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ReportState Transformation and Human Development

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Nepal HumanDevelopment Report 2009

State Transformation andHuman Development

The end of the Cold War worldwide generally moved the focus of armed conflict from clashes between states

to tensions within them. Preventing and averting civil war requires allowing all citizens to resolve their

differences through representation and participation in the various fora of state and society from the local

through to the national level. Redressing exclusion and inequality requires vastly different approaches to

varied sets of circumstances – political, cultural, social, economic, and those created by gender. This report

focuses especially on the structure of the state, emphasizing the importance of inclusion as a trigger for the

improvement in other dimensions as well.

As this Report argues, representation can become a catalyst for creating a society that offers greater equality

and justice to all in a number of spheres. And a significant change in political representation demands active,

equitable involvement of those now excluded from the processes of framing and implementing policy. This

calls first and foremost for opening state structures to participation by groups that have never before engaged

in governance. It means transforming the State and Nepali society as the vast majority of the country’s

inhabitants have known it through most of their lives. This report explores how reform of the electoral system,

enhancement of the democratic culture of political parties, and greater decentralisation can widen and

deepen the quality of representation and participation, and thus democracy.

Nepal has only recently emerged from a decade of civil war and is navigating a fragile peace. Protecting these

vital achievements requires managing popular expectations through rule of law, transitional justice,

improving access to services by the poor and excluded, fostering a sense of national community and creating

a new constitution. It also will entail managing a nation-building process alongside a state restructuring

project.

With the Comprehensive Peace Accord as a starting point, the Nepal National Human Development Report

2009 attempts to explore the relationships between inclusion, human development and the role of state

transformation as a means to these ends. It argues that if inclusion is to be sustained in future, it also

requires the fair political representation and integration of various cultural groups and regions in nation

building. The Report invites all Nepali stakeholders to engage in the debate on the structure of the state, the

modes of democracy they want, and the ways in which they can reconcile their differences harmoniously.

Without peace, human development is not possible, and without human development, peace is not

sustainable.

Nepal


STATE TRANSFORMATIONAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Nepal Human Development Report 2009State Transformation and Human Development

Copyright @ 2009United Nations Development Programme

Published byUnited Nations Development ProgrammePost Office Box 107PulchowkKathmandu, Nepal

tel. 977-1-5523200email. [email protected]. http://www.undp.org.np

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted,in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopying, recording or otherwise, without priorpermission of UNDP.

ISBN: 978-99946-916-2-3

Printed in Nepal by: Jagadamba PressDesign and layout by: WordScape

T E A M F O R T H E P R E P A R A T I O N O F

Nepal Human Development Report 2009

UNDP Reader GroupGhulam Isaczai, Lazima Onta-Bhatta,Sharad Neupane, Vijaya Singh, Lalita Thapa,Arun Dhoj Adhikary, Sriram Pande,Dharma Swarnakar, Deepak Shrestha,Sangita Khadka, Jorn Sorensen, Heather Bryant,Tek Tamata, Amanuel Gebremedhin,and Sean Deely

Peer ReviewersYuba Raj Khatiwada, Meena Acharya,Chaitanya Mishra, Hira L. Vishwakarma,Chitra Lekha Yadav, Mukta S. Lama,Devendra Chhetry, Krishna Hachhethu,Prakash S. Mahat, Mahendra Lawoti andSakuntala Kadirgamar

Review from HDRU, RCC, Sri LankaAnuradha Rajivan and other unit staff

Review from HDRO, NHDR Unit, UNDP, New YorkTim Scott, Paola Pagliani and Amie Gaye

Core Team of AuthorsBishwa Nath Tiwari - Lead AuthorYash Ghai, Sarah Levit-Shore and Lok Raj Baral

Statistics, Maps and GraphsPrakash Dev Pant, Bishwa Nath Tiwari,Arun Kumar Lal Das and Rudra Suwal

EditorShawna Tropp

Resource PersonsRobert Piper, Anne-IsabelleDegryse-Blateau, Lazima Onta-Bhatta,Ghulam Isaczai, Sean Deely,Dev Raj Dahal, Heather Bryantand Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Background/Thematic Paper WritersChhaya Jha, Ameet Dhakal, Jill Cottrell,Prakash Dev Pant, Lazima Onta-Bhatta,Bal Gopal Baidya, Shankar Sharma,Shiva Sharma, Pushpa Raj Kandel,Suman Subba, Madan P. Pariyar,Meen Bishwakarma, Arun Kumar Lal Das,Bishnu Raj Upreti, and Vijaya Kant Karna

