The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 44 | Number 2 | Article ID 4392 | Nov 02, 2015

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Northeast Eurasia as Historical Center: Exploration of a JointFrontier

Nianshen Song

Summary:

In this paper I use a transborderlens to investigate the regionencompassed by the Russian FarEast, northeast China, easternMongolia, northern Korea, and theS e a o f J a p a n . W e n e e d t otranscend the framework of nation-states and restore the region’shistorical agency in a broadergeographic, geopolitical, andeconomic context. We also need tov i e w t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i cdevelopment of the area in termsof a protracted process in whichvarious indigenous groups playedcrucial roles. Recognizing thehistorical dynamic of this regionhelps to reconceptualize itspresent and future development.

Key Words: Northeast Eurasia, Russian FarEast, the greater Amur River region, Hunchun,Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI)

Since 2000, Russia has increasingly turned itsgaze eastward emphasizing the economicpotential of Siberia and the Far East. From2014, international tensions in the wake of theUkraine crisis have further reinforced Russia’s“pivot to Asia,” a policy that emphasizescooperation between its Far East and the EastAsian countries.1 This move brought worldattention to the northeast part of the Eurasiancontinent, a long overlooked region that is asubstantial and conceptual “frontier” for both

Russia and Asia.2 This paper focuses on thetransborder region encompassed by theRussian Far East, northeast China, easternMongolia, northern Korea, and the Sea ofJapan. I call it a “joint frontier” in that it isviewed as an outer and peripheral region inpolitical, economic, and social terms by allsurrounding nation states. To understand thehistorical dynamics of this frontier, I argue, weshould view it not as an isolated and dividedspace at the margins of nation states butrestore its historical agency in a broadergeographic, geopolitical, and economic context.We also need to view the socioeconomictransformation of the area as a processencompassing at least 500 years, if not more,with multiple indigenous groups, state andnonstate actors alike, playing crucial roles inlocal development and interchanges. Realizingthe historical dynamic of this region will helpus reconsider its contemporary and futuredevelopment and its place in the geopolitics ofthe wider region.

Boundaries and Nation-CenteredNarratives

The geographic area I am focusing onencompasses the Russian Far East (includingSakhalin Island), northeast China, easternMongolia, northern Korea, and the Japaneseisland of Hokkaidō. We have no common nameto refer to this vast borderland in thenortheastern part of the Eurasian Continent.The modern phrase “Far East,” which waspopularly used before the 1960s, typicallyreferred to Eastern Asia (including northeastAsia and sometimes southeast Asia). Today,“Far East” as a fixed geopolitical term is

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arguably only officially used in Russia (Dal’niyVostok), referring to the eastern territorycomprising the Far Eastern Federal District.Since Russia is not normally considered anAsian nation, few scholars discuss the RussianFar East within the framework of Asia (and viceversa).3 By the same token, none of theindigenous terms used in Asian countriescaptures this vast land stretching from theTumen River region all the way to the ChukchiPeninsula.

The Northeast Eurasian Region (Revised by authorfrom the “Relief Map of Far Eastern Federal District”in Wikimedia Commons. “J. A. O.” is the “JewishAutonomous Oblast.”)

Scholars refer to the Russian Far East as a“frozen frontier” or “the last frontier.” 4 Theextremely harsh climate and mountainoustopography, with its diverse ecological systems,make it one of the few areas in the Eurasiancontinent that has not been fully developed bymodern states. The Russian Far East is ofcourse not an isolated space. Its ecology andgeography were shared with the largergeoecological realm surrounding it. Thesouthern part of this area (including thegreater Amur River region5 and the Sea ofJapan) deserves special attention, as it has long

been a center of human activity, a place wheremultiple state influences intersect. Indigenousinhabitants long shared a similar nomadic orseminomadic lifestyle of hunting, fishing, andgathering. It was not until the nineteenthcentury that these modes of productiongradually diversified with timbering, mining,agriculture and eventually industry brought byimmigrant settlers. Local histories, not alwaysin written form, largely concentrated on thisrelatively warmer part of the frontier. Likewise,if we look at today’s Russian Far East, leavingaside other parts of the region, it is clear thatthe local population is concentrated in itssouthern part. A significantly greater portion ofeconomy in this federal district (90 percent ofagricultural production, heavy industry,consumer goods production, and foodprocess ing) i s in the f ive border ingadministrative units of Amur Oblast, JewishAutonomous Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai,Primorsky Krai, and Sakhalin Oblast.Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, the two largestcities in the Russian Far East (their populationsfar outnumbering that of the third largest city,Komsomolsk-on-Amur6), are both border citiesand transportation hubs. Their strategicimportance comes precisely from their locationas gateways connecting the Russian Far East tothe surrounding areas.

This puzzle – there is no common name toidentify this vast and geographically integratedrealm – is related to another problem: theobstinate habit of understanding all space fromthe perspective of the modern state. Historiansand political scientists tend to look at thisperipheral region from various “centers” andwith a contemporary sense of internationalboundaries. The very term “Far East,” ofcourse, betrays a deep-seated Eurocentrism. InAnglophone scholarship, “northeast Eurasia” isnot an independent category of Asian studiesbut only partly overlaps with “inner Asianfrontiers,” which includes (greater) Manchuriaas well as (greater) Mongolia, ChineseTurkistan (Xinjiang), and Tibet.7 Until recently,

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written histories in Russia, China, Korea, andJapan all describe indigenous peoples (most ofthem nomadic tribes) as “barbarian.”8

Moreover, the surrounding states, recognizingonly their own parts of the region, divided thisecological and historical unit into severalseparate subregions: the Russian Far East andSiberia, China’s northeast three provinces andeastern Inner Mongolia, northeast Korea,eastern Mongolia, and northern Japan. Such aview ignores, even denies, the historicalinteractions among local peoples. It also turnsa blind eye to the longue durée development ofthis land by inhabitants of multiple cultures forthousands of years before the coming ofmodern imperial and national states. It isperhaps not far-fetched to draw an analogybetween this region and what scholars ofSoutheast Asia, notably James Scott, call“Zomia,” the highland region stretching fromthe Indochinese Peninsula and southwest Chinato northern India: both are divided by moderninternational borders and are home to diverseindigenous peoples that all neighboring statesregard as “marginal.”9

The Greater Amur River Region (Source: WikimediaCommons)

