity Counterterrorism Board isresponsible for coordinating the nationalintelligence agencies concerned withcombatting international terrorism. These

agencies include the CIA (lead agency), DIA,National Security Agency, DOS, DOJ, FBI,the Department of Energy, the DOT, USCG,FAA, Federal Communications Commission,and the Department of Defense. Serviceintelligence and counterintelligenceproduction organizations that compilecomprehens ive in te l l i gence andcounterintelligence from these agencies fordistribution on a need-to-know basisthroughout the Services include: the ArmyCounterintelligence Center; the NavyAntiterrorism Alert Center; Headquarters, USMarine Corps, Counterintelligence; andHeadquarters, AFOSI. In combatantcommands, the J-2 is responsible for theintegration of intelligence policy issues acrossthe command staff. The counterintelligencesuppor t o f f i ce r (C ISO) p rov idescounterintelligence interface between thecombatant command, the componentcommands, and the Joint Staff.

d. Local Information. Other valuablesources of information are the individualService member, civil servant, family member,and individuals with regional knowledge suchas college faculty or members of culturalorganizations. Local crime or neighborhoodwatch programs can also be valuable sourcesof information and can serve as a means tokeep individuals informed in dispersed andremote areas. Intelligence exchanges withlocal government agencies throughcooperative arrangements can also augmentregional information.

3. Responsibilities of USGovernment Lead Agencies

a. General. The FBI is responsible forcollecting and processing domesticterrorist information. Overseas, terroristintelligence is principally a CIAresponsibility, but the DOS, DIA, and hostnation are also active players. Militaryintelligence activities are conducted inaccordance with Presidential Executive

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Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis

orders, Federal law, SOFAs, MOUs, andapplicable Service regulations.

b. Responsibilities of IntelligenceActivities.

• The geographic combatantcommander, through the commander’sJ-2 Joint Intelligence Center and theCISO and in consultation with DIA,CIA, embassy staff, country team, andapplicable host-nation authorities,o b t a i n s i n t e l l i g e n c e a n dcounterintelligence specific to theoperational area and issues intelligenceand counterintelligence reports,advisories, and assessments to the unitswithin the combatant command’s controlor operating within the combatant

command’s AOR. This network is thebackbone for communicatingintelligence and counterintelligenceinformation, advisories, and warning ofterrorist threats throughout the region.

• DODD 2000.12, “DoD CombatingTerrorism Program,” tasked theSecretaries of the MilitaryDepartments to ensure that acapability exists to collect, receive,evaluate from a Service perspective,and disseminate all relevant data onterrorist activities, trends, andindicators of imminent attack. Toaccomplish this task, each Secretaryappoints a military intelligence orcounterintelligence agency (US ArmyIntelligence and Security Command,

SHINING PATH

Shining Path (in Spanish, Sendero Luminoso ) sprung up in the isolated Andeandepartment of Ayacucho, one of the poorest regions of Peru. Its roots wereembedded in the Sino-Soviet split of 1963, when a small circle of universitylecturers led by Abimael Guzman formed a core group within the break-away,pro-China faction of the Peruvian Communist Party.

The faction’s ideology is an idiosyncratic mixture of the theories of Marx, Leninand Mao, mainly Mao, knotted together by Guzman in accordance with hisanalysis of the history and social realities of Peru. In claiming to be the “fourthsword” of communism, Guzman conceives himself as carrying on where Marx,Lenin and Mao left off, partly intellectually, but mainly in being at the vanguardof international communist revolution, which he regards as a scientific-historical inevitability temporarily betrayed by revisionists in the hands ofreactionary imperialists. Guzman’s achievement rests in molding a cohesivebody of thought sufficiently relevant to Peru for it to have inflamed universitylecturers, industrial workers and illiterate peasants alike.

Shining Path divides combat into four forms: “armed” propaganda such asslogan painting, enforced radio broadcasts and street rallies; sabotage aimedat suffocating the state economy; “selective” killings, targeting people in keypositions opposed to them, whether state authorities, political leaders, priests,businessmen or, in their context of being “government collaborators,” foreignand local aid workers; and guerrilla warfare to take on the security forces andarmy-backed peasant militia.

SOURCE: Simon Strong Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological T errorism

Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, April 1993

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NCIS, AFOSI) to conduct intelligenceand counterintelligence activities directedagainst terrorists and to detect, neutralize,or deter terrorist acts. To accomplish thismission, the Military Departmentintelligence agency establishes, asneeded, counterintelligence offices on anarea basis to collect and disseminateinformation to combatant commanders.Each Military Department intelligenceagency is responsible for the following:

•• Provides overall direction andcoordination of the Servicecounterintelligence effort.

•• Operates a 24-hour operations centerto receive and disseminate worldwideterrorist threat information to and fromthe combatant command J-2s, applicableService staff elements, subordinatecommands, and national agencies.

•• Provides Service commanders withinformation on terrorist threatsconcerning their personnel, facilities, andoperations.

•• With the FBI or host-nationauthorities, investigates terrorist incidents

for intelligence, counterintelligence, andforce protection aspects.

•• Provides terrorist threat informationin threat briefings.

•• Conducts liaison with representativesfrom Federal, state, and local agenciesas well as host-nation agencies toexchange information on terrorists.

•• Provides international terrorismsummaries and other threat informationto supported commanders. On request,provides current intelligence andcounterintelligence data on terroristgroups and disseminates time-sensitiveand specific threat warnings toappropriate commands.

• Investigative Agencies. Servicecriminal investigative services (e.g.,USACIDC, NCIS, AFOSI) collect andevaluate criminal information anddisseminate terrorist-related informationto supported installation and activitycommanders as well as to the Servicelead agency. As appropriate, criminalinvestigative elements also conductliaison with local military police or

Success in thwarting terrorist activities requires a coordinatedintelligence effort from several US government agencies.

V-5

Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis

security forces and civilian lawenforcement agencies.

• Intelligence staff elements ofcommanders at all echelons will:

•• Promptly report all actual orsuspected terrorist incidents, activities,and early warnings of terrorist attack tosupported and supporting activities, thelocal counterintelligence office, andthrough the chain of command to theService lead agency.

•• Initiate and maintain liaison with thesecurity forces or provost marshal’s office,local military criminal investigative offices,local counterintelligence offices, securityoffices, host-nation agencies, and (asrequired or allowed by law or policy) otherorganizations, elements, and individuals.

•• In cooperation with the localcounterintelligence offices, develop andpresent terrorism threat awareness briefingsto all personnel within their commands.

• Law enforcement staff elements willbe responsible for the following:

•• Report all actual or suspected terroristincidents or activities to their immediatecommander, supported activities, andService lead agency through establishedreporting channels.

•• Initiate and maintain liaison with localcounterintelligence offices and militarycriminal investigative offices.

•• Maintain liaison with Federal, host-nation, and local law enforcementagencies or other civil and military ATagencies as appropriate.

• Installation, base, ship, unit, and portsecurity officers will be responsible forthe following:

•• Report all actual or suspected terroristincidents or activities to their immediatecommander, supporting military lawenforcement office, other supportedactivities, local counterintelligenceoffice, and local military criminalinvestigation office.

•• Conduct regular liaison visits with thesupporting military law enforcementoffice, counterintelligence office, andlocal criminal investigation office.

•• Coordinate with the supportingmilitary law enforcement office andcounterintelligence offices on theirpreparation and continual updating of thethreat assessments.

•• Assist in providing terrorism threatawareness training and briefings to allpersonnel and family members asrequired by local situations.

4. Information Requirements

To focus the threat analysis, intelligenceand counterintelligence officers developinformation requirements (IRs) foridentifying potential terrorist targets basedon existing knowledge of an organization.Terrorist group IRs are shown in Figure V-2.

SECTION B. THREATASSESSMENT

5. Preparation of ThreatAnalysis

Terrorist threat analysis is a continualprocess of compiling and examining allavailable information in order to identifyterrorist targeting of US interests. Avulnerability analysis is a continual processof compiling and examining information onthe security posture of a facility. The threatanalysis is then paired with the facility’s

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Joint Pub 3-07.2

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Organization, size, and composition of group

Organization's long- and short-range goals

International and national support; e.g., moral, physical, financial

Identity of group leaders, opportunists, and idealists

Sources of supply and support

Planning ability

Preferred tactics and operations

Willingness for self-sacrifice

Equipment and weapons (on-hand and required)

Medical support availability

Motivation

Religious, political, and ethnic affiliations

Recruiting methods, locations, and targets; e.g., students

Group intelligence capabilities and connections with other terroristgroups

Important dates

Internal discipline

Willingness to kill

Group skills (demonstrated or perceived); e.g., sniping, demolitions,masquerade, industrial sabotage, airplane or boat operations,tunneling, underwater, electronic surveillance, poisons orcontaminants

Transportation (on-hand and required)

Means and methods of command and control

Means and methods of communicating to the public

Figure V-2. Information Requirements

V-7

Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis

vulnerability analysis to create the threat andvulnerability assessment. Threat analysis isan essential step in identifying probabilityof terrorist attack. To enhance this capabilityto collect and analyze information from manysources, DIA maintains a terrorism data baseon the Migration Defense Intelligence ThreatData System and the combatant command’sJ-2; the CISO, in consultation with DIA,focuses this data base information andregional information toward the intelligenceand counterintelligence needs specific to thesecurity of the command. Country threatassessments and information about terroristorganizations, biographies, and incidents inthe data base are disseminated to thecommands and Services. Commands at allechelons then augment or refine the DIA’sanalyses to focus on their area of interest. Thisprocess is operative across the range ofmilitary operations, promotes coordinationbetween all levels of the intelligence,counterintelligence, and law enforcementcommunities, broadens acquisition channels,and enhances timely distribution ofinformation to the supported commander.

a. Several factors complicate intelligenceand counterintelligence collection andoperations. The small size of terrorist groups,coupled with their mobility and cellularorganization, make it difficult to identify themembers. Unlike other criminals, terroristcadres often receive training incounterintelligence and security measuresfrom foreign intelligence agencies or otherterrorists. Additionally, the traditionalorientation of police organizations is towardindividual criminals, while militaryintelligence organizations focus onconventional forces. Terrorist activity,therefore, requires some degree ofreorientation for police and militaryintelligence and counterintelligencecollection and operations.

b. The ability of an intelligence systemto provide critical and timely information

to the user depends not only on efficientcollection and processing, but also on theability to organize, store, and rapidlyretrieve this information. This capability,coupled with early warning, carefulobservation, and assessment of threat activity,enhances the probability of accuratelypredicting the types and timing of terroristattacks.

c. Commanders must carefully exercisejudgment in estimating both the existingterrorist threat and the need for changesin antiterrorism measures. Commandersshould consider the following key questions:

• What has changed (mission, politicalclimate, installation and unit personnelor equipment, terrorist capabilities)?

• What affect will the changes have on thesecurity posture?

Extraordinary security measures, unlesspart of a deliberate deception during criticalor high-threat situations, draw attention anddetract from mission accomplishment.Sound physical security, personnel who areaware, an accurate threat assessment, andwell-rehearsed response plans reduce theprobability of a successful terrorist venture.The aim is to make an attack too difficult orthe level of risk unacceptable to the terrorist.However, the ability of the terrorists to reactquickly and adapt swiftly in modifying theirown tactics, techniques, and procedurescannot be overlooked.

d. A threat analysis should be written tothe factors below:

• Factor 1, Existence: A terrorist groupis present, assessed to be present, or ableto gain access to a given locale.

• Factor 2, Capability: The acquired,assessed, or demonstrated level ofcapability to conduct terrorist attacks.

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• Factor 3, Intentions: Recentdemonstrated anti-US terrorist activity,or stated and/or assessed intent toconduct such activity.

• Factor 4, History: Demonstratedterrorist activity over time.

• Factor 5, Targeting: Current credibleinformation on activity indicative ofpreparations for specific terroristoperations and/or specific intelligencewhich shows that an attack is imminent.

• Factor 6, Security Environment: Theinternal pol i t ical and securityconsiderations that impact on thecapability of terrorist elements to carryout their operations.

e. To determine the level of threat, seeFigure V-3.

6. Preparation of Criticality andVulnerability Assessments

Having obtained a threat analysis, thecommander and staff proceed to complete thethreat assessment by conducting thecriticality and vulnerability assessments.This process considers the following:

a. Mission. A review and analysis of themission of the installation, base, ship, unit,or port in relation to the terrorist threat. Thereview should assess the cost of AT measuresin terms of lost or reduced missioneffectiveness. Often the best operationalmethod and routine may be the worst tocounter potential terrorist activities. It shouldthen assess the level of acceptable risk tofacilities and personnel given the estimatederosion of mission effectiveness. This reviewand analysis is performed routinely andparticularly for deployment.

b. Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, orPort Assessment. This step combines the

results of the following considerations tocreate the installation, base, ship, unit, orport assessment. The assessment providesthe staff with the overall vulnerability toterrorist attack. The staff then developsthe crisis management plan (see AppendixG, “Crisis Management Plan Format”)from this assessment. The crisismanagement plan addresses all terroristthreat levels regardless of the present level.THREATCONs (see Appendix J,“THREATCON System”) are then appliedin accordance with the local threat. Theconsiderations are as follows:

• Vulnerability. The VA is a self-assessmenttool. The installation, base, ship, unit, orport uses the VA to evaluate its vulnerabilityto terrorist attack. The more vulnerable aninstallation, base, ship, unit, or port is, themore attractive it becomes to terrorist attack.Appendix A, “Vulnerability Assessment,”

THREAT LEVEL

CRITICAL

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

NEGLIGIBLE

Factors 1, 2, and 5 are present. Factors3 or 4 may or may not be present

Factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 are present

Factors 1, 2, and 4 are present. Factor 3may or may not be present

Factors 1 and 2 are present. Factor 4may or may not be present

Factors 1 and 2 may or may not bepresent

Figure V-3. Threat Level

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Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis

provides a guide to developing anassessment capability.

• Criticality. The criticality assessmentidentifies key assets and infrastructureslocated on and adjacent to theinstallation, base, ship, unit, or port, suchas the existence of symbolic targets thattraditionally appeal to a specific terroristgroup (e.g., headquarters, buildings andmonuments). It addresses the impact oftemporary or permanent loss of keyassets or infrastructures to the ability ofthe installation, base, ship, unit, or portto perform its mission. The staffdetermines and prioritizes critical assets.The commander approves the prioritizedlist. The assessment:

•• Selects key assets;

•• Determines whether critical functionscan be duplicated under various attackscenarios;

•• Determines time required to duplicatekey assets or infrastructure efforts iftemporarily or permanently lost;

•• Determines vulnerability of key assetsor infrastructures to bombs, vehiclecrashes, armed assault, and sabotage; and

•• Determines priority of response tokey assets and infrastructures in the

event of fire, multiple bombings, orother terrorist acts.

• Damage. The damage assessmentdetermines the ability of theinstallation, base, ship, unit, or portto plan for and respond to a terroristattack against key assets andinfrastructures.

• Recovery Procedures. The recoveryprocedures assessment determines thecapability to recover from thetemporary or permanent loss of keyassets and infrastructures. Based onthis assessment, the staff establishesrecovery procedures to ensure thecontinued ability to perform themission.

7. Drills and Exercises

Multi-echelon wargaming of possibleterrorist attacks is the best test, shortof an actual incident, to analyze theability of an installation, base, ship, unit,or port to respond. Drills and exercisestest suspected vulnerabilities and ATmeasures. These exercises and drills alsotrain the staff as well as reaction forceleadership and help maintain a validthreat assessment by identifying andadjusting to changing threat capabilitiesas well as installation, base, ship, unit,or port vulnerabilities.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VICRISIS MANAGEMENT EXECUTION

VI-1

1. General

Chapter IV, “Antiterrorism Program;Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, and Port,”structured the framework for an integrated ATprogram. This chapter provides commanderswith a specific view of the program as anincident occurs. When the program ischallenged, crisis management executionrequires special considerations, which areshown in Figure VI-1.

2. Initial Response

Either on-duty military law enforcementpatrols or guard personnel usually provideinitial response to a terrorist attack. Theinitial response force is under the controlof the on-scene senior officer ornoncommissioned officer or senior enlistedperson who has assumed responsibility. Oncethe initial response force has responded to theincident and determined the circumstances,the installation commander activates requiredforces and begins notification procedures tomilitary and civilian authorities.

a. Initial Response Force. The initialresponse force immediately identifies andreports the nature of the situation, isolatesthe incident, and contains the situation untilrelieved by the reaction force commander.Initial response force actions are critical. Eachshift of the daily security force must havetrained personnel who are aware of the threatand are capable of reacting promptly to anynew development. For example, if the attackis a bombing, ambush, assassination, orfirebombing, the terrorists may escape before

“If historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary guerrillawar, it is that military measures alone will not suffice.”

BGen S.B. Griffith, USMCIntroduction to Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla W arfare, 1961

additional forces arrive. In these cases, theinitial response force provides medical aid,seals off the crime scene, and secures otherpotential targets in case the initial attack wasa diversionary tactic. If the event is a hostageor barricade situation, the initial response forceseals off and isolates the incident scene toensure that no one enters or leaves the area.The initial response force must also beprepared to locate witnesses and direct themto a safe location for debriefing. For foreignincidents, the initial response force must beprepared to interface with host-nation policeor military forces that may also be respondingto the incident.

b. Installation, Base, Ship, Unit, or PortCommander. The commander, dependingupon established SOPs, activates thecommand center, notifies specializedresponse forces, and immediately reportsthe incident to the appropriate superiormilitary command operations centers, militaryinvestigative agency, FBI, civilian authoritiesand, if a foreign incident, to host-nationauthorities as required.

c. The Operations Center. Theoperations center serves as the commandpost at a predetermined location.Communications are immediately establishedwith the initial response force containing thesituation, the specially trained operationalresponse force preparing to take over oraugment the initial response force, and othercritical participants as predesignated in theoperational center’s SOPs. There are usuallythree standard secure communicationscircuits: command net (administrative

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matters, support, routine traffic), tactical net(operations), and intelligence net. The tacticalnet may be divided in order to accommodatethe myriad of security activities that transpireon a large military installation during anemergency situation. Ideally, static postsshould be on one tactical net, the mobilepatrols on another, and other patrols uniqueto the installation on yet another frequency.If necessary, a dedicated net for negotiationsmay be necessary if a landline cannot beestablished with the terrorists.

d. Confirmation. Because jurisdictiondepends on whether the crime is a terroristincident, the response force must identifythe type of incident as quickly as possible.If the FBI or host nation assumes control, thenthe response force must be prepared tocoordinate the operational handover and assistas needed. For example, the initial orspecialized response forces may be requiredto provide outer perimeter security while theFBI or host-nation forces take overresponsibility for the inner perimeter securityand the handling of the situation. At the sametime, the operational coordination and controlcenter, as well as the response forces, must beprepared to manage the entire event if the FBIor host nation either does not assume controlor relinquishes control. The key here is forthe installation, base, ship, unit, or portforces to always prepare for the worstpossible contingency. This level of readinessrequires considerable sustainment training.

