norwegian refugee council evaluation report

EVALUATION

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REPORT

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

EVALUATION OF GENERAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION INNORTHERN UGANDA: GULU, AMURU AND KITGUMDISTRICTS 2005-2008

DISTRIBUTION AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME IN UGANDA

BY REKHA DAS AND ANNE NKUTUNORDIC CONSULTING GROUP

JUNE 2008

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

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EVALUATION OF GENERAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA: GULU, AMURU AND KITGUM

DISTRICTS 2005-2008

FINAL REPORT

BY REKHA DAS AND ANNE NKUTU NORDIC CONSULTING GROUP

KAMPALA, JUNE 2008

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List of Abbreviations CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CSB Corn Soya Blend DDMC District Disaster Management Committee DFID Department for International Development, UK EFSA Emergency Food Security Assessment EVI Extremely Vulnerable Individual FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation FFA Food for Assets FFE Food for Education FFL Food for Life FFW Food for Work FGD Focus Group Discussion FMC Food Management Committee FSL Food Security and Livelihoods FY Fiscal Year GAM Global Acute Malnutrition GFD General Food Distribution GoU Government of Uganda HH Household ICLA Information Communication and Legal Aid (NRC

Programme component) IDP Internally Displaced Person Kcal Kilo Calories LC Local Council LC5 Local Council Five MDG Millennium Development Goals MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoU Memorandum of Understanding NEVI Non Extremely Vulnerable Individual NGO Non Governmental Organisation NOK Norwegian Kroner NRC Norwegian Refugee Council OPM Office of the Prime Minister PC Project Coordinator PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PM Project Manager PRDP Peace Recovery and Development Plan PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation RDA Recommended Daily Allowance RDC Regional District Commissioner TFC Therapeutic Feeding Centres UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United National High Commission for Refugees UNOCHA UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs USD United States Dollar Ushs Uganda Shilling WFP World Food Programme YEP Youth Education Pack (NRC Education Programme

Component)

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List of Contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................... 1

1.1 Project Relevance & Appropriateness .................................................................... 1

1.2 Project Efficiency & Coverage................................................................................. 2

1.3 Project Effectiveness & Impact ............................................................................... 3

1.4 Coordination............................................................................................................. 6

1.5 Connectedness – Relief & Recovery................................ ................................ ....... 6

1.6 Phasing Out Food Aid................................ ................................ .............................. 7

2 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 8

2.1 Objectives & Methodology of the Evaluation ......................................................... 8

2.2 Structure of the Evaluation Report ......................................................................... 9

3 NORTHERN UGANDA – A CHALLENGING CONTEXT.................................. 10

3.1 Poverty & Conflict in Northern Uganda ................................................................ 10

3.2 Peace Process & Returns ...................................................................................... 10

3.3 Government Policies, Plans & Services ............................................................... 11

3.4 Global Food Politics & Local Prices ................................ ................................ ..... 12

4 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - THE GFD PROJECT......................... 15

4.1 GFD Project Objectives.......................................................................................... 15

4.2 Alignment to NRC’s Policies ................................................................................. 15

5 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENESS .......................................... 17

5.1 Being There at the Right Time ............................................................................... 17

5.2 Appropriateness of Food Aid in Protracted Conflicts ......................................... 17

5.3 Lesson Learned...................................................................................................... 19

5.4 Recommendations ................................................................ ................................ . 19

6 PROJECT EFFICIENCY & COVERAGE .......................................................... 20

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6.1 Dealing with Logistics, Security & Delays ................................ ............................ 20

6.2 The Value of Building a Dedicated & Flexible Organisation ................................ 21

6.3 Beneficiaries Help Distributing Food .................................................................... 21

6.4 But Does Everybody Get a Share – Getting the Numbers Right? ....................... 22

6.5 Lesson Learned...................................................................................................... 23


7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS ........................................................................... 25

7.1 Project Objective 1 ................................................................ ................................ . 25 7.1.1 Traditional Nutrition & Diet in Northern Uganda ................................ .......... 25 7.1.2 Nutrition & Diet Provided During the Conflict ................................ .............. 25 7.1.3 Employing the Fair Share ‘Family Size Model’ ............................................. 26 7.1.4 Have Beneficiary Needs & Demands been met? ................................ .......... 26 7.1.5 Responding to Complaints ............................................................................ 27 7.1.6 But People Have Been Kept Alive ................................ ................................ . 28 7.1.7 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 29 7.1.8 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 29

7.2 Project Objective 2 ................................................................ ................................ . 30 7.2.1 The Evidence Base for Ration Reductions ................................ ................... 30 7.2.2 Covering the Net Food Gap – How do People Cope? .................................. 33 7.2.3 Stimulating Other Options ............................................................................. 36 7.2.4 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 36 7.2.5 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 36

7.3 Project Objective 3: ................................ ................................................................ 37 7.3.1 Targeting Food Aid......................................................................................... 37 7.3.2 Categorising People ................................ ....................................................... 37 7.3.3 Empowering Women in a Disempowered Situation ................................ ..... 38 7.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs? ........................................................................... 39 7.3.5 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 39 7.3.6 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 40

8 COORDINATION .............................................................................................. 41

8.1 A Co-ordinated Response in the Field .................................................................. 41

8.2 WFP – NRC: A Mutual Partnership........................................................................ 43

8.3 Lessons .................................................................................................................. 43


9 RELIEF AND RECOVERY – CONNECTEDNESS............................................ 45

9.1 From Relief to Recovery – The Linkages.............................................................. 45

9.2 From Relief to Recovery – The Gaps .................................................................... 45

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9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards Connectedness ............................................................... 47

9.4 Lessons Learnt....................................................................................................... 49


10 YEARS OF FOOD AID - IMPACT ................................................................. 50

10.1 Women’s Empowerment/Crisis of Masculinity .................................................... 50

10.2 Skills Transfer/Employment .................................................................................. 50

10.3 Dependency Syndrome.......................................................................................... 50

10.4 Creation of Parallel Structures ................................ ................................ .............. 51

11 PHASING OFF FOOD AID – A DISCUSSION .............................................. 52

11.1 Phase Out Strategy on its Way................................ ................................ .............. 52

11.2 Piloting the Phase Out in 20 Districts ................................................................... 52

11.3 Comments to the Phase Out Efforts ................................ ................................ ..... 53

11.4 Recommendations for Phase Out ......................................................................... 54

ANNEXES 1. TOR for the Evaluation 2. Evaluation Programme 3. List of Documents Consulted 4. List of People Met 5. Example of a Typical Acholi Menu (pre-IDP) 6. Question Guide/Evaluation Tool

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report presents the outcome of an Evaluation of the General Food Distribution project (GFD) in Northern Uganda, commissioned by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The Acholi Sub region in Northern Uganda has been at the centre of a conflict between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 22 years. The protracted conflict resulted in massive internal population displacements in Northern Uganda. At the height of the insurgency (2002 -2004) nearly 2 million people were forced to live in crowded camps. The war had a direct impact on people’s lives and ability for survival. Over 20.000 children were abducted by the LRA and forced into the rebel forces as chil d soldiers. Abducted girls and young women were subjected to sexual enslavement and forced to serve as wives to LRA rebels . In addition to repeated gross human rights violations, countless lives have been lost and assets, social infrastructure and liveliho ods destroyed. Health indicators during many years reflected discouraging trends. Between 1995 and 2000 infant mortality increased from 81 to 88 deaths per 1000 live births. Mortality amongst children under the age of five increased from 147 to 152 per 1 ,000 deaths and by early 2000 the global acute malnutrition rates reached an alarming 20% in many parts of the North. From being a farming community once supplying the rest of Uganda with food, people of the North became largely dependent on humanitarian a ssistance for their survival. In 1997, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) with NRC as its cooperating partner started distributing food to the affected population in Gulu 1 and Kitgum districts. At that time there was an average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The number of people today receiving monthly food assistance is nearly 755,000 IDPs - located in the camps as well as in transit sites. Having distributed food to IDPs for 10 years NRC decided in 2008 to conduct an evaluation of the GFD project, to obtain a systematic and objective assessment of performance and also to identify lessons learned which can inform recommendations for future project direction. To narrow down the scope and increase relevance for future NRC programming, the evaluation period was defined from 2005 to 2008. The Evaluation was completed in June 2008. The main findings and recommendations are summarised below: 1.1 Project Relevance & Appropriateness Being one of the few NGOs on the ground for nearly a decade and duri ng the peak of the conflict in Northern Uganda, NRC was able to make a timely response to the emergency. Taking on the task as implementing partner for WFP’s food distribution programme was relevant viz. the palpable humanitarian needs. Bringing the Countr y Office to the field was essential to cut costs, bureaucracy, and time and thereby essential for fast decision -making and eventually quick response. Moreover, having a clear and undisputed humanitarian objective and policy, measured in simple terms (quant itative indicators) gave NRC a focused direction and mandate of work in times of complex emergency and insecurity. Nevertheless, when a conflict develops signs of a protracted situation, it can be beneficial to design and implement alternative/complementa ry solutions to the humanitarian food aid response. This may in some cases require more complex and multi -faceted analysis and

1 Gulu district was divided to two administrative districts, Gulu and Amuru in 2007.

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tools; however it ensures food security for the beneficiaries, which ultimately is the humanitarian obligation of NRC. For future food aid operations, the Evaluation therefore recommends: ♦ In future humanitarian operations that involve continued food distribution during an

extended period of time and on a massive scale NRC’s should continue to prioritise being close to the field and implement its undisputed humanitarian objective of serving people in need.

♦ In protracted situations, NRC should – as now also obliged by its Emergency Food

Security and Distribution Policy - as early as possible, explore the possibility of combining general food distribution with alternative strategies. If the situation calls for it and allows for it, topping up/complimenting WFP food supplies for a period of time should be considered. Alternative strategies should also include livelihoods initiatives, income generation activities, cash programmes or voucher programmes possibly earmarked for food.

♦ Given that this combination of approaches might be new to NRC, some investments

should be made in analysis/research, which could lead to developing a toolbox or a kit that combines cash and in-kind programmes and also considers the options for topping up/complimenting food supplies. Striking a balance between various approaches is challenging and should be researched 2.

♦ NRC’s Emergency Food Security and Distri bution Policy should give more concrete

guidance on different options and alternative/complimentary solutions that can be combined with the general food distribution activities.

1.2 Project Efficiency & Coverage For approximately USD 1.8 million per year, NR C has organised, arranged, distributed and monitored food assistance to some 755,000 people on a monthly basis during insecure and restrictive times. This means on average a cost of USD 2.3 per IDP per year. This cost is over and above the expenditures for food itself and WFP’s own costs. In view of the efficient field operation, use of local resource base and the number of beneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations of this magnitude. NRC has distributed food without major delays or failures, despite WFP pipeline breakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays etc. This has indeed been possible because of a flexible work force of experienced and disciplined people who have grown with the organisation and possesses detailed local knowledge. The investment in capacity building of 200 volunteers has proven worthwhile. In addition, m anagement and ground supervision of the operation with constant communication and dialogue with beneficiaries and camp/community networks provides smooth distribution of aid and an opportunity to solve conflicts and problems that may arise along the way. When beneficiaries are involved as much as possible a fair and dignified distribution of food aid may be ensured and hence also a mitigation of potential conflicts amongst beneficiaries. However, revalidation and verification exercises for food registration take a lot of time and require close supervision and management. When data collection, entry and verification are outsourced to different organisations it leads to many errors and beneficiaries losing out on

2 In order not to invent the wheel, reference may be made to findings from many safety net programmes, voucher for work programmes or cash for work programmes. NRC is at present joining hands with other cluster stakeholders in making joint assessments and the findings of these assessments may inform future alternative strategies.

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food. Rather, one organisation with close contact and overview of the beneficiaries should do it. Verifying the print list before entering the data into the database is a fundamental ‘check -point’ if errors are to be captured before they make their way into the final list, from which WFP allocates its metric tonnes. Hence it is recommended that: ♦ For future food aid operations, NRC should learn from the orga nisational set-up and

human resource pool in Uganda and build well equipped operations based on local knowledge and capacities.

♦ The terms and conditions of the current volunteer work force should be assessed to

provide people with a more competitive package. Also, the capacity of the volunteers should be assessed in view of possible future expansion of their scope of work into other programme areas that may maximise and benefit from the operational, organisational or technical skills of these people.

♦ In future food aid projects NRC or WFP should consider delegating/outsourcing the entire

verification exercise to one single actor (firm or NGO) to ensure consistency in data collection, data entry and printing of lists and cards. This way the process is s treamlined and errors due to many ‘managers’ is minimised. If NRC has the capacity, it should in future operations offer to take on this task, in view of efficiency, costs and its knowledge on the ground.

♦ Time and resources should be invested in verifying the data on the print list, before it is

finalised and approved by WFP. It will minimize errors and problems at a later stage. Print out of the data base list is in the hands of WFP, however if possible this task could be delegated to the implementing agency who has eyes and ears on the ground.

1.3 Project Effectiveness & Impact Project Objective 1: To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to IDPs in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts. Food aid has been vital to fighting (acute) malnutrition and saving peoples lives during the protracted crisis in Northern Uganda. Composing a food basket with the correct amount and type is essential to meeting the minimum nutritional dietary standards. But with ration reductions, cuts in the food basket and few alternative options, the maintenance of minimum standards of 2,100 kcal per person per day is seriously challenged. Moreover, food aid has not been provided according to preferred die tary needs and demands of the Acholi people and has in several cases also been of inferior quality. The traditional Acholi diet is rich and diverse. The uniform food basket given over many years has changed diet habits and nutrition of the IDPs. Being awar e of needs and involving beneficiaries in finding alternative or complimentary solutions to food aid can boost the diet and nutrition and respond to some of their preferences. In general, changes in food rations, problems with quality, missing food items e tc may require more intensive and repeated explanation to the IDPs so as to fully answer complaints. Nevertheless, adjusting distribution mechanisms to the family size system with an emphasis of beneficiary involvement can prove effective in as much as re aching the target populations with food in a fair way and controlling crowds into an orderly distribution. The Evaluation recommends the following:

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♦ With the ration reduction, changes in food basket and inconsistencies in supplies, NRC

should as recommended in Section 1.1 incorporate alternative strategies to food aid programmes in a protracted situation. IDPs, with a wealth of dietary knowledge, can be brought more actively on board to identify ideas or solutions to meet thei r own needs. Based on this, NRC should source for the most feasible operational solution (e.g. topping up food aid, implementing small scale livelihood activities, initiating cash programmes and stimulate market forces).

♦ NRC should include qualitative indicators in the project design to compliment the existing

quantitative health indicators, which may not always provide a complete picture. Qualitative indicators could be defined around ‘beneficiary satisfaction’, which NRC has already been reporting on in Post Distribution Monitoring Reports.

♦ Taking IDPs complaints seriously through actions and recourse increases the feeling of a

dignified process. In this connection NRC and WFP should reassess the functions and purpose of the complaint desk with a vie w to improve the use of them and reach a more effective complaint handling process.

♦ NRC should take other/alternative measures to push for actions and recourse in some

areas with persisting complaints (rations cards, verification/print list failures/pipe line shortages etc). For example more direct communication/advocacy can be made to WFP management.

Project Objective 2: To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap. IDPs have in general not been able to meet their net food gap as quickly as assumed from the beginning of the project period. Meeting the net food gap as well as nutritional standards is challenging if food ration reductions do not go hand in hand with livelihood and food security expansion, particularly for more vulnerable groups and in the transit sites, where basic services are lacking and markets for purchase/sale are far. With the food ration reductions and no immediate livelihood opportunities, IDPs are forced into various c oping strategies, some more encouraging than others. In worst cases the coping strategies are of a degrading nature, challenging the protection of some of the IDPs. As evidence base for reductions of rations, net food gap coverage etc., the Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) and nutritional surveys are faced with a series of methodological limitations, delays and lack of nuances, which question their credibility. Yet these surveys comprise the sole basis for crucial decision-making on food aid policy in Northern Uganda. Enhanced corroboration, triangulation of data, comprehensiveness and independence of the surveys will increase the credibility of the evidence base for decision -making. Therefore the Evaluation recommends: ♦ To address the reported problems regarding the EFSAs’ methodology and credibility and

provide a more confident basis for decision making and policy development at this time in Northern Uganda, an EFSA cum nutrition survey, independent, and of a higher quality should be conducted to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of food security, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap etc. The research should be conducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawn from current experienced food actors on the ground. An independent EFSA need not necessarily replace currently planned EFSAs, but be additional to it. NRC should advocate for and contribute to the

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realisation of this. (See also recommendations for the Food Phase Out strategy, Section 1.6).

♦ NRC should invest in more specific research of various alternatives to food aid during

and after emergency settings, with a view to strengthen peoples’ coping strategies as quickly as possible (ref. recommendations in Section 1.1).

Project Objective 3: To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women and children, EVIs, and the long -term effect of insufficient access to food. When women are actively engaged in food distribution it increases their empowerment and authority and it also affects traditional household dynamics. As the registered recipients of food aid and involvement in food management committees etc. women have acquired greater decision-making power in the household over how and when food utilized and have become the de facto breadwinners – a position that was prior to the conflict held by the men. When the extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI) lose out of the food distribution system they become even more vulnerable. Discussions have as of recent been devoted to the topic of EVIs and their future, however, there seems to be little concerted planning made or actions taken by the actors on the ground. The categorisation of EVIs – still maintained - may become counterproductive if efforts are not put into defining and designing a transitional response. This requires thinking ‘out of the box’ and borrowing tools and experience from for example traditional development programmes that have worked with the ‘m ainstreaming’ agenda for years (e.g. mainstreaming gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights etc). In fact, assuming that EVIS will automatically be taken care of by families and friends may not be the case. Family structures and dynamics have changed and NGOs and ag encies as well as districts should be careful in automatically assuming that upon return to the villages ‘everything will be normalised’. In view of this, the Evaluation recommends that: ♦ NRC should in future food aid projects include a mainstreaming as well as an exit

strategy – in good time - especially for targeted vulnerable groups, so as not to leave them in a vacuum, once the assistance is phased out.

♦ NRC should in the current situation in Northern Uganda be very careful to follow the

assumption that EVIs will automatically be taken care of by families and friends as the return process picks up and IDPs move back to their villages. NRC should strongly advocate for simple and targeted mainstreaming interventions for EVIs, for example through a multi-pronged approach involving 1) strengthening family and community social systems 2) strengthening relevant district social sectors to provide services and 3) targeting EVIs with tailor made livelihoods activities.

♦ It may be beyond NRC’s mandate/policy t o engage fully in the reintegration and

mainstreaming of EVIs into society. However, as a preparatory step, there is a need for research and documentation in the area of EVIs, through a household survey, which can more specifically determine the targeted need of people. NRC (together with other NGOs and district authorities) should take the lead on such a survey, which can incorporate several household issues, including gender related issues: i.e. assessing changes in the household and community dynamics wh ich food aid brings about on gender roles, changes in traditional practices, social protection and safety nets. This will prepare actors for a more realistic and strategic recovery response.

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1.4 Coordination NRC’s approach to coordination through openness, transparent dialogue and sharing of information with humanitarian organizations, agencies, beneficiaries as well as Government has been imperative to efficient coordination during food distribution. However, lack of active coordination on behalf of all stakeholders (perhaps due to lack of clear understanding of roles and responsibilities) is having a negative effect on the current recovery response, leaving IDPs in a void. Therefore the Evaluation recommends the following: ♦ NRC should push/advocate for an articulation of roles and responsibilities as well strong

coordination amongst humanitarian actors through the recovery phase. ♦ NRC should capitalise on its longstanding good partnership with WFP to push and

advocate more strongly for the solution of l ong standing problems like e.g. answering IDPs complaints.

♦ NRC is also urged to make its own strategic objectives, buffer budget and contingency

plan, so as not be contingent upon WFP delays and bureaucracy. 1.5 Connectedness – Relief & Recovery Strong and effective leadership is critical for articulating the link between relief and recovery and for galvanizing early recovery efforts. Lack of leadership in a post emergency situation creates a sense of paralysis amongst actors. Indeed also co-operation between the different actors, government/donors/humanitarian agencies/NGOs, is critical for successful recovery efforts. At present stakeholders do not seem clear of their roles and responsibilities and this hampers a smooth transition into recovery. In a complex situation such as that in northern Uganda, the beneficiaries’ perspectives and needs of the communities should be the driving force to avoid pushing people into further destitution. Needs’ assessments should be the basis for decision-making in humanitarian situations. Humanitarian organisations working on the ground have sound knowledge of the realities and needs of the ground and if properly packaged can be used to influence programmes and policy. However, there seems to be few and disperse funds av ailable for the much needed recovery activities. Availability of funds in a predictable, timely (more than 6 months) and coherent fashion can improve planning for recovery and assist in implementation of useful livelihoods programmes. Therefore it is recommended: ♦ With the resources, capacity and goodwill NRC has in Uganda, the organisation should

take a lead in advocating for concerted recovery efforts. The current lack of leadership from GoU as well as the humanitarian community should not prohibit NRC from exercising its mandate and leverage as an independent, capable and important NGO to move forward and set examples for the recovery process.

♦ NRC should advocate for targeted and needs based interventions. This will imply carrying

out research and studies (of which some recommendations have been made in this report) so as to have a credible evidence base for future programming. Time is not in anybody’s favour. For every delay a farming season for the IDPs may be missed.

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♦ In the current transition from the humanitarian to the recovery phase, NRC should along

side General Food Distribution (GFD) activities engage more widely and strategically in Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) activities. During the coming months it should be explored how to maximise the synergies between NRCs’ GFD team/structure and the FSL programme objectives.

♦ If there is limited and unsustainable funding for livelihoods/self reliance activities NRC

should request advocacy support from the food security cluster lead or higher up in the UN humanitarian system.

1.6 Phasing Out Food Aid Before deciding on phasing out, the Evaluation recommends the following: ♦ A credible basis for a food Phase Out decision would be - similar to the recommendations

in Section 1.3 - to conduct an EFSA cum nutrition survey independent and of higher quality to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of food security, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap and phase out etc.

♦ Acknowledging that a more comprehensive EFSA may require more resources, NRC

should advocate directly to humanitarian donors for funding for such an EFSA. Given the concern of some donors for the direction of food aid policy, there is currently an opportunity to present and to persuade its rationale.

