Nina Baltic, Tomasz Milej

Synthetic Report on Human Rights under the Yugoslav System, Processes of Ethnic Mobilization and EU Crisis Management

This report was compiled in the frame of the FP6 project “Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts”. The authors were affiliated to the Institute for East European Law, part of the Faculty of Law at the University of Cologne (Germany), one of the partners in this project. Copyright March 2007: the executing contracting institution

Human and Minority Rights in Violent Ethnic Conflict Synthetic report on the basis of MIRICO Work Package 2 Reports: Human and

Minority Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System, Country-Specific Reports on Actors and Processes of Ethno-Mobilization in Croatia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia and EU Reactive Crisis Management

Nina Baltic, Tomasz Milej

MIRICO: Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts

Table of contents Table of contents.........................................................2 List of Abbreviations .....................................................4 Abstract ....................................................................5 1. Introduction............................................................6 2. Basic Concepts and Definitions .....................................8

2.1. Ethnicity ............................................................. 8 2.2. Ethnic Conflict ...................................................... 8 2.3. Ethnic Group/Nation ............................................... 8 2.4.Perception ............................................................ 9 2.5.Cognitive Frames .................................................... 9 2.6.Ethno-Mobilization .................................................11 2.7.Summary .............................................................13

3. Prelude to violent conflict and ethnic mobilization under the Yugoslav Communist System ...................................... 14

3.1. Concept of Statehood during Socialist Yugoslavia ............14 3.1.1. Development of the Concept of Nations and Minorities ......14 3.1.2. Self-determination and secession in particular ................15 3.1.3. The concept from Serbia’s perspective: ........................17

3.2. Economic Preconditions for Ethno-Mobilization ..............18 3.3. Increasing of Ethnic Tensions ....................................20

4. Actors and means of ethno-mobilization ........................ 22 4.1. Politicians/Political Parties ......................................22

4.1.1. Developments on the political scene ............................22 4.1.2. Evaluation ............................................................24

4.2. Civil Society and Intellectuals ...................................25 4.3. Military, Paramilitary and State Intelligence Agencies ......25

4.3.1. JNA ....................................................................25 4.3.2. Republics .............................................................26 4.3.3. Kosovo ................................................................27 4.3.4. Evaluation ............................................................27

4.4. Influence of the Diaspora.........................................29 4.5. Churches and Religious Communities...........................30 4.6. Media ................................................................31

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5. Minorities in the New Republics .................................. 32 5.1. BiH, Croatia and Serbia...........................................32 5.2. Macedonia...........................................................33 5.3. Kosovo ...............................................................33 5.4. Evaluation ..........................................................33

6. Violence ............................................................. 36 7. Third-Party Intervention ........................................... 37

7.1. Individual States in the Region ..................................37 7.2. The Mujahedin and Islamic States...............................38 7.3. Individual States on the Geopolitical Scene ...................39 7.4. The Role of the EU (initially EC only) ..........................40

7.4.1. General ...............................................................40 7.4.2. Croatia................................................................40 7.4.3. BH and Kosovo.......................................................40 7.4.4. Macedonia............................................................41

7.5. The Role of the UN ................................................41 7.5.1. Croatia and BH ......................................................41 7.5.2. Croatia in particular................................................41 7.5.3. Serbia .................................................................42 7.5.4. Macedonia............................................................42

7.6. The Role of NATO ..................................................42 7.7. The OSCE ............................................................42

8. Conclusion............................................................ 44 Bibliography ............................................................. 46

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List of Abbreviations ARBH Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosnian Army) BH Bosnia Herzegovina BiH Bosnia i Herzegowina CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIVPOL Civilian Police (created by United Nations) EC European Community EU European Union FADORUK Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the

Undeveloped Republics and Kosovo FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic

Union) HVO Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) IMF International Monetary Fund IVZ Islamska Vjerska Zajednica JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Peoples Army) KLA Kosovo Liberation Army LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista

Jugoslavije) MBO Muslim Bosniak Organisation MUP Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova (Serbian Ministry of

Interior) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDH Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent Croatian State) NGO Non-Governmental Organization NLA National Liberation Army OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe SANU Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of

Sciences and Arts) SAO Serbian Autonomous Oblast SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SPS Socijalistička Partija Srbije (Serbian Socialist Party) SR Socialist Republic TDF Territorial Defence Forces UN United Nations UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNPA United Nations Protected Areas UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force US United States USA United Stats of America VMRO-DPMNE Vnatrešno-Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija-

Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Narodno Edinstvo (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity)

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Abstract The Synthetic Report elaborates the factors of ethno-mobilization that led to outbreak of violence on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the position of minorities within the conflicts and the role of third parties. Therefore it raises and analyses the results of the country specific reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, the Report on Human and Minority Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System and other sources on the basis of explanatory models and theories developed in the scholars’ writings. The results show how within a declining Yugoslav socialist state model serious security concerns emerged which made people vulnerable to ethno-mobilization, initiated by authoritarian political top leaders in Serbia, Croatia and BH. The right to (external) self-determination and an effluent right to secession – perceived to be held by both nations and (newly defined) national minorities - became the most central question. Despite this common root, the nature of the conflict was different in each republic and in Kosovo. The emphasis is put on political and economic factors that contributed to the security concerns as well as on religious communities, their leaders’ involvement in politics and ethno-mobilization. Finally, the report addresses the question of the so called “point of no return” in the republics concerned, at which a violent ethnic conflict could be said to be no longer avoidable. The developed results are supposed to serve as a basis for the further work packages of the MIRICO-project.

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1. Introduction The Synthetic Report elaborates the contents and the results of the Report on the Theory and Practice of Human Rights and Minority Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System and the country specific Reports on Actors and Means of Ethno-Mobilization, Third-Party-Intervention and Violence. The present survey will attempt to explain why violent ethnic conflict occurred in Yugoslavia. It will also try to establish “the point of no-return” at which ethno-mobilization was so advanced that a violent ethnic conflict became unavoidable.

Dealing with of the process of ethno-mobilization leading to ethnic violence, one must first observe that four different views on its nature have basically been presented in the literature.1 The first (“primordial”) explanation model stresses the primordial character of ethnic affiliation, attaching to it an “overpowering emotional and non-rational quality”. According to this view, in the former Yugoslavia, a fierce competition for political power combined with uncertainty and distrust turned entire ethnic communities against each other and activated hatred that had previously been hidden just under the surface of “normal” inter-community relations. According to the second (“instrumentalist”) view, ethnic loyalties are manipulated by politicians and intellectuals for political ends, such as, for example, the establishment of a new state. The third (“constructionist”) model opposes the idea of a primordial character of ethnic affiliations, arguing that ethnicity is only one of several roles and identities that matter and is subject to change, as it is constructed and eroded by political institutions and choices. Finally, according to the fourth (“collapse”) model, the security dilemma arising from the conditions of state-breakdown is the main source of ethno-mobilization as it let the ethnic group appear to be the powerful protector of life and property against ethnic rivals.

Instead of relying on one particular model, the present report will take an analytical-comparative approach based mainly on the data provided in the aforementioned reports and, where appropriate, evaluating the findings against the conceptual framework presented. The variety of concepts taken alone shows that convincing results cannot be reached by limiting the analysis only to one group of actors, for example politicians. Therefore the report will attempt to define the major actors of the process of ethno-mobilization, make an assessment of their role and means used to trigger it, to slow it down or to minimize its impact.

It begins with an analysis of some basic concepts put forward in the literature and definitions provided in the country reports. On this basis, country specific definitions of ethno-mobilization and its common traits are elaborated.

The second part deals with the “grass roots” of the conflict which have to be sought in the Yugoslavian Communist system. The emphasis is put on the final stage of its development. This part includes an analysis of the concept of statehood and the rights which were granted to the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia that left all of the ethnic groups unsatisfied, a special focus being put on the Serbian constitutional crisis.

According to the initially prepared questionnaire the following three parts draw up a comparison of the country specific results on actors and means of ethno-mobilization, minorities and third-party interventions. The subsection on actors and means of ethno-mobilization concentrates on the most important actors: the political elites and the clergy, also showing how important the media were in this

1 The following overview is based on Anthony Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, Ethnic and Racial Studies (2000), 982-984.

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process. The next subsection points out the legal and actual effects on minorities in the respective republics, the last subsection deals mainly with the role of foreign states, international institutions and their (in)effective influence on negotiations, violent escalation and peace settlement.

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2. Basic Concepts and Definitions The Croatian report provides a definition of ethnicity, which will be used as basis for further reflections on the term “ethno-mobilization” and the analysis of the following processes.

2.1. Ethnicity Ethnicity is defined as “[…] use of descent as basis for membership in ethnic groups […]. The belief of a common origin is encouraged by a common language, a shared religion, a sense of homeland, common customs and shared historical narratives.”2

In a simplified way, ethnicity is an “identity with one’s ethnic group […]”.3 Despite the ethnic identity, individuals have various identities based on their profession, sex, religion, etc. “[…] When ethnicity becomes politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in defence of a valued status quo.”4

Ethnic identification within a national collective became important when the republics of Yugoslavia sought to become truly sovereign (national) states for the first time in their history – a right, which was contested by ethnic groups within their own territory and by other republics. Ethnic affiliation became dominant in everyday life, in matters of residence, citizenship, job loss or maintenance and - the worst case - physical integrity or survival.

2.2. Ethnic Conflict “Ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict, in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide”.5

2.3. Ethnic Group/Nation: The term nation will be used in contexts which will deal with ethnic groups that are the titular nation within a certain republic (nation state). “Ethnic group” will be used as general clause.

2 Antonija Petricusic, Country Specific Report on Croatia, p. 3, see also classical studies on ethnicity: Max Weber, “Ethnic Groups” in Werner Sollors (ed.) Theories of Ethnicity, (New York University Press, New York, 1922); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, London, 1983); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge, 1996). 3 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic conflict, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), 31. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., 2.

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2.4. Perception The Yugoslav leadership had claimed from the very beginning that the national question was resolved with the establishment of the second Yugoslavia. The old national plans of Serbs and Croats and hatreds of other peoples inhabiting Yugoslavia were considered to be obsolete.

Far from that - it seems that the mutual perceptions of the ethnic groups or the mutual perceptions of old (hegemonic or separatist) threat they presented to each other in the Balkans were the only perceptions in the collective memories that survived and became true eventually, beside the fact that there have also been reverse developments. To say it with the words of the Serbian report in a generalised way: The “[…] threat in the consciousness of one ethnic group was real because it was the perceived reality that guided action and in turn, mobilized the other ethnic groups, corroborating their thesis of the others’ hostility”.6

2.5. Cognitive Frames The sharp contrast between the situation after World War II until late eighties, in which nations and nationalities were living peacefully together,7 and atrocities committed in the course of the war call for a special explanation. It is hereby not necessary to explain why Yugoslavia fell apart, but why the process of falling apart took such violent forms.8 The issue will be addressed on the basis of a concept of cognitive frames.9 A cognitive frame is to be understood as a “mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others.”10 According to Anthony Oberschall the people in the Balkans experienced ethnic relations through two frames: a “normal” frame and a “crisis” frame. The aforementioned contrast can be explained by the fact that during the time of communist Yugoslavia the normal frame was dominant and the ethnic relations were cooperative and neighbourly. The crisis frame which dominated in the subsequent war was grounded in the experiences of the Balkan wars and World War II in particular. In this frame:

Atrocities, massacres, torture, ethnic cleansing, a scorched-earth policy were the rule. Everyone was held collectively responsible for their nationality and religion, and became a target of revenge and reprisals.11

The official policy of Yugoslavia was striving to erase the crisis frame12 but these attempts were not successful. The absence of an open debate13 on the tragic past

