G.R. No. 80774 May 31, 1988SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO VEGA,respondents.Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices for petitioner.The Solicitor General for public respondent.FELICIANO,J.:In line with an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner San Miguel Corporation ("Corporation;" "SMC") and under which management undertook to grant cash awards to "all SMC employees ... except [ED-HO staff, Division Managers and higher-ranked personnel" who submit to the Corporation Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation, private respondent Rustico Vega submitted on 23 September 1980 an innovation proposal. Mr. Vega's proposal was entitled "Modified Grande Pasteurization Process," and was supposed to eliminate certain alleged defects in the quality and taste of the product "San Miguel BeerGrande:"Title of ProposalModified Grande Pasteurization ProcessPresent Condition or ProcedureAt the early stage of beer grande production, several cases of beer grande full goods were received by MB as returned beer fulls (RBF). The RBF's were found to have sediments and their contents were hazy. These effects are usually caused by underpasteurization time and the pasteurzation units for beer grande were almost similar to those of the steinie.Proposed lnnovation(Attach necessary information)In order to minimize if not elienate underpasteurization of beer grande, reduce the speed of the beer grande pasteurizer thereby, increasing the pasteurization time and the pasteurization acts for grande beer. In this way, the self-life (sic) of beer grande will also be increased.1Mr. Vega at that time had been in the employ of petitioner Corporation for thirteen (1 3) years and was then holding the position of "mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery situated in Tipolo, Mandaue City.Petitioner Corporation, however, did not find the aforequoted proposal acceptable and consequently refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a cash award under the Innovation Program. On 22 February 1983., a Complaint2(docketed as Case No. RAB-VII-0170-83) was filed against petitioner Corporation with Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (Cebu City) of the then.", Ministry of Labor and Employment. Frivate respondent Vega alleged there that his proposal "[had] been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented by the Corporation [in] October 1980," and that the same "ultimately and finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande." Private respondent thus claimed entitlement to a cash prize of P60,000.00 (the maximum award per proposal offered under the Innovation Program) and attorney's fees.In an Answer With Counterclaim and Position Paper,3petitioner Corporation alleged that private respondent had no cause of action. It denied ever having approved or adopted Mr. Vega's proposal as part of the Corporation's brewing procedure in the production of San Miguel Beer Grande. Among other things, petitioner stated that Mr. Vega's proposal was tumed down by the company "for lack of originality" and that the same, "even if implemented [could not] achieve the desired result." Petitioner further alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Mr. Vega having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed under a then existing collective bargaining agreement between management and employees, and available administrative remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. A counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses closed out petitioner's pleading.In an Order4dated 30 April 1986, the Labor Arbiter, noting that the money claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of his employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article 217 of the Labor Code, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. However, in a gesture of "compassion and to show the government's concern for the workingman," the Labor Arbiter also directed petitioner to pay Mr. Vega the sum of P2,000.00 as "financial assistance."The Labor Arbiter's order was subsequently appealed by both parties, private respondent Vega assailing the dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and petitioner Corporation questioning the propriety of the award of "financial assistance" to Mr. Vega. Acting on the appeals, the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, on 4 September 1987, rendered a Decision,5the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is hereby set aside and another udgment entered, order the respondent to pay the complainant the amount of P60,000.00 as explained above.SO ORDERED.In the present Petition for certiorari filed on 4 December 1987, petitioner Corporation, invoking Article 217 of the Labor Code, seeks to annul the Decision of public respondent Commission in Case No. RAB-VII-01 70-83 upon the ground that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code, as last amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 227 which took effect on 1 June 1982:ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have theoriginal and exclusive jurisdictionto hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving are workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement,except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;4. Cases involving household services; and5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this; Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. (Emphasis supplied)While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 related to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to employers).It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended by B.P. Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer employee relations,"6which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.Applying the foregoing reading to the present case, we note that petitioner's Innovation Program is an employee incentive scheme offered and open only to employees of petitioner Corporation, more specifically to employees below the rank of manager. Without the existing employer-employee relationship between the parties here, there would have been no occasion to consider the petitioner's Innovation Program or the submission by Mr. Vega of his proposal concerning beer grande; without that relationship, private respondent Vega's suit against petitioner Corporation would never have arisen. The money claim of private respondent Vega in this case, therefore, arose out of or in connection with his employment relationship with petitioner.The next issue that must logically be confronted is whether the fact that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his employment relation" with petitioner Corporation, is enough to bring such money claim within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.InMolave Motor Sales, Inc. v. Laron,7the petitioner was a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles, while private respondent was the sales Manager of petitioner. Petitioner had sued private respondent for non-payment of accounts which had arisen from private respondent's own purchases of vehicles and parts, repair jobs on cars personally owned by him, and cash advances from the corporation. At the pre-trial in the lower court, private respondent raised the question of lack of jurisdiction of the court, stating that because petitioner's complaint arose out of the employer-employee relationship, it fell outside the jurisdiction of the court and consequently should be dismissed. Respondent Judge did dismiss the case, holding that the sum of money and damages sued for by the employer arose from the employer-employee relationship and, hence, fell within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In reversing the order of dismissal and requiring respondent Judge to take cognizance of the case below, this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:Before the enactment of BP Blg. 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code had jurisdiction over" all other cases arising from employer-employee relation, unless, expressly excluded by this Code."Even then, the principle followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved.InMedina vs. Castro-Bartolome, 11 SCRA 597, 604, in negating jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, although the parties were an employer and two employees, Mr. Justice Abad Santos stated:The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they have retroactive effect is unnecessary.It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice.Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.And inSingapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, 122 SCRA 671, 677, the following was said:Stated differently,petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.In the case below, PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him.Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action was one under the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of DEFENDANT. Hence the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC should have jurisdiction.8It seems worth noting thatMedina v. Castro-Bartolome, referred to in the above excerpt, involved a claim for damages by two (2) employees against the employer company and the General Manager thereof, arising from the use of slanderous language on the occasion when the General Manager fired the two (2) employees (the Plant General Manager and the Plant Comptroller). The Court treated the claim for damages as "a simple action for damages for tortious acts" allegedly committed by private respondents, clearly if impliedly suggesting that the claim for damages did not necessarily arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship.Singapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, also cited inMolave, involved a claim for liquidated damages not by a worker but by the employer company, unlikeMedina. The important principle that runs through these three (3) cases is that where the claim to the principal relief sought9is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner Corporation to its employees to submit innovation proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to employees who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions, in the judgment of the Corporation's officials, satisfied the standards and requirements of the Innovation Program10and which, therefore, could be translated into some substantial benefit to the Corporation. Such undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual (facio ut des)11obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.WEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The decision dated 4 September 1987 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE and the complaint in Case No. RAB-VII-0170-83 is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the right of private respondent Vega to file a suit before the proper court, if he so desires. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 78277 May 12, 1989SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER ILDEFONSO AGBUYA and FERNANDO M. ALMONICAR,respondents.Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.The Solicitor General for public respondent.Edgardo A. Camello for private respondent.CORTES,J.:Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Arts. 279, 281, 282-284), but the rudimentary requirements of due process notice and hearing must also be observed before an employee may be dismissed [Art. 277 (b).] One cannot go without the other, for otherwise the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.The resolution of the instant case hinges on the determination of whether or not petitioner had complied with the procedural requirements before it dismissed private respondent.The antecedents of this case, as summarized with particularity by the Solicitor General, are as follows:1. Private respondent, Fernando M. Almonicar, had been an employee of the petitioner corporation for almost ten years preceding his termination on August 15, 1982. He started working for the petitioner on October 1, 1973 as Route Helper in the Company's Beer Marketing Division, Cotabato Sales Office, Cotabato City; and since then, he was promoted twice before his elevation to his last position of Route Salesman.2. During his period of employment, Almonicar had a clean record until at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of February 22, 1982, after arriving from his day's work, he was approached at the Sales Office inside the company's warehouse in Cotabato City by another company Route Salesman named Abdulkadil Dumamba. Then and there, in the presence of the company warehousemen, Dumamba requested Almonicar if the latter could transfer to his account the 100 cases of empty regular beer bottles and 100 cases of empty Beer Grande bottles worth P3,340.00, which were returned allegedly for cash refund by Dumamba's customer, but that Dumamba did not have sufficient sales/collections for the refund.3. Finding nothing wrong with Dumamba's proposition, as in fact, it was then a common practice among salesmen whenever one of them did not have sufficient sales/collection to pay for the value of beer empties returned for cash refund. Almonicar agreed to the proposition. Forthwith, Almonicar handed to Dumamba the P3,340.00 out of his sales/collections, and issued in the name of Dumamba's customer the corresponding cash refund invoice (Annex "B", Petition). Whereupon, Almonicar advised the warehouseman to reflect in his Checker's Stock Report said returned beer empties.4. It turned out, however, that the beer empties were returned not for cash refund, but to be credited to the customer's account with the petitioner company. For which, Dumamba issued to the customer a charge refund invoice (Annex "A", Petition), but which was not recorded in the latter's account ledger card because Dumamba did not include it in his sales report to make his transaction records appear to be in order.5. Consequently, when a verification was made on February 25, 1982, of the account of Dumamba's customer, the latter refused to sign the confirmation slip (Annex "C", Petition) of his account with the petitioner company, claiming that the same did not tally with his record. As a result, an inquiry was conducted wherein it was found out that the discrepancy lies in Dumamba's failure to include in his report the charge refund invoice he issued for the return of said beer empties, and the misappropriation for his personal use [of] the cash intended for the refund of the value thereof which was extended to him by Almonicar out of the latter's sales/collections. This, resulted in the recommendation for the grounding of Dumamba until further investigation (Annex "D", Petition).6. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted sometime in March 1982 in connection with several acts of defalcation allegedly committed by Dumamba during the year 1982, one of which was the misappropriation of the P3,340.00 covered by a cash refund invoice issued by Almonicar.7. It was for the purpose of helping the Company in the investigation against Dumamba, particularly with respect to the above-mentioned cash refund, as he was made to understand by Regional Sales Manager Romeo A. Reyes who conducted the investigation, that Almonicar gave his statement (Annex "F", Petition) in the early morning of March 4, 1982.8. As a result of said investigation, Dumamba was immediately grounded. Almonicar on the other hand was even recommended by the company's sales supervisor, Ranulfo Mabacho, for promotion to Salesman in-Charge of the Midsayap (North Cotabato) Sales Office. He was likewise entrusted to act as Salesman-in-Charge of the Cotabato Sales Office whenever the regular salesman was absent.9. However, to Almonicar's shock and astonishment, he received on July 26, 1982, a letter dated July 21, 1982 from their Regional Manager, advising him that, "after due investigation of your recent case, we have decided to separate you from service at the close of business on August 15, 1982."10. Immediately, Almonicar sought an explanation from the Regional Manager but the latter told him that the "decision" came from the company's head office in Manila. However, when the Regional Manager was asked for copies of the alleged "investigation" and "decision", the latter simply told him that the pertinent papers will be forwarded to the Ministry of Labor.11. This prompted Almonicar to file on October l6, 1982 a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Ministry's Regional Office No. 12 in Cotabato City against the herein petitioner and Regional Sales Manager Romeo A. Reyes.12. After efforts of conciliation with the Labor's Regional Office in Cotabato City failed, the case was indorsed for compulsory arbitration to the Executive Labor Arbiter in Cagayan de Oro City, wherein the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed at the hearing called on October 26, 1983 to submit their case for decision on the bases of their position papers and supporting evidence.13. Pursuant thereto, complainant Almonicar (herein private respondent) duly filed his position paper and supporting documents on January 23, 1984. Anent the respondent (herein petitioner), its counsel filed a Manifestation and Motion asking for an extension of twenty (20) days from Jan. 20, 1984 within which to file its position paper. Subsequently, another motion was filed asking for a final extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1984 within which to file its position paper, but the petitioner failed to file even until Executive Labor Arbiter rendered his decision (Annex "G", Petition) on May 30, 1984 finding private respondent's dismiss to be without basis and, therefore, entitled to full back wages with all fringe benefits from the time of his termination up to the promulgation of the decision. However, since private respondent's reinstatement was no longer feasible, he was awarded a separation pay corresponding to his ten (10) years of service at 1/2 month pay for every year of service based on the last salary. In addition, petitioner was ordered to pay private respondent's counsel 10% of the total award.14. From the foregoing decision, both parties appealed to the respondent Commission. In its appeal, petitioner alleged that the Executive Labor Arbiter abused his discretion and erred in his findings of fact and conclusion of law by introducing for the first time evidence in refutation of private respondent's position paper. For his part, private respondent assailed the Executive Labor Arbiter's decision for not ordering his reinstatement, despite the finding that his dismissal was without basis and no evidence whatsoever was shown that this was no longer possible.15. The respondent Commission, which apparently overlooked private respondent's appeal and was misled into appreciating petitioners evidence presented for the first time on appeal, promulgated on December 10, 1985 a decision (Annex "J", Petition), finding private respondent guilty of the offense imputed to him. However, considering his ten (10) years of unblemished record with the company, he was awarded a separation of 1/2 month's pay for every year of service, instead of reinstatement, without back wages.16. So that, on a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "K", Petition) filed by private respondent, the respondent Commission rectified its errors by reversing and setting aside its previous decision of December 10, 1985 and instead, promulgated on March 30, 1987 another decision (Annex "L", Petition) the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages with all of the benefits legal and by contract and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, computed from the date of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. Consequently, respondent is directed to show proof of immediate compliance to the mandate of the decision after ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. [Rollo, pp. 121-128.]Without seeking reconsideration of the NLRC's decision of March 30, 1987, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of said decision on the ground that public respondents had gravely abused their discretion.The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.The pleadings filed by petitioner and the annexes to its petition glaringly reveal a fatal lapse on its part the failure, prior to private respondent's dismissal, to furnish him written notice and to afford him the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself as mandated by the Labor Code, as amended. Thus, the code provides that "the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires" [Art. 277(b); formerly, Art, 278 (b).] In implementation of this requirement, the amended rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor provides:Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and afterdue process.Sec. 2.Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.x x xSec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice.The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.x x x[Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; Emphasis supplied.]In the instant case, after giving his statement as a witness for the company in connection with the investigation on the alleged acts of defalcation committed by Dumamba, private respondent was unexpectedly dismissed, without even being investigated in connection with the violation attributed to him, much less notified that the company intended to dismiss him for the alleged violation.It is therefore apparent that private respondent's dismissal was an afterthought. He was asked to make a statement in connection with the investigation against Dumamba and when it became subsequently apparent to those in the head office in Manila that his act of issuing the invoice in the name of Dumamba's customer constituted a possible violation of company rules and regulations he was unceremoniously meted the penalty of dismissal. Even the tenor of his statement [Annex "F", Petition; Rollo, pp. 30-32], which was in the form of question and answer, indicates that it was being given in connection with the investigation of Dumamba's misappropriation of the money given by the private respondent for the refund of the empty bottles. There is no indication in said statement that private respondent was also under investigation. In contrast, Dumamba's statement [Annex "E", Petition; Rollo, pp. 27-29] clearly stated that he was the subject of the investigation. Thus, it was prefaced by a paragraph entitled "Preliminaries", which provides:We are investigating youto shed light on reported beer empties that were retrieved from United Grocery, situated at Supermarket, Cotabato City, and it (sic) were not credited to the account of said outlet. . . [Rollo, p. 27; Emphasis supplied.]Moreover, that the company did not contemplate conducting an administrative proceeding against private respondent was bolstered by the undisputed fact that he was allowed to continue with his regular duties after he gave his statement, and even recommended for promotion some time before his sudden dismissal, contrasted with the immediate grounding of Dumamba. The failure of petitioner to afford private respondent due process, as required by the Labor Code, in effecting his termination, is thus patent.No grave abuse of discretion could therefore be attributed to the NLRC for holding that private respondent was illegally terminated and ordering his reinstatement with backwages, as such was fully supported by the facts and the law. The reinstatement of private respondent, as ordered by the NLRC, in lieu of the payment of separation pay, as directed by the Labor Arbiter, is even made more imperative by the fact that he was arbitrarily deprived of his employment at the early age of thirty-two (32) when he was just approaching the prime of his life, causing his family economic dislocation and untold hardship as he pursued his case through the years.Neither can grave abuse of discretion be ascribed to the Executive Labor Arbiter for basing his findings of fact and, consequently, his decision exclusively on private respondent's position paper. It will be recalled that the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their position papers and that in spite of the extension granted it, petitioner failed to file its position paper, forcing the arbiter to decide the case without it. Moreover Art. 221 of the Labor Code, which provides that the technical rules of evidence are not controlling in proceedings before Labor Arbiters, allows the latter to decide the case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted by the parties [Manila Doctors Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64897, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 262; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, G.R. No. 56398, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219.]No grave abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of the corrective writ ofcertiorarihaving been established, the dismissal of the petition is in order.A final word. While the Court finds no cogent reason to set aside the NLRC's decision, We are not, however, disregarding or in any way diminishing the employer's prerogative to instill discipline in his employees and to impose reasonable penalties, including dismissal, on erring employees pursuant to company rules and regulations [Soco V. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, G.R. Nos. 53364-65, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 526.] Neither is the Court deviating from the established rules that an employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment of workers guilty of acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, and whose continuance in the service of the employer is clearly inimical to his interests, and that the law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither the oppression nor self-destruction of employers [Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940); San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. National Labor Union, 97 Phil. 378 (1955); Colgate Palmolive Philippines v. Ople, G.R. No. 73681, June 30, 1988.] But it must be emphasized nevertheless that due process must be observed in effecting an employee's dismissal. And rightfully so, because the dismissal of an employee affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood and his dependents' sustenance. The employee must be informed of the alleged violation and given an opportunity to be heard before he is dismissed. Strict adherence to the requirements set forth in the Labor Code, as amended, is essential. Thus, the Court in the recent case ofCentury Textile Mills, Inc., et al, v. NLRC, et al.[G.R. No. 77857, May 25, 19881 stated:The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the 1987 Constitution.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC dated March 30, 1987 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of backwages is fixed at three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, in line with current jurisprudence. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on May 20, 1987 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 82467 June 29, 1989SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PEDRO B. DELEN, FELIPE P. MERCADO, ROGELIO Z. MISOLAS, HENRY S. LOGAN & EFREN M. QUERUBIN,respondents.Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.Mildred A. Ramos for private respondents.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the resolution dated December 15, 1987 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NRC Case No. 6-2896-83, entitled "Pedro Delen, Felipe Mercado, Rogelio Z. Misolas, Henry S. Logan, Efren Querubin, Complainants versus San Miguel Corporation, Respondent," dismissing the appeal of the respondent corporation (now petitioner) and affirmingin totothe decision dated March 17, 1986 of the Labor Arbiter, Ceferina J. Diosana, who found that the complainants (herein private respondents) were illegally dismissed by the petitioner, and directed the latter "to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other benefits appurtenant to their respective positions" (Annex I).We dismissed the petition on April 11, 1988 on the ground that it failed to show that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its questioned resolution (p. 311, Rollo). The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was prematurely denied by Us on August 29, 1988 (p. 416, Rollo). At that time, We inadvertently overlooked the fact that the petitioner had filed an omnibus motion on August 24, 1988: (1) for leave to file a reply to private respondents' comment; and (2) to require private respondents to furnish petitioner a copy of page 5 of their comment (p. 345, Rollo). The petitioner's consolidated reply to the separate comments filed by the NLRC and the private respondents (pp. 335-343 and 349-415, Rollo) was filed on September 21, 1988 (p. 417, Rollo). On October 14, 1988, the petitioner filed an "Extremely Urgent Motion for Leave of Court En Banc to File Appeal En Banc." (p. 479, Rollo.)While it is necessary to disabuse the mind of the petitioner of the impression that the CourtEn Bancis an appellate court within the Supreme Court to which parties may appeal decisions of the Division, for it is the same Supreme Court, and the referral of a case by a Division to theEn Bancrests entirely in the discretion of the Division, We have decided to deny the plea for referral of this case to the CourtEn Banc, but instead, to treat the "appeal to the Court En Banc" (p. 479, Rollo) as a second motion for reconsideration of the resolutions of this Court dated April 11, 1988 and August 29, 1988.The complainants were former security guards of the petitioner which dismissed them for falsification of their lame cards. They made false entries in their time cards showing that they reported for work on February 19 and 20, 1983 when the truth was that they went on a hunting tap to San Juan, Batangas, with their chief Major Martin Asaytuno, then head of the Administrative Services Department