♦ In addition NRC should pursue the inclusion of a consequence analysis for each area

subject to the Phase Out. ♦ NRC should assist in developing a ‘mainstreaming approach’ for EVIs, which should be

included in the Phase Out strategy, so they are not left to the assumption that NEVIs will take care of them.

♦ Based on a new EFSA, NRC together with other food security stakeholders should be

guided in the Phase Out of food aid. ♦ While Phase Out is being discussed and determined, NRC and other actors should scale

up its FSL activities to cover more households.

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2 INTRODUCTION “…The right to adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others has physical and economic access at all times to adequate foo d or means for its procurement…”3 For the last 22 years, the population in the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, has been affected by a violent conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda (GoU). In 1995-1996, the GoU decreed that all residents of areas affected by the conflict had to move into “protected villages”. These were de facto camps with limited space and extremely poor living conditions, creating an unbearable humanitarian situation for thousands of people, which in time triggered a humanitarian response. In 1997, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as its cooperating partner started distributing food to the affected population in Gulu 4 and Kitgum districts. At that time there was an average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The number of people today receiving monthly food assistance amounts to 755,000 IDPs 5 - located in the camps as well as in transit sites. In 2007 NRC distributed food to 458,000 IDPs in 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu and Amuru districts, and 297,000 IDPs in 26 camps and 13 transit sites in Kitgum district. 6 The objectives of the General Food Distribution Project have been to: 1. To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and

dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts.

2. To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap.

3. To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women and children, EVIs, and the long-term effect of insufficient access to food.

After distributing food to IDPs for 10 years NRC decided in 2008 to conduct an evaluation of the GFD project. The purpose being to obtain a systematic and objective assessment of the achievements and performance of the GFD project viz the realisation of the three objective, and subsequently also to identify lessons learned which can inform recommendations for future project direction. To narrow down the scope and increase relevance for future NRC programming, the evaluation period was defined from 2005 to 2008. 2.1 Objectives & Methodology of the Evaluation In order to assess the performance and achievements of the GFD project the following OECD DAC evaluation criteria has been used: Relevance/Appropriateness; Project Efficiency and Coverage, Project Effectiveness, Coordination, Impact and Linkages/Connectedness. The GFD evaluation methodology comprised three phases: i) an inception/desk phase to make necessary logistical arrangements, review relevant documents and develop an evaluation tool/question guide; ii) a field phase to collect qualitative data through observations and interviews/consultations with stakeholders; and (iii) a synthesis phase bringing together the results of the field and desk phases.

3 The UN charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 4 Gulu was divided in two administrative districts in 2007, Gulu and Amuru 5 The NRC Food distribution program as cooperating partner to WFP covers the districts of Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. Pader district is covered by World Vision. 6 The following part is summarised from NRC Evaluation TOR

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NRC coincided the field phase of the evaluation with their monthly food distribution activities in order to provide the Evaluation Team an opportunity to follow ‘activities on the ground’. Subsequently the Evaluation Team spent two weeks in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum from 14 th-25th April. During the field phase several meetings and discussions were held with the NRC GFD team and other NRC programme staff as well as management (Gulu and Kitgum). A series of consultations and interviews were carried out with district officials (DDMCs, LCVs and RDCs) in the three districts. In addition interviews were conducted with humanitarian actors and implementing agencies in the food security, nutrition and coordination clusters (WFP, FAO, UNOCHA, UNHCR etc). In Kampala interviews were held with donor agencies and WFP Country Office. A full list of people consulted is attached in Annex 4. In order to obtain detailed information from the IDPs a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) and individual interviews were held in a number of camps and transit sites. Some FGDs were held exclusively with extremely vulnerable individuals or men or women. Other groups were mixed. The camps and transit sites visited are presented in table 1 below: Table 1: Camps and Transit Sites Visited District Date Location Activity

17th April Amida IDP Camp Observation of Food Distribution FGD with 10 IDPs (male a nd female) Key Information Interviews with 2 women (NEVI)

17th April Lukwor Transit site FGD with 15 people (EVI and NEVI) 18th April Pawidi Transit site FGD with 15 people – and later plenary discussion with 37

IDPs (female and male (EVI and NEVI)

Kitgum

18th April Omiya Anyima IDP Camp

Observation of Food Distribution

15th April Opit IDP Camp FGD with 20 Food Management Committee members Key informant Interviews with selected EVIs

22nd April Orafwoyo Transit site

FGD with 15 IDPs – later deve loped into plenary sessions with 30 IDPs (women and men)

Gulu

22nd April Acet IDP camp Observation of Food Distribution Key Information Interview with 2 female beneficiaries (EVIs)

Amuru 21st April Amuru IDP Camp FGD with 21 IDPs (men and women) FGD 16 Food Management Committee members

The combination of all these actors ensured, that a balanced approach was made to cover stakeholders from all levels and as many voices as possible have been heard. The Evaluation Team consisted of Rekha Das and Anne Nkutu of Nordic Consulting Group, Uganda. The Evaluation Team would like to extend its thanks to all the stakeholders who patiently participated in this evaluation exercise. Your views and opinions have been of importance to the input to the report. Special thanks are also extended to the NRC GFD team who played an important role in facilitating the logistics and contacts and a smooth field visit. 2.2 Structure of the Evaluation Report After a brief context description and an introduction to the GFD project, the fo llowing pages will analyse and discuss the performance, achievements and challenges, which the NRC implemented GFD project has faced. The chapters are sequenced as follows: Relevance & Appropriateness; Efficiency &Coverage; Project Effectiveness (analysing the fulfilments of the three GFD objectives); Coordination; Connectedness (between relief and recovery); Impact and finally a discussion of the scenario of Phasing off food aid in Northern Uganda. Each chapter discusses findings/achievements/concerns and wraps up with lessons learned and recommendations.

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3 NORTHERN UGANDA – A CHALLENGING CONTEXT 3.1 Poverty & Conflict in Northern Uganda The districts of Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in the Acholi Sub region in Northern Uganda have been at the centre of a conflict between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 22 years. The protracted conflict has lead to massive internal population displacements in Northern Uganda. At the height of the insurgency (2002 -2004) nearly 2 million people were forced to live in crowded camps. In the Acholi region alone, more than a million people were living in 112 camps. Insecurity hampered free movement, to the effect that people were confined in camps for years 7. This contributed to making North Uganda the third, among the 10 worst internal displacement situations in the world8. The war had a direct impact on people’s lives and ability for survival. Over 20.000 children have been abducted by the LRA and forced into the rebel forces as child soldiers. Abducted girls and young women were subjected to sexual enslavement and forced to serve as wives to LRA rebels9. In addition to repeated gross human rights violations 10, countless lives have been lost and assets, social infrastructure and l ivelihoods destroyed. Health indicators during many years reflected discouraging trends. Between 1995 and 2000 infant mortality increased from 81 to 88 deaths per 1000 live births. Mortality amongst children under the age of five increased from 147 to 152 per 1,000 deaths11, stunting reached the level of 39% and by early 2000 the global acute malnutrition rates reached an alarming 20% in many parts of the North.12 Northern Uganda accounts for over 20% of Uganda’s arable land. Traditionally this area was known as the breadbasket of Uganda as it produced a food surplus that was sold in other parts of the country. However, the impact of the conflict changed this favourable situation, and from being farmers and livestock herders, people became largely dependent on humanitarian assistance for their survival. The conflict has contributed to high poverty levels, which range between 61 – 70% and are more than double the national average of 31% 13. The war widened the poverty gap between the North and the rest of the country from 17% in 1992 to 30% in 2005/06. Today, almost half (44.3%) of the poorest 20% in Uganda live in Northern Uganda, many of whom are extremely vulnerable individuals 14. With time the humanitarian crisis has drawn international attention. Resourc es channelled towards emergency assistance have grown substantially from USD 42 million in 2002, USD 204 million in 2006 and close to USD 300 million in 2007. 15 Although the regularity of the humanitarian assistance varied due to the security situation, provision of basic social services, food, medicine and other support services have been extended to the IDPs. 3.2 Peace Process & Returns The security situation in Northern Uganda has improved significantly since the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006 and the peace talks in Juba. The respite improved mobility, access for humanitarian assistance, increased movement, access to land, and sparked the re-emergence of economic life in parts of the region. However, while the 7 EU, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme: Identification Mission Report 8 IDMC/NRC: Internal Displacement - Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2005 9 Feinstein International Center: Movement on the Margins: Livelihoods and Security in Kitgum District, Northern Uganda 10 Abductions, conscription, mutilations, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 11 A UNICEF situation analysis report of 2005 states that the dire situation resulted in over 400 children under the age of five would die each week from easily preventable diseases including malaria, diarrhoea, anaemia and malnutrition. 12 WFP PRRO 2005-2008 13 2005/06 Uganda National Household Survey 14 Orphans, widows, children heading households and the elderly 15 UNIRIN, November 2007

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Juba talks have been perceived as the best chance for peace so far, they have been faced by many challenges and a long drawn process. It was initially anticipated that a comprehensive peace agreement would have been signed between the GOU and the LRA in the first quarter of 2008. The process has however been delayed by sticking points around the issues of justice, accountability and reconciliation for the LRA – all of which are critical for lasting peace and stability. The impasse around the indictments of the Internatio nal Criminal Court of the LRA leadership and the application of alternative justice mechanisms remains one of the bigger challenges.

Originally the IDP population of the Acholi sub region (Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader) was 1.102.438. The Gulu/Amuru and Kitgum population alone comprise 763.499 IDPs. While the GOU has declared the period of active conflict as effectively over, the delays in the signing of the peace deal have tapered the optimism and return movements of the IDP communities in the worst affected Acholi sub region. For example, it was expected that 70 % of the population would have returned to their villages of origin by December 2007. However, statistics as of March 200816 show that approximately 50% of the population (534.380 people17) in the Acholi sub region had moved away from the main camps. Many Acholis (36%) who have left the camps have returned not to their villages, but have settled in spontaneous transit sites from which they have better access to the own land 18 and also social services. Studies show that many may – contrary to initially anticipated – never return to original homes.19 The number of transit sites in the Acholi sub region today amounts to 1062. The most recent figures also show that only 12% of the IDPs in Acholi have retur ned to their villages of origin. The return patterns indicate that many IDPs still maintain some presence in the original camps first and foremost, as a security blanket in the event of fresh outbreaks of insecurity. Security concerns aside, return patterns are also affected by among others – the absence of basic services in some of the return areas, fear of unexploded ordinances (UXOs), lack of construction materials for shelter, lack of adequate agricultural inputs and the continued threats of the Karimojong in certain areas. The return process has also increased pressure on the already overstretched humanitarian resources as humanitarian agencies providing food assistance, health, water and sanitation services struggle to meet the needs of communities in the camps, transit and in the villages of origin. Although GOU has listed criteria to assess sites for resettlement – few services are in place and this has slowed the resettlement process.

3.3 Government Policies, Plans & Services The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) – GOU’s overarching development framework recognises that, while economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, poverty is a multi-dimensional problem. Over the years, the PEAP has been revised to capture and reflect emerging issues pertinent to poverty reduction. In the last revision, the PEAP introduced a third pillar on security and conflict resolution as a direct recognition of the poverty implications of conflict and hence the need for a coherent approach to r ecovery and development. Priority areas under this pillar include: ending rebel insurgency, by peaceful means if possible; ending cattle rustling; and enhancing disaster management specifically in relation to issues of internal displacement. Government has also developed an IDP policy aimed at mitigating the IDP crisis. GoU hence commits to:

16 UNHCR matrix on estimated IDP population movements, March 2008 (It should be noted that during population movements accurate figures are difficult to ascertain) 17 Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader 18 CAP, OCHA 2008 19 Waiting for Godot in Gulu, OCHA 2007

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Box 1: National IDP Policy 2004 § Protect its citizens against arbitrary displacement; § Minimize the effects of internal displacement by

providing an enabling enviro nment for upholding the rights & entitlements of IDPs;

§ Promote integrated and co -ordinated response mechanisms to address the causes and effects of internal displacements;

§ Assist in the safe and voluntary return; resettlement, integration and re -integration of IDP

§ Ensure that every person, internally displaced or otherwise, receives information about its provisions.

§ To guide the development of sectoral programs for recovery through rehabilitation and reconstruction of social and economic infrastructure in support of the return and resettlement of IDPs.

Whereas it covers crucial areas, the policy has been criticised for its failure to adequately address equally important issues such as land/property issues. Moreover, key challenges in the implementation of the policy have included the weak institutional capacity of local governments at the sub county/ district level; absence of law & order agencies as well as service providers to ensure the rights of returnees. In 2007 GoU launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) – which provides the framework for stability, recovery and development in the North. The PRDP has four strategic objectives: 1. Consolidation of State Authority, 2. Rebuilding and Empowering Communities 3. Revitalisation of the Economy 4. Peace Building and Reconciliation. The humanitarian and development community is looking closely to the steps taken by GoU to lead the efforts in the North. The total PRDP budget currently stands at US$ 606 million and its implementation is expected to o fficially begin in the FY 2008/ 2009. There is however still unclarity amongst central as well as local governments, not to mention humanitarian/development stakeholders with regards to its funding and implementation mechanisms. To date most of the North (outside camps) suffers from a lack of basic social services. 3.4 Global Food Politics & Local Prices Globally the international community has committed itself to the MDGs 20 – the first of which is cutting by half the number of food insecure people in the worl d. Food aid is considered a step on the path to meet this goal. The table below gives an overview of the main donors and recipients of food aid and some of the numbers involved 21.

20 Millennium Development Goals 21 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 2006

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Table 2: 2004 Global Food Aid Deliveries 22 Category Million metric tones Share of Total

Sub Saharan Africa 3.8 51% Asia 2.0 27% Latin America 0.7 9%

Recipient Region

Other regions 1.0 13% US 4.2 55% EC and other members 1.5 20% Japan 0.6 8%

Donor

Other 1.2 17% Emergency 4.4 59% Project 2.1 28%

Category

Program 1.0 13% Cereals 6.5 87% Commodity Non Cereals 1.0 13% Local purchase 1.1 15% Triangular purchase 0.9 12%

Procurement

Direct transfers 5.5 73% Given the big numbers and big players involved in global food aid, its political and financial connotations cannot be ignored. There are a couple of trends, which influence food aid policies and decisions at various levels. Declining resource levels/ priority for emergency programming: The global levels of food aid have been declining steadily from an average of 12-15 million metric tons in the late 1980s and early 90s to 7.5 MMT in 2004. The trends show an increased focus on emergencies and a marked decline in longer -term programme food aid including recovery assistance. However since 2005, even the funding for emergency food aid has been on the decline, especially to conflicts that have developed into a protracted crisis. The preference for ‘emergency’ food aid has also resulted in a reduction of food aid in post conflict situations, even during the critical phase of transition from emergency to recovery when as communities gradually rebuild their livelihoods 23. Local/regional purchase: Procurement modalities are also changing. There is a growing tendency towards cash resources for local/regional purcha se. With the exception of the US’ ‘tied food’, 45% of food aid is now purchased in local/regional markets. The main advantages of this approach are the reduced shipping costs and the ability for a quicker response to emergencies. Rather than cause trade distortions as has been argued, local purchases, if managed properly, would support market development in developing countries. Although the current US government has expressed the need for untying food aid, the proposition is being heavily opposed on the domestic front by those with interests in agri -business and shipping24. Politics around food aid: The debate over the form in which food aid is provided has extended to the WTO in relation to farm/export subsidies and their effects on trade. European countries argue that “tied” US food aid exports amount to an export subsidy in disguise and is trade distorting. The view of the US is that any attempt to ‘untie’ US aid contributions may result in the loss of political support of powerful American business interests and ultimately lead to a reduction of US contributions of food aid. So while humanitarian NGOs support regional purchases - the political trade–off remain to be seen. The US remains the largest food aid donor and the outcome of the debate will grea tly influence the future of food aid25.

22 Modified from Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell 2006 23 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 2006 24 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 2006 25 Ibid

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Food prices on the rise: Over the past years food prices in many parts of the world have steadily increased, leading politicians, experts and news media to conclude that we are in the midst of a global food crisis. The increase in food prices is mainly blamed on increased demand (from China and India), slow-growing supplies, high energy prices, biofuel production and climatic changes arising from global warming 26. The immediate effect of the food crisis is already observed in several places. For example the increasing food prices are already felt in households in local communities in Uganda. Food items have nearly doubled since the beginning of 2008, particularly in urban areas, as reflected in the table below. Table 3: Cost of Food Items in Kampala Markets in Uganda 27

Item November 2007 (Ushs) May 2008 (Ushs) 1 kilo Rice 1300 2100 1 kilo Beans 1200 1700 1 kilo Peas 1200 1700 1 kilo Simsim 1500 2500 1 kilo Millet flour 1200 2500 1 kilo Cassava flour 400 800 1 kilo Groundnuts 1500 2500 1 litre Cooking Oil 3500 5000 1 kilo Meat 3000 5000

Although some economists may argue that increases in food prices have a positive impact on economies in the long run since higher prices will stimulate higher production and th us longer term food security, the short term impact – particularly in less robust/more sensitive markets, like conflict affected markets – is a heavy burden. The surge in the global price of crops has created a budget shortfall for major donors and food agencies, who may be forced to scale back emergency operations28. The WFP has announced that it is currently facing a $755m shortfall in its budget. This could result into the reduction of the number of recipient nations or the amount of food aid served.

26 Daily Monitor 5th May 2008, Farmers face climate challenges amidst world food shortage 27 Daily Monitor, April 30, 2008/ New Vision May 7, 2008 28 Washington Post: March 1, 2008: Soaring Food Pric es Putting U.S. Emergency Aid in Peril

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4 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - THE GFD PROJECT 4.1 GFD Project Objectives NRC has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 29 with WFP as a cooperating partner to the General Food Distribution (GFD) Programme in Northern Uganda. With this MoU NRC commits itself to distribute WFP’s food aid to Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum Districts on a monthly basis. NRC has defined more specific objectives of the GFD project in Northern Uganda30: 1. To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and

dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts.

2. To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap.

3. To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women and children, EVIs, and the long-term effect of insufficient access to food.

The outputs, to be achieved are concrete and quantifiable: increased access to food to the IDPs in Kitgum, Gulu and Amuru and the percentage of the average assessed net food gap met by IDPs31. Box 2: The success indicators from NRC’s logical framework 06/07 32: ♦ Reduction in the number of malnourished IDPs receiving food aid to less than 10% ♦ The correct number of people receives regular food assistance and the correct quantity of food. ♦ Increased level of participation from the IDP themselves in food distribution ♦ Reduction in the incidences of death due to hunger ♦ Prevalence of acute malnutrition among IDPs and children under 5 to be under 5% ♦ Crude mortality and morbidity rates at acceptable level among IDPs (i.e. < 1:10.000 per day) ♦ % of children < 5 years who are malnourished to be less than 10% without aggravating factors 4.2 Alignment to NRC’s Policies Taking a rights based approach to food aid, NRC’s Core Activity Policy Document on Emergency Food Security and Distribution states 33 its overall objective as follows: ”… to promote and protect the right to food34 to refugees and internally displaced persons”. Rooted in the UN charter for social and economic rights, the more specific objectives of this overall NRC food aid policy are: - to fulfil the immediate food needs of refugees and IDPs and maintain their adequate

nutritional status in emergency situations, - to promote self reliance, and support durable solutions as soon as the context allows; - to contribute to food security, livelihoods and recovery in various phases of displacement

and; - to promote education, alleviate short -term hunger and improve cognitive learning.

29 NRC-WFP Annual Memorandum of Understanding 30 From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2006/07 31 From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2006/07 32 From NRC Project Proposal, budget year 2006/07 33 Finalised in April 2008 34 In accordance with the UN charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - that the right to adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.

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The target groups of NRC embrace refugees, IDPs and returnees and priority is given to vulnerable individuals and households, including women and children 35. NRC would, according to its policies, like to design projects that are culturally and contextually appropriate and acceptable. NRC emphasises the importance of appropriate timing of food aid (also taking into account the local agricultural calendar) as well as a longer -term view by promoting sustainable livelihoods through agricultural pro duction and income generation. Participatory and community based approaches through involvement, direct and active participation, training and capacity building of local competencies as well as advocacy and sensitisation on food security issues (the right to food, land rights, food crisis etc) play an important role. Moreover NRC policy prescribes for concerted interventions in conflicts or humanitarian crisis of protracted nature. Box 3: If security allows in protracted situations 36: NRC will implement a complementary approach between direct distributions and food security and livelihood recovery. Rations distributed will then not fulfil the entire beneficiary daily food requirements (2100 kcal/day/person) while other food security and livelihood interve ntions will be defined according to the context; refine targeting from general distribution to a more targeted system. In return and recovery phases, food assistance may still be necessary for a period of time. Return kits may be distributed and food secu rity and livelihood programs aiming at securing food needs of returnees in the longer term may be implemented. Programs will be planned and phased out in accordance with NRC Exit Strategies. At the Ugandan level, the Core Activity Strategy Document on Fo od Security and Distribution for Uganda (2008-2010)37 states its strategic objective as: contributing to household security and livelihoods of people affected by displacement with emphasis on IDPs and returnees in Northern Uganda. The strategy emphasises that the focus may shift gradually from general food distribution to interventions that ‘encourage self-reliance of households depending on the positive development in Northern Uganda”. NRC’s global policy to emergency food security and distribution as wel l as a ‘Core Activity Strategy’ for Food Security and Distribution in Uganda are in turn supported and supplemented by NRC policies on protection, gender equity, camp management, shelter and information, counselling, legal assistance and education 38.