3. Response

The response to a terrorist incident variesdepending on the nature and location of theincident. Recognizing that many incidents donot develop beyond the first phase, there aregenerally three distinct phases (shown inFigure VI-2) through which an incident mayevolve.

a. Phase I is the commitment of locallyavailable resources. This includes available

CRISIS MANAGEMENTEXECUTION

CONSIDERATIONS

Awareness of the possibilityof multiple incidents ordiversionary tactics

Notifications to thecombatant command,appropriate militaryinvestigative agency, FBI, andhost-nation officials

Negotiation, if the situationrequires it

Preparation of after-actionmeasures to protect theevidence, handle capturedpersonnel, identify andprocess hostages, documentactions for use inprosecution, and identifyneeded changes to theexisting antiterrorism plan

Activation of requiredresources by combatantcommander and base underattack

Exercise of the public affairsofficer's role with newsmedia

Implementation of tacticalmeasures to contain ordefeat the threat

Figure VI-1. Crisis ManagementExecution Considerations

VI-3

Crisis Management Execution

military law enforcement personnel, securityforce patrols or guards, and available backupunits. Ideally, all law enforcement or securitypersonnel are familiar with local SOPs forterrorist incidents and have practiced these

procedures as part of their unit trainingprogram. They must be prepared to secure,contain, and gather information at the sceneuntil the beginning of Phase II. Becauseterrorist incidents often include diversionarytactics, response forces must be alert to thisfact while securing and containing the incidentscene. The evacuation of threatened areas isa priority function.

b. Phase II is the augmentation of theinitial response force by additional lawenforcement and security personnel and/or a specially trained response force —special reaction team, emergency servicesteam, FBI regional special weapons andtactics units or the hostage rescue teams,or host-nation tactical units. This phasebegins when the operational center isactivated. During this phase, either the FBIor the host nation may assume jurisdictionover the incident. If that occurs, militaryforces must be ready to support the operation.The installation, base, ship, unit, or portspecially trained reaction force must be readyfor employment in this phase of the operation.In any country in which a terrorist incidentagainst an American facility or unit occurs,the DOS and the US Embassy will play thekey role in coordinating the US Governmentand host country response to such an incident.

TERRORIST INCIDENTPHASES

PHASE ONE

The commitment of locally availableresources - military law enforcementpersonnel, security force patrol orguards, and available backup units

PHASE TWO

The augmentation of the initialresponse force by additional lawenforcement and security personneland/or a specially trained responseforce

PHASE THREE

The commitment of the specializedFederal Bureau of Investigation,Department of Defense, or host-nation counterterrorist force

Figure VI-2. Terrorist Incident Phases

Joint forces must be prepared to play an active security rolethroughout all three terrorist incident phases.

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c. Phase III is the commitment of thespecialized FBI, DOD, or host-nationcounterterrorist for ce. This is the phasein which steps are taken to terminate theincident. Incident termination may be theresult of successful negotiations, assault,or other actions including terroristsurrender. Because identifying the

terrorists, as opposed to the hostages, maybe difficult, capturing forces must handleand secure all initial captives as possibleterrorists.

d. Response Sequence. A typical responsesequence to a terrorist incident is shown inFigure VI-3.

RESPONSE TO A TERRORIST INCIDENT

Terrorist IncidentSAC Establishes JointCommand Center with

Military (Coequal)

Commander RetainsAuthority

Commander ActivatesCommand Center

SAC Determines RequiredAssets

Mission-EssentialPersonnel Arrive at

Designated Location

FBI CounterterrorismAssets Arrive

Response ForceIsolates and Reports

Intelligence

FBI or Host NationAssumes Control

Commander NotifiesMilitary Chain of

Command

FBI Agents ReconnoiterTerrorist Incident

Notify FBI, CID, NCIS, orAFOSI Who Will Notify

Host Nation (if overseas)or FBI (in the United

States)

SAC Forwarded toIncident

Force ActionsConsidered

Military Force Utilized

Terrorist IncidentResolved

FBI Determines ifAdditional Forces are

Required andContacts Attorney

GeneralWill FBI or Host NationAssume Jurisdiction?

NO

YES

REFERTO "A"

REFERTO "A"

A

ACRONYMSAFOSI

CID

FBI

NCIS

SAC

SF

SP/MP

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

Criminal Investigation Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

Special Agent in Charge

Security Forces

Shore Patrol/Military Police

SP, MP, and/or SFProvide Inner and Outer

Security

Figure VI-3. Response to a Terrorist Incident

VI-5

Crisis Management Execution

4. Special Considerations

The following special considerations applyin implementing crisis management (SeeFigure VI-4).

a. Establishing and ControllingCommunications. A crucial aspect ofimplementing the AT plan is establishing andcontrolling secure communications amongthe forces in the incident area, theoperations center, and the special responseforce. The terrorists’ communications withnegotiators must also be established quicklyand access to these communications must belimited. Once this is done, all other elements

of the communications plan are activated.Communications personnel must be able torespond to changing needs during the incidentand be able to maintain, over a prolongedperiod, control of all incoming and outgoingcommun ica t ions as we l l as thecommunications channels included in the ATplan.

b. Evidence. Witness testimony andphotographic evidence, for example, areimportant in achieving a successfulprosecution. Maintaining a continuous chainof custody on evidence obtained during anincident requires documenting the location,control, and possession of the evidence from

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Establishing andControlling

Communications EvidenceAfte

r-Acti

on

Repor

ting

Imm

edia

te P

ost-

Inci

dent

Act

ions

Logistics

Dispos

ition

ofApp

rehe

nded

Perso

nnel

Reports

Public Affairs

Figure VI-4. Special Considerations

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the time custody is established untilpresenting the evidence in court. Failure tomaintain the chain can result in exclusion ofthe evidence. Types of evidence for whichthe chain must be established include:

• Photographs and videotapes taken duringthe incident;

• Physical evidence, including any itemsused by the terrorists;

• Tape recordings of conversationsbetween terrorists and hostagenegotiators;

• Reports prepared by the military lawenforcement authorities who initiallyresponded to the incident scene;

• Eyewitness testimony; and

• Demand notes or other written messagesprepared by the terrorists.

c. Logistics. An inherent responsibility forcommand authorities is the considerationof logistics to support the specialcircumstances in a terrorist incident.Shortages of communications equipment,photographic supplies, and vehicles, forinstance, will reduce the capability of responseand response forces.

d. Disposition of ApprehendedPersonnel. Apprehended militarypersonnel must be handled according toService regulations and applicableinstallation, base, ship, unit, or port SOPs.In the United States, civilian detainees mustbe released to the FBI or US FederalMarshals for disposition. In foreignincidents, civilian detainees will beprocessed according to the SOFA,international agreement, or otherarrangements with that particular country.The command military legal authority should

be consulted before releasing any individualto host-nation authorities.

e. Reports. Reporting to higherheadquarters is an important element inany special threat or terrorist situation.Each Service and command should have areporting procedure that requires a timelyreport of the incident to higher militaryauthorities. The crisis management planshould dictate required reports and timelinesfor notification. An after-action report shouldbe prepared within 7 working days aftertermination of the event. This should includeall staff journals and other documentation withdetailed information concerning dispositionof evidence and captured individuals. Thecommand legal authority and military lawenforcement personnel should ensure that thisreport is in sufficient detail to meetprosecution requirements.

f. Public Affairs. Principal public affairsobjectives of an AT plan are to ensure thataccurate information is provided to thepublic (including news media) and tocommunicate a calm, measured, andreasonable reaction to the ongoing event.Public affairs programs are designed to initiatethe following:

• Identify terrorist activities as criminalacts not justifying public support.

• Reiterate US policy on terrorism, whichidentifies all terrorist acts as criminal acts,mandates no concessions to terrorists,refuses to pay ransom, and isolates thosenations identified as fostering terrorism.

• Support DOD public affairs strategy onreleasing information pertaining to ATplans, operations, or forces involved inantiterrorist operations.

•• The DOJ has public affairsresponsibility for incidents occurring on

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Crisis Management Execution

US territory if the FBI assumesjurisdiction for resolving the incident.

•• When US military antiterrorist forcesare employed, the Department of Defenseprovides a spokesman for dealing onlywith antiterrorist military operationalmatters. On military installations, theDOJ may delegate the public affairsresponsibility to a designated DODrepresentative.

•• The DOS coordinates public affairsduring terrorist incidents overseas. TheDOS may delegate the public affairsresponsibility to a designated DODrepresentative.

•• The Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense (Public Affairs)is the single point of contact for allpublic affairs aspects of US militaryantiterrorist actions. Although there isno mandatory requirement to releaseinformation, installation commanders areadvised to exercise prudent judgment onsuch matters.

•• When the operations center isactivated, operations include theactivities of the PAO and media center.The media center is located in a separatelocation from the operations center. ThePAO is represented in both theoperations center and media center andprepares media releases and conductsbriefings at the media center during theincident, using information obtained bythe PAO and cleared by the operationscenter and the commander. The PAOmust be fully apprised of the situationas it develops. The mediarepresentatives should not have directaccess to hostages, hostage takers,communications nets, or anyone directlyinvolved in a terrorist incident unless the

PAO has cleared such contact with theoperations center. DOD experience withmedia representatives has shown thatbringing them in early under reasonableconditions and restrictionscommensurate with the risk and gravityof the event and providing themthorough briefings maintains DODcredibility and preserves freedom ofinformation. Appendix M, “PublicAffairs Checklist,” provides additionalguidance.

g. Immediate Post-Incident Actions.During the immediate post-incident phase,medical and psychological attention (alongwith other support services) should begiven to all personnel involved in theoperation, including captured terrorists. Afinal briefing should be given to mediapersonnel; however, they should not bepermitted to visit the incident site. Becauseof the criminal nature of the terrorist event,the site must be secured until the crime sceneinvestigation is completed by the appropriateinvestigative agency. It is also imperative thatevery action that occurred during the incidentbe recorded.

h. After-Action Reporting. In theaftermath of a terrorist incident, theoperations center personnel review all theevents and actions to revise the threatestimate, if necessary, and to determine theeffectiveness of the AT plan. All personnelinvolved in the AT operation should bedebriefed and the debriefings recorded. Thisinformation will be used to develop lessonslearned and after-action reports. It is theresponsibility of the commander to ensure thatall required after-action reports are preparedand subsequently reviewed withrepresentatives of the command legal office.After-action reports should be submitted inaccordance CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIPREVENTIVE MEASURES AND CONSIDERATIONS

VII-1

1. Commander’s Responsibility

Preventive and protective security measuresshould be taken by military units andindividual Service members to protectthemselves and their ability to accomplishtheir mission during deployment andexpeditionary operations. Additionally, restand recuperation (R&R) facilities also requireclose consideration. These facilities arefrequently vulnerable due to their location andgenerally easy access. Service personnel areat risk of lowering their guard while usingthese R&R facilities. The installation, base,ship, unit, or port AT plan provides themechanism to ensure readiness againstterrorist attacks while the unit performs itstactical and technical mission duringdeployments. The degree of the protectionrequired depends on the threat in a givenlocation. Commanders must constantlyevaluate security against the terroristthreat in order to effectively evaluatesecurity requirements. This responsibilitycannot be ignored in any situation.

2. AT Force Protection inHigh-Risk Areas

The following are antiterrorism tactics,techniques, and procedures for high riskmissions; they represent worst-caseprocedures. Security for forces performingsecurity assistance, peacekeeping, mobiletraining teams, and other small militaryactivities can be derived from these measures.

a. Installations, Bases, Ships, Sites, andNon-Urban Facilities. Forces are

“A general should direct his whole attention to the tranquillity of hiscantonments, in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety, andrepose in security from his fatigues.”

Attributed to Frederick the Great

frequently employed for securityoperations or other short-term,conventional, combat-related tasks. Easilydefended locations are often rare in urbanareas because of building and populationdensity or lack of proper cover andconcealment and inability to create perimeterstand-off. Political restrictions may also limitthe military’s ability to construct fortificationsor disrupt areas, but commanders must takeall practical means to ensure force protectionand identify shortcomings to appropriatelevels of command for resolution. Militaryplanners should adapt existing structures toprovide protection based on the mission,potential for attack, and ability to usesurroundings effectively.

• Estimate of the Situation. Thecommander and staff should complete athorough estimate of the situation usingmission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, andpolitical planning factors in developinga security assessment. The followingquestions aid in developing an estimateof the terrorist situation:

•• Mission: (1) Who is being tasked? (2)What is the task? (3) When and where isthis task to take place? (4) Why are weperforming this task?

•• Enemy: (1) Who are the potentialterrorists? (2) What is known about theterrorists? (3) How do the terroristsreceive information? (4) How might theterrorists attack? (Think like theterrorists! Would you ambush or raid?Would you use snipers, mortars, rockets,

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air or ground attacks, suicide attacks,firebombs, or bicycle, car, or truckbombs?) (5) Does your unit haveroutines? (6) What is the potential forcivil disturbances and could terrorists useor influence these disturbances in anattack? Local law enforcement personnel(e.g., host-nation police) can at times bea valuable source for this information.

•• Terrain: (1) What are the strengthsand weaknesses of the installation, base,ship, port, and local surroundings? (2)Are the avenues of approach above orbelow the water or ground? (3) Are thereobservation areas, dead spaces, fields offire, illumination, or no-fire areas (e.g.,schools)? (4) Are there tall buildings,water towers, or terrain either exterior oradjacent to the perimeter that couldbecome critical terrain in the event of anattack?

•• Troops: (1) Determine what is thefriendly situation. (2) Are other USforces or equipment available? (3) Areengineers and/or EOD in the area? Willthey be able to provide support? (4) Areemergency reinforcements available? (5)Are MWD teams available? (6) Whatare the host-nation responsibilities,capabilities, and attitudes towardproviding assistance? (7) What restraintswill be imposed by the US Governmenton the show or use of force?

•• Time: (1) What is the duration of themission? (2) Are there time constraints?(3) Will there be sufficient time toconstruct force protection facilities suchas barriers, fences, and lights?

•• Political Planning Factors: (1) Arethere host-nation concerns or attitudesthat will impact on the situation? (2) Willthe situation be influenced by theexistence of any religious or racialconcerns?

• Develop Plan. Defenses should includea combination of law enforcement andsecurity assets, fortifications, sensors,obstacles, local-hire security forces (ifapplicable), unit guards, deception, andon-call support from reaction forces.Each situation requires its owncombination of abilities based onavailable resources and perceivedneed. Figure VII-1 provides generalguidance concerning fortificationmaterials.

•• Obstacles. Obstacles slow down ordisrupt vehicles and personnelapproaching an area. Constructingvehicle barriers by using commerciallyinstalled electronic barriers, trenches,masonry barriers, concrete-filled oildrums, or vehicles staggered across theroute creating a zigzag maze forcesvehicles to slow down and make sharpturns and exposes the driver to captureor direct fire. Scattering speed bumps orsandbags on the route further slowstraffic. Designing entrance gates to allowaccess to authorized personnel whiledenying access to unauthorized personnelby use of controlled turnstiles providestime for observation and protection toguards and slows down direct frontalattacks. Fences, entrance gates, andobstacles should be illuminated toprovide easy observation. Obstaclesmust be covered by observation and fire.

•• Local Security. Local security mustbe around-the-clock to provideobservation, early warning and, ifnecessary, live fire capabilities. Thesecurity should include guards atentrances to check right of entry inobservation posts (OPs), aroundperimeter, and on rooftops to view thesurrounding area. These guard positionsmust also be integrated into the AT planto enable their use in augmentingresponding law enforcement personnel.

VII-3

Preventive Measures and Considerations

Security forces should have available tothem and be trained in specializedequipment for responding to terroristattacks and/or incidents (See FigureVII-2). Local installations, with theassistance of the parent Service, shouldidentify and procure this equipmentbased on Service directives and the localsituation.

• Establish Defense. Measures taken toestablish the defense must be continuallyreviewed and progressively updated tocounter the changing threat and add an

element of unpredictability to theterrorist’s calculation. Defensivemeasures include the following:

•• Determine priority of work (assignsectors of observation and fire, constructobstacles, fortify).

•• Improve obstacles, fortifications, andthe defense as a whole. Long-termdeployments should program engineerassets and force protection or physicalsecurity funds toward the construction ofpermanent fixtures.

FORTIFICATION MATERIALSFORTIFICATION MATERIAL PURPOSE

Wire fences Barbed wire Delay access

Concertina wire Channel movementthrough manned points

Chain link/weld mesh Use as grenade, firebomb,or high explosive antitankrocket barriers

Screens Canvas Deny observation inwards(Note: may also preventobservation outwards.Additional sensors maybe required.)

Plywood

Natural growth

Canopies Chain link/weld mesh Protect roofs

Corrugated iron Detonate mortar projectiles

Absorb shrapnel

Cover machinegunspositioned on roofs

Sandbags Sandbags Absorb shrapnel

Protect personnel andequipment

Sensors and ClosedCircuit TV

Provide early warning

Figure VII-1. Fortification Materials

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•• Establish inspections and immediateaction drills, exercises, and training toimplement the security plan.

•• Maintain, when possible, secure radioor landline communications with themilitary police, security guards, andreaction force(s).

•• Keep abreast of current military andhost-nation police and intelligenceassessments.

b. Guard Duties. Guard duties are detailedin Service regulations and in local, general,and special orders. In a terrorist high-riskenvironment, special orders should address asa minimum the following:

• Details of authorized passes; providesamples of passes.

• Procedures for searching people andvehicles.

• Response to approach by unauthorizedpersonnel or hostile crowds.

• Specific rules of engagement (ROE) oruse of force policy in the event of civildisturbances, potential damage, or injury

to US personnel or specific property,looting, or arson.

• Response to unauthorized photographyand surveillance activities.

• Steps necessary to obtain police, reactionforce(s), fire department, and ambulance.

• Guidelines for contact with host-nationpolice.

• Guidelines for contact with press andmedia.

c. Road Movement. Road movements arealways vulnerable to terrorists attacks in high-risk areas. Road reconnaissance should beconducted periodically to identify high-threatareas. If possible, alternate forms oftransportation (e.g., helicopters) should beused. If road movement is required:

• Avoid establishing a regular pattern;

• Vary routes and timing;

• Travel in groups, never single vehicles;

• Avoid traveling at night unless tacticaladvantage can be gained through use of

SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT

Pyrotechnic pistols Marshalling wands

Riot shotguns Telescopes and tripods

Tear gas launchers Binoculars

Hand-held flashlights Night vision devices

Antiriot helmets Loud speakers

Shields 3'6" Fire extinguishers

Shields 6' Cameras with flash and tripods

Side-handled or straight batons Telescopic sights

Hand cuffs Photographic filter

NBC protective masks Body ArmorFigure VII-2. Security Force Equipment

VII-5

Preventive Measures and Considerations

night vision devices. Additionalprecautions should be considered if travelis required during periods of agitation(e.g., religious or political holidays);

• When possible, keep a low profile (usevehicles that do not stand out);

• Plan alternate routes and reactions tovarious threatening scenarios;

• Plan communications requirements;

• Avoid dangerous areas (e.g., ambushsites, areas known for violence);

• Provide adequate security;

• Plan in advance for maintenance andevacuation; and

• Use countersurveillance.

d. Vehicle Protection. Take the followingprecautions when using tactical and sometypes of commercial vehicles, such as trucks,in a high-risk area:

• Place sandbags on floorboards andfenders.