S T E E R I N G C O M M I T T E EPosh Raj Pandey, Hon’ble Member, National Planning Commission - ChairpersonHari D. Pandey, Joint Secretary, National Planning Commission Secretariat - MemberGanga D. Awasthi, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Local Development - MemberBimal Wagle, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance - MemberShyam Sundar Sharma, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction - MemberIshwori Prasad Paudyal, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Physical Planning and Works - MemberBishnu Prasad Lamsal, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Transport - MemberTunga S. Bastola, Director General, Central Bureau of Statistics - MemberGhulam Isaczai, Deputy Resident Representative (Programme), UNDP - MemberMadhavi Singh Shah, Head, Department of Economics, Tribhuvan University - MemberShibesh Chandra Regmi, Chairperson, Association of INGOs - MemberArjun Karki, President, NGO Federation - MemberBal Gopal Baidya, President, Federation of Democratic NGOs - MemberTirtha Biswakarma, Executive Director, Dalit NGO Federation - MemberPasang Sherpa, Chairperson, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities - MemberBisheshwar Rajak, Chairperson, Madhesi Dalit Development Federation - MemberSharada Pokharel, Acting President, Women Security Pressure Group -MemberChandi R. Dhakal, President, Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries - MemberBishwa Nath Tiwari, NPM, Support for Human Development Initiatives, UNDP - Member Secretary

Note: The institution and the position held by the members listed above refer to August 2007, when thiscommittee was formed.

A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E EGanga D. Awasthi, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Local DevelopmentSubarna Lal Shrestha, Joint Secretary, National Planning Commission SecretariatTunga S. Bastola, Director General, Central Bureau of StatisticsShyam Sundar Sharma, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Peace and ReconstructionBimal Wagle, Joint Secretary, Ministry of FinanceIshwori Prasad Paudyal, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Physical Planning and WorksBishnu Prasad Lamsal, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Transport ManagementDev Raj Dahal, Head, Friedrich Ebert StiftungBishwambher Pyakuryal, Professor, Department of Economics, Tribhuvan UniversityDilli Raj Khanal, Chairperson, Institute of Policy Research and DevelopmentArzu Deuba, Chairperson, SamanataBina Pradhan, Gender Expert / Freelance ConsultantArjun Karki, President, NGO FederationShibesh Chandra Regmi, Chairperson, Association of INGOsJeetpal Kirat, Vice Chairperson, National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous NationalitiesJohn Stompor, Legal Officer, UNOHCHR-NepalSharad Neupane, ARR, UNDPRam P. Yadav, Vice Chairperson, Poverty Alleviation FundBal Gopal Baidya, Chairperson, Federation of Democratic NGOsAmanuel Gebremedhin, Senior Reintegration and Recovery Advisor, UNDPBinod K. Chaudhary, President, Confederation of Nepalese IndustriesShengjie Li, Director, ILOChandi Raj Dhakal, President, Federation of National Chamber of Commerce and IndustriesSriram Pande, ARR, UNDPGhulam Isaczai, DRR, UNDPChhaya Jha, Director, HURDECHira Lal Vishwakarma, Technical Advisor, Dalit NGO FederationArun Dhoj Adhikary, Coordinator, UNDP Field Offices, UNDPBikash Sharma, Energy Officer, ICIMODDevendra Chhetri, Professor, Department of Statistics, Tribhuvan UniversityLazima Onta-Bhatta, Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist, UNDPBishwa Nath Tiwari, National Project Manager, SHDI/UNDP

Note: The institution and the position held by the members refer to the period of September 2007, whenthis committee was formed.

P R O J E C T B OA R DLazima Onta-Bhatta

Hari D. Pandey

Pushpa Lal Shakya

Madhavi Singh Shah

Deepak Shrestha

Preface

Previous Nepal Human Development Re-ports and the reports of many other organi-zations have successively mapped underly-ing patterns of exclusion, disadvantage andvulnerability in Nepal. While the proportionof Nepalis living in extreme poverty has low-ered over the last decade, these underlyingpatterns of inequity have not changed sig-nificantly.