Any historical narrative about this jointfrontier, then, can hardly be immune to a state-

centered perspective. The most typical exampleis the history of Russia’s eastward expansioninto Siberia from the late sixteenth century,which usually starts like this: spurred by thethought of the profitable fur trade, the powerfulStroganov merchant family, with the support ofTsar Ivan the Terrible (r. 1533-1584), recruitedCossack mercenar ies led by YermakTimofeyevich (? -1584) to conquer Siberia inthe name of the tsar. With their more advancedweaponry, Yermak and his army of 840 Cossacksoldiers invaded and overthrew the KuchumKhan of Sibir in 1582. From this point, Moscowvigorously expanded its military power east tothe Ural Mountains, establishing numerousfortresses to solidify the new Russian coloniesin this terra incognita. In 1647 the Russiansbuilt Okhotsk, their first fortress on the Pacificcoast and what was to become the moststrategic Russian base in the Far East until theAmur Acquisition in 1860. It is not surprisingthat Russia’s eastward march is frequently seenas parallel to the Anglo-American westwardconquest at the other end of the Pacific in thenineteenth century.10 Historian Alan Woodreminds us of the speed of Russia’s expansion:“If one accepts the date of Yermak’s originalforay as 1582, then Russia’s early pioneers hadtraversed the entire continent from the Urals tothe Pacific in the space of only 65 years.”11

The story of the Russian expedition, importantas it is, has nevertheless been presented as aone-sided colonial narrative, much like itsAmerican counterpart of Manifest Destiny.While highlighting the continuity of Russianempire/nation-building, it ignores the internalmomentum of regional development over amuch more protracted historical period. Itcompresses history to a brief moment – a mere65 years – relegating the long durée to thestatus of prologue to the consolidation of theRussian state. Another problem of the Russia-centered narrative is that it isolates theeastward movement from its global context.Such a movement i s dep ic ted as an“occasional” event due mainly to the initiative

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of certain “national heroes” (as Yermak isportrayed in modern Russian historiography).The impulse of capital accumulation and thedesire to join a global competition forcommercial interest are largely separated fromthe story of frontier exploitation.

The Russian version of frontier historiographyis hardly unique. Similar narratives can befound in almost all countries in the transborderregion. Japanese historians, for example, haveseen the colonization of Hokkaidō and Karafuto(Sakhalin Island) of the Meiji period as asignificant step towards a modern Japanesenation.12 China, too, weaves this remote frontierinto its nationalist historical memory. Modernhistoriography either emphasizes Han or non-Han rule over the Inner and Outer Manchurianregion from the Han to Qing dynasties orstresses defense and territorial loss in the faceof Russian and Japanese intrusions.13 Since theearly twentieth century, Korean nationalisthistoriography has called for greater attentionto the continental elements of the peninsularnation. The nostalgia for the ancient kingdomsof Koguryŏ (37 BC–668 AD) and Parhae(698–926) (Gaogouli and Bohai in Chinese),whose territory expanded from the LiaodongPeninsula to Primorsky, has an important placein historical textbooks and museum exhibitionsin contemporary North and South Korea.14

In all this rhetoric of the past, many indigenouspeoples are voiceless; history is fragmented,the space segregated. The overall developmentof the Northeast Eurasian continent, instead ofbeing examined as a continuous process and anorganic part of world history, is broken intopieces each of which is subsumed as aperipheral part of the Russian, Chinese,Japanese, and Korean Histories (with a capitalH—history as a linear narrative of a nation).These parallel linear Histories, of course,hardly coincide, overlapping only in the case ofconfrontations (territorial, political, ethnic,economic, and military) among imperial ornational states. This region was the battlefield

of the Qing-Russian border wars (1652–1689),the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the SiberianIntervention (1918-1922), the Soviet-Japaneseborder conflicts (1932-1945), and the PRC-Soviet border war (1969), to name a few. It isno surprise, then, that being a gateway or“meeting ground”15 of different cultures andcivilizations, the region is rather portrayed asthe “cradle of conflict.”16

An Alternative Narrative: NortheastEurasia as the Center

Recent developments in historiography,especially the application of world systemtheory and increasing attention to marginalcommunities, provide opportunities to rethinkthe history of this joint frontier.17 By examiningindigenous dynamics of regional development, Iplace the transformation of Northeast Eurasiain a regional and global (as opposed tonational) context. This is not to deny thatcompetitive nation building over the last twocenturies has been a decisive stimulus forborderland transitions. To the contrary, afrontier-centric view aims at reexamining theinteraction between hinterland and frontier. Iturges us to recognize the historical significanceof the nation-state-building processes in allsurrounding countries and gives us a new anglefrom which to cons ider the ongoingdevelopment of the region and its potential .

From the Ancient Period to the MongolEmpire

Northeast Eurasia was the home of variousancient Altaic- or Turkish-speaking peoples.Many of them, such as the Sushen, Huimo,Donghu, Xianbei, Wuhuan, Fuyu, Woju, Mohe,Koguryŏ (Chinese: Gaogouli), Shiwei, Khitan,and Jurchen, gradually merged into (oramalgamated with) other groups and becameindistinguishable from them. Many others, suchas the Yakut, Nanai (Ch: Hezhe), Oroqen (Ch:Erlunchun), Daur, Koryaks, Evenks (Ch:

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Erwenke), Chukchi, Nivkh, and Ainu, areofficially recognized minorities and indigenouspeoples in today’s Russia, China, and Japan. Itshould be emphasized that the boundaries ofthese groups were far from rigid, and there wasa large degree of overlap or acculturation bothamong them and with the surroundingcommunities such as the Han Chinese, Manchu,Russian, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese. Adistinguishing feature of the indigenous groupsis that most of them engaged in hunting,fishing, and gathering as their primary form oflivelihood. Agriculture was also developed inthe southern parts of the border region,especially in Manchuria and the northernKorean Peninsula. Archeological evidenceshows the sociopolitical organizations of theindigenous people varied. Some formed statesor quasi-states, others did not. Before theMongol Empire (1206<-1368) conqueredsubstantial parts of the Eurasian continent andfor the first time placed a major part ofN o r t h e a s t E u r a s i a u n d e r a s i n g l eadministration (the Liaoyang Xingsheng),several indigenous kingdoms had ruled variousparts of this frontier. Among them wereKoguryŏ, Parhae, the Khitan Liao (915–1125),and the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234).