• Cover sandbags with rubber or fibermats.

• If carrying personnel, sandbag the vehiclebed as well as the driver’s compartment.

• Remove canvas so passengers can seeand shoot.

• Fold windshield in driver’s compartmentand fit high-wire cutter. Lower sidewindows and place wire over allopenings to deflect grenades or IEDs.

• Normally, avoid large concentrations ofpersonnel in any one vehicle. If

necessary, assign convoys additionalvehicles to disperse personnel loads.

• Passengers riding in truck bed faceoutboard and are assigned sectors ofobservation and fire.

• Rig chicken wire or chain link screenson front bumper frame to deflect rocks,bottles, firebombs, and grenades.

• Carry pioneer tools (fire extinguishers inparticular), a line with grappling hook toclear obstacles, and tow bars for disabledvehicles.

• When the threat of hostile fire is constant,plan for the use of vehicles withadditional armored protection.

e. Convoys. In extremely high-risk areas,consider using armed escorts for convoyprotection.

• Develop and rehearse immediate actiondrills before movement.

• Perform route clearance beforemovement.

• Establish and maintain communicationsthroughout the route.

• Develop deception plans to conceal orchange movement timing and route.

• If possible, include host-nation policeand/or military personnel in the convoy.

• When selecting routes, avoid entering orremaining in dangerous areas. Ifambushed, gauge response by enemystrength. Counter ambushes byaccelerating through the ambush area,counterattacking, withdrawing, orwithdrawing and staging a deliberateattack.

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• Convoy escort composition depends onavailable forces. Light armored vehicles,high mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicles, or trucks equipped with M2 50-caliber and MK19 40mm machine gunsare extremely effective. Overheadhelicopters and AC-130 gunships canalso be used as air escorts if available.Escorts should be organized into anadvance guard, main body escort, andreaction or strike group. Planningconsiderations are as follows:

•• Determine concept of operation.

•• Identify available transportation.

•• Identify order of march and roadorganization.

•• Identify disposition of advance guard,main body escort, and reserve.

•• Designate assembly area for convoy.

•• Determine rendezvous time atassembly area, departure time of first andlast vehicle, and expected arrival of firstand last vehicle at destination.

•• Identify action upon arrival.

•• Determine required coordinatinginstructions for speed, spacing, halts,immediate action drills, breakdowns, andlost vehicles.

f. Rail Movement. Rail movement is themost difficult form of transportation toconceal and protect because it follows apredictable route and rail heads aredifficult to conceal. Opportunities fordeception are limited and physical security iscritical. The following security precautionsshould be considered:

• Restrict passengers to military personnelonly.

• Search for explosives or possiblehijackers before departure and after everyhalt (MWDs are particularly suited forthis mission). Appendix N, “MilitaryWorking Dogs,” provides informationconcern ing use o f MWDs inantiterrorism operations.

• Ensure that the railway is free ofobstructions or explosives.

• Patrol the railway area.

• Place armed security personnel on dutythroughout the train, including engineroom and trail car.

• Patrol and guard departure and arrivalstations.

• Use deception measures.

• Provide air cover (AC-130, helicopters).

• Maintain communications within thetrain and with outside agencies.

• Provide reaction force to be moved byair or coordinate host-nation support(HNS) (if available).

g. Sea Movement. Sea movement,especially aboard military vessels, mayprovide a false sense of security. Seaoperations are certainly more secure thanurban patrols; however, ships in harbor oranchored off hostile coastlines are visibleand high-risk targets. Crews of ships inharbors need to evaluate each new port anddetermine possible terrorist actions and ship’sforce counteractions (such as using fire andsteam hoses to repel attackers). Crewmembers must be aware of HNS andresponsibilities while in port or anchoredin foreign national waters. The ship’scaptain is solely responsible for the shipand all those embarked. As a minimum,the captain:

VII-7

Preventive Measures and Considerations

• Establishes methods of embarkation anddebarkation and patrol activities for allpersonnel;

• Identifies vital areas of the ship (forexample, engine room, weapons storage,command and control bridge), andassigns security guards;

• Coordinates above and below waterlineresponsibilities;

• Establishes a weapons and ammunitionpolicy and ROE, and appoints a reactionforce (e.g., security alert team [SAT],backup alert force [BAF], and/or reserveforce [RF]); and

• Drills all personnel involved.

h. Air Movement. For the most part,while a unit is being transported by air it isunder the purview of the Air Force or airmovement control personnel. Troopcommanders and Air Force personnelcoordinate duties and responsibilities for theirmutual defense. Personnel must remainvigilant and leaders must provide adequatesecurity. Unit security personnel coordinatewith airfield security personnel, assistdepartures and arrivals at airfields while enroute, and determine weapons andammunition policies. Special considerationsinclude the following topics:

• Road transport security when driving toand from airfields is critical. Keep arrivalarrangements low profile. Do not pre-position road transport at the airport forextended periods before arrival.

• If pre-positioned transport is required,attach a security element and station itwithin the airfield perimeter. Security atthe arrival airfield can be theresponsibility of the host nation andrequires close coordination. Maintaincommunications between all elements

until the aircraft is “wheels-up” and, uponarrival, reestablish communications withthe new security element.

• All personnel (air crews and transportedunit) must be cautioned concerning thetransportation of souvenirs and otherpersonal items that could be containersfor explosives.

• Man-portable weapons systems in thehands of terrorists create additionalplanning challenges for the security ofaircraft. Planning considerations shouldinclude defensive measures against suchsystems in the choosing of airfields andforward arming and refueling points.

i. Patrolling. Units outside the UnitedStates may be called upon to conductpatrols in urban or rural environments.These patrols will normally be planned andexecuted in conjunction with host-nationauthorities and should be coordinated with therepresentatives of the appropriate staff judgeadvocate office and be in accordance with anyapplicable basing, status-of-forces, or otheragreements. Patrols support police operations,expand the area of influence, gatherinformation, police nightclubs and restaurants,detain individuals as required, conduct hastysearches, and erect hasty roadblocks. Patrolsmust understand the ROE. Patrolling unitsshould avoid patterns by varying times androutes, using different exit and entry points atthe base, doubling back on a route, and usingvehicles to drop off and collect patrols andchange areas. Base sentries or guards, othervehicle patrols, helicopters, OPs, host-nationassets, and reaction forces provide additionalsupport.

j. Roadblocks. There are two types ofroadblocks: deliberate and hasty.Deliberate roadblocks are permanent orsemipermanent roadblocks used on borders,outskirts of cities, or the edge of controlledareas. Use deliberate roadblocks to check

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identification and as a deterrent. Use hastyroadblocks to spot check, with or without priorintelligence. Hasty roadblocks use theelement of surprise. Their maximum effectis reached within the first half hour of beingpositioned. Hasty roadblocks can consist oftwo vehicles placed diagonally across a road,a coil of barbed wire, or other portableobstacles. Roadblocks must not unnecessarilydisrupt the travel of innocent civilians.Personnel manning roadblocks must knowtheir jobs thoroughly, be polite andconsiderate, act quickly and methodically, usethe minimum force required for the threat, andpromptly relinquish suspects to civil policeauthorities. General principles considered inestablishing roadblocks are concealment,security, construction and layout, manning,equipment, communications, and legal issues.Unless combined posts (host nation and USpersonnel) are used, language training will bea key planning factor in employingroadblocks.

k. Observation Posts. OPs provideprolonged observation of areas, people, orbuildings. OPs are critical. OPs allowobservation of an area for possible terroristactivity (avenues of approach); observationof a particular building or street; ability to

photograph persons or activities; ability toobserve activity before, during, or after asecurity force operation (e.g., house search)and ability to provide covering fire for patrols.Special factors apply to OPs located in urbanareas. The OP party and reaction force mustknow the procedure, ROE, escape routes,emergency withdrawal procedures, rallyingpoint, casualty evacuation, and password.Cover the occupation and withdrawal of anOP by conducting normal operations (e.g.,house searches, roadblocks, patrols to leavepeople behind), flooding an area with patrolsto disguise movement, using civilian vehiclesand clothes, and using deception. Anycompromise of an OP location should beimmediately reported.

l. Civil Disturbances. Crowd violencecan either be a spontaneous emotionaleruption or a planned event. In the lattercase, its purpose is to draw police or troopsinto a target area or away from some otherevent. Crowd violence may also involveviolence within the crowd or from opposinggroups. Crowd violence is characterized byincitement and violence; both are highlycontagious. Riot control aims to restore orderwith minimum use of force. Bearing in mindthat the size or motivation of the crowd may

Deployed joint forces may be tasked to conductantiterrorist operations in urban areas.

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Preventive Measures and Considerations

prevent its control, the general approach isto reduce or disrupt the crowd’s unifyinginfluences and reorient the participants toconcerns for personal vulnerability andwelfare. The principles of riot control areshown in Figure VII-3.

m. Bomb Explosion or Discovery. Theinitial terrorist bomb may not be the endof the incident. The initial bomb may be

designed to draw forces into an area as targetsfor a shooting ambush or another explosion.Upon discovery of a bomb or upon entering abomb site, response forces should proceedwith extreme caution and contact the EODteam immediately. MWDs or explosivedetection dogs should be considered uponbomb discovery or during entry to the site ofthe explosion. Appendix K, “ExplosiveDevice Procedures,” contains procedures forhandling bomb situations.

n. Personal Protective Measures.Overseas deployments require a highdegree of personal protective measures.The guidelines in Appendix B, “PersonalProtective Measures Against Terrorism,” stillapply, but the commander must also focus onthe exposure of the troops to any specialterrorist threat. This requires particularattention to areas where troops will live, work,and conduct R&R. Coordination betweenmilitary law enforcement and intelligenceagencies and host-nation forces is critical. Thedeployed military member must alsounderstand the threat and required personalsecurity measures.

3. Tactical Force Protection

During joint and multinationaloperations, US units and bases in the jointrear area (JRA) are still vulnerable toterrorist attacks. The same proceduresidentified in the preceding paragraphs apply.Commanders will be advised by the JRAcoordinator (JRAC) of potential terroristthreats, and subordinate commands will reportany terrorist activity to the JRAC. Unitspassing through the JRA are still required tomaintain AT measures commensurate with theJRAC’s guidance. Specific tactics, techniques,and procedures for operations in the JRA arecontained in Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine forJoint Rear Area Operations.”

Flexibility in changing tacticsas necessary to meet thesituation

Rehearsals ensure success

The appearance of being ableto do damage is often moreeffective than actually havingto resort to force

Control the situation bypositioning personnel andpresenting the image ofhaving and maintaining fullcontrol even if the situationdeteriorates

Provide all-round defense ofassigned sectors ofobservation and fire and beable to observe and fire 360degrees around control force

There must be speed indeployment, arrest, andapprehension, and reaction tochange

Surprise keeps the crowd offbalance

PRINCIPLES OFRIOT CONTROL

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Figure VII-3. Principles of Riot Control

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AVULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

A-1

1. General

The VA provides the commander with a toolto assess the potential vulnerability of a base,unit, ship, or port activity, but it is not asubstitute for sound judgment. Theseguidelines also serve to limit the scope of theforce protection vulnerability assessments tothose elements that are directly and uniquelyrelated to combatting terrorism and are onlyone part of the larger issue that clearly andappropriately belongs to the traditionalcommanders’ responsibilities for the overallwell-being of Service members, civilianemployees, and family members as well asfacilities and equipment. The VA must standon its own and be supported by validconsiderations. Typically, a small group ofknowledgeable individuals (at the minimumoperations, law enforcement, security,intelligence, counterintelligence, communications,engineer staff, medical services, housing, fireprotection, emergency planning, and NBCdefense and response) develop the VA andforward it to the command group uponcompletion. The command group then usesthe VA as an aid in developing measures tocounter the threat.

2. Assessing Vulnerability

It is understood that each location, site, orfacility is unique in terms of vulnerability toterrorist operations. Accordingly, theseguidelines are intended to be flexible, allowingfor adaptation to site circumstances.

a. Functional Areas. The concept forforce protection VA is to focus on two broadareas:

• Preventing and, failing that, substantiallymitigating the effects of a terrorist act.

• Emergency preparedness and crisisresponse.

Combined, the proactive and the reactivecapabilities within these two broad areas formthe essence of what can be considered theessential elements for deterring andcombatting terrorism.

b. The proactive and reactive aspects offorce protection are divided into foursignificant elements:

• Physical security. Consists of all thefunctional areas that make up thosemeasures necessary to protect andsafeguard personnel, facilities, andinstallations from terrorist acts.

• Weapons effect mitigation. Consists ofall the functional areas that make up thecapability to calculate blast, shock,shrapnel, fire, and other damageassociated with chemical explosives; tocalculate effects from other weapons thatterrorist might employ including WMD;and to assess the mitigating values ofstandoff distances, blast barriers,structural hardening, and a host of adjunctmitigating capabilities, includingemergency preparedness and responsecapabilities.

• Threat, vulnerability, and riskanalysis. Consists of the functional areasthat make up the capability to assess howwell the threat statements produced bythe intelligence community (DIA, CINCJ-2, Service, national, local intelligenceauthorities, and local unit level) havebeen fused with logical analysis andconclusions about terrorist abilities toattack a specific installation, facility, or

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group of people. Consistency ofproduced threat estimates, reasonablypostulated terrorist target and targetvulnerability estimates, and efforts toenhance security and reduce weaponseffects are major functions in thiselement.

• Application of DOD standards. To theextent that the DOD standards for forceprotection go beyond the functionalexpertise required to do the first threeforce protection elements, the requisiteexpertise may be collected by theinstallation, base, ship, unit, or portactivity in this area. The standards’compliance area is more an assessmentof the vulnerability reduction value of thestandards than it is a review to determineif the standards are being complied with.

3. Areas of Expertise

Required areas of expertise for a VA team.

a. Assessment Team Chief. Keyresponsibilities: Overall management,training, and performance of the vulnerabilityteam members; finalizing the assessment teamout-briefing; preparing the populationdynamics and risk assessment.

• Ensures that the team is properly trained,prepared and equipped.

• Ensures that the team members have theappropriate security clearances.

• Oversees the pre-deployment collectionand analysis of available information tosupport the deployment.

• Oversees operational and proceduralsecurity training for team members.

• On-site, assesses critical populationcenters and mass population areas

including travel routes; assists in threatand vulnerability analysis.

b. Physical Security Specialist. KeyResponsibilities: Installation, facility, andpersonnel security and safety. Major functionsperformed:

• Assess overall physical security,operations, and information security.

• Assess access control, to include sensorsand intrusion devices.

• Assess perimeter defensive positions andvehicular and/or personnel barriers.

• Assess lighting, police security, andsecurity response planning and forcecapability.

• Assess overall security planning andresponsiveness to threat assessments andprepared intelligence estimates.

• Assess relationship and support fromlocal law enforcement and other securityagencies, both local and national.

• To the extent that vulnerabilities arefound, formulate and suggest mitigatingmeasures and assist in theirimplementation.

c. Structural Engineer. This functionexamines a variety of potential terroristweapon effects and structural responses inorder to better protect personnel from shockand blast by reducing damage throughtechnically appropriate use of stand offmeasures, hardening, blast shielding, andshatter-resistant window film (i.e., mylar).Key responsibility: Threat and damageassessment from terrorist weapons estimates;suggestions for threat protection or damagemitigation measures. Major functionsperformed:

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Vulnerability Assessment

• Assess damage mechanisms includingblast, shock, and fragmentation.Calculate hazardous radii based onstructural dynamics and calculatedstructural loads.

• Assess building and barrier resistanceor mitigation of threat weapons effects.Determine appropriate standoff distance,potential hardening or other mitigatingmeasures.

• Assess systems related to physicalsecurity and personnel protection(warning devices, alarms).

• Assess and/or identify safe havens.

• Assess mechanical, electrical, and otherservice systems for vulnerability toweapons effects and suggest mitigatingmeasures.

• To the extent that structuralvulnerabilities are found, formulate andsuggest mitigating measures and assistin their implementation.

d. Infrastructure Engineer. This functionexamines three distinct elements of forceprotection:

• Protection against the effects of WMD.

• Protection against terrorist incident-induced fires.

• Utility systems that can be employed tominimize terrorist incident casualties,inc lud ing e lements o f power,environmental control, and l i fesupport systems. Key responsibilities:Infrastructure security, fire, safety, anddamage control. Major functionsinclude:

•• Assess facility and operationalutility systems for susceptibility todamage from terrorist acts.

•• Assess fire protection planning andcapabilities, including emergencyresponse planning and exercises.

•• Assess vulnerability of installationutilities and plans for back-up services.

•• Assess availability of support, toinclude use of local national capabilities.

•• Assess mechanical, electrical, andother infrastructure systems forvulnerability to weapons effects andsuggest mitigating measures.

•• To the extent that structuralvulnerabilities are found, formulate andsuggest mitigating measures and assistin their implementation.

e. Operations Readiness Specialist. Thisfunction examines plans, procedures andcapabilities for crisis response, consequencemanagement, and recovery operations,should a terrorist incident occur. Theoperations readiness objectives are to provideindividual protective measures andemergency response capabilities thatminimize mass casualties and reduce thenumber of severe injuries and fatalities.Operational readiness includes training of allpersonnel in response actions to tacticalwarning, alarms of imminent attack,planning and exercise of rescue operations,emergency medical triage, and treatment inmass casualty situations. The installation’sForce Protection and/or Antiterrorism officer,the installation fire chief, emergency medicalservices, and local and/or host country fireand medical services all play a part in forceprotection operations readiness. Key

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responsibility: Emergency medical andindividual readiness assessments. Majorfunctions performed:

• Assess individual, personnel, facility,and installation protection capabilities.

• Assess emergency medical capabilitiesand planning including the identificationof key assets and infrastructure.

• Assess recovery procedures and planningto understand the ability to recover fromloss of key assets, infrastructure, orfacilities.

• Assess planning and/or consideration ofevacuation as a risk mitigating measure.

• Assess application of the DOD forceprotection standards and determine theirvalue in vulnerability reduction.

• To the extent that structuralvulnerabilities are found, formulate andsuggest mitigating measures and assistin their implementation.

f. Intelligence and/or CounterintelligenceSpecialist. Key responsibility: Performslogical analysis and prepares possibleconclusions regarding terrorist targets andtarget vulnerabilities based on processedintelligence information, knowledge ofterrorist capabilities, and methods and in viewof US installation, facility, and personnelsafety and security practices. Major functionsperformed:

• Develop possible threat scenarios.

• Assess installation, facility, and personnelvulnerability in view of scenarios, andin consideration of ongoingcounterintelligence activity, demonstratedcapabilities in exercises, capabilities oflocal authorities, and terrorist intelligenceactivities.