If the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is anyguide, these same patterns appear to have fu-eled the decade-long insurgency. The termsof the peace as spelled out in this historicdocument, are anchored in the principles ofrights, access and equity. The country haslaunched itself on a process of profound trans-formation, where everything is up for nego-tiation - the structure of the state, the symbolsof nationhood, the rights of the citizen - withina pre-agreed and hopefully peaceful frame-work. Reading the peace agreement and manyof the successive agreements through a hu-man development lens, one has the sense thatthese underlying patterns have now, finally, trulyarrived at ‘centre stage’. And that the key deci-sions ahead, will ultimately be measured bythe extent to which they break these long-standing patterns.

Patterns entrenched over hundreds of yearswill not easily be broken however. Over thecoming months and years, the Nepali peopleand their leaders face an array of decisionswith long-term consequences. Not every

option guarantees a good 'human develop-ment outcome' and in the background willremain the peace process itself, which willneed protection at all costs. Nepal will findits own formula for securing the peace andadvancing this complex agenda.

This year's Nepal Human Development Re-port, therefore, explores some of the deci-sions ahead with a view to better understand-ing their potential impact on Nepal's humandevelopment status.

As usual, this year’s human development reportalso provides a wealth of data and informationon the HDI and other related indices by 13 sub-regions of Nepal and by 11 caste and ethnicgroups. The spatial and social canvas of the HDIcontinues to indicate pockets of prosperityalongside deep pockets of poverty and depri-vation. The variation in the level of human de-velopment between caste and ethnic groups islarger than those of regions and sub-regions,implying the need for refocusing our attentionand revisiting our targeting criteria to vulnerablecaste and ethnic groups in a region.

We want to thank the lead author, BishwaNath Tiwari, the other core authors, succes-sive UNDP and National Planning Commis-sion staff and the array of local and interna-tional resource persons, steering committeeand advisory board members, peer review-ers and the like, for their inputs since thisprocess began in 2007.

Yuba Raj KhatiwadaVice-ChairNational Planning Commission

Robert PiperResident RepresentativeUNDP

vNepal Human Development Report 2009

The journey towards the 2009ReportThe Nepal Human Development Report(HDR) is a nationally owned and led prod-uct, based on a nation-wide consultativeprocess that involved guidance from aSteering Committee, technical supportfrom an Advisory Committee, and com-ments and suggestions from a ReaderGroup. The Report was led by the Na-tional Planning Commission and UNDPNepal. In accordance with the UNDP Cor-porate Policy on the National Human De-velopment Reports (NHDRs), the findingsand recommendations are those of the in-dependent team of authors and experts,and do not necessarily reflect those ofUNDP or the Government of Nepal.

The preparation of this Report also fol-lowed the six UNDP Corporate Principleson NHDRs. Of these, the first three con-cern the critical role of the process inNHDR preparation. They are: country own-ership, participatory and inclusive prepara-tion, and independence of analysis. Thisimplies the need for involving differentstakeholders from the project’s beginning.These NHDR principles faithfully de-manded intense consultation over a periodof more than two years.

Following the principles of country owner-ship, and participatory and inclusive prepara-tion called for several efforts, among these:

identification of three themes for criticaldiscussion, based on the review of earlierNepal Human Development Reports, andconsultation with policy-makers;

Acknowledgement

holding a national level consultative work-shop for further identifying and selectingtheme;meeting with thematic groups to deter-mine sub-themes of the selected themeand to prepare a draft theme outline;formation of a National Steering Com-mittee to provide overall guidance andpolicy suggestions;formation of an advisory committee tooffer technical inputs and insights in thepreparation of the report;formation of a reader group to providecomments and inputs;preparation of five background paperson five sub-themes by five two-memberinclusive teams of consultants;review of background papers by readergroup and advisory committee and itssub-committees;revision of the theme and preparation ofdetailed outline and its sharing;presentation of the detailed outline fol-lowing a consultative process and incor-porating inputs from excluded groups;preparation of the first draft report;presentation of the draft report in the meet-ings of the Steering Committee, the Advi-sory Committee, and the Readers’ Group;review of the report by the national peerreviewers and UNDP resource persons;refinement of the content, and subsequentrevisions of the report;preparation of the second revised draftreport;review of the report - by both nationaland international reviewers - and its re-finement;editing of the report by independent editor;

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preparation of media kits;layout and design for creativity and flex-ibility in the report’s presentation andlaunching; andtranslating the report into Nepali and dis-seminating the text widely.