Liao Dynasty in 1025 AD

Jin Dynasty in 1141 AD (Source: WikimediaCommons)

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Liao Dynasty in 1025 AD

Jin Dynasty in 1141 AD (Source: WikimediaCommons)

The early history of Northeast Eurasia wasrecorded mainly in Chinese official histories.These works portrayed a geopolitical maphighlighting the military tension between theMiddle Kingdom and the nomad Xiongnu

Khanate (4th century BC – 48 AD) in today’snorthern China, Mongolia, and Central Asia. Tothe east, various tribal polities in the greaterAmur River region (Wuhuan, Xianbei, etc.)were viewed as either potential allies orenemies in the China-Xiongnu confrontation.John Stephan argues that in this early stageChina had the most visible cultural and politicalinfluence in the area.18 The Han Dynasty (206BC–220 AD) established four commanderies in109 BC to rule today’s southern northeastChina and the northern Korean Peninsula. Bythe time of the Western Jin Dynasty (216-366),however, with the rise of Koguryŏ, all fourcommanderies had dissolved (313 AD). TheTang Dynasty (618–907), along with Silla ofKorea, overthrew Koguryŏ in 668. The Tang notonly reestablished Chinese control over theYalu and Tumen River region but also set upoutposts and established “tributary” relationswith native chiefs in the middle and lowerAmur River regions. Meanwhile, otherneighboring polities attempted to expand tothis area. In the mid-seventh century, Japanesegeneral Abe no Hirafu launched severalsuccessful wars against the Sushen (Japanese:Mishihase) and Emishi/Ainu peoples inHokkaidō. But the Tang-Silla allied forcedefeated Abe’s later invasion of the KoreanPeninsula.19

Although the centralizing governments viewedit as a marginal place, the diverse inhabitantsof the greater Amur River region played acritical role in bringing East Asian societiestogether. Through war, trade, migration, andgovernmental communication, the region notonly linked societies in China, Korea, and Japanbut also connected East Asia to a larger world.Take the example of local religions: in all earlyindigenous regimes, from Koguryŏ to theMongol Yuan, the belief system was a mixtureof Buddhism and nat ive Shamanism(occasionally combined with Daoism), whichconfirmed the region’s geocultural importanceas a meeting ground of South Asia, CentralAsia, and East Asia. It was also a hub on the

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trans-Eurasian trade route (aka the Silk Road):those traveling from Europe to Korea and Japansimply couldn’t bypass this region. The earliestrecorded Japanese contacts with China werethrough the four commanderies.20 Later theKoguryŏ kingdom frequently interacted withvarious Chinese dynasties to its west, Paekcheand Silla to its south, the Wuji/Mohe tribes toits north, and Japan in the east. The Parhaekingdom established official diplomacy withboth Tang China and Japan in the eighth andninth centuries. The Khitan Liao and JurchenJin not only penetrated deeply into the Chinesehinterland but fostered trade relationships withstates in central Asia, west Asia, and eveneastern Europe. In most Slavic languages, theword “Khitan” (Kitay in Russian) is still thename for China, revealing the huge historicalimpact the Northeast Eurasian power once hadin both ends of the continent.

The regimes that arose in premodern NortheastEurasia have distinct sociopolitical features(e.g. nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle andshamanism) that differentiate them to varyingdegrees from the Chinese, Korean, andJapanese states that existed in the same period.Today, however, their histories have beensubsumed into the larger Chinese, Korean,Mongolian, and Japanese national Histories,provoking fierce debates as to which modernnation-state can lay claim to a particularindigenous regime. One of the most visibleconflicts in recent decades has been theC h i n e s e - K o r e a n d i s p u t e o v e rKoguryŏ/Gaogouli.21 Each side refused to viewthe ancient kingdom as an independentregional polity that adopted (and rejected)influences from both the Middle Kingdom andthe southern part of the Korean Peninsula.Although the PRC and the ROK maintained aglowing bilateral trade record, the antagonismignited by anachronistic historical narrativescertainly hindered their political trust andcooperation.

The Age of Discovery, the Competition

between Empires

Scholars refer to the expansion of power inWestern Europe in the fifteenth to seventeenthcenturies as the Age of Discovery, highlightingthe maritime exploration of the trade route thateventually incorporated most human societiesinto a capitalist world. The main players wereSpain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, andFrance. But let us not forget two importantelements that were deeply embedded in theEuropean motive to “discover” the world. Thefirst was the desire to find a route to tradedirectly with the East, including India, China,and Southeast Asia. This was at least partiallyinspired by Marco Polo’s travels to the MongolYuan (1271-1368), a transcontinental powerthat arose from the northeast Eurasian steppe.The other was the persistent need to acquirevarious kinds of fur (known as “soft gold” at thetime) thanks to the global cooling in thesixteenth and seventeenth centuries.22 It wasthese two elements that absorbed NortheastEurasia into an increasingly globalized tradenetwork in which the Amur region would playan important role. Contrary to earlierassumptions, China was not an outsider in thistransformative era. Recent scholarshipdemonstrates that Ming China’s voyage to theIndian Ocean from 1405 to 1433, led by theMuslim eunuch and mariner Zheng He, sharedmany similarities with European maritimeexpansion.23

Another Chinese expedition around the sameperiod that is less well known than Zheng He’svoyage is the expedition to the Amur Riverregion led by another eunuch, Yishiha (Isiqa).In 1409 Emperor Yongle (r. 1402-1424) set upthe Nurgan Regional Military Commission(Nu’ergan dusi) in today’s Tyr, Russia, toincorporate local tribes in the Amur andSungari River regions to his frontieradministration. From 1411 to 1432, as animperial envoy, Yishiha led the Ming fleet toinspect the Nurgan region (including SakhalinIsland) on ten occasions.24 Like Zheng He’s

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voyage, Yishiha’s overland expeditionscombined political, military, and commercialinterests. Ming China’s strategic goal was tosecure local Jurchen support for its militarycampaign against the post-Yuan Mongols andto establish tributary relationships with nativechiefs. Ming rule of this vast area followed theTang practice of “nominal governorship” (jimi),in which native leaders received official titlesand were entrusted to govern local affairs inexchange for political submission andpreservation of order. Historical records showthat Yishiha, who spent nine years altogether inNurgan, was in contact not only with theJurchens but also the Nivkh, Ainu, and otherindigenous tribes.25 His expedition significantlyincreased social, political, and commercialexchanges between Beijing and Nurgan.Although the Nurgan commission wasabolished in 1434, the more than 200 guardsand dozens of outposts supervised by Nurganlargely remained until the Jianzhou Jurchenunified the region in the early seventeenthcentury and renamed the Jurchen people“Manchu.”26