• Propose additional security, counteraction,and threat reduction efforts.

g. Communications, housing, fireprotection, NBC defense, and response arefunctional areas which can be executed by anyteam member if appropriate for the missionand threat of the installation, base, ship, unit,or port activity.

4. Assessment Planning,Preparations and Conduct

This section addresses the activities whichmay be performed in order to provide a forceprotection VA visit and upon completion ofthe visit.

a. Pre-assessment Preparations. The keyelement of preparation is the beginning of thesite folder development. The site folder isthe official record of the assessmentteam information gathering, analysis,recommendations, and assistance for thecommander. A critical aspect of the site folderformation is the intelligence informationgathering relative to the terrorist threat. All-source intelligence on groups, motivation andintent, tactics and weapons, activities, andoperating areas should be obtained from DIA,CINC J-2, and other sources. A complete listof installation characteristics, includinglayouts, drawings, functions, personnel, andprocedures, should be requested in advanceof the visit to be sent to the requesting teamor made available upon arrival. If available,a copy of the antiterrorism plan may be madeavailable to the assessment team.

• Administrative preparations includecoordination particulars of the visit withthe installation, base, ship, unit, or portactivity, including:

•• Theater clearances (if applicable).

•• Requirements for invitational travelorders, passports, visas, inoculations,

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Vulnerability Assessment

insurance (health life) and other legal issuesas well as emergency information forms.

• Security preparations include:

•• Identifying a security representative.

•• Submitting requests for countryclearances and identifying classifieddocuments to be couriered.

•• Coordinating secure storage forarrival.

•• Preparing letter requests for overseascourier authorization.

•• Presenting mandatory threat briefingand mandatory security proceduresbriefing

.• Logistics preparations include:

•• Any travel arrangements (tickets,lodging, and billeting).

•• Travel kits (pharmaceuticals andsupplies).

•• Equipment checkout and packagingand shipping.

b. Conduct of the Assessment. Uponarrival, the assessment team provides anin-briefing for the commander, staff, anddesignated technical point of contact. Asite familiarization briefing and tour shouldbe conducted by site personnel.Administrative activities may includeestablishing the team support area, settingup equipment, scheduling team and/ortechnical points of contact meetings anddiscussions, ensuring classified materialcontrol, establishing personnel locator, andorganizing materials (view graph, photos,and diagrams) for the out-briefing and sitefolder. Each assessment team memberconducts the assessment based on thespecific responsibilities for each functionalarea as outlined above.

c. Post-assessment Activities. Within 30days of the conclusion of the visit, a summarynarrative report and annotated briefing shouldbe delivered to the installation commander.Follow-on assistance for the commander maybe applicable in areas of technicalcharacteristics of improvement options, costestimates, and generic sources of materials andequipment. Lessons learned from theassessment should be extracted and enteredin the Joint Universal Lessons LearnedSystem.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BPERSONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

AGAINST TERRORISM

B-1

1. General

Any member of the Department ofDefense — not just senior leaders — canbecome a target for terrorists. The purposeof this appendix is to provide generalguidance to DOD members and theirfamilies on how to avoid acts of terrorism,as well as to provide basic instructions inthe event DOD personnel become victimsof a terrorist attack.

2. Precautions

Since terrorist acts are criminal acts,measures taken to protect oneself fromterrorism are similar to those measures takento guard against crime. Attitude towardsecurity is most important. Although someof these precautions are applicable overseas,you can decrease your chances of becominga terrorist target, as well as those of yourfamily members, by taking the precautionslisted in this appendix. Therefore, it is highlyrecommended that you share this informationwith every member of your family. It is alsosuggested that you and your family reviewthese precautions on a regular basis.

a. At All Times

• Encourage security awareness in yourfamily and discuss what to do if there isa security threat.

• Be alert for surveillance attempts orsuspicious persons or activities, andreport them to the proper authorities.Trust your gut feelings.

• Vary personal routines wheneverpossible.

• Get into the habit of checking in to letyour friends and family know where youare or when to expect you.

• Know how to use the local phone system.Always carry telephone change. Knowthe emergency numbers for local police,fire, ambulance, and hospital.

• Know the locations of civilian police,military police, government agencies, USEmbassy, and other safe locations whereyou can find refuge or assistance.

• Avoid public disputes or confrontations.Report any trouble to the properauthorities.

• Know certain key phrases in the nativelanguage such as “I need a policeman,”“Take me to a doctor,” “Where is thehospital?,” and “Where is the policestation?”

• Set up simple signal systems to alertfamily members or associates that thereis a danger. Do not share this informationwith anyone not involved in your signalsystem.

• Carry identification showing yourblood type and any special medicalconditions. Keep a minimum of a 1-week supply of essential medication onhand at all times.

• Keep a low profile. Shun publicity. Donot flash large sums of money.

• Do not unnecessarily divulge your homeaddress, phone number, or familyinformation.

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• Watch for unexplained absences of localcitizens as an early warning of possibleterrorist actions.

• Keep your personal affairs in good order.Keep wills current, have powers ofattorney drawn up, take measures toensure family’s financial security, anddevelop a plan for family actions in theevent you are taken hostage.

• Do not carry sensitive or potentiallyembarrassing items.

b. At Home

• Have a clear view of approaches to yourhome.

• Install strong doors and locks.

• Change locks when you move in or whena key is lost.

• Install windows that do not allow easyaccess.

• Never leave house or trunk keys withyour ignition key while your car is beingserviced.

• Have adequate lighting outside yourhouse.

• Create the appearance that the house isoccupied by using timers to control lightsand radios while you are away.

• Install one-way viewing devices in doors.

• Install intrusion detection alarms andsmoke and fire alarms.

• Do not hide keys or give them to veryyoung children.

• Never leave young children at homealone.

• Never admit strangers to your homewithout proper identification.

• Use off-street parking at your residence,if at all possible.

• Teach children how to call the police, andensure that they know what to tell thepolice (e.g., name, address).

• Avoid living in residences that are locatedin isolated areas, on one-way streets,dead-end streets, or cul-de-sacs.

• Avoid residences that are on the groundfloor, adjacent to vacant lots, or on steephills.

• Carefully screen all potential domestichelp.

• Do not place your name on exterior wallsof residences.

• Do not answer the telephone with yourname and rank.

• Personally destroy all envelopes andother items that reflect personalinformation.

• Close draperies during periods ofdarkness. Draperies should be opaqueand made of heavy material.

• Avoid frequent exposure on balconiesand in windows.

• Consider owning a dog to discourageintruders.

• Never accept unexpected packagedeliveries.

• Don’t let your trash become a source ofinformation.

c. While Traveling

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Personal Protective Measures Against Terrorism

• Vary times and routes.

• Be alert for suspicious-looking vehicles.

• Check for suspicious activity or objectsaround your car before getting into or outof it. Do not touch your vehicle untilyou have thoroughly checked it (lookinside it, walk around it, and look underit).

• Know your driver.

• Equip your car with an inside hood latchand a locking gas cap.

• Drive with windows closed and doorslocked.

• Travel with a group of people — there issafety in numbers.

• Travel on busy routes; avoid isolated anddangerous areas.

• Park your car off the street in a securearea.

• Lock your car when it is unattended.

• Do not routinely use the same taxi or busstop. NOTE: Buses are preferred overtaxis.

• If you think you are being followed,move as quickly as possible to a safeplace, such as a police or fire station.

• If your car breaks down, raise the hoodthen get back inside the car and remainthere with the doors locked and thewindows up. If anyone offers to assist,ask the person to call the police.

• Do not pick up hitchhikers.

• Drive on well-lit streets.

• Prearrange a signal with your driver toindicate that it is safe to get into thevehicle. Share this information only withpersons having a need to know.

• Have the driver open the door for you.

• If the driver is absent, do not get into thecar.

• If possible, tell your driver yourdestination only after the car has started.

• Keep your vehicle’s gas tank at least halffull.

d. In Hotels

• Keep your room key on your person atall times.

• Be observant for suspicious personsloitering in the area.

• Do not give your room number tostrangers.

• Keep your room and personal effects neatand orderly so you will recognizetampering or strange out-of-placeobjects.

• Know the location of emergency exitsand fire extinguishers.

• Do not admit strangers to your room.

• Know how to locate hotel securityguards.

e. Ground Transportation Security

• Use a plain car that is common in the areato minimize the rich American look.

• Do not be predictable in your daily travelbehavior; vary your travel times, your

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routes, and your mode of transportationwhenever possible.

• Check the area around the vehicle, theexterior of the vehicle, and then theinterior of the vehicle before starting theengine.

• Travel with companions or in convoywhenever possible.

• Know the locations of safe havens (e.g.,police and fire stations) along your travelroutes.

• Install appropriate mirrors, locks, andother devices to secure your car againsttampering.

• Safeguard car keys at all times.

• Screen chauffeurs or permanentlyassigned drivers. Develop a simplesystem for the driver to alert you todanger when you are picked up. Sharethis information only with personshaving a need to know.

• Lock your car, especially at night, andcheck and lock your garage when youpark there overnight.

• Park in well-lighted areas if you mustpark on the street.

• Always fasten seat belts, lock doors, andclose windows when driving or riding ina car.

• Be alert for surveillance and be aware ofpossible danger when driving or ridingin a car.

• Drive immediately to a “safe haven”when surveillance is suspected; do notdrive home.

f. Air Travel Security

• Use military aircraft whenever possible.

• Avoid travel through high-risk areas; useforeign flag airlines and/or indirect routesto avoid such areas.

• Do not use rank or military addresses ontickets, travel documents, hotelreservations, or luggage.

• Select a window seat on aircraft becausethey offer more protection and are lessaccessible to hijackers than are aisle seats.

• Select a seat in the midsection of theaircraft because it is not one of the twousual areas of terrorist activity.

• Do not discuss your US Governmentaffiliation with any other passengers.

• Consider using a tourist passport whentraveling in high-risk areas; if you use atourist passport, store your officialpassport, identification card, travelorders, and other official documents inyour carry-on bags. Also, if you normallywear a military ring (e.g., Service oracademy), consider leaving it at home orpack it in your checked baggage.

• Do not carry classified material unless itis mission-essential.

• Use plain civilian luggage; avoid usingB-4 bags, duffel bags, and other military-looking bags. Remove all indications ofyour rank and any military patches, logos,and decals from your luggage andbriefcase.

• Do not carry official papers in yourbriefcase.

• Travel in conservative civilian clothing.Do not wear mi l i tary-or ientedorganizational shirts or caps or military-issue shoes or glasses. Also, avoid

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Personal Protective Measures Against Terrorism

obvious American clothing such ascowboy boots and hats as well asAmerican-logo T-shirts. Cover visibleUS-affiliated tattoos with a long-sleevedshirt.

• If possible, check your baggage with theairport’s curb service.

• Adjust your arrival at the airport tominimize waiting time, be alert for anysuspicious activity in the waiting area, andproceed immediately to the departure gate.

3. Hostage Defense Measures

a. Survive with honor — this is the missionof any American hostage.

b. If your duties may expose you to beingtaken hostage, make sure your family’s affairsare in order to ensure their financial security.Make an up-to-date will and give appropriatepowers of attorney to your spouse or to atrusted friend. Concern for the family is amajor source of stress for persons in kidnapor hostage situations.

c. If you are taken hostage and decide notto resist, assure your captors of your intentionto cooperate, especially during the abductionphase.

d. Regain your composure as quickly aspossible after capture, face your fears, and tryto master your emotions.

e. Take mental note of the direction, timein transit, noise, and other environmentalfactors that may help you identify yourlocation.

f. Note the numbers, names, physicalcharacteristics, accents, personal habits, andrank structure of your captors.

g. Anticipate isolation and terrorist effortsto confuse you.

h. Try to mentally prepare yourself for thesituation ahead as much as possible. Staymentally active.

i. Do not aggravate your abductors; instead,attempt to establish a positive relationshipwith them. Do not be fooled by a friendlyapproach — it may be used to get informationfrom you.

j. Avoid political or ideological discussionswith your captors; comply with theirinstructions, but maintain your dignity.

k. Do not discuss or divulge any classifiedinformation that you may possess.

l. Exercise daily.

m. Read anything you can find to keepyour mind active.

n. Eat whatever food is offered to you tomaintain your strength.

o. Establish a slow, methodical routine forevery task.

p. When being interrogated, take asimple, tenable position and stick to it. Bepolite and maintain your temper. Giveshort answers, talk freely aboutnonessential matters, but be guarded whenthe conversation turns to substantialmatters.

q. If forced to present terrorist demands toauthorities, in writing or on tape, do only whatyou are told to do. Avoid making a plea onyour own behalf.

r. Be proud of your heritage, government,and military affiliation, but be careful that yourbehavior does not antagonize your captors.Affirm your faith in basic democraticprinciples.

s. In the event of a rescue attempt:

B-6

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-07.2

• Drop to the floor. Do not move unlessinstructed to do so by the rescuing force.Under no circumstances attempt to assistthe rescue force. Stay completely clearof anything that could be regarded as ormisidentified as a weapon;

• Be quiet and do not attract your captors’attention;

• Wait for instructions;

• Rescue forces will initially treat you as oneof the terrorists until you are positivelyidentified as friend or foe. This is for yoursecurity. Cooperate, even if you are initiallyhandcuffed or bound; and

• Once released, do not make commentsto the news media until you have beendebriefed by the proper US authoritiesand have been cleared to do so by theappropriate military commander.

APPENDIX CVERY IMPORTANT PERSON AND SENIOR

OFFICER SECURITY MEASURES

C-1

1. General

Very important persons and seniorofficers are terrorist targets by virtue oftheir position and symbolic nature.Although the level of threat to theseindividuals varies, their best protection istheir own awareness of this threat as wellas their dependents’ awareness of thethreat. The following measures are stepsthat they can take in their daily activitiesto reduce their exposure to terrorist attacks.

2. Security at Home

a. Evaluate home security requirements.

b. Check persons entering the premises(e.g., electricians, plumbers, telephonemaintenance personnel). If in doubt, calltheir office to verify their identity beforeallowing them in your home.

c. Do not open the door to a caller atnight until the caller is identified byexamination through a window or doorviewer.

d. Ensure that all door locks and windowclasps are working.

e. Consider installing a door securitychain, spyglass, or visitor intercom.

f. Consider locking the driveway gateswith a security lock to prevent entry.

g. Consider installing security lights toaid in viewing entrances.

h. Close curtains in a room beforeturning on lights.

i. Consider fitting windows with eithervenetian blinds or thick curtains.

j. Have reserve lighting handy (e.g.,flashlight, lamps).

k. Consider placing the telephone whereyou will not be seen from doors or windowswhen answering.

l. Investigate household staff (especiallytemporary staff).

m. Always be on the lookout for theunusual. Ensure that home is locked andsecure whenever the residence isunattended. Be cautious upon return.

n. Note and report suspicious persons.

o. Strictly control house keys.

p. Place car in a locked garage.

q. Be alert for the unusual (e.g., themovement of furniture or the placing ofunusual wires).

r. Consider the fitting of a panic alarmbell to the outside of the house withswitches upstairs and downstairs.

s. Clear the area around the house ofdense foliage or shrubbery.

t. Test your duress alarm if available.Make certain the members of your familyunderstand the importance of the alarm andhow it works.

u. Cooperate with law enforcementpersonnel and abide by their security

C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-07.2

recommendations concerning your home’ssecurity.

3. Security To and From Work

a. Vary your daily pattern as much aspossible. Leave and return at differenttimes. Use alternative routes, but notifyyour office of chosen route prior todeparture.

b. Be discreet in forecasting movements,but ensure that someone knows yourwhereabouts at all times.

c. Consider traveling to and from workwith escorts, or travel with a neighbor.

d. Use defensive and evasive drivingtechniques. Drill with your driver bywatching for suspicious cars and takingevasive action.

e. Keep car doors locked. Do not openwindows more than a few inches.

f. Park car in a safe area.

g. Keep the trunk locked. Never leavelarge bulky items in the trunk of unattendedparked cars that would prevent locking thetrunk.

h. Examine car before entering to see ifthere has been any interference. A smallmirror on a rod is a cheap and effectivemethod to inspect underneath cars. Do nottouch the vehicle until it has beenthoroughly checked (look inside it, walkaround it, and look under it).

i. Do not leave personal items exposedin the car (e.g., uniform items, Service-issued maps, official briefcases).

j. Use the same precautions when youdrive a privately owned vehicle.

4. Security at Official Functions

a. Discuss security requirements withthe person planning the function.

b. Travel to and from the function withescorts.

c. Choose the route carefully.

d. Do not publicize planned attendanceat official functions unless required.

e. Attempt to sit away from both publicareas and windows.

f. Encourage the sponsor(s) of thefunction to close the curtains to minimizethe likelihood that anyone outside willbe able to see inside and determine whois attending the function and where theyare located. This is extremely importantfor an evening function, when a well-litinterior can be easily viewed fromoutside.

g. Request external floodlights be usedto illuminate the area around the buildingwhere an evening function will occur.

5. Security at Private Functions

a. Ensure that the host is aware of yourneed for security and takes appropriatemeasures.

b. Have your personal staff assist acivilian host if required.

c. Arrange for visitors to be subject toadequate security control.

d. Screen the invitation list, if possible.

e. Vary times of sporting activities (e.g.,golfing, jogging).

C-3

Very Important Person and Senior Officer Security Measures

6. Security During Travel

a. Book airline seats at the last moment.Consider using an alias.

b. Restrict the use of rank or title.

c. Do not allow unknown visitors inhotel room or suite.

d. Keep your staff and your familymembers advised of your itinerary andsubsequent changes. Restrict thisinformation to those having a need to know.

7. Security of Children

a. Ensure children’s rooms are not readilyaccessible from outside the house.

b. Instruct children never to admit strangersto the house.

c. Teach children when and how to alertpolice or neighbors.

d. Instruct children attending school to travelin groups or at least in pairs, use busythoroughfares, and avoid play areas outside theschool.

e. Instruct children to refuse gifts orapproaches from strangers.

f. Instruct children to immediatelyreport attempts of an approach to thenearest responsible adult, and also to tellyou as soon as possible.

g. Instruct children to tell you wherethey are, who they are with, and how longthey will be away from the house.

h. Instruct children not to discuss whatyou do and to tel l you if they arequestioned about you by anyone.

i. Encourage chi ldren to reportsuspicious incidents to you.

j. Accompany young children to andfrom bus stops, where necessary.

k. Do not allow preschool children towander from the house or play in areaswhere they cannot be supervised.

l. Discourage children from answeringthe door, especially during hours ofdarkness.

m. Advise children attending schoolsaway from home to use the applicabletechniques listed above in their dailyactivities.

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Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DBUILDING SECURITY PROCEDURES

D-1

1. General

A skilled and determined terrorist group canpenetrate most office buildings. However, thepresence and use of guards and physicalsecurity devices (e.g., exterior lights, locks,mirrors, visual devices) create a significantpsychological deterrent. Terrorists are apt toshun risky targets for less protected ones. Ifterrorists decide to accept the risk, securitymeasures can decrease their chance of success.Commanders should develop comprehensivebuilding security programs and frequentlyconduct security surveys that provide the basisfor an effective building security program.These surveys generate essential informationfor the proper evaluation of present securityconditions and problems, available resources,and potential security policy. Being just oneof the many facets in a complex structure,security policies must be integrated with otherimportant areas such as fire safety, normalpolice procedures, work environment, andwork transactions. The following informationprovides guidance when developing buildingsecurity procedures.