The sharing and discussion of the back-ground papers prepared by the end of 2007revealed that the theme of the post-conflictrecovery and reconstruction has lacked a con-ceptual framework with a human face. Hav-ing identified this shortcoming, the StudyTeam revised the theme as well as the out-line of the Report based on the insights andinputs received from various consultationswith the resource persons. The final agreedoutcome was “State Transformation andHuman Development”.

During the participatory preparation of theReport, some of the key challenges thatemerged include:

dilution of the theme because of the needfor incorporating the concerns of allstakeholders involved in the process;difficulty in finding experts from the ex-cluded groups;formation of an inclusive team for boththe Steering and Advisory Committees,among other consultative groups, a pro-cess that involved more time than initiallyanticipated.

Though the journey was long and arduous,the high subsequent demand for the Reportby both the state and non-state actors has beendeeply satisfactory. Behind these many requestslies the credibility that the Report commands,which itself stems from the broad involve-ment of the various stakeholders in its prepa-ration. The Report is a product of a joint ef-fort by many individuals and organizations. Itis expected that the Report will contribute togenerating debate in the process of preparingthe new constitution, new policies, and plan-ning for a just, peaceful and prosperous Nepal.

Further details of key events and milestonesof this process are presented below.

Preparing the Report

National stakeholder workshopThe preparation of the Nepal HDR startedwith organizing a national level workshop on24 January 2007. Support for Human Devel-opment Initiatives (SHDI) project of UNDPorganized this workshop, which was chairedby Dr. Pushpa Raj Rajkarnikar, an honourablemember of the National Planning Commis-sion (NPC), to determine the Report’s theme.To foster “brainstorming” and to facilitate theselection of the theme, Bishwa Nath Tiwari,Lead Author and Manager of the SHDIproject, presented the group with three con-temporary issues, viz, recovery and recon-struction; unemployment and migration; andpost-conflict capacity-building as the basis ofdiscussion and exploring the issues further.After an entire day’s deliberation, the work-shop identified “Recovery, Reconstruction andRehabilitation” as a broad theme with a viewto contributing to the government’s prepara-tion of its interim plan (2007/08–2009/10).

Many individuals participated in the consulta-tion, including former members of the Na-tional Planning Commission, university pro-fessors and other academics, the leaders andrepresentatives of different government andnon-government organizations, as well asdonors. Though space limitations precludenaming them all here, several merit specialmention, notably Bishwambher Pyakuryal,Madan Kumar Dahal, Prithivi Raj Ligal,Shankar Sharma, Dilli Raj Khanal, Arzu RanaDeuba, Sapana Pradhan Malla, Om Gurungand Kush Kumar Joshi. UNDP would liketo thank all who participated in this nationalstakeholder consultation and other theme-focused workshops for their contributionsto choosing and clarifying the scope of thetheme of this Nepal HDR.

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ixNepal Human Development Report 2009

Thematic workshopsFollowing the national stakeholder workshop,the SHDI organized other consultations withthematic groups so as to hone the selectedtheme, define sub-themes and prepare a de-tailed outline.

Formation of the 19-memberNational Steering CommitteeThe National Planning Commission formeda Steering Committee to provide overall guid-ance and critical inputs to the Nepal HDR.Under the leadership of the honourable NPCmember Dr. Posh Raj Pandey, the Commit-tee drew eight of its members from govern-ment organizations, two from UNDP andthe SHDI project, and other nine from non-government organizations, including thosedevoted to women, Dalits, indigenouspeoples’ issues, and the private sector andacademia. UNDP would like to express grati-tude to Dr. Pandey and all the other mem-bers of the committee listed above for theirinspiring direction and insights at differentmilestones of the Report’s evolution. Someother individuals who attended steering com-mittee meetings include Matthew Kahane,Pushpa Lal Shakya, Chij Kumar Shrestha,Shyam Nidhi Tiwari, Netra Timsina and RanjitKanaujiya, all of whom the UNDP wishes tothank for their contributions.