Early Ming expeditions in the South China Sea, theIndian Ocean, central Asia, and northeast Asia. Thered line shows Yishiha’s expedition; the black lineshows Zheng He’s voyages. The green line showsChen Cheng’s mission to Central Asia in the first halfof the 15th century. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

The Ming northeast expedition needs to beunderstood within global, regional, and localframeworks. First, the expedition was part ofthe imperial enterprise of extending China’spolitical influence, as was Zheng He’s voyageto the Indian Ocean. It incorporated NortheastEurasia into what was to become a much moreconnected world. Commodity exchanges, in theform of tributary mission or border markets,strengthened Manchuria’s socioeconomic tieswith China, Korea, and Siberia. Horsesproduced in Manchuria, furs in Siberia, andfoodstuff and iron implements in China’sCentral Plains and Korea were among the mostimportant commodities. Various Jurchen chiefscompeted for the limited patents to trade withthe Ming. The monopoly of the Ming tradeeventually contributed to Nurhaci’s unificationof the Jurchen tribes in the late sixteenth andearly seventeenth century.27 Second, theexpedition occurred around the time whenChosŏn Korea (1392-1897) expanded itsterritory to the Tumen River and MuromachiJapan (1336-1573) to southern Hokkaidō. Allthree East Asian powers were marching northto solidify control over the ethnic frontiers inthe wake of the collapse of the Mongol Empire.Third, the establishment of Nurgan was initiallyproposed by native Jurchen tribes and wassupervised by Yishiha, an ethnic Jurchenhimself.28 These facts suggest that localinitiative could be equally critical, if not moreimportant, in linking the capital and thefrontiers. The creation of the northeastEurasian gateway was never a one-sidedproject imposed by the imperial state.

The seventeenth century was a period of globalimperial competition. It witnessed not only therise of maritime powers like the Netherlandsand Britain but also the rise of two continentalpowers in Eurasia: the Manchu Qing in the eastand Russian Tsardom in the west.29 Russia waslured eastward to Siberia and the Far East, asmentioned above, by the huge profits in the furtrade. Historians suggest that before the fiscalreform of Peter the Great (r. 1696-1725),

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profits from the fur trade accounted forapproximately 10% of the state revenue.30 Thesame quest for fur drove the Dutch, the British,and the French to explore and conquer NorthAmerica. The two new sources for fur, Siberiaand North America, spurred the contests formarkets and trade routes. But fur was not itselfthe end goal. European explorers expected thecapital generated by the fur trade to fund abigger enterprise: trade with China. As TimothyBrook explains, “The dream of getting to Chinais the imaginative thread that runs through thehistory of early-modern Europe's struggle toescape from its isolation and enter the widerworld.”31 From this perspective, Russia’seastward push, perhaps the only expedition toki l l two birds with one stone, was aninseparable part of early global reach of theEuropean powers.

In the late seventeenth century, however,Russia’s exploration in the Far East waschecked by the Qing in the Amur River basin.For Qing China, the northeast frontier hadunique political, social, ritual, religious, andeconomic meanings since it was regarded asthe birthplace of the ruling ethnic group, theManchus. During its rise, the Qing successfullyincorporated or conquered various Mongoltribes, and established its control over theinner Asian steppe. Many recent scholars thusemphasize the Manchu Qing’s nature as aninner Asian power as opposed to merelyanother Chinese dynasty.32 I would ratheremphasize its Northeast Eurasian character.Qing rule over the greater Manchurian regionwas institutionally distinct from both the orderimposed in China proper (the Six Boardssystem) and that in the rest of inner Asia (thelifanyuan system). The region was ruled underthe indigenous banner system and supervisedby three military commanders (Shengjing, Jilinand Heilongjiang). Until 1905, almost allcommanders were members of either theManchu or Mongol Eight Banners.33

Qing policy towards the Amur River region

differed from Russian policy towards the sameregion. During most of the Qing period, theforest zone of Jilin and Heilongjiang, largelysegregated from the agricultural zone ofLiaodong and the nomadic zone of Mongolia,was designated as “royal reserves” for theManchus. Access to this part of the empire waslimited. As a result, in the seventeenth andeighteenth century when Russia graduallyextended its reach to the far north, evenAlaska, the Qing Northeast Eurasia waspreserved from exploitation (and continued tobe so until the late nineteenth century).

The military clash between the two greatpowers eventually led to a Qing-Russianagreement to divide Northeast Eurasia. The1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk officially establishedthe boundaries and regulated bilateral trade.34

The treaty, mediated by Jesuit and Mongolinterpreters, was among the earliest of severalsimilar diplomatic protocols between countriesof the Eurasian continent. In other words, thecompetition over this frontier gave birth to oneof the first international treaties over nationalterritory in the modern world.35 As a result,Russia was kept out of the Amur River basinuntil 1860. In 1727, Russia and Qing Chinasigned the Treaty of Kyakhta, which establishedofficial border trade between the two empires.The treaty made Kyakhta one of the mostfamous Sino-European commercial ports (alongwith Canton) and helped to create a thrivingcross-continental trade route through theMongolian steppe.

The Russian expedition in the Far East in thelate seventeenth century led to the first Russo-Japanese encounter. For generations, manyJapanese ships foundered on the shores of theKamchatka Peninsula. In 1697 a sailor from aJapanese shipwreck, Dembei, encountered aRussian explorer, Vladimir Atlassov, inKamchatka. Dembei eventually was sent to St.Petersburg and served as the first Japanese-language teacher in Russia. From that moment,Russian merchants and envoys appeared in the

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Ezo region (Hokkaido) as well as the Japaneseinterior. They became one of the rare sources,aside from the Dutch, to provide Japaninformation about early modern Europe beforethe coming of the “Black Ships” in the mid-nineteenth century.36

2-3 Modern Stage: The Continuation ofFrontier Transformation

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries arenotable for the global spread of capitalism,nationalism, and industrialism. Imperial,colonial, and national powers struggled againsteach other as they vied for territory, people,markets, and natural resources. The impact inNortheast Eurasia, as in other parts of theworld, was unprecedented. The NortheastEurasian frontier was profoundly transformedby the coming of “modernity” in the form ofglobal capitalism. 37

There is no need to e laborate on thecompetition among Russia (and later the SovietUnion), Japan, China, Korea, and the UnitedStates to control the region in the last twocenturies. But we need to understand howcertain significant transitions in thismultilateral borderland were partly the resultof this competition.