6 Vesna Pešić, Country Specific Report on Serbia, 4. 7 See Nina Baltić, Special Report on Theory and Practice of Human Rights and Minority Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System, 39 et seq. For BH see also Wolfgang Petritsch, Bosnien und Herzegovina 5 Jahre danach. Hat der Friede eine Chance?, (Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt et al. 2001), 31. 8 The necessity to distinguish between these two questions is pointed out by John B. All-cock, Explaining Yugoslavia, (Columbia University Press, New York 2000), 419. 9 Oberschall, 989. 10 David Snow et al., “Frame alignment processes, micromobilization and movement par-ticipation”, American Sociological Review (1986), 464-481, cited after Oberschall, 989 11 Oberschall, 989. 12 Baltić, 49. 13 According to Hansjörg Eiff a political debate about the recent past (World War II) aiming at reconciliation was “completely missing”. Hansjörg Eiff, “Anmerkungen zum Zerfall Jugos-

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may be the major reason for this. What the authoritarian regime offered was not an open debate, but a party-managed top-down equalisation of ethnic groups, applying an “ethnic key” in many areas of public life. Even if the Yugoslav system is considered to be a quite liberal one as compared with other countries of “real socialism”, an articulation of collective needs by ethnic groups and representation of collective interests belonged to the restricted domain. Initiating a debate about the roots of past ethnic violence would definitely overstep the borderline drawn for the permitted public debates by the communist leadership.14 Such a debate would undermine the crucial partisan myth lying at the roots of Tito-Yugoslavia and legitimating it. A common Communist Party-led antifascist fight of all Yugoslav peoples was this myth. It was not only propagated by the party but also enforced by prosecuting its objectors.15 At the end of the day, however, precisely this lack of public debate actually conferred upon the not-outspoken past inter-ethnic violence legendary or mythological forms16 which could be easily used by nationalists. The crisis frame was dormant but it still existed. It could be activated and amplified17 and this is what actually happened in the course of ethno- mobilization.

lawiens in den Jahren 1988-1992”, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović, Sozialistisches Jugoslawien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-Zikic-Stiftung 2001-2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005),177-104, at 189. 14 Baltić, 48-49. 15 Aleksandar Jakir, “Nationale Ideologien und das System der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung im sozialistischen Jugoslawien“, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović, Sozialistisches Ju-goslawien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-Zikic-Stiftung 2001-2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005), 99-149, at 123. 16 For examples, see Allcock, 382-383. 17 Oberschall, 989.

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2.6. Ethno-Mobilization The table below summarizes definitions of an ethnic mobilization provided for in country reports. BH Croatia Serbia Kosovo/a Macedonia The bringing of members to a state of readiness/mobility that should be a pre-requisite for the performance of other actions or obstacle to the sudden or unannounced attack by opposing ethnic groups. In simple words, ethno-mobilization could be defined as “closing ranks” within a single national corps in order to achieve a certain goal or perform some extraordinary work, most frequently for the purpose of “organizing defense from an enemy”, i.e. removing the causes of vulnerability.18 It means bringing members of one ethnic group in a state of readiness, mobility, what should be a pre-requisite for performance of other actions and/or obstacle and barrier to the sudden or unannounced “attack” by another “opposing” ethnic group or groups

Ethno-mobilization can be understood as an instrumentalization of ethnic identities, or in other words, (mis-) use of the ethnicity by the elites, in order to mobilize the masses for the realization of their political objectives and (even personal) interests. Ethnic mobilization implies grouping around the ethnic lines and the (re)-emergence of ethnic cleavages that had consequences for the segmentation of the society. Ethnic mobilization can be said to emerge as a response to the threats and fears that were intentionally fostered, or even manipulated by politicians who simply employed already existing historical narratives.

Ethnic mobilization is the state-building move-ment of a people led by an authoritarian leader who has succeeded in assuming control over the state apparatus, the media, the Church and the cultural elite, the involvement of which is pre-requisite for achieving the emotional, cultural and political homogenization of the nation’s awareness of the common enemy war should be waged against.

Ethno-mobilization is ‘the process by which an ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic entrepreneurs, that political action is necessary to promote or defend the community’s vital collective interests. This awareness results in the recruitment of individuals into the movement or into specific organizations that purport to speak for the movement. Likewise, financial and other material resources required for political action are drawn to the movement.’

Ethno-mobilization is political mobilization along ethnic lines.

18 The very term “mobilization“ is primarily of military origin and it means “transition of the nation’s armed forces from peace-time status into mobile status and reaching full bat-tle readiness” (Bratoljub Klaić, Veliki rječnik stranih riječi (Zora, Zagreb, 1972)). The same dictionary describes a broader sense of the term “mobilization” as “attracting certain groups of population [...] to perform some tasks that are required by the current circum-stances”, and “put in motion (for instance, popular masses) for the purpose of performing some extraordinary work”. The term “ethno-mobilization” would mark the last case: “mo-bilizing masses for the purpose of performing some extraordinary work, which would, in the eve of war in former Yugoslavia, be defense of jeopardized nations (in the broadest mean-ing of the word).

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The evaluation of the term “ethno-mobilization” starts with the broadest definition, given by the Macedonian Report, which defines ethnic mobilization as political mobilization along ethnic lines.19 The other reports provide definitions of ethno-mobilization which are built on to the processes in different countries and show what is considered the most important factors in ethno-mobilization.

The Serbian report defines ethno-mobilization as the state-building movement of a people - led by an authoritarian leader who gained control over the state apparatus, the media, the church and cultural elite, the involvement of which is a pre-requisite for achieving the emotional, cultural and political homogenization of the nation’s awareness of the common enemy war should be waged against.20 It is interesting that the Serbian report includes the element of state building, as “Serbs” were perceived to be an advocate of the maintenance and perseverance of Yugoslavia as a state - an already existing state - and “they” accused the other republics/nations of separatist aims, building their own states. That means that the Serb state-building movement started in a period when they were living in a state that “they” wanted to preserve as an entity.

In the Croatian report ethno-mobilization is defined as the instrumentalization of ethnic identities, (ab-) use of ethnicity by the elites, in order to mobilize the masses for the realization of their political objectives and (even personal) interests.21 What is relevant here is that manipulation of masses for the realization of subjective political goals.

The Bosnian report puts emphasis on the isolation of one ethnic group from the other. Each group aims to defend itself from the enemy, “removing the causes of vulnerability”.22 The analytical deduction of the word “mobilization” from the military origin - “the transition of the nation’s armed forces from peacetime status into mobile status and reaching full battle readiness” points exactly to what occurred in BiH within a very short period of time.23 The eighties had been quiet in BiH as political pressure on nationalistic forces had been heavy. Once ethnic mobilization started, fueled by influences of ongoing military disputes in Croatia, the level of ethnic mobilization experienced a sudden shift – inevitable military mobilization of large parts of the (male) population.

The Kosovo report refers to ethno-mobilization as a process by which an ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic entrepreneurs, that political action is necessary to promote or defend the community’s vital collective interests.24

Contrary to the other ethnic groups it appears that Albanian ethno-mobilization was a continuing process that started much earlier than in the other ethnic groups, since they had already been struggling continuously for more rights in Yugoslavia with a strong emphasis on their “national” affiliation. On the other hand the point on which “they” took arms to defend themselves from their enemies was reached much later compared to the other ethnic groups.

To sum up, in the cases of Serbia, Croatia and BiH, on the basis of the provided definitions, one may speak of ethnic-mobilization driven from the top and not from the bottom, which was not successfully opposed by a relatively weak civil

19 Zoran Ilievski, Country Specific Report on Macedonia, 3, cited after: James D. Fearon, Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence (August 2004, at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/ethreview.pdf), 7 20 Pešić, 3, 4. 21 Petricusic, 4. 22 Nerzuk Ćurak, Zarije Seizović, Nermina Šačić, Sead Turčalo, Country Specific Report on BiH, 2. 23 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 3. 24 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming)

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society.25 In Croatia and Serbia ethno-mobilization presupposes an initiative and subsequent commitment of the political leader (-ship) steadily assuming control over segments of society. In BiH, the situation is similar. The difference consists in the fact that the political leadership was acting from the outside (Serbia and Croatia). This concept is close to the instrumentalist model presented in the introduction. The case of Kosovo is quite different, as the definition does not stress any special role of political leadership. Stressing the “vital collective interests” of an ethnic group, it gets close to the primordial model.

2.7. Summary From this point a summarizing definition of ethno-mobilization is possible as follows:

Ethno-mobilization is a process of (emotional, cultural and political) homogenization of societies according to their ethnic identity. The intensity depends on the promotion of a strong and influential political leader or leading elite (political parties), religious leaders and intellectuals, and is promoted by the media and religious communities, pointing to more recent or older collective traumatic experiences. This leads to the isolation of ethnic groups from one another, as members of other ethnic group(s) are perceived as enemies.

The most intensive stage of ethnic mobilization results in ethnic conflict and in the worst case the violent unloading of tensions and attempts at the extermination/genocide of the enemy group, or at least the backing of actions taken by the “defence forces” to do so.

As this is an all embracing definition it is clear that not all features must be fulfilled to set off the avalanche of ethnic mobilization; sometimes it is enough to have one ethnic group start national homogenization, invoking an automatic collective process in other ethnic groups.

In order to make this definition more operational, it is helpful to resort to the concept of cognitive frames. Doing so, one may distinguish two stages of ethno-mobilization in the former Yugoslavia. A shift from the normal frame to the crisis frame, or more properly the moment, in which the crisis frame becomes dominant can be regarded as the crucial point. Taking into account that within the crisis frame the peoples of Yugoslavia think about each other in terms of collective responsibility for past harms and atrocities, one may argue that a violent ethnic conflict became unavoidable as the crisis frame started to dominate. A shift from the normal frame to the crisis frame is thus to be regarded as a “point of no-return”, at which the ethnic mobilization inevitably leads to violence. The establishment of this point of no-return is one of the major goals of this survey.

25 The “top-down” direction in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia in general is ob-served by Allcock, 418. This author seems to link it to the authoritarian rule forcing every-thing into the pattern of state-sponsored self-management and, doing so, impeding a crea-tion of a civil society. See Allcock, 420.

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3. Prelude to Violent Conflict and Ethnic Mobilization under the Yugoslav Communist System

3.1. Concept of Statehood during Socialist Yugoslavia

The constitution of 1974 postulated a concept of statehood for Yugoslavia, the republics and the provinces that became decisive for the coming break-up of Yugoslavia. It was the result of historical and legal decentralizing and “democratizing” developments, which gradually conceded ground to the growing national/republican demands that in the end led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The concept provided for an almost equal position of republics and autonomous provinces26 and formally transferred almost all “decisive” competences to the republican and provincial level. The question of whether the republican institutions ever had real decisive power has to be seen in the context of the decision-making process under Tito and his comrades. After his death, the federal authorities had a problem implementing any decisions they made as all important decision could be blocked by the mutual veto rights.

The federal state apparatus was, at least at the top level, dominated by the principle of equal representation of republics and provinces (collective state leadership/presidency, republican and provincial representation in the communist party (Central Committee and Presidency of the LCY). The chairs of various state agencies were filled according to a rotation system based on an ethnic key.

The provinces were granted a veto right concerning the changing of their constitutional status at federal level. They issued their own constitutions, had their own legislative, administrative and judicial system, including constitutional courts. 3.1.1. Development of the Concept of Nations and Minorities

The effect of this constitutional system, which provided Autonomous Provinces within Serbia, was that the largest minorities (Albanians and the Hungarians living in Kosovo and Vojvodina respectively) were directly represented at the federal level in the same way as the constitutive nations. Most notably in Vojvodina, rules of proportional representation and language rights were fairly applied to the state organization. In Kosovo proportional representation was slowly progressing but in most fields not fully achieved until the situation in Kosovo started to deteriorate.

In the rest of the republics minority quotas were implemented at a local level as well. Minorities were proportionally represented in municipalities in the local assemblies and socialist organizations as a result of adoption of minority quotas.27

Besides “political” participation, which was fairly developed since the sixties, the promotion of cultural rights commenced immediately after the Second World War by establishing and gradually extending a minority educational system as well as assistance in cultural fields (newspapers or theatres in minority languages, etc.).