Formation of the 32-memberAdvisory CommitteeThe National Steering Committee formedan Advisory Committee, drawing on someof its own members. The overall responsi-bility of this Committee was to ensure ob-jectivity and assure the quality of this NepalHDR. The Committee and its sub-groupshave provided technical inputs, commentsand suggestions on the background papers,and the initial draft of the Report. UNDPwould like to express heartfelt thanks to allthese individuals.

Formation of UNDP Advisory/Reader GroupUNDP formed an in-house Reader Groupto review progress and provide close regu-lar guidance at the working level, includingassistance to the Project Manager, in concep-tualizing the theme, in the selection of ap-propriate consultants, in the review of draftreports and for participating in the essentialbrainstorming. UNDP thanks all the mem-bers of this group for undertaking these tasksduring the preparation of this Nepal HDR.

Computation of the HDI and relatedindices and other statistics, as well as mapsInitially, a team consisting of Prakash DevPant, Arun Kumar Lal Das and Rudra Suwalcomputed the Human Development Indexand the three related indices by rural-urbandivide, Nepal’s three ecological belts, thecountry’s five development regions, and atmost 15 sub-regions (a cross-section of fivedevelopment regions and three ecologicalbelts). Later, given the increased demand forsuch indices for various caste and ethnicgroups, Prakash Dev Pant computed theHDI for 11 of them in view of data con-straints. Bhola Nath Dhakal refined the mapsdepicting the human development and re-lated indices.

Bishwa Nath Tiwari updated GEM values,and compiled, computed and analysed all theother statistics presented in the tables andcharts/graphs of this report. Several of thesestatistics are put in the Annex to this Report.Rajendra Lal Dangol and the project staffincluding Mim Lama, Kamala Adhikari, andKrishna Dangol helped in the collection ofinformation.

UNDP would like to thank the demogra-pher, statistician and GIS experts, and theproject staff involved in this task for theirpainstaking work.

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Preparation of background papers andthematic papersIn accordance with the sub-themes and theinitial outline developed on the theme ofrecovery and reconstruction, five teams, eachwith two members, prepared five back-ground papers by the end of 2007. After-wards, the group made clear that the Reportdid not aim at becoming a post-conflict plan-ning document.Instead, the text had to diag-nose the root causes of conflict and offerpolicy options. For this reason, the theme waschanged to Inclusive Peace-Building.

Later, with the revision of the theme to in-clusive peace-building, six thematic papers/chapters were prepared on the followingsubjects: the causes of conflict, social exclu-sion, economic exclusion, political exclusion,rule of law and the making of the constitu-tion, and reconciliation. Ameet Dhakal, BalGopal Baidya, Chhaya Jha, Jill Cottrell andBishwa Nath Tiwari have prepared the the-matic papers/chapters for the theme on theinclusive peace building.

Consultations were held with different groupsincluding excluded groups (women, Dalits,Janajati, Madhesi and people with disabilities)in the process of preparing the backgroundpapers, thematic papers and their content. Inthis process, the role of all the participantsincluding Aruna Thapa, Shanta Thapaliya, LilyThapa, Ranju Thakur, Tirtha Biswokarma andJay Nishant was crucial in shaping the tone ofthe papers. That was further enriched with theinformation offered by Dibya Gurung, ArunaThapa, Keshab Dahal and Budhi Karki.UNDP appreciates for their contribution.

Bishwa Nath Tiwari compiled the papers,shared the report, and received commentsthat the theme is very broad. Subsequently,the theme has been honed to State Transfor-mation and Human Development with the

insights received from the various reviewsand consultations and insights of the resourcepersons. Hence, these thematic papers havenot been directly incorporated into the Re-port as chapters of the State Transforma-tion and Human Development; however,these papers nourished the Report’s prepa-ration.

Finally, drawing on the background and the-matic papers, Yash Ghai wrote chapter five,Sarah Levit-Shore chapter three, Lok RajBaral part of the chapter four, and BishwaNath Tiwari wrote all other chapters includ-ing the part of chapter four and the over-view section of this report.

UNDP acknowledges the contribution ofall the authors, background and thematicpaper writers and more importantly review-ers, readers and resource persons.