Russia’s territorial acquisitions, especiallyouter Manchuria in 1860 and Sakhalin in 1875,stimulated great immigration waves from alldirections. To strengthen their control onManchuria, the Qing gradually opened whatwere once forbidden lands and encouragedChinese to settle the region. It also allowedKoreans to claim the wild land north to theTumen and Yalu Rivers. By the end of WorldWar II, northeast China was home to 20 millionHan Chinese, nearly 2 million Koreans and 1.66million Japanese. Responding to the Russianthreat, Meiji Japan also moved aggressively tocolonize Hokkaidō and the Kuril Islands. By1945, more than 3.5 million Japanese andothers had migrated to Hokkaidō. Between1860 and 1940, the Russian Far East not only

accommodated millions of immigrants fromUkraine, Siberia, and central Russia but also200,000 Koreans (who were forcibly resettledin central Asia in the 1930s). The immigrantsfar outnumbered the indigenous peoples, whowere classified as ethnic minorities in theirhomeland with the flow of migrants from thelate nineteenth century.

Second, with the arrival of agricultural settlersand large-scale building of infrastructure(roads, railways, ports and cities), what hadbeen a forest frontier simultaneouslyexperienced agricultural and industrialdevelopment. Manchuria and Hokkaidō becameimportant food bases for China and Japan. Thefishing industry in Primorsky and Hokkaidōplayed a critical role in Russia and Japan.Mining and timber industries had long beeneconomic pillars of the region. Heavy industriesin northeast China in the twentieth centurywere among the most advanced in East Asia.The result was the modern transformation ofloca l ways o f l i f e and the pro foundtransformation of society and ecology.

Third, the modern transformation of thefrontier took place amidst fierce rivalry amongthe powers. The industrialization of northeastChina can be trace to late Qing New Policyreforms and their extension under the Beiyangwarlords in the 1910s and 20s. The Japaneseturned Manchukuo into an industrial base ofthe colonial empire in the years 1932-45.38 Withsignificant input from the Soviets, northeastC h i n a b e c a m e a v i t a l e n g i n e f o rindustrialization of the PRC from the late1940s. The industrial transformation ofNortheast Eurasia thus continued acrossvarious historical stages, taking place underdiverse political regimes including imperialism,colonialism, nationalism, and socialism). Wecannot understand the transition of the regionwithout seeing its historical continuities.

Fourth, in most the twentieth century when thisfrontier region was fundamentally transformed,

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the dominant economic mode was (and to someextent still is) planned economy, as opposed tomarket economy. On one hand, local products(soybeans, rice, coal, timber, and industrialgoods) were directly sold to the globalcapitalist market in exchange for industrialproducts; on the other hand, various statesproactively controlled and commanded localeconomic development in order to transformthis “virgin land” into an agricultural andindustrial base for modern states.39 Stateprojects, such as intensive infrastructurebuilding (railroads, roads), collectiveagricultural production, energy exploitation,and heavy industrial construction, drove localdevelopment and stimulated inward migrationfrom the early twentieth century to the 1970s.The region’s geostrategic importance longplaced a premium on state planning. In the1990s, neoliberal economic reform in northeastChina, including privatizing state-ownedenterprises and abandoning the welfaresystem, has generally been deemed a failure inboth economic and social terms.40

Finally, the frontier’s transition since thenineteenth century would not have beenpossible had there had been no local initiativeor transboundary collaboration. Take theexample of the Trans-Siberian Railway(1891-1916) (including the Chinese EasternRailway and South Manchurian Railwayattached to i t ) , a grand project thatsignificantly changed Northeast Eurasia’spolitical, economic, and ecological landscapes.The construction of the railway combined theefforts of engineers, laborers, managers, localsuppliers, and technicians from Russia, China,Korea, and Japan. It was hardly an enterprisecompleted by one government or one group ofpeople. By the same token, northeast China andPrimorsky became rice producers only becauseKorean immigrants, through years ofexperiment in the early twentieth century,applied Japanese seed and their farming skill tothe paddy fields in this high-latitude area.41

Later Chinese, Russians, and Japanese all

promoted rice farming in this area, to theextent that the principal local food changedfrom millet to rice. This history of localcooperation is, I believe, particularly pertinentfor discussion today. In this multinationalfrontier, no single nation could build a thrivingeconomy or society on its own.

Hunchun: A Case Study

Perhaps no city better exemplifies the historicalevolution of this joint frontier than Hunchun, aborder town in the Yanb ian KoreanAutonomous Prefecture in China’s JilinProvince. Located at the mouth of the TumenRiver and facing the settlement of Posyet inRussia, the city of Rasŏn in North Korea, andthe Sea of Japan, Hunchun is regional hub. Thetownship was first built by the Koguryŏkingdom and set up by the Parhae dynasty asthe eastern capital (Longyuanfu) and politicalcenter. During the Parhae period (698-926), therulers sent envoys from Hunchun to Japanthirty-four times, receiving thirteen returnvisits. Trade between Parhae and Japan (fur,textile, ginseng) thrived until Hunchun wasoccupied by the Jurchen in the tenth century. In1714 the Qing established a mid-rankingbanner unit of assistant commandant (xieling)in Hunchun, in 1859, promoting it to vicecommander-in-chief (fudutong). According tothe terms of the Qing-Russian Treaty of Beijing(1860), Russia occupied the mouth of theTumen River, so that Hunchun (and the wholeof northeast China) lost direct access to the Seaof Japan.42

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The location of Hunchun

In the late nineteenth century, Hunchun was nolonger a military town inhabited mainly by theManchus. With the opening of Manchuria, thisborder town grew to become a center of theregional market network. Merchants fromChina, Japan, and Russia flooded in, along withHan and Korean agricultural immigrants. By1909 Hunchun was home to more than 7,000people and 500 firms. Adjoined by the PosyetBay of Russia, Hunchun was an importantintersection of several land and maritimeroutes in northeast Asia, proclaiming itself thecenter of the Hunchun-Vladivostok commercialcircle. The business area of the circle coveredJilin and Heilongjiang of Manchuria, thesouthern part of Primorskaya Oblast, northernKorea, and northern Japan, as shown in thechart below.

