Notes

INTRODUCTION

I. Some interesting discussions about the conceptual implications of the notion of constitution can be found in Bodganor (1988: 1-12); Sartori (1962) and McWhinney (1981).

2. See Elster and Slagstad, (eds) (1988). 3. See, for instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and O'Donnell et al. (1986);

Diamond et al. ( 1989); Huntington ( 1989) and Burton et al. ( 1992). 4. Przeworski (1988:64). His work on democratic transition represents one of the

first major contributions to the theoretical analysis of democratization. See also Przeworski ( 1986).

5. Bogdanor (1988:2-3). 6. Of course, the role that the historical-structural constraints play in allowing the

materialization of such agreements has been also raised. On this issue, see Cammack (1990).

7. See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:39). 8. See Burton et al. (1992:3,17-18). 9. On the question of consolidation, see, for instance, Whitehead (1989).

I 0. The tension between politics and economics in relation to the process of consolidation is examined in Lamounier (1989b).

11. See Banting and Simeon, (eds) (1985). 12. Ibid.

THE CONSTITUTION UNDER MILITARY RULE: GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

I. Focusing particularly on the 1964-84 period, a historical review of the 'institutional engineering' of independent Brazil is made in Fleischer ( 1986b ).

2. An examination of military rule in Brazil from the perspective of the legal and institutional evolution is made by Alves (1985).

3. See Kinzo (1988a:121). 4. On the Brazilian doctrine of national security refer to chapter one in Alves ( 1985)

and chapter 8 in Stepan (1971). 5. See Skidmore (1973:44). 6. During the post-1945 period, the military had played an important role in

securing the maintenance of the general rules of the political game which was referred to as the moderator role of the military. An analysis of the role of the military in politics up to 1968 is made in Stepan (1971).

7. A general historical account of the period of military rule is found in Skidmore (1988).

8. Included among the main measures were the suspension of the legal guarantees of job security for six months for all public employees without the right of appeal, the establishment of special inquiries to individual or collective actors who were

203

I.

204 Notes

considered to have committed a crime 'against the state, its property and the political and social order' not precluding juridical consideration, and the cancellation of electoral mandates as well as political rights for ten years at all levels of government. The complete Institutional Acts are reproduced in Paes and Bonavides (1990:770-91 ).

9. For instance, the constitutional amendment of July 1964, which postponed presidential elections, included also a provision requiring an absolute majority of the popular vote to elect the president (the amendment extended Castelo Branco's term of office for 14 months until March 1967). In early 1965 Congress also passed a bill introducing a new code for party organization which was supposed to strengthen the existing political parties.

10. This act also granted the executive the power to decree congressional recesses during which the president would be authorized to legislate in all matters.

11. This mechanism is the opposite of the so-called 'pocket veto' in the American system.

12. In addition to the previous act, this one also abolished habeas corpus for all cases of political crimes against national security.

13. This presumably would give some advantage to the pro-government party in the most backward states of the North and Northeast where illiteracy was high.

14. Purges conducted between 1964 and 1979 in all the three levels of the federation is provided by Alves (1985:98).

15. The head of the SNI was given ministerial status and enjoyed considerable powers. Presidents Medici and Figueiredo held this post before being nominated for the presidency.

16. The role of Congress under the military is discussed in Baaklini ( 1992); Pereira (1991) and Packenham (1990).

17. See Santos (1986). 18. A more detailed analysis of the performance of the National Congress and its

component parts is found in Baaklini ( 1992). 19. In the data presented by Baaklini (1992) the breakdown of initiatives by house

of origin shows that the Senate, with fewer members, introduced fewer bills than its largest counterpart, the Chamber. However, he does not present a breakdown of initiatives by party of origin.

20. This committee was integrated by 45 deputies and 15 senators selected annually by each house. The committee met as a whole for 90 days to review the budget but each house voted separately.

21. See Baaklini (1992:139-44). 22. The most complete analysis of political parties under the compulsory two-party

system, from the perspective of the opposition MDB, was made by Kinzo (1988a). A broader historical perspective on the evolution of the party system in Brazil is found in Lamounier and Meneguello (1986).

23. The calculation of this distortion is reported in Veja, Sao Paulo, 5 September 1990.

24. There is a discussion on the electoral trends by party, region and urban areas during the two-party system in Kinzo (1988a:55-75).

25. Stepan (1988:36-7). The author also provides an interesting account of Geisel and Golbery's perceptions and motivations for liberalization, ibid., chapter 3.

26. In fact, some other authors such as Maria Helena Moreira Alves considered both Geisel's and Figueiredo's liberalizing measures not as a steps of transition to

Notes 205

democracy but rather as further moves towards the institutionalization of the national security state. Alves (1985:139-251).

27. Attempts to establish a distinction between these two concepts have been made in the literature on democratization. However, in the empirical world such distinctions are not always very clear. Basically, the distinction lies in the extension of the objective. Liberalization entails a process by which the authoritarian incumbents introduce some basic individual and group guarantees (habeas corpus; freedom of movement, speech, association, and so on) without allowing any effective access to office or public decisions. Democratization involves a wider process which requires an effective right and possibility for all to win control of the government and influence the collective choices. Stepan seems to suggest more explicitly that the latter necessarily requires an active and open contestation to come about. The basic sources on this point are Stepan (1988), Przeworski (1988), and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

28. His analysis of this question is found in three main works: Lamounier ( 1984 ), (1985) and (l989a). For a longer perspective on the development of Brazilian democracy, see also Lamounier (1989b).

29. In fact, looking at the Brazilian political context in 1973, influential scholars such as Stepan, Skidmore, Schmitter and Cardoso, saw no significant opposition which could become a real factor for liberalization in the short term. See Stepan (ed.) (1973).

30. See Stepan (1986). 31. Particularly important is the fact that the liberalization process was initiated right

after the end of the Brazilian 'economic miracle'. Sustaining high rates of economic growth became clearly impossible, particularly after 1981, when Brazil plunged into recession with high inflation, aggravating the persistent problem of income inequality and, therefore, the social tensions. The literature on the process of democratization from a variety of perspectives is already vast. Some references are included in the bibliographical section of this book.

32. Packenham ( 1986) has examined the revalorization of the formal institutions of liberal democracy among the intellectual left.

33. During the Geisel administration, there had already been an election for state governors in October 1974. But the previous administration had managed to make them indirect once more. Not surprisingly, the official party, ARENA, swept that election.

34. An analysis of the impact of elections upon Congress for the whole liberalization period is found in Fleischer ( l986a).

35. After 197 4, the electoral calendar included direct elections for the three legislative bodies in 1978 and 1982. In 1976, municipal elections for local councils and mayors; in 1978 indirect presidential election; in 1980, municipal elections (actually postponed untill982); in 1982, direct election for state governors plus the suspended municipal elections; in 1985, indirect presidential election.

36. These senators were nicknamed 'bionic' and were regarded as illegitimate by public opinion.

37. The debate about the party reform is introduced by Kinzo (1980). 38. The formation of the PT is examined in Meneguello (1989). A more complete

study is elaborated by Keck (1992). 39. The bill was in fact passed by the decurso de prazo mechanism secured by the

lack of quorum of the pro-government majority.

206 Notes

40. In September 1980, the municipal elections (mayors and councillors) due at the end of that year had been postponed until 1982. Elections for state governors were to be held directly for the first time since 1965. As to the rest of the levels, one-third of the Senate was to be renewed, the entire Chamber of Deputies and all states' legislatures.

41. In fact, some scholars argue that the democratization process in the strict sense began only after 1982, when the effects of the massive 1978-79 strike movement, the acceleration of the economic crisis and the withdrawal of support of the business community, initiated with the 1974 campaign against state intervention, finally started to break up the socioeconomic basis of the ruling coalition. See, for instance, Bresser Pereira (1985).

42. A journalistic description of the events leading to the formation of the Democratic Alliance is found in Dimenstein, et al. ( 1985).

43. See Kinzo (1988a:132). 44. See Kinzo (1988a:l93). 45. See Monclaire and de Barros (1988:10-11). 46. Partido do Movimento Democnitico Brasileiro (PMDB) Revista do PMDB no.

4, October-November 1982. 47. Speech in support of the diretas-ja delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on 24

Aprill984. Revista do PMDB no. 7, p. 7. 48. Interview with Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes on 9 June 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 49. Excerpts of Tancredo Neves campaign declarations are found in Digesto

Econ6mico, July/August 1985 no. 313. 50. Interview with Senator Mario Covas on 10 December 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 51. See Bicudo (1986: 187). 52. Interview with Senator Marco Maciel on 8 June 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 53. See Monclaire and de Barros (1988: 11-12). 54. In Gonzalez et al. ( 1991 :7). 55. The case for a full constitutional renewal for symbolic purposes was not

uncommon at the beginning of 1985. For instance, OAB President in Sao Paulo, Marcio Thomaz Bastos, argued that 'the most serious problem with the 1967~9 constitution lies in its sin of origin'. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 30 January 1985.