2. Office Accessibility

a. Buildings most likely to be terroristtargets should not be directly accessible to thepublic.

b. Executive offices should not be locatedon the ground floor.

c. Locate senior personnel at the inner coreof the building. This affords the bestprotection and control of visitors and preventspeople outside the building from obtainingvisual surveillance.

d. If building windows face public areas,reinforce them with bullet resistant materialsand cover them with heavy curtains.

e. Monitor access to executive offices witha secretary, guard, or other individual whoscreens all persons and objects enteringexecutive offices.

f. Place ingress door within view of theperson responsible for screening personneland objects passing through the door.

g. Doors may be remotely controlled byinstalling an electromagnetic door lock.

h. The most effective physical securityconfiguration is to have doors locked fromwithin and have only one visitor access doorinto the executive office area. Locked doorsshould have panic bars.

i. Depending upon the nature of theorganization’s activities, deception measuressuch as a large waiting area controlling accessto several offices can be taken to drawattention away from the location and functionof a particular office.

3. Physical Security Measures

a. Consider installing the followingsecurity devices: burglar alarm systems(preferably connected to a central securityfacility), sonic warning devices or otherintrusion systems, exterior floodlights, deadbolt locks on doors, locks on windows, andiron grills or heavy screens for windows.

b. If feasible, add a 15- to 20-foot fence orwall and a comprehensive external lighting

D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.2

system. External lighting is one of thecheapest and most effective deterrents tounlawful entry.

c. Position light fixtures where tamperingwould be difficult and noticeable.

d. Check grounds to ensure that there areno covered or concealed avenues of approachfor terrorists and other intruders, especiallynear entrances.

e. Deny exterior access to fire escapes,stairways, and roofs.

f. Manhole covers near the building shouldbe secured or locked.

g. Cover, lock, or screen outdoor openings(e.g., coal bins, air vents, utility access points).

h. Screen windows (particularly those nearthe ground or accessible from adjacentbuildings).

i. Consider adding a thin, clear plastic sheetto windows to degrade the effects of flyingglass in case of explosion.

j. Periodically inspect the interior of theentire building, including the basement andother infrequently used areas.

k. Locate outdoor trash containers, storagebins, and bicycle racks away from thebuilding.

l. Book depositories or mail slots shouldnot be adjacent to, or in, the building.

m. Mailboxes should not be close to thebuilding.

n. Seal the top of voids and open spacesabove cabinets, bookcases, and display cases.

o. Keep janitorial closets, service openings,telephone closets, and electrical closets locked

at all times. Protect communications closetsand utility areas with an alarm system.

p. Remove names and ranks on reservedparking spaces.

q. Empty trash receptacles daily(preferably twice a day).

r. Periodically check all fire extinguishersto ensure that they are in working order andreadily available. Periodically check allsmoke alarms to ensure that they are inworking order.

4. Personnel Procedures

a. Stress heightened awareness bypersonnel working in the building, becauseeffective building security depends largely onthe actions and awareness of people.

b. Develop and disseminate clearinstructions on personnel security procedures.

c. Hold regular security briefings forbuilding occupants.

d. Personnel should understand securitymeasures, appropriate responses, and shouldknow who to contact in an emergency.

e. Conduct drills if appropriate.

f. Senior personnel should not work lateon a routine basis. No one should ever workalone.

g. Give all personnel, particularlyswitchboard personnel and secretaries, specialtraining in handling bomb threats andextortion telephone calls. Ensure that a bombthreat checklist and a pen or pencil are locatedat each telephone instrument.

h. Ensure the existence of securecommunications systems between seniorpersonnel, secretaries, and security personnel

D-3

Building Security Procedures

with intercoms, telephones, and duress alarmsystems.

i. Develop an alternate means ofcommunications (e.g., two-way radio) in casethe primary communications systems fail.

j. Do not open packages or large envelopesin buildings unless the sender or source ispositively known. Notify security personnelof a suspicious package.

k. Have mail room personnel trained inbomb detection handling and inspection.

l. Lock all doors at night, on weekends, andwhen the building is unattended.

m. Maintain tight control of keys. Lockcabinets and closets when not in use.

n. When feasible, lock all building restrooms when not in use.

o. Escort visitors in the building andmaintain complete control of strangers whoseek entrance.

p. Check janitors and their equipmentbefore admitting them and observe while theyare performing their functions.

q. Secure official papers from unauthorizedviewing.

r. Update security clearances of employees(especially foreign nationals).

s. Do not reveal the location of buildingpersonnel to callers unless they are positivelyidentified and have a need for the information.

t. Use extreme care when providinginformation over the telephone — remember,telephone lines may be tapped.

u. Do not give the names, positions, andespecially home addresses or phone numbers

of office personnel to strangers or telephonecallers.

v. Do not list the address and telephonenumbers of potential terrorist targets in booksand rosters.

w. Avoid discussing travel plans ortimetables in the presence of visitors.

x. Be alert to people disguised as publicutility crews (e.g., road workers, vendors) whomight station themselves near the building toobserve activities and gather information.

y. Note parked or abandoned vehicles nearthe entrance to the building or near the walls.

z. Note the license plate number, make,model, year, and color of suspicious vehicles andthe occupants’ descriptions, and report thatinformation to your supervisor, security officer,military and/or security police, or local police.

5. Controlling Entry

a. Consider installing a peephole, intercom,interview grill, or small aperture in entrydoorways to screen visitors before the door isopened.

b. Use a reception room to handle visitors,thereby restricting their access to interioroffices.

c. Consider installing metal detectiondevices at controlled entrances. Prohibit non-organization members from bringing boxesand parcels into the building.

d. Arrange building space so thatunescorted visitors are under the receptionist’svisual observation and to ensure that thevisitors follow stringent access controlprocedures.

e. Do not make exceptions to thebuilding’s access control system.

D-4

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.2

f. Upgrade access control systems toprovide better security through the use ofintercoms, access control badges or cards, andclosed circuit television.

6. Law Enforcement Proceduresin the Area

a. Determine if the local or military lawenforcement personnel patrol the area.

b. Request patrol by the local or militarylaw enforcement personnel to include doorchecks after duty hours.

c. Know the capabilities and limitations oflocal and military law enforcement.

d. Use private guards if appropriate.Ensure that their background checks arecompleted before they assume duties.

e. Remember, the use of guards is adeterrent, not the primary source of security.

f. Brief and rehearse guards on appropriateresponses in case of a terrorist incident.

7. Preparation for Emergencies

a. Maintain emergency items (e.g., supplyof fresh water, nonperishable food, candles,lanterns, flashlights, extra batteries, blankets,portable radio, camping stove with spare fuel,axe, first aid kit, and other appropriate items).

b. Ensure that all members of theorganization know the location of fireequipment, fire escapes, and other emergencyexits as well as electrical service switches,weapons, and emergency radio.

c. Select and prepare an interior safe roomfor use in case of an attack.

• The safe room should have a sturdy doorwith a lock and an emergency exit if

possible. Bathrooms on upper floors aregood safe rooms.

• Store emergency and first aid supplies inthe safe room. Bars or grillwork on saferoom windows should be locked from theinside to expedite escape.

• Keep keys to locks, a rope or chain ladderto ease escape, and a means ofcommunication (e.g., telephone or radiotransmitter) in the safe room.

d. Select and identify emergency exits.

e. Determine evacuation and escape routesand brief personnel.

f. Senior personnel and secretaries shouldhave duress switches that alarm at a constantlymanned security office.

g. Maintain a set of written emergency andcontingency procedures in the security officeto assist rescue efforts.

h. Emergency procedures should includebomb threat and bomb search techniques.

8. Public Areas

a. Remove all potted plants and ornamentalobjects from public areas.

b. Empty trash receptacles frequently.

c. Lock doors to service areas.

d. Lock trapdoors in the ceiling or floor,including skylights.

e. Ensure that construction or placementof furniture and other items would not concealexplosive devices or weapons.

f. Keep furniture away from walls orcorners.

D-5

Building Security Procedures

g. Modify curtains, drapes, or cloth coversso that concealed items can be seen easily.

h. Box in the tops of high cabinets, shelves,or other fixtures.

i. Exercise particular precautions in publicrest rooms.

j. Install springs on stall doors in restrooms so they stand open when not locked.Equip stalls with an inside latch to prevent

someone from hiding a device in a lockedstall.

k. Install a fixed covering over the topson commode water tanks.

l. Use open mesh baskets for soiled towels.Empty frequently.

m. Guards in public areas should have a wayto silently alert the office of danger and tosummon assistance (e.g., foot-activated buzzer).

D-6

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ELOCK SECURITY

E-1

1. General

Locks or locking devices are the first lineof defense in any security system. Locks aredelaying devices of perimeter security andshould be effectively integrated into othersecurity and protection systems (e.g., alarmsand electronic controls). There are five majorcategories of locks available for use inresidences or offices: cylindrical, mortise,cylinder dead bolt, rim, and cylindrical locksets with dead bolt functions. Residence,office, and vehicle security rely heavily uponlocking devices that vary in appearance,function, and application.

2. Entryway Safety Factors

a. Windows. Windows pose more securityproblems than doors. Windows are availablein a variety of styles and sizes and are oftendesigned with little or no thought to security.The choice of window size or type is primarilybased on ventilation, lighting, and esthetics.A window’s only security value is that, if it isproperly placed, it can make vulnerable areasunobservable. Intruders use windows to entera building usually only as a last resort. Theyavoid breaking glass because of the noisemade by its shattering and potential injury tothemselves. The following techniques can beused to upgrade window security:

• For windows that slide up or down, thesimplest measure is to drill one or moreholes through the sash and frame andinsert a pin or nail from the inside toprevent the window from being opened.Key-operated locks are also available, butthey pose a safety hazard in the event thewindow is needed for escape in anemergency.

• Windows which don’t open or are notintended for emergency exit should havesteel bars, mesh, or grill work installedover them.

b. Doors. As important as the lockingdevice is, the security afforded is only as goodas the construction of the door and frame.There are four major types of doors: flushwood doors, turnstile, rail (panel) wood doors,and metal doors. There are two types of flushdoors: hollow-core and solid-core. A hollow-core door is made of two sheets of thin veneeroverlaying hollow cardboard strips. A solid-core door is made of two sheets of woodveneer overlapping a solid wooden core.Solid-core doors not only provide a substantialsecurity advantage over hollow-core doors,they also add sound insulation and fireresistance. From a security perspective, ametal door is superior to any wooden door.A door’s vulnerability (as opposed to itsframe, hinges, or other accessory parts) isdefined in terms of penetrability. (How easyis it to break through? How long does it taketo break through?) However, breakingthrough a door is not the most commonmethod of defeating a door system. A farmore significant hazard is a door that fitsloosely to the frame, thereby allowing it tobe pried or forced open. Most wooden doorframes have solid wood, 3/4-inch to 1-inchin depth. Beyond this, there is usually a 4-inch to 6-inch gap of air between the frameand the first stud. This constructionprovides very little resistance to forcedentry. The following steps can be taken toenhance door security:

• Strengthen the door frame. Secure2-inch x 4-inch studs directly behind thedoor frame’s facing.

E-2

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.2

• Install striker plates. Striker platesvary in shape and are made for mortisedor surface-mounted locks. A close fitbetween the lock and the striker platereduces door movement when the dooris closed. If the striker plate is notsecurely affixed to a sturdy door frame,it is easily forced apart.

• Secure the door hinge. The securityvalue of the door hinge is oftenoverlooked. A well-secured hingeprevents forcing a door out of its frame.From a security standpoint, the mostimportant feature of a hinge is whether itis located on the inside or outside of thedoor. If the hinge pins are on the outside,they can be removed and the doorremoved from the frame. There areseveral solutions to this problem. Oneof the most effective methods is to weldthe pins to the hinge. One methodrequires drilling a small hole through thehinge and into the pin, and then insertinga second pin or small nail flush with thehinge surface. Another method requiresinserting two large screws in the door (orjamb) and leaving the screw headexposed 1/2-inch. Drill a matching holeon the opposite side so the screw headfits into the hole when the door is shut.

• Secure sliding glass doors. Sliding glassdoors present easy access to a residenceand pose complex security problems.These doors are available in a variety ofstyles and sizes and are designed withlittle or no thought to security. Manyfactors affect the ability to secure this typeof entrance. It is not enough to preventthe door from being moved horizontally,it must also be secured vertically. Thechannel in which the door rides providewide tolerances and facilitates verticallylifting the door out of its channel. Mostlocks designed for sliding glass doorstake into consideration both types of

movement and prevent the door frombeing lifted out of the channel. Thesimplest measure is to drill a hole throughthe channel and the frame. Insert a pinor nail to prevent the door from beingopened and insert sheet metal screws intothe upper channel, allowing them toprotrude far enough to prevent the doorfrom being lifted out of the channel.

c. Locking Mechanisms

• Cylindrical locks (key-in-knob locks) arethe most widely used locks in residentialconstruction. These locks are bothinexpensive and simple to rekey. Cheapcylindrical locks have seriousshortcomings. Cheaper cylindrical locksmay not have a dead latch and may beslipped open with a credit card orcelluloid strip. From a security point ofview, these locks are the least desirable.

• Mortise locks fit into a cavity cut intothe outer edge of the door. Since theintroduction of cylindrical locks, theuse of mortise locks has declined.Mortise locks are more expensive toinstall than cylindrical locks becauselarge sections of the door and jambhave to be mortised to fit the lock. Aquality mortise lock should have adead bolt with enough throw to fitsecurely into the door frame.

• Rim locks are erroneously referred to asjimmy proof. Do not be misled by theuse of the phrase “jimmy proof” becausethese locks can be compromised.However, rim locks are one of the mostsecure surface-mounted locks. Rim locksare not usually used as the primary lock.Install rim locks on the inside of the doorabove the vulnerable primary jamb. If avertical dead bolt is used, the rim lockmakes an excellent auxiliary lock and isvery difficult to defeat.

E-3

Lock Security

• Cylindrical lock sets with dead boltfunctions are comparative newcomers tothe security hardware market. Theycombine the best features of a goodsecurity lock — a dead bolt function witha dead bolt lock. The better designsinclude a 1-inch throw dead bolt, arecessed cylinder to discourage forcibleremoval, a concealed armor plate to resistdrilling, and a cylinder guard that spinsfreely when the dead bolt is in the lockedposition. The last feature makes itvirtually impossible for an intruder towrench the cylinder or cylinder guard offthe door. These lock sets include a panicfeature that ensures that the knob turnsfreely from the inside to permit rapid exitin case of emergency.

• Cylinder dead bolt locks are rapidlybecoming the most popular auxiliarylocks. They are installed above theprimary lock. The best designs have steelbars and cylinder guards so they cannotbe twisted, pried, or broken off. Double-cylinder locks may be a safety hazardwhere rapid escape is essential (e.g., inthe case of fire) and are prohibited bymany municipal codes in commercialfacilities because fire officials areconcerned that the need to find a keydelays escape in an emergency.

d. Lock Selection Guidelines

• Consider locking hardware as a long-term investment that requires planningand exceptional quality.

• Match locks to the door and door frameto create a strong integral unit.

• Ensure that entrance door locks have a1-inch dead bolt, a recessed cylinder todiscourage forcible removal, and acylinder guard that spins freely.

• Consider magnetic alarms if window ordoor glass is within arm’s reach of alocking device.

• Consider alarm foil, resident alarmsystems, and magnetic contacts ifresidence has large picture windows orsliding glass doors.

• Consider using padlocks to providesecurity protection to critical areasof the home. Padlocks should meetthe fol lowing minimumrequirements:

•• A heavy shackle — at least 9/32-inchof hardened steel;

•• A double-locking mechanism thatlocks the heel and toe;

•• A minimum five-pin tumbler ontumbler locks; and

•• A key-retaining feature that preventsremoving the key unless the padlock islocked.

• Use rim locks to provide additionalprotection.

• Lock all vulnerable windows and doorsat night.

• Ensure that entrance door hinges areheavy duty, pinned in the hinge, andequipped with door pins (metal pins orscrews).

• Consider the possible safety hazardsof using double-cylinder dead boltlocks that require key action on bothsides.

• Check local fire safety codes before usingdouble-cylinder dead bolt locks.

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Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.2

• Fill hollow metal door frames behind thestriker plate with cement to preventforcing the frame.

• Restrict access or distribution of homeand office keys.

• Keep spare keys in a locked drawer orfiling cabinet.

• Incorporate heavy-duty, double-cylinderdoor locks on office entrance doors if fireand safety regulations permit.

APPENDIX FTELEPHONE CALL PROCEDURES

F-1

1. Upon receiving a threatening or suspicious telephone call:

a. Try to keep a verbatim record of the conversation.

b. Attempt to obtain the caller’s name, address, and telephone number. Point out to thecaller that by giving these details the caller is indicating that the call is a genuine warning.

c. Attempt to keep the caller talking and elicit further information if possible.

d. Summon assistance (through a telephone exchange) to trace the call and to corroboratefacts and opinions.

e. Comply with the caller’s request to be connected with another extension. Monitor thecall if possible. Alert the officer of the day.

2. During the call:

a. Try to obtain answers to the questions listed on the telephone bomb threat checklistlocated in this appendix.

b. Try to determine the type of telephone call by contacting the operator immediately afterthe call ends. Was the call operator-connected? If the call was operator-connected, can theoperator identify the source? Was it from a pay phone? If dialed from a pay phone, was itdirect dialed?

3. After the call:

After the call is completed, provide the police duty officer with details of the telephone calland make a full written record of the conversation and any impressions, based on theinformation annotated on the telephone bomb threat checklist. This could be invaluable tothe local or military police.

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Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-07.2

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (ATF)BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

Exact time of call________________________________________________________Exact words of caller_____________________________________________________

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. When will the bomb explode?__________________________________________2. Where is the bomb?__________________________________________________3. What does the bomb look like?__________________________________________4. What kind of bomb is it?______________________________________________5. What will cause it to explode?__________________________________________6. Did you place the bomb?______________________________________________7. Why: _____________________________________________________________8. Where are you calling from?____________________________________________9. What is your address?_________________________________________________10. What is your name?__________________________________________________

CALLERS VOICE (circle)

Calm Disguised Nasal Angry BrokenStutter Slow Sincere Lisp Rapid GigglingDeep Crying Squeaky Excited StressedAccent Loud Slurred Normal

If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?____________________________________Were there any background noises?__________________________________________Remarks:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Person receiving the call:__________________________________________________Telephone number call received at:__________________________________________Date: _________________________________________________________________

Report immediately to:___________________________________________________(refer to bomb incident plan)

APPENDIX GCRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN FORMAT

G-1

The format outlined on the following pages highlights areas of concern in crisis managementplanning. It is not meant to be all inclusive or rigidly followed. Note: This is a local formatonly and does not reflect a format developed and approved for use with operation plans oroperation plans in concept format prepared by the combatant commanders to fulfill tasksassigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or as otherwise directed by the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy No. ____ of ____ CopiesIssuing Headquarters _________________Location __________________________Date-time-group_____________________

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

Refs: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

Time Zone: X

Task Organization: (List units organized to conduct antiterrorism operations. Includeattachments, supporting roles, and delegation of authority as necessary.)