The Hunchun-Vladivostok circle connected withthe business circles in Shandong, Shanghai,and Japan. According to Chinese historianHuang Jinfu, many Hunchun merchants set upheadquarters in Shanghai, general branches inHunchun and Vladivostok, and retail shops intowns and villages in eastern Jilin.

44

This linked

the world market to the multilateral frontier ofJilin-Hamgyŏng-Primorsky. Local agriculturalproducts (soybean bricks, soybean oil,vegetables, livestock, and timber) wereexported from Hunchun in exchange forindustrial products from inner China, Russiaand other countries. The imports included finecloth (made in Japan, Shanghai, the UnitedStates, and Britain), oil products (mainly MeiFoo, a local brand of Standard Oil from theUnited States), matches (Japan), gauze andwoolens (Russia), seafood (Russia and Japan),cigarettes (Russia and Britain), and cotton(Japan and China).

45

When the Chinese Eastern Railway, whichconnected Siberia and Vladivostok throughManchuria, was built in1903, Hunchun’s statusas a regional commercial center was weakened.Cargo imported from Vladivostok and PosyetBay could then be delivered to Manchuria andRussia without passing through Hunchun. Butwhat was more significant was the borderrestriction that resulted from military tensionsbetween the newly established Soviet Unionand Japan in the 1920s.46 In 1922, the Sovietsturned Vladivostok into a navy port and closedoff the border, curtailing overseas trade. Adecade later, Japan occupied the whole ofManchuria and established Manchukuo. Fromthe 1920s to the end of WWII , Japanmonopolized international trade in Hunchun.The once thriving multinational commercialtown became an easy channel for Japan todump its products to Manchuria.47 During theCold War, aside from very limited exchangesbetween China and North Korea, there was litleinternational trade in Hunchun.48

The Hunchun Commercial Circle

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The end of the Cold War brought newopportunities for local development. In 1992the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) endorsed the Tumen River AreaDevelopment Programme (renamed the GreaterTumen Initiative in 2005).49 Proposed first byChina, the program envisaged regionaleconomic cooperation among the neighboringcountries and aimed to create a free economiczone in the Tumen River delta. Hunchun wasregarded as the linchpin to implement thisplan. The city soon established a BorderEconomic Cooperation Zone in hope offollowing the successful developmental modelof Chinese coastal cities. After several years ofhigh-speed development and investment fever,however, the government-oriented planreached a bottleneck. Since the late 1990s, theprogram has stagnated. Trying to pinpoint thereason for the failure, one local officialsuggested that the lack of internationalcooperation was the main obstacle.50 Mostobservers also attribute the difficulty toongoing geopolitical tensions in the region.51

The City of Hunchun (photo by Wang Laihui, 2012)

Recognizing the difficulties, the Chinesegovernment altered the original plan andrefocused on developing the provincialeconomy of Jilin, hoping that its power wouldradiate to the frontier. In 2009 the Jilin

provincial government presented the “Outlineof the Tumen River Area CooperativeDevelopment Program Considering Changchun-Jilin-Tumen as a Pilot Zone for Developmentand Opening.”52 The program soon received theChinese central government’s endorsement.53

The new plan prioritized the economicintegration of the three sub-regions in Jilin:Changchun, Jilin, and the Yanbian KoreanAutonomous Prefecture. Hunchun’s strategicstatus was again highlighted. Viewingindustrialized regions like Changchun and Jilinas its hinterland, the Chinese promised to turnHunchun into the “bridgehead of Tumen Riverregional cooperation.” Some progress has beenmade since 2009, especially in infrastructure.The collaboration with North Korea, includingthe long-term lease of the Rasŏn port andtransborder tourism, also shows some positivesigns. Yet the program faces challenges in theform of international and domestic politics,long-term investment, and a sustainable socialenvironment. Considering especially thecurrent awkward China-DPRK relationshipsince North Korean leader Kim Jungunassumed power in 2011, the future of bilateraleconomic cooperation remains in doubt.

Viewed in regional perspective, neither theTumen Initiative nor the Changchun-Jilin-Tumen program is a new creation. Rather, eachcan be seen as a return to the past or theresumption of an historical trajectory that wasinterrupted by geopolitical conflict in the lastcentury. The historical evolution of Hunchun—and the northeast frontier in general—wasnever just about economy or trade. AlthoughHunchun once played a leading role in regionaltrade, the prosperity of such a network wascontingent on the social-ecological transition ofNortheast Eurasia in general. The key to itshistorical success was not so much the logic ofa t r a n s b o r d e r f r e e m a r k e t b u t t h etransformation of the frontier region within adynamic state and region. Without acomprehensive program for promoting socialand ecological development in Hunchun and

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throughout the region, the economy willeventually lose momentum. In the past twodecades, transportation and communicationsinfrastructure in Hunchun has growndramatically. However, a significant portion ofyoung ethnic Koreans have left for employmentas migrant workers in South Korea. The“empty-nest” family has become a pervasivesocial problem in both the countryside andcities in Yanbian. If current economic plans andprograms cannot attract local youth, how willthey attract people from elsewhere?

Conclusion:

Russia’s recent “pivot to Asia” has drawninterest in the economic potential of theNortheast Eurasian frontier. But Russia’s moveis only the latest in various similar projectsinitiated by various states in the region. Forexample, Japan was arguably the first countryto promote the concept of “the economic circlesurrounding the Sea of Japan.” Immediatelyafter the end of the Cold War, this projectenvisioned international collaboration amongJapan, Russia, China, and the two Koreas.Japan’s plan was followed by the GreaterTumen Initiative, which was announced by theUNDP and endorsed by China, Russia,Mongolia, South Korea, and North Korea(which withdrew in 2009). Moreover, in the1990s, North Korea established its first“economic special zone” in Rasŏn, a city thatadjoins both Russia and China. In 2010,P'yŏngyang even promoted Rasŏn as a “specialcity” governed directly by P'yŏngyang. Russia’srecent “pivot” further confirms the strategicimportance of this Eurasian gateway.