2 THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE COALITION AND THE PROCESS OF REFORM

1. The manifesto of the Democratic Alliance is reproduced in Dimenstein et al. (1985: 2~).

2. See Arruda Sampaio Junior and Affonso (1986:61-2). 3. See Jaguaribe (1985:40-1). 4. See Keck (1992:34-5). 5. A series of interviews with some of Brazil's most prominent intellectuals and

political figures in the first half of 1985 reflected the degree of difficulty in establishing a consensus regarding the order of priorities for the New Republic. Four of them favoured economic questions, particularly inflation, as the national priority. Another four saw the institutional reorganization as the basic national

Notes 207

priority. The series of interviews were published by 0 Estado deS. Paulo and reproduced in book-form in Dantas Mota (1985).

6. A specific description and analysis of the Brazilian economy on the eve of the New Republic's inauguration and its first year is found in Arruda Sampaio Junior and Affonso ( 1986). For a broader perspective see Fish1ow and Cardoso ( 1990).

7. See Arruda Sampaio Junior and Affonso (1986:62-3). 8. This was, for instance, the interpretation of Jaguaribe (1985:42) among others. 9. See Lamounier (l989b:l34).

lO. See Michiles et al. (1989:23). 11. Professor Bolfvar Lamounier had already been informed that he would be

nominated for such a commission. Interview with Bolfvar Lamounier, Sao Paulo, 14 September 1993.

12. Weffort, a member of the national executive committee of the Workers' Party (PT) and one of the left's major social theorists, argued for an abandonment of the view of political democracy as a bourgeois system. See Weffort (1984).

13. See Fleischer (1990:223). 14. For details on the electoral performance of the PMDB refer to Chapter 1. 15. See Fleischer (1990:222-4). 16. This kind of view is held by a number of different authors such as Schneider

( 1986:228) and Lamounier ( 1989c:46-7). A critical view is held by Sallum Junior (1988: 127).

17. One of the elements of the agreement with the military involved presumably an assurance that Neves would not allow an independent and autonomous constituent assembly to draw up the new constitution. See Fleischer (1990:221). In July 1984,/sto E published the terms of another unofficial deal with Vice-president Aureliano Chaves. By the terms of the so-called Acordo Mineiro, Neves agreed not to make criticisms to the 'revolution' or the Figueiredo administration, to accept a member of the dissident group as his running mate and make an equitable distribution of administrative posts in the coming administration. See /sto E 18 July 1984.

18. Because of the considerations following in the next section, perhaps to a lesser degree it is presupposed by Bruneau. See Bruneau (1992).

19. Folha deS. Paulo, 22 Aprill985. 20. Interview with Ulysses Guimaraes, Brasilia, 9 June 1992. 21. See Skidmore ( 1988:257--60). 22. Folha deS. Paulo, 22 April1985. 23. For an interpretation of the process by which the presidency tried to recapture

its power capacity, see Sallum Junior (1988). His main argument is that the weakening of the presidency had less to do with the incumbent than with the erosion of financial capacity of the Brazilian state, which started in the 1970s. This condition of the state, according to him, imposed restrictions on its ability to continue its role in economic development and limited the material rewards needed to 'purchase' the loyalty of potential supporters.

24. See Fleischer (l986a: Ill). 25. According to a number of accounts, Samey, as Tancredo himself, had the

intention to postpone any elections for mayors in order to avoid an early electoral confrontation between the PMDB and the PFL which would damage the Democratic Alliance. See, for instance, Noblat (1990:18).

26. Folha deS. Paulo, 14 January 1986.

208 Notes

27. See Noblat (1990:44). 28. Ibid. (48-9). 29. Veja, 5 March 1986. 30. There are many studies of the Cruzado Plan both from the political and the

economic perspectives. See, for instance, Flynn (1986); Sola (1988); Baer and Beckerman (1989).

31. See Noblat (1990:52). 32. Folha deS. Paulo, 21 April 1986. 33. See Fleischer (1990:223). 34. Veja, 15 May 1985. 35. Ibid. 36. 'No more subservience' and 'the legislative power has to learn to be independent'

were two phrases which captured the prevalent attitude towards the executive and the past of many congressmen. See Veja, 15 May 1985, p. 25. For an analysis of the mayoral election in Sao Paulo, see Lamounier (ed.) (1986b).

37. Lamounier (1989c) and ( 1986a). Like him, many other analysts believe that this law would make the establishment of a new structure more difficult in the future as newly generated interests would have to be overcome.

38. See Cardoso (1986b:99). 39. See Fleischer (1990:221). 40. Refer to Lamounier (1987b). 41. For more details on the characteristics of this movement, see Chapter 3. 42. See Bruneau (1992:268-9). 43. Refer to Faoro (1986b). 44. See Riedel (1987:74). 45. Congresso Nacional, Diario do Congresso Nacional, Brasilia, November 1985. 46. For a self-defence of his proposal see Bierrenbach ( 1986). 47. Ex-Minister of Finance Mario Henrique Simonsen referred to the project as a

'treatise of anti-economics'. Veja, 24 September 1986. 48. The argument was that sending the project would be 'an undue intervention of

the executive in the legislative'. Veja, 24 September 1986, p. 55. 49. According to Lamounier, at some point the list consisted of nearly one thousand

elements. Interview with Bolfvar Lamounier, Sao Paulo, 14 September 1993. 50. Veja, 24 September 1986.

3 POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONSTI­TUTIONAL ISSUES

I. In fact, electoral practices seemed to have been more institutionalized than political parties. Useful material on this matter is found in Lamounier and Meneguello (1986), Kinzo (1988b).

2. Doubts existed about the ability of the pre-New Republic arrangement for survival once the structure imposed by the authoritarian rulers was lifted. The speed with which politicians started to move from one party to another and the creation of new party labels added more doubts about the disintegration of the party structure. This point is illustrated in /sto E, 8 April 1986 and 6 May 1986.

Notes 209

3. The federal district and the two newly created states of Amapa and Roraima were not to elect a governor.

4. The PMDB won 19 out of 25 mayorships of city capitals, which were up for election in 1985, but it lost in the most critical ones, such as Sao Paulo, Rio, Recife, and so on.

5. Anglade ( 1987) reports on the results and the political climate of these elections. 6. The recommendations of the PMDB National Convention of 1986 repeated the

traditional promises of the party on a magnified scale. See Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, Revista do PMDB, April, 1987. The project of the PT prepared by the prestigious jurist Fabio Konder Comparato, did not proscribe private initiative, but placed the state at the centre of economic activities. See, for details, Comparato ( 1987).

7. The analysis of the campaign in Sao Paulo is found in Bucalem Ferrari and Da Costa ( 1989). A flavour of the political climate surrounding the election can be obtained from Saab (1987), arranged by topics with the short headlines of newspapers. See also Veja, 13 August 1986.

8. The analysis of the parliamentary partisan alignment in relation to the pre­existing one is made by Fleischer (1990).

9. Many other studies, produced by private lobby agencies and newspapers using different methodologies and with different purposes, were circulating by the instalment of the assembly. On this specific study, see Folha deS. Paulo, 19 January 1987, supplement.

I 0. He also calculated the turnover rate of congressmen, concluding that there were 274, or 49 per cent, of 'freshmen' members. See Fleischer (1988).

11. See Martins Rodrigues (1987). 12. See Folha deS. Paulo, 19 January 1987, supplement. 13. See Martins Rodrigues (1987). 14. The complete analysis is found in Fleischer (1988, 1990). 15. The complete survey was published in Veja, 4 February 1987. 16. Ibid., p. 20. 17. See Martins Rodrigues (1987:106-21). 18. The story of the unionism in the 1980s is told by Martins Rodrigues (1990).

Payne (1991) examines the strategy of Brazilian labour in the process of transition, which is classified as 'democratic recalcitrant' strategy.

19. At the end of 1985, another central sindical was also created: the USI, or Independent Union Confederation. However, this business-sponsored organization advocated an apolitical line for unions. In its Constitution, the organization criticized the involvement of unions in party politics and defended the peaceful resolution of conflicts between capital and labour in order to preserve peace and order. For further details see Martins Rodrigues ( 1990: 14-16). The record of the centrais in the formulation wage policies during Sarney' s government is found in Tavares (1989, 1993).

20. Martins Rodrigues (1993) makes a brief but clear characterization of the old corporatist structure and an evaluation of the modifications introduced during the constitutional renewal.

21. According to this legislation, all the workers of a given firm who wanted to be unionized had to register in the same union, regardless of their own trade or activity, as the company had been classified.

210 Notes

22. It should be also noted that state or municipal entities could not be organized to unite workers of areas that, at the national level, belonged to the same confederation. By the same token, no national entities were allowed to be formed following the classification of trade unions at the local level. For instance, labour unions of textile company employees in a given state could form a federation within the state, but the legislation did not allow a national confederation of textile workers (or paper, rubber, and so on).

23. This obviously provided some financial advantages to the official unions. The compulsory union due or impasto sindical is equivalent to one day's pay per year. It is collected by the employer and, until the 1988 Constitution, it was distributed according to the following shares: 60 per cent for the local union, 15 per cent for the federation to which the union belonged, 5 per cent for the confederation, and 20 per cent for a special account at the Ministry of Labour. See Martins Rodrigues (1993:30).

24. Interview with Ulisses Riedel on 11 December 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 25. One important instrument of pressure used by DIAP in the final phases of the

constitutional deliberations was the evaluation of the voting behaviour of each assembly member to produce posters and bulletins listing the 'enemies of the people' who opposed labour demands (they were also carefully displayed in each member's electoral constituency). Many of the congressmen I interviewed mentioned that this kind of pressure helped to shape to a large extent the voting behaviour of many of their peers. The final outcome of DIAP' s evaluation was published in book-form with the title Who was who in the Constituent Assembly. See DIAP (1988).

26. An amendment to the Labour Code in 1967 instituted the FGTS (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servi~o) which allowed employers to fire employees as long as they compensated them for the number of years they had worked in the firm. This indemnity provision was still part of the Labour Code in 1987. Labour leaders argued that this was an extremely weak deterrent to discharges without cause and in some cases encouraged high turnovers.

27. An account of the failed attempts by Labour Minister, Pazzianoto, to introduce a new strike law is told by Diniz (1986).

28. The point is elaborated by DIAP's director in Riedel (1987). 29. Using other methodologies, other studies offered different but not substantially

divergent results. For instance, Martins Rodrigues estimated that workers accounted for 3 per cent against 32 per cent of businessmen of the Constituent Congress as a whole. See Martins Rodrigues ( 1987:79-80).

30. See Payne (1991:231). 31. One account of the business sector's participation in the liberalization process

is found in Cardoso ( 1986a). A comparison of the industrial business sector's attitudes and behaviour during the regime change of 1964 and the most recent democratic transition is undertaken by Payne ( 1994). The role of the industrial business in the constitutional debate is made genemlly in Diniz and Boschi (1989).

32. In addition to the important administrative positions they started to occupy such as in the case of Dilson Funaro in the Ministry of Finance, others, like Tasso Jeressati -a successful businessman from the Northeastern state of Ceara- won governorship, and Antonio Ermirio de Morais - the owner of the influential industrial group, Votoratim- seriously challenged the candidacy of the PMDB in Sao Paulo in 1986. See Diniz and Boschi (1989: 122).

33. Folha deS. Paulo, 19 September 1986. See also Diniz and Boschi (1989).

Notes 211

34. Diniz and Boschi (1989:128-32). 35. Further details on the UDR and its role in the constituent process is presented

in Chapter 6. An analysis of the rural business sector during the Samey government is found in Baltar (1990).

36. Dreifuss (1989:50--6) provides a list of organizations which were organized presumably to provide electoral support to 'friendly' candidates.

37. These are the estimates of Fleischer's analysis mentioned above. Martins Rodrigues calculated that 9 per cent of the business class belonged to the rural sector. Martins Rodrigues (1987:79-80).

38. Afif Domingos, president of the FNLI and the Association of Commerce of Sao Paulo, and member of the Constituent Assembly, claimed then that a $35 million fund was developed to run the campaign of the FNLI. Veja, 11 November 1987.

39. See Silva (1989:31-3). 40. See Stepan (1988:93-127). 41. The National Intelligence Service (SNI) was abolished by President Collor de

Mello only in 1 990. He created in its stead the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs or Secretaria de Asuntos Estrategicos (SAE), to be headed by a civilian.

42. In 1979, Congress had voted an amnesty for crimes committed between 1964 and 1979 and it was widely accepted by both the military and civilian camps. During the discussion for the convocation of the assembly, several PMDB congressmen proposed an extension of the amnesty, which was strongly opposed by the military.

43. The influence of the military during the New Republic is discussed in G6es (1988) and Diniz (1986:82-5). A useful comparative approach among Spain, Argentina and Brazil is made by Zaverucha (1993).

44. The threat of a military intervention was used constantly during the whole process to harass the assembly. For details, see, for instance, Veja, 30 March 1988.

45. For details on the extreme-right organizations, including the military, see Dreifuss ( 1989:85-99).

46. The story of the movement is written by Michiles et al.( 1 989). The authors were themselves leaders of the movement.

47. In 1986, the CNBB published a document entitled 'Por uma Nova Ordem Constitucional' in which it advocates not only the reform of the institutions of political democracy but a socioeconomic democratization. The document discusses the methods of popular participation and lists a wide range of concrete demands including human rights, minority rights, labour rights, and radical land reform. It did not directly advocate the establishment of an anti-capitalist model, but recommended economic planning, the encouragement of social and communal forms of property and stressed the supremacy of labour over capital. For more details, see Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (1986).

48. The point was extensively argued by Hermann Assis Baeta, president of the OAB, during the second National Congress of Lawyers pro-Constituent Assembly on 15 October 1985.

4 THE CONSTITUTION'S DRAFfiNG PROCESS, 1987-88

I. This was the longest process in the history of Brazil's constitution-making experiences. In 1891, the constitutional discussion lasted for three months, eight months in 1934, seven months in 1946 and 45 days in 1967.

212 Notes

2. On his analysis of Congress, Baaklini dedicates a couple of chapters to the constitution-making process. On the organization of the works, see particularly chapter 7, Baaklini (1992).

3. Because of the renewal of the Senate in two parts - one and two-thirds in alternate sequence - there were 23 senators elected in 1982 under the military regime.

4. Veja, 11 February 1987. 5. In Fleischer's opinion, these were the democratic equivalent to the military regime's

'institutional acts'. See Fleischer (1990:244). 6. During the deliberations of draft in plenary, the PT Deputy, Plinio de Arruda

Sampaio, argued that 'the gradual and slow transition would not be so for ever. It would end today'. Veja, 4 March 1987.

7. Arguments in this fashion were articulated by many jurists and political figures: Gofredo da Silva Telles Jr, Marco Maciel and Paulo Brossard, among others. Veja 4 March 1987. Editorials of some of the most influential newspapers such as Jornal do Brasil and 0 Estado de S. Paulo criticized the proposal as well. See, for instance, Jomal do Brasil, 4 February 1987.

8. Veja, 4 March 1987. 9. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 10 March 1987.

10. lorna[ de Brasilia, 3 February 1987. 11. Folha deS. Paulo, 11 February 1987. 12. Interview with Joiio Gilberto Lucas Coelho on 30 June 1992, Porto Alegre, Rio

Grande do Sui. 13. See Assembleia Nacional Constitutinte, Regimento lnterno da Assembleia

Nacional Constituinte, Resoluriio No. 2 de 24 de marro de 1987. 14. Veja, 25 April1987. 15. Folha deS. Paulo, 21 March 1987. 16. Jornal do Brasil, 23 March 1987. 17. Correia Brasiliense, 20 March 1987. 18. Veja, 8 Aprill987. 19. A sociological analysis of the total number of 72719 popular suggestions received

and organized by Prodasen between 1986 and 1987 is found in Monclaire (1991).

20. The data on the number of amendments were collected from Prodasen database, Brasilia.

21. See Veja, 3 June 1987. 22. See for instance Veja, 3 June 1987. 23. Veja, 27 May 1987. 24. Other informal parliamentary groups also had been operating since the beginning

of the deliberations. On the right, there was the Centro Democratico, formed by the members of the PMDB, part of the PFL, PTB, PDC and PL. On the left, there was the so-called historicos of the PMDB and the MUP (Movimento de Unidade Progresista), which included the most radical members ofthe PMDB as well as other allies from the small leftist parties.

25. Interview with Bernardo Cabral on 12 June 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 26. In fact, the total number of popular amendments received by the Constituent

Assembly was 122, but only 83 met the requirements specified by the internal statute.

Notes 213

27. Jomal do Brasil, 18 October 1987. 28. Interview with Senator Mario Covas on 10 December 1992, Brasilia, D.F. 29. This was indeed recognized by most of my interviewees along the various

ideological spectra. 30. Jomal do Brasil, 4 November 1987. 31. Several studies had indicated that the impact of the labour rights provisions on

wage costs would bring an increase of an average of 33 to 42 per cent, and in some sectors as much as 60 per cent. In 1988, Pastore and Zylberstajn calculated that the transference of income from capital to labour factor would be up to 40 billion US dollars. This meant, according to them, the most spectacular income distribution achieved by constitutional means, never seen before in any society. See article by Jose Pastore and Helio Zylberstajn in Folha deS. Paulo, 9 July 1988.

32. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 16 October 1987. 33. Folha deS. Paulo, 16 November 1987. 34. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 4 November 1987. 35. See Resolup'io No. 3 da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, 5 January 1988,

Brasilia. 36. Pressures from outside were crucial to define the vote of many congressmen.

Many of my interviewees on the right recalled how many of them became intimidated by the strong campaign against the Centrlio. Particularly, one of the PFL leaders, Jose Lins, recalled that the campaign against the 'enemies of the people', launched by the unions and other civic organizations in early 1988, intimidated the conservative majority, dropping the number to a bottom 230 members. Interview with Jose Linson 30 September 1993, Brasilia.

37. See Coelho (1988:54). 38. See Fleischer (1990:252). 39. Analysis on the voting behaviour of parties, in general and with reference to

specific issues, have been elaborated. The most significant of them was elaborated by Professor Maria D' Alva K.inzo based on 33 crucial votes. Her conclusion was that 'in spite the high index of dispersion in many cases, the distances between parties reflected meaningful divisions among them ... therefore, it cannot be denied that partisan cleavages do exist.' See Kinzo (1988b:22). Also, see Baaklini (1992), chapter 8, and Lamounier (1989c), chapter 2.

40. Veja, 7 September 1988 and 5 October 1988. 41. An analysis of the text, from the juridical point of view, can be found in Paes

and Bonavides ( 1990) and D' Avila ( 1993). Weffort has elaborated an interpretation of the constitution in terms of what it means politically. See Weffort (1990).

42. A political-institutional analysis of the constitutional decisions in historical perspective has been elaborated by Amaury de Souza and Bolfvar Lamounier. See Souza (1990).

43. Some excellent analyses on this issue can be found in Moises (1990b) and Benavides (1991), particularly chapters 6 and 7.

44. A clear examination of this issue is found in Selcher ( 1990). 45. This question is analysed in Martins Rodrigues (1990) and (1993).

214 Notes

5 PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUENT PROCESS

1. This was clearly the underlying view in the document 'Esperanya e Mudanya' of 1982. See, Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, Revista do PMDB, 4, 1982.

2. Veja, 4 February 1987. 3. See Veja, 4 February 1987. 4. The academic and political debate around this question will be enriched over

the next five years. See Chapter 7 for references. 5. The most influential texts on the issue during the Populist Republic were Arinos

and Pilla ( 1958) and Reale (1962). On the parliamentary experience of the 1960s, see Skidmore (1967).

6. See Cardoso Silva et al. (1985:41-3). 7. One of the first press articles on the issue was written by Lamounier,

'Presidencialismo ou Parlamentarismo?' in F olha deS. Paulo, 19 January 1986. Later, he also advanced his arguments in PMDB, Revista do PMDB, 8, 1986. Helio Jaguaribe also discussed the matter on several occasions. See, for instance, 'As Opy6es da Comissao Constitucional' in Jomal do Brasil, 9 September 1986.

8. Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Diario daAssembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 62:92-107.

9. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplements 62, 63, 66. 10. Public hearing by Senator Marco Maciel on 21 April1987, Diario daAssembleia

Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 79:88-102. On the eve of the floor session to vote the system of government, he repeated similar arguments in defence of the presidential option. See Senator Marco Maciel, speech to the Senate 16 March 1988.

11. Public hearing by Joiio Amazonas on 30 April 1987. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 81:54-62.

12. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 81:52-8. 13. Interview with Senator Jose Fogaya, 10 September, 1992. Brasilia. 14. FolhadeS. Paulo,16June 1987. 15. Folha deS. Paulo, 18 and 20 July 1987. 16. Out of office, Samey would change his mind by the 1993 plebiscite. Despite

the lack of any institutional change, parliamentarism does not appear to him a:> a dangerous adventure any more. He cast his vote for the parliamentary system during the plebiscite of 21 April 1993. Folha de S. Paulo, 22 April 1993.

17. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, several supplements. 18. Veja, 4 November 1987. 19. JomaldoBrasil,11March 1988. 20. A short account of business involvement in the question of the system of

government and the mandate is found in Dreifuss (1989: 198-207). 21. The Carta de Montes Claros, rejecting the parliamentary proposal, was subscribed

on 15 September 1987 by Newton Cardoso, Alberto Silva, Tasso Jeressati, Geraldo Melo, Femardo Collor, Waldir Pires, Epitacio Cafeteira and Antonio Carlos Valadares. Jomal de Brasilia, 26 September 1987.

22. Veja, 30 March 1988.

Notes 215

23. Folha deS. Paulo's headline 'Prisco multiplies spending to guarantee the five years of Samey' estimated that the ministry of Housing and Urban Development had increased spending six times in only two months. Folha deS. Paulo, 18 March 1988.

24. 0 Estado de S. Paulo, 25 March 1988. 25. Jornal da Tarde, 25 March 1988; 0 Estado de S. Paulo, 25 March 1988. 26. Interview with Senator Jose Foga~a. Brasilia, I 0 September 1992, Brasilia. 27. 'The military accepts parliamentarianism', Gazeta Mercantil, 22 March 1988. 28. For instance, the influential Folha deS. Paulo newspaper made clear its

presidential inclination as early as June 1987. See editorial section, Folha deS. Paulo, 21 June 1987. On the voting day, 0 Globo newspaper made an alarming argument against parliamentarianism.

29. Some of them were actually quite grotesque and reflected a lack of information on the issue, on the part of opinion makers. An opinion poll carried out by 0 Estado deS. Paulo at the end of August 1987 put the following question to the people: In the case of an implementation of the parliamentary system, how should the prime minister be selected?: (a) by direct popular suffrage, (b) by the president of the Republic, (c) by the Congress. Eighty-two per cent chose the first option. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 30 August 1987.

30. The total assembly membership was 559 while the sum of signatures of the two rival amendments totalled 693. Over one hundred members were subscribing those two exclusive options.

31. Interview with Senator Mario Co vas on I 0 December 1992, Brasilia. Referring to Cabral's negotiated solution of a six-year mandate for the parliamentary option, the senator had made clear that, against his convictions, he would be forced in such a case to vote for the presidential option. 0 Globo, 23 August 1987.

32. Gazeta Mercantil, 22 March 1987. 33. An analysis of the calculations of strategic political actors on this crucial vote

is elaborated in Baaklini and Pojo ( 1989). 34. Interview with Deputy Cunha Bueno on 3 June 1992, Brasilia. 35. Constituifiio da Republica Federativa do Brasi/1988:163.

6. THE DEBATE OVER THE LAND REFORM ISSUE IN THE CONSTITUENT PROCESS

1. As in the case of the form of government, the discussion over the issue of land reform was not at all new in Brazilian politics. The question was part of the political dispute-which precipitated the military coup in 1964. Two weeks before the coup, President Goulart had decided to use decree powers to initiate a land reform programme which had until then been denied by Congress. On this point see Skidmore (1988) chapter 1.

2. See Santos (1990:32,34). 3. Ibid, p. 36. 4. See Sorj (1988: 144). 5. Ibid., pp. 140-1. Ivan de Otero Ribeiro, a prominent Marxist scholar who

formulated numerous economic arguments for land reform in the 1970s, also

216 Notes

suggested this kind of conclusion. But his argument for land distribution and the elimination of large land-holdings also contained political reasons: to alter the structure of power. The development of his arguments for land reform over the previous decade can be traced in his collection of essays, in Otero Ribeiro (1988).

6. See Sorj (1988:142-3). He himself questions three arguments which were normally put forward to justify a land reform programme: (a) it would stop the exodus to the cities and improve the living conditions in the countryside; (b) it would, consequently, make the urban demographic pressure and poverty diminish; (c) it would increase the supply of the internal market with cheap products.

7. A brief analysis of the (re)emergence of the peasant and agricultural worker movement as a political actor in the 1970s is found in Sigaud (1989:163-80).

8. The political process of the land reform from 1979 to 1988 is described in Tavares (1989).

9. Tavares (1989:6-8). 10. Jose Gomes da Silva was director of ABRA and participated in the Samey

Government as director of INCRA. He resigned in late 1985 in protest at the presidential cuts in the original land reform plan. See Silva (1989:14).

II. See Tavares (1989:2-5). 12. See Baltar (1990: 156). 13. According to Otero Ribeiro, who participated in the elaboration and execution

of the plan, one of the major problems in speeding up the progmmme was that the strongest pressures for land distribution were coming from the Southeast and South regions, precisely where the process of modernization had been more intense and successful. Most properties were highly productive and, therefore, were, according to the law, excluded from expropriation. Other problems were related to the lack of technical expertise. See Otero Ribeiro ( 1988: 115-20).

14. Several studies on the issue of land reform had been produced. For an overall historical view, see Tavares ( 1989). On the role of the rural business sector, see Baltar ( 1990). An excellent critique from the economic point of view to the land reform plan is found in Cintra (1985).

15. By the internal rules, each committee was to be formed by 63 members which would then be divided into three subcommittees of 20 to 21 members (the president and rapporteur of a committee were prohibited from participating in any subcommittee). However, there was some flexibility in the application of this rule in order to be able to accommodate the preferences of the assembly members and party proportionality. The Commission of Economic Order was particularly in great demand. Instead of 63, it was integrated with 64 elements, distributed unevenly among the three subcommittees.

16. Lima Filho served as a minister for agriculture during the Goulart government and was a well-known proponent for a mdicalland reform, with ties to the Catholic Church.

17. Unless stated otherwise, the general description of the subcommittee proceedings is based mostly on the various issues of the Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte.

18. Telles de Menezes made his presentation on 30 April1987. The other exponents from the business sector elaborated around the same line of argument. On the Telles de Menezes presentation see Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 96:115-35.

Notes 217

19. For an account of the constituent process from the point view of the CONT AG, refer to Silva ( 1989).

20. This proposal was the result of a unified effort by all the different organizations involved in the land reform campaign, such as CONT AG, CJYI', MTST, ABRA, CUT, CGT and CNBB, among others.

21. ABRA' s exponent, Luiz Fachin, contended that many of the 1100 articles and paragraphs of the existing estatuto da terra and its related laws were deliberately written to obstruct and complicate the process of land reform. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 56:50.

22. The m6dulo was a measure of area used in the estatuto da terra to classify the size of properties that varied according to the region. For instance, the m6dulo in the region of Sao Paulo was equal to five hectares. In the most remote areas of the Amazon it was equal to over 100 hectares.

23. This provision, according to ABRA, would allow the confiscation of nearly 200 million hectares. It was argued in the presentation that this would allow the settling down of nearly one half of the landless workers without the need to transfer them to other parts of the country or the need to expropriate land holdings with less than 60 m6dulos which did not fulfil its social obligation. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 56:48.

24. The existing legislation determined that, once the executive had issued an expropriating decree, the judiciary should be given time to consider the case and, if justified, it should then issue an appropriation order. The inclusion of the imissiio automatica meant that the intervention of the judiciary in judging the executive's expropriation decrees would be eliminated.

25. Perhaps his best argument can be illustrated by the following statement: '[keeping] a property of four million hectares as it is the case of a timber company that belongs to MANASA, in the Amazon, even if it is totally productive, which it is not, is a social injustice, when we have millions of people without a piece of land to plant'. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 56:53.

26. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 97:80-98. 27. Relatorio e Anteprojeto, Subcomissiio da Politica Agricola e Fundiaria e Da

Reforma Agraria. 28. The discussion on the Oswaldo Lima Filhos report was held for around ten days.

See Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplements 99, 101, 102. 29. On this point, the reformist camp claimed that setting a top limit at 100 m6dulos

would mean expropriating only 10 per cent of owners while 90 per cent would be left untouched.

30. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 101: 101-2. 31. The incidents of the voting session of the subcommittee received wide publicity

in the press and were notoriously pinpointed by some analysts as an example of the resistance of the 'reactionary' forces against land reform in Brazil. For instance, see Ferreira and Teixeira ( 1988).

32. The act of the long voting session is found in Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 104.

33. Of course, the internal regulation stipulated that substitution of absent members could be made only by members of the same party in order to maintain the party proportionality in each subcommittee and committee. But the interpretation given by the subcommittee's president to the Guimariies resolution was in the sense of allowing a PL member to substitute a PMDB member. Guimariies's

218 Notes

resolution was certainly unclear: 'by virtue of party understandings, one seat which belonged to the PL had been handed over to the PMDB, remaining, consequently, with its respective substitute [suplente]'. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 99:146.

34. Some members of the reformist camp claimed that Oswaldo Almeida's signature had been written down the night before.

35. The internal regulation explicitly prohibited the presentation of alternative projects to the constitutional project as a whole, but was unclear regarding the partial reports of subcommittees and committees. The resolution by Ulysses Guimaraes was not entirely unambiguous either.

36. Substitutivo (Nova Reda~ao), Comissao da Ordem Economica, Assembleia Nacional Constituinte.

37. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Supplement 91. 38. Since the beginning of June, the leaders of the Frente Parlamentar da Agricultura

and several leaders of the business sector had been discussing and negotiating a counter-proposal as well as the actions to be taken on the voting day. See Baltar (1990:223-4).

39. Projeto da Comissao, Comissao da Ordem Economica, Assembleia Nacional Constituinte.

40. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Comissao de Sistematiza~/io, Supplement 171.

41. The president of CONTAG, Jose Francisco da Silva, defended the popular amendment with 638469 electors' signatures (the third largest) supported by CONT AG, ABRA and CPT. State deputy Vladir Ganzer (PT) defended a similar amendment with 550000 signatures sponsored by CUT, MTST and CPT. Flavio Telles de Menezes presented also a popular amendment with 43275 signatures sponsored by SRB, OCB and CNA. The official requirements for the submission of popular amendment were 30000 electors and three civic associations. See Michiles eta!. (1989:267-9).

42. The three groupings consisted of the following members. On the right, the members of the PMDB Centro Democratico, part of the PFL, PTB, PDC, and PL. On the left, the so-called historicos of the PMDB, the MUP ( Movimento de Unidade Progresista, which included the most radical members of the PMDB), PT, PCB, PCdoB, PDT, and PSB. In the centre, there was the so-called Grupo dos 321ed by Senator Jose Richa (PMDB) and Deputy Sandra Cavalcanti (PFL) who tipped the balance.

43. In the nominal roll-calling the votes in favour of the amendment increased to 85 against eight votes against.

44. For many members on the right, such a criterion was too vague and subjective, leaving 'productive' land without constitutional protection.

45. For reference on the voting session, see Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Comissao da Sistematiza~ao, Supplement 171 C:2064-83.

46. As part of its own plan of action, the UDR published a leaflet in defence of the protection ofthe 'productive' land to be distributed to assembly members. For more details on the political actions undertaken by the rural business organizations see Baltar (1990:233-50).

47. During the floor deliberations, on the question of the agrarian issue, the assembly was more clearly polarized into two distinct inter-partisan camps. the Centr/io and the reformist group. The latter was composed roughly of the historicos of

Notes 219

the PMDB led by Senator Mario Covas. the members oftheMovimento de Unidade Progresista (MUP), which included the most radical members of the PMDB, and the rest of the small leftist parties: PDT, PT, PCB, PCdoB and PSB.

48. From the CONTAG, the objection to the proposal was the word 'minimum' in specifying the conditions under which productive property would be guaranteed. This, according to them, was too ambiguous and subjective. See Silva (1989: 182).

49. 0 Estado deS. Paulo, 6-11 May 1988. 50. Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, p. 10299. (My emphasis.) 51. The DVS (Destaque para Votafilo em Separado) was introduced during the

modification of the internal statute in order to help to accelerate floor voting. 52. Jobim was then vice-leader of the PMDB. Interview with Nelson Jobim, Brasilia,

7 October 1993. 53. Jobim, a respected centre-left figure, was extremely critical of the behaviour of

the left in the assembly. 'The left made this brutal procedural mistake due to the monitoring [patrulhamento] that the CPT, MTST and others, who were totally irrational, were imposing on the leftist assembly members.[ ... ) After the vote, the left tried to hide this fact, but it is all documented. [ ... ] In truth, some sectors on the left were not committed to land reform. They were committed in not recognizing private property.' Interview with Deputy Nelson Jobim, Brasilia, 7 October 1993.

54. To contrast this result with Martins Rodrigues predictions, see Chapter 3 of this book.

7 THE NEW DEMOCRATIC ORDER AT WORK AND THE REFORM PROCESS OF 1993

1. See Lamounier (1993: 117). 2. For instance, this line of argument is followed in Kinzo (1994). 3. Lamounier has used the concept of consociational democracy to argue that in

its functioning and aggregate effect (though clearly not in its structure), the Brazilian democratic system has become excessively consociational. As he also notes, the term consociational democracy in contemporary political science is normally employed to refer to that sub-group of democracies such as they exist in Belgium and Holland, for example, which integrate into the global institutional structure of representation and decision-making, detailed counterweights and rights designed to protect minorities against the majority's will. But the similarities he intends to draw refer to the effects rather than to the material institutional mechanisms. Lamounier (1993: 118-20).

4. As it was explained in the Chapter 4 of this book, the provisional measure was the device designed by the Constituent Congress to substitute the old legal figure of the decree-law. It can be issued by the president in cases of 'extreme relevance and urgency'. It becomes immediately effective unless rejected by a congressional majority within 30 days.

5. Estimated by Banco de Dados do SICON (Sistema de lnforrnafCio do Congresso Nacional), Brasilia.

6. For a detailed analysis of the presidential election, see Shidlo (1990) and Lamounier ( 1989c: 127-45).

PMDB PMDB

220 Notes

7. Five of those provisional measures were actually contested in the Supreme Court (STF) for unconstitutionality, but the Supreme Court chose initially to maintain them. For instance, provisional measure 173 which cancelled the right of defence (liminares) against the freezing of financial assets was accepted by the Supreme Court. See /sto E, 16 May 1990.

8. Lamounier has characterized the experience of the first months of the Co !lor administration as the situation of a 'Roman Dictatorship' in which, by virtue of the serious economic emergency, democratic controls were virtually suspended. His analysis of the executive-legislative relations in the first months of the Collor administration is found in Lamounier (199la:83-98).

9. In fact, the 'honeymoon' of President Col!or with the other branches of government was broken by the Supreme Court (STF) in the early days of June. By nine to zero, the judges of the STF declared the provisional measure 190 unconstitu­tional (which was are-edition of provisional measure 185). This measure granted power to the federal labour courts to suspend increases in wages approved by the regional labour courts. See lsto E, 13 June 1990.

10. An account of the relationship between the president and Congress during 1990-91 of the Collor government on the issue of the wage policy is found in Castro Santos (1991).

11. An account of the impeachment process is found in Kinzo ( 1993c ). For an overview of the Collor' s government, see Flynn ( 1993).

12. Exactly 434 such measures had been issued until March 1994. See Lamounier (1994:30).

13. See the opinion survey made by Souza and Lamounier (1992). 14. For a pro-parliamentary interpretation of the Collor crisis, see Kinzo (1993c).

Lamounier also elaborated on his argument that the plebiscitarian character of the Brazilian presidential system had showed once more that the fixed presidential mandate was likely to be exhausted earlier in practice than its due. This argument was developed in several articles. See Lamounier (1989b, 1993, 1994).

15. For instance, Helio Jaguaribe, an advocate of the parliamentary government, rightly argued that changes in the electoral and party system should precede the introduction of parliamentarism as there was no guarantee that parties and

congressmen would improve as a result of it. Instability and lack of discipline would tend to remain even under the parliamentary system. See Jomal do Brasil, 4 April 1993.

16. This was, for instance, the argument of Renato Lessa. He suggested that the combination of presidentialism with the proportional representation electoral system offered the opportunity of maximizing both governability and repre­sentativeness. To co-ordinate the two branches of government, two crucial variables should be taken into consideration: the disposition of elites to form coalitions and the coinciding presidential and congressional elections. See Lessa (1993).

17. As can be observed, the distribution of partisan forces in the Chamber of Deputies after the election of October 1994 has not suffered any significant alteration. The PMDB continues to be the largest party with 21.5 per cent of the seats. The PFL maintains second place with the same 17.5 per cent. Altogether, the PSDB/PFUPTB coalition of the president-elect, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, represents only 35.5 per cent of the seats, far short of a majority.

Notes 221

18. Within those two years, seven deputies changed party affiliation as many as five times. See Correio Brasiliense, 28 June 1993.

19. According to Kinzo, it has been the combined effect of those three elements which had produced the existing situation. See Kinzo (1988b, 1993b).

20. This is the argument of Kinzo (1993b) and Hudson de Abranches (1993). 21. See Lamounier (1994:21). 22. The analysis of the issue in the aftermath of the promulgation of the new

constitution is made by Selcher (1990). 23. See Flynn (1993:369). 24. By 1993 this became a highly explosive issue. Governors were reluctant to accept

any fiscal reform which might reduce their resources, especially when most of them were deeply in debt. Moreover, the payroll of local governments grew by 77 per cent between 1985 and 1990. Only three states were solvent and local governments now owed 49 billion dollars, more than Brazil's debt to foreign commercial banks. See Flynn (1993: 269).

25. /sto E, 16 January 1991. 26. In the January 1963 plebiscite, the people chose to restore the presidential

system which had been dismantled by Congress a few months earlier. On that episode refer to Skidmore ( 1967:205-20). For a comparison between 1963 and 1993, see Benavides (1993).

27. This section draws on Martinez-Lara (1993). 28. The plebiscite generated a rich academic discussion on the various aspects of

the issue, with specific reference to Brazil, among Brazilian as well as foreign scholars. Some of the most important references are Lamounier ( 1991 b); Andrade (1993); Serra (1993); Nunes (1993); Mainwaring (1993); Sartori (1993); and Whitehead ( 1993a).

29. Datafolha Survey in Folha deS. Paulo, 12 March 1993. 30. Official results published in Folha deS. Paulo, 18 May 1993. 31. See Angell et a!. (1992). 32. Another common opinion among the anti-revision forces was that alterations

to the constitution should be carried out only under the normal amending procedure, which required a three-fifths majority in two rounds and separately in the senate and the chamber, in order to make sure that the modifications enjoyed a high level of national consensus. This type of argument was expressed by the president of the CNBB, D. Luciano Mendes de Almeida, in Folha deS. Paulo, 30 June 1993. A similar view was also made by Senator Josephat Marinho. Interview with Senator Josephat Marinho, 6 October 1993, Brasilia.

33. The formal arguments of the PT to justify its opposition to the revision followed the lines of the OAB and CNBB' s opinion. F olha de S. Paulo, 13 June 1993.

34. After a discussion in August 1988, the National Directory of the PT decided to vote against the document but agreed to sign it as an indication that it rejected the general character of the text but acknowledged the minimum social conquests. The document of the National Directory is reproduced in Gadotti and Pereira (1989:311-12).

35. The distribution of ideological forces after the 1990 congressional elections had been altered in favour of the right. At the beginning of the 1991-94legislature, the Chamber of Deputies had 20 per cent on the left, 29 per cent in the centre and 51 per cent of deputies on the right. On this question see Lamounier ( 1991 a:96). On the second point, Martins Rodrigues argued that, in addition to

222 Notes

the deep-rooted statism and bureaucratic tradition of the left, the main reason behind the anti-revision stance was the defence of the corporatist structure that, though it does not serve the general interest of the working class, provides enormous benefits to the union bureaucracy. See Folha deS. Paulo, 4 October 1993.

36. Gazeta Mercantil, 21 October 1993. 37. Veja, 6 October 1993. A more elaborated survey on the issues of reform among

the business community and congressmen was elaborated by Lamounier and Souza and published by Gazeta Mercantil. In broad terms, the level of consensus on the agenda of reform is remarkably high. Gazeta Mercantil, 21 October 1993.

38. Veja, 29 September 1993. 39. Veja, 13 October 1993. 40. Veja, 20 October 1993. 41. Among other things, Deputy Jobim had proposed to set a threshold of 195

signatures for amendments to take precedence in floor voting. This provision alone would eliminate the obstructionist procedural manoeuvre of the anti­reform group (which altogether had over 90 votes), allow Congress to work on a less disaggregated basis and speed up the process. Instead, the adopted procedure allowed for the multiplication of the number of issues to be discussed and decided as it provided no incentives for worldng on a more aggregating manner. Folha deS. Paulo, I October 1993.

42. This measure and an increase of income tax would enable the government to balance its books in 1994 by bringing down the expected fiscal deficit of US $22 billion to zero (five per cent ofGDP). The measures involving constitutional amending over the retention of transference of resources to state and municipalities were made only on a provisional basis. This meant that it all belonged to the transitory part of the revision and not to the permanent provisions of the revised chart. Isto E, 16 February 1994.

43. Jomal do Brasil, 20 February 1994.

CONCLUSION

1. At the beginning of 1995, Veja stated that there were nearly seven million public employees all over the country, of which 700000 were being employed by the federal government and the rest by the 27 states and the 5000 municipalities. This meant that one out of ten Brazilian workers makes his living out of the tax payers' pocket. See Veja, 22 February 1995.

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UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS AND PAPERS

Ames, Barry (1992) 'Disparately Seeking Politicians: Strategies and Outcomes in Brazilian Legislative Elections'. Paper prepared for the Convention of the Latin American Studies Association.

Baltar, Ronaldo (1990) Os Empresarios Rurais e a Reforma Agraria no Governo de Transifiio ( 1985-1989). Campinas, Sao Paulo: MA diss., Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

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Bruneau, Thomas C. ( 1989) 'Constitutions and Democratic Consolidation: Brazil in Comparative Perspective'. Paper prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Cammack, Paul ( 1990) 'The Transitions to Democracy in Latin America: A Historical­Structural Analysis'. Paper prepared for the Session on Transition to Democracy in the Contemporary World, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, UCLA.

G6es, Walder de (1993) 'A Persistencia do Pensamento Autoritario nas For~as Armadas Brasileiras'. Paper prepared for the annual conference of ANPOCS, Caxambu.

Kinzo, Maria D' Alva G. (l994)'The Current Crisis in Brazil's Congress: Reversal or Revival of Democracy?' Paper prepared for the conference 'Constraints of Growth in Brazil: Economy, Society and Institutions', Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London.

Lamounier, Bolfvar ( 1994) 'Brazilian Democracy from the 1980s to the 1990s: The Hyper-Active Paralysis Syndrome'. Paper prepared for the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, D.C.

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GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, OFFICIAL REPORTS AND SPEECHES

Assembleia Nacional Constituinte (1987-1988) Diario da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte. Brasilia D.F.

-- (1987) Resolurao No. 2: Regimento lnterno. Brasilia D.F. -- (1988) Resoluriio No. 3: Altera o Regimento lnterno. Brasilia D.F. Baeta, Hermann Assis (1985) 'Razi'>es da Constituinte Exclusiva'. Address to the

Second Congress of National Lawyers in OAB-D.F., on 15 October 1985. Banco de Dados do SICON, Apem, Prodasen, Senado Federal, Brasilia, D.F. Brazil ( 1988) Constituifiio: RepUblica F ederativa do Brasil. Brasilia: Senado Federal. Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (1986) 'Por uma Nova Ordem

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Maciel, Marco (1988) 'Por un Novo Presidencialismo'. Address to the Federal Senate on 16 March 1988.

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Editora Anita Garibaldi. Partido do Movimento Democnitico Brasileiro, Revista do PMDB, Funda~io Pedroso

Horta, vols 1-9. Rio de Janeiro.

NEWSPAPERS

Assembleia Constituinte, Newspaper Archive, Cimarados Deputados, Brasilia, D.F. Digesto Economico, Ano XVI, no. 313. F olha de S. Paulo, 1985-1988. OEstadodeS. Paulo,1985-1988. Refonna Agraria, Newspaper Archive, Cimara dos Deputados, Brasilia, D.F. Revisiio Constitucional, Newspaper Archive, Cimara dos Deputados, Brasilia, D.F. Sistema de Govemo, Newspaper Archive, Cimara dos Deputados, Brasilia, D.F. Veja, 1985-1994.

INTERVIEWS

Senator Fernando H. Cardoso, Sio Paulo, 30 August 1990. Paulo Affonso Martins de Oliveira, Brasilia, 19 May 1992. Deputy Cunha Bueno, Brasilia, 3 June 1992. Deputy Carlos Sant' Anna, Brasilia, 3 June 1992. Senator Marco Maciel, Brasilia, 8 June 1992. Deputy Ulysses Guimaries, Brasilia, 9 June 1992. Deputy Haroldo Lima, Brasilia, 10 June 1992. Deputy Bernardo Cabral, Brasilia, 12 June 1992. Deputy Jose Genoino, Brasilia, 16 June 1992. Deputy Jose Lauren~o. Brasilia, 17 June 1992. Deputy Joio Gilberto Lucas, Porto Alegre, 30 June 1992. Senator Jose Foga~a. Brasilia, I 0 September 1992. Deputy Roberto Cardoso Alves, Brasilia, 8 December 1992. Senator Mario Covas, Brasilia, 10 December 1992. Deputy Fernando Lyra, Brasilia, 10 December 1992. Dantas Lucena, Brasilia, 11 December 1992. Ulisses Riedel (DIAP), Brasilia, II December 1992. Mozart Vianna de Paiva, Brasilia, II December 1992. Bolfvar Lamounier (IDESP), Sao Paulo, 14 September 1993.

Bibliography

Deputy Plfnio de Arruda Sampaio, Sii.o Paulo, 15 September 1993. Deputy Jose Lins, Brasilia, 30 September 1993. Deputy Ronaldo Caiado (UDR), Brasilia, 5 October 1993. Senator Josephat Marinho, Brasilia, 6 October 1993. Deputy Luis Roberto Ponte, Brasilia, 6 October 1993. Deputy Nelson Jobim, Brasilia, 7 October 1993. Mario Amato (FIESP), Sii.o Paulo, 21 October 1993. Flavio Telles de Menezes (SRB), Sao Paulo, 21 October 1993.

233

Index

ABI (AssociQfao Brasileira de lnzprensa),28,58, 185

ABINEE (AssociQfiio Brasileira da Industria Eletro-Eletronica), 79

ABRA (Associafiio Brasileira de ReformaAgraria), 83, 152, 153, 154

agrarian reform, see land reform; see also peasants

ARENA (Alianfa Renovadora Nacional)

electoral decline of, 28-30 origins of, 24-5 advantage over MDB, 25-6 representation in Congress, 20-1

armed forces participation in the Constituent

Assembly, 84-6, 142 prerogatives under the 1988

Constitution, 103 role of, 36, 71

Brizola, Leonel, 31, 63, 64, 135, 140, 142

Cabral, Bernardo, 3, 99, 109, 110, lll, 112, 118, 136, 140, 161, 162, 166

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 52, 53, 54,56,57,93, 119,188,197,201

Cardoso Alves, Roberto, 82, 113 Castelo Branco, Humberto de Alencar,

14, 16, 17, 18, 149 Chamber of Deputies

under Military rule, 18, 20-2, 25-6, 28-9,33

under the New Republic, 47-8, 51, 53-4,57,64,66

the 1988 Constitution and, 172-6, 197-202

Centriio activities of, 116-18 organization of, 113-15 opposition to land reform and, 115,

163-7

opposition to parliamentarism and, ll5, 139-42

CGT (Central Geral dos Trabalhadores), 15, 76, 77, 185

CL T ( Consolidafao das Leis do Trabalho), 76, 77, 104-5, 122-3, 124, see also labour

CNA (ConfederQfiio Nacional da Agricultura), 81, 82, 150, 152

CNBB (Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil), 28, 35, 55, 58, 83,86,185

CNI(Confederafiio Nacional das lndustrias), 79, 80, 82, 113, 140

CNRA ( Canzpanha Nacional de ReformaAgraria), 153, 154, 155

Congress constitutional revision of 1993 and,

186-9 corruption and, 141, 189 amendment no.25 and, 55-7 amendment no.26 and, 57-9 under Military rule, 19-23 under the New Republic, 48, 51-3 reform proposals for, 36 under the 1988 Constitution, 120,

172-8 Constituent Assembly

Afonso Arinos Commission and, 59-60,91, 95

agenda of discussion, 87-8 composition of, 66-71 convocation of, 41-2,55 demands for, 30,34-8 elections for, 54 interest groups and, 74-87 operation of, 100-20, 129-45,

151-68 opinion profile of, 71-4 organization of, 46, 57-9,93-7 socioeconomic profile of, 69-71

constitution definition of, 5 ofl946, 13-17,126,149

234

Index 235

ofl967, 18,30 ofl988, 120,121,122,123,124,

170-80: revision of, 185- 9; legitimacy and, 190-4; reform of 1995, 197-202

of 1988 v. 1967--69, 121-3 constitution-making, see constituent

assembly; see also constitutional change

constitutional change conditions for, 7, 9 dimensions of, 4-5 transition to democracy and, 5-7 types of, 7-8

CONTAG (Confedera~iioNacional dos Trabalhadores da Agricultura), 83, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 164, 165

COPAG (Commissiio do Plano de A~iio do Govemo ), 44

CPT (Commissiio Pastoral da Terra), 83, 149, 152, 153, 154

Costae Silva, Artur, 18, 22, 23, 24, 149

Covas, Mario, 38, 98, 99, 113, 119, 129, 135, 137, 143, 145

CUT (Central Onica dos Trabalhadores), 58, 75, 76, 77, 78, 185, 199

democracy and constitutional change, 4-9 Constituent Assembly's models of,

101, 121, 131 definition of, 5-6 see also transition to democracy

Democratic Alliance, 33-4 and the Constituent Assembly, 36-8,

41-2,45-7 composition of, 47, 64 ideological and institutional basis of,

47-51 manifesto of, 40-2 performance of, 51-5,63

democratic consolidation, 6-7 constitution-making and, 190-4

DIAP (Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar), 58, 75, 76

economic policy and economic performance, 42-4 Cruzado Plan, 51, 53-5,61, 63-4 Neves' proposal for, 41-5

elections control of, 23--6 liberalization and, 28-30, 32-4 ofl986,54,62-6

electoral system under Military rule, 17-19, 23--6 reform proposals for, 38, 41, 56, 60 the 1988 Constitution and, 102, 121,

133, 175-8 exec uti ve-1egislati ve relations

under Military rule, 16, 19-20 reform proposals for, 38, 41, 56 the 1988 constitution and, 101,

131-3, 172-5 see also parliamentarism; presiden­

tialism

federal system reform proposals for, 36, 38, 41,72 the 1988 Constitution and, 103, 120,

121,124,179-80,200 FIESP (Federa~iio das lndl1strias do

Estado de Siio Paulo), 79, 80, 140 Figueiredo, Joao Batista de Oliveira,

22,23,24,31,33,48 Fleischer, David, 67, 70, 119 FNLI (Frente Nacional pela Livre

lniciativa), 79, 81, 114 Folha de Siio Paulo, 66, 67, 68, 109,

141 Franco, Afonso Arinos de Melo,

59--60, 109, 126, 136 Franco, Albano, 82, 113, 140 Funaro, Dilson, 52, 55

Geisel, Emesto, 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27,28,29,30,31

Golbery do Couto e Silva, 26, 27, 32 Gomes, Severo, 99, 159, 160 Guimaraes, Ulysses, 34, 37, 48, 51, 52,

93,94,98, 119,135,140,142, 157, 158

IMF (International Monetary Fund), 43

236 Index

INCRA (lnstituto Nacional de Coloniza(:iio e Reforma Agraria), 150, 153

institutional acts, 13 Institutional Act no.l, 15 Institutional Act no.2, 16, 17 Institutional Act no.3, 17 Institutional Act no.4, 17 Institutional Act no.5, 14, 18, 19, 30,

35 Institutional Act no.9, 149

interest groups, 74-87, 196-7 business, 78-83 labour, 75-8 peasants, 83-4, 150 popular movements, 86-7

job security, 72, 77,104,115, 199,see also labour

judicial power under Military rule, 16, 30 reform of, 38,41 the 1988 Constitution and, 102

Kinzo. Maria D' Alva, 14, 35

labour as interest group, 75-8 organization of, 75-6 participation in the Constituent

Assembly of, 75-8 rightsof,41, 104,105,122-3,124 the 1988 Constitution and, 104, 105,

124 Lamounier, Bolivar, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29,

38,56,57,126 land reform, 147-69

Constituent Assembly's debate on, 152-7

under Military rule, 149-50 movement for, 83-4 the New Republic's programme for,

147-50 proposals for, 41, 45,74

Lauren~o,Jose, 99,113,166 legitimacy

Cardoso's government and, 201 constitution-making and, 8, 37-9 Military rule and, 27-30

the 1988 Constitution and, 170--2, 190-4

liberalization Constituent Assembly and, 34-8 origins of, 26-8 see also transition to democracy

Lula (Luis lmicio da Silva), 31, 78, 172 Lyra, Fernando, 33, 95

Maciel. Marco, 34, 38, 48, 54, 64, 130 Magalhaes, Antonio Carlos, 34, 141,

201 Martins Rodrigues, Leoncio, 67, 69,

72, 73. 74, 167 MDB (Movimento Democratico

Brasileiro), 20, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35,67

Medici, Emflio Garrastazu, 22, 23, 24 Military rule

Congress under, 19-23 constitutional and institutional

change under, 13-34 elections under, see elections land reform and, 149-50 political parties and, see political

parties and transition to democracy, 14,

26-38 Minas Gerais, 32, 33, 140, 141 MTRST (Movimento dos

Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra). 83, 149

Neves, Tancredo Constituent Assembly and, 37-8,

41-2,45-6,57,59,192 Democratic Alliance and, 33-4,

36-8,40-7,49,51 landreformand,41,45, 147,148,154 see also PMDB

OAB (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil), 28, 34, 55, 58, 86, 185

OCB (Organiza(:iio das Cooperativas do Brasil), 81, 82, 150, 152

parliamentarism Constituent Assembly's debate on,

37,39,137-9

Index 237

floor voting on, 142-4 and the plebiscite of 21 April 1993,

180-5 proposals for, 36, 46, 71, 128-9, roots of, 126-8

PCB (Partido Comunista Brasileiro), 56,64,65,68,69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 100, 130, 151, 158, 167, 176, 177, 186

PC doB (Partido Comunista do Brasil), 56,64,65,68,69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 100, 130, 151, 158, 167, 176, 177, 186

PDS (Partido Democratico Social), 20, 25,26,29,32,33,34,44,47,49, 50,53,63,64,65,66,67,68,69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,114,115,144, 151, 158, 167, 173, 176-7

PDT (Partido Democratico Trabalhista), 31, 33, 63, 64, 65, 66 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 93, 144, 151, 158, 167, 173, 176-7, 186, 187,195,201

peasants under the New Republic, 150 organization for Constituent

Assembly, 83-4 PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal)

Democratic Alliance and, 38, 42, 47-8,51-2

characteristics of, 48, 69-74 electoral performance of, 62-6, 173,

176-7 ideological profile of, 48, 68-9 leadership of, 34 performance in Constituent

Assembly of, 93-100, 142-4, 151, 167, 158

plebiscite introduction of, 36, 101, 122 of21 April1993, 144--5, 180-5

PMB (Partido Municipalista Brasileiro), 64, 65, 144

PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro)

Democratic Alliance and, 33-4, 42, 47-8,51-2

electoral performance of, 26, 29, 62-6, 173, 176-7

ideological profile of, 66-9 leadership of, 33 origins and characteristics of, 31-2,

47-8,69-74 performance in Constituent

Assembly of, 93-100, 142-4, 151, 158, 167

Sarney and, 53-4 Tancredo Neves and, 49-51, 51-2

political parties ideological profile of, 66-9, 194 under Military rule, 17, 20-1, 23,

25,31-2 under the New Republic, 47-53, 62,

74 and the plebiscite of 21 April 1993,

182 reform proposals for, 34,55-7, 178 socioeconomic profile of, 69-71 the 1988 Constitution and, 102,

174-8 popular participation

in the Constituent Assembly, 58-9, 86-7

the constitutional revision and, 185 PP (Partido Popular), 31, 32 presidentialism

Constituent Assembly's debate on, 101, 129-44

floor voting on, 142-4 and the plebiscite of 21 April 1993,

180-5 background of, 125-8

private property, 107, 152-4 PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), 31,

33,38,42,55,58,63,64,65,68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78,86, 144, 151, 158, 167, 172, 173, 176-7,186,187,195,201

PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro), 32,33,63,64,65,66,68,69, 70, 71, 73, 74,114,115,144,151, 158, 167, 176-7

redistribution, social and economic, 44, 54

rights, bill of the 1967 Constitution, 17, 121, 122

238 Index

the 1988 Constitution, 104, 105, 121, 122, 124

Rio de Janeiro, 28, 32, 58, 63, 140 Rio Grande do Sol, 28, 58

Sao Paulo, 26, 28, 32, 58, 63, 140, 153, 201

Santos, Wanderley Guilherme dos, 21 Samey,Jose

Congress and, 55-9, 201 Constituent Aseembly and, 59-60,

94-5, 108, 110, 111, 114, 119 Democratic Alliance and, 33-4,

49-51,62-4 government of, 44,51-5, 150 the Military and, 84-5 presidentialism and, 110, Ill, 126,

128-9,130, 134-7, 139-44 the 1988 constitution and, 119, 172

Sayad,Joiio,44,52,53 senate

under Military rule, 19-23, 25, 29 under the New Republic, 47-8,

53-4,57,65,100,177 the 1988 Constitution and, I 0 I, 121

SNI (Servi~o Nacional de lnforma~oes), 18, 19, 84, 85

SRB (Sociedade Rural Brasileira), 81, 82, 150, 152

state intervention in economy Constituent Assembly's debate on,

104-6, 121 constitutional revision and, 198-202

suffrage Constituent Assembly's debate on,

103 under Military rule, 25 restoration of, 41,56

transition to democracy and constitutional change, 5-7 and Military rule, 26-38

UBE (Uniiio Brasileira de Empresarios), 79, 114, 139

UDR ( Uniiio Democratica Ruralista), 79,81,82, 150,157,164,165

unions, see labour

Veja,67, 71, 72,126,176,177,187