35 Core Activity Policy Document, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, NRC 36 Ibid, p. 2 37 Still a draft version 38 All availed to the Evaluation Team

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5 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENESS As a result of the conflict in the North, food assistance has been given to Uganda since 1996. Although the WFP protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) assumed that IDPs would return home in large numbers in 2001, IDPs continued to stay in camps for security reasons as the conflict escalated. Uganda was facing the worst humanitarian crisis in years. During the peak of the crisis nearly 2 million IDPs were confined in 188 camps in the North and East and as outlined in Chapter 3, their situation continued to deteriorate. Surveys documented alarming malnutrition rates (in some cases 18 -20%) and the need for reliable humanitarian support was palpable. Against this backdrop and with the cl ear objective of safeguarding rights, protecting lives and contributing to house hold food security, the NRC’s project design is found timely and most relevant: to distribute food aid based on needs to a targeted population including the most vulnerable in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. 5.1 Being There at the Right Time As an implementing partner for WFP since 1997, NRC is one of the oldest humanitarian actors on the ground in Northern Uganda – with a presence throughout the most challenging times of the conflict. In order to respond appropriately and maintain efficient communication on the ground, NRC – unlike most other humanitarian organisations - established its Country Office in Gulu and has over the years geared up its resource base to over 500 staff including 200 volunteers to facilitate timely response of food aid and several other activities. As one appreciative district official in Kitgum noted: “they brought their head quarters to the heart of the conflict, at a time when not many others were around”. This strategic move to the ‘field’ allowed NRC to shorten the distance to decision-making and cutting back layers of management and bureaucracy, which may otherwise hamper quick and efficient emergency response. Logistical arrangements for the food distribu tion through the peak of the crisis were quite challenging. NRC has however accommodated itself by risking lives and being flexible when the security situation was not conducive and also by travelling to distribution points with armed escorts. Today NRC’s interventions in food distribution follow ‘a most likely scenario’ – that “security remains relatively stable. The uncertainty of the outcome of the peace talks, as well as the infrastructural and social challenges of protracted displacement lead to a le ngthy process of return and reintegration”39 This means that NRC – in line with its policy - continues to contribute to household food security – not only in camps but also to transit sites, where some people have resettled. 5.2 Appropriateness of Food Aid in Protracted Conflicts Emergency food assistance composes a food basket, which is supposed to help keeping people alive in an emergency period. The composition of food items is designed to maintain a minimum nutritional and dietary standard (Section 7.1 provides details). The fact that the conflict in Northern Uganda has been protracted has meant that thousands of women, men and children, old and young, have nourished themselves with a daily emergency ration for longer than what was anticipated. In a protracted situation, like Uganda, one may argue that emergency food assistance for ten years is a contradiction in itself. 39 From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2008/09

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Targeting of food aid should be followed by questions such as when, how long, how much and by what means, as emergency food aid is not designed for a long -standing intervention40. Thoughts about reducing dependency and increasing self -reliance, alternative or complimentary strategies to the food aid should therefore most preferably be built into the project interventions at an early stage. While in the more recent years maintaining a broad portfolio of other activities 41, NRC did not consider exploring alternative or complementary solutions to the monthly food ration distribution, except for also distributing the rations for WFP’s school feeding programme (see also Section 9.3 in Chapter 9 for NRC’s efforts to link relief and recovery). Given the security situation, which has been a restricting factor, this is to some degree understandable. But considering the time span of the conflict as well as persisting needs of the people combined with an inconsistent supply of food or reduction in rations and food basket – steps might have been taken to explore alternative strategies to food distribution, going beyond merely keeping people alive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, NRC acknowledges the possibilities and obligations in a protracted situation in its recently finalised Core Activity Policy on Emergency Food Security and Distribution. Several key informants to this Evaluation42 have said that in as much as NRC has been the implementing partner for WFP, NRC – in its capacity as an independent NGO - could have tried out alternative options for food aid, notwithstanding the security situation, whereby for many years only 2-5 km periphery land was accessible around most camps or other circumstantial challenges. One option could have been sourcing of extra/differe nt food in Uganda to top up the WFP supplies or fill in when there is a gap (missing food items, delays due to logistical challenges and bureaucracy, identification of new groups that are waiting to be registered). It can assist in fulfilling the main obje ctive of the programme: ensuring food security/protecting peoples’ right to food . In a protracted situation, where the needs are dire and the existing food sources and channels may be challenged and even delaying the humanitarian response, some thought should be given to this option in order to compliment ongoing activities and overcome challenges and in turn – and most importantly - fulfil and NRC’s obligation to the beneficiaries. There have also been ‘pockets of periods’ where the security situation ha s been manageable, particularly from 2005, where other options could have been tried out 43. These could have involved livelihood activities, cash programmes or other market or community stimulating interventions that could have contributed to household (food) security.44 Some studies45 show that – contingent upon the context - cash inputs are a more effective means of helping vulnerable households, and this stems from the somewhat evident fact that vulnerable households have (food) needs beyond the food, which they are given46.

40 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell 2006. 41 Information, Communication and Legal Assistance Programme, Youth Education Pack, Food Security and Livelihoods Programme. 42 Interviews and discussions with donors, IDPs, NRC GFD staff and other project staff, and other humanitarian organisations. 43 During 2005 more space was available to IDPs through GoUs initiative of ‘decongesting’ camps. 44 Interviews with food aid donors as well as UN agencies in Gulu and Kitgum, NRC staff + Food security surveys of 2005. NRCs own livelihood activities did not pick pace until late 2006. 45 This point was also discussed with several key informants and donor agencies in Kampala. The Norwegian Embassy in Kampala has commissioned a study on cash programmes in resettlement areas, with an aim to support people as they move back. The findings of the study may be of use to NRC. 46 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, p. 5

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5.3 Lesson Learned ♦ ‘Being there at the right time’ and bringing the Country Office to the field is essential to

cut costs, bureaucracy and time and thereby essential for fast decision -making and eventually quick response.

♦ Having a clear and undisputed humanitarian objective and policy, measured in simple

terms (quantitative indicators) gives an organisation a focused direction and mandate of work in times of complex emergency and insecurity.

♦ Nevertheless, when a conflict develops signs of a protracted situation, it can be beneficial

to design and implement alternative/complementary solutions to the humanitarian food aid response. This may in some cases require more complex and multi -faceted analysis and tools, however it ensures food security for the beneficiaries, which ultimately is the humanitarian obligation of NRC.

5.4 Recommendations ♦ In future humanitarian operations that involve continued food distribution during an

extended period of time and on a massive scale NRC’s should conti nue to prioritise being close to the field and implement its undisputed humanitarian objective of serving people in need.

♦ In protracted situations, NRC should – as now also obliged by its Emergency Food

Security and Distribution Policy - as early as possible, explore the possibility of combining general food distribution with alternative strategies. If the situation calls for it and allows for it, topping up/complimenting WFP food supplies for a period of time should be considered. Alternative strategies should also include livelihoods initiatives, income generation activities, cash programmes or voucher programmes possibly earmarked for food. Research shows that where markets are functioning or market forces are still thriving, food aid may be alternated with cash programmes, giving people the freedom of choice to buy their own food items or items beyond food. Even in contexts where markets are restricted and may not function optimally, other alternative solutions to the general food distribution could be tried to ensure that beneficiaries are assisted in maintaining a comprehensive food basket or support their livelihoods in other ways. 47

♦ Given that this combination of approaches might be new to NRC, some investments

should be made in analysis/research, wh ich could lead to developing a toolbox or a kit that combines cash and in-kind programmes and also considers the options for topping up/complimenting food supplies. Striking a balance between various approaches is challenging and should be researched 48.

♦ NRC’s Emergency Food Security and Distribution Policy should give more concrete

guidance on different options and alternative/complimentary solutions that can be combined with the general food distribution activities.

47 Global Trends in Food Aid, Maxwell 2006, www.fao.org, Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response, Maxwell, et al, 2008 + Interview with key informants. 48 In order not to invent the wheel, reference may be made to findings from many safety net programmes, voucher for work programmes or cash for work programmes. NRC is at present joining hands with other cluster stakeholders in making joint assessments and the findings of these assessments may inform future alternative strategies.

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6 PROJECT EFFICIENCY & COVERAGE NRC’s yearly budget for the food distribution project has on average been USD 1,8 million 49. This figure combines the funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as well as WFP. MFAs contribution makes up most of the NRC’s budget with an average annual input of roughly USD 1 million50. The budget has funded the organisation, logistics, manpower, distribution and monitoring of food assistance to some 755.000 people on a monthly basis from 2005 -2008. In 200751 NRC distributed food to 458,000 IDPs in 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu and Amuru districts, and 297,000 IDPs in 26 camps and 13 transit sites in Kitgum district 52. This roughly amounts to distribution costs of USD 2,3 per person per year. This cost is over and above the food expense itself and other WFP costs53. The Evaluation Team lacks comprehensive data to gather a picture of the exact unit cost for comparison with other food aid operations and thereby estimate accurate cost efficiency. However, in view of the efficient field operati on, extensive use of local resource base (see this chapter) viz. the number of beneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations of this magnitude54. The current funding from MFA and WFP runs until March 2009. Food aid is globally experiencing funding cuts and Uganda is no exception. As IDPs continue to return to their homes or resettled areas and food distribution continues to these new points, NRC needs to secure more funds to cover this temporarily ‘expanded’ programme. 6.1 Dealing with Logistics, Security & Delays The distribution of food to a great number of people is always a logistical challenge, and in times of insecurity even more so. Nevertheless, NRC has been commended, by many colleagues, for tackling precisely this challenge in a comprehensive way with limited mismanagement and learning from mistakes along the way 55. NRC has applied strict security measures. This is crucial in emergency operations, where staff, volunteers and truck drivers are subjected to threats, ambush and direct fire – while still keeping the food distribution ‘pipeline’ flowing. WFP’s delays have on the whole been managed fairly well, with distributions not being postponed for more than three weeks56, except for the heavy rainy season in 2 007, where delays were longer. The delays in food delivery can mainly be ascribed to WFP’s pipeline breakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays but also to impassable roads, severe rainfall and other logistical/circumstantial chal lenges. In addition the spontaneous movements of IDPs to new settlements have also been a challenge as have lack of military escorts used to ensure security of the food convoys. However NRC has maintained a flexible approach to this: Changing locations at short notice, adjusting time

49 Budget, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, April 2007 to March 2008 and WFP-NRC MoU April 2007 to March 2008. 50 2006/07 MFA grant = NOK 7,6 million. 2007/08 MFA grant = NOK 6,6 million. 2008/09 MFA grant = NOK 7 million. Conversion into USD varies according to exchange rates. 51 Figures vary over the years due to population increase, movements, registry etc. For the sake of consistency this report will use the population and distribution figures from 2007 as an average as they represent the situation half way through the project period under evaluation. 52 Initially NRC was also distributing food to Pader and Lira, however this was scaled down in order to maximise human and financial resources more efficiently. 53 The total WFP food cost for the PRRO 2005-2008 is USD 118,736,570 (equivalent to 452,508 mt). 54 Interviews with food aid donors also confirmed this. 55 Interview with WFP Kampala, Gulu, Kitgum, district officials in Gulu and Kitgum, OCHA Gulu and Kitgum as well as food aid donors. 56 NRC GFD Programme Coordinator, Gulu.

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schedules and working long hours to accommodate ‘disruptions’ have meant that IDPs on the whole have received their monthly rations of food in the three year period 57. 6.2 The Value of Building a Dedicated & Flexible Organisation NRC has built an organisation around experienced and qualified staff and 200 well trained volunteers, who all have clear roles, responsibilities and reporting structures. The staff as well as volunteers – who mainly originate from the Acholi region – have in depth local knowledge and seem to be motivated to carry out a humanitarian deed for ‘their people’. The national staff has been with NRC for many years, some started with NRC when it first established itself in Northern Uganda. Therefore the organisat ion has a substantial amount of institutional memory and long-term experiences to build on and learn from. The staff employed in the GFD section have a good understanding of the objectives of the GFD project and the needs and fundamental rights of the be neficiaries that it serves. The staff are given the opportunity to work themselves up through the organisation and NRC supports advancement initiatives with training and courses. NRC is trying to implement its human resource policy of promoting more national staff to managerial posts, and this is slowly taking place. Both GFD project coordinators in Gulu and Kitgum are Ugandan 58. The volunteers are hired59 to assist the food distribution process and are given substantial amount of responsibilities to organise and oversee the process at each distribution points. A volunteers training manual has been developed and it provides guidance on conduct and operation. With the employment of such a large group of people, management and supervision is crucial. WFP, amongst others, emphasised, that when human resource problems have arisen, NRC management has showed the will to address and rectify the problem60. Several key informants have described the 200 volunteers, as an efficient means of ’getting the work done’. Generally, NRC is complimented by many fellow humanitarian stakeholders for having a work force that genuinely “understand field challenges and dynamics”61. One stakeholder described it as NRC getting “very sleek at doing it”, indicating the organisations capacity, flexibility and professionalism. The volunteers are hired on a daily basis with remunerations between Ushs 8.500 to 10.00062. Although they only have ‘volunteer status’ they are employed most of the year. Most of the volunteers are students from the area, who try to pursue studies and family life at the same time. NRC trains volunteers and builds their capacity in the area of food distribution, nutrition, crowd control and beneficiary communication 63. Some of the volunteers have advanced in the hierarchy and are now employed as regular staff in some of the NRC programme components. The work of the volunteers although expressed as rewarding is at times also tedious and tiring. Some times the volunteers have to spend the night in the field after a food distribution, if security or time does not allow them to return to their duty stations. 6.3 Beneficiaries Help Distributing Food Another significant factor for NRC’s efficiency in food distribution is the high degree of beneficiary participation. With the implementation of the family size distribution model (see chapter 7.1) IDPs have actively been involved in distribution and organisation of work, 57 WFP Gulu. 58 NRC in Uganda employs 13 international staff. 59 Recruited by NRC but paid by WFP – amounting roughly USD 300.000 per year. 60 WFP Gulu. 61 WFP Gulu. 62 Ushs 1,660 = USD 1 63 NRC Training Manual for Volunteers.

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through off loading of food from trucks, maintaining distribution grounds tidy and scooping food rations from bags. NRC has facilitated the organisation of Food Management Committees (FMCs). FMCs compose village leaders and camp management who spear head communication with NRC, undertake conflict resolution and manage complaints in relation to the food distribution. The FMCs have in some cases developed into powerful community organisations and advocates of food and camp related issues, and IDPs have a space to voice their concerns in a concerted effort. Working closely with the FMCs, delegating responsibility and entrusting them with authority has also given NRC a platform to act with the necessary leverage. This approach has been fundamental to increasing efficiency in distribution of food and minimizing conflicts. Wit h substantial organised participation, as well as supervision of volunteers, spillage and wastage is low. More essentially it has increased ownership of what could otherwise be perceived as an undignified process64. 6.4 But Does Everybody Get a Share – Getting the Numbers Right? Where the main and most frustrating concerns and challenges appear in terms of efficient and well-covered food assistance however is in establishing the correct number of beneficiaries and thereby requesting for the equivalent amounts of food from WFP storages. The revalidation and verification exercise, which is supposed to register and confirm the number of people entitled to food has by all stakeholders including all NRC staff, volunteers and not least IDPs been highlighted as the most troublesome activity to date. IDPs are eligible to food rations upon registration and receipt of a ration card. Without a genuine card, food will not be provided. However, due to technical and methodological deficiencies in the registration and verifi cation process as well as some degree of manipulation and squandering by IDPs the situation looks like this: (1) There are unregistered IDPs who need food (2) There are registered IDPs who do not appear on the WFP registry (3) There are IDPs who are registered and on the registry, but without food and finally (4) there are unregistered IDPs with ration cards 65. In sum it means that thousands of eligible IDPs have in long periods of time not been receiving their entitled food aid. NRC has put much effort i nto capturing some of the missed targets through a home grown ‘coupon’ intervention, where many of those left out were picked up in a second registry and are now back onto the WFP list. The problem in Kitgum was reported down sized to 2-4% missed targets. One of the main problems in the verification process has been the outsourcing of the data collection and data entry process to different organisations. Hence in Gulu and Kitgum, whereas NRC has been in charge of organising, grouping and distributing food and ‘ticking off’ people on the print lists from WFP, other organisations have been involved in making the household/family head counts through door-to-door visits and even other organisations have been tasked with the data entry into the WFP registry, whi ch eventually makes up the list of eligible beneficiaries. Many ‘managers’ involved in a single process has resulted in inconsistencies, errors and missed targets. Particularly the data entry was highlighted as not being meticulous enough, leaving out seve ral members of a household, although they had initially been identified as recipients of food.

64 NRC also highlights their aptness to respond quickly and flexibly to the floods in Northern Uganda in August and September 2007, where WFP decided to use airdrop of food in four camps in Amuru and five camps in Kitgum as a result of impassable roads and bridges. Although this airdrop operation has been criticised by some stakeholders/donors for being too expensive and unnecessary considering the scope of people reached and the limited effects of the floods in the Acholi sub-region, NRC through its mobilisation of FMCs on the ground to some degree controlled an otherwise chaotic situation at the drop grounds.

65 From NRC Advocacy Strategy for GFD.

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The complaints about the failed verification process and the missed targets have been numerous. Most often the IDPs are fed back with the explanation that the print list from the WFP computer did not capture their names. This is most dissatisfying for many IDPs, and as an older woman from a transit site in Kitgum said: “How does a computer know how many family members I have at home?” Apart from trying to rectify the problem through the ‘coupon’ intervention NRC has consistently brought forward the complaints of the IDPs in monthly and quarterly monitoring reports submitted to WFP, seeking help to re -include the missed targets on the registration lists. However, action on behalf of WFP is slow. Getting onto the list, once you have been knocked off is not an easy process and can take up to several months, where one is left without food.

6.5 Lesson Learned ♦ For approximately USD 1,8 million per year, NRC has organised, arranged, distributed

and monitored food assistance to some 755.000 people on a monthly basis during insecure and restrictive times. This means on average a cost of USD 2,3 per IDP per year. This cost is over and above the expenditures for food itself a nd WFP’s own costs. In view of the efficient field operation, use of local resource base and the number of beneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations of this magnitude.

♦ NRC has distributed food without major delays or failures, despite WFP pipeline

breakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays etc. This has indeed been possible because of a flexible work force of experienced and disciplined people who have grown with the organisation a nd possesses detailed local knowledge. This has been imperative to delivering swift food aid. The investment in capacity building of 200 volunteers has proven worthwhile.

♦ Management and ground supervision of the operation with constant communication and

dialogue with beneficiaries and camp/community networks (FMCs) provides smooth distribution of aid and an opportunity to solve conflicts and problems that may arise along the way.

♦ A distribution approach where beneficiaries are involved as much as possi ble is important

to ensure fair and dignified distribution of food aid and hence also a mitigation of potential conflicts amongst beneficiaries.

♦ Revalidation and verification exercises take a lot of time and require close supervision

and management. When data collection, entry and verification is outsourced to different organisations its leads to many errors. Rather, one organisation with close contact and overview of the beneficiaries should do it. Verifying the print list before entering the data into the database is a fundamental ‘check-point’ if errors are to be captured before they make their way into the final list, from which WFP allocates its metric tonnes.

6.6 Recommendations ♦ For future food aid operations, NRC should learn from the organisational set-up and

human resource pool in Uganda and build well equipped operations based on local knowledge and capacities.

♦ The terms and conditions of the current volunteer work force should be assessed to

provide people with a more competitive package. Also , the capacity of the volunteers

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should be assessed in view of possible future expansion of their scope of work into other programme areas that may maximise and benefit from the operational, organisational or technical skills of these people.

♦ In future food aid projects NRC or WFP should consider delegating/outsourcing the entire

verification exercise to one single actor (firm or NGO) to ensure consistency in data collection, data entry and printing of lists and cards. This way the process is streamlined and errors due to many ‘managers’ is minimised. If NRC has the capacity, it should in future operations offer to take on this task, in view of efficiency, costs and its knowledge on the ground.

♦ Time and resources should be invested in verifying the data o n the print list, before it is

finalised and approved by WFP. It will minimize errors and problems at a later stage. Print out of the data base list is in the hands of WFP, however if possible this task could be delegated to the implementing agency who has eyes and ears on the ground.

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7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS Having assessed the performance and challenges in terms of Relevance/Appropriateness in project design and response as well as project Efficiency/Coverage this chapter, deals with project Effectiveness, i.e. fulfilment of the three GFD objectives. The objectives will be analysed in turn, and at the end of each section lessons learned and recommendations will be drawn up. 7.1 Project Objective 1 To Contribute to HH food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru, and Kitgum. 7.1.1 Traditional Nutrition & Diet in Northern Uganda The traditional (pre IDP camps) nutrition and dietary system in No rthern Uganda consisted of a variety of grains, cereals, vegetables, fruits, meats as well as seasonal delicacies. Apart from nutritional values, some food elements were culturally favoured for the growth of children and help increase breast milk for nursi ng mothers66. The box below gives an idea: Box 4: Traditional Acholi Food Around each homestead, there were plots of land for growing vegetables like Malakwang (a bitter-sour but delicious and nutritious vegetable) , Boo (the staple vegetable of the Acho li) Akeyo, Oyado (Green vegetables) pumpkin, tomatoes, cabbages, beans and Irish Potatoes. The homestead plots were also used to grow cassava, sweet potatoes, maize (for cob consumption as opposed to producing flour) and fruits like mangoes, pawpaw, oranges, lemon, guavas and tangerines. A mile or two from the homesteads were the main family gardens of small farms where millet and simsim (the main staple food of the Acholi), were grown. Other main food crops grown here included Lapena (Chick peas), groundnu ts, sorghum for brewing beer. Each family had a minimum of two granaries ( dero) to store millet and simsim. The food stored would always last past the next harvest. Other granaries were built to store peas and groundnuts. Nearly every family kept poultry, a few goats and sheep, which were reared in and around the homestead and many families kept cattle reared within the village. The fruits consumed included the Shea nut (Yaa) from which –Shea butter ( Moo Yaa) was extracted. Moo Yaa was mainly used in sauce s, but also served as a body lotion for women and children. Other fruit trees include Tugu (palm tree), Cwaa (Tamarind), Langoo, Ocoga, Oywelo . People had Beehives ( Bong) in communal grazing areas or forests for honey. Grasshoppers ‘Nsenene’ ( Ocene) or fungi like mushrooms ( Obwol) were also popular seasonal delicacies. During the dry season (November to February), there were joint hunting sessions in the forests (Buffalo, Antelopes, field rats). The average family also set traps for small animals like rab bits and birds like Guinea Fowls (Aweno) in and around their gardens. 7.1.2 Nutrition & Diet Provided During the Conflict With the increasing insurgency and large parts of the population in IDP camps and subsequent introduction of the WFP food distribution the Acholi diet changed dramatically. From a rich and diverse diet, IDPs were now given carefully calculated food rations with selected items to compose the food basket. The rations normally include cereals (maize or sorghum), pulses (beans or yellow split peas) and vegetable oil enriched with Vitamin A. During the 10 years of food distribution there has been little variation in the food basket. 66 Detailed research provided by Jane Oryem. An example of a typical Acholi menu is found in Annex 5.