However, none of the previous projectsachieved their goal. If this plan is to be moresuccessful, it is important to learn the lessonssuggested by earlier projects. The mostimportant one, simply put, is that the nationalagendas of each country hardly coincide. Inter-national conflicts during the last century haverepeatedly undermined attempts to fulfill the

regional potential for development and trade.Ultimately, multilateral cooperation is criticalto the success of all of these projects.

By providing an alternative way to view thehistory and modern development of thenortheast Eurasian frontier, I argue forunderstanding this ecological space in terms ofits unique historical agency, with its owndevelopmental dynamic. It was never isolatedfrom “civilizations,” nor was it merely a jointperiphery of multiple nation-states. Rather, thisregion not only played a crucial role inconnecting various Asian societies while alsogiving birth to some great transregionalpowers, notably the Yuan and the Qing. Thehistory of this frontier is inseparable fromregional and global history with their cycles ofabsorption and expansion. This multilateralinteraction repeatedly transformed the region,at times making it a dynamic immigrantdestinations and developmental area, whileremaining susceptible to conflicts among theregional powers.

Current attempts to revitalize the economy ofthis joint frontier must be seen within thehistorical trajectory of local and regionalevolution and transformation; success hingesultimately on the development of local andregional social and ecological systems.Comparing the trading systems in SoutheastAsia, where the overseas Chinese played acritical role in forming a social network,Takeshi Hamashita observes that a majordifficulty for the future development ofNortheast Asia is “the lack of an appropriatehuman network that could serve as a templatefor regional structures.”54 Internationalcooperation is possible only if there is sufficientlocal initiative. A unilaterally imposed plancannot succeed if it serves only the short-terminterests of a state rather than the long-termwelfare of a transborder society. By the sametoken, a neoliberal vision of a “free-trade zone,”which highlights only economic developmentbut not social and ecological development, is

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hardly sustainable.

Nianshen Song (nisong@vassar.edu) is aMellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the HistoryDepartment, Vassar College. This article isbased on a paper he presented at theconference “Developing Asia Pacific's LastFrontier: Fostering International Cooperationin the Development of Russia's Siberia and FarEast,” held in Vladivostok, Russia, in 2015.

Recommended citation: Nianshen Song,"Northeast Eurasia as Historical Center:Exploration of a Joint Frontier", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 44, No. 2,November 2, 2015.

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Notes

1 Andrew C. Kuchins, “Russia and the CIS in2013: Russia’s Pivot to Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol.54 , No . 1 , A Survey o f As i a i n 2013(January/February 2014), pp. 129-137.

2 The first recognition of the importance of theregion in Anglophone literature came in the1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.See, for example, Stephen Kotkin and DavidWolff, eds., Rediscovering Russia in Asia:Siberia and the Russian Far East (New York:Routledge, 1995); Mark J. Valencia, ed., TheRussian Far East in Transition: Opportunitiesfor Regional Economic Cooperation (Boulder:Westview Press, 1995); Tsuneo Akaha, ed.,Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East:Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific (London:Routledge, 1997); Peggy Falkenheim Meyer,“The Russian Far East's Economic Integrationwith Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects,”Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Summer 1999),pp. 209-224. Also mention literature on Tumenzone from 1992?

3 For example, the Association for AsianStudies, the world’s leading academicorganization in Asian studies, doesn’t listRussia or the Russian Far East within itsresearch umbrella.

4 For example, see Alan Woods, Russia’s FrozenFrontier: A History of Siberia and the RussianFar East 1581-1991, (New York: BloomsburyAcademy, 2011) and Sue Davis, The RussianFar East: The Last Frontier? (New York:Routledge, 2003).

5 I use this term to refer to an area that roughlyincludes the eastern part of northeast China(Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces, and theeastern part of Inner Mongolia), the southernpart of the Russian Far East (Amur Oblast, theJewish Autonomous Oblast, Primorsky Krai, and

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southern Khabarovsk Krai), the eastern part ofMongolia, and the northeastern part of theKorean Peninsula.

6 According to the 2002 census, the populationsof Vladivostok and Khabarovsk are 594,701 and583,072 respectively. The population ofKomsomolsk-on-Amur, the third largest city inRFE, was 271,600. Source: Russian Census of2002.

7 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontier ofChina (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). See alsoJoseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," in DenisCrispin Twitchett and John King Fairbank, eds.,The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10,Part 1 (London: Cambridge University Press,1978), pp. 35–106. However, in a new bookEvelyn Rawski argues that “[f]rom theperspective of the sixteenth and seventeenthcenturies … the primary Inner Asian influencescome from northeast Asia.” Evelyn Rawski,Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2015) p.2.

8 For example, Yan Congjian, a Chinese writerin the Ming dynasty, defines the Tartars(Mongols) as “Northern Barbarians (di)” andthe Jurchen as “Northeastern barbarians(dongbei yi).” See Zhou yu zhou zi lu, (Beijing:zhong hua shu ju, 1993). Korean texts beforethe 20th century refer to the Jurchen/Manchupeople in its northern border as “barbarians(ho).” Ancient Japanese texts use the term“Emishi” or “Ezo” for aboriginal people livingin northern Honshu and Hokkaido, a termwhich is composed of two characters for“shrimp” and “barbarian.”

9 James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed:An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

10 During the heyday of Russia’s eastwardexpansion, Russian intellectuals frequentlyenvisaged the Amur River region as “Russia’svery own Mississippi.” See Mark Bassin,

Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination andGeographical Expansion in the Russian FarEast, 1840-1865, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999), p.10.

11 Alan Wood, Russia’s Frozen Frontier: AHistory of Siberia and the Russian Far East,1581 – 1991 (New York: Bloomsbury Academic,2011), p. 31.

12 Michele Manson, Dominant Narratives ofColonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan:Envisioning the Periphery and the ModernNation-State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2012).

1 3 Jin Yufu, Dongbei tongshi (东北通史)(Chongqing: Wushi Niandai Press, 1943); XueHong and Li Shutian, eds., Zhongguo dongbeitongshi (中国东北通史) (Changchun: JilinWenshi Press, 1991).

14 Andre Schmid, "Looking North towardManchuria," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 99,No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 219–240; AndreSchmid,"Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch’aehoand the Politics of Territorial History in Korea,"Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1(February 1997), pp. 26-46.

15 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: AHistory (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1994), p. 2.

16 Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle ofConflict (New York: Macmillan, 1935).