1. SITUATION (Identify essential information in order to understand ongoing events.)

a. Terrorist Force (Identify terrorist composition, disposition, methods of operation,estimated strength, and capabilities that could influence the crisis management operation.Refer to appropriate annex.)

b. Response Forces (Explain response force abilities and responsibilities. Responseforce ability can influence the crisis management mission.)

c. Attachments and Detachments (Address here or refer to an annex.)

d. Assumptions (Provide assumptions used as a basis for this plan [e.g., strength ofresponse force to be supported, support available from other agencies]).

• Tactical Situation Possibilities (Obtained from the commander’s planning guidance.)

• Personnel Situation (Provided by the personnel officer.)

• Logistic Situation (Provided by the logistics officer.)

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Joint Pub 3-07.2

• Legal Situation Possibilities (Provided by the staff judge advocate.)

• Public Affairs Considerations (Provided by PAO.)

2. MISSION (Identifies terrorism action mission. For example, “. . . to contain and neutralizeterrorist threats and actions aimed at the disruption of this installation.”)

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations (State commander’s tactical plan. Purpose is to inform. Mayaddress how the commander will conduct combatting terrorism operations. Provides enoughdetail to insure proper action by subordinates in the absence of specific instructions. If therequired details are extensive, address in an annex. If an operation involves two or moredistinct phases, designate each phase and use subparagraphs [e.g., Phase I, Phase II]).

b. Tasks (Identify specific tasks for each element of the command charged with executinga crisis management mission. When giving multiple instructions, itemize and indicate priorityor sequence [e.g., commander, reaction force]).

c. Coordinating Instructions (Include coordination and control measures applicable totwo or more elements of the command.)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT (Provide a statement of service support instructions andarrangements supporting the crisis management operation. Use the following subparagraphsas required.)

a. General (Outline the general plan for service support.)

b. Materiel and Services (Address supply, transportation, labor [e.g., location of facilities,collection points, maintenance priority], and services [e.g., type of service available, designationand location of the unit, schedule of service] required.)

c. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization (Provide the plan for evacuation andhospitalization of sick, wounded, or injured personnel. Address evacuation responsibilitiesand air evacuation policy.)

d. Personnel (Provide required information and instructions to supporting unit personnel.)

• Maintenance of Unit Strength

•• Strength Reports (Provide instructions for submitting status reports. Includerequirements for routine and special reports.)

•• Replacements (Address validating existing personnel requisitions, instructions forsubmitting requisitions, and instructions for processing and removing replacements.)

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Crisis Management Plan Format

• Personnel Management (Address military and civilian personnel and civilian detaineemanagement procedures.)

• Development and Maintenance of Morale

•• Morale and Personnel Services (Provide postal and finance services, religiousactivities, personal hygiene, and special services activity information.)

•• Mortuary Affairs (Include evacuation procedures and handling of personal effects.)

• Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order (Provided by military law enforcementauthority.)

• Miscellaneous (Include personnel administrative matters not specifically assigned toanother coordinating staff section or included in preceding subparagraphs.)

e. Miscellaneous (Provide special instructions or special reports not covered in precedingparagraphs.)

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL (Provide instructions for command and operation ofcommunications-electronics equipment. Communications-electronics instructions may referto an annex but should list the index and issue number of the command, control,communications, and computers operation instructions in effect. If not already issued, giveinstructions for control, coordination, and establishment of priorities in the use ofelectromagnetic emissions. Command instructions include subordinate and higher unitcommand post locations and designated alternate command posts.)

6. ACKNOWLEDGE INSTRUCTIONS

/s/Commander

Annexes as applicable

Distribution:

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX HCRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN CHECKLIST

H-1

General. Unit antiterrorism success will depend on the degree and seriousness of the crisismanagement planning. The following checklist identifies items for use by joint forcecommanders and component commander staffs in analyzing antiterrorism plans within theircommands.

YES NO

1. Intelligence and/or Counterintelligence

___ ___ Does the plan allow for the threat analysis process (e.g., collection, analysis,production, and dissemination) to aid in the identification of the local threat?

___ ___ Does the plan consider restrictions placed on the collection and storage ofinformation?

___ ___ Does the plan indicate an awareness of sources of information for the threatanalysis process (e.g., military intelligence, counterintelligence, Federalagencies, and state and local authorities)?

___ ___ Does the plan allow for liaison and coordination of information (e.g., establishinga threat analysis committee)?

2. Threat Assessment

___ ___ Does the plan identify the local threat (immediate and long term)?

___ ___ Does the plan identify other threats (e.g., national and international groups thathave targeted or might target US installations)?

___ ___ Does the installation incorporate factors of the assessing the threat? Does itaddress:

___ ___ Geography of the area concerned;

___ ___ Law enforcement resources;

___ ___ Population cultural factors; and

___ ___ Communications capabilities?

___ ___ Does the plan establish a priority of identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities?

___ ___ Is the threat assessment periodically updated?

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3. Security Countermeasures

___ ___ Does the plan have specified THREATCONs and recommended actions?

___ ___ Do security countermeasures include a combination of physical operations andsound-blanketing security measures?

___ ___ Do the THREATCONs correspond to Appendix BB of DODD O-2000.12H,“Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism andPolitical Turbulence”?

4. OPSEC

___ ___ Have procedures been established that prevent terrorists from readily obtaininginformation about plans and operations (e.g., not publishing the commandinggeneral’s itinerary, safeguarding classified material)?

___ ___ Does the plan allow for in-depth coordination with the installations OPSECprogram?

___ ___ Has an OPSEC annex been included in the contingency plan?

5. Personnel Security

___ ___ Has the threat analysis identified individuals vulnerable to terrorist attack?

___ ___ Has a training program been established to educate both military and civilianpersonnel in the proper techniques of personnel protection and securitycommensurate with the local threat and the type of position held?

6. Physical Security

___ ___ Are special threat plans and physical security plans mutually supportive?

___ ___ Do security measures establish obstacles to terrorist activity (e.g., guards, host-nation forces, lighting, fencing)?

___ ___ Does the special threat plan include the threats identified in the threat statementsof higher headquarters?

___ ___ Does the physical security officer assist in the threat analysis and correctiveaction?

___ ___ Is there obvious command interest in physical security?

___ ___ Does the installation have and maintain detection systems and an appropriateassessment capability?

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Crisis Management Plan Checklist

7. Security Structure

___ ___ Does the plan indicate that the FBI has primary domestic investigative andoperational responsibility in the United States and US territories?

___ ___ Has coordination with the staff judge advocate been established?

___ ___ Does the plan allow for close cooperation between principal agents of themilitary, civilian, and host-nation communities and Federal agencies?

___ ___ Does the plan clearly indicate parameters for use of force, including the briefingof any elements augmenting military police assets?

___ ___ Is there a mutual understanding between all local agencies (e.g. military, localFBI resident or senior agent-in-charge, host-nation forces and local lawenforcement) that might be involved in a terrorist incident on the installationregarding authority, jurisdiction, and possible interaction?

___ ___ Has the staff judge advocate considered ramifications of closing the post (e.g.,possible civilian union problems)?

___ ___ Does the plan identify the DOS as having primary investigative and operationalresponsibility overseas?

8. Operations Center Training

___ ___ Has the operational command and coordination center (operations center) beenestablished and exercised?

___ ___ Is the operational command and coordination center based on the needs of theinstallation while recognizing manpower limitations, resource availability,equipment, and command?

___ ___ Does the plan include a location for the operations center?

___ ___ Does the plan designate alternate locations for the operations center?

___ ___ Does the plan allow for the use of visual aids (chalkboards, maps with overlays,bulletin boards) to provide situation status reports and countermeasures?

___ ___ Does the plan create and designate a location for a media center?

___ ___ Have the operations and media centers been activated together within the lastquarter?

___ ___ Does the operations center have SOPs covering communications and reportsto higher headquarters?

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___ ___ Does the operations center offer protection from terrorist attack?

9. Reaction Force Training

___ ___ Has the force been trained and exercised under realistic conditions?

___ ___ Has corrective action been applied to shortcomings and deficiencies?

___ ___ Has the reaction force been formed and mission-specified trained (e.g., buildingentry and search techniques, vehicle assault operations, countersnipertechniques, equipment)?

___ ___ Has the reaction force been tested quarterly (alert procedures, response time,overall preparedness)?

___ ___ Has responsibility been fixed for the negotiation team? Has the negotiationteam been trained and exercised under realistic conditions?

___ ___ Does the negotiation team have the proper equipment?

10. General Observations

___ ___ Was the plan developed as a coordinated staff effort?

___ ___ Does the plan outline reporting requirements (e.g., logs, journals, after-actionreport)?

___ ___ Does the plan address presence of the media?

___ ___ Does the plan include communications procedures and communications nets?

___ ___ Does the plan consider the possible need for interpreters?

___ ___ Does the plan consider the need for a list of personnel with various backgroundsto provide cultural profiles on foreign subjects and victims, as well as to assistwith any negotiation efforts?

___ ___ Does the plan provide for and identify units that will augment military policeassets?

___ ___ Does the plan delineate specific tasking(s) for each member of the operationscenter?

___ ___ Does the plan provide for a response for each phase of antiterrorism activity(e.g., initial response, negotiation, assault)?

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Crisis Management Plan Checklist

___ ___ Does the plan designate service support communications?

___ ___ Does the plan make provisions for notification of accident and incident controlofficer?

___ ___ Does the plan provide for EOD support?

___ ___ Does the plan take into consideration the movement from various locations,including commercial airports, of civilian and military advisory personnel withmilitary transportation assets?

___ ___ Does the plan allow for the purchase and/or use of civilian vehicles, supplies,food, if needed (including use to satisfy a hostage demand)? Does the planmake provisions for paying civilian employees overtime if they are involved ina special threat situation?

___ ___ Does the plan take into consideration the messing, billeting, and transportationof civilian personnel?

___ ___ Do appropriate personnel have necessary language training?

___ ___ Is MWD support available?

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Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX JTHREATCON SYSTEM

J-1

SECTION I. BASICTHREATCON PROCEDURES

1. General

The THREATCONs outlined belowdescribe the progressive level of a terroristthreat to all US military facilities andpersonnel under DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program.” As approvedby the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the terminology and definitions arerecommended security measures designed toease inter-Service coordination and supportof US military AT activities. The purpose ofthe THREATCON system is to provideaccessibility to, and easy dissemination of,appropriate information. The declaration,reduction, and cancellation of THREATCONsremain the exclusive responsibility ofcommanders. Although there is no directcorrelation between threat information (e.g.,intelligence summaries, warning reports, andspot reports) and THREATCONs, suchinformation, coupled with the guidanceprovided below, assists commanders inmaking prudent THREATCON declarations.THREATCONs may also be suffixed with thegeographic area deemed at risk. Once aTHREATCON is declared, the selectedsecurity measures are implementedimmediately. NOTE: When used in AT plans,recommend that the information contained inthis appendix be marked “For Official UseOnly” in accordance with DOD Regulation5400.7-R. The DODD 2000.12, “DoDCombating Terrorism Program,” recommendedmeasures are as follows:

a. THREATCON NORMAL existswhen a general threat of possible terroristactivity exists but warrants only a routinesecurity posture.

b. THREATCON ALPHA applieswhen there is a general threat of possibleterrorist activity against personnel andfacilities, the nature and extent of whichare unpredictable, and circumstances donot justify full implementation ofTHREATCON BRAVO measures.However, it may be necessary to implementcertain measures from higherTHREATCONs either resulting fromintelligence received or as a deterrent. Themeasures in this THREATCON must becapable of being maintained indefinitely.

• Measure 1. At regular intervals, remindall personnel and dependents to besuspicious and inquisitive aboutstrangers, particularly those carryingsuitcases or other containers. Watch forunidentified vehicles on or in the vicinityof US installations. Watch for abandonedparcels or suitcases and any unusualactivity.

• Measure 2. The duty officer or personnelwith access to building plans as well asthe plans for area evacuations must beavailable at all times. Key personnelshould be able to seal off an areaimmediately. Key personnel required toimplement security plans should be on-call and readily available.

• Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms,and storage areas not in regular use.

• Measure 4. Increase security spot checksof vehicles and persons entering theinstallation and unclassified areas underthe jurisdiction of the United States.

• Measure 5. Limit access points forvehicles and personnel commensuratewith a reasonable flow of traffic.

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• Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply measures14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCONBRAVO, either individually or incombination with each other.

• Measure 7. Review all plans, orders,personnel details, and logisticrequirements related to the introductionof higher THREATCONs.

• Measure 8. Review and implementsecurity measures for high-riskpersonnel as appropriate.

• Measure 9. As appropriate, consult localauthorities on the threat and mutualantiterrorism measures.

• Measure 10. To be determined.

c. THREATCON BRAVO applies whenan increased and more predictable threat ofterrorist activity exists. The measures in thisTHREATCON must be capable of beingmaintained for weeks without causing unduehardship, affecting operational capability, andaggravating relations with local authorities.

• Measure 11. Repeat measure 1 and warnpersonnel of any other potential form ofterrorist attack.

• Measure 12. Keep all personnelinvolved in implementing antiterroristcontingency plans on call.

• Measure 13. Check plans forimplementation of the next THREATCON.

• Measure 14. Move cars and objects(e.g., crates, trash containers) at least 25meters from buildings, particularlybuildings of a sensitive or prestigiousnature. Consider centralized parking.

• Measure 15. Secure and regularlyinspect all buildings, rooms, and storageareas not in regular use.

• Measure 16. At the beginning and endof each workday, as well as at otherregular and frequent intervals, inspect theinterior and exterior of buildings inregular use for suspicious packages.

• Measure 17. Examine mail (above theregular examination process) for letter orparcel bombs.

• Measure 18. Check all deliveries to suchlocations as messes and clubs. Advisedependents to check home deliveries.

• Measure 19. Increase surveillance ofdomestic accommodations, schools,messes, clubs, and other soft targets toimprove deterrence and defense and tobuild confidence among staff anddependents.

• Measure 20. Make staff and dependentsaware of the general situation in order tostop rumors and prevent unnecessaryalarm.

• Measure 21. At an early stage, informmembers of local security committees ofactions being taken. Explain reasons foractions.

• Measure 22. Physically inspect visitorsand randomly inspect their suitcases,parcels, and other containers. Identifythe visitor’s destination. Ensure thatproper dignity is maintained and, ifpossible, ensure that female visitors areinspected only by a female qualified toconduct physical inspections.

• Measure 23. Operate random patrols tocheck vehicles, people, and buildings.

• Measure 24. Protect off-base militarypersonnel and military vehicles inaccordance with prepared plans. Reminddrivers to lock vehicles and check vehiclesbefore entering or exiting the vehicle.

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THREATCON System

• Measure 25. Implement additionalsecurity measures for high-risk personnelas appropriate.

• Measure 26. Brief personnel who mayaugment guard forces on the use ofdeadly force. Ensure that there is nomisunderstanding of these instructions.

• Measures 27. As appropriate, consultlocal authorities on the threat and mutualantiterrorism measures.

• Measures 28 and 29. To be determined.

d. THREATCON CHARLIE applieswhen an incident occurs or intelligence isreceived indicating that some form of terroristaction against personnel and facilities isimminent. Implementation of measures in thisTHREATCON for more than a short periodprobably will create hardship and affect thepeacetime activities of the unit and itspersonnel.

• Measure 30. Continue, or introduce, allmeasures listed in THREATCONBRAVO.

• Measure 31. Keep all personnelrespons ib le fo r imp lement ingantiterrorist plans at their places of duty.

• Measure 32. Limit access points to theabsolute minimum.

• Measure 33. Strictly enforce control ofentry. Randomly search vehicles.

• Measure 34. Enforce centralizedparking of vehicles away from sensitivebuildings.

• Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards.Local orders should include specificorders on issue of ammunition.

• Measure 36. Increase patrolling of theinstallation.

• Measure 37. Protect all designatedvulnerable points. Give special attentionto vulnerable points outside the militaryestablishment.

• Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstaclesto control traffic flow.

• Measure 39. Consult local authoritiesabout closing public (and military) roadsand facilities that might make sites morevulnerable to attacks.

• Measure 40. To be determined.

e. THREATCON DELTA applies in theimmediate area where a terrorist attack hasoccurred or when intelligence has been receivedthat terrorist action against a specific locationor person is likely. Normally, this THREATCONis declared as a localized condition.

• Measure 41. Continue, or introduce, allmeasures listed for THREATCONsALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE.

• Measure 42. Augment guards asnecessary.

• Measure 43. Identify all vehicles withinoperational or mission-support areas.

• Measure 44. Search all vehicles andtheir contents before allowing entranceto the installation.

• Measure 45. Control access andimplement positive identification of allpersonnel — no exceptions.

• Measure 46. Search all suitcases,briefcases, and packages brought into theinstallation.

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• Measure 47. Control access to all areasunder the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates.

• Measure 48. Make frequent checks ofthe exterior of buildings and of parkingareas.

• Measure 49. Minimize all administrativejourneys and visits.

• Measure 50. Coordinate the possibleclosing of public and military roads andfacilities with local authorities.

• Measure 51. To be determined.

SECTION II. SHIPBOARDTERRORIST THREAT

CONDITIONS

2. Shipboard TerroristTHREATCON Measures

The measures outlined below are for useaboard vessels and serve two purposes. First,the crew is alerted, additional watches arecreated, and there is greater security. Second,these measures display the ship’s resolve toprepare for and counter the terrorist threat.These actions will convey to anyoneobserving the ship’s activities that the ship isprepared, the ship is an undesirable target, andthe terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for avulnerable target. The measures outlinedbelow do not account for local conditions andregulations or current threat intelligence. Theship’s command must maintain flexibility. Asthreat conditions change, the ship’s crew mustbe prepared to take actions to counter thethreat. When necessary, additional measuresmust be taken immediately. The simplesolution to THREATCON CHARLIE orDELTA is to get under way, but this optionmay not always be available.

a. THREATCON ALPHA is declaredwhen a general threat of possible terroristactivity is directed toward installations,vessels, and personnel, the nature and extentof which are unpredictable and wherecircumstances do not justify fullimplementation of THREATCON BRAVOmeasures. However, it may be necessary toimplement certain selected measures fromTHREATCON BRAVO as a result ofintelligence received or as a deterrent. Themeasures in this threat condition must becapable of being maintained indefinitely.

• Measure 1. Brief crew on the threat, shipsecurity, and security precautions to betaken while ashore.

• Measure 2. Muster and brief securitypersonnel on the threat and ROE.

• Measure 3. Review security plans andkeep them available. Keep on call keypersonnel who may be needed toimplement security measures.