Such rights were denied to the nations, which lived outside their “native” republics and were numerically inferior to the majority population, for example the Serbs in Croatia or the Croats in Slovenia (economic migrants whose number had increased considerably through the years). Any aspirations to form cultural associations were suppressed by the regime and denounced as “nationalistic”. The status of a “nation” was regarded as sufficient, since they were in a stronger

26 Pešić, 7. 27 Since the system of minority protection was never completely applied to all communes that had minorities living in their territory.

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political position (which in the Yugoslav context does not mean the freedom of political participation in a truly democratic sense), hence there was no need for protection.

There was almost no institutional distinction between the republics and provinces anymore. The distinction manifested itself in the status attached to the inhabiting nations and nationalities. The first Basic Principle of the Federal Constitution stated that the “nations, proceeding from their right to self-determination, including the right to secede, […], have together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities …”28. Therefore they (the nations) were perceived to have a right of self-determination and secession under the Yugoslav Constitution.

In the riots of 1968 and 1981 the Albanians (in particular in Kosovo) wanted their status to be changed from a national minority to that of a nation. This would have incorporated the mentioned rights of self-determination and secession.

The Albanians in Kosovo were intentionally not granted the status of a nation with the Constitution of 197429. Equalization was pursued by giving Kosovo a strong status providing almost all features of statehood and the adjustment of an Albanian representation in state agencies, hoping that a virtual equalization would satisfy Albanian demands.

However, this compromise left the Albanians unsatisfied, as it amounted to a denial of the right to self-determination and secession. 3.1.2. Self-determination and secession in particular

The question of self-determination and secession was hardly dealt within the constitutional Yugoslav system and was vague under international law. How far the right of self-determination and secession goes is and was disputed both under the Yugoslav law and international law.

Concerning the Albanian minority it is clear that they did not possess the right to self-determination and secession under Yugoslav national law. The Yugoslav constitution limited this right to constituent nations and Albanians were not granted this status.30

Today, after a long period of disputes in international law concerning the scope of the aforementioned rights, the right to (internal) self-determination concerning national minorities is tending to develop into a right of participation in political affairs and to preserve and develop their own identity.31 In general, there is confusion on the basis of international law as to whether national minorities have the right to self-determination including the right to secession (external self-

28 “The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and So-cialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historic aspirations, aware that further con-solidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interests, have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working people – the Social-ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in which in the interests of each nation and nationality separately and of all of them together, they shall realize and ensure ...”, see The Constitu-tion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, translated by M. Pavčić, (Jugoslovenski pregled, Beograd 1989), S. 9. 29 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming) 30 This interpretation was also adopted by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia in its deci-sion of 19 February 1991. Cited after Peter Radan, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and Interna-tional Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2002), 198. 31 Antonio Cassese, Self-determination, a legal reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), 352, 353.

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determination), as the latter is granted to “peoples” only and not to national minorities. Moreover, public international law tends to preserve the sovereignty of existing states.32 Although the concepts of minority rights and self-determination were developed independently, an overlap may occur, if the national minority is at the same time “a people” or a part of it,33 as it is the case of Albanians. One may argue that in this situation the minorities’ rights are to be regarded as a fulfillment of the right to self-determination.34 The latter may, however, generate the right to secession, if the minorities’ rights are gravely disregarded and secession represents the only way to avoid flagrant violations of these rights.35 There is until now no clear legal position on Kosovo problem. Yet, it has been observed that in the practice of the UN with regard to Kosovo, reference to the right to self-determination is carefully avoided.36

Croatia and Slovenia and afterwards BiH and Macedonia had claimed that they had a right to self-determination and (an entailed) right to secession under the Yugoslav Constitution. Since the right to self-determination and secession referred to nations, the Serbs in Croatia and in BiH claimed that they also had the right to secession from the republics that wished to leave Yugoslavia.

The claims of the four republics, however, were challenged by many Yugoslav scholars.37 The Federal Executive Council took the position “that the right must result from a democratic process and not from a unilateral act.”38 The same position was taken by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia which also stressed that Yugoslavia’s international borders can only be altered by virtue of laws passed by the Federal Assembly (Article 183).39 This interpretation can be regarded as being in line with the concept of self-determination prevailing in international law, given its reluctance towards affirming a right to secession.40 In contrast, the principle of the Yugoslav constitution understood autonomously and literally, as linking self-determination unconditionally to the right of secession, would go far beyond of what is established under international law. One must keep in mind that the right to secession under public international law, if acceptable at all, must preserve a character of “an absolute exception”.41

32 Knut Ipsen/ Hans-Joachim Heintze, Völkerrecht (C.H. Beck, München 2004), 423. Accord-ing to M. Shaw “Self-determination as a concept is capable of developing further so as to include the right to secession from existing states, but that has not as yet convincingly hap-pened.” See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003), 231. 33 Ipsen/Heintze, 413. 34 This was apparently the position of Badinter Committee in its opinion regarding the status of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Opinion No. 2, (3) European Journal of International Law (1992), 184. 35 Ipsen/Heintze, 414. This view is not shared e.g. by Shaw, 231. According to Heintze, the right to secession must have a character of “an absolute exception”. Ipsen/Heintze, 423. Heintze invokes an argumentum a contrario from the Resolution of the UN General Assem-bly Resolution on Friendly Relations (Friendly Relations Declaration, Res. 2625 (XXV)) which does not constitute a source of international law as such and may be only regarded as a piece of evidence of respective customary law rule. 36 Ipsen/Heintze, 415. 37 Cp. Ben Bagwell, “Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of Member Republics”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1991), 489-523, at 509. 38 Ibid., 511. 39 Cited after Radan, 169 and 173. 40 See supra, p. 15. 41 See supra, fn. 35

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Under the international law the right to self-determination had developed from a vague principle of a right held by peoples.42 Nevertheless, the principle of self-determination was not developed far enough, let alone the question about the implementation of such a right to self-determination or secession, that it could have provided rules for the handling of the process of dissolution in Yugoslavia.43 Therefore “the achievement of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia […took] place beyond the regulation of the existing body of laws.”44

The Badinter Committee applied the uti-possidetis principle to take ground from a further truncation of the seceding entities. Eventually, the right to self-determination and secession was recognized only for the former nations of Yugoslavia within the existing republican borders. This Badinter Committee’s idea of the uti-possidetis concept was vigorously criticized by many scholars.45 Minorities like the Albanians or minorities that emerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia (the Serbs in Croatia) were therefore not accorded the right to secession.

Looking at the right to self-determination as a factor triggering the process of ethno-mobilization it is difficult to claim that its actual legal contents had a decisive impact on it. It was rather its common perception as a “right to secede” and this perception had no foundation either in the Yugoslav constitutional law, or in the public international law. This perception had a destructive impact. Accordingly, it was initially used by Croatia and Slovenia to justify their secession,46 and subsequently by Serbian communities in Croatia and BiH to justify their secessions,47the last two in the capacity of the Serbian people as a constituent nation and not as a “minority”. This will be evaluated under point 5.4. 3.1.3. The concept from Serbia’s perspective

For all republics and nations and nationalities the development which Yugoslavia had undergone, presented a continuing affirmative process, except for Serbia, for which it was a reverse process.

Serbia was the only republic with autonomous provinces. And its problem with the 1974-Constitution was twofold. Internally, the implementation of uniform laws on the whole republican territory was very difficult or even impossible, since laws, which were not approved by the provincial assemblies (basically laws had to be adopted by consensus of all three entities) applied only to “Serbia proper”.48

Externally, it was confronted with the fact the representative of the Serbia (proper) represented only one part of Serbs living on Serbian territory49, while the other republics represented their “nations” living in their republican territories

Therefore in Serbia the resistance against such a concept of the Serbian state emerged. It was consolidated in the “Blue Book”, which was unpublished until 1990 and perceived to be nationalistic by the other republics and in particular by 42 Cassese, 65-66. 43 This is mainly due to the fact that the concept of external self-determination was shaped largely within the decolonisation process. In this particular context, the territory for which the external self-determination was claimed did not constitute a part of the territory of the colonial power. Ipsen/Heintze, 422. The case of Yugoslavia’s dissolution was much differ-ent. The seceding republics were a part of Yugoslavia’s territory, the inviolability of which was moreover protected by constitutional provisions. 44 Cassese, 270. 45 These opinions are referred to by Radan, 242 who adopts a critical view himself too, see Radan, 247. 46 See Radan 173 and 177 respectively. 47 Radan, 173 and 177 respectively. 48 Pešić, 9. 49 Pešić, 8.

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the provinces.50 On the Serbian side, the delay in addressing the attempts to redefine Serbian competences and institutionalize Serbian authority in an appropriate way on a common basis with the others was perceived as “part of the anti-Serbian coalition”.51

The incapability to resolve the problem by means of negotiation between all republics and provinces (which was necessary to address Serbian internal affairs according to the Constitution) resulted in the instrumentalization and exploitation of the question of Serbia’s status by nationalistic forces in the party, military and police.52

Serbian mass emigrations from Kosovo, the high birth rate amongst the Albanian population53 and the gradual acquisition of proportional representation, meant a gradual weakening of the Serbian population in Kosovo. This was the starting shot for the coming tragedy of war in the former Yugoslavia.

3.2. Economic Preconditions for Ethno-Mobilization In the economic context, two factors can be identified as contributing to ethno-mobilization. Probably the most important factor is the profound decentralization of the decision making process resulting from the adopted system of workers’ self-management. A substantial gap in the level of economic development between the republics is the second factor. Both factors must be seen against the background of overall “extreme crisis”54 which plagued Yugoslavia in the eighties.

The Constitution of 1974 at the latest transformed Yugoslavia into a de facto confederation.55 It is even claimed that the adoption of this constitution put an end to the common state installing a system of Balance of Nations (or States) on the territory of SFRY.56 The highly complex system of organizations of associated labour forming the key element not only of economic, but also of the political structure of the country could be hardly understood by ordinary people. At the of the day, a system which was supposed to defeat “technocracy” and “managerialism” by strengthening worker control over the enterprises fell easily under the control of local party bosses.57 According to a study carried out in the eighties, there were oligarchic structures of power in place that worked in favor of

50 Pešić, 9. 51 Pešić, 9,10. 52 Pešić, 8. 53 Pešić, 10. 54 Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel (Westview Press, Oxford 2002), 50. 55 Baltić, 19. 56 Milan Kosanović, “Auf dem Weg zur selbstverwalteten Konföderation. Der jugoslawische Föderalismus im Spiegel der Verfassungstexte“, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović, Sozialistisches Jugoslawien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-Zikic-Stiftung 2001-2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005), 63-98, at 93. 57 Allcock, 92. Christiane von Kohl identifies two factors which led to this development. The first factor lies in the nature of Kardelj’s self-management concept: The decentralization of decision-making process did not go along with the abolishment of the monopoly of the Communist Party which was still supposed to be “responsible for everything”. The second factor is the mentioned complexity of the system. It became complex in the course of the reforms in the sixties and – above all – with the Law on Associated Labor (Zakon o udruženom radu) from 1976. The bureaucratic and incomprehensible language, in which it was written, made it vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation by the party functionaries. Christiane von Kohl, Jugoslawien (C.H. Beck, München 1990), 19-21. See also from the eco-nomic point of view Werner Gumpel, “Das Wirtschaftssystem”, in Klaus-Detlev Grothausen (ed.), Handbuch Südosteuropa. Band I.Jugoslawien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1975), 199-234, at 230.

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the professional management and against the interests of workers.58 Hence, one may assume that the economy was controlled by managerial and party elites at the republican or regional level advocating particular and egoistic local, mostly republican interests.59

Because of the aforementioned development cleft and differences in the economic structure of the republics, their economic interests were often contradictory and revealed high conflict potential. This conflict potential could not be mitigated by establishment of the FADORUK (Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the Undeveloped Republics and Kosovo). On the contrary, it was even aggravated as it served as reason for complaints from all parties about the volume and allocation of FADORUK resources.60 In general, it has been observed that the most open conflicts taking place between the elites of various republics referred to economic contradictions and the uneven distribution of wealth. Therefore these must not be underestimated.61

The impetus for ethno-mobilization could arise out of this situation and it did arise as the articulation of economic interests of the republic shifted to nationalistic argumentation.62 The economic interests hidden behind the nationalistic rhetoric were also contradictory, as assessed in the context of potential secession. Whereas Slovenia, with its manufacturing and food-processing links to Austria, Italy and Germany, and Croatia, with its tourism sector, were in the position to generate economic growth as independent states, the prospects for the Serbian economy, especially in the case of the loss of Kosovo or even Voivodina, were very unfavourable.63 Over the course of the economic crisis in the eighties, the Slovenian elites for example, formulated a political program which was summarized by the slogan “Nećemo u Evropu preko Beograda” (we don’t want to go to Europe via Belgrade).64 The inner-Yugoslav ties were not strong, and the local elites were ready to break them as soon as their economic interests could be realized in a different setting in a more effective manner.65

The main characteristics of the economic crisis in the eighties were tremendous foreign debt, denied access to new credits, recession and falling industrial production.66 The inability of the central Yugoslav government under Ante Marković to enforce reform steps against the resistance of republican elites67 seems to confirm the decisive role of the latter. The more the crisis proceeded, the more economic egoism determined inter-republican relations and the more this contradictory economic egoism generated nationalism. The Serb-Croat opposition seems to play a particularly important role and this issue will be explored below.

As far as contradictory economic interests are to be considered as a basis from which nationalistic feelings arose that shifted the cognitive frame and led to the violent ethnic conflict, this process fits best into the constructionist explanation model of ethno-mobilization.

Finally, one more aspect of the economic reforms of the eighties must be added. The reform steps taken under the pressure of International Monetary Found

58 Jakir, 140 quoting a study of Vladimir Arzenšek, Sudbina radničkih saveta, Sociologija (1984), 13. 59 Jakir, 122-124, 128. This view seems to be shared by Allcock, 93 and 426. 60 Baltić, 16-17; Jakir, 146. 61 Jakir, 103. 62 Jakir, 104. 63 Allcock, 427. 64 Eiff, 192 65 See also Eiff, 184. 66 Its nature and roots are not evaluated here as they have little to do with ethno-mobilization. For a compact description see Allcock, 423 and Ramet, 50-51. 67 Allcock 97; Eiff, 188.

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(hereafter: IMF) from 1985-1986 dismantled the system of self-management and abolished the organizations of associated labor.68 On the one hand, it is true that the capability of this system to generate economic growth was low and this became visible to foreign scholars much earlier.69 On the other hand, the symbolic power of self-management must not be underestimated. Self-management was the “Yugoslav road to socialism”, the entire pride arising from Tito’s “no” to Stalin, a trump in foreign policy, an object of fascination for foreigners, and along with the partisan myth a core element of “Yugoslav” identity.70 Noting this, one must be aware of how important this brace, which was taken away by the reform from 1985-1986, had been.

3.3. Increasing of Ethnic Tensions The cleansings of Croatian Spring had led to a subdued attitude of the Croatian Communist Party in the eighties, which in turn lacked legitimacy from the Croatian population.71 As there was no official political forum, nationalism spread latently through the civil society in Croatia. It was promoted by the processes going on in Serbia.

Milošević picked up what was provided by the church and the intellectuals.72 He put it on the political stage and made it accessible to a broader population so that nationalism could spread. He used mass-movements and an anti-bureaucratic revolution against the institutionalized system of the provinces “impeding” Serbian power (in his nationalistic sense). Thus he brought down the provincial leadership in Vojvodina, cleansed the leadership in Kosovo, and seized power with his allies in Montenegro.73

Tensions also became appreciable in Croatia. In the late eighties pro-Serbian demonstrations of Croatian Serbs took for example place in Knin.74 This was another step in the spiral of ethnic mobilization in Croatia, which also shifted the Croatian national/istic estimation to a higher level. The Croatian Communist Party (except for many of the Serbian party members) and the Croatian population took a critical view of Milošević’s policy.75

While throughout the eighties the media became less and less restricted and diverse political opinions were present in public, a definitively open stadium of ethnic mobilization was only reached with the legalization of other parties for democratic elections besides the Communist Party. It looked like now “nationalism” had an open political stage in Croatia and BiH.

68 Ramet, 50. 69 See for example the critical assessment of Wolfgang Gumpel from 1975; Gumpel, 212-214. 70 See Allcock, 422; von Kohl, 19; Tadeusz Szymczak, Jugosławia. Państwo Federacyjne (Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź 1982), 202. From the point of view of the “official” Yugoslav ideology, “a common progress and goals in a socialist self-managing community of peoples“ was the factor uniting multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, considered even as more important than the partisan myth. See Michael B. Petrovich, “Population structure”, in Klaus-Detlev Grothausen (ed.), Handbuch Südosteuropa. Band I.Jugoslawien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1975), 322-344, at 337 71 Petricusic, 5. 72 Pešić, 13. 73 Petricusic, p. 6, cited after: Paul Garde, Život i smrt Jugoslavije (Ceres, Zagreb, 1997), 246-255. 74 Petricusic, 6. 75 Petricusic, 6.

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Nevertheless, the political protagonists promoting nationalism who emerged in the nineties came from the opposition in Croatia - although Tuđman was a former partisan and a Communist Party member, he belonged to the group of dissidents who were imprisoned for their (nationalistic) opinions and attitude against the regime in the seventies and eighties.

The fact that the republics sought independence by building nation states loomed seriously ahead. This concept was suitable for all the republics, except BiH in which no nation had an absolute majority.76

The situation that arose at the eve of the war was dominated by two rival nationalisms striving for contradictory political and economical aims. 76 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, , 7.

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4. Actors and Means of Ethno-Mobilization

4.1. Politicians/Political Parties 4.1.1. Developments on the political scene

Knowing well the fragile situation in BiH, the Communist Party of BiH tried to impede the establishment of political parties based on national or religious grounds. The attempt failed and the multi-party elections brought the country a political break-up almost entirely along ethnic lines. None of the three large nationally-affiliated parties in the parliament won an absolute majority, proportional to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population, however they defeated the former Communist Party (13 %) and the other small parties that altogether had a share of 4.6 % in the elections.77

In addition to participation in the newly built Bosnian state, the representatives of the SDS (Srpska Demokratska Stranka) - the Serbs in BiH - created their own para-state institutions (the Assembly of the Serb People in BiH) and issued an unconstitutional referendum on the question of whether the citizens agreed with “the decision made by the Serbian people in BiH and Herzegovina on 24 October 1991, that the Serbian people should remain in the common country of Yugoslavia, together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem”.78 The outcome of the referendum marks the end of the parliamentary work of all three nations in BiH.79

BiH was the last of the four republics seeking international recognition to conduct a referendum on independence - one of the conditions for recognition as an independent state posed by the Badinter Committee. In February/March 1992 the Referendum of Independence of BiH was held and affirmed by 99.44 % of the participating population (Bosniaks and Croats), while the Serb population boycotted the referendum. Shortly before the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created, a Constitution proclaiming the “state of the Serbian people and all other citizens” was issued.80

The completion on the Bosnian Croatian side was established with Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (18 October 1991), renamed the Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna on 28 August 1993 – a separate economic, political, cultural and ethno-territorial unit on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.81

Ethnic cleansing took place in the form of expulsion of non-Croatian population, removing of local non-Croatian leaders, spreading ideas of Larger Croatia and Croatian symbols.82

The behaviour of their fellow-citizens, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, induced the ethno-mobilization and ethno-religious radicalization of Bosniaks. The Bosnian report sees ethno-mobilization in BiH as a reaction to the ethno-mobilization in Serbia and Croatia, in which the Bosniaks were the last group grasped by nationalism and ethnic hatred.83

The SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) (Muslims/Bosniaks) emerged as the strongest party from the elections in 1990. However, the MBO (Muslim Bosniak Organization) split from the SDA immediately after a rally in Velika Kladusa on 15

77 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 12, 13. 78 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 16, 17. 79 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 36. 80 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 42. 81 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 38. 82 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 36. 83 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 20 fn. 20, 24, 36.

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September 1990 which bore Muslim-nationalist symbols, with the argument that the SDA was too religious.84

In this context it is interesting that the group around Alija Izetbegovic, adopted leading political positions only after the first multi-partisan elections, while they played no outstanding role during the electoral campaign.85

The Croatian report also postulates that the emerging nationalism in the late eighties was spilling over from the eastern neighbourhood.86

The voting system in Croatia87 and Serbia allowed the HDZ and the SPS to occupy the absolute majority of the parliamentarian seats - while their majority was only a relative one according to the election results.

Once the HDZ, with Tuđman on top, assumed institutionalized political power, it developed further political supremacy. For this purpose the media were aligned and freedom of (oppositional) speech was suppressed. The triumph of the HDZ in the elections, whose members revealed ultra-nationalist statements against Serbs and Jews, shifted radicalism and support for the, until then, rather weak party of the Croatian Serbs (established in 1990) to a higher level.88 The referendum on the independence of Croatia (May 1991), adopted in (25 June) and proclaimed in October 1991, was partly boycotted by the Serb population. A “referendum on Serbian autonomy” had taken place in August 1990. In December 1990, Croatian Serbs in Knin proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous district Krajina and announced independence from Croatia.89

Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia, a transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia, continued the policy it commenced of intermingling left ideologies and nationalism, using the slogans of extreme right wing parties to make people believe that these parties would direct the country into war.90 The state media were in line with Milošević’s policy, and he did not hesitate to use all means to suppress any opposition in Serbia.

In Pristina, three days before the provincial assembly was dissolved by Milošević it issued The Declaration of Independence. Three months later, deputies from the dissolved assembly proclaimed a Constitutional law for “The Republic of Kosovo,” and finally one year later a referendum – attended by Albanians - was held on the same issue, in which 99 % voted in favour of an Independent Kosovo.

The report from Kosovo states that the political leadership in Kosovo pursued a rather passive approach towards the increasing Serbian suppression. This ineffectiveness, which did not lead anywhere for the Albanians in Kosovo, caused the formation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), who pursued different tactics to remedy the situation of the Albanians in Kosovo.91

In Macedonia a relative majority was won by the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, however the transformed Communist party and other parties acted as counterbalance and the presidency went to a person with a moderate attitude: Kiro Gligorov.92 After the admission of the equalization of the Albanian ethnic group, the referendum on independence, held on 8 September 1991 was boycotted and the Constitution adopted on 17 November 1991 was rejected by the Albanian population.93 They organized a referendum on their own for the establishment of

84 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 39. 85 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 15. 86 Petricusic, 5. 87 Petricusic, 6, 7. 88 Petricusic, 7. 89 Petricusic, 7. 90 Pešić, 15, 19, 91 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 92 Ilievski, 5, Pešić, 21. 93 Ilievski, 37.

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an “Autonomous Republic of Ilirida” in January 1992 on the territory inhabited predominantly by Albanians.94

The Badinter Committee considered all conditions to be fulfilled by the Macedonian state (including the minority rights protection) and recommended its recognition95; however, at first Macedonia was not recognized since Greece prevented recognition by the EC States due to the dispute over the name of the newly independent state.96

4.1.2. Evaluation

The results of the first multi-party elections, and in particular the voting systems implemented in different republics, set the course for further developments throughout the nineties. It was in particular the strong position that the HDZ and SPS gained in Croatia and Serbia respectively without a real political counterbalance that enabled political power to be channeled in a certain direction. This also influenced the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transformed Communist Parties lost elections in all republics to the right wing parties, except in Serbia.97 In Macedonia, however, there was some counterbalance from the other parties who were involved in the political decision-making process.

The time of 1990-1992 was full of referenda and counter referenda and proclamations of independence in all republics throughout former Yugoslavia – except in Serbia (“Proper” and Vojvodina), Montenegro,98 and Kosovo.