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Up until 2005 most people received a 74% or 98 -100% rations depending upon the capability to compliment the distributed food aid with food items from own sources. In 2006 the rations were reduced. In Gulu and Amuru the reduction was 40%, 50% and 60% of the full ration for Non Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (NEVIs) and for the Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) 98%. In Kitgum the rations were reduced to 60% for NEVIs and maintained at 100% for the EVIs. Table 4: Food rations and Values Food ration

Cereal kg/person/month

Pulses kg/person/month

Veg. Oil kg/person/month

CSB kg/person/month

Food Value/day

100% 12,5 2,1 0,6 2,1 2100 kcal 98% 12,45 2,1 0,6 1,5 2054 kcal 74% 8,4 1,8 0,37 1,8 1554 kcal 60% 7,2 1,2 0,45 - 1259 kcal 50% 4,5 1,8 0,36 - 1050 kcal 40% 4,5 0,9 0,3 - 828 kcal

As shown in the table with the exception of EVIs, most allocated food ration s do not amount to the minimum nutritional and dietary standard of 2.100 kcal per person per day, the assumption being that IDPs will manage to secure the remaining food -gap themselves. Furthermore it is argued that IDPs compliment their diet with other fo od aid interventions from WFP such as Food for Education (school feeding), Therapeutic Feeding Centres (food for babies and lactating mothers) and Food for Work (food in exchange for manual labour). 7.1.3 Employing the Fair Share ‘Family Size Model’ In order to ensure that each household was secured equally with food, NRC employed a new methodology of food distribution in 2003, described as the ‘family size model’. Until then NRC had been using a model, where individuals with a ration card would receive the sam e rations regardless of their family size. This resulted in an unfair distribution of rations, where a family of one person would receive the same amount of food, as a family of 12 persons. With the ‘family size model’ food rations are given according to t he number of people in each household, which eventually leads to all individuals receiving the same amount. It took some time before the new model was understood and the organisation of the distribution performed as intended. Once this was in place the results were clear: households were receiving their fair share of food in an organised way 67. Moreover, NRC handed over the physical distribution activity of scooping to the beneficiaries themselves and the FMCs. In groups beneficiaries carry their sacks and divide scoops of the different items between them. IDPs appreciate being actively involved because as one women said: “its our food, why should we leave it to somebody else to serve for us”68. In order to ensure that NEVIs do not disturb the EVIs this group is served separately. 7.1.4 Have Beneficiary Needs & Demands been met? NRC monitors its contribution to household security and the maintenance of nutritional and dietary standards (‘Objective 1’) through daily, monthly and quarterly reports, post distributio n monitoring reports and participation in food security and nutritional surveys. Some of the consistent findings on the quantity and quality of food during the past three years include 69: Regarding the food basket composition, its usage and quality: Beneficiaries expressed general satisfaction with the food basket as a temporary intervention – particularly when it was complete, i.e. with all the intended food items. This food basket combined with the supplementary feeding programmes in feeding centres and in schools was appreciated by

67 Key informants from Kitgum and Gulu Districts, WFP Gulu and OCHA Kitgum. 68 Focus group discussion with IDPs in Amida camp. 69 NRC monthly and quarterly monitoring reports + Post Distribution Monitoring Reports from 2005 to 2008 + interviews/focus group discussions with male and female IDPs (EVIs and NEVIs) in Amida camp, Pawidi Transit site, Opit camp, Orafwoyo Transit site, Lukwor Transit site, Acet IDP camp, Amuru IDP camp.

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most and mothers observed the nutritional standards of their children gradually improving. Nevertheless the uniform and unchanged diet during so many years was expressed as insufficient to maintain a healthy nutrition. Conside ring their traditional staple food and varied diet IDPs explained that their needs included a more diverse food basket including such nutritious items like sweet potato, vegetables and meat. It took them some time to get used to new food items such as sorghum, cooking oil and split peas (the latter two not used in a traditional Acholi diet). As mentioned, the Acholi diet usually uses sim sim for cooking, which contains a more nutritious fat. The IDPs tried to supplement their food basket in various ways – amongst others by growing cassava in their gardens, but due to the tall size of the plant the military prohibited the production of cassava, which provided for camouflage for the LRA rebels. These kinds of constraints have lead many IDPs to rely on the food supplies as a main part of their diet through the most difficult times in the conflict. Several IDPs have experienced receiving extremely poor quality food, including rotten maize and uneatable beans70 through the GFD programme. IDPs did however find the Corn Soya Blend (CSB) useful. Mothers prioritised the CSB for the children as a substitute for the traditional nutrients, which the Acholi diet prescribes for small children. CSB was however eliminated from the food basket with the ration reduction. The sa me applies to cooking oil. Most IDPs use their food for household consumption (more than 95%). Only a ‘negligible level’ (between 1-3%) is used for sale to acquire other necessities such as salt, lighting fuel etc. Regarding food rations and food quantity : Across the board IDPs expressed dissatisfaction with the reductions in food rations. In most cases the reduced rations, delays in delivery as well as missing items from the food basket leave IDPs with food for less than two weeks and in the majority of cases one meal or less than a meal per day (see also Section 7.2. for more details). The 98% and 100% rations given to EVIs have suffered from reductions in cooking oil and CSB particularly since June 2007. Most frustrating to many IDPs is being left off the WFP registry after the verification process (discussed in Section 6.4). Apart from monitoring beneficiary satisfaction, reactions and complaints, NRC has during th e project period not taken initiatives to supplement the diets or provide alternative nutritional solutions. 7.1.5 Responding to Complaints IDPs complaints regarding food aid are regularly compiled in NRC reports and filed to WFP for action and recourse. However the problems and demands of the IDPs remain. Although several stakeholders claim that IDPs have received multiple explanations and justifications to issues such as WFP print list problems, rotten food, the lack of cooking oil and the ration reductions, the Evaluation Team found that these had not been sufficiently internalised by the IDPs. A complaint desk is set up after each food distribution. It is manned by volunteers, who receive and forward complaints from the IDPs, but otherwise have no autho rity to take any other action. The normal use – one would think - of a complaint desk is that the complaints received at the desk are handled or addressed and that IDPs get a satisfactory feed back. Nevertheless observing and visiting the complaint desks set up after the food distributions and speaking to several IDPs as well as staff/volunteers in charge of the desks, the Evaluation Team found that the value of these desks to some degree seems to have withered away. Complaints have been filed to WFP for ye ars without any major action or recourse. The frustration or apathy of no response is showing amongst both IDPs and volunteers, questioning the use/seriousness of these desks.

70 In several NRC monitoring reports the expression about the poor quality food is ‘that it is not fit for human consumption’.

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It is recognized that numerous recipients of food aid will complain about food . One district official from Gulu claimed that: “food is like money, and however much you provide IDPs with food there will never be enough”. Nevertheless some key stakeholders criticise WFP as well as NRC for not providing the IDPs with thorough, targeted and repeated explanations as to why food baskets are composed in a certain way, and why rations have been reduced, and what the expectations are from the IDPs to do in return. Many IDPs deny that they have been thoroughly involved in the dietary compositi on of the food basket or even the food reductions, and that these decisions were in most cases ‘just presented to them’ through radio announcements or by the camp leaders71. More involvement could perhaps have reduced complaints. NRC acknowledges this in so me of its monitoring reports. 7.1.6 But People Have Been Kept Alive Despite the reductions in rations and food basket, pipeline breakages, uniform diet and missing food items health indicators72 from the past three years show that malnutrition rates have been kept relatively manageable, under the emergency threshold of 10%. The Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates of 2005 showed: 4,7% in Gulu and 11,8% in Kitgum 73. In 2008 these figures have reduced even further to 3,1% in Gulu and approximately 8% in Kitgum. It is argued that the number of admissions to therapeutic feeding centres in this period has reduced. The incidences of deaths due to hunger in camps have reduced bringing the crude mortality and the under 5 mortality rate down to or less than 1/10.00 0 persons per day74. Many IDPs interviewed did express their appreciation and satisfaction with food aid, qualified with statements such as: “it sustained our lives”… or more literally “it kept us breathing”… or in terms of nourishment “it kept our children healthy”. Or as a group of people in Pawidi transit site in Kitgum district said: “we ran from our villages, and moved with nothing… at least we found food in the camps”. This was followed by a more sad consideration: “we wished we could dig, but securi ty didn’t allow us… so we depended on the food”. 75. Several mothers appreciatively also added that food aid had kept their children in school. The fact that food distribution in camps had lead to a safer life without the threat of or reality of abductions and killings, which all IDPs had faced in the home gardens was humbly acknowledged. However had there been alternative options and possibilities of fending for oneself, most IDPs would have opted for these. In sum, the quantitative indicators show that the GFD project through difficult times has contributed to household food security and the maintenance of minimum nutritional and dietary standards, and brought down high GAM rates and saved lives. However, research, beneficiaries’ voices, observations on the ground, opinions of humanitarian actors and donors paint a more cloudy picture of the fulfilment of the objective. Multiple factors contribute to positive nutritional rates, not only food, but also good sanitation, clean drinking water and proper hygiene practices and a clean environment. Hence, the positive developments in the quantitative indicators are not just a reflection of food aid. Moreover, the reality – and maybe the more qualitative signs - is that pipeline breakages, delays, shortages in food items, reduced rations and few alternative food options, little diversity in food supplies and weak coping strategies on behalf of the IDPs (also in new transit sites where supporting services are not available) have meant that IDPs have struggled to maintain their minimum nutritional dietary standards of 2.100 kcal per person per day and according to several stakeholders, many have not managed at all. A closer look at some of the issues is taken in the following chapter.

71 Focus group discussions with IDPs in camps and transit sites. 72 NRC Quarterly reports, EFSA of 2007, WFP PRRO, ACF nutritional report 2007 73 GAM rates before this period were even higher, close to 20% 74 Nutritional Surveys for Gulu district in 2005 and 2006, WFP 75 Interviews and focus group discussions in Camps and transit sites in Gulu and Kitgum

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7.1.7 Lesson Learned ♦ Food aid has been vital to fighting (acute) malnutrition and saving peoples lives during

the protracted crisis in Northern Uganda. Composing a food basket with the correct amount and type is essential to meeting the minimum nutritional dietary standards. But with ration reductions, cuts in the food basket and few alternative options the maintenance of minimum standards of 2.100 kcal per person per day is seriously challenged.

♦ The food aid has not been provided according to preferred dietary needs and demands of

the Acholi people and has in several cases also been of inferior quality. The traditional Acholi diet is rich and diverse. The uniform food basket given over many years has changed diet habits and nutrition of the IDPs. Being aware of needs and involving beneficiaries in finding alternative or complimentary solutions to food aid can boost the diet and nutrition and respond to some of their preferences.

♦ Changes in food rations, problems with quality, missing food items etc may require more

intensive and repeated explanation to the IDPs so as to fully answer complaints. ♦ Adjusting distribution mechanisms to the family size system with an emphasis of

beneficiary involvement can prove effective in as much as reaching the target populations with food in a fair way and controlling crowds into an orderly distribution.

7.1.8 Recommendations ♦ With the ration reduction, changes in food basket and inconsistencies in supplies, NRC

should incorporate alternative strategies to food aid programmes in a protracted situation. IDPs, with a wealth of dietary knowledge, can be brought more actively on board to identify ideas or solutions to meet their own needs. Based on this, NRC should source for the most feasible operational solution (e.g. topping up food aid, implementing small scale livelihood activities, initiating cash programmes and stimulate market forces). See also recommendations and qualifications under Section 5.4.

♦ NRC should include qualitative indicators in the project design to compl iment the existing

quantitative health indicators, which may not always provide a complete picture. Qualitative indicators could be defined around ‘beneficiary satisfaction’, which NRC has already been reporting on in Post Distribution Monitoring Reports.

♦ Taking IDPs complaints seriously through actions and recourse increases the feeling of a

dignified process. In this connection NRC and WFP should reassess the functions and purpose of the complaint desk with a view to improve the use of them and reach a more effective complaint handling process.

♦ NRC should take other/alternative measures to push for actions and recourse in some

areas with persisting complaints (rations cards, verification/print list failures/pipeline shortages etc). For example more direct communication/advocacy can be made to WFP management.

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7.2 Project Objective 2 To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap Based on improving indicators, the assumption made by WFP to reduce the food rations for Northern Uganda in 2005 has been that ‘the IDP population will be able to contribute significantly to their food needs with improvements in security and access to land’ 76. WFP anticipated that with the improved security the IDP population of 1,6 million people would decrease by 321.500 in 2005, 643.000 in 2006 and 275.000 in 2007. ‘The residual caseload of 45.900 will not be targeted with relief assistance because it is assumed that most of them will have access to land for cultivation’77. However today we know that the process was different, especially in the Acholi region. With the delay in the peace talks and signing of the peace agreement, the continued threat of Karamojong raiders from the east, seasonal floods and general trauma and fear of moving home immediately, the return movement of IDPs and their ability to cultivate their land has taken longer than anticipated. Although movements out of the camps have been picking pace (50% of IDPs left camps in Acholi sub region by Ma rch 2008) as described in Section 3.2 on peace process and return, statistics show that many out of the original 1.102.438 IDPs in Acholi are still in camps or have otherwise settled in transit sites, and may never move back to their original homesteads. Agricultural production is still taking a slow pace, as labour and farm inputs are few. Moreover, markets are not that easily accessible and other income generation activities are few. Nevertheless changes in the food suppl y were made to all camps in late 2005. The rationale behind the reduction in food rations was that IDPs from 2005 and onwards would be in a better position to cover their net food gap 78. 7.2.1 The Evidence Base for Ration Reductions It is said that “food aid has historically been resource driven, not analysis driven”79. Only recently has it been common that information systems for food aid capture more comprehensive pictures of the context in which the actors are working 80. In the case of Northern Uganda, Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) and nutritional surveys provide the context analysis and a broader basis for guidance and decision -making for food ration reductions as well as indications of peoples’ ability to cover their net food gap. NRC commonly participates together with WFP, other food security actors and the District Disaster Management Committees (DDMC) in the Emergency Food Security Assessment. This section summarises the key findings of the EFSA of 2005 and 2007 81.

76 WFP, PRRO, 2005-2008 77 Ibid 78 Net food gap is the difference between what IDPs and refugees can produce or access through market channels and the minimum recommended daily allowance (RDA) of 2100 kcal per person per day (WFP PRRO, 2005-2008) 79 “Global Trends in Food Aid”, Daniel Maxwell, 2006, p. 6 80 “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et al, 2008 81 The level of food assistance is determined through assessments. WFP piloted an emergency food need methodology in 2000 including both primary and secondary data from HH levels. Between 2000 and 2003 the EFNA was used to determine food aid needs. Today the EFNA has changed to the Emergency Food Security Assessment, EFSA, which employs a process of random sampling and more comprehensive data sources and variety. The plan has been to carry out an EFSA twice a year, however this does not always materialise. In stead a rapid food security review takes place. Source: EFSA 2005

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By 2005 the profile of the crisis in the North had changed slightly. In the camps humanitarian actors were getting a grip of the situation and were coming to terms with soaring malnutrition rates and diseases, epidemics and security. IDPs now had access to more land around the camps – the perimeter was extended to a limited 3-5 km82. Box 5: Findings from EFSA 2005 Access to land, various food sources and income strategies has increased consumption at household level and the average food gap has declined. Nevertheless the EFSA i s at the same time careful to recognize that land utilisation amongst IDPs is still low and there are limited opportunities for other economic employment 83, with the opportunities in Kitgum more restricted than in Gulu. Based on calculations of RDA, avera ge household kcal intake, own production, possibilities for market purchase, income generation etc – the EFSA concludes for Gulu 84: that given the improving circumstances in Gulu and the increasing access to land and markets, the levels of food intake from own production and market purchase is ‘very expandable’ – indicating that IDPs should be in a relatively easy position covering their net food gap. Nevertheless it proceeds to state that: “given the fluidity of the current situation a drastic cut back of f ood aid to 38% of RDA may result in untoward consequences”. For Kitgum 85 the conclusion is: “potential for expandability is limited to own food production and food aid given, that market purchase is almost at its ceiling. Improving land access would imply that own food will provide about 20% of RDA. Provisioning from purchase cannot be expanded and remains at about 35% of RDA. Acknowledging the complex and challenging situation, but assuming that IDPs will benefit from the potential opportunities and return to their villages of origin, WFP hence reduced food rations for NEVIs in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum to 40%/50% and 60%. EVIs maintained 98-100% of their rations Two years later the EFSA found the situation had improved considerably, assuming this would convince more IDPs to cover their net food gap. Box 6: Findings from EFSA 2007 As the food security status continue to improve through more accessible land, better purchasing opportunities, market access, crop production and sale a “significantly higher pro portion of the households food basket is acquired from their own production.” Although there is absence of an updated and informative market study, the EFSA finds that the net gap is covered from market and own production contributing between 20 -40% to the food basket (and higher during harvest season), ‘and the remainder of the households food basket is acquired from gathering and borrowing’. Despite these positive trends, the 2007 EFSA 86 cites that 68% of the household sample is classified food insecure or moderately food insecure and only 10% of the households have access to more than five acres of land. Moreover the EFSA found that 82% of the households had difficulties in securing enough food to feed their family in the rainy season of May, June, July and August87. The ration reductions, which WFP decided upon in 2005 are maintained today, with the assumption that IDPs ability to cover their net food gap is even greater. Although the EFSA’s and nutritional surveys do provide contextual analysis and back ground, the studies have methodological limitations. Stakeholders argue that the methodological limitations challenge EFSA’s from being used as a tool for evidence based decision -

82 In effect this did not mean more than a few acres per household, if at all any. 83 EFSA, 2005, p. 22-29 84 EFSA 2005, p. 29 85 EFSA 2005, p. 30 86 EFSA 2007 covers mother camps and transit camps in: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac & Oyam, Amuria & Katakwi and Lira, with Gulu and Kitgum being better off than the rest. 87 EFSA 2007, p. 10

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making88. The box below gives a summary of some of the main limitations highli ghted to the Evaluation Team89. Box 7: Limitations to EFSA’s and Other Surveys ♦ The sample size does not appear representative and as expressed by one stakeholder – sizes may be so

small that they ‘don’t always show reality’. 90 The EFSA of 2005 is based on 10 camps per district and interviews with 10 households in each camp to give a total of grand total of 400 households for the entire study. In 2007 the EFSA, which includes a larger area than the 2005 EFSA, was based on 220 households in camps and transit sites totalling 1760 households.

♦ Determination of the ration level is based on the analysis of household consumption from a 7 -day recall

period. This limited amount of time may bring about inaccuracies in data quality. ♦ EFSA as well as WFP Nutritional S urveys are supposed to cover both mother camps and transit sites,

however key informants note that in particular the WFP Nutritional Surveys cover mainly the original camps, where access to services is much more convenient than for example in the transit s ites91. Nutritional Surveys carried out by independent NGOs, seem to capture a more diverse picture covering both camps and transit sites.92

♦ Although the EFSA is often combined with the Nutritional Survey, the process of data triangulation is not

clear. ♦ The EFSAs are supposed to be carried out twice a year and provide a comprehensive picture of the situation

on the ground. However in 2005 and 2007 there has only been one EFSA per year. ♦ The publication of the EFSAs is often several months delayed and hen ceforth the picture which the EFSA

reveals on the day of publication may be far from the evolving challenges and changes on the ground 93 and again doubtful as a decision -making tool.

In summary – as can be seen from above - stakeholders in Northern Uganda and Kampala express dissatisfaction with the quality, lack of nuance, timeliness and comprehensiveness of the EFSA. Their concern in particular stems from the fact that EFSAs are the sole basis for the development of food aid policy and subsequent decisio n making in Northern Uganda. A critical and thought provoking point highlighted by a number of stakeholders is that in as much as the EFSAs are carried out by food security actors spear headed by WFP and a WFP composed research team, the credibility of the EFSAs is challenged. The argument made by stakeholders is that the situation in Northern Uganda is changing and complex (in some areas changing for the better quickly, in some areas changing for the better not so quickly) but the inability to capture nuances and methodological limitations challenge the outcomes of the EFSA. Some stakeholders argue that there may be a conflict of interest when WFP, who is responsible for the EFSAs, and subsequently, also determines the rations, at the same time is also the ‘service provider’ of the food aid94 whether it regards increasing or decreasing food aid.

88 Interview with NRC and DFID. 89 Summarised from interviews with NRC GFD staff, DFID, Selected humanitarian actors, WFP-phase off workshop in Kitgum + the EFSA of 2007. 90 Interview with key informants in Gulu and Kampala. 91 Nutrition and Health Assessments in IDP camps in Gulu, November 2006 and February 2008, 92 ACF Nutritional Survey, May 2007 93 This was the case with the EFSA carried out in April 2007. It was released in August 2007, by which the rainy season had hit Uganda and later developed into floods. The 2005 EFSA was also prepared in April but only released by WFP in September 2005. 94 Interviews with humanitarian actors, independent humanitarian experts and food aid donors.