of the Security Directorate of the petitioner.Besides the falsification of the entries for February 19 and 20, 1983 in their time cards, complainant Misolas was caught redhanded by Security Guard Romeo Martin at 7:45 A.M. on March 2, 1983 punching in not only his own time card but also the time cards of Delen and Querubin (p. 51, Rollo). Seeing Misolas in a tight fix, Querubin rushed to the bundy clock and punched in a time card (which turned out to be the card of one Rodrigo de Castro) to save Misolas and to make it appear to Martin that he (Querubin), punched in his own time card.On the basis of the evidence, the Labor Arbiter found that the complainants did go on a hunting trip to San Juan, Batangas on February 19 and 20, 1983, upon the invitation of their department head, Major Asaytuno. They went along to please him because they believed that his invitation was equivalent to a command (p. 229, Rollo). Being an army man, Asaytuno expected "total obedience" from his subordinates (p. 229, Rollo). The complainants and Asaytuno left the office at 2:00 P.M. on February 19, 1983 and tarried in Batangas up to February 20. Asaytuno signed four (4) sets of overtime authority for February 19-20 so that the private respondents could collect overtime pay (p. 230, Rollo). When they reported for work on February 21, 1983, Major Asaytuno asked for their time cards and initialed the false entries showing that they reported for work on February 19-20 (p. 230, Rollo). The Labor Arbiter held that under those circumstances 'the dismissal of the complainants cannot be sustained" (p. 230, Rollo).With regard to the charge that complainants Misolas and Querubin dishonestly punched the time cards of Delen and others, the Labor Arbiter found "material discrepancies in the testimony of the petitioner's principal witness, Security Guard Romeo Martin, and rejected his evidence as 'questionable'" (p. 231, Rollo). The Labor Arbiter directed the company "to reinstate the complainants to their respective former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other benefits appurtenant to their respective positions" (p. 232, Rollo) but dismissed the complainants' claim for damages for lack of merit (p. 233, Rollo).The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, Third Division, which in a resolution dated December 15, 1987 (Annex K), dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the appealed judgment (p. 269, Rollo). The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied on March 10, 1988 (Annex N).The company filed a petition for review in this Court on March 25, 1988, alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision and "in not finding that the private respondents were guilty of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of trust" (p. 14, Rollo) which warranted their dismissal from the service.As the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC adverted to the testimony of Major Asaytuno as a witness for the company, but were silent regarding any disciplinary action that the company took against him, and as the petitioner admittedly put him on the witness stand "to clear his name," and considered him a "victim of his friendship with the complainants" (p. 19, Rollo), this Court was misled to believe that the company let Asaytuno, the "big fish," go, but penalized the "little fish" (his subordinates) for the misconduct that they all committed. Since We could not sanction that brand of selective justice, We dismissed the petition for review.However, after a more careful consideration of the pleadings and their annexes, We found these statements in paragraph 19 of the petition for certiorari and in Annex J of the petition (petitioner's Appeal Memorandum in the NLRC):l 9. After a thorough and impartial investigation conducted both by the Security and Legal Directorate of the petitioner, private respondents, together with Major Asaytuno, were found to have committed serious irregularities in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, they were dismissed from the service and termination letters were respectively served on them. (p. 11, Rollo.)16. ... all the five (5) complainants together with Major Asaytuno were found to have committed serious irregularities in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, they were dismissed from the service and termination letters were respectively served on them. (p. 243, Rollo.)We, therefore, now resolve to grant the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, for, although it may be conceded that the private respondents acted under some degree of moral compulsion when they agreed to accompany Major Asaytuno on a hunting trip to San Juan, Batangas, they were certainly under no compulsion from him to falsify their time cards and thereby defraud the company by collecting wages for the dates when they did not report for work.In order for obedience to be considered as an exempting circumstance ...it must be in compliance with a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of the subaltern,and that the person commanding act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his superior. But between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plainly forbids what the superior commands, the choice is not doubtful. (Viada, I Penal Code 528, 5th Ed.; People vs. Barroga, 54 Phil. 247).In order to be exempted (on the ground of obedience) it must be shown thatboth the person who gives the order and the person who executes it are acting within the limitations prescribed by law. (People vs. Wilson, 52 Phil. 919.)The falsification and fraud which the private respondents committed against their employer were inexcusable. Major Asaytuno's initials on the false entries in their time cards did not purge the documents of their falsity. Their acts constituted dishonesty and serious misconduct, lawful grounds for their dismissal under Art. 282, sub-pars. (a) and (c), of the Labor Code, which provides:ART. 282. Termination by employer.An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following just causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work.xxx xxx xxx(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondents to their positions with backwages. Its decision was an unjustified departure from the rule that:An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. The Hon. Francisco Zulueta, et al., 69 Phil. 485, cited in San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. National Labor Union et al., 97 Phil. 387.)WHEREFORE, our resolutions dated April 11, 1988 and August 29, 1988 are hereby recalled and the petition for certiorari is granted. The decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2896-83 are hereby set aside. The private respondents' complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and damages is dismissed. Costs against the private respondents.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 81471 April 26, 1989CHONG GUAN TRADING,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE M. CHUA,respondents.Neva B. Blancaver and Apolinario N. Lomabao, Jr. for petitioner.Faustino F. Tugade for private respondent.The Solicitor General for public respondent.CORTES,J.:Assailed in this petition is the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 11-4406-83, entitled "Jose M. Chua v. Chong Guan Trading," whereby the NLRC held that private respondent Jose M. Chua was illegally dismissed by petitioner Chong Guan Trading. The Court after a careful examination of the pleadings filed in this case,i.e., the Petition and its Annexes, the Comment of public respondent, the Reply and Supplemental Reply of petitioner, the Manifestation/Opposition of private respondent, and the Rejoinder of public respondent, considered the Comment as answer, the issues joined, and the case submitted for decision.Jose M. Chua was employed as sales manager of Chong Guan Trading, a dealer of paper and paper products owned by Mariano, Pepito and Efren Lim. Private respondent started working with the petitioner way back in 1960 but it was only in 1972 that his name was registered by petitioner with the Social Security System. [Decision of SSC in SSS Case No. 8728, p. 1; Rollo, p. 49.]In November 1983, private respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Labor Arbiter of the National Capital Region charging petitioner with illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay and other benefits provided for by law. In his complaint, private respondent alleged that he was fired by Mariano Lim because of the incident that occurred on October 28,1983.It appears from the record that on the morning of October 28, 1983, a customer, who borrowed the store's telephone directory, accidentally dropped it on the top-glass of the store's showcase causing it to break. When Pepito Lim saw the already taped broken top-glass he asked for an explanation from private respondent. In order to cover up for the customer, private respondent admitted that he himself accidentally broke it. Pepito then got angry and hurled "unprintable words and invectives" at private respondent. [Decision of NLRC, p. 2; Rollo, p. 14.] What transpired thereafter was disputed by both parties. Private respondent claimed that he was dismissed by Mariano Lim when the later ordered him to leave petitioner's premises. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied having dismissed private respondent and claimed that it was private respondent who went home after the incident and failed to report for work for many days thereafter. Petitioner alleged that, far from being dismissed, it was private respondent himself who abandoned his job.The parties filed their respective position papers and agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.On April 18,1984, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that there was no illegal dismissal since private respondent was never dismissed by petitioner. The Labor Arbiter held that the altercation that occurred between private respondent and the Lim brothers because of the broken top-glass cannot be construed as the dismissal of the private respondent because it was only a minor incident. No pronouncement on the issue of the alleged abandonment by private respondent was made but the Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of private respondent but without backwages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without backwages, to pay him his proportionate 13th-month pay for the year 1983 and the money equivalent of fifteen (15) days service incentive leave pay. All his other claims including the claim for damages are hereby, DISMISSED.SO ORDERED. [Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 7; Rollo, p. 31 .]Private respondent elevated the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. In a resolution promulgated on June 30, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.Upon motion of private respondent, the NLRC reconsidered its Resolution and gave due course to the appeal. On December 29,1987 respondent Commission decided in favor of private respondent and held that:xxx xxx xxx... we are by and large convinced that the appellant was indeed dismiss without the attendant formalities required by law. On account of which he should therefore, be reinstated to his former position with three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction.Should reinstatement, however, be not feasible due to circumstances or developments not attributable to the appellees, the appellant should, in addition to the three years backwages, be paid a separation pay equivalent to one half month pay for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.The rest of the award for other benefits stays.WHEREFORE, modified as above-indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby, AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. [NLRC Decision, p. 18; Rollo, p. 18.]From the NLRC decision, petitioner interposed the present petition.The Court will first address the procedural issue raised by the petitioner.Petitioner maintains that respondent NLRC has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal flied by private respondent, much less modify the decision appealed from, the same having become final and executory after the lapse of ten (10) days from respondent's receipt thereof.Article 223 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442, as amended] provides for a reglementary period of ten (10) days within which to appeal a decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been interpreted by this Court in the case ofVir-jen and Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[G.R. Nos. 58011-12, July 20, 1987, 115 SCRA 347] as ten (10) "calendar" days and not ten (10) "working" days.In the instant case, while the appeal was filed within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision, it was filed beyond the (10) calendar days prescribed by law. Private respondent received a copy of the decision of Labor Arbiter Martinez on May 3, 1984 while the appeal was filed only on May 15, 1984 or twelve (12) days from notice of the decision. [Resolution of NLRC, p. 1; Rollo, p. 32.]It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. [Narag v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 69628, October 28,1987, 155 SCRA 199.] However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of an appeal. [Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 6; Rollo, p. 46; See also Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 187; MAI Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 196.]In this case, the appeal was filed out of time because the counsel of private respondent relied on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter which stated that "the aggrieved party may appeal ... within ten (10)workingdays, as per NLRC Resolution No. 1, series of 1977." [Decision of NLRC, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13; Emphasis supplied.] In the case ofFirestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Phil. v. Lariosa,[supra], which has substantially the same set of facts as this case, the Court accepted the party's reliance on the erroneous notice in the labor arbiter's decision as a reasonable ground for excusing non-compliance with the ten (10) calendar day period for appeal. Explaining the reason for this ruling, the Court said:xxx xxx xxxMindful of the fact that Lariosa's counsel must have been misled by the implementing rules of the labor commission and considering that the shortened period for an appeal is principally intended more for the employee's benefit, rather than that of the employer, We are inclined to overlook this particular procedural lapse and to proceed with the resolution of the instant case, [at p. 191.]xxx xxx xxxThus, private respondent's late filing of the appeal notwithstanding, the Court finds that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal.Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court will now deal with the main issue in this case, which is whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioner to pay private respondent three years backwages and separation pay (if reinstatement is no longer possible) for the alleged illegal dismissal of private respondent.While petitioner concedes that private respondent must be reinstated since there was no intentional abandonment on the part of private respondent, it challenges the order for the payment of backwages and separation pay. Petitioner contends that there was no illegal dismissal to speak of since private respondent was never dismissed in the first place, and that justice dictates that private respondent must simply be reinstated. [Reply, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 51-52.]Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC agree that the accidental breaking of the showcase's top-glass was so minor an incident as to provoke an employer to dismiss a managerial employee who has worked with him for more than twenty (20) years. [Decision of NLRC, Rollo, p. 16.] However, in holding that private respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner, the NLRC held that:We agree that the accidental breaking of the showcase's top-glass was a minor incident. Ordinarily it could not provoke an employer (who knew what its repercussions could be) to dismiss an employee for that matter.But the appellees [petitioner Chong Guan trading and its owners] who,we perceive,were indeed bent on ousting the appellant [private respondent Chua] magnified it to such a serious proportion, as shown by the unprintable words and invectives that they hurled to the appellant, to ostensibly justify their heretofore desire to terminate him.In short, they seized the incident as the most opportune time to implement their obvious decision to lay-off the appellant.[Decision of NLRC, p. 4; Rollo, p. 16; Emphasis supplied.]The import of the above findings of the NLRC is that the breaking of the top-glass was used by petitioner as an excuse to terminate respondent Chua in accordance with its scheme or plan to oust him.The Court cannot sustain the findings of respondent NLRC.As found by the labor arbiter, no evidence was presented to establish the existence of the so-called scheme to oust private respondent [Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 5; Rollo, p. 29.] It was based only on private respondent's unsupported claim that there was an "orchestrated scheme or plan" to oust him and that this plan had been carefully laid out for a long time. Private respondent's claim is not borne out by the record which shows that petitioner has been granting substantial cash advances to private respondent. In fact barely a month before his alleged illegal dismissal, petitioner allowed private respondent to make a cash advance of P4,718.00. [Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 5; Rollo, p. 29.] If indeed there was a scheme to oust private respondent, petitioner should have denied him further cash advances knowing that his services will soon be terminated and as a result thereof, there may be no way to recover the cash advances.Furthermore, the NLRC admitted in its decision that its finding that the petitioner was "indeed bent on ousting" private respondent was based only on its "perception" and not on any evidence on record. [Decision of NLRC, p. 4; Rollo, p. 16.] This Court, however, cannot rely on NLRC's perception or speculations in the absence of any credible evidence to support it. [San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 50321, March 13, 1984, 128 SCRA 180.] For while it is well-established that the findings of facts of the NLRC are entitled to great respect and are generally binding on this Court [Antipolo Highway Lines, Inc. v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 441; Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-41288, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 162; Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-48687, July 2, 1979, 91 SCRA 311; Pan-Philippine Life Insurance Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 53721, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 866; Pepsi-Cola Labor Union-BLFUTUPAS Local Chapter No. 896 v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 58341, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 930; Mamerto v. Inciong, G.R. No. 53068, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 265; San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 50321, March 13, 1984, 128 SCRA 180] it is equally well-settled that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC when the Court finds that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter or when the findings of facts from which the conclusions were based were not supported by substantial evidence [Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. L- 25291, March 10, 1977, 76 SCRA 50; Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes v. Camara Shoes, G.R. No. 50985, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 477.]The question that must now be addressed by the Court is whether, absent the alleged scheme or plan to oust private