Consolidating the Report andValidating the Findings

Consolidation of the ReportThe lead author of the Report, who tookpart in every stage of its evolution, includingthe writing of individual chapters, wove thechapters together and prepared overviewsection, and conclusions and recommenda-tions gathering insights from several work-shops, and in consultation with the resourcepersons who guided the Report’s refinement.In addition, Mr. Robert Piper, the UnitedNations Resident Coordinator, played an in-strumental role in refining the message ofthe Report and furnishing insights thatstrengthened its unity. In the process of theconsolidation and refinement, among otherresource persons the role of Lazima Onta-Bhatta, Heather Bryant and Dev Raj Dahalwas noteworthy in offering comments andinsights on different versions of the report.

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Validation workshopsThe Project organized two sets of validationworkshops because of the revision of the ini-tial theme. It is gratifying to note that most ofthe members of the NPC, as well as mem-bers of the Steering Committee and the Ad-visory Committee attended a three-day resi-dential workshop in Godavari in 2008 on thefirst draft of the Report. UNDP wishes toexpress its gratitude to all these individuals, aswell as to the former Vice-Chair, JagadishChandra Pokharel, and other NPC membersas follows: Pushpa Raj Rajkarnikar, IndiraShrestha, Chaitanya Subba, Deependra BahadurKshetry, Maheswor Man Shrestha, BhimNeupane and Ramakant Gauro. Their com-ments and inputs helped refine the theme andimprove the substance and presentation of thefindings and policy options put forward bythe Report. Although the Steering Committeechaired by NPC was dissolved before the sec-ond set of validation workshops, some keyparticipants in the second set who made sig-nificant contributions in distilling the findingsand their policy implications include Dev RajDahal, Bipin Adhikari, Krishna Bhattachan,Ananda Aditya, Sushil Pandey, Chuda B.Shrestha, Nainakala Thapa, Manoj K. Bachchan,Bhuwan K. C, Krishna P. Acharya, Durga Sob,Nima Lama and Bandita Sijapati. The Teamextends warm thanks to all of them.

At the final stage of refinement, the report wasshared with Guna Nidhi Sharma, Vice-Chair,Ram Mani Pokharel, member, and Janak RajJoshi, Member Secretary, NPC; Karin Landgren,Representative of the Secretary-General,UNMIN; and Gellion Melsop, Representative,UNICEF Nepal. UNDP would like to thankthem for their inputs and co-operation.

Refining and publishing the Report

National and international peer reviewUNDP would like to express gratitude tothe national and international peer reviewerswho read through the complete draft of the

Report and offered helpful critiques and sug-gestions. Apart from those included as thepeer reviewers, some other reviewers whooffered critical inputs include MadhavGhimire, Secretary and Shaligram Sharma,Under Secretary, Ministry of Peace and Re-construction, and Bharat Pokharel, Associ-ate Professor, Tribhuvan University.

The Team of the Authors also wishes to thankexperts and colleagues from Human Devel-opment Report Office, UNDP, New York;and Human Development Report Unit,UNDP Regional Centre in Colombo, whovolunteered to review the Report and pro-vided extremely useful suggestions and otherinputs that helped strengthen the document’sconceptual foundation and policy value. Inparticular, the Team would like to thankAnuradha Rajivan and Tim Scott.

Editing and publicationThe Team would like to record its apprecia-tion to Shawna Tropp not only for the finalediting of the Report, but also for her interestin the substance and views expressed by the2009 edition. Like her editing of past NepalHDRs, she has transformed the final text intoa Report that flows consistently and smoothlyfrom one chapter to another. Thanks are dueto Ms. Sangita Khadka for supporting thepreparation of the media kit. A final wordof thank goes to Bhaikaji Rajbahak for thepreliminary design, and to WordScape forthe final design and layout of the Report.

Thanks are due to Deepak Shrestha,Programme Officer for supervision through-out the process, and to other Programme Of-ficers including Nabina Shrestha and AnjaniBhattarai who attended one or the other events,and to several other support staff includingPushpa Tuladhar, who supported the processat different stages. Finally, the authors assumefull responsibility for the opinions expressed inthis Report, which reflect neither the views ofUNDP nor the Government of Nepal.

AF Advocacy ForumCA Constituent AssemblyCAAFAG Children Associated with Armed

Forces and Armed GroupsCBS Central Bureau of StatisticsCIDA Canadian International Development

AgencyCPA Comprehensive Peace AccordCPN Communist Party of NepalDFID Department for International

DevelopmentFPIC Free Prior and Informed ConsentFPTP First-Past-the-PostGDI Gender-related Development IndexGEM Gender Empowerment MeasureHDI Human Development IndexHDR Human Development ReportHPI Human Poverty IndexICTJ International Centre for Transitional

JusticeIDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral

AssistanceIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsINSEC Informal Sector Service CentreLPC Local Peace CommitteeMOF Ministry of FinanceMOH Ministry of HealthMOHP Ministry of Health and PopulationMOPR Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction

Acronyms and abbreviations

NDHS Nepal Demographic and Health SurveyNHDR National Human Development ReportNLSS Nepal Living Standards SurveyNPC National Planning CommissionNTG Nepal Tamang GhedungOCHA Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian AffairsOHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for

Human RightsPLC Para-legal CommitteePR Proportional RepresentationRIPP Regional Indigenous Peoples

ProgrammeSAARC South Asian Association for Regional

Co-OperationSHDI Support for Human Development

Initiatives project of UNDPSPA Seven (Political) Party AllianceTRC Truth and Reconciliation CommissionUML Unified Marxist-LeninistUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development

ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNMIN United Nations Mission in NepalUSA United States of America

NRs refer to Nepali rupees, unless otherwise specified$ refers to US dollar, unless otherwise specified

xiiiNepal Human Development Report 2009

Preface vAcknowledgement viiAcronyms and abbreviations xiii

Overview 1

CHAPTER 1 STATE TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 11An ambitious theme for ambitious times 13Multiple transitions and high expectations 13Human development, human security and state transformation 17The sources and dimensions of exclusion 18Exclusion—a recapitulation 21Consequences of conflict on human development 22The Nepali comprehensive peace accord—its contentand follow-up 25The post-CPA documents 26

CHAPTER 2 UNEQUAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 29Human development and its measurement 31Human development in South Asia 32The Nepal human development index 32The gender-related development index 36The gender empowerment measure 38Poverty and human development 41Caste and ethnicity and human development 43Inequality in educational and health outcomes 47To sum up… 48

CHAPTER 3 GETTING THE PEACE PROCESS RIGHT 49Dealing with the past 51Managing expectations in the present 58Where we now stand 66

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CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL INCLUSION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 67Revisiting political exclusion 69The electoral system and human development 70Internal democracy of the political parties 75Participation of citizens and their representatives 77Unitary state structure and the centralization of decision-making 78Conclusion 80

CHAPTER 5 FEDERALISM AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 81Challenges facing Nepal 84Social inclusion—the core values and principles of the constitution 87Federalism and human development 88Federalism is not the panacea for every one 93Designing the federation and institutional arrangements 97To sum up… 99

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101Inequality as both the cause and effect of exclusion 103Reform the political system for equitable representationand effective participation 104Devise federalism for social justice, inclusion, and participation 105Make the peace process right 107Summing up 112

ENDNOTES 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

ANNEXES 127Annex 1 131Annex 2 141Annex 3 158

xvi Nepal Human Development Report 2009

BOXES

1.1 A chronology of key events leading to the current state of Nepali polity 141.2 Cultural liberty for human development 161.3 What is human security? 171.4 Key conventions ratified by Nepal 221.5 Key building blocks of peace process in Nepal 252.1 Status of social exclusion in Nepal, 2006 453.1 The demand for an inclusive truth and reconciliation commission, Nepal 523.2 Protection of the interests of women: United Nations Resolution 1325 533.3 Social reintegration package for the disqualified Maoist army personnel, Nepal 583.4 Para-legal committees: a community-based protection mechanism in Nepal 613.5 Assessment of Local Peace Committees in Nepal: some key findings 633.6 Process adopted by the Government of Nepal for developing the new constitution 654.1 Inclusive provisions after the CPA, Nepal, November 2006 714.2 Results of CA Election, Nepal, 10 April 2008 725.1 The effects of federal structure on excluded groups - women, and

the attitude of the authorities: some examples 93

TABLES

2.1 Change in human development index, Nepal, 2001 and 2006 342.2 Percentage shortfall of GDI over HDI by region, Nepal, 2001 and 2006 382.3 Change in gender empowerment measure due to provision of

quota for women in 2008 Constituent Assembly 402.4 Poverty incidence by geographical areas, Nepal, 1995/96 and 2003/04 452.5 Poverty incidence by caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 1995/96 and 2003/04 462.6 Average per capita income by caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2003/04 462.7 Differentials in educational attainment by gender, and caste and ethnicity

(15–49 years), Nepal, 2006 474.1 Social Representation in the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008 74

MAPS

1.1 People killed across development regions, Nepal, 1996-2006 231.2 People displaced across development regions, Nepal, 1996-2004 241.3 Human development index across development regions, Nepal, 2006 242.1 Human development index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006 342.2 Human development index across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006 362.3 Gender-related development index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006 372.4 GDI/HDI ratio across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006 382.5 Gender empowerment measure across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006 392.6 Human poverty index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006 422.7 Human poverty index across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006 43

xviiNepal Human Development Report 2009

xviii Nepal Human Development Report 2009

FIGURES

1.1 The broad social mosaic of Nepal, 2001 151.2 Range and average number of people killed in a district, Nepal, 1996-2006 232.1 HDI trend of some SAARC countries at the interval of 5 years, 1975–2005 322.2 Comparison of three sub-indices of HDI of SAARC countries, 1992 and 2005 332.3 Human development index across areas and regions, Nepal, 2006 332.4 Human development in Nepal: with and without Kathmandu 352.5 Human development across ecological zones: Hills with and without Kathmandu 352.6 Human developments across development regions: Central region

with and without Kathmandu 352.7 Gender-related development index across areas and regions, Nepal, 2006 372.8 Trends in gender inequality by region, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006 392.9 Gender empowerment measure across areas and regions, Nepal, 2006 402.10 Human poverty in rural and urban Nepal, 2006 412.11 Human poverty index across areas and regions, Nepal, 2001 and 2006 412.12 Human development index by major caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2006 442.13 Human development index and its components by major caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2006 442.14 Under-five mortality rate by caste and ethnicity, and regional identity, Nepal, 2006 484.1 Quota for excluded caste and ethnic groups, and region in the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008 734.2 Social representation in Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008 734.3 Party registered and contested, and voter trend in four elections, Nepal 76

Overview

ithout peace, human develop-ment is not possible and with-out human development, peace

is not sustainable. Both require inclusion andparticipation—which can evolve through therestructuring of the state and deepening ofthe democracy of a political system. This Re-port makes the case that inclusion and par-ticipation can restore sustainable peace andhuman development through state transfor-mation.

Politics—or the exercise of power throughparticipation—matters for human develop-ment because people everywhere want to befree to determine their own destiny, expresstheir views, and participate in the decisionsthat shape their lives. These capabilities arejust as important for human development—for expanding people’s choices—as beingable to read or to enjoy good health. De-mocracy must widen and deepen if politicsand political institutions are to promote hu-man development and safeguard the free-dom and dignity of all individuals.

Peace, together with prosperity and democ-racy, also constitute the core mandates ofthe 2006 April Janandolan (people’s move-ment). This is articulated firmly in the Com-prehensive Peace Accord and the InterimConstitution 2007. The ComprehensivePeace Accord has at least four components:

political and socioeconomic transformation;management of armies and arms;ceasefire provisions and measures for nor-malization; and

protection of human rights and funda-mental rights.

This Report focuses on the political trans-formation or restructuring of the state forinclusion and for human development whilerecognising that implementing all the othercomponents is necessary for peace.

Here inclusion refers to the equitable politi-cal representation of the excluded segmentsof Nepal’s population, including women,various caste and ethnic groups, and thosewho live in underdeveloped regions. Partici-pation implies the active engagement of rep-resentatives in voicing the views of their con-stituencies so that these opinions are heardand heeded.

The Report advances the view that becauseexclusion causes unequal human develop-ment—which, in turn, perpetuates exclu-sion—eliminating it through the equitablerepresentation and participation of excludedgroups and regions will improve the qualityof human development. Consequently, theReport explores different options in changesto the state structure or political system toaccommodate the interests of differentgroups of people. Nevertheless, the Reportalso recognises that equitable representationcannot alone resolve the problems of exclu-sion unless those