17 For example, Takeshi Hamashita’s study ofthe Ryukyu kingdom located at the intersectionof the East China Sea and South China Sea,incorporated world system theory. See “TheRyukyu maritime network from the fourteenthto eighteenth century,” in Takeshi HamashitaTakeshi, “China, East Asia, and the GlobalEconomy : Reg iona l and H i s to r i ca lPerspectives” (London: Routledge, 2008.)

18 Stephan, The Russian Far East, pp. 14-19.

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17

19 Nihon shoki (日本書紀), Vol. 26.

20 Fan Ye, Book of Later Han (后汉书), Vol. 85,Treatise on the Dongyi, “Wo.”

21 Yonson Ahn, “The Contested Heritage ofKoguryo/Gaogouli and China-Korea Conflict,”Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (accessed onMay 6, 2015).

22 See Timothy Brook, Vermeer's Hat: TheSeventeenth Century and the Dawn of theGlobal World (New York: Bloomsbury Press,2008).

23 See Geoff Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: AReassessment,” Journal of the MalaysianBranch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 78,No. 1 (288) (2005), pp. 37-58; Tansen Sen, “TheFormation of Chinese Maritime Networks toSouthern Asia, 1200-1450,” Journal of theEconomic and Social History of the Orient, Vol.49, No. 4 (2006), pp. 421-453.

24 Li Jiancai, Ming dai dong bei (明代东北)(Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 1986), pp.17-19. The size of his expedition varied eachtime. For example, in 1411, he employed 25giant boats with more than 1000 staff andcrew; the final expedition (1432) mobilized 50giant boats with a crew exceeding 2000 .

25 Yishiha, “yong ning si ji (永寧寺記)” and“chong xiu yong ning si ji (重修永寧寺記).”

26 Li Jiancai, Ming dai dongbei, p. 19. Also seeAgui, qing ding man zhou yuan liu kao (欽定滿洲源流考), Vol.1.

27 Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building before1644", in Willard J. Peterson (ed.), CambridgeHistory of China, Vol. 9, Part 1: The Ch'ingDynasty to 1800, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,) pp. 9–72

28 Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, The Eunuchs in theMing Dynasty (New York: SUNY Press, 1996),pp. 129–130.

29 See Peter Perdue, China Marches West: TheQing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2005).

30 Wood, Russia’s Frozen Frontier, p. 32.

31 Brook, Vermeer’s Hat, pp. 43-46.

32 See Pamela Kyle Crossley, A TranslucentMirror: History and Identity in Qing ImperialIdeology (Berkeley : University of CaliforniaPress, 1999); Mark Elliot, The Manchu Way:The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in LateImperial China (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2001); Peter Perdue, ChinaMarches West: The Qing Conquest of CentralEurasia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,2005).

33 The only exception was Fumingga, a memberof the Hanjun banner who was the commanderof Jilin from 1866 to 1870.

34 Peter Perdue, “Boundaries and Trade in theEarly Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinskand Beijing,”

Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3(Spring 2010), pp.341-356.

35 Wang Hui, Xiandai zhongguo sixiang dexingqi (现代中国思想的兴起) (Beijing: SDX JointPress, 2004), p. 690.

36 Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery ofEurope, 1720-1830 (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1969), pp. 31-58.

3 7 By “moderni ty” I mean the g loba lsociopolitical transformation associated withWestern-oriented capitalism, colonialism,industrialism and nationalism in the nineteenthand twentieth centuries.

38 See Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire:Manchuria and the Culture of WartimeImperialism (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1998); Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The

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Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center,2001).

39 Hai Zhao, Manchurian Atlas: CompetitiveGeopolitics, Planned Industrialization and theRise of Heavy Industrial State in NortheastChina, 1918-1954 (PhD dissertation, Universityof Chicago, 2015).

40 See Mun Young Cho, The Specter of “thePeople”: Urban Poverty in Northeast China(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

41 Yi Baozhong, chaoxian yimin yu dongbeishuitian kaifa (朝鲜移民与东北地区水田开发)(Changchun: Chuangchun Press, 1999).

4 2 Hunchun shi d i fangzhi b ianzhuanweiyuanhui, Hunchun Shi Zhi (珲春市志),(Chuangchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2000),pp.11-18.

43 Adapted from Huang Jinfu, “Chuyi jindaimaoyi zhongzhen, Hunchun (刍议近代贸易重镇——珲春),” in Yanbian Institute of HistoricalStudies, ed., Yanbian Lishi Yanjiu (延边历史研究), Vol. 3 (Yanji: Yanbian Institute of HistoricalStudies, 1988), pp. 22-23

44 Ibid.

45 Ge Xiufeng, “Hunchun zaoqi duiwai maoyi(珲春早期对外贸易),” in Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui,Yanbian Committee of the CCPCC, ed., XiriYanbian Jingji,Yanbian Wenshi Ziliao, Vol. 7 (昔日延边经济：延边文史资料第七集), (Yanji:Yanbian Renmin Press, 1995), p. 212. Also seeTokanfu Rinji Kanto Hashutsujo Zanmu Seirijo,

Kanto sangyo chosasho (間島産業調査書),Shōgyō, pp. 23-26, pp. 112-114.

46 Chosengun Shireibu. Kanto oyobi Konshun(間島及琿春), 1921, pp.55-56.

47 Japan did this by lowering the import tax forJapanese goods. See Hunchun shi zhi, p.400and p.461. See also Setsurei Tsurushima,Tomanko chiiki kaihatsu (豆満江地域開発),(Suita-shi : Kansai Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2000),p.176.

48 Hunchun shi zhi, pp.455-461.

49 Greater Tumen Initiative (accessed on May 6,2015).

50 See the interview with Deng Kai, CCPsecretary of the Yanbian Korean AutonomousPrefecture, in 2007 by the Xinhua NewsAgency.

51 For example, see Shen Yue, “Tumenjiangquyu guoji hezuo: libi yinsu yu jianyi (图们江区域国际合作:利弊因素与建议),” Jingying guanlizhe, 2013, Issue 27.

52 Zhenxing dongbei wang.

53 Central People’s Government of People’sRepublic of China, official website (accessed onMay 6, 2015).

54 Takeshi Hamashita, “The Future of NortheastAsia,” in Stephen Kotkin and David Wolff, eds.,Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and theRussian Far East (New York: M. E. Sharpe,1995), p. 320.