respondent, it can be inferred from the events that transpired on the morning of October 28, 1983 that private respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner.Private respondent claims that Mariano Lim dismissed him when the latter said: "Lumayas ka rito." This is disputed by the petitioner who claims that it was private respondent who voluntarily left petitioner's premises.After a careful examination of the events that gave rise to the present controversy as shown by the record, the Court is convinced that private respondent was never dismissed by the petitioner. Even if it were true that Mariano Lim ordered private respondent to go and that at that time he intended to dismiss private respondent, the record is bereft of evidence to show that he carried out this intention. Private respondent was not even notified that he had been dismissed. Nor was he prevented from returning to his work after the October 28 incident. The only thing that is established from the record, and which is not disputed by the parties, is that private respondent Chua did not return to his work after his heated argument with the Lim brothers.Moreover, petitioner has consistently manifested its willingness to reinstate private respondent to his former position. This negates any intention on petitioner's part to dismiss private respondent. Petitioner first expressed its willingness to reinstate private respondent during the initial hearing of the case before the Labor Arbiter. [Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 6; Rollo, p. 30.] In its position paper the petitioner also stated that:x x x x x x x x xIN PASSING, we gladly reiterate ... that the management is still waiting and more than willing to accept him [private respondent] and return to his former position, notwithstanding his long unauthorized absences and the intentional abandonment from his job.x x x x x x x x x[Annex "B" to the Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 24.]This was again reiterated by the petitioner in its Reply to the Comment of public respondent filed in connection with the instant petition. [Reply, pp. 1- 2; Rollo, pp. 51-52.]Therefore, considering the Court's finding that private respondent was never dismissed by the petitioner, the award of three years backwages was not proper. Backwages, in general, are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal from work. [New Manila Candy Workers Union (NACONWA-PAFLU) v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-29728, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 37; Durabuilt Recapping Plant and Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 76746, July 27, 1987, 152 SCRA 328.] Where the employee was not dismissed and his failure to work was not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employee should not be shifted to the employer. [SSS v. SSS Supervisors' Union-CUGCO, G.R. No. L-31832, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 746; Durabuilt Recapping Plant and Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission,supra.]In this case, private respondent's failure to work was due to the misunderstanding between the petitioner's management and private respondent. As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, private respondent must have construed the October 28 incident as his dismissal so that he opted not to work for many days thereafter and instead filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.[Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 6; Rollo, p. 30.] On the other hand, petitioner interpreted private respondent's failure to report for work as an intentional abandonment. [Annex "B "to the Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 24.] However, there was no intent to dismiss private respondent since the petitioner is willing to reinstate him. Nor was there an intent to abandon on the part of private respondent since he immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal soon after the October 28 incident. It would be illogical for private respondent to abandon his work and then immediately file an action seeking his reinstatement. [Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, G.R. No. 51494, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 887; Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 55971, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 145; Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 56176-77, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167.] Under these circumstances, it is but fair that each party must bear his own loss, thus placing the parties on equal footing. [Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-20434, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 813; SSS v. SSS Supervisors' Union-CUGCO,supra.]As to the separation pay, considering that petitioner has expressed its willingness to reinstate private respondent to his former position, the order for the payment of separation pay is no longer necessary.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of respondent NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 149011 June 28, 2005SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,petitionervs.PROSPERO A. ABALLA, BONNY J. ABARING, EDWIN M. ADLA-ON, ALVIN C. ALCALDE, CELANIO D. ARROLLADO, EDDIE A. ARROLLADO, REYNALDO T. ASONG, RENE A. ASPERA, JOEL D. BALATERIA, JOSEPH D. BALATERIA, JOSE JOLLEN BALLADOS, WILFREDO B. BASAS, EDWIN E. BEATINGO, SONNY V. BERONDO, CHRISTOPHER D. BRIONES, MARLON D. BRIONES, JOEL C. BOOC, ENRIQUE CABALIDA, DIOSCORO R. CAHINOD, ERNESTO P. CAHINOD, RENANTE S. CAHINOD, RUDERICK R. CALIXTON, RONILO C. CALVEZ, PANCHO CAETE, JUNNY CASTEL, JUDY S. CELESTE, ROMEO CHUA, DANILO COBRA, ARMANDO C. DEDOYCO, JOEY R. DELA CRUZ, JOHN D. DELFIN, RENELITO P. DEON, ARNEL C. DE PEDRO, ORLANDO DERDER, CLIFFORD A. DESPI, RAMIE A. DESPI, SR., VICTOR A. DESPI, ROLANDO L. DINGLE, ANTONIO D. DOLORFINO, LARRY DUMA-OP, NOEL DUMOL, CHITO L. DUNGOG, RODERICK C. DUQUEZA, ROMMEL ESTREBOR, RIC E. GALPO, MANSUETO GILLE, MAXIMO L. HILA-US, GERARDO J. JIMENEZ, ROBERTLY Y. HOFILEA, ROBERTO HOFILEA, VICENTE INDENCIO, JONATHAN T. INVENTOR, PETER PAUL T. INVENTOR, JOEBERT G. LAGARTO, RENATO LAMINA, ALVIN LAS POBRES, ALBERT LAS POBRES, LEONARD LEMONCHITO, JERRY LIM, JOSE COLLY S. LUCERO, ROBERTO E. MARTIL, HERNANDO MATILLANO, VICENTE M. MATILLANO, TANNY C. MENDOZA, WILLIAM P. NAVARRO, WILSON P. NAVARRO, LEO A. OLVIDO, ROBERTO G. OTERO, BIENVENIDO C. PAROCHILIN, REYNALDO C. PAROCHILIN, RICKY PALANOG, BERNIE O. PILLO, ALBERTO O. PILLO, JOE-MARIE S. PUGNA, EDWIN G. RIBON, RAUL A. RUBIO, HENRY S. SAMILLANO, EDGAR SANTIAGO, ROLAND B. SANTILLANA, ROLDAN V. SAYAM, JOSEPH S. SAYSON, RENE SUARNABA, ELMAR TABLIGAN, JERRY D. TALITE, OSCAR TALITE, WINIFREDO TALITE, CAMILO N. TEMPOROSA, JOSE TEMPOROSA, RANDY TINGALA, TRISTAN A. TINGSON, ROGELIO TOMESA, DIONISE A. TORMIS, ADELINO C. UNTAL, FELIX T. UNTAL, RONILO E. VISTA, JOAN C. VIYO and JOSE JOFER C. VIYO and the COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES,J.:Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC), represented by its Assistant Vice President and Visayas Area Manager for Aquaculture Operations Leopoldo S. Titular, and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower), represented by the Chairman of its Board of Directors Roy G. Asong, entered into a one-year Contract of Services1commencing on January 1, 1993, to be renewed on a month to month basis until terminated by either party. The pertinent provisions of the contract read:1.The cooperative agrees and undertakes to perform and/or provide for the company, on a non-exclusive basis for a period of one yearthe following services for the Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant:A. Messengerial/JanitorialB. Shrimp Harvesting/ReceivingC. Sanitation/Washing/Cold Storage22. To carry out the undertaking specified in the immediately preceding paragraph,the cooperative shall employ the necessary personnel and provide adequate equipment, materials, tools and apparatus, to efficiently, fully and speedily accomplish the work and services undertaken by the cooperative. xxx3. In consideration of the above undertaking the company expressly agrees to pay the cooperative the following rates per activity:A. Messengerial/Janitorial Monthly Fixed Service Charge of: Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos Only (P19,500.00)B. Harvesting/Shrimp Receiving. Piece rate of P0.34/kg. Or P100.00 minimum per person/activity whichever is higher, with provisions as follows:P25.00 Fixed Fee per personAdditional meal allowance P15.00 every meal time in case harvest duration exceeds one meal.This will be pre-set every harvest based on harvest plan approved by the Senior Buyer.C. Sanitation/Washing and Cold Storage P125.00/person for 3 shifts.One-half of the payment for all services rendered shall be payable on the fifteenth and the other half, on the end of each month. The cooperative shall pay taxes, fees, dues and other impositions that shall become due as a result of this contract.The cooperative shall have the entire charge, control and supervision of the work and servicesherein agreed upon. xxx4. There isno employer-employee relationshipbetween the company and the cooperative, or the cooperative and any of its members, or the company and any members of the cooperative. The cooperative is an association of self-employed members, an independent contractor, and an entrepreneur. It is subject to the control and direction of the company only as to the result to be accomplished by the work or services herein specified, and not as to the work herein contracted. The cooperative and its members recognize that it is taking a business risk in accepting a fixed service fee to provide the services contracted for and its realization of profit or loss from its undertaking, in relation to all its other undertakings, will depend on how efficiently it deploys and fields its members and how they perform the work and manage its operations.5.The cooperative shall, whenever possible, maintain and keep under its control the premises where the work under this contract shall be performed.6. The cooperative shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement and discharge of its member-workers or otherwise in the direction and control thereof. The determination of the wages, salaries and compensation of the member-workers of the cooperative shall be within its full control. It is further understood that the cooperative is an independent contractor, and as such, the cooperative agrees to comply with all the requirements of all pertinent laws and ordinances, rules and regulations. Although it is understood and agreed between the parties hereto that the cooperative, in the performance of its obligations, is subject to the control or direction of the company merely as a (sic) result to be accomplished by the work or services herein specified, and not as to the means and methods of accomplishing such result, the cooperative hereby warrants that it will perform such work or services in such manner as will be consistent with the achievement of the result herein contracted for.xxx8.The cooperative undertakes to pay the wages or salaries of its member-workers, as well as all benefits, premiums and protection in accordance with the provisions of the labor code, cooperative code and other applicable laws and decrees and the rules and regulations promulgated by competent authorities, assuming all responsibility therefor.The cooperative further undertakes to submit to the company within the first ten (10) days of every month, a statement made, signed and sworn to by its duly authorized representative before a notary public or other officer authorized by law to administer oaths, to the effect that the cooperative has paid all wages or salaries due to its employees or personnel for services rendered by them during the month immediately preceding, including overtime, if any, and that such payments were all in accordance with the requirements of law.xxx12. Unless sooner terminated for the reasons stated in paragraph 9 this contract shall be for a period of one (1) year commencing on January 1, 1993. Thereafter, this Contract will be deemed renewed on a month-to-month basis until terminated by either party by sending a written notice to the other at least thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of termination.xxx3(Underscoring supplied)Pursuant to the contract, Sunflower engaged private respondents to, as they did, render services at SMCs Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant at Sta. Fe, Bacolod City. The contract was deemed renewed by the parties every month after its expiration on January 1, 1994 and private respondents continued to perform their tasks until September 11, 1995.In July 1995, private respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, praying to be declared as regular employees of SMC, with claims for recovery of all benefits and privileges enjoyed by SMC rank and file employees.Private respondents subsequently filed on September 25, 1995 an Amended Complaint4to include illegal dismissal as additional cause of action following SMCs closure of its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant on September 15, 19955which resulted in the termination of their services.SMC filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Party Complaint6dated November 27, 1995 to implead Sunflower as Third Party Defendant which was, by Order7of December 11, 1995, granted by Labor Arbiter Ray Alan T. Drilon.In the meantime, on September 30, 1996, SMC filed before the Regional Office at Iloilo City of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Notice of Closure8of its aquaculture operations effective on even date, citing serious business losses.By Decision of September 23, 1997, Labor Arbiter Drilon dismissed private respondents complaint for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:We sustain the stand of the respondent SMC that it could properly exercise itsmanagement prerogative to contract out the preparation and processing aspects of its aquaculture operations. Judicial notice has already been taken regarding the general practice adopted in government and private institutions and industries of hiring independent contractors to perform special services. xxxxxxIndeed,the law allows job contracting. Job contracting is permissible under the Labor Code under specific conditions and we do not see how this activity could not be legally undertaken by an independent service cooperative like the third-party respondent herein.There is no basis to the demand for regularization simply on the theory that complainants performed activities which are necessary and desirable in the business of respondent. It has been held thatthe definition of regular employees as those who perform activities which are necessary and desirable for the business of the employer is not always determinativebecause any agreement may provide for one (1) party to render services for and in behalf of another for a consideration even without being hired as an employee.The charge of the complainantsthat third-party respondent is a mere labor-only contractor is a sweeping generalization and completely unsubstantiated. xxx In the absence of clear and convincing evidence showing that third-party respondent acted merely as a labor only contractor, we are firmly convinced of the legitimacy and the integrity of its service contract with respondent SMC.In the same vein, theclosure of the Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant was a management decision purely dictated by economic factorswhich was (sic) mainly serious business losses. The law recognizes the right of the employer to close his business or cease his operations for bonafide reasons, as much as it recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to closure or cessation of business operations, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the law on security of tenure. The decision of respondent SMC to close its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant, due to serious business losses which has (sic) clearly been established, is a management prerogative which could hardly be interfered with.xxx The closure did affect the regular employees and workers of the Bacolod Processing Plant, who were accordingly terminated following the legal requisites prescribed by law.The closure, however, in so far as the complainants are concerned, resulted in the termination of SMCs service contract with their cooperativexxx9(Underscoring supplied)Private respondents appealed to the NLRC.By Decision of December 29, 1998, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, it finding thatthird party respondent Sunflower was an independent contractorin light of its observation that "[i]n all the activities of private respondents, they were under the actual direction, control and supervision of third party respondent Sunflower, as well as the payment of wages, and power of dismissal."10Private respondents Motion for Reconsideration11having been denied by the NLRC for lack of merit by Resolution of September 10, 1999, they filed a petition for certiorari12before the Court of Appeals (CA).Before the CA, SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss13private respondents petition for non-compliance with the Rules on Civil Procedure and failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.SMC subsequently filed its Comment14to the petition on March 30, 2000.By Decision of February 7, 2001,the appellate courtreversedthe NLRC decision and accordingly found for private respondents, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, judgment is hereby RENDERED: (1) REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE both the 29 December 1998 decision and 10 September 1999 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division, Cebu City in NLRC Case No. V-0361-97 as well as the 23 September 1997 decision of the labor arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-07-10316-95; (2)ORDERING the respondent, San Miguel Corporation, to GRANT petitioners: (a) separation payin accordance with the computation given to the regular SMC employees working at its Bacolod Shrimp ProcessingPlant with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from 11 September 1995, the time their actual compensation was withheld from them, up to the time of the finality of this decision; (b)differentialspays(sic) effective as of and from the time petitioners acquired regular employment status pursuant to the disquisition mentioned above,and all such other and further benefits as provided by applicable collective bargaining agreement(s) or other relations, or by law, beginning such time up to their termination from employment on 11 September 1995; and ORDERING private respondent SMC to PAY unto the petitionersattorneysfeesequivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.15(Underscoring supplied)Justifying its reversal of the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, the appellate court reasoned:Although the terms of the non-exclusive contract of service between SMC and [Sunflower] showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an employer-employee relationship between SMC and [Sunflower] or the latters members,the extent to which the parties successfully realized this intent in the light of the applicable law is the controlling factor in determining the real and actual relationshipbetween or among the parties.xxxWith respect to the power to control petitioners conduct, it appears thatpetitioners were under the direct control and supervision of SMC supervisorsboth as to the manner they performed their functions and as to the end results thereof. It was only after petitioners lodged a complaint to have their status declared as regular employees of SMC that certain members of [Sunflower] began to countersign petitioners daily time records to make it appear that they (petitioners) were under the control and supervision of [Sunflower] team leaders (rollo, pp. 523-527). xxxEven without these instances indicative of control by SMC over the petitioners, it is safe toassume that SMC would never have allowed the petitioners to work within its premises, using its own facilities, equipment and tools, alongside SMC employees discharging similar or identical activities unless it exercised a substantial degree of control and supervision over the petitionersnot only as to the manner they performed their functions but also as to the end results of such functions.xxxxxx it becomes apparent that [Sunflower] and the petitioners do not qualify as independent contractors.[Sunflower] and the petitioners did not have substantial capital or investmentin the form of tools, equipment, implements, work premises, et cetera necessary to actually perform the service under their own account, responsibility, and method. The only "work premises" maintained by [Sunflower] was a small office within the confines of a small "carinderia" or refreshment parlor owned by the mother of its chair, Roy Asong; the only equipment it owned was a typewriter (rollo, pp. 525-525) and,the only assets it provided SMC were the bare bodies of its members, the petitioners herein(rollo, p. 523).In addition, as shown earlier, petitioners, who worked inside the premises of SMC, wereunder the control and supervision of SMC both as to themannerandmethodin discharging their functions and as to theresultsthereof.Besides, it should be taken into account that theactivities undertaken by the petitionersas cleaners, janitors, messengers and shrimp harvesters, packers and handlers weredirectly related to the aquaculture business of SMC(SeeGuarin vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 267, 273). This is confirmed by therenewal of the service contract from January 1993 to September 1995, a period of close to three (3) years.Moreover, thepetitioners here numbering ninety seven (97), by itself, is a considerable workforce and raises the suspicion that the non-exclusive service contract between SMC and [Sunflower] was "designed to evade the obligations inherent in an employer-employee relationship" (SeeRhone-Poulenc Agrochemicals Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC,217 SCRA 249, 259).Equally suspicious is the fact that the notary public who signed the by-laws of [Sunflower] and its [Sunflower] retained counsel are both partners of the local counsel of SMC(rollo, p. 9).xxxWith these observations, no other logical conclusion can be reached except that[Sunflower] acted as an agent of SMC, facilitating the manpower requirements of the latter, the real employer of the petitioners. We simply cannot allow these two entities through the convenience of a non-exclusive service contract to stipulate on the existence of employer-employee relation. Such existence is a question of law which cannot be made the subject of agreement to the detriment of the petitioners (Tabas vs. California Manufacturing, Inc., 169 SCRA 497, 500).xxxThere being a finding of "labor-only" contracting, liability must be shouldered either by SMC or [Sunflower] or shared by both (SeeTabas vs. California Manufacturing, Inc.,supra,p. 502). SMC however should be heldsolelyliablefor [Sunflower]became non-existent with the closure of the aquaculture business of SMC.Furthermore, since the closure of the aquaculture operations of SMC appears to be valid, reinstatement is no longer feasible. Consistent with the pronouncement inBustamante, et al., vs. NLRC,G.R. No. 111651, 28 November 1996, petitioners are thus entitled to separation pay (in the computation similar to those given to regular SMC employees at its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant) "with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them" up to the time of the finality of this decision. This is without prejudice to differentials pays (sic) effective as of and from the time petitioners acquired regular employment status pursuant to the discussion mentioned above, and all such other and further benefits as provided by applicable collective bargaining agreement(s) or other relations, or by law, beginning such time up to their termination from employment on 11 September 1995.16(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)SMCs Motion for Reconsideration17having been denied for lack of merit by Resolution of July 11, 2001, it comes before this Court via the present petition for review on certiorari assigning to the CA the following errors:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERREDIN GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING RESPONDENTS PATENTLY DEFECTIVE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI. IN DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERREDIN RECOGNIZING ALL THE RESPONDENTS AS COMPLAINANTSIN THE CASE BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER. IN DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THIS CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE EMPLOYEES OF SMC.IVTHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERREDIN NOT FINDNG (sic) THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF. THE CLOSURE OF THE BACOLOD SHRIMP PROCESSING PLANT WAS DUE TO SERIOUS BUSINESS LOSSES.18(Underscoring supplied)SMC bewails the failure of the appellate court to outrightly dismiss the petition for certiorari as only three out of the ninety seven named petitioners signed the verification and certification against forum-shopping.While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient,19this Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.20Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.21It does not, however, thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.22Thus in the recent case ofHLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association,23this Court held:Respondents (who were plaintiffs in the trial court) filed the complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their homeowners association president who was likewise one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Samaon M. Buat.Respondents raised one cause of actionwhich was the breach of contractual obligations and payment of damages. Theyshared a common interestin the subject matter of the case, being the aggrieved residents of the poorly constructed and developed Emily Homes Subdivision.Due to the collective nature of the case, there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M. Buat could validly sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of all his co-plaintiffs. In cases therefore where it ishighly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to signthe certificate of non-forum shopping, it issufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of the plaintiffs, acting as representative, to sign the certificate provided that xxx theplaintiffs share a common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the case as a "collective," raising only one common cause of action or defense.24(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Given the collective nature of the petition filed before the appellate court by herein private respondents, raising one common cause of action against SMC, the execution by private respondents Winifredo Talite, Renelito Deon and Jose Temporosa in behalf of all the other private respondents of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.25That the three indeed represented their co-petitioners before the appellate court is, as it correctly found, "subsequently proven to be true as shown by the signatures of the majority of the petitioners appearing in their memorandum filed before Us."26Additionally, the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may also be deemed as "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" to take cognizance of a petition although the certification against forum shopping was not executed and signed by all of the petitioners.27SMC goes on to argue that the petition filed before the CA is fatally defective as it was not accompanied by "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto" in contravention of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.28This Court is not persuaded. The records show that private respondents appended the following documents to their petition before the appellate court: the September 23, 1997Decision of the Labor Arbiter,29theirNotice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandumdated October 16, 1997 filed before the NLRC,30the December 29, 1998NLRCD E C I S I O N,31theirMotionforReconsiderationdated March 26, 1999 filed with the NLRC32and the September 10, 1999NLRCResolution.33It bears stressing at any rate that it is the appellate court which ultimately determines if the supporting documents are sufficient to make out aprima faciecase.34It discerns whether on the basis of what have been submitted it could already judiciously determine the merits of the petition.35In the case at bar, the CA found that the petition was adequately supported by relevant and pertinent documents.At all events, this Court has allowed a liberal construction of the rule on the accomplishment of a certificate of non-forum shopping in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.36Rules of procedure should indeed be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.37SMC further argues that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC as "findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and finality," and that this principle acquires greater weight and application in the case at bar as the labor arbiter and the NLRC have the same factual findings.The general rule, no doubt, is that findings of facts of an administrative agency which has acquired expertise in the particular field of its endeavor are accorded great weight on appeal.38The rule is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions, however. Thus, when the findings of fact of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence or their judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the appellate court may make an independent evaluation of the facts of the case.39SMC further faults the appellate court in giving due course to private respondents petit