• Measure 4. Consistent with local rules,regulations, and SOFAs, post qualifiedarmed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry.Rifles are the preferred weapon.

• Measure 5. Consistent with local rules,regulations, and SOFAs, post qualifiedarmed pier sentry and pier entrancesentry.

• Measure 6. Issue two-way radios to allsentries, roving patrols, quarterdeckwatch, and response force. If practical,all guards will be equipped with at leasttwo systems of communication (e.g.,two-way radio, telephone, whistle, orsignal light).

• Measure 7. Issue night vision devicesto selected posted security personnel.

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THREATCON System

• Measure 8. Coordinate pier and fleetlanding security with collocated forcesand local authorities. Identify anticipatedneeds for mutual support (securitypersonnel, boats, and equipment) anddefine methods of activation andcommunication.

• Measure 9. Tighten shipboard and pieraccess control procedures. Positivelyidentify all personnel entering pier andfleet landing area — no exceptions.

• Measure 10. Consistent with local rules,regulations, and SOFAs, establishunloading zone(s) on the pier away fromthe ship.

• Measure 11. Deploy barriers to keepvehicles away from the ship. Barriersmay be ship’s vehicles, equipment, oritems available locally.

• Measure 12. Post signs in locallanguage(s) to explain visiting andloitering restrictions.

• Measure 13. Inspect all vehiclesentering pier and check for unauthorizedpersonnel, weapons, and/or explosives.

• Measure 14. Inspect all personnel, hand-carried items, and packages before theycome aboard. Where possible, screeningshould be at the pier entrance or foot ofbrow.

• Measure 15. Direct departing andarriving liberty boats to make a securitytour around the ship and give specialattention to the waterline and hull. Boatsmust be identifiable night and day toship’s personnel.

• Measure 16. Water taxis, ferries, bumboats, and other harbor craft requirespecial concern because they can serve

as an ideal platform for terrorists.Unauthorized craft should be kept awayfrom the ship; authorized craft shouldbe carefully controlled, surveilled, andcovered.

• Measure 17. Identify and inspect workboats.

• Measure 18. Secure spaces not in use.

• Measure 19. Regulate shipboardlighting to best meet the threatenvironment. Lighting should includeillumination of the waterline.

• Measure 20. Rig hawsepipe covers andrat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses.Consider using an anchor collar.

• Measure 21. Raise accommodationladders, stern gates, and jacob ladderswhen not in use. Clear ship of allunnecessary stages, camels, barges, oildonuts, and lines.

• Measure 22. Conduct security drills toinclude bomb threat and repel boardersexercises.

• Measure 23. Review individual actionsin THREATCON BRAVO for possibleimplementation.

• Measure 24. To be determined.

b. THREATCON BRAVO is declaredwhen an increased and more predictable threatof terrorist activity exists. The measures inthis THREATCON must be capable of beingmaintained for weeks without causing unduehardships, without affecting operationalcapability, and without aggravating relationswith local authorities.

• Measure 25. Maintain appropriateTHREATCON ALPHA measures.

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• Measure 26. Review liberty policy inlight of the threat and revise it asnecessary to maintain the safety andsecurity of the ship and crew.

• Measure 27. Conduct divisionalquarters at foul weather parade todetermine the status of on-boardpersonnel and to disseminateinformation.

• Measure 28. Ensure that an up-to-datelist of bilingual personnel for theoperational area is readily available.Ensure that the warning tape in the pilothouse and/or quarterdeck that warnssmall craft to remain clear is in both thelocal language and English.

• Measure 29. Remind all personnel to:(a) be suspicious and inquisitive ofstrangers, particularly those carryingsuitcases or other containers; (b) be alertfor abandoned parcels or suitcases; (c)be alert for unattended vehicles in thevicinity; (d) be wary of any unusualactivities; and (e) notify the duty officerof anything suspicious.

• Measure 30. Remind personnel to locktheir parked vehicles and to carefullycheck them before entering.

• Measure 31. Designate and brief picketboat crews. Prepare boats and placecrews on 15-minute alert. If the situationwarrants, make random picket boatpatrols in the immediate vicinity of theship with the motor whaleboat or gig.Boat crews will be armed with M16rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds ofammunition, and 10 concussiongrenades.

• Measure 32. Consistent with local rules,regulations, and SOFAs, establisharmed brow watch on pier to check

identification and inspect baggage beforepersonnel board ship.

• Measure 33. Man signal bridge or pilothouse and ensure that flares are availableto ward off approaching craft.

• Measure 34. After working hours, placearmed sentries on a superstructure levelfrom which they can best cover areasabout the ship.

• Measure 35. Arm all members of thequarterdeck watch and SAT. In theabsence of a SAT, arm two members ofthe self defense force (SDF).

• Measure 36. Provide shotgun andammunition to quarterdeck. If thesituation warrants, place sentry withshotgun inside the superstructure at a sitefrom which the quarterdeck can becovered.

• Measure 37. Issue arms to selectedqualified officers to include commandduty officer and assistant command dutyofficer.

• Measure 38. Arm sounding and securitypatrol.

• Measure 39. Muster and briefammunition bearers or messengers.

• Measure 40. Implement procedures forexpedient issue of firearms andammunition from small arms locker(SAL). Ensure that a set of SAL keysare readily available and in the possessionof an officer designated for this duty bythe commanding officer.

• Measure 41. Load additional smallarms magazines to ensure adequatesupply for security personnel andresponse forces.

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THREATCON System

• Measure 42. Inform local authoritiesof actions taken as the THREATCONincreases.

• Measure 43. Test communications withlocal authorities and other US Navy shipsin port.

• Measure 44. Instruct watches to conductfrequent random searches under piers,with emphasis on potential hiding places,pier pilings, and floating debris.

• Measure 45. Conduct searches of theship’s hull and boats at intermittentintervals and immediately before it putsto sea.

• Measure 46. Move cars and objects suchas crates and trash containers 100 feetfrom the ship.

• Measure 47. Hoist boats aboard whennot in use.

• Measure 48. Terminate all public visits.

• Measure 49. Set materiel conditionYOKE, main deck and below.

• Measure 50. After working hours,reduce entry points to the ship’s interiorby securing selected entrances from theinside.

• Measure 51. Duty department headsensure that all spaces not in regular useare secured and inspected periodically.

• Measure 52. If two brows are rigged,remove one of them.

• Measure 53. Maintain capability to getunder way on short notice or as specifiedby SOPs. Consider possible relocationsites (such as a different pier oranchorage). Rig brow and accommodationladder for immediate raising or removal.

• Measure 54. Ensure that .50-calibermount assemblies are in place withammunition in ready service lockers (.50-caliber machine guns will be maintainedin the armory, pre-fire checks completed,and ready for use).

• Measure 55. Prepare fire hoses. Briefdesignated personnel on procedures forrepelling boarders, small boats, and ultra-light aircraft.

• Measure 56. Obstruct possiblehelicopter landing areas in such a manneras to prevent hostile helicopters fromlanding.

• Measure 57. Review riot and crowdcontrol procedures, asylum-seekerprocedures, and bomb threat procedures.

• Measure 58. Monitor localcommunications (e.g., ship-to-ship, TV,radio, police scanners).

• Measure 59. Implement additionalsecurity measures for high-risk personnelas appropriate.

• Measure 60. Review individual actionsin THREATCON CHARLIE forpossible implementation.

• Measures 61 and 62. To be determined.

c. THREATCON CHARLIE is declaredwhen an incident occurs or intelligence isreceived indicating that some form of terroristaction against installations, vessels, orpersonnel is imminent. Implementation ofthis THREATCON for more than a shortperiod will probably create hardship and willaffect the peacetime activities of the ship andits personnel.

• Measure 63. Maintain appropriatemeasures for THREATCONs ALPHAand BRAVO.

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• Measure 64. Cancel liberty. Executeemergency recall.

• Measure 65. Be prepared to get underway on one (1) hour’s notice or less. Ifconditions warrant, request permission tosortie.

• Measure 66. Muster and arm SAT, BAF,and RF. Position SAT and BAF atdesignated location(s). Deploy RF toprotect command structure and augmentposted security watches.

• Measure 67. Place armed sentries on asuperstructure level from which they canbest cover areas about the ship.

• Measure 68. Establish .50- or .30-calibermachine gun positions.

• Measure 69. If available, deploySTINGER surface-to-air missiles inaccordance with established ROE.

• Measure 70. Energize radar andestablish watch.

• Measure 71. Ships with high-powersonars operate actively for randomperiods to deter underwater activity. Manpassive sonar capable of detecting boats,swimmers, or underwater vehicles.Position any non-sonar-equipped shipswithin the acoustic envelope of sonar-equipped ships.

• Measure 72. Man one or more repairlockers. Establish communications withan extra watch in damage control central.

• Measure 73. Deploy picket boat. Boatsshould be identifiable night and day fromthe ship (e.g., by lights or flags).

• Measure 74. If feasible, deploy ahelicopter as an observation or gun

platform. The helicopter should beidentifiable night and day from the ship.

• Measure 75. Activate antiswimmerwatch. (Portions of watch may alreadybe implemented by previousTHREATCON measures).

• Measure 76. Issue weapons to selectedofficers and chief petty officers in theduty section (i.e., the commandingofficer, executive officer, departmentheads).

• Measure 77. Issue concussion grenadesto topside rovers, forecastle and fantailsentries, and bridge watch.

• Measure 78. Erect barriers and obstaclesas required to control traffic flow.

• Measure 79. Strictly enforce entrycontrol procedures and searches — noexceptions.

• Measure 80. Enforce boat exclusionzone.

• Measure 81. Minimize all off-shipadministrative trips.

• Measure 82. Discontinue contract work.

• Measure 83. Set materiel conditionZEBRA, second deck and below.

• Measure 84. Secure from the inside allunguarded entry points to the interior ofthe ship.

• Measure 85. Rotate screws and cyclerudder(s) at frequent and irregularintervals.

• Measure 86. Rig additional firehoses.Charge the firehoses when manned justprior to actual use.

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THREATCON System

• Measure 87. Review individual actionsin THREATCON DELTA forimplementation.

• Measure 88. To be determined.

d. THREATCON DELTA is declaredwhen a terrorist attack has occurred in theimmediate area or intelligence has beenreceived that indicates a terrorist action againsta specific location or person is likely.Normally, this THREATCON is declared asa localized warning.

• Measure 89. Maintain appropriateTHREATCONs ALPHA, BRAVO, andCHARLIE measures.

• Measure 90. Permit only necessarypersonnel topside.

• Measure 91. Prepare to get under wayand, if possible, cancel port visit anddepart.

• Measure 92. Post sentries with fullyautomatic weapons to cover possiblehelicopter landing areas.

• Measure 93. Arm selected personnel ofthe SDF.

• Measure 94. Deploy grenade launchersto cover approaches to ship.

• Measure 95. To be determined.

SECTION III. AVIATIONFACILITY THREATCON

PROCEDURES

3. General

In addition to basic THREATCONprocedures, a variety of other tasks mayneed to be performed at aviation facilities.This is particularly true for airbases located

in areas where the threat of terrorist attacksis high.

a. THREATCONs ALPHA ANDBRAVO

• Planning

•• Review THREATCONs ALPHA andBRAVO measures.

•• Update THREATCONs ALPHA andBRAVO measures as required.

• Briefing and Liaison

•• Brief all personnel on the threat,especially pilots, ground support crews,and air traffic controllers.

•• Inform local police of the threat.Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraftflight paths into and out of air stations.

•• Ensure that duty officers are alwaysavailable by telephone.

•• Prepare to activate contingency plansand issue detailed air traffic controlprocedures if appropriate.

•• Be prepared to receive and directaircraft from other stations.

• Precautions Inside the Perimeter

•• Perform thorough and regularinspection of areas within the perimetersfrom which attacks on aircraft can bemade.

•• Take action to ensure that noextremists armed with surface-to-airmissiles can operate against aircraftwithin the perimeter.

•• Establish checkpoints at all entrancesand inspect all passes and permits.

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Identify documents of individualsentering the area — no exceptions.

•• Search all vehicles, briefcases, andpackages entering the area.

•• Erect barriers around potential targetsif at all possible.

•• Maintain firefighting equipment andconduct practice drills.

•• Hold practice alerts within theperimeter.

• Precautions Outside the Perimeter

•• Conduct, with local police, regularinspections of the perimeter — especiallythe area adjacent to flight paths.

•• Advise the local police of any areasoutside the perimeter where attacks couldbe mounted and that cannot be avoidedby aircraft on takeoff or landing.

•• Advise aircrews to report any unusualactivity near approach and overshootareas.

b. THREATCON CHARLIE

• Planning

•• Review THREATCON CHARLIEmeasures.

•• Update THREATCON CHARLIEmeasures as required.

• Briefing and Liaison

•• Brief all personnel on the increasedthreat.

•• Inform local police of increased threat.

•• Coordinate with the local police onany precautionary measures takenoutside the airfield’s perimeters.

•• Implement appropriate flyingcountermeasures specified in SOPs whendirected by air traffic controllers.

• Precautions Inside the Perimeter

•• Inspect all vehicles and buildings ona regular basis.

•• Detail additional guards to be on callat short notice and consider augmentingfirefighting details.

•• Carry out random patrols within theairfield perimeter and maintaincontinuous observation of approach andovershoot areas.

•• Reduce flying to essential operationalflights only. Cease circuit flying ifappropriate.

•• Escort all visitors.

•• Close relief landing grounds whereappropriate.

•• Check airfield diversion state.

• Precautions Outside the Perimeter

•• Be prepared to react to requests forassistance.

•• Provide troops to assist local policein searching for terrorists on approachesoutside the perimeter of militaryairfields.

c. THREATCON DELTA

• Planning

J-11

THREATCON System

•• Review THREATCON DELTAmeasures.

•• Update THREATCON DELTAmeasures as required.

• Briefings and Liaison

•• Brief all personnel on the very highlevels of threat.

•• Inform local police of the increasedthreat.

• Precautions Inside the Perimeter

•• Cease all flying except for specificallyauthorized operational sorties.

•• Implement, if necessary, appropriateflying countermeasures.

•• Be prepared to accept aircraft divertedfrom other stations.

•• Be prepared to deploy light aircraftand helicopters for surveillance tasks orto move internal security forces.

• Precautions Outside the Perimeter

•• Close military roads allowing accessto the airbase.

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Appendix J

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX KEXPLOSIVE DEVICE PROCEDURES

K-1

1. Search and EvacuationProcedures for a SuspectedIED

a. Suspicion that an IED is within anestablishment often stems from a threateninganonymous telephone call. Treat the callseriously even though subsequentinvestigation may prove it to be a false alarmor hoax. Appendix F, “Telephone CallProcedures,” provides advice on handlinganonymous telephone calls.

b. Upon receiving an anonymous warningor threat, notify the military law enforcementauthorities or police immediately. Local SOPsdetermine subsequent actions. Immediateaction may include search without evacuation,movement of personnel within theestablishment, partial evacuation, or totalevacuation.

• Factors favoring a search beforemovement of personnel include thefollowing:

•• There is a high incidence of hoaxtelephone threats.

•• Effective security arrangements havebeen established.

•• Information in the warning isimprecise or incorrect.

•• The caller sounded intoxicated,amused, or very young.

•• The prevailing threat of terroristactivity is low.

•• Physical security in place (checks ofall incoming packages, visitor escort)would prevent the placement of a bomb.

• Factors favoring movement of personnelbefore searching include the following:

•• The area (e.g., post or base) iscomparatively open.

•• Information in the warning is preciseas to matters of location, description ofdevice, timing, and motive for attack.

•• Prevailing threat of terrorist activityis high.

•• A suspicious package or bomb-looking devices are discovered.

c. Searching for a Suspected IED

• Use a nominated persons search whenthe threat’s credibility is very low.Predesignated individuals searchassigned areas. The search can becompleted in a short time or can be donecovertly.

• Use an occupant search when the threat’scredibility is low. Occupants search theirown areas. The search is completedquickly because occupants know theirarea and are most likely to noticeanything unusual.

• Use a team search when the threat’scredibility is high. Search teams make asystematic search of the area. The searchis slow and thorough, and places theminimum number of personnel at risk.Completely evacuate the area and ensurethat it remains evacuated until the searchis complete.

• Use patrol-explosive MWD, if available,as a final means of checking the situationin each instance.

K-2

Appendix K

Joint Pub 3-07.2

d. Search Procedures

• Make an audio check and listen forunusual sounds.

• Visually sweep the area up to the waist,then sweep up to the ceiling. Do notforget the tops of cabinets and cupboards.

• Perform a thorough and systematicsearch in and around containers andfixtures.

• Pass search results as quickly as possibleto the leader responsible for controllingthe search area.

e. Search Organization. Search partiesare designated by the commander or seniorDOD civilian in charge of the site. The personcontrolling the search should possess a meansof tracking and recording the search results(e.g., a diagram of the area). Delegate areasof responsibility to search team leaders whoreport to the person controlling the searchwhen their areas have been cleared. Payparticular attention to entrances, toilets,corridors, stairs, unlocked closets, storagespaces, rooms, and areas not checked by usualoccupants — external building areas, windowledges, ventilators, courtyards, and spacesshielded from normal view. Searchers mustbe familiar with the area so that they canreadily identify unusual or foreign objects.

f. Evacuation Procedures. Evacuationprocedures depend upon circumstances.Prepare, publicize, and rehearse evacuationplans in advance. Address alarm systems,assembly areas, routes to assembly areas,personnel evacuation response, building andarea clearance, and evacuation drills.

g. Alarm System. The bomb threat alarmsystem should be easily distinguished fromthe fire alarm.

h. Assembly Areas. Assembly areas arepreselected and well known to personnel.Establish a clearly defined procedure forcontrolling, marshalling, and checkingpersonnel within the assembly area. Ifbuildings or establishments are in a publicarea, coordinate assembly areas with localpolice. Assembly areas are chosen with thefollowing considerations:

• Assembly areas should be at least 200meters and not less than 100 meters fromthe likely target or building, if at allpossible.

• Locate assembly areas where there islittle chance of an IED being hidden.Open spaces are best. Avoid car parkingareas — IEDs can be easily hidden invehicles.

• Select alternate assembly areas to reducethe likelihood of ambush with a seconddevice or small arms fire. If possible,search the assembly area beforepersonnel occupy the space.

• Assembly areas should not be nearexpanses of plate glass or windows. Blasteffects can cause windows to be suckedoutward rather than blown inward.

i. Routes to Assembly Areas. Chooseroutes to the assembly area so that personneldo not approach the IED at any time. Preselectroutes to the assembly area, but devise asystem to inform personnel of the location ofthe suspected IED and alternate routes. Routesprevent confusion and bunching and avoidpotential hazards (e.g., plate glass, windows,and likely locations of additional IEDs).

j. Personnel Evacuation Response. Uponhearing the alarm, personnel secure allclassified documents, conduct a quick visualsearch of their immediate working area, open

K-3

Explosive Device Procedures

windows wherever possible, leave thebuilding taking only valuable personalbelongings, leave doors open, andimmediately proceed to the assembly area.

k. Building and Area Clearance.Establish procedures to ensure that threatenedbuildings and areas are cleared and to preventpeople from reentering the building. Establisha cordon to prevent personnel from enteringthe danger area. Establish an incident controlpoint (ICP) as the focal point for military lawenforcement and police control.

l. Evacuation Drills. Periodically practiceevacuation and search drills under thesupervision of the installation or unit seniorofficer. Hold drills in cooperation with localpolice if possible. Avoid unnecessarilyalarming personnel and civilians in adjacentpremises.