On the one hand it was a reaction to the conditions posed by the Badinter Committee to gain independent statehood for the republics (as the republics had proclaimed independence before the referenda were held). At the other hand it was the desire to form new entities adjusted to the needs of the different ethnic groups within the actually existing borders, based on a perceived right to self-determination and secession.

In the comparative perspective, one may observe a twofold similarity of the situation in Serbia and in Croatia. In both republics, an absolute majority was won by parties advocating nationalistic ideologies led by charismatic leaders willing to consolidate political power. These victories – generated by the electoral system to a larger extent in Croatia than in Serbia – resulted in the radicalization of political forces acting within the other ethnic (“minority”) communities in both republics: the Serbs in Croatia and the Albanians in Serbia. This scenario was avoided in Macedonia with respect to the Albanian community because of, first, the moderate approach of the President, and second, the existence of real political counter-weights limiting the power of the victorious party. The consolidation of the Bosnian political scene along ethnic lines99 can be seen as a derivative of what had happened in Croatia and Serbia. At the time of elections in BiH (18 November 1990), an authoritarian nationalistic rule was already consolidated in Croatia and Serbia as a result of the elections in April/May 1990 and the “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” respectively. The established condominium of forces, becoming

94 Ilievski, 4, 37. 95 Ilievski, 28. 96 Ilievski, 28. 97 And Slovenia, which can be left aside in this particular context. 98 The referendum of Independence of Montenegro from Serbia followed in 2006. 99 Each of the nationalist parties attracted at least 84 per cent of votes from their respec-tive national constituencies. See Radan, 183. One must, however, note that also the parties of Bosnian Serbs and the Croats had quite moderate programmes initially, which became more and more nationalistic due to the influence exerted on them by Belgrade and Zagreb government respectively.Petritsch, 32-33.

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themselves more and more nationalistic,100 could not integrate the ethnic-groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina or significantly slow down ethno-mobilization.

The process of how the political leaders in Croatia, but also in Serbia assumed control over the intellectuals is well described by Dubravka Ugresic.101 It consisted mainly in corrupting one group appointing them for various “honourable” state positions, while fingering the others as traitors, the latter method being also consequently used towards all moderately minded people.

4.2. Civil Society and Intellectuals The initiative of Serbian intellectuals culminating in the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) memorandum of 1986 remained without example in the other republics. In the late eighties intellectuals publicly expressed complaints about the suppressive regime throughout all the republics. Within the newly established states many of them took the same line with the respective regimes. In Croatia, however, there emerged NGOs who monitored human rights and helped minority members with legal and factual assistance.102

In Macedonia the political scenery was more diversified than in Serbia and Croatia. Intellectuals who did not adopt a nationalistic attitude nevertheless remained in the minority.103

The situation in Kosovo was different. The demonstrations in 1968, 1981 were all dominated by students and professors. During that time the University in Pristina and the schools were regarded as strongholds of Albanian nationalism. Later on, intellectuals were not just one of many groups who played an important role in the political process - they were the group from which most of the political protagonists were recruited. This might be explained by the desire to compensate for the lack of education that was attached to the Albanian ethnic group for a long time.104

The role of intellectuals in ethno-mobilization was decisive, as they gave the nationalist movements the “scientific” shift and justification on which the other strata of society could rely to justify their own views or deeds.

4.3. Military, Paramilitary and State Intelligence Agencies 4.3.1. JNA

The Yugoslav Peoples Army (hereinafter JNA – Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) was regarded as the guardian of Yugoslav Integrity under Socialist Yugoslavia and remained a stronghold of conservative forces closely connected to the Communist Party. The JNA derived its position from the “heroic victory” over the fascist enemies and the “liberation of the South Slav peoples”. It was the military wing of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.105 When the routing institution - the League of Communists of Yugoslavia - disintegrated and the position of the JNA was questioned in the changing political atmosphere in the republics, it had to seek a

100 Petritsch, ibid. 101 Dubravka Ugrešić, The Culture of Lies. Antipolitical essays, (Penn State University Press, Pennsylvania 1998), passim. 102 Petricusic, 9. 103 Ilievski, 9. 104 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 105 Pešić, 14.

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new ally who would secure the strong position it once held. 106 JNA officers had offered to defend Yugoslavia’s unity but were rejected by the Yugoslav Federal presidency.107 JNA became de facto “vojska bez države” – an army without a state.108

Milošević, claiming to be the guardian of Yugoslav unity and assertor of socialist values, won the high representatives in the JNA over to his purposes, pursuing his goals with behaviour models well known and well fitting to the JNA from former Yugoslav times.109

When tensions rose, the military servants were withdrawn to their respective republics and the JNA-Corps became nationally homogenized with a composition of almost exclusively Serbs and Montenegrins.110 This “Serbization” of the JNA was to some extent also brought about by members of other nationalities which deserted from the army or simply left it, as they were unwilling to participate in its attempts to preserve Yugoslavia.111 Much of the personnel who left the JNA became the root of new armies in the separatist territories.112 The decisive fact is that in a relatively early stage of the conflict the JNA was standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Milošević’s regime and Serb separatists in Croatia and – most evidently – in BiH. This mere fact was known to the Croats and Bosniaks and, as will be argued below, could have contributed to ethno-mobilization. One may also conclude that the Titoist JNA was not a source of ethno-mobilization but let itself be used by politician as an instrument of it.

4.3.2. The Republics

Military staff in the territories barricaded by the Serbs comprised regular JNA units, local Territorial Defence Forces (hereinafter: TDF113), Serbian and Montenegrin TDFs, local and Serbian Ministry of Interior (hereinafter MUP) police forces and paramilitary units.114

The JNA officially withdrew from the Croatian territory in May 1992, leaving equipment behind, which provided the local Serb rebels with arms. Initially the JNA did not openly take sides between the Croatian government and the Croatian Serb population. With these events, the JNA openly took sides with Serbs in Croatia.115

A similar scene developed in BiH, even though the incidents in the forefront of violent conflict were less spontaneous than in Croatia. The JNA’s own newsletter regularly issued accusations against the Croatian and Muslim parties and individuals for taking a hostile attitude towards Serb leaders and the Army.116 The Bosnian report traces the scaremongering in the Serb population by diverse Serb institutions precisely. In November 1989 the National Security Service of Serbia had already evacuated the Serb population in two Bosnian municipalities allegedly under

106 Pešić, 14. 107 Petricusic, 8. 108 Eiff, 180. 109 Petricusic, 8. 110 Pešić, 15. 111 See Eiff, 197 112 The armies of Slovenia, Croatia and BH consisted mainly of military personnel and equipment of the former JNA. Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts es-tablished pursuant to security council resolution 780 of 1992 (hereinafter: “Bassiouni Re-port”), Annex III, The military structure, strategy and tactics of the warring factions, avail-able under http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III.htm, at § II. 113 Which were republican Territorial Defence Forces. 114 Petricusic, 8. 115 Petricusic, 8. 116 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 18, 19, 20.

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Muslim fundamentalist pressure.117 Such actions and Serb propaganda were used to provoke destabilization in BiH in order to involve the JNA, 68% of whose soldiers were stationed in BiH, and further federation militia in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s affairs.118

Due to the violent conflicts with the JNA, the Bosnian Serbs and later the Croatian Defence Council, ethno-mobilization also reached the ARBH (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine - Bosnian Army), which absorbed more and more mono-national (Muslim/Bosniak) and religious elements.

In this period the Macedonians managed to withdraw their soldiers from the JNA and the territory of the other republics without violent incidents. The JNA left the Macedonian territory peacefully in 1992 and took most of the valuable military equipment with them. This is mainly attributed to the fact that Macedonia had no significant Serb population on whose behalf Milošević’s regime could make territorial demands.119 Furthermore, the JNA was already engaged in Croatia and BiH, and Milošević counted on Macedonia’s inability to survive on its own.120 There was therefore no issue regarding the triggering ethno-mobilization by the JNA in Macedonia.

Armed crisis did not break out on the territory of Macedonia until 2001. Throughout the nineties the establishment of Albanian paramilitary formations was reported. However the Albanian National Liberation Army involved in the clashes in 2001 was formed in 1999.121

Ethnic conflict is defined as ethnic Albanian insurgency in Macedonia, led by the NLA and initially sparked from Kosovo, after pressure had been released there by the NATO bombardments in Serbia.

4.3.3. Kosovo

After the Autonomy of Kosovo had been abolished, a repressive period followed in which schools were closed and students ousted from the university. The police forces tightened the repression and torture of Albanians. After the outcome of the negotiations on the termination of the war in BiH, the problems of the Albanians in Kosovo passed unnoticed internationally.122 This increased frustration amongst the Albanians and led to the foundation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The attacks on Serbian local representatives and policemen caused a brutal reaction by fully equipped Serb police, military and paramilitary forces against KLA units and masses of civilians until the NATO bombardments of 1999.123

4.3.4. Evaluation

The JNA was not only an important factor in ethno-mobilization, but it was also subjugated to it124 by the withdrawal of all non-Serb or Montenegrin soldiers from the JNA to their respective republics and the internal dissemination of propaganda (accusations that the Croatian and Muslim enemy allegedly wanted to harm the JNA and the Serbs). However, with the ethnic separation of the JNA, the Yugoslav National Army ceased to exists. It might be said that the JNA was mistrusted by the

117 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 21. 118 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 20, cited: Suzan Vudvord, Balkanska tragedija: Haos i disolucija nakon Hladnog rata (Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 1997), 255. 119 Ilievski, 8,9. 120 Ilievski, 33, 34. 121 Ilievski, 9. 122 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 123 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 124 In General: Petricusic, 8, cited after, Donald. L. Horwitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Uni-versity of California Press, Berkeley, 1985), 443-471.

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other nations due to the overrepresentation of Serb and Montenegrin leading staff in Yugoslavia.125 And again, the prefabricated perception – in this case which side the JNA would take - was fulfilled.

Looking at the role of the military from the perspective of changing the cognitive frame, it might have been important that the JNA entered visibly into a sort of alliance with the Serbs and became Serbian-dominated. This fact changed the situation insofar as it entailed an armed power siding with just one party in an already considerably sharp ethnic conflict. Bosniaks and Croats found themselves in such a situation for the first time after World War II. Given this, the perception of being threatened, in this case by the Serbs, may have become significantly more intense and consequently contributed to changing the cognitive frame to a crisis frame.

One can, however, hardly speak about the spontaneous formation of armed units and militarization as a consequence of ethno-mobilization, as it seems to be rather a process driven and organized from the top.126 Although 83 paramilitary units operating on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were counted in 1994, there is strong evidence that they were indirectly controlled or at least supplied by the respective political leaders.127 The command chains were, however, purposely blurred in order to shield the perpetrators of serious war crimes committed by these units from responsibility.128 In addition, the decentralization of military activities and structures (combined with conventional warfare) corresponded to the official Yugoslav military doctrine of Total National Defence, the latter relying on positive partisan experience with these tactics in World War II. Political parties founded their own military units directly as well.129

The contribution of the newly formed units to the process of ethno-mobilization was overwhelmingly made after the border to the crisis frame had already been crossed and atrocities committed by the units were revealed. The Kosovo Liberation Army was formed relatively late, although it can be argued that Kosovars had been acting within the crisis frame since riots of 1981 at the latest.

Another kind of contribution of the numerous paramilitary units to ethno-mobilization should be seen in the enhancement of the security concerns of ordinary people, which is particularly significant from the point of view of changing the cognitive frame to crisis frame. Judging on the basis of the date on which the units were founded (Arkan Tigers: November 1990, Šešejl’s forces: late 1990/early 1991)130 their impact could have slightly differed in Croatia on the one hand and in BiH on the other. In Croatia, ethnic tensions were already more advanced (HDZ and Tuđman had won the elections half a year earlier), whereas it was the time of election campaign or directly following it in BiH. There is reason to believe that the frame had already been switched to the crisis frame in Croatia, whereas this process was still to come in BiH. This will be referred to below.

Scaring, threatening and even killing moderates and non-nationalists can, as said, surely be regarded an important factor triggering ethno-mobilization to which the paramilitary groups contributed. According to Anthony Oberschall:

125 Already in the Croatian Spring, there had been demands for a separate army. Baltić, 17. 126 See also Eiff, 199. 127 See Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, at § C. Some of the leading figures of these units, for example Arkan and Vojislav Šešejl, were directly involved in the politics. 128 Bassiouni Report, Annex III, The military structure, strategy and tactics of the warring factions, available under http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III.htm, at § II. 129 Bassiouni Report, ibid. 130 Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, § I D 1.

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Ordinary people could not escape ethnic polarization. In an interview a Serb taxi driver explained: “No one wanted the coming war, but if I don’t fight, someone from my side will kill me, and if my Muslim friends don’t fight, other Muslims will kill them”131

There are no reasons to believe that the situation in this regard was much different outside BiH. However the exclusion of moderates was, as noted, a general political plan which was only reinforced by threats of violence. The only republic in which the paramilitary units played a more or less autonomous role in this regard was Macedonia with the NLA.132

The declining JNA made it possible for Serb rebels in Croatia and BiH to keep the territories won by force. The Serb military, police and paramilitary forces helped stabilize the occupation through ethnic cleansing conducted by executions, deportation of non-Serb civilians, or in BH by deportation. Similar tactics were used by the Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnian Croats were assisted financially and technically by Croatia and the Croatian army. Once ethno-mobilization captured the ARBH, each of the three armies stood for one ethnic group and religion.

4.4. Influence of Diaspora The role of the diaspora was very important among the Croats, Albanians and Macedonians, even if the modes of influence fundamentally differ.

The situation in Croatia is best explained with the citation from the Croatian report, which comprises all that can be said.

General Martin Špegelj, first minister of defence, argues that the Ustashism in Croatia has “been brought from outside, by the return of extreme emigrants in Croatia. They were not high or lower ranking officers of former NDH, but those who thought that heritage of Ustashism will be good ground for creation of new power in Croatia, and that they would obtain personal profit. Indeed, they won power and personal profits; however, their presence in politics has caused shaking of power and big problems even nowadays. That fact, alongside with undermining of Serb’s houses in Spring 1991, made worse damage to the Croatia’s defence than whole JNA aggression. We have suffered consequences ever since and witness different sorts of neo-fascism emergence”.133

The Macedonian diaspora supported the independence of Macedonia and the rights of Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring countries in the sight of disputes with Greece and Bulgaria.134

The Albanian diaspora, of which some members had immigrated to western countries to find refuge and were politically involved, endowed Albanians in Kosovo financially.135Some of the young diaspora members returned to Kosovo to take part in the hostilities.136

131 Oberschall, 996. 132 Ilievski, 17-18. 133 Petricusic, 21, cited after Martin Špegelj , Sjećanje vojnika (Memories of a Soldier) (Znanje, Zagreb, 2001), 55-56. 134 Ilievski, 4. 135 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming); Ilievski, 4. There are estimations that about half a million of Kosovo Albanians were living abroad, pay-ing regularly 3 % of their income for the maintenance of the “shadow state” led my Ibrahim

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In the balance, one may observe a very considerable influence of the Croatian and Albanian diasporas, the former triggering ethno-mobilization by putting forward nationalistic ideas, the latter supporting the paramilitary KLA financially.

4.5. Churches and Religious Communities The rise and powerful expansion of the Serbian church began in Kosovo.137 It was the Serbian clergy in Kosovo - the “cradle of Serbian civilization” - who complained about the decay of the Serbs. However there is no indication in the reports that the Albanian actions were somehow motivated in a religious sense (Islam). Nevertheless the Serbian clergy in Kosovo saw an immediate need to save the Serb nation and used a purely political problem to put forward its own position. A religious connotation was added to the situation of the Serbs in BiH and Croatia, in the form of complaints referring to the Ustasha regime and the atrocities of the Second World War.138 The Kosovo myth was revived largely with the festivities of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, celebrated amongst other things with the transport of Emperor Lazar’s relic through BiH (to mark the future borders of a Greater Serbia).139 This had clearly effects in creating a psychosis of war in BiH.140

After the clergy had been kept out from politics for almost half of the century it now had not only the possibility to publicly comment the events, but also to become an active part in the politics in Serbia, Croatia and BiH.

The pro-nationalistic parts of the clergy supported Tuđman’s HDZ regime in Croatia. Politicians were welcomed on various religious festive occasions, and vice versa, that were broadcast on television in Croatia.141

In BiH the regularly elected reis-ul-lema of IVZ (Islamska Vjerska Zajednica), a Muslim Macedonian, was replaced by Mustafa effendi Ceric through an unpleasant procedure by the political elite around Alija Izetbegovic.142 The influence of the Muslim clergy increased amongst Bosniaks as well. Before the war, Bosnian Islam was regarded as a cultural expression of identity of members belonging to a secular community and was described as a “secular Euro-Islam”. This changed very much in the course of hostilities and is regarded as a reaction to the “crusade of the Serbs”.143

Religion and clergy therefore played a very important role in ethnic mobilization amongst Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, although according to the Croatian report, the strengthening of religious affiliation served the purpose of national identification, and that the wars in Croatia and BiH are not to be considered as truly religious wars. The destruction of places of worship and the

Rugova. Later, however, they preferred to pay for the KLA-run endowment fund “The homeland is calling”. Jens Reuter, “Zur Geschichte der UÇK” in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser Verlag, Klagen-furt et al. 2000), 171-186, at 172. 136 Reuter, 172. 137 Pešić, 11, 12. 138 Pešić, 12. 139 Pešić, 12. 140 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 24. 141 Petricusic, 10. 142 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 27. 143 Bassam Tibi, „Der bosnische Islam. Von säkularer Religion zum Fundamentalismus?“, (7) Internationale Politik (1997), 21-28, at 21 and 23.

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killings of clergy during the wars were atrocities that symbolized the destruction of a certain ethnic group.144

4.6. Media The media are the most important instrument in building public opinion. After the democratization of the former Yugoslav republics, however, the democratization of the media failed in Serbia and Croatia. The state media were completely in line with the new regimes. In Serbia the daily Politika helped consolidate Milošević’s regime, the television and print media were used to spread propaganda to scare the population of the Ustasha and the fanatic Muslims.145

In Croatia, “Slobodni Tjednik” directed chauvinistic hate speeches mostly against the Serbian minority.146 Croatia’s fascist past was rewritten with an attempt to “correct” the image of the NDH regime.147 Employees belonging to minorities, mainly Serbs, lost their jobs at the public Croatian TV and Radio. Two of the rare regime-critical media outlets, the Feral Tribune and Radio 101, were subjugated to repressive measures, including the attempts to close them down.148

The instrumentalization of the media in the two republics had enormous effects on BiH. The propaganda of hatred was broadcast from Croatia and Serbia and was readily accessible to the Croat and Serb populations respectively, while broadcasting from Sarajevo had difficulties reaching all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly.149 Furthermore, from the Bosnian report it can be concluded that the concept of nation, national state, the principles of natural and historical rights, historical injustices or current threats, that could have been used for propaganda, were lacking amongst the Bosniak population,150 whereas it constituted a credo for the Serbs and Croats. The Bosnian population was concentrated on the preservation of BiH as a whole.

In Kosovo the media were brought in line with Milošević’s politics, while the two main Albanian official media outlets RTVP and the daily Rilindja were banned and the Albanian employees dismissed.151

In Macedonia the media were not eager to adopt an “objective” view.152 However, as the political landscape is reflected in the media it might be concluded that in Macedonia a wider scale of political opinions was represented in comparison to Serbia and Croatia.

144 Petricusic, 10, cited after: Milan Vukomanović, The Religious Dimension of the Yugoslav Conflicts (University of Belgrade, at http://kotor-network.info/papers/easr2004/dimension.mv.htm). 145 Pešić, a13, 16, 17. 146 Petricusic, 21. 147 Petricusic, 21. 148 Petricusic, 21, 22. 149 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35. 150 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35. 151 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 152 Ilievski, 20.

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5. Minorities in the New Republics It was not unexpected that in their struggle for independence the four republics stressed the significance of the titular nation in the new constitutions. All introduced different concepts of minority rights. The creation of nation states was at first perceived as entailing a reduction of the privileges in the status of national minorities and impediments for contacts between minority groups living in other republics. At the later stage, the war had a devastating effect on minorities.

5.1. BH, Croatia and Serbia Except for BiH, all the republics have - or at least had before the wars - a considerable number of national minorities. In Serbia fourteen national minorities have set up minority councils since Serbia introduced a very wide concept of minority rights.153 The difficult situation in Croatia, the separation and reintegration of parts of its territories and the conflicts with other republics, entailed various changes and suspensions of minority rights and even the legal elimination of “minority” groups from the Constitution (Albanians, Bosniaks and Slovenes in 1997).154 However, a legal framework for collective (political participation and cultural rights) and individual minority rights has been established in Croatia, Serbia and BiH.

The practice looked more and more difficult. The wars in Croatia and BiH have caused affliction to minorities in Serbia and Croatia and BiH. In Serbia and Croatia the number of minority members was reduced by approximately 50 % and 60 % respectively. The Croats and Bosniaks in Serbia and Serbs in Croatia were hit the hardest. In Serbia, Croats or Serbs married to Croats were discriminated against; there were incidents in which Bosniaks were killed and Hungarians were denied the guaranteed right to transcribe their names in their own languages in personal documents or to the bilingual naming of streets or settlements.155 The Serbs in Croatia faced similar problems.156 The discrimination against Serbs continued after the war. If they tried to return to Croatia they were confronted with problems in acquiring citizenship or the assertion of property rights.157 In Serbia the high level of centralization proved to be a problem for minorities.158

Both in Serbia and Croatia there was almost no legal protection against discriminating perpetrators or administrative measures.159 The situation for minority members did not improve in Croatia and Serbia until the change of governments in 2000.160

As a result of the wars, it was not the “classical” minorities that faced the harshest discrimination, even though the growing nationalism affected them as well161, it was the former members of the Yugoslav constituent nations that became minorities in the new republics. 153 Pešić, 23. 154 Petricusic, 13,14. 155 Pešić, 31, 32. 156 Petricusic, 14-16. 157 Petricusic, 15, Pešić, 32. 158 Pešić, 24. 159 Petricusic, 14, 15. 160 Petricusic, 14, Pešić, 32. 161 After the reintegration of the formerly occupied territories the parliament temporarily suspended provisions ruling the minority participation of Serbs, while the participation of smaller minority communities remained valid in Croatia in 1995, Petricusic, 13.

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5.2. Macedonia The new Macedonian Constitution reduced the protection of minority rights as it aimed to integrate citizens individually and not at group level.162 This caused discontent particularly amongst the Albanian parts of the population and proved to be entirely inappropriate. The other minorities in Macedonia stayed out of these conflicts.163

Indeed Albanians participated in all government coalitions since Macedonia’s independence, and some positions within the government and administration were distributed to Albanians. Nevertheless, Albanians were generally underrepresented in the administration.164

The government pursued to resolve the ethnic tensions with concessions towards the Albanians, coercive means and corrupt exchanges between ethnic elites.165 The adherence/lobbying of political elites impeded the process of finding a democratic solution. Problems were left unsolved and therefore led to an accumulation of discontent at the base, where the NLA could recruit its combatants after its foundation in the late nineties. Main Albanian demands were the recognition of the Albanian group as a constitutive nation (some parts favoured a separation from Macedonia), the Albanian language as an official language and official recognition of the University of Tetovo, which was founded illegally in the early nineties.166 The process of the Albanian rebellion had two stages. It was brought in from Kosovo, where the pressure from the Serbian side was released after the bombardments of 1999, and then gained momentum from the internal forces in Macedonia.167

A real solution was not looked for until problems erupted violently in 2001. It was found with the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, which was negotiated with constructive international assistance and broadened the political, language and educational rights of the Albanians.

5.3. Kosovo The Kosovo conflict is dominated by disputes between the Serbs and the Albanians. Other minorities have largely kept out of it, although the side effects concern the other minorities as well. The Roma somehow became directly involved in the conflict when some of them took sides with the Serbs, which the Albanians resented.168

5.4. Evaluation

The conflicts that arose between the Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, between the Serbs and Albanians and the Macedonians and Albanians were caused by growing nationalism. Side effects hit the other minorities living in the republics of former Yugoslavia as well.169

162 Ilievski, 5. 163 Ilievski, 5, 15. 164 Ilievski, 5. 165 Ilievski, 5. 166 Ilievski, 18, 19. 167 Ilievski, 20. 168 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 169 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).

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In the newly created nation states, new national minorities emerged, e.g. Serbs in Croatia. These minorities had enjoyed a status of a constituent nation in the SFRY. From the legal point of view, the shift of status from constituent nation to national minority does not per se mean that the set of rights conferred upon a given community is reduced. Nevertheless, the perception of these rights and the right to self-determination and the right to secede in particular, does differ. Because of this different perception, not only “new” minorities like Serbs in Croatia, but also Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia,170 were not willing to accept the status of a national minority and kept struggling for another status, e.g. being recognized as a constituent nation within Macedonia. The negative perception of the status of a national minority was reinforced, as the minorities were exposed to the nationalistic pressure of the respective majority.

Answering the question of when the normal frame shifted to the crisis frame, one must address the new minorities individually. As for the Serbs in Croatia, one may argue that the prospect of becoming the minority in an independent Croatian state and thus loosing the status of constituent nation was decisive. This seems to be, however, not convincing, even given the negative perception of minority status. Taking the decentralized structure of the SFRY into account and the fact that according to the constitution of 1974 the decisive powers were overwhelmingly vested within the socialist republics, the Serbs in Croatia must be considered as being de facto national minority on Croatia since then (1974). Moreover, there are no findings that the exercise of the collective rights granted to Serbs under the Constitution of SR Croatia was subject to dispute.171 The independence of a Croatia willing to assure a basic set of minority rights would have led to a symbolic loss of the status of constituent nation, but would not have had any actual impact on the real state of affairs and living conditions. The mere symbolic loss of the constituent status cannot be sufficient to change the normal frame to the crisis frame. Rather, the change of frame seems to be brought about by the electoral victory of the HDZ and Tuđman in April/May 1990. Given the victors’ ambiguous attitude to the Ustaša regime and nationalistic rhetoric, the Serbs were for the first time confronted with the perspective of living in a state with a genocidal past.172 The memory of World War II was revived and irrespective of all formal guarantees of minority rights given by the Croatian state, the victory of nationalistic forces was perceived as a clear sign that Serbs under the new rule would not be respected and safe.173

A similar observation has been made by Hansjörg Eiff, German Ambassador to SFRY from 1988 to 1992. In his opinion, the real far-reaching deterioration of the relationships began as Tuđman came into power, because with him a counter-player to Milošević appeared on the field. Tuđman himself had no scruples to enter a conflict with Serbs, and it was his seizure of power that gave Serbs a reason and pretext to revolt. According to Eiff, the Serbs would not have revolted had Ivica Račan (the Prime Minister after 2000) won the election in 1990.174

The history of relative observance of minority rights in the SFRY did not seem to be relevant, as the observance of minority rights in the normal frame does not necessarily mean its observance in the crisis frame. Furthermore, all nation states opposed the introduction or, in the case of Serbia, the implementation of adequate minority rights provisions as they considered them as counter-productive in their struggle for sovereignty over their republican territory. 170 Ilievski, 5. 171 See Baltić, 41. 172 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism, (Farrar, Straus & Griraoux, New York 1993), 47, as quoted by Radan, 178. 173 Oberschall, 991. 174 Eiff, 194.

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The fate of the Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia was influenced and closely connected to the fate of the Albanians living in Kosovo. The change of frame seems to be influenced from there. In Kosovo, on the other hand, the Albanians and Serbs were acting within the crisis frame since the riots in 1981 at the latest.

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6. Violence The intensity of violence differed from republic to republic. Since in Serbia (“proper” and Vojvodina) war never broke out, violent incursions were confined to occasional but sometimes lethal incidents. The Albanian population experienced a time of suppression that initially resembled more a totalitarian dictatorship than a war, Albanian infrastructure was systematically destroyed and Albanians were subjected to torture, detention and murder by the Serbian police forces.

With the establishment of the KLA and the attacks on Serbs, however, the violence reached a new stadium. Fights with Albanian combatants entailed large scale massacres, torture and rape by Serbian police and military forces.

In Croatia the occupied territories were cleansed by the murder and expulsion of the non-Serb population, the unoccupied territories were bombarded and put under artillery attacks form the occupied territories in Croatia, BiH and Montenegro.175 Many Serbs disappeared or were killed during the first half of the nineties in the unoccupied territory of Croatia.176 However, the main revenge followed when the occupied territories were freed and atrocities were committed on the Serbian population.

The fate of the Bosnian civilians is well known, a tragedy in which the Bosniaks were the most numerous victims.177 The forms of violence described also took place in BiH, however, in much larger dimensions. In Macedonia a large scale escalation and military solution of the Albanian insurgence was avoided, since all the political parties were forced to negotiate by international interference.

175 Petricusic, 24. 176 Petricusic, 27. 177 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 23.

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7. Third-Party Intervention

7.1. Individual states in the region Serbia and Croatia178 exerted influence on “their” national communities in other states emerging from Yugoslavia fostering the process of their ethno-mobilization.179 The Bosnian report puts a special emphasis on this kind of external fostering of ethno-mobilization and the Croatian report refers to it as well. The following instruments of this process are mentioned:

- propaganda of state-controlled broadcasting stations of Croatia and Serbia aimed at the respective national community in BH;180

- granting support to “the extremist” politicians (by Croatia and Serbia); 181 - inspiring the JNA to deploy more troops on the territory of BiH in order to

prevent it from proclaiming independence and/or to secure the “survival” of Serbs in one single state; 182

- secret operations of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to destabilize BH; 183 - providing financial and training assistance, military equipment and

operational support to the HVO and help in organizing and planning its military operations (Croatia).184

The ties between the Croatian state and the Croats in BiH were tightened by the fact that Croats from BiH had no difficulties in obtaining Croatian passports and participating in Croatian elections.185

One may assume that the Serbian external influence was exerted through the largely Serbian-dominated JNA,186 whereas Croatia had no other choice than to support its compatriots more directly. This estimation equally applies to the policy of the Serbian government towards Serbs in Croatia. Furthermore, the Croatian report stresses that the policy of the new Croatian government provoked the ethno-mobilization of Serbs to a large extent.187 The newly created Serb “states” on the Croatian territory depended, however, on financial help from Belgrade which was actually provided.188

The Macedonian report mentions that the continuous challenging of Macedonian national, state and religious identity by various neighbouring countries including Greece and Bulgaria played a special role as an important factor of ethno-mobilization.189

The policy of the Albanian government cannot be regarded as fostering ethno-mobilization. Its quite constructive attitude at Rambouillet and towards

178 Both are regarded as „neighbouring countries“ by Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 3. 179 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 17; Petricusic, 26, 27; Pešić, 32. 180 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35. 181 Pešić, 32, Petricusic 26, 27. 182 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 19 183 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 21. 184 Petricusic, 26, 27. 185 Petricusic, 26. 186 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 8 and 17. 187 Petricusic, 7. 188 Petricusic, 24. 189 Ilievski, 26.

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Macedonia has been observed.190 However, Albania has to be considered as an important base for the KLA, which did contribute to ethno-mobilization. There were KLA training camps in Albania and the Albanian territory was used as a base for guerrilla attacks in Kosovo. There is some evidence that this was at least tolerated by Albanian authorities.191Moreover, one may even argue – and this is the major point about Albania’s role in the Kosovo conflict – that the KLA would not have been effectively established without weapons stolen from magazines of the Albanian army during the riots in 1997. It is estimated that up to 1 million guns were robbed and their price at the black market was as low as 15 German marks initially, rising later to 250 marks.192

7.2. The Mujahedin and Islamic states According to UN-Report:193

Mujahedin, or “holy warriors”, is a generic term for Muslim volunteers fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Many Mujahedin originate from Muslim countries outside the former Yugoslavia. It was reported that the Mujahedin began arriving in BiH as early as June 1992. Reports on the number of Mujahedin forces operating in BiH vary, but it is unlikely that the Mujahedin forces have made a significant military contribution to the BiH Government's war effort. The Mujahedin forces came from several Muslim states and many of them were veterans of the Afghan war. The Mujahedin forces were reported to be under the command of the BiH Army. However, they frequently acted with independence and their presence is no longer welcomed. They are alleged to be terrorizing the Muslims they came to protect in an effort to enforce Islamic practices. Their presence, the Serbs and Croats have argued, is evidence that the Bosnian Muslims intend on turning BiH into a fundamentalist Muslim state.

The presence of Mujahedin was meaningful for the ethno-mobilization of Serbs and Croats, insofar as Serb and Croat propaganda made an extensive use of the “radical Islamism” of Bosniaks.194 On the other hand, their presence had little impact on the ethno-mobilization of Bosniaks.195 Iran is mentioned as a state directly involved in the Bosnian conflict by providing President Izetbegović with financial aid.196 There is insufficient evidence of the involvement of Mujahedin or Islamic states in the Kosovo and Macedonia conflicts.197

190 Peter Schubert, “Der Kosovo-Konflikt und Albanien“, in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt et al. 2000), 213-225, at 214 and 217. 191 Schubert, 216. 192 Reuter, 171-172. 193 Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, at § II B 2. 194 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, passim, see for example 16, 20, 22, 26, 27. 195 This is also the conclusion of the Srebrenica Report by Netherlands Institute for War Documentation from 2002 (hereinafter: “Srebrenica Report”), available at www.srebrenica.nl, Appendix 6, Chapter 4, Section 5 “The Mujahedin in Bosnia”. 196 Srebrenica report, ibid. 197 Although the Macedonian authorities repeatedly claimed that there had been Mujahedin involvement on the side of Albanian rebels, the Western officials were however sceptical about the claims. The issue arose, as the Macedonian police shot 7 persons dead at the Al-banian border, the majority of them stemming form Pakistan. The Minister of Interior Boškoski, now tried in Hague, claimed the these persons were “Mujahadin terrorists”. See

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7.3. Individual states on the geopolitical scene

A special role of Germany and to a lesser extent of Greece and the USA is pointed out throughout the reports.

The German role is connected to its initiative for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and dates back to mid 1991.198 It contributed to the shift in the policy of the European Union (see infra.) from a policy of containment of the Yugoslav federation in any form whatsoever to a policy of recognition of the successor states. This policy culminated in the German unilateral recognition of Croatia199 which took place before the Badinter Committee presented its findings as to whether Croatia fulfilled the conditions for recognition set out in the declaration of EC foreign ministers of 16 December 1991 (guidelines for recognition). The US did not have a clear stand on the Yugoslav conflict, although, according to the Bosnian and Kosovo report200, though it sympathized with the containment policy. In spite of the Badinter’s Commission assessment201 that Macedonia and Slovenia met all the recognition criteria, Macedonia was initially not recognized by the EC due to Greek lobbying.202 The actions taken by Germany and Greece had serious implications for the credibility of the EC as a neutral and assertive actor.

Russia is considered to have been in a military and economic sense too weak to put forward and enforce a coherent Balkan policy. The major steps taken by the Western countries were not thwarted. This situation changed slightly with the Kosovo conflict, although the capability of Russia to influence the course of events was rather minor and largely overestimated.203 NATO’s military threats aiming at preventing the brutal action of the Serbian armed forces against Albanian civilians in July 1998 was thwarted, at least symbolically, by Moscow inviting Milošević’s to Kremlin.204 At the later stage, the myth of Panslavic brotherhood cultivated in Serbia helped Russia to co-act as a mediator.205

Ana Petruseva, Macedonia says seven “Mujahideen”' shot dead, Reuters, 3 March 2002, as quoted by UNIMIK Division of Public Information, http://www.unmikonline.org. 198 See also Radan, 163-164. 199 The declaration on recognition of December, 19th 1991 has been suspended and took effect on January, 15th 1992. See Radan, 181. 200 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 201 Opinion delivered on January 11th 1992. 202 Ilievski, 28. 203 Klaus Segbers and Christoph Zürcher, „Russland und der Kosovo-Konflikt“, in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt et al. 2000), 171-186, at 383 and 386 204 Segbers/Zürcher, ibid. 205 Segbers/Zürcher, 383

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7.4. The role of the EU (initially EC only)206 The role of the EC and EU can be summarized as initiating peace talks and sending contradictory signals as to its policy of recognition of the successor states. 7.4.1. General

The crisis management of the EU indirectly fuelled the process of ethno-mobilization in Serbia and deepened distrust of the EU:

- Given that Serbian leaders stemmed from the communist party, there was initial distrust towards the EC inherited from the cold war period. The EC was blamed by the Serbian party for lacking objectivity as early as the Peace Conference in The Hague in autumn 1991.207 It can be interpreted as a general distrust towards “The West” which was fostered by Germany’s action. 208

- The EC recognized Croatia, although, according to the Badinter Committee, it did not meet the conditions set in the recognition guidelines for the EC;

- Economic sanctions imposed by the EC at the eve of the conflict were kept intact with regard to Serbia, whereas they were lifted with regard to other post-Yugoslav republics; 209

- The last two points were presented by Serbian propaganda as a conspiracy of Croatian allies.210

- On the basis of the very same facts, it cannot be ruled out that some parts of the European leadership and public opinion looked at the Yugoslav conflict through the prism of cold war divisions, also perceiving the “post-communist led” Serbs as being on the other side of the barricade.

7.4.2. Croatia

There has initially been little involvement in crisis management within Croatia. It cannot be ruled out that the shift it the EC in late 1991 strengthened ethno-mobilization in this republic, providing Croatia with prospects of recognition. Additionally, the recognition of Croatia by the EC despite its non-fulfilment of recognition conditions set out in its own guidelines undermined its credibility as an international actor.211

7.4.3. BiH and Kosovo

The crisis management of the EC failed to prevent the war in BiH.212 With the recognition of BiH, the full-scale military conflict erupted. As pointed out in the Special Report, the EC refused to send troops to BiH despite a respective request of its authorities and another round of peace-talks was initiated instead rejected by the Serbian delegation. The recognition approach adapted by the EC was dangerous 206 Regarding the entire section on international organizations, see also Ugo Caruso, The Interplay between CoE, OSCE, EU and NATO, Report for MIRICO Work Package 1. 207 Pešić, 27, 28. 208 Pešić, 25. 209 Pešić, 29. 210 Pešić, 25. 211 Stefan Wolff/Annemarie Peen Rodt, Report on the Reactive Conflict Management of the EU in the Western Balkans, 5. 212 The question, how the various „peace plans” for BH, (e.g. plan of Cutilheiro, plan of Owen and Stoltenberg) influenced the ethno-mobilization will be explored within the Work Package 3.

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for BiH as it created tensions resulting from a paradoxical situation: on the one hand the dismembering of the multi-ethnic SFRY into national states was accepted; on the other hand the unity of a multi-ethnic BH was supposed to be preserved.213 The EC’s reliance on uti-possidetis principle with regard to the borders of Yugoslavia’s republics is also indirectly criticized by the Kosovo report, as it prevented the EC from questioning the situation in Kosovo which was detrimental to Kosovo Albanians and eventually led to the armed conflict in the late nineties.214

7.4.4. Macedonia

The EU had no weight to put behind its warnings in the early nineties, given the lack of credible military capacities to support diplomatic action and visible disagreement among the EC-Members as to the nature of the conflict and the means of resolving it. Yet, as the instruments of the CFSP were evolving, the conflict management ability of the EU was improving. Hence, there is a positive assessment of conflict management after 1999, especially with regard to Macedonia.215 However, the EU benefited from the steadily strong support for European integration in this country. The positive outcome of the EU actions after 1999 is linked to the accession perspective which it can open to the states in the West Balkans. The latter aspect is also mentioned by the Croatian report.216

7.5. The role of the UN 7.5.1. Croatia and BH

There is a negative assessment of the UNPROFOR-mission, both in BiH and in Croatia. 217 The soldiers under the UN-mandate entitled to use force to “self-defence” failed to stop ethno-mobilization from generating violence and to create conditions for peaceful negotiations. In Croatia, the UNPA’s were perceived as consolidating Serb control over Croatian territory and UNPROFOR (later UNCRO) neither stopped the expulsion of the non-Serb population from there nor prevented the violent recapture of this territory by the Croatian army in 1995.218

7.5.2. Croatia in particular

The Croatian report mentions the positive role of the UN-led civil police agents in UNPA’s (CIVPOL) and the UNHCR. 219

213 Szulik, „Konflikt w byłej Jugosławii”, (1) Sprawy Międzynarodowe (1997), 91-108, at 99. This explains also the Bosnian memorandum of 14 October 1991 conditioning the BHs’ stay-ing within Yugoslavia on Serbia and Croatia staying too (So called “letter of intention”, see Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 37). Preserving the territorial integrity of BH was of par-ticular importance for Bosniaks. The majority of Bosniaks and President Izetbegović were rejecting a potential division of the country, as they were split over the whole territory and a division would hit them the most. Petritsch, 34. 214 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). The Kosovo’s application for recognition was not even submitted to the Badinter Committee for consid-eration, see Radan, 188. 215 Wolff/Peen Rodt, 24. 216 Petricusic, 31. 217 Petricusic, 34. 218 After the Croatian offensive, UNCRO helped the Serbian population on the recaptured territory to flee, as it felt threatened under the new rule. Szulik, 105. 219 Petricusic, 34.

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7.5.3. Serbia

As in the case of the EU-imposed sanctions, the sanctions imposed by the UN on FRY because of its involvement in the hostilities in BiH were extensively used by Milošević’s propaganda to “unite” the society against “the common enemy” from outside. The analysis of the election results performed in the Serbian report suggests that this regime’s action was quite successful.220

7.5.4. Macedonia

Regarding the UN troops deployed in Macedonia in 1992, the assessment is quite the opposite. It was the first preventive deployment of troops in the history of the organization and it proved successful in maintaining the stability of Macedonia.221 The timing of its withdrawal222 in 1999 was, however, unfortunate as the flux of refugees from Kosovo started to enter Macedonia in that year. The “blue-helmets” thus succeeded in their role as a preventive conflict management, whereas they did not in the reactive one.

7.6. The role of NATO Whereas it is stated that NATO membership has been at least an attractive option or even a policy priority of Croatia223 and Macedonia224, a post cold war approach dominated in Serbia, where NATO was perceived as a serious external treat in 1992. 225 The NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis contributed to the consolidation of Serbian society around the defence of the country. 226

7.7. The OSCE The OSCE is mentioned in the reports as an organization initially supporting the containment of Yugoslavia, then suspending its membership (after the secessions, in July 1992) and adopting various resolutions which, however, did not have much impact on the process of ethno- mobilization. Quite the opposite is true for the Kosovo Verification Mission established in 1998. Being perceived as biased by the Serb population from the very beginning, its officials accused the Serbs of massacring Albanian civilians after having discovered the bodies after a police action in the village of Racak. These accusations deepened the distrust and contributed to the further consolidation of the Serbian population. The Kosovo report, on the other hand, draws attention to the fact that these accusations raised the international awareness of the situation in Kosovo. 227

As a general conclusion on third party-intervention, one may assume with the Macedonian report a cacophony of the international community in addressing the Yugoslavian crisis at its beginning. 228 At this stage of the conflict, the EC and

220 Pešić, 32. 221 Ilievski, 29. 222 The mandate was not extended in 1999 and thus terminated due to the veto of China which is supposed to be a reaction on Macedonian recognition of Taiwan. 223 Petricusic, 36. 224 Ilievski 31. 225 Pešić, 36. 226 Pešić, 34. 227 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). 228 Ilievski, 28.

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then the EU failed to take the role of a credible regional leader capable of presenting a firm standpoint or – as in the case of BiH – assume responsibility for the consequences of its recognition policy by taking military action. There can be doubt as to whether the policy of early recognition fostered the ethno-mobilization in Croatia by backing its separatist action and in Serbia by uniting the Serbs against external threats.

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8. Conclusion

Three types of general conclusions can be made.

First, addressing the type of the conflict, the Macedonian conflict with the Albanians comes closest to the “classic” conflict about the extent of minority rights, addressing questions such as granting political participation/autonomy, defining a set of rights in the sphere of education, mother language use, and so on. The fact that the Albanians kept putting forward the Yugoslav-rhetoric postulate of becoming a “constituent nation” does not change the very nature of the problem. The Kosovo conflict is, on the contrary, not a conflict about the extent of minority rights, but rather a conflict of who – Albanians or Serbs – should be the majority. The Albanians are the majority in Kosovo taken alone, whereas Serbs are the majority, if Kosovo is taken together with Serbia. The conflicts in Croatia and BiH can be regarded as conflicts over the subject and scope of the right to self-determination.

Second, addressing the nature of the ethno-mobilization process, the present survey suggests that it was a top-down process driven by the emancipated political elites of the republics or its parts (BiH). None of the initially presented models can claim exclusivity as an explanation. It can be said to have been a “constructionist” process initially, especially with regard to its economic dimension. It turned into an “instrumentalist” process which, after some time (the shift of the cognitive frames), also activated a “primordial” process which since then has been running parallel with the “instrumentalist” process. An exception from this is likely to be made for Macedonia, where the ethno-mobilization of Macedonians had predominantly “constructionist” traits.229

The establishment of a “point of no return” is the final question to be addressed here. Rejecting historical determinism in any form, it must be stated that ethno-mobilization ultimately leading to a violent ethnic conflict was extremely difficult to reverse by political means after Tuđman and the HDZ came into power in the elections in April/May 1990. In this sense the seizure of power by this political faction can be regarded as a point of no return with regard to Croatia.

There are also good reasons to argue that the same point of no return (the elections in Croatia) applies to the conflict in BiH, even if the cognitive frame had not yet changed there. On the basis of the present survey, it may be regarded as proven that manifold strong pressure was exerted from Croatia and Serbia. In fact, this pressure was not the only, but definitely a major factor triggering ethno-mobilization in BiH. Given for example the “letter of intention” of President Izetbegović conditioning BiH’s staying in Yugoslavia on Serbia and Croatia staying too230, one my claim that without the Serbo-Croatian antagonism affecting the Bosnian population disastrously, the stability of this country could have been preserved. The collision course of these two (Serbia and Croatia) was a long history in which economic factors should not be underestimated. This collision course was definitely set with the result of the Croatian elections and by this event – this is

229 This is, what can be deduced from the comments of Ilievski who is arguing that “Mace-donian ethno-nationalism wasn’t only ‘not dominant as, for example, Croatian was in Croa-tia’, but it was mobilized predominantly in the struggle for international recognition of the state, in lobbying for the ‘name dispute’ with Greece and the struggle for rights of the Ma-cedonian minority in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.”, Ilievski, 34. On the other hand, the ethno-mobilization of Albanians in Macedonia does not seem to differ much from the gen-eral scheme. 230 See the reference in the Footnote 213.

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the crucial point – the crisis frame was activated at the heart of Yugoslavia for the first time after World War II. It remains, however, an open question, whether the collision within the crisis frame could have been avoided by a radical action from outside, for example by denying the prospects for recognition to Tuđman-ruled Croatia or ultimately by deploying international armed forces equipped with a robust UN-Security Council mandate.

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