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Recent studies95 on global food security and emergency needs assessments support the above findings by arguing that linking ‘analysis to decision making’ in food s ecurity is faced with numerous challenges. The criticisms amongst others centre around: “analytical capacity (assessments of needs, cost-effectiveness and impact), the ability to allocate resources impartially, the ability to link analysis or early warning to a timely and appropriate response…”96. Studies also highlight that while food security assessments may be useful for food agencies’ own programming, they “are not as useful for donors or other partners in facilitating decision making… they continue to be narrowly focused on an a priori assumption of food aid programming, rather than providing a basis on which to inform the broader range of response options”97. To address the problems regarding the EFSAs and provide a more confident basis for food aid policy development in Northern Uganda, an EFSA conducted independent of those with a vested interest would be timely and relevant (see also Chapter 11 on Food Phase Off). Of course the research should be conducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawn from current experienced food actors on the ground. Moreover, an independent EFSA need not necessarily replace currently planned EFSAs, but be additional to it. Given stakeholders’ and donors’ concerns for t he direction of food aid policy, the Evaluation Team finds that there is opportunity to present an independent EFSA and persuade donors of its added value. What they stand to gain from a quality EFSA would most likely dwarf the cost. 7.2.2 Covering the Net Food Gap – How do People Cope? Despite the noted improvements in security, increased access to land and possibilities for market use, NRC’s monitoring reports and post distribution reports as well as several interviews98 with humanitarian actors and donors still show that meeting the net food gap is a challenge to many IDPs. IDPs asked during the field visits in mother camps as well as in transit sites confirmed that they had access to land (average 2 -5 acres) and some access to markets. Some IDPs said the land was their own, while others said they had to rent land. Many were farming this season and hoped for a good harvest (due to heavy seasonal rains last year their crops were destroyed). Nevertheless most of the IDPs interviewed explained that they were not able to meet their food gap largely because:

95 ODI study of 2007: “A Review of the links between needs assessments and decision making in response to food crisis: WFP/Emergency Needs Assessment” + “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et. al, 2008 in a discussion paper for CARE, Oxfam, Tufts University and Feinstein Internationa l Centre. A conference on food security and how to ‘rethink it’ was held in Rome in April 2008. Earlier papers on this subject amongst others include: Simon Levine and Claire Chastre et al: “Missing the point: An analysis of food security in the Great Lakes”, Network Paper 47, Humanitarian Practice Network London, ODI, 2004 96 “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et al, 2008, p. 23. 97 ODI study of 2007: “A Review of the links between needs assessments and decision making in response to food crisis: WFP/Emergency Needs Assessment”. Referenced in “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et. al, 2008, p. 32-33 98 Interview with OCHA Gulu/Kitgum, DFID Kampala, FAO Kitgum, NRC staff and volunteers Gulu/Kitgum, IDPs (incl . FMC members, camp commandants) in several camps and transit sites visited, WFP Kitgum

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Box 8: IDPs reasons for not meeting their net food gap 99 Regarding access to land Regarding cultivation of land ♦ For several years accessing a few km of land

in the periphery of the camps has not been enough to sustain the food gap (gradually expanded from 1 -5km).

♦ Not everybody has access to land. ♦ Some have to rent land and it is costly 100. ♦ With their manual efforts they were only in a

position to cultivate and weed 1 -2 acres. ♦ In Eastern parts of Kitg um there is fear of

Karamojong raiders, who raid peoples homes – this fear restricts many IDPs to their camps or transit sites.

♦ Inadequate farming tools and seeds despite

some blanket distribution; ♦ ‘Opening up’ the uncultivated land is difficult

and needs more than just manpower (when it takes long to open up land, they miss a farming season);

♦ The lack of oxen ploughs/tractors or more

intensive machinery to open up land. ♦ IDPs ‘don’t feel strong enough to dig, as they

don’t get enough food’

Regarding alternative income opportunities Regarding saving and investment ♦ Income generating activities and employment

opportunities in camps, in town or in transit sites are few.

♦ The youth no longer help parents in the farms

– they have little experience of far ming and dream of urban lifestyles and jobs.

♦ Older women who have lost their family but

still have land are not able to get help to cultivate it.

♦ No granaries to store food (some IDPs in

Amuru said that their produce in farms last year resulted in a sur plus, which they cannot save)

♦ Lack of money to rent an oxen and a plough ♦ Prices on food have increased in towns. 101

Several key informants (government officials, humanitarian organisations and donors) admitted that along side the ration reductions in most cases the IDPs have not been able to meet their net food gap. As one UN agency in Kitgum phrased it: ”people are not yet where we thought they would be”. A confirmation of this statement is found in some of the coping strategies, which several of the IDPs, interviewed have claimed to apply102: Box 9: Coping strategies 2005 to 2008 103 1. Reduction in number of meals per day 2. Borrowing food 3. Reduced the sizes of meals 4. Purchasing food on credit 5. Skipped food consumption for an entire day 6. Restriction of adult consu mption at home

7. Consumption of wild food 8. Consumption of immature foods 9. Consuming less preferred food 10. Eating seed stocks 11. Engaging in degrading jobs

99 Naturally this is only a snap shot, as the IDPs interviewed are not representative of the entire IDP population. The methodological sensitivity of any survey regarding food aid, which invariably prompts biased or rhetoric answers is taken into consideration: Sources are multiple, answers have been cross checked and corroborated with surveys, monitoring reports and interviews with other stakeholders. 100 Price mentioned: ushs 15.000/acre/year. 101 Prices from Kitgum Town Sorghum 2007: Ushs 30/mug and in 2008: Ushs 100/mug. Sweet potato 2007: Ushs 100/heap and in 2008: Ushs 200/heap. Source: FAO, Kitgum 102 The EFSA 2005 summarises that the interpretation of the above is difficult and attributes the coping strategies to the fact that the crisis is protracted to such an extent “that some of the strategies may have been adapted”. This is seen in conjunction with the fact that global malnutrition rates as well as severe malnutrition rates declined in all districts. 103 This is only a snap shot, as the IDPs interviewed for the Evaluation are not representative of the entire IDP population. Nevertheless the answers – which were repeated in the majority of FDGs give an indication. Moreover, they were confirmed in several of NRCs own monitoring reports from 2005-2008.

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From the 2007 EFSA104 it transpired that adults in 52% of the households had only one meal a day and the figure was higher in transit sites (60%)105 Even for children the figures were noticeable, with 36% reporting only 1 meal and 3% reporting no meals the previous day before the EFSA survey. 47% could manage to feed their children twice a day, but only 14% were in a position to give their children more than 3 meals a day. The EFSA does indicate that Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum seem to be faring better than the remaining sample sites for the EFSA 2007. Although not commonly adopted, some of the more disturbing and damaging coping strategies that the Evaluation Team discovered through some focus group discussions with IDPs were: Box 10: Other coping strategies 2005 -2008106 ♦ Begging or sending your younger family members to beg ♦ Theft (crime rates in camps are in general high) ♦ Prostitution (also by young mothers) ♦ Child labour by sending children of young age to work ♦ Gambling ♦ Exploiting natural resources for selling (charcoal burning) The Evaluation Team found that despite having more access to land and having left behi nd the strains of camp-life, the coping strategies in transit sites in Gulu and Kitgum 107 seem more challenging than in the mother camps. The lack of basic services such as health, access roads, clean water and sanitation in particular puts people in a vulne rable situation. The Evaluation Team’s observations show (and were confirmed by several NRC staff and volunteers) that the malnutrition levels amongst lactating mothers and the vast number of children who have not yet reached the school going age was relat ively high. As mentioned earlier nutritional surveys conducted by WFP concentrate their research mainly in mother camps108. In spite of these observations, several interviews and findings documented in monitoring reports from amongst others NRC, the common understanding that IDPs are not meeting their net food gap is still disputed. For example district officials in Gulu emphasised to the Evaluation Team that as documented in the Nutrition Surveys, Northern Uganda is “out of the danger zone…. people today are okay… and…they produce enough to supply the Sudan market”.109 If there are reasons for the Acholi people not meeting their net food gap, it is according to some officials because they ‘by nature are lazy’ 110 and that food aid over the past 10 years has brought about a highly inconvenient ‘dependency syndrome’ 111. One UN agency was strongly of another view: “IDPs do not want the food rations any longer and they can grow the food. The problem is only that the yield is not high enough and therefore they are not meeting their net food gap…they need tractors…If they had the option, they would go for something else than food aid. The option is still not there. Food is no longer considered a push or a pull factor…”112.

104 The EFSA 2007 covers mother camps and transit camps in: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac & Oyam, Amuria & Katakwi and Lira – i.e. figures include Acholi, Lango and Teso regions. 105 EFSA 2007, p.12 106 IDPs interviewed for the Evaluation are not representative of the entire IDP population, and as stated these coping strategies are not commonly adopted amongst all IDPs interviewed. Some answers are also confirmed in NRCs own monitoring reports from 2005-2008. 107 Pawidi in Kitgum, Lukwor in Kitgum and Oraphoyo in Gulu 108 WFP Nutritional Surveys of 2006 and 2007 conducted in 53 mother camps in Gulu 109 Interview with DDMC, Gulu. 110 District Official, Gulu 111 District Official Gulu 112 Interview with UNHCR Gulu.

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7.2.3 Stimulating Other Options Like the statement made above the 2005 and 2007 EFSAs note that there is a strong relationship between household food security and contribution of own production to the food basket. However, apart from blanket distributions 113 of seeds and tools to a number of IDPs it seems that little has been done by GoU, humanitarian agencies or donors to 114 1) stimulate own production 2) facilitate the market 3) create employment opportunities 4) create investment prospects 5) help farmers save their produce or seeds 6) open up for income generating activities and 7) revive animal husbandry … all of which are fundamentally necessary for the IDPs to cover their net food gap (regular and seasonal) 115. It is clear to humanitarian and recovery actors on the Ugandan scene that between relief and recovery/development there is a gap without adequate interventions and actors. While some shut down and phase out their operations others are supposed to open up, increase and expand. But interventions in the area of food security, livelihoods, durable solution s, social protection and safety nets are still slow in taking off. Some of the reasons given are lack of donor funding, lack of leadership from GoU to steer the process and lack of a consolidated and coordinated approach from recovery/development actors. C hapter 9 will discuss some of these challenges and dilemmas. 7.2.4 Lesson Learned ♦ IDPs have in general not been able to meet their net food gap as quickly as assumed

from the beginning of the project period. Meeting the net food gap as well as nutritional standards is challenging if food ration reductions do not go hand in hand with livelihood and food security expansion, particularly for more vulnerable groups and in the transit sites, where basic services are lacking and markets for purchase/sale are far.

♦ With the ration reductions and no immediate livelihood opportunities, IDPs are forced into

various coping strategies, some more encouraging than others. In worst cases the coping strategies are of a degrading natu re, challenging the protection of some of the IDPs.

♦ EFSA’s and nutritional surveys are faced by a series of methodological limitations, delays

and lack of nuances, which question their credibility. Yet these surveys comprise the sole basis for crucial decision-making on food aid policy in Northern Uganda. Enhanced corroboration, triangulation of data, comprehensiveness and independence of the surveys will increase the credibility of the evidence base for decision -making.

7.2.5 Recommendations ♦ To address the reported problems regarding the EFSAs’ methodology and credibility and

provide a more confident basis for decision making and policy development at this time in Northern Uganda, an EFSA cum nutrition survey, independent, and of a higher quality should be conducted to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of food security, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap etc. The research should be conducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawn from current experienced food actors on the ground. An independent EFSA need not necessarily replace currently planned EFSAs, but be additional to it. (This is also recommended in Chapter 11 on Food Phase Out strategy). NRC should advocate for and contribute to the realisation of this.

♦ NRC should invest in more specific research of various alternatives to food aid during

and after emergency settings, with a view to strengthen peoples’ coping strategies as quickly as possible (ref. recommendations in Sections 5.4 and 7.1).

113 Amongst others undertaken by GoU, ICRC and selected other NGOs 114 Key informant interviews with District officials in Gulu, Kitgum and Amuru, WFP Gulu and Kitgum, OCHA Gulu and Kitgum, NRC, AVSI as well as selected food aid donors, Kampala. 115 All of which is also mentioned in the EFSA’s

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7.3 Project Objective 3: To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women, children and EVIs and the long-term effect of insufficient access to food. 7.3.1 Targeting Food Aid Food aid is targeted to two groups of people: The non extremely vulnerable (NEVI) and the extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs). The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operatio n (PRRO) defines the extremely vulnerable group as: the disabled people, orphans, widows without direct family support and households headed by children and returning abducted children. Rough estimations show that EVI households make up 5 -8% of the target group in Kitgum. 15-20% of the households are EVIs in Gulu and Amuru 116. Estimates fluctuate according to the number of people served each month. Judging that their capacity to obtain their own food is minimal, WFP provides this group with full food rations117. Over the past three years EVIs have been given 98% and 100% food rations. It is assumed that the remaining 2% is acquired through other means (borrowing from friends or relatives and receiving gifts). NRC has distributed the agreed amount through its f amily size distribution methodology to the EVIs since 2005. EVIs are – like NEVIs – involved in scooping their own food and distributing it according to household sizes. Those who are not in a position to carry out this task, due to their physical condition, are helped by other family members. As the Evaluation Team observed at the various food distributions, there seemed generally to be a good understanding from NEVIs why EVIs are given higher food rations. The Evaluation Team was told that on occasion NEVIs steal from the EVIs or try to cheat them to get their share of the food, however on whole this seemed not to be a serious problem. EVIs have also suffered from pipeline breakages and delays. Moreover this group seems more increasingly also to be suffering from a reduced food basket, as some items in periods continue to be left out. During some of the food distributions observed by the Evaluation Team, vegetable oil was missing from the EVI food basket. Complaints seemed to be filed instantaneously to NRC, who regularly reports this in monthly and quarterly reports. The EVIs – despite their higher food rations – are struggling to cover their net food gap, perhaps even more critically than the NEVIs. The coping strategies left for an older woman or a physically disabled person are limited. Most often they engage in begging. Young mothers are known to venture into prostitution. 7.3.2 Categorising People A categorisation of people ensures that funds and items are ‘earmarked’ to this group in particular and thereby protecting their rights. Nevertheless, in the case of food distribution the category for EVIs has by some stakeholders been found to be too restrictive. Several individuals, who do not necessarily represent any of the above EVI titles could be s aid to be

116 Kitgum 2007: 51051 HH - 3980 EVI HH. Kitgum 2008: 59031 HH - 2504 EVI HH. Gulu/Amuru 2007: 75257 HH - 10966 EVI HH. Gulu 2008: 72108HH - 14768 EVI. Source: Sample of distribution figures from Quar terly Monitoring Reports Oct-Dec2007 and Jan-March 2008, NRC 117 In addition, nutritional interventions will target malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women and people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, however these interventions are now being scaled down due to funding cuts.

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extremely vulnerable, simply by being extremely poor or for other reasons excluded from society. NRC, WFP and other stakeholders agree that several cases of extremely vulnerable individuals are left out of the group to receive 98% simply because they do not fit the present category. Many EVIs have not been captured in the last verification exercise due to problems in the mentioned data collection and date entry process. In effect this means that they are not on the WFP print-list and no longer eligible for food. Although EVIs have complained about this WFP has not rectified the problem and as described by some of the NRC volunteers: “When an EVI loses out it puts the person in an even more vulnerable position”. NRC has discussed the above problems frequently with WFP sub-offices in Gulu and Kitgum. WFP sub offices have expressed willingness to support NRC in developing a solution that can capture the missed targets of the extremely vulnerable and has also argued that more food will be sourced for those cases where needs are extreme and should be handled swiftly118. 7.3.3 Empowering Women in a Disempowered Situation Many years of food aid has pushed women in the forefront of decision -making and management at household level and in communities. Half of the representatives and half of the executive-level members (vice chair person, secretary etc) on the food distribution committees are women. The election is carried out in the respective camps and the electorate is composed by the Chairperson and the bene ficiaries. NRC has provided training in community participation and leadership skills to women who take part in food distribution committees. NRC has monitored the developments in monthly and quarterly reports 119 and some of the positive findings are: ♦ A positive attitude amongst people towards women embracing leadership positions; ♦ Women participate not only in the distribution activities, but also in administrative

management of the camp; ♦ Women’s participation in food management committees gradually exceeds that of men,

both in terms of membership as well as active participation (in 75 -85% of the camps the VC of the GMC is a women and 35-45% of the FMCs is constituted by women;

♦ Women participating in the scooping exercise at each point of distribution made i t easier for volunteers and staff to monitor and manage the distribution.

Women have been encouraged to get actively involved in food distribution, since they are the ones preparing the food at home. Being in control of the food rations will assist in red ucing the complaints that men collect food and sell or trade it in return for alcohol or money for gambling. Some reports say that more than 60% of the people who collect food rations are women. During the food distributions observed by the Evaluation Team this figure seemed closer to 80%. Despite regular reporting on participation and collection of food, however, the NRC monitoring efforts do not capture some of the more in depth effects of household dynamics which food distribution brings about by giving women a more powerful role in the family. See Chapter 10 for assessment of impact on household level.

118 As an example: A group of some 9000 extremely needy IDPs were discovered late 2007 in Nakwanya Village in Orom Sub-County in Kitgum. They had fled from Sudan, through Kabong in Karamoja and had been displaced since 1986. Th ey arrived in Kitgum with no food stocks and were surviving on wild fruits and dirty water when found and were ‘quite vulnerable’. Due to bureaucracy and procedures an assessment of this vulnerable population was only made in March 2008, upon which they were included in the WFP print list and served as late as April 2008. 119 NRC Monthly and Quarterly Reports from 2005-2008 (some are more elaborate and analytical on the issues of female participation than others) + Post Distribution Monitoring reports from 2008.

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7.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs? Separating the most vulnerable individuals in a group by itself has its advantages and disadvantages. It helps targeting and directing the reserved rations to the ones in need in a controlled way ensuring that, their right to food is exclusively protected. In a time of crisis and chaos where thousands are fighting for food thi s may be the only sensible approach. However at the same time the separation of individuals also changes the dynamics of communities and families. Those individuals, who perhaps previously (before the conflict) were taken care of by family members (elde rly, orphans, disabled etc) have been ‘taken care of’ for 10 years. The problem may arise, when reductions in food aid continue and EVIs cease to be an eligible ‘category’. Acknowledging that Government plans are considering attention to this group in the recovery efforts120, the Evaluation Team posed questions to various stakeholders to find out what the interventions on the ground would be. Some maintained the position that the IDPs of Northern Uganda are a resilient people. Social structures may have changed, but perhaps not so much as expected, and are to some extent still intact121. Reviving and supporting social structures that might have weakened after years of displacement in camps was one idea: “lets revitalise the traditional mechanisms of healing and taking care of the people”122. This was also emphasised by some concerned district officials.123 To some, the revitalisation of the social structures was seen as a ‘hands off’ strategy for the humanitarian and development community, leaving the development t o occur naturally as communities find their roots, justified by the hope that “EVIs will automatically be helped as NEVIs become stronger”124. Although more careful, a basis for strategising was expressed by a stakeholder encouraging the conduct of a large scale household survey that looks exclusively at household dynamics, including targeted needs for EVIs and also other groups in society: the youth, the children etc, with the aim of creating interventions that ‘build on the existing strengths and structure s in society 125. Others also confirmed that: “there is a need to think out of the box… targeting with different activities”126. Acknowledging that EVI households are very insecure and need protection, but not incapable of taking care of themselves in a dignif ied way one respondent said: “Most of them cannot get involved in very heavy work…. You have to target them with income generating activities such as beekeeping, grinding mills or give them boar goats” 127. Despite being told that the challenges regarding EVIs has been discussed extensively by food security stakeholders, the Evaluation Team did not find a clear or coherent strategy amongst the current actors in the ground to address the multiple needs of thousands of EVIs as food rations continue to be subject to funding cuts and recovery interventions are slow to pick up. 7.3.5 Lesson Learned ♦ When EVIs lose out of the food distribution system they become even more vulnerable. ♦ Discussions have as of recent been devoted to the topic of EVIs and their future,

however, there seems to be little concerted planning made or actions taken by the actors on the ground. The categorisation of EVIs – still maintained - may become counterproductive if efforts are not put into defining and designing a transitional

120 The PRDP under its Strategic Objective 2 should cover assistance to extremely vulnerable individuals in the North. 121 Interview AVSI, Kampala 122 Interview with OCHA Kitgum 123 Interviews with district official Amuru and Gulu 124 Interview with OCHA Gulu 125 Interview with AVSI, Kampala 126 UNHCR Gulu 127 Interview with NRC FSL PC, Gulu. It should be noted however that some EVIs have said that even grinding mills and goats is too heavy work for them.

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response. This requires thinking ‘out of the box’ and borrowing tools and experience from for example traditional development programmes that have worked with the ‘mainstreaming’ agenda for years (e.g. mainstreaming gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights etc).

♦ Assuming that EVIS will automatically be taken care of by families and friends may not be

the case. Family structures and dynamics have changed and NGOs and agencies as well as districts should be careful in automatically assuming that upon return to the villages ‘everything will be normalised’.

♦ When women are actively engaged in food distribution it increases their empowerment

and authority and it also affects traditional household dynamics. 7.3.6 Recommendations ♦ NRC should in future food aid projects include a mainst reaming as well as an exit

strategy – in good time - especially for targeted vulnerable groups, so as not to leave them in a vacuum, once the assistance is phased out.

♦ NRC should in the current situation in Northern Uganda be very careful to follow the

assumption that EVIs will automatically be taken care of by families and friends as the return process picks up and IDPs move back to their villages. NRC should strongly advocate for simple and targeted mainstreaming interventions for EVIs, for example through a multi-pronged approach involving (1) strengthening family and community social systems (2) strengthening relevant district social sectors to provide services and (3) targeting EVIs with tailor made livelihoods activities.

♦ It may be beyond NRC’s mandate/policy to engage fully in the reintegration and

mainstreaming of EVIs into society. However, as a preparatory step, there is a need for research and documentation in the area of EVIs, through a household survey, which can more specifically determine the targeted need of people. NRC (together with other NGOs and district authorities) should take the lead on such a survey, which can also incorporate several household issues, including gender related issues: i.e. assessing changes in the household and community dynamics which food aid brings about on gender roles, changes in traditional practices, social protection and safety nets. This will prepare actors for a more realistic and strategic recovery response.

Having assessed and analysed the performance/effectiveness viz. the three main GFD objectives the report turns to the remaining evaluation criteria: Coordination; Connectedness; and Impact. Each subject will be evaluated and lessons learned and recommendations will be listed.

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8 COORDINATION 8.1 A Co-ordinated Response in the Field The nature of the intervention and especially the overriding need to deliver food to the right people at the right time has necessitated the involvement of several of humanitarian actors including GoU. The table below is not exhaustive and only attempts to capture some of the most critical partners, their roles and responsibilities in NRC’s operations with a view to highlight the areas of co-operation and co-ordination. Table 5: Stakeholders and Their Roles Verification

of beneficiaries

Assessment of food security

Delivery of commodities

Community Mobilisation

Distribution of

commodities

Monitoring /feedback

NRC ü ü ü ü ü WFP ü ü ü ü UNOCHA ü DDMC ü ü ü ü ü Food security cluster ü ü Military /security ü ü Camp Managm ent ü ü FMCs ü ü ü ü ü Beneficiaries (IDPs) ü ü ü Coordination between the different actors takes place through different mechanisms: District Disaster Management committee (DDMC) 128: is the overall coordinating body for all emergency interventions in di fferent sectors in the district and is chaired by the Chief Administrative Officer129. The DDMC includes representatives from all relevant government departments, humanitarian agencies and IDPs. The DDMC meets monthly and is expected to advise, support and monitor implementation of the different interventions 130. Food Security Cluster131: is co-chaired by FAO the lead UN agency and the district production officer as the government counterpart. The cluster is composed of representatives of different agencies/ NGOs engaged in food security interventions. Food Aid sub-committee132: is a sub committee of the Food Security cluster and is chaired by WFP and composed of agencies and other actors engaged in food aid. Mainly focuses on issues related to food distribution (verification of beneficiaries, food assessment, transportation issues, security, etc). Food Management Committees (FMC) 133: established in each and every distribution point and includes representatives of the beneficiaries (IDPs) and camp leaders. FMCs mee t monthly but may meet more frequently depending on the needs. FMCs are responsible for liaison with NRC, mobilization of beneficiaries, disseminating information, coordinating and managing the food distribution process. In addition to the above, NRC frequently attends meetings, workshops and shares reports with the different actors depending on the issues at hand. Feed back from many of the actors134 reveals that the understanding of roles and responsibilities and the subsequent co -ordination effort which has improved over the years has resulted in: the increased

128 Interviews with RDC/LCV/ Deputy CAO Kitgum. 129 This is mandated by the National IDP Policy. 130 Several stakeholders said that there had been problems in keeping the meetings regular and fully attended. 131 Interview with FAO, UNOCHA. 132 Interview with WFP, UNOCHA. 133 Interview with FMCs, Opit and Amuru IDP camps. 134 Interviews with WFP, DDMC, RDC, UNOCHA,FAO, FMCs, Vice LCV.

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involvement of stakeholders; sharing of information, greater leverage of resources; identification of needs; increased accessibility to all camps; quality assurance and ultimately, the timely, efficient and safe distribution of food aid to the intended beneficiaries. Examples of some of the areas where the co-ordination efforts with some of the actors e.g. DDMC have been useful include: provision of military personnel 135 to escort the food trucks and provide security protection during distribution in particularly insecure areas. The DDMC Coordinator has at times also been involved in dissemination of information to the communities on food distribution issues (reductions in rations)136. At the level of the beneficiaries, co-ordination efforts have resulted into increased beneficiary involvement, better identification and representation of the communities’ needs and problems; orderly distribution and crowd control. Coordination with other agencies/NGOs involved in camp management has provided NRC with important information on IDP populations, return movements and figures as well as information on protection concerns e.g. level of gender based violence137. There have been challenges arising from the limited capacity (personnel, finances, equipment) of some agencies, organisations and government institutions to participate actively138 and effectively respond to problems within their ambit. For example the poor condition of some roads during the rainy season has from time to time caused delays in delivery of food aid to some IDP camps. NRC frequently experiences problems in transporting food to some camps e.g. Pabbo in Amuru and the Eastern Chwa region in Kitgum. Food trucks occasionally get stuck, delaying the di stribution process and necessitating the volunteer teams to spend nights in the camps. Kitgum district expects to repair at least 5 bridges139 having submitted a request for funds from the Ministry of Works and Housing for funds; as well as repair some of th e feeder roads through funds from Danida. In the interim, NRC has demanded for stronger trucks from its transporters and has also arranged to distribute at least two months rations to some of the hard to reach areas ahead of the rain season140. Frequent movements of IDPs and the absence of uniform data on camp populations and return figures have also been a challenge to proper planning. UNHCR (in liaison with organisations responsible for camp management) compiles figures of the IDP populations in camps and transit sites and updates a matrix sent out to all other stakeholders. Communication with the beneficiaries is not always timely. It was found that beneficiaries were not always fully aware of the reasons behind the ration reduction and/or absence of certain food items. The beneficiaries also complained about the slow response to the problems that they have raised. Participation of IDPs in DDMCs is not as regular due to funding constraints141. Although NRC as an organization has ensured that food related an d other problems of IDPs are captured in its reports, non response (as highlighted in earlier chapters) to the problems has partly been a result of the co -ordination challenges of the different sectors as discussed below. The GFD is only a part of the humanitarian response to the conflict in northern Uganda. There are many other inter-related activities. Although not indicated on the table, there are a number of other players142 – UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs, CBOs, NRC’s programmes and to

135 Interview with District Official, Gulu 136 Interview with DDMC Coordinator, Gulu 137 Interviews with UNHCR and Camp Management NRC 138 Often district sector officials have not attended meetings. 139 Interview with Vice Chair, LCV Kitgum 140 Quarterly report FFL/FFE: Jan – March 2008 141 FGD with IDPs in Opit and Pawidi 142 UNICEF, WHO, MSF, ICRC, AVSI, IRC, OXFAM just to mention a few.

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some extent also GoU through district departments, that have provided services that have increased the effectiveness of NRC’s GFD e.g. provision of water & sanitation, health, education and some food security interventions. With the security improvements in the North and the ongoing return process, the nature of the roles and responsibilities by actors on the ground is also subject to change. This concerns humanitarian actors, NGOs, UN, Donors and in particular Government actors at central and district levels. All are now supp osed to change gears from the emergency approach to the recovery. However it has been noted that coordination between the different sectors and capacity of Government in particular to pick up where humanitarian agencies are leaving is neither effective nor adequate. Coordination of this process falls within the remit of the DDMCs and the various sector/cluster groups. For example the absence of certain social services in the transit sites has forced a number of IDP households to move back and forth and has caused some disruption in GFD’s distribution programme 143. These are some of the challenges facing a coordinated response to the transition from relief to recovery, more of which will be discussed in Chapter 9. 8.2 WFP – NRC: A Mutual Partnership WFP has the overall mandate of providing emergency food aid to the IDPs in Northern Uganda and NRC is one of and also its biggest cooperating partner in Uganda. As spelt out in the MOUs that are renewed annually, NRC is re sponsible for logistical operations and distribution of commodities in addition to being WFP’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground. NRC and WFP employ a number of channels including regular meetings and monthly post distribution monitoring reports through which information is shared and delivery and distribution activities are co-ordinated. Effective co-ordination between the two partners has contributed to the improved assessment of beneficiary needs and hence adjustments of rations144, improved targeting (at least 97% of planned beneficiaries reached), preparedness and delivery of food in response to changing circumstances e.g. floods and impassable roads. WFP has highlighted NRC’s openness and transparency in discussion of difficult issues as being one of the main reasons for effective coordination. NRC is credited for its efficiency, flexibility and ability to quickly adjust its distribution plans in sync with WFP’s modalities. However, despite this very conducive environment there have been a number of coordination challenges incl. verification and registration of beneficiaries, slow handling of complaints and slow responses to problems, which have caused frustration amongst all – also in the absence of contingency measures (See details Section 6.4). 8.3 Lessons ♦ NRC’s approach to coordination through openness, transparent dialogue and sharing of

information with humanitarian organizations, agencies, beneficiaries as well as Government has been imperative to efficient coordination.

♦ Lack of active coordination on behalf of all stakeholders (perhaps due to lack of clear

understanding of roles and responsibilities) is having a negative effect on the recovery response, leaving IDPs in a void.

8.4 Recommendations ♦ NRC should push/advocate for an articulation of roles and responsibilities as well strong

coordination amongst humanitarian actors through the recovery phase.

143 Interview with NRC, Kitgum 144 Interview with WFP Gulu

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♦ NRC should capitalise on its longstanding good partnership with WFP to push and advocate more strongly for the solution of long standing problems like e.g. answering IDPs complaints.

♦ NRC is also urged to make its own strategic objectives, buffer budget and contingency

plan, so as not be contingent upon WFP delays and bureaucracy (see also recommendations on alternative solutions in Chapter 5 Section 5.4)

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9 RELIEF AND RECOVERY – CONNECTEDNESS 9.1 From Relief to Recovery – The Linkages Following the improved security situation, Northern Uganda is currently transitioning from the humanitarian phase to the recovery phase. The goal of the UN and the humanitarian organisations in terms of food security for the North is clearly stated in the CAP of 2008: “To support, stabilise and improve the food security and livelihoods of households affected by and recovering from conflict …”. And for the Acholi region more specifically: “…to provide a “soft landing” for returning households while not neglecting the needs of continuing IDPs…”145. On the GoU side the PRDP was launched to guide the recovery efforts in the North and ensure coherence and coordination amongst the various actors. Under Strategic Objective 2 of the PRDP (rebuilding and empowering of communities ) cognizance is taken of the challenges that IDPs are likely to experience during the transition period. This Strategic Objective is geared towards providing social service and livelihoods support, to assist households to achieve a level of normalization beyond mere survival levels . Box 11: PRDP Strategic Objective 2 Rebuilding and empowering of communities ♦ improving the conditions and quality of life of the displaced persons ♦ return and reintegration of displaced populations ♦ initiating community rehabilitation and recovery activit ies in all communities ♦ provision of services and protection of vulnerable people

Official implementation of the PRDP is expected to start in the FY 2008/ 2009. In the interim, government has through the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) distributed seed s and tools to some IDPs to support agricultural production; and intends to distribute iron sheets to each IDP household later this year146. Plans are also underway to identify model farmers to be supported under the NAADs programme147. Having declared the emergency phase over government, donors and humanitarian organisations/agencies are keen to see the return process in full gear. Although the comprehensive peace deal is still to be finalised, the government is confident that peace will prevail and is urging the communities to leave the camps and return to their villages of origin148 There are those who hold the view that food assistance to IDPs in the camps is ‘delaying’ the return process149 and would rather that it was shifted to the return areas to act as a pull factor. As we shall see in the following chapters experiences from 20 camps in Gulu have not entirely confirmed this argument. Nevertheless, the tone on food assistance has ignited a discussion on a Food Aid Phase Out strategy (see chapter 11) in tandem with the changing context and shift to recovery and development. 9.2 From Relief to Recovery – The Gaps The relatively stable security environment has triggered movements of IDPs from the main camps to the transit sites. However the pace has been slower than anticipated. As of March 2008, approximately 50% of the 1.102.438 IDPs in Acholi are said to have left the main 145 CAP OCHA 2008, p. 31 146 It should be noted that Kitgum has more than 70.000 households, but has so far been given only 33.000 iron sheets 147 Interview RDC, Kitgum 148 Interview with district leaders, Gulu 149 Interview with WFP, Gulu

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camps150, but mainly moved to transit sites, bringing the number of transit sites in Acholi up to 1062. In Gulu and Amuru districts, which count 453.359 IDPs, 57% are estimated still to be in camps, while 30% have moved to transit sites and only 13% are said to have moved home. Gulu and Amuru are considered the most fertile districts in the Acholi su b region. In Kitgum, which comprises 310.140 IDPs, 67% are still in camps, whereas 25% of them have moved to transit sites, but only 9% have moved all the way back to their villages of origin 151. The reasons for these trends are varied, but security concerns rank high. IDPs have repeatedly said “we will only feel safe to return to our homes when Kony puts his hand on the peace agreement”152. Even some leaders agree as one said “let there be peace and people will walk away from the camps by themselves” 153. But IDPs have also cited the lack of productive assets and the absence of social services in return areas as some of the overall impediments to their resettlement and the reason why some of them continue to maintain a presence in the main camps and move back and forth. Indeed as the communities return, there is increasing pressure on the humanitarian community to meet the needs of those people remaining in the camps, those on the move, and those who have settled in new areas154. Conversely, there is a reduction in funds available for humanitarian work, now that the emergency is over. As one agency put it “when the cameras stop rolling, so does the money”! 155 Presently, on-going activities to support the recovery process, particularly with regards to social services and livelihood support, remain somewhat ad hoc and fairly fragmented 156. Albeit there has been a blanket distribution of seeds and tools to most IDP camps 157 many still lack substantial livelihood support activities 158, technical support, income generating activities, market development and access etc. By the end of 2007 attempts were made to establish an early recovery cluster, now named the GIL cluster (Governance, Infrastructure and Livelihoods) , which would be responsible for the overall coordination of activities, including supporting local government to strengthen structures to provide social services and plan for, implement and monitor recovery efforts. The GIL cluster would also have responsibility for supporting the livelihoods (non –agricultural) of returned communities. To date the effective operationalisation of this cluster remains to be seen. The late and not so visible arrival of the lead agency (UNDP) to head the recovery tasks plus the uncertainty of the PRDP and the lack of guidance and leadership from Office of the Prime Minister (GOU’s co-ordination point for the PRDP) have been mentioned as some of the reasons for creating a gap that has affected coherence in understanding as well as funding of early recovery and recovery159. Moreover, it also seems to have affected the strong concerted articulation of the importance of the recovery phase, if the situation in Northern Uganda should not suffer from a relapse. While humanitarian agencies are being encouraged to integrate recovery activities in to their work, they are constrained by technical limitations, lack of leadership and funding limitation. As a result NGOs such as AVSI that have been active in this region have stopped their food security activities because the funding available (6 months) is inadequate for the tasks 150 UNHCR IDP Population Movement Matrix, March 2008 151 Figures are from UNHCR matrix on IDP population movements from March 2008. It should be noted again that these figures are estimates. 152 Focus Group with IDPs, Opit Camp, Gulu. Ref. to Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA. 153 Interview with district leader, Amuru 154 European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 2 155 Interview with WFP, Kitgum 156 Interview with UNHCR, Gulu 157 Seeds and tools distribution carried out by ICRC – source: OCHA 158 Interview with UNOCHA, Gulu 159 Interviews with Country Director & Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC

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expected of them. From their perspective, ”supporting livelihoods during this transition period is more complicated and requires more resources and expertise particularly given the weakened capacity of the district production department”160. While stakeholders (GOU, donors, UN agencies, NGOs) are in agreement on the need for the concurrent implementation of relief and recovery activities to mitigate the impact of a sudden withdrawal, the link between the two (transition) has become a ‘grey’ area affected by the absence/slow release of funds. Attempts were made to include recovery activities in the Consolidated Appeals Process, but as of May 2008, only 22% out of USD 400 million requested for has been realized (the Food security cl uster – excluding food aid - in particular appears to have attracted the least funds 161). It would appear that funding agencies, that traditionally support either relief or development activities are struggling with this ‘transition idea’ in terms of policy, programming and funding. This situation is a classical example of the compartmentalisation between humanitarian and development work 162. It is also worth noting that hesitation to fund the transition could also be linked to the delayed signing of the peace process and hence uncertainty on what is going to happen 163. As mentioned earlier, the link between relief and recovery has also been affected by the delayed and unclear implementation of the PRDP – which is supposed to establish the foundation for the process i.e. through the various objectives. The total PRDP budget currently stands at US$ 606,519,297, which has both created anticipation and some confusion. Some of the common questions asked are: is this new money and how soon is it going to be available? And to whom is it going to be allocated, NGOs or districts? What is the absorptive capacity of districts to handle this money? How exactly the PRDP will be funded is still being discussed, but it could involve either of these mechanisms 164: i) re-allocation of national expenditures; ii) international co -financing through budget support; iii) international co-financing through allocations at the district level by way of block grants; iv) establishment of a multi -donor trust fund; and v) parallel stand alone projects. This also creates uncertainty about the implementation mechanisms165, which will be determined by the different modes of funding. The situation has put stakeholders in a ‘waiting position’ to see GoUs next move. Consolidation of state authority an d specifically that of local governments appears particularly crucial to the recovery process and yet the formal administrative structures are a long way off in terms of capacity to manage the recovery and development processes”166. 9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards Connectedness Advocacy on Recovery: The GFD programme is developing an advocacy strategy that revolves around the issues under Strategic Objective 2 of the PRDP. GFD’s advocacy efforts are aimed at drawing the attention of other actors to the needs of the IDPs in the camps and those in the return areas and thereby guiding recovery efforts. From its experiences in the process of food distribution as well as camp management, NRC has been able to identify a number of issues affecting the communities and particularly during the resettlement process. Some of the advocacy messages that NRC is focusing on: the basic needs of the population; voluntary return; the security and protection concerns, particularly of vulnerable persons e.g. children left in the main camps. NRC is also particularly concerned about the articulation and the lack of institutional clarity of the early recovery cluster167, and is considering various

160 Interview with Country Director, AVSI 161 Interview with UNOCHA, Kitgum 162 Interview with Advocacy Advisor, NRC 163 Interview with humanitarian stakeholder 164 PRDP 2007 – 2010: Funding 165 European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 1 166 Interview with UNHCR 167 Interview with Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC

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approaches through which it can stimulate a debate on transitional issues among the relevant actors in Uganda in order to bring some coherence to the process . Strengthening Local Capacities: At an operational level, GFD is building the capacity of local structures (albeit on a limited scale) that are expected to direct future development efforts within the community. Whereas it created its own distribution structures (the FMCs) which have been accused of undermining the authority of local structures, NRC is increasingly working with local officials at the parish level in the transit sites and return a reas. Parish chiefs and local council officials are more involved in the food distribution processes and have been trained and equipped with community mobilization and leadership skills 168. During the first quarter of 2008, a training programme was conducted in all sub counties for FMCs, sub-county leaders and some LC members. The training tackled topics on the roles of FMC/LCs, distribution processes, role of food aid during return and recovery, hygiene promotion and domestic violence169. Linkages with Other NRC Programmes: NRC has a portfolio of programmes including support to food security & livelihoods (FSL); support to Information Communication and Legal Aid (ICLA); support to Food For Education (FFE), support to Education, in particular the Youth Education Pack (YEP) and support to Shelter and Camp Management. All these programmes have a longer-term perspective that would complement the GFD programme. Interestingly GFD is credited for creating a special status for NRC, which has offered some level of protection for the other programmes170 and yet until recently, there have been no efforts to strengthen the linkages between these programmes and GFD and maximise on this ‘good will’. The FSL project which offers a variety of livelihood options through agricultu ral production; income generating activities (IGAs); and environmental conservation, was initiated towards the end of 2005 with the aim of increasing IDPs’ self sufficiency, following reductions of WFP food rations171. The programme picked pace in 2006. The FSL project targets both NEVIs and EVIs and is today (2008) working with a total of 7613 households in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts, but would like to expand its target group, as the needs are great. Support to farmer groups has so far included input provision (seeds, oxen, ploughs) and training to increase appropriate knowledge and skills. By creating knowledge on, strengthening and developing sources of food and sources of cash, the project assists IDPs and returnees to cope with their current situation in the short term as well as to gain skills that will benefit them while returning to their places of origin172. The FSL project in its current scope is fully funded until April 2009. The number of households so far reached by the FSL project appear rela tively small in light of the high unmet need for livelihoods support in the three districts, and hence the need to expand these interventions. As noted in earlier sections, NRC’s GFD and FSL components could complement each others’ efforts more than has be en the case, given their common interest in food security. Apart from a few occasions, the two have to some degree been working in parallel. While their approaches to food security are somewhat different with the FSL component requiring more technical back stopping and close monitoring, GFD brings certain strengths to the table (logistics, mobilization skills, a broad network, regular contact with, and knowledge of communities in all sub -counties) some of which could be harnessed to inform and/ or support expansion of the livelihoods’ interventions.

168 FFL/FFE Quarterly report, April 2008 169 Ibid 170 Interview with ICLA, NRC 171 Based on recommendations from a WFP EFSA conducted in March 2005 172 NRC: Food Security & Livelihoods leaflet

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9.4 Lessons Learnt ♦ Strong and effective leadership is critical for articulating the link between relief and

recovery and for galvanizing early recovery efforts. Lack of leadership in a post emergency situation creates a sense of paralysis amongst actors.

♦ In a complex situation such as that in northern Uganda, the beneficiaries’ perspectives

and needs of the communities should be the driving force to avoid pushing people into further destitution. Needs’ assessments should be the basis for decision-making in humanitarian situations.

♦ There seems to be few and disperse funds available for the much needed recovery

activities. Availability of funds in a predictable, timely (more than 6 months) and coherent fashion can improve planning for recovery and assist in implementation of useful livelihoods programmes.

♦ Co-operation and close collaboration between the different actors: government/

donors/humanitarian agencies/NGOs is critical for successful recovery efforts. At present stakeholders do not seem clear of their roles and responsibilities and this hampers a smooth gear-shift into recovery.

♦ Humanitarian organisations working on the ground have sound knowledge of the realities

and needs of the ground and which if pr operly packaged can be used to influence programmes and policy.

9.5 Recommendations ♦ Strong leadership is needed to facilitate the recovery process. As time passes IDPs are

left in a vacuum and the consequences may be difficult to handle. With the resources, capacity and goodwill NRC has in Uganda, the organisation should take a lead in advocating for concerted recovery efforts. The current lack of leadership from GoU as well as the humanitarian community should not prohibit NRC from exercising its mandate and leverage as an independent, capable and important NGO to move forward and set examples for the recovery process.

♦ NRC should advocate for targeted and needs based interventions. This will imply carrying

out research and studies (of which some recommendati ons have been made in this report) so as to have a credible evidence base for future programming. Time is not in anybody’s favour. For every delay a farming season for the IDPs may be missed.

♦ In the current transition from the humanitarian to the recovery phase, NRC should along

side GFD activities engage more widely and strategically in Food Security and Livelihood activities. During the coming months it should be explored how to maximise the synergies between the GFD team/structure and the FSL programme objectives.

♦ If there is limited and unsustainable funding for livelihoods/self reliance activities NRC

should request advocacy support from the food security cluster lead or higher up in the UN humanitarian system.