2. Discovery of a Suspected IED

Do not touch or move a suspicious object.If it is possible for someone to account for thepresence of the object, then ask the person toidentify it with a verbal description. Thisshould not be done if it entails bringingevacuated personnel back into the area. Takethe following actions if an object’s presenceremains inexplicable:

a. Evacuate buildings and surroundingareas, including the search team.

b. Evacuated areas must be at least 100meters from the suspicious object.

c. Establish a cordon and ICP.

d. Inform the ICP that an object has beenfound.

e. Keep person who located the object atthe ICP until questioned.

f. Cordon suspicious objects to a distanceof at least 100 meters and cordon suspiciousvehicles to a distance of at least 200 meters.Ensure that no one enters the cordoned area.Establish an ICP on the cordon to controlaccess and relinquish ICP responsibility to themilitary law enforcement authorities or localpolice upon their arrival. Maintain the cordonuntil the military law enforcement authoritiesor local police have completed theirexamination or state that the cordon may standdown. The decision to allow re-occupationof an evacuated facility rests with thecognizant commander or senior DOD civilianin charge of the facility.

3. Reaction to an Exploded IED

a. Explosion Without Casualties

• Maintain the cordon. Allow onlyauthorized personnel into the explosionarea.

• Fight any fires threatening undamagedbuildings if this can be achieved withoutrisking personnel.

• Report the explosion to the military lawenforcement authorities or local policeif they are not yet in attendance.

• Report the explosion to the installationoperations center even if an EOD teamis on its way. Provide as much detail aspossible (e.g., time of explosion, numberof explosions, color of smoke, and speedand spread of fire).

• Ensure that a clear passage for emergencyvehicles (e.g., fire trucks, ambulances)and corresponding personnel ismaintained.

• Refer media inquiries to the PAO at theoperations center.

K-4

Appendix K

Joint Pub 3-07.2

• Establish an information center to handleinquiries from the concerned friends andrelatives.

b. Explosion With Casualties. The firstconsideration is the effective, organized searchfor and evacuation of casualties. Peoplenaturally approach the explosion area to aidin searching for casualties. The senior officermust coordinate the search and keep thenumber of searchers to the absolute minimumbecause of the threat of IEDs and secondaryeffects (e.g., falling masonry and fires).Attempt to prepare an accurate casualty listfor notification of next of kin. It is far betterto release an accurate list of casualties a littlelater than an incorrect list immediately.Arrange for unaffected personnel to quicklycontact their next of kin.

c. Assisting the Threat ManagementTeam

• Pass available information to theoperations center. Do not delay reportsbecause of lack of information — reportwhat you know. Do not take risks toobtain information.

• Include the following information in yourreport:

•• Any warning received and if so, howit was received.

•• Identity of the person(s) whodiscovered the device.

•• How the device was discovered (e.g.,casual discovery, organized search).

•• Location of the device — give asmuch detail as possible.

•• Time of discovery.

•• Estimated length of time the devicehas been in its location.

•• Description of the device — give asmuch detail as possible.

•• Safety measures taken.

•• Suggested routes to the scene.

•• Any other pertinent information.

• Access control.

•• Upon arrival, ensure that military lawenforcement authorities, local police, andEOD vehicles are not impeded fromreaching the ICP.

•• Evacuate through building doors andwindows.

•• Obtain a diagram of the building andtry to obtain detailed plans of the publicservice conduits (e.g., gas, electricity,central heating). If unavailable, a sketchcan be drawn by someone with detailedknowledge of the building.

•• Witnesses are invaluable and shouldbe on hand when military and local policearrive. Witnesses include the person(s)who discovered the device, witnessed theexplosion, or possesses detailedknowledge of the building or area.

APPENDIX LJURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR HANDLING

TERRORIST INCIDENTS

L-1

L-2

Appendix L

Join

t Pu

b 3

-07

.2

Figure L-1. Jurisdictional Authority for Handling Terrorist Incidents

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR HANDLING TERRORIST INCIDENTS

LOCATION INITIAL RESPONSE PRIMARY AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION

PRIMARY ENFORCEMENTRESPONSIBILITY

EXERCISING CONTROL OF MILITARYASSETS

PRIMARY INVESTIGATIVERESPONSIBILITY

WITHIN THEUNITED STATES

ON BASE

OFF BASE

MILITARY POLICE

CIVIL POLICE

FBI/INSTALLATIONCOMMANDER

FBI/CIVIL POLICE

FBI/INSTALLATIONCOMMANDER

FBI/CIVIL POLICE

INSTALLATION OR UNIT COMMANDER(SUPPORT FBI)

FBI/NCIS/PMOCID/AFOSI

FBI

OUTSIDE THEUNITED STATES

ON BASE MILITARY POLICE HOST GOVERNMENT/DOSINSTALLATIONCOMMANDER

HOST GOVERNMENT/DOSINSTALLATIONCOMMANDER

INSTALLATION OR UNIT COMMANDER (IAWAPPLICABLE STATUS-OF-FORCESAGREEMENT OR OTHER BILATERALAGREEMENTS GOVERNING THEEMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES)

HOST GOVERNMENT/NCIS/PMOCIDAFOSI

OFF BASE HOST-COUNTRY LAWENFORCEMENT

HOST GOVERNMENT/DOS HOST GOVERNMENT/DOS INSTALLATION OR UNIT COMMANDER (IAWAPPLICABLE STATUS-OF-FORCESAGREEMENT OR OTHER BILATERALAGREEMENTS GOVERNING THEEMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES)

HOST GOVERNMENT WITHSUPPORT FROM US LAWENFORCEMENT AGENCIESAS PROVIDED FOR INBILATERAL AGREEMENTS

NOTE: Coordinate with the local Staff Judge Advocate to clarify authority and questions of jurisdiction. Coordinate with Department of State officials as required. Coordinate inadvance with local law enforcement agencies to ensure that support procedures are in place and established information/communication channels are functioning.

LEGEND: AFOSIFBINCISPMOCIDDOS

Air Force Office of Special InvestigationsFederal Bureau of InvestigationNaval Criminal Investigative ServiceProvost Marshal's OfficeCriminal Investigation DivisionDepartment of State

APPENDIX MPUBLIC AFFAIRS CHECKLIST

M-1

1. General. Because terrorists seek media recognition, media information managementmust be in the best interest of the hostage and the situation. The PAO screens information tothe media to ensure OPSEC and provides advice and counsel to those in charge. The followingchecklist contains the planning considerations for the PAO in a crisis management situation.

___ Check with the center commander upon entering the operations center.

___ Revise the public affairs plan to meet the requirements of the situation includinga location for the media.

___ Disseminate information to the news media in accordance with the establishedplan.

___ Control press releases.

___ Coordinate press releases with the commander, staff judge advocate, otheroperations center staff, and higher echelon PAOs before release.

___ Control movement of news media personnel with press passes and escorts.

___ Obtain approval for the following items from the commander.

— News releases.

— News media personnel to enter outer perimeter.

— Release of photographs of suspects, victims, and immediate scene.

— Interviews with anyone other than the commander.

— Direct communication with press personnel and suspect(s).

2. Focus. The major public affairs focus of the antiterrorist plan should be to ensure thataccurate information is provided to the public (including news media) and to communicate acalm, measured, and reasonable reaction to the ongoing event. Commanders should providethe PAO officer with complete control over media activities.

M-2

Appendix M

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX NMILITARY WORKING DOGS

N-1

1. Purpose

This appendix is designed to provide thecommander with minimal informationconcerning the use of MWDs for ATrequirements. The military law enforcementoffice supporting the area should be consultedfor specifics associated with using MWDs inthe operational area.

2. General

The DOD MWD program produces dualpurpose trained MWDs. These MWDs areexcellent for use in an AT program. Each Servicehas MWDs, which are managed and controlledby the law enforcement office at each installation.The MWD program is designed to supporttactical operations and daily policecommitments. In addition, many host nationshave working dog programs that can be used tosupport military operations. Coordination forhost-nation assistance should be done by the localmilitary law enforcement office to ensurecompatibility with mission requirements.

3. Advantages

An MWD is a compact, mobile, easilytransported asset that can work in a variety ofconditions, including confined spaces anddifficult terrain. MWDs will increase the speedof many operations and, by their ability to locateexplosives and/or firearms at a distance in theright conditions, they can enhance theeffectiveness of searches and patrols. The MWDis an excellent deterrent in many circumstances.

4. Disadvantages

An MWD can be distracted by other dogs,animals, people, and food. It can tire, sicken,

be injured, reflect the handler’s mood, andhave inexplicable off-days. Also, an MWDcan be affected by extremes in weather.However, with intelligent handling and usemany of these disadvantages can beminimized.

5. Antiterrorism Uses

The MWD provides considerablebenefit to AT programs. Special forcesteams have been known to carry specialweapons to eliminate MWDs guardingfaci l i t ies, thus indicating a strongmeasure of effectiveness for the inclusionof MWDs in AT plans. The followingare some of the possibilities:

a. Patrolling perimeters and critical facilities.

b. Searching for explosives.

c. Augmenting access control points.

d. Serving as a deterrent in riot and crowdcontrol situations.

e. Serving as an early warning indicator forintrusions.

f. Serving as an augmentation to military lawenforcement capabilities.

6. Legal Considerations

The military law enforcement officewil l coordinate with appropriatecommand legal authorities to determineprocedures for MWD in a particular area.These ROE should be spelled out in theAT plan and practiced during trainingexercises.

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Appendix N

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX OREFERENCES

O-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-07.2 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Public Law 99-399, “Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.”

2. DODD 2000.12, “DoD Combating Terrorism Program.”

3. DODD O-2000.12H, “Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence.”

4. DODD 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).”

5. DODD 3025.12, “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).”

6. DODD 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.”

7. DODD 5025.1-M, “DoD Directives System Procedures.”

8. DODD 5160.54, “DoD Key Asset Protection Plan (KAPP).”

9. DODD 5210.84, “Security of DoD Personnel at US Missions Abroad.”

10. DODD 5240.1, “DoD Intelligence Activities.”

11. DODD 5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Componentsthat Affect United States Persons.”

12. DODD 5240.6, “Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program.”

13. DODD 5525.5, “DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.”

14. DODI 2000.14, Draft, “DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures.”

15. DODI O-2000.16, “DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards.”

16. Defense Special Weapons Agency, Force Protection, Vulnerability Assessment Team,“Guidelines for Assessment Team Members,” Initial Draft.

17. Commandant Instruction 16000.12, “Marine Safety Manual,” Volumes VII and X.

18. DOD Manual C-5210.41-M, “Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (U).”

19. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

O-2

Appendix O

Joint Pub 3-07.2

20. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”

21. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

22. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

23. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

24. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

25. Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.”

26. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

27. Joint Pub 3-07.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic SupportOperations.”

28. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”

29. Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

30. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

31. Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

32. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

33. CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

34. CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

35. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

APPENDIX PADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

P-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forOperations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-07.2, 25 June 1993, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J34/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

P-2

Appendix P

Joint Pub 3-07.2

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special InvestigationsAOR area of responsibilityASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence)ASD(FMP) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-

Intensity Conflict)AT antiterrorismATCC Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee

BAF backup alert force

C-B chemical-biologicalCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCINC commander of a combatant commandCISO counterintelligence support officerCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCOM Chief of MissionCT counterterrorismCTRIF Combatting Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund

DIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDODD Department of Defense DirectiveDODI Department of Defense InstructionDOJ Department of JusticeDOS Department of StateDOT Department of Transportation

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

FAA Federal Aviation AdministrationFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationFCG Foreign Clearance GuideFP force protection

HNS host-nation support

IAW in accordance withICP incident control pointIED improvised explosive deviceIR information requirement

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJRA joint rear areaJRAC joint rear area coordinatorJROC Joint Requirements Oversight CouncilJTF joint task force

MOOTW military operations other than warMOU memorandum of understandingMWD military working dog

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCIS Naval Criminal Investigative ServiceNRC National Response CenterNSC National Security Council

OP observation postOPSEC operations securityOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSPG Overseas Security Policy Group

PAO public affairs officerPPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting SystemPSYOP psychological operations

RF reserve forceROE rules of engagementR&R rest & recuperation

SAC special agent in chargeSAL small arms lockerSAT security alert teamSDF self defense forceSOFA status-of-forces agreementSOP standing operating procedure

THREATCON terrorist threat conditionTSA travel security advisory

USACIDC United States Army Criminal Investigations CommandUSAMPS United States Army Military Police SchoolUSCG United States Coast GuardUSDA&T Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

VA vulnerability assessment

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.2

GL-3

aircraft piracy. Any seizure or exercise ofcontrol, by force or violence or threat offorce or violence or by any other form ofintimidation and with wrongful intent, ofan aircraft within the special aircraftjurisdiction of the United States. (Joint Pub1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),taken to oppose terrorism throughout theentire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence support. Conductingcounterintelligence activities to protectagainst espionage and other foreignintelligence activities, sabotage,international terrorist activities, orassassinations conducted for, or on behalfof, foreign powers, organizations, orpersons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deterrence. The prevention from action byfear of the consequences. Deterrence is a

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

state of mind brought about by the existenceof a credible threat of unacceptablecounteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, andequipment, in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combattingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services,and supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (This term and its definitionreplaces the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

high-risk personnel. Personnel who, by theirgrade, assignment, symbolic value, orrelative isolation, are likely to be attractiveor accessible terrorist targets. (Joint Pub1-02)

hostage. A person held as a pledge that certainterms or agreements will be kept. (Thetaking of hostages is forbidden under theGeneva Conventions, 1949). (Joint Pub1-02)

improvised explosive device. A deviceplaced or fabricated in an improvisedmanner incorporating destructive, lethal,noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiarychemicals and designed to destroy,incapacitate, harass, or distract. It mayincorporate military stores, but is normallydevised from nonmilitary components.Also called IED. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term anddefinition and is approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

incident control point. A designated point closeto a terrorist incident where crisis

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.2

management forces will rendezvous andestablish control capability before initiating atactical reaction. Also called ICP. (This termand its definition modifies the existing termand definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

initial response force. The first unit, usuallymilitary police, on the scene of a terroristincident. (Joint Pub 1-02)

installation. A grouping of facilities, locatedin the same vicinity, which supportparticular functions. Installations may beelements of a base. (Joint Pub 1-02)

installation commander. The individualresponsible for all operations performed byan installation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

insurgent. Member of a political party whorebels against established leadership. (JointPub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting fromthe collection, processing, integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofavailable information concerning foreigncountries or areas. 2. Information andknowledge about an adversary obtainedthrough observation, investigation,analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

negotiations. A discussion betweenauthorities and a barricaded offender orterrorist to effect hostage release andterrorist surrender. (Joint Pub 1-02)

open-source intelligence. Information ofpotential intelligence value that is availableto the general public. Also called OSINT.(Joint Pub 1-02)

operations center. The facility or locationon an installation, base, or facility used bythe commander to command, control, andcoordinate all crisis activities. (Joint Pub1-02)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. Identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligence systems.b. Determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries. c. Select and executemeasures that eliminate or reduce to anacceptable level the vulnerabilities offriendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

physical security. That part of securityconcerned with physical measures designedto safeguard personnel; to preventunauthorized access to equipment,installations, material and documents; andto safeguard them against espionage,sabotage, damage, and theft. (Joint Pub1-02)

prevention. The security proceduresundertaken by the public and private sectorin order to discourage terrorist acts. (JointPub 1-02)

proactive measures. In antiterrorism,measures taken in the preventive stage ofantiterrorism designed to harden targets anddetect actions before they occur. (Joint Pub1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreementwhich defines the legal position of a visitingmilitary force deployed in the territory of afriendly state. Agreements delineating thestatus of visiting military forces may bebilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertainingto the status of visiting forces may be set forthin a separate agreement, or they may form apart of a more comprehensive agreement.These provisions describe how the authoritiesof a visiting force may control members ofthat force and the amenability of the force or

GL-5

Glossary

its members to the local law or to the authorityof local officials. To the extent that agreementsdelineate matters affecting the relationsbetween a military force and civilianauthorities and population, they may beconsidered as civil affairs agreements. Alsocalled SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawfulviolence or threat of unlawful violenceto inculcate fear; intended to coerce orto intimidate governments or societies inthe pursuit of goals that are generallypolitical, religious, or ideological. (Thisterm and its definition replaces theexisting term and its definition and isapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

terrorist. An individual who uses violence,terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.(Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorist groups. Any element regardless ofsize or espoused cause, which repeatedlycommits acts of violence or threatensviolence in pursuit of its political, religious,or ideological objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorist threat conditions. A Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved programstandardizing the Military Services’identification of and recommendedresponses to terrorist threats against USpersonnel and facilities. This programfacilitates inter-Service coordination andsupport for antiterrorism activities. Alsocalled THREATCONs. There are fourTHREATCONs above normal:a. THREATCON ALPHA—Thiscondition applies when there is a generalthreat of possible terrorist activity againstpersonnel and facilities, the nature andextent of which are unpredictable, andcircumstances do not justify fullimplementation of THREATCON BRAVOmeasures. However, it may be necessaryto implement certain measures from higher

THREATCONs resulting from intelligencereceived or as a deterrent. The measuresin this THREATCON must be capable ofbeing maintained indefinitely.b. THREATCON BRAVO—Thiscondition applies when an increased andmore predictable threat of terrorist activityexists. The measures in this THREATCONmust be capable of being maintained forweeks without causing undue hardship,affecting operational capability, andaggravating relations with local authorities.c. THREATCON CHARLIE—Thiscondition applies when an incident occursor intelligence is received indicating someform of terrorist action against personneland facilities is imminent. Implementationof measures in this THREATCON for morethan a short period probably will createhardship and affect the peacetime activitiesof the unit and its personnel.d. THREATCON DELTA—Thiscondition applies in the immediate areawhere a terrorist attack has occurred orwhen intelligence has been received thatterrorist action against a specific locationor person is likely. Normally, thisTHREATCON is declared as a localizedcondition. (Joint Pub 1-02)

threat analysis. In antiterrorism, threatanalysis is a continual process of compilingand examining all available informationconcerning potential terrorist activities byterrorist groups which could target a facility.A threat analysis will review the factors ofa terrorist group’s existence, capability,intentions, history, and targeting, as well asthe security environment within whichfriendly forces operate. Threat analysis isan essential step in identifying probabilityof terrorist attack and results in a threatassessment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

threat and vulnerability assessment. Inantiterrorism, the pairing of a facility’sthreat analysis and vulnerability analysis.(Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.2

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-07.2 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINTWARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF