nuclear bluster or dialogue

7/28/2019 Nuclear Bluster or Dialogue

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Nuclear bluster or dialogue?

Dr Maleeha LodhiTuesday, May 28, 2013

From Print Edition

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

What should be made of a distinguished former Indian foreign secretarys assertions

about his countrys nuclear posture and policy? In a speech last month in Delhi, Shyam

Saran made several pronouncements about the evolution of Indias nuclear policy and

the current status of its nuclear deterrent.

He cast these remarks as his personal views. But Saran is current chairman `of Indias

National Security Advisory Board. Many in India and outside saw his statements asarticulating official policy on a sensitive issue, while maintaining deniability. The Times of

India, for example, said Saran was placing on record Indias official nuclear posture

with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi. And

Islamabad asked Delhi for an official clarification.

Sarans assertions merit careful consideration. It is not surprising that he is irked by

adulatory remarks in Western literature about the safe and secure custody of

Pakistans nuclear assets by the Strategic Planning Group (presumably he means the

Strategic Plans Division). Insisting this is unmerited as the military has stewardship of these

assets, Saran overlooks the fact that it is the National Command Authority headed by

the prime minister that is Pakistans apex nuclear authority. Saran also disapproves of

the international communitys growing acknowledgement of the security-driven nature

of Pakistans nuclear programme. He strains to explain that Indias nuclear capability is

security not prestige-drivenan explanation that has come four decades too late.

However, the most consequential part of his speech for Pakistans security policymakers

is where he presents a scenario that culminates with India engaging in massive

nuclear retaliation against Pakistan. He posits an escalatory ladder that presumably

starts with a sub-conventional event or terrorist attack, after which Pakistan tries to
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dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its

tactical nuclear weapons. India responds by using strategic weapons.

Saran warns that any nuclear attackwhether by strategic or tactical weaponswould

be met by massive retaliation from India. This will be designed to inflict

unacceptable damage on its adversary. Any nuclear exchange once initiated, would

swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan, he declares, should

be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by

developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons.

Several of Sarans assumptions are open to quest ion. First there is a presumption that

Pakistans decision to develop battlefield nuclear weapons represents a nuclear war-fighting option. Official spokesmen have repeatedly said that Pakistan regards the

surface-to-surface solid fuel-based Hatf IX (Nasr), or any additional battlefield weapon

that may subsequently be developed, as primarily weapons of deterrence. Their

purpose is to reinforce deterrence and restore nuclear stability that has been disturbed

by i) growing conventional asymmetry in the region as Indias military build-up

continues; ii) provocative Indian military doctrines that aim to bring conventional

military offensives to a tactical level and iii) Indias development of ballistic missile

defence (BMD) systems, whose purpose is to neutralise Pakistans strategic capabilities.

As for Sarans claim that significant shifts in Pakistans nuclear posture have altered

the regional nuclear equation, the fact is that Islamabad remains committed to its

nuclear policy of achieving credible nuclear deterrence at the lowest practical level.

The central tenet of its nuclear policy is for its capability to be maintained for the

purpose of deterrence against aggression and war-prevention in all its manifestations,

thereby preserving peace. Pakistan also believes that credible deterrence requiresappropriate levels of conventional and nuclear capabilities to be developed and

maintained.

Most importantly Sarans escalatory scenario lays bare an underlying frustration that

Indias Cold Start Doctrine, nowknown as proactive operations, has been challenged


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if not blunted by Pakistans TNW response. That is why this emerges as the main thrust of

his remarks and leads him to depict TNWs as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. In doing

so he also reaffirms the Indian intent to preserve the limited war option and prevent

Cold Start from being rendered irrelevant.

That Saran believes that India can or should consider a punitive war against its nuclear

neighbour in retaliation for an act of terror carried out by a non-state actor is

disconcerting enough. But he then warns that if Pakistan tried to deter an Indian

conventional attack by its TNWs, India would retaliate with nuclear weapons. This

represents dangerous thinking. But the strategic hole in Sarans escalatory scenario is

this. In holding out the threat of massive retaliation he fails to factor in Pakistans full

spectrum capabilities to counter massive retaliation not to speak of its potent secondstrike capability. It is surprising why this typical but dangerous Mutually Assured

Destruction scenario has not been carefully thought through to its logical conclusion.

One interpretation of why Saran has focused attention on TNWs and declared a

massive retaliation Indian response is that this seeks to play on Western fears about

the risks of inducting battlefield nuclear weapons and the nuclear danger this could

expose the region to. This may be designed to galvanise international pressure on

Pakistan to abandon the TNW option. In the unlikely event that this were to happen it

would restore Cold Start and re-establish Indias conventional military edge over

Pakistan.

The rationale for Pakistans decision to pursue a TNW capability is well known. It bears

repetition to understand why there appears to be mounting Indian frustration with this

development as indicated by Sarans speech. Pakistan perceived a number of rapid

developments in the past decade to adversely affect the regions strategic equilibriumestablished after the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by both countries. They included the

Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and the NSG exemption under which India was enabled

to conclude fuel supply agreements with many countries. These significantly enhanced

Indias ability to expand its strategic arsenal and in turn altered Pakistans security

calculations.


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Meanwhile, the new Indian military doctrine and efforts to develop BMD, which came

on the back of these developments, became game-changers. The effort to find space

for limited conventional engagement below the nuclear threshold impelled Pakistan to

seek a response at the tactical level in the nuclear domain. In trying to call Pakistans

nuclear bluff by operationalising proactive war-fighting strategies, these Indian moves

urged Pakistan to develop TNWs to deter Cold Start and re-establish nuclear stability. By

adding another layer to the countrys deterrence capability Hatf IX aimed to close the

gap at the operational and tactical level.

Against this backdrop what Saran now seems to be signalling is that if Pakistan thinks it

can deter limited conventional war by tactical nuclear weapons then India too hasoptions and can use strategic weapons in massive retaliation. This makes little

strategic sense but it is dangerous talk in a situation where there is a delicate balance in

a strategic relationship that remains undefined between the nuclear neighbours.

Nuclear powers do not define their relations by threats or bluster. The only answer to

new and old dilemmas created by the regions nuclearisation is for both nations to

engage seriously and constructively to build a better understanding of each others

nuclear policy, doctrines and postures. This means advancing the nuclear dialogue

with the aim of putting in place credible and meaningful confidence building measures

in both the strategic and conventional military spheres.

The glacial progress on CBMs in expert-level talks over the past decade underscores the

need to step up that effort. Indian officials have generally been dismissive about

Pakistans proposal for a Strategic Restraint Regime. This has three interlocking elements

designed to achieve strategic stability measures for nuclear restraint, conventionalmilitary balance and resolution of disputes. Even if Delhi finds it difficult to accept the

linkage between these components of strategic stability, the separate proposals tabled

in these areas are worthy of consideration.


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The two countries have a mutual interest in stabilising their nuclear relationship. The way

forward is not by ill-thought nuclear signalling but in engaging substantively to narrow

the perception gaps and address the issues that lie at the root of both countries security

predicaments and the regions nuclearisation.

nuclear bluster or dialogue

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