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10 YEARS OF FOOD AID - IMPACT Ten years since it was started, NRC‘s GFD has had considerable impact on the conflict -affected communities in the Acholi sub region, some more positive than others. As mentioned in chapter 4.1., the GFD project has identified indicators to measure the quantitative impact of its activities. Weekly, monthly and quarterly monitoring as well as post distribution monitoring is carried out. In as much as having acknowledged the effectiveness of the GFD project and concluded that it has contributed to keeping roughly half of the IDP population alive in Northern Uganda, the GFD project has had other significant effects. 10.1 Women’s Empowerment/Crisis of Masculinity The methods employed during the distribution of food aid have not only given the IDPs some level of autonomy through their increased participation in the distribution process, it has also contributed to women’s empowerment. Half of the member of the food distribution committee must be women and this has created leade rship opportunities for women in a society where leadership positions were traditionally held by men. This has led to a positive change in the attitude of the people towards women embracing leadership173. According to some FMC members, the presence of the women on the committee has infused gender sensitivity and particularly in the resolution of domestic conflicts arising from food. The partner with custody of the children (mostly women) manages food issues. 174 The reverse side of the story has been the increased workload for women. More than 60% of people who come to pick the rations are women, as men have tended to keep away altogether. As the registered recipients of food aid – women have acquired greater decision-making power in the household over how and when food utilized175 and have become the de facto breadwinners – a position that was prior to the conflict held by the men. “Men have nothing unlike in the past when they had food” .176 Dealing with these changes and the frustrations that come with confinement in the camps has not been easy for the men, a good number of whom have resorted to alcohol triggering a cycle of social problems - domestic violence, alcoholism and family break ups 177. See, also recommendations for household survey of changes in gender dynamics in Section 7.3. 10.2 Skills Transfer/Employment To facilitate the distribution of food commodities, NRC has recruited over 200 volunteers who have been trained and equipped with a variety of skills inclu ding (leadership, management, mobilization etc). Moreover, others have been employed by the organization to manage the food distribution programme. Community members serving on the FMCs have also been equipped with basic management skills. In addition to creating employment, income and leadership opportunities for the individuals involved, the programme has created a pool of dedicated and skilled personnel in the Acholi sub -region: a resource for future developments in the region. See recommendations on ut ilising this resource base in Section 6.6 and in Section 9.5. 10.3 Dependency Syndrome It is debatable to what extent food aid has created dependency among the IDP commu nities in northern Uganda. There are those who hold the view that food aid has created

173 Quarterly Report Jan – March 2008, FFL/FFE 174 FGD with FMCs in Amuru IDP camp 175 Quarterly Report Jan – March 2008, FFL/FFE 176 Male IDP, Amuru IDP camp 177 FGDs with IDPs in Pawidi and Amuru

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dependency among the IDPs and unwillingness to return home .178 With the exception of some extremely vulnerable households, it appears as if many households have adopted different livelihood strategies to meet their food needs. As such food aid becomes only a part of their coping mechanism and not the whole picture. It is the view of the Evaluation Team that it is other factors such as limited access to land, limited produ ctive assets and public services, which have suppressed the productive capacities of the IDP communities. Nevertheless for some groups of the IDP community and particularly the (male) youth food aid might be a disincentive to agricultural production. Fur thermore, after years of confinement in the camps young men have no experience, skills or know how of working the land and some of the young men have succumbed to ‘urban evils’ – gambling and alcoholism and are not interested in returning to the villages. Also, as discussed in Section 7.3, the categorization of the community into EVIs and NEVIs might in the short/medium term reflect an erosion of the traditional support mechanisms. “The war has made everybody selfish. Nobody is willing to share anything because they are not sure of how long their food stocks will last. Although they get more food, some of the elderly EVIs have become very selfish even with their own relatives. As such people no longer have that mu ch pity for them”179. 10.4 Creation of Parallel Structures The need to ensure that food gets to the right people in an orderly fashion necessitated the creation of FMCS and close co -ordination with camp leaders. Unfortunately, the creation of parallel structures may have inadvertently undermined the role/authority of local government structure. The FMCs and Camp Management in several cases today wield more authority than the LCs. This has brought about some friction from the established structures now fearing that: “Camp leaders are more influential than LC officials” 180.

178 Interview with district leader, Gulu 179 FGD with NRC volunteers. 180 Interview with district leader, Amuru

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11 PHASING OFF FOOD AID – A DISCUSSION 11.1 Phase Out Strategy on its Way WFP is at present finalising a ‘Food Assistance Phase Out Strategy for the North” 181. The purpose of the strategy is to guide – through a clear and agreed process - the exit of food assistance to IDPs and returnees in Kitgum, Gulu, Amuru and Pader districts. The principle of the strategy is that the Phase Out/exit of general food distribution should be determined by: 1) the need of IDPs and not the location 2) voluntary movement of IDPs and 3) humanitarian principles. It is emphasised that in spite of the political and economic context within which food assistance is operating in Uganda today, food should not be used ‘as an incentive to get people to leave camps – or to stay in them’. WFP so far has proposed that the food Phase Out decisions are going to be determined by 1) EFSA 2) nutrition surveys 3) the WFP run food security monitoring system (FSMS). Stakeholders involved in the decision-making include: WFP, district authorities and the food security cluster. Stakeholders have discussed the Phase Out Strategy. The Evaluation Team had the opportunity to participate in a WFP facilitated workshop where this Phase Out was discuss ed amongst GoU and an array of food security stakeholders 182. Some of the pertinent areas of discussion included the evidence-base for decision-making, i.e. the use of EFSA’s and nutritional surveys to determine the phase-off. Moreover the classification and categorisation of communities was discussed. The Phase Out strategy emphasises ‘cost efficient’ and easy data collection. An efficient classification of communities will ‘reduce the number of people that need to be sampled overall’. By categorising of IDP s into red (constant GFD required), yellow (seasonal GFD required), green (no GFD required) and white (no food assistance required) groups a more visual and simple overview/map may be made of who needs the food assistance and for how long and who can live without. How to capture the EVIs has apparently also been discussed extensively. The Food Phase Out strategy states that: ‘it is expected that when a broader community no longer requires food assistance (i.e. it is classified as ‘White’), it will be able to care for its EVIs.’ And it goes on to explain the burden sharing once GFD has been phased off: ‘If there are some individuals who still require special attention once the humanitarian response has ended, the government of development partners would address their need with welfare-based interventions’. NRC, like other stakeholders, has participated in the discussions around the Phase Out strategy and has also provided a series of comments strategy. Amongst others, NRC has flagged the idea of a consequence analysis to be included in the process of phasing out, so as to prompt thinking and alternative strategies in case it is needed. 11.2 Piloting the Phase Out in 20 Districts A phase-off pilot test has been made in 20 camps in Gulu. The target was 20 IDP cam ps close to town centres and those in the return sites with a three months food ration provided in July 2007 to facilitate return to villages of origin. The selected camps had better access to land and economic opportunities to support livelihoods based on their proximity to areas of return and the urban centres. A rapid assessment carried out by WFP (Kampala and Gulu), the DDMC, NRC and members of the food security cluster was carried out in January to

181 Food Assistance Phase Off Strategy for the North, (draft) WFP 182 Phase Off workshop in Kitgum, April 2008

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establish the food security situation in the selected camps and whether IDPs had or were returning to their places of origin. 183. Box 12: The Main Conclusion from This Rapid EFSA is: ‘It was generally established that 14.69% of the IDPs in the selected camps were food insecure, 43.13% were found to be mode rately food secure while 42.18% were food secure. …at least more than 48% of households faced difficulties in feeding their households between September and December 2007. …at least 50% of the households were affected by excessive rainfalls during the second season of 2007 which actually affected food crops in the field. However it was also established that among the selected camps, some were better off than others. Six (6) camps were established not to be having households who were food insecure, nine (9) camps had at least 13% of food insecure households while five (5) camps had over 33% of food insecure households.’ The most commonly cited coping strategy amongst the IDPs after the rations ran out was: ‘reduction in consumption patterns’. The pilot test to some degree shows that many people are not yet in a position to meet their net food gap and they are still food insecure and not ‘shock resistant’ as their food stocks are not stable enough. 11.3 Comments to the Phase Out Efforts The Phase Out strategy is not explicitly or strategically linked to a livelihoods or self -reliance strategy. The transition, i.e. the ‘how’ and ‘when’ IDPs should move from receiving ‘hand outs’ to ‘self-reliance’ is not spelled out in the Phase Out strategy. By only describ ing the Phase Out and not mentioning what is fundamentally supposed to ‘phase in’ and by who there is a risk that stakeholders (Government, donors, humanitarian actors) commit themselves to one intervention without considering the other. For the IDPs it ma y result in being lost in a vacuum. Considering the several limitations of the EFSA (discussed in Section 7.2), it is of some concern that mainly this tool – notably with a cost efficient aim - is going to be used as basis for the Phase Out. The classification and categorisation exercise – intended to ease data collection – may prove counter productive in as much as not providing a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. The assumption in the Phase Out Strategy that EVIs will be taken care of may not hold. This has not been the case in Lira, where IDPs have returned to their villages. Research should be made to support this assumption before it is used for decision -making otherwise EVIs will loose out. The results from the pilot Phase Out in 20 camps in Gulu should more expressively provide guidance on the consequences and pitfalls of a Phase Out process. The politics around food aid in Uganda with WFP subject to funding cuts coupled with the strong message from GoU to IDPs of having to return to their homes and no longer be dependent on the food aid should be kept in mind. The IDPs are well aware of the politicization on food aid. A group of beneficiaries in a mother camp in Gulu, advised donors, WFP and others not to be bamboozled by the politics around food aid, and the GoU message that it is not needed anymore because the crisis in Northern Uganda is considered over. During focus group discussions many strong statements came about. As on e woman of

183 Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment, In 20 IDP camps in Gulu and Amuru Districts, January 2008

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Pawidi Transit Site firmly stated: “I don’t even want to talk about the possibility of reducing food aid as long as that man, Kony, has not signed.” 11.4 Recommendations for Phase Out ♦ A credible basis for a food Phase Out decision would be - similar to the recommendations

in Section 7.2 - to conduct an EFSA cum nutrition survey independent and of higher quality to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of food security, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap and phase out etc.

♦ Acknowledging that a more comprehensive EFSA may require more resources, NRC

should advocate directly to humanitarian donors for funding for such an EFSA. Given the concern of some donors for the direction of food aid policy, there is currently an opportunity to present and to persuade its rationale.

♦ In addition NRC should pursue the inclusion of a consequence analysis for each area

subject to the Phase Out. ♦ NRC should assist in developing a ‘main streaming approach’ for EVIs, which should be

included in the Phase Out strategy, so they are not left to the assumption that NEVIs will take care of them.

♦ Based on a new EFSA, NRC together with other food security stakeholders should be

guided in the Phase Out of food aid. ♦ While Phase Out is being discussed and determined, NRC and other actors should scale

up its FSL activities to cover more households.

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ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the Evaluation

NRC Evaluations

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Project/Program: General Food Distribution in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts 1997 -2008 Country: Uganda Period: April 2005 - April 2008 Date final version: 20 th February

A. Project Background For the last 20 years, t he population in the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, has been affected by a violent conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda (GoU). In 1995 -1996, the GoU decreed that all residents of areas affected by the conflict h ad to move into “protected villages”, which triggered humanitarian response. In 1997, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as its cooperating partner started distributing food to the affected population in Gulu 184 and Kitgum districts. An average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) was registered in camps. In late 2001, the GoU declared the LRA a terrorist organisation which led the LRA to infiltrate the northern region further and to intensify their commitment of violent and atrocious acts against the civil population. This resulted in a second massive wave of displacement. By October 2003, the total population of displaced persons had grown to 885,800 persons in the Acholi region. The IDP population increased, and in 2006 the number of IDPs in Acholi was 1,111,780. In August 2006 a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed between the GoU and LRA. This Agreement has largely held over the last year, and resulted in reducing violence in the region. Peace tal ks are ongoing in Juba, South Sudan. Most notably, the parties must develop a mechanism to implement the Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement reached in June 2007, and the Annex to this Agreement reached in February 2008. Justice and reconciliation and the role of ICC remain challenges. The relative improvement in security situation has enabled IDPs to cultivate land further away from the camps than before 2007, and transit sites 185 have been established adjacent to parishes of origin. In the Acholi r egion, (Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader districts) it is estimated that out of 1.1 million IDPs, 300,000 are gradually resettling in their sub -counties/parishes of origin. Still, many of these IDPs maintain a strong link to the camp, and do not feel secure t o return to their homes of origin until the peace agreement is signed. By June 2007 on average an estimated 63% of the IDP population in Acholi region remained in the camps while 34% had moved to transit sites and 3% settled home 186. Project context and rat ionale: The Norwegian Refugee Council has provided food assistance to IDPs in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts in the Acholi sub -region in partnership with the UN World Food Programme since 1997. During 2007, 755,000 IDPs 187 received a monthly ration in the camps and transit sites through the General Food Distribution/Food for Life project (GFD/FFL 188). In 2007 NRC distributed food to 458,000 IDPs in 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu and Amuru districts, and 297,000 IDPs in 26 camps and 13 transit sites in Kitgum district. The food rations provided to the IDPs and the composition of the food basket are based on biannual comprehensive EFSA led by the WFP Vulnerability and Assessment Monitoring unit. One nutritionist and one monitoring officer from the NRC FFL project and food security officers from NRC’s Food Security and Livelihoods project participate in the EFSA. The food rations to be distributed are calculated based on the assessment results

184 Gulu was divided in two administrative districts in 2007, Gulu and Amuru. 185 In Gulu and Amuru districts, IDPs in 27 transit sites have received food assistance since July, and IDPs in 13 transit sites have received food assistance in Kitgum district. 186 Pader district contributed most to these figures and that especially movement in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum district has be en limited (respectively 19 and 25 % at transit sites). 187 The NRC Food distribution program as cooperating partner to WFP covers the districts of Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. World Vision provides food assistance to IDPs in Pader in partnership with WFP. 188 The name of the WFP and NRC General Food Distribution Programme was changed to Food for Life in 2007 in accordance with WFP HQ policies.

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which include access to land by IDPs. The rations are expecte d to cover the net food gap which the IDPs can not meet through their own agricultural production. The food rations have been maintained since January 2006 when the food rations were reduced from 74% to 60%, 50% and 40% for Non Extremely Vulnerable Indiv iduals (NEVIs) and to 98% for Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) in Gulu and Amuru districts. For Kitgum district the food rations are 60% for NEVIs and 100% for EVIs. The food rations normally include cereals (maize or sorghum), pulses (beans or yell ow split peas) and vegetable oil enriched with Vitamin A. The last EFSA of April 2007 showed that the food security situation has improved slightly but not enough to reduce the food ration any further. Up to 70% of the households are moderate food inse cure while around 14% are severely food insecure, even when food aid is included. Therefore, there is still a food gap in most households resulting in a maximum of two meals per day. Project objectives Within the NRC Distribution core activity there are two project activities, Food Distribution (FFL project) and Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL). While the FFL project provides food assistance to IDPs in the camps and transit sites on a monthly basis to cover the food net gap, the Food Security and Live lihoods provides support to IDPs agricultural production to enable them to sustain themselves and assist them in the transition phase when they move to transit sites and eventually their homes of origin. The objectives of the two project activities are r espectively: Food for Life/FFL: - To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts. - To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap - To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women and children, EVIs, and the long -term effect of insufficient a ccess to food. Food Security and Livelihoods project:

1. To enhance productive capacity and self -reliance of displaced households.

In this context the Distribution core activity aims at developing a more comprehensive approach towards food security, and contributes to durable solutions for the affected population. B. Purpose and phase for the evaluation and intended use NRC’s Food for Life (FFL) project has been operating in Gulu and Kitgum districts since 1997 and until date no evaluation has been carried out of the program activity. The main purpose of the evaluation is to provide a systematic and objective assessment of the achievements and performance of the FFL project over the last three years and identify lessons learned and recommendations fo r future project direction. Emphasis will be placed on evaluating NRC’s ability to provide assistance in a relevant, efficient, effective and coordinated manner, as well as coverage and an analysis of impact and connectedness. The intended use of the eval uation is two-fold:

• The results of the evaluation will be used by the FFL program manager to re -direct, if necessary, the project design and implementation of the FFL project.

• To consider lessons learned from FFL in Uganda in design and implementation of d istribution projects in similar IDP contexts.

C. Scope of work and method Even though the FFL project has been carried out in Uganda for more than ten years, since 1997, the timeframe for the evaluation will mainly be limited to the last three years . This coincides with the current WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) from April 2005 to March 2008. In April 2008 a new PRRO will begin, and the evaluation team will assess how the FFL project has been operating over the last three years, str engths, weaknesses and lessons learned of the project will be evaluated, and recommendations for the way forward for the following PRRO period will be given. The methodology will include:

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• Desk studies . As a general background, the evaluation team should s tudy relevant material in NRC, such as NRC policy paper, country information, the NRC country strategy for Uganda, the NRC distribution policy, action plans, project applications, agreements, reports and correspondence.

• Field visits . A two-week field mission to Uganda; Kampala and the three districts where the FFL project is currently implemented; Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. These visits should include meeting and interviews with NRC staff, WFP staff in Kampala, Gulu and Kitgum, district authorities in Gulu an d Kitgum, beneficiaries, Food Management Committee members in the camps, donor representatives and other stakeholders

• Interviews with stakeholders . Interviews with NRC HQ staff (i.e. program coordinator, head of Africa section, Distribution advisor). Cons ultations in the field will be held with all relevant stakeholders: NRC staff, FFL staff, WFP staff, local authorities, beneficiaries, donor representatives and other stakeholders.

Evaluation principles: The evaluation will be guided by the following ethi cal rules/considerations: § Openness – of information given, to the highest possible degree to all involved parties, where there are not

special considerations against this § Publicity/public access – to the results when there are not special consideration aga inst this § Broad participation – the interest parties should be involved when relevant/ /possible § Reliability and independence – the evaluation should be conducted so that findings and conclusions are

correct and trustworthy D. Issues to be covered

The evaluation team will assess the performance of the FFL project in Uganda by applying the following criteria, based on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and defined in NRC’s Evaluation Policy. The question under each criterion is meant to guide the eva luation team in focusing on key issues for NRC. Relevance/ Appropriateness

• Is the current project design consistent with the humanitarian needs of NRC’s populations of concern, IDPs?

• To what extent does the FFL project provide the right response to the ne eds of NRC’s population of concern, IDPs?

• How have beneficiaries been engaged in the project development and implementation? • Are the objectives of the FFL project in line with NRC’s Distribution policy? • Has NRC the required capacity in terms of staffing, local knowledge and expertise in the country to

conduct relevant and appropriate response? • What are the alternatives to the current design of the FFL project? Is the FFL project the best alternative

in the current IDP context, and why? • Are there mechanisms in place to monitor whether the FFL project has adapted to changes in the

context and needs? Efficiency

• To what extent has the FFL project utilised its resources and time efficiently? • Could the results have been achieved with fewer inputs? • Were appropriate and adequate resources (material, human, financial) available, in the right place and at

the right time? Effectiveness The envisaged outcome of the FFL project in Uganda is to contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts. It works towards that goal through concrete objectives (see page 2 of this ToR).

• Are objectives and activities sufficiently and clearly defined? Are they relevant to the context and the envisaged outcome of the project?

• Was the application of the criteria for selection of beneficiaries (i.e. EVIs) applied consistently? • Is there an internal monitoring mechanism and objectively verifiable indicators in place to assess

whether or not objectives are achieved? To what extent did the beneficiaries actually benefit from the FFL project?

• How do the beneficiaries and others view the value, quality and quantity of the FFL project? • What knowledge, about the project objectives, does the national NRC FFL staff have?

Coordination

• To what extent has there been coordination with NRC; WFP and other relevant agencies/national/local authorities?

• Which parties were included in the FFL project an d in what manner? Why?

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• Where NRC, WFP, district authorities and other stakeholders coherent in their understanding and implementation of the FFL project?

Coverage

• Were the intervention criteria chosen appropriately at different stages of the project? Impact

• Has the FFL project identified quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure the impacts of its activities? Are monitoring and analysis mechanisms in place?

• What intended and unintended, positive and negative effects are produced by the FFL proj ect, both on the population of concern and others who are affected?

• Does the FFL project produce the most appropriate impact, given the situation and recourses available? • What can be done to avoid any negative impact or to enhance any positive impact?

Connectedness

• Have linkages between relief and recovery phases been established? • To what extent has national and local capacity been supported? • To what extent are the GoU and the districts able to ensure that the IDPs minimum nutritional needs are

covered after end of the FFL project? Cross cutting issues:

• Gender – how has the FFL project adopted a gender sensitive approach? • Protection – how has the FFL project ensured that protection concerns have been incorporated and

rights based approach adopted?

Specific issues for consideration:

Possible consequences if the FFL operation is scaled down too rapidly Due to a relatively stable security period over the last year, the GoU, various international and national organizations and donors are preparing a transitio n from emergency phase to recovery and development phase. This has its basis in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), launched by the GoU in October 2007. In this situation the pressure for IDPs to move to transit sites and their homes of orig in is increasing. Simultaneously there is a pressure for international organizations to reduce humanitarian assistance and development organizations to gradually take over. In accordance to this, there will be a reduction of IDPs receiving food rations i n 2009. The question is the rate of which the reduction of food assistance or a scale down will take place. Monitoring of the food security situation for the IDPs is a key factor, and climatic changes resulting in natural disasters i.e. in 2007 prolonged h eavy rain and floods during the rainy season affected the harvest in August and September. WFP and NRC have included contingency planning for the worst case scenario in their strategy for the upcoming PRRO period (2008 -2010). Consequences of a rapid scale down need to be taken into account in an assessment of the remaining project period. Conclusions and results from the evaluation should culminate in recommendations for the NRC FFL project and gradual phase -out over the next 2 -3 year period (2008 – 2009/2010). E. Evaluation team The evaluation team will be composed of two persons. The team leader will lead the work of the team and be responsible for completing the report. The team leader should have skills and proven background in evaluations of humanitarian assistance projects in emergency/relief/recovery phases, preferably with food assistance and experience with situation of forced displacement. The regional/national team member should have knowledge and expertise in humanitarian assistance and goo d knowledge of the culture and conflict in the region. The team members should be gender aware. An Evaluation Steering Committee will be established, with the following members: Advisor for Evaluation, NRC HQ; Advisor for Distribution, NRC HQ; Programme Director, NRC CO, Uganda;, Project Manager, GFD/FFL, NRC CO, Uganda; and Program Coordinator for Uganda, NRC HQ. The evaluation manager is Advisor for Evaluation, NRC HQ, The main function of the Steering Committee will be to select the external evaluato rs, review preliminary findings and recommendations and establish a dissemination and utilisation strategy. The main function of the Evaluation Manager will be preparing the terms of reference (in close collaboration with the stakeholder and members of the steering committee), administration and over all co -ordination, including monitoring progress.

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F. Time frame and budget considerations The whole process of evaluation will have a time frame of six weeks starting in April 2008 and ending in May 30 th 2008. The evaluation is scheduled to start its work early -April initiating field visits to Uganda no later than April 21 st.The team leader should alter the evaluations manager at NRC immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval of any significant changes to the evaluation time table will be referred to the Steering Committee. Total Budget frame USD 50,000. ( Fees for consultants USD 37,500 (not including VAT, travel expenses, DSA and printing og report). Expression of interest should be forwarded to Advisor for Evaluation, NRC HQ Kine Brox Brodtkorb not later than March 24 th, 2008. The final decision on selected candidates for the evaluation will be taken by March 28th. For further information please contact: Advisor for Evaluation, NR C HQ Kine Brox Brodtkorb: [email protected] G. Reporting At the end of the field research, the evaluation team will hold a workshop with the NRC Uganda team, main stakeholders (representatives from th e UN World Food Programme, the District Disaster Management Committee) and other relevant staff of the NRC office identified by the Steering Committee to discuss the preliminary findings of the evaluation exercise. A draft report should be submitted not l ater than May 20th. The completion date for the Final Evaluation report will be May 30 th with the consultant having addressed NRC’s comments as appropriate. Difference of opinion between team members regarding conclusions/ recommendations should be reflect ed in the report. The size of the report should be approximately 40 pages (appendices not included), clearly written in English, using Arial 11 point.

The evaluation report should consist of:

§ Executive summary and recommendations not more than 5 pages § Main text, to include index, context, NRC mandate, evaluation methodology, commentary and

analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issue of particular lessons -learning focus, conclusion (not more than 35 pages )

§ Appendences, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework and bibliography.

§ All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Evaluation manager prior to the termination of the contract. H. Follow up The final evaluation report will make the basis for a management response and an action plan to follow up on the recommendations provided by the evaluation team. The final report and action plan will also be part of the planning for p roject activities for the remaining period of the FFL project, and integrated as part of the NRC Uganda Country Strategy to be revised in September 2008. For the follow up of the evaluation the Project Manager, GFD/FFL, NRC CO, Uganda is the main respo nsible with the Distribution Advisor as the focal point at NRC HQ. A management response, responding to the recommendations, including an action plan should be prepared by the Project Manager, GFD/FFL, NRC CO, Uganda by June 16th, 2008. It is the responsib ility of the Programme Director, NRC CO, Uganda to ensure that the realisation of these plans are monitored and documented. The final evaluation report will be shared with all stakeholders of the FFL project, other Country Offices where distribution is pa rt of the core activities and donors. The final report will be shared with other relevant partners of NRC, and be available for all NRC staff via NRC’s intranet web pages. March 10 th, 2008 ---------------------------

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NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL Kine Brox Brodtkorb Advisor Quality Assurance and Evaluation / Head of Strategic Management Support (SMS) + 47 23 10 98 00 + 47 99 03 89 66 www.nrc.no

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Annex 2: Evaluation Programme – including field trip to Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum (14 th to 25th April) Date Activity Comment Tuesday 8th - Prepare Planning field trip and logistics

- Working on questions for field and Kampala meetings

- Read documents

AT to confirm meetings with DFID, ECHO, USAid and Nor. Embassy

Wednesday 9th - Working on questions for field and Kampala meetings

- Read documents - Meeting donors?

Documents to be received from NRC

Thursday 10th - 11:00 Meeting with WFP, Alix Loriston, Paul Howe and Amos Mwesigye

Friday 11th - Read documents Saturday 12th Write up of Inception Note: Question guide

ready/issues to be addressed + overview of methodology + list of people to meet

Sunday 13th Monday 14th - Depart for Gulu by car from Kampala at 09.00

- Introduction meeting with Nin a Birkeland, Programme Director, and Anne

- Meeting with Anne

AT to arrange transport (flight) and accommodation (Boma or Acholi Inn)

Tuesday 15th - 08.00 Meeting with Bai Mankay Sankoh, WFP HoO, Gulu and Amuru

- Meeting with Anne and Boniface - 10:00 Field visit to Opit, Gulu

Wednesday 16th - 08.45 Travel to Kitgum - 11:00 Meeting with RDC, Kitgum - 12.30 Meeting with Moi, PC FFL - 13.00 – Lunch with Astrid Van Rooij, Project Manager, Food Security and Livelihoods project, Moi and Anne - 14.30 Meeting with Assistant CAO, Kitgum - 16.00 Meeting with Keton Sankei, HoO WFP,

Kitgum

Thursday 17th - 09.00 Meeting with Deputy LCV, Kitgum - 10.00 Attend FFL Phase -Off Strategy Workshop

organized by WFP - 12.30 Field visit to Amida - Field visit to trans it site

Friday 18th - 08.30 Meeting with HoO UNOCHA,Kitgum - 10:00 Field visit to Pawidi transit site - 13.00 Field visit to Omiya Anyima (Camp, FFL

Distribution)

Saturday 19th - 09:00 -11:30 Meeting with NRC GFD/FFL staff - 11.45 Meeting with HoO FAO, Kitgum - 12:45 Lunch - 13.45 Return to Gulu

Sunday 20th - Consolidate findings from Kitgum - Write up of field notes/preliminary findings

Monday 21st - 09.30 Meeting with Harry Leefe, HoO UNHCR and PO, Sisse Kristensen

- 11:00 Meeting with Joseph PC FSL - 11.45 Travel to Amuru with RDC Amuru - 13:30 Meeting with RDC, CAO and LCV, Amuru - 15:00 Field visit to Amuru camp, Amuru

Tuesday 22nd - 09:00 Meeting with Lamin Manjang/ Claire, PM/PC, Camp Management - 10:00 Field visit to Ora -Pwoyo

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- 11:00 Field visit t o Acet, Gulu district - 16.30/17.00 Meeting with Mohammed Siryon, HoO

UNOCHA, Gulu Wednesday 23rd - 08.15 Meeting with DDMC, Gulu

- 09.15 Meeting with Deputy LCV, Gulu - 10:00 Meeting with RDC, Gulu - 11:00 Meeting with CAO, Gulu - 12:00 Meeting with Lotte Grauball e, CD - 13.00 Lunch - 14.00 Meeting with Craig, PM ICLA - 15.30 Meeting with Christine Gottsch. USAID,

Gulu TBC /Meeting with Anne

Christine’s leave extended, Meeting with David Mutazindwa in Gulu or Kamp.

Thursday 24th - 08:30 Preparations for prese ntation of preliminary findings

- 13.00 Lunch - 14:00 -17.00 Meeting at NRC – Presentation of

preliminary findings from the evaluation

Friday 25th - 08.00 Meeting with the Volunteers - 09.00/09.30 Meeting with Jessica Huber, PAA,

NRC - 10.30 Finalization with Ann e - 12.00 Lunch - 14.00 Departure from Gulu with flight to Entebbe

Saturday 26th Sunday 27th Monday 28th - 11.00 Meeting w/ Gerald Owachi, DFID

.

Tuesday 29th - 11.00 Meeting with DFID, Graham C. - 14.00 Meeting with USAID, Douglas Balko and

Jason xx Food for Peace - 16.00 Meeting with AVSI, Dr. Filippo Ciantia,

Country Representative at AVSI

Wednesday 30th

Thursday 1st- to 14th May

Write up of Evaluation report

Wednesday 14th May

Meeting with Gjermund Sæther, Norwegian Embassy.

Embassy moved to new premises: Plot 18B, Akii Bua Road Nakasero,

Despite many attempts not able to meet ECHO – no staff was available for interview at any point

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Annex 3: List of Documents Consulted Title Author Year Budget Proposal: Food for Life Distribution, Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum, Food for Education, Kitgum, Northern Uganda for 01.04.2008 -31.03.2009

Norwegian Refugee Council

2008

Consolidated Appeal, Uganda, 2008 UN OCHA, Uganda 2008 Core Activity Policy Document, Education Norwegian Refu gee

Council

Core Activity Policy Document, Emergency Food Security and Distribution


Core Activity Policy Document, Protection Norwegian Refugee Council,

Core Activity Policy Document, Shelter Norwegian Refugee Council,

Emergency Food Security Assessment WFP, Uganda 2005 Emergency Food Security Assessment of IDP Camps and Settled Areas in The Northern and North Eastern Conflict Affected Regions, March -April 2007

WFP, Uganda August 2007

Evaluation Report: Uganda WFP PRRO 10121.1, Targeted Food Assistance for Relief and Recovery of Refugees, Displaced Persons and Vulnerable Groups in Uganda

World Food Programme

2008

FAO Working Paper: Assessing the Impact of Food Aid on Recipient Countries: A Survey

Titus O. Avokuse September 2006

FAO Working Paper: Food Aid in Response to Acute Food Insecurity

Christopher B. Barrett September 2006

Food Assistance Phase -Off Strategy for the North WFP Uganda 2008 Food for Life Programme and Food for Education Programme, Monthly Report, Gu lu and Kitgum

Norwegian Refugee Council, Uganda

Copies availed from the period 2005-2008

Food for Life Programme and Food for Education Programme, Quarterly Report, Gulu and Kitgum

Norwegian Refugee Council, Uganda

January-March 2008

Food Security and D istribution, Core Activity Strategy, Uganda 2008 -2010 (Draft, Internal Document)


2008

Gender Policy Norwegian Refugee Council

Khartoum Food Aid Forum, Global Trends in Food Aid, Expert Opinion

Daniel Maxwell June 2006

National Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda

Government of Uganda

2007

Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme, Identification Mission Report

European Commission

2007

Nutrition and Health Assessment in Internally Displaced Peo ple’s Camps in Gulu and Amuru Districts

WFP Uganda/GoU February 2008

Nutrition and Health Assessment in Internally Displaced People’s Camps, Gulu District

WFP Uganda/GoU November 2006

Nutritional Anthropometric Survey, Final Report, IDP Camps and Resttle ment Areas of Gulu & Amuru Districts, Northern Uganda

Action Against Hunger, Uganda

May 2007

Post Distribution Monitoring Report Norwegian Refugee Council, Uganda

December 2007, January, February 2008

Poverty Eradication Action Plan Government of Uganda

2004 – 2007

Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation Uganda 10121.1, Targeted Food Assistance for Relief and Recovery of Refugees, Displaced Persons and Vulnerable Groups in Uganda


February, 2005

Rapid Assessment Report, Food Secur ity, Nakwanya Village Orom Sub County Kitgum District

WFP Kitgum March 2008

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Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment in 20 IDP Camps in Gulu and Amuru districts

WFP Uganda January 2008

Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response

Daniel Maxwell et. Al. Tufts University, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy and Feinstein International Centre

April 2008

Situation Analysis of Northern Uganda UNICEF, Uganda 2005 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Respo nse

The Sphere Project 2004

Uganda National Household Survey 2005/06 Government of Uganda

2006

US Food Aid, Time to Get It Right Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy

2005

Waiting for Godot in Gulu UN OCHA, Uganda 2007 Annex 4: List of persons/ organisations met Institution/Agency Name Title

Col. Walter Ochora RDC, Gulu Mr. Omwony Ogaba RDC, Kitgum Mr. Komakech RDC Amuru Vice LCV Chair, Gulu Vice LCV Chair, Kitgum Mr. Sylvester DISO, Kitgum Mr. Barnabas Deputy CAO, Kitgum

Government of Uganda

Mr. Charles DDMC Coordinator, Gulu Mr. Alix Lorriston Deputy Country Director Mr. Paul Howe Emergency Coordinator Mr. Amos Mwesigyi Mr. Bai Mankay Sankoh Head of Office, Gulu Mr. Kenton Sankei Head of Of fice, Kitgum


Mr. Joseph Okellowange Programme Manager, Kitgum Mr. Mohammed Siryon Head of Office, Gulu UNOCHA Mr. Komakech Kitgum Office Mr. Harry Leefe Head of Office, Gulu UNHCR Ms. Sisse Kristensen Community Services Officer

FAO Ms. Brenda Pilo yo Programme Officer, Kitgum DFID Mr. Gerald Owachi Conflict and Humanitarian Advisor

Mr. David Mutazindwa Mr. Douglas Balko

USAID

Mr. Jason Food for Peace AVSI Mr. Filippo Ciantia Country Representative

Mr. Gjermund Sæ ther Deputy Ambassador Norwegian Embassy, Kampala Ms. Lotte Grauballe Country Director Ms. Nina Birkeland Programme Director Ms. Anne Mette Teigen Programme Manager GFD Mr. Philip Moi Programme Coordinator Kitgum Mr. Simon Boniface Programme Co ordinator,Gulu Ms. Astrid Van Rooij Programme Manager FSL Ms. Claire Camp Management Ms. Jessica Huber Advisor Mr. Joseph FSL, Gulu Mr. Craig ICLA, Gulu Mr. Lamex Odonkyero Data clerk, Kitgum Mr. Gabriel Ochan Monitoring Assistant, Kitgum Mr. Hoska Akia Focal Person, FFE, Kitgum Mr. Rashid Buga Field Assistant, Kitgum


Mr. Ezra Monitoring Officer

2

Mr. Joe Oloya Monitoring Officer, Kitgum Expert Opinions Mr. Graham Carrington

3

Annex 5: Traditional nutrition and diet in Northern Uganda – By Jane Oryem The traditional (pre IDP camps) nutrition and dietary system in Northern Uganda (Acholi sub -region comprising the districts of Kitgum, Pader, Amuru and Gulu) consisted of the staples such as Millet and Sim -Sim, fruits, vegetables, poult ry, meat (fresh and Game) and seasonal delicacies. The Acholi had a variety of foods accessible to every family. Apart from nutritional values there some food elements culturally favoured for the growth of children, to help increase breast milk for nursin g mothers ,some to increase vitality in young men. Sources of Food

• Practically every family kept poultry, a few goats and sheep, which were reared, in and around the homestead. Many families kept cattle reared within the village (with the help of the B alaloo People who kept most of the milk for sale). The wealthy families had large farms with hundreds of herds.

• Around each homestead, there were plots of land for growing vegetables like Malakwang (a bitter-sour but delicious and nutritious vegetable) , Boo (the staple vegetable of the Acholi) Akeyo, Oyado (Green vegetables) pumpkin, tomatoes, cabbages, beans and Irish Potatoes. The homestead plots were also used to grow cassava, sweet potatoes, maize (for cob consumption as opposed to producing flour) and fruits like mangoes, pawpaw, oranges, lemon, guavas and tangerines.

• A mile or two from the homesteads were the main family gardens of small farms where millet and simsim (the main staple food of the Acholi), were grown. Other main food crops grown here inc luded Lapena (Chick peas), groundnuts, sorghum for brewing beer (sometimes sorghum was mixed with cassava flour in times of a poor millet harvest).

• Each family had a minimum of two granaries ( dero) to store millet and simsim. The size and number of the granaries depended on the size of the family and wealth. The food stored would always last past the next harvest. Other granaries were built to store peas and groundnuts.

• Around the family gardens, in the communal grazing fields, by the rivers and in the fore sts there were lots of fruit trees and anyone could collect these fruits. Among these were Shea nut trees (Yaa) whose fruits contain the seeds from which –Shea butter (Moo Yaa) was extracted. Moo Yaa was mainly used in sauces, but also served as a body lot ion for women and children. Other fruit trees include Tugu (palm tree), Cwaa (Tamarind), Langoo, Ocoga, Oywelo, and many others.

• People had Bee hives ( Bong) in communal grazing areas or forests for honey. Some individuals were also known to lay claim on ho ney troves found in some hollow trees, those claims were accepted and respected by the rest in the village. They would then periodically extract honey from that tree. These sorts of claims also applied to fresh anthills in the communal land (but not in som eone’s garden). The owner of the anthill would then trap White Ants ( Ngwen) from the anthill every season.

• Grasshoppers ‘ Nsenene’ ( Ocene) or fungi like mushrooms Obwol) were also popular seasonal delicacies.

• During the Dry Season (November to February), there were joint hunting sessions in the forests in which the entire village was involved. Most of the hunting was, however carried out by lone hunters (Oken) with their dogs around the bushes and forests in the area. The hunters are mostly very successful (Buffalo, Antelopes, field rats) and they sold most of their game and fish (either fresh or smoked) to the people. The average family also set traps for small animals like rabbits and birds like Guinea Fowls (Aweno) in and around their gardens.

It should also be noted that, throughout Acholi land, Saturdays and or Wednesdays are “Market days”. People brought their produce to the central market (in each village) and used the money to buy other produce or supplement their income. These two days are normally when cows are slaughtered and people could buy and eat fresh meat. Those who could not afford to buy fresh meat or game on a Saturday used chicken as a substitute. Goats and sheep were slaughtered when there were special family functions or occasions of c ultural importance.

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Typical Menu: BREAKFAST:

• Millet porridge prepared with tamarind to make it a bit sour. ( Mostly for men after digging hard in the gardens and vitality)

• Sour milk or yoghurt mixed with mashed sweet potatoes ( mostly for kids and the ir mothers). • Tea with milk, boiled cassava and simsim/groundnuts paste (peanut butter). • Pawpaw, mangoes and shea nuts ( Odur Yaa) • Cake of boiled peas ( Lapena) mixed with simsim paste and served the size of a tennis ball (a ll time

favourite for children ). • Fried white ants. • Left Over ( millet bread and sauce normally from previous evening mainly for kids or those leaving home

at dawn to go the farms) MAIN MEAL:

• Millet bread or sweet potatoes or maize meal or rice ( collectively called Kwon) accompanied by t he following sauces ( collectively called Dek).

• Malakwang or Boo vegetables • Lapena (peas) or beans • Dry or smoked meat, game or fish. • Chicken or Guinea fowl • All the above served in a Sim Sim or groundnut sauce • Fresh meat or game or chicken or fish fried an d boiled Irish potatoes added.

SNACKS: (Normally eaten between meals)

• Fruits • Dry or fried groundnuts. • Simsim paste mixed with honey • White ants paste mixed with honey or shea butter ( eaten with millet bread ) • Boiled cassava with simsim or groundnuts paste . • Cakes of boiled peas mixed with simsim paste • Fried grasshoppers or white ants.

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Annex 6: Evaluation Tool/Question Guide NRC objectives and TOR objectives

To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standards through food assistance to people affected by displacement

To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to meet the net food gap

To safeguard fundamental rights to food for IDPs incl. Women, children, EVIs

Relevance and Appropriateness

To what extent has NRC food assistance contributed to sustain nutritional and dietary standards of IDPs - in response to their needs and demands and context Is NRC’s approach to HOUSEHOLDS food assistance in line with populations concerns? Is the FFL project in line with NRC’s distribution policy? (do no harm, timing, participation, cultural sensitivity, gender sensitivity, quality) NRC’s capacity (staffing and resources) to distribute the appropriate response How does NRC’s structure and organisationa l set up assist in providing relevant and appropriate assistance

TO what extent have beneficiaries demands and needs been addressed in terms of meeting their net food gap? Which standards have been followed to meet the net food gap – have they been appropriate? Is the FFL project the best solution to ensure that the net food gap is met in the current IDP situation?

How have beneficiaries been engaged in project development and implementation – in order to ensure everybody’s right to food? Participation of women in food management committees, capacity building, training etc? How has NRC in its design and implementation clearly spelled out its concern and address of issues regarding women, children and EVIs NRC’s capacity (staffing and resources ) to distribute the appropriate response to selected target groups To what extent has NRC’s gender policy been adhered to in implementation of the project?

Coverage In view of the vast geographical context – how has NRC’s efforts contributed to the total coverage and outreach to people affected by displacement Has NRC adjusted its focus, scope and coverage at different stages of the project?

What percentage do women, children and EVIs make up of the total target group and the extent to which their needs have been addressed. How were the target groups defined and selected

Efficiency NRC’s experience and capacity (material, human, financial) to distribute in the right place at the right time Deliveries, pipeline and local procurement – how has it worked? Timeliness?

Has the net food gap been met in the time and with the resources available to NRC during the project period? If not – why?

How would you describe NRC’s capacity (material, human, financial) to address the conditions of women, children a nd EVIs in the right place at the right time Lessons learned?

Effectiveness How has NRC defined objectives and activities for Has the net food gap been met? What are the concrete achievements and

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NRC objectives and TOR objectives




the food assistance? Are they clear and relevant? To what extent have activities been carried out as per plan? To what extent have objectives for household food assistance been achieved? Challenges? Lessons learned?

To what extent has the concrete objectives been achieved ? Are beneficiaries satisfied with the assistance? Challenges? Lessons learned?

outcomes regarding ensuring the food rights of women, children and EVIs? Female participation and leadership positions? Challenges? Success stories/Best practices? Lessons learned?

Coordination How has the coordination between NRC and other stakeholders (district, communities UN, NGOs) taken place? Relevance of coordination (examples)? Strengths and weaknesses?

Do districts and other stakeholders understand the approach and interventions made by NRC in addressing the net food gap?

Connectedness to relief and recovery and Uganda’s national plans

To what extent has a linkage between relief and recovery in terms of household food security been made? To what extent are the GoU and the district s able to ensure that the IDPs minimum nutritional need are covered after end of the FFL project?

How does the NRC approach to providing humanitarian food assistance link to the national recovery plans (PRDP)

Sustainability What has NRC done to ensu re sustainability (enhance productive capacity and self reliance of people affected by displacement)?

How has NRC planned for not only HOUSEHOLDS, but also vulnerable groups in scaling up food security and livelihoods interventions to meet gradual reductio n in food distribution?

Impact Impact according to indicators: distribution, malnutrition (gam), participation … vis a vis target?

Impact?

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NRC objectives and TOR objectives




What effects can be seen from FFL – at house hold level Intended and unintended?

Cross cutting issues

How has t he FFL project adopted a gender sensitive approach?

How has the FFL project ensured that protection concerns have been incorporated ? Has a rights based approach been adopted?

What are the best practices and lessons learned from working to safeguard peop le fundamental right to food?

Monitoring Are there mechanisms in place for monitoring FFL and the way it has adapted appropriately to changes in context and needs? How have they worked?

Has post distribution monitoring been carried out?

Are there mechani sms in place to monitor women’s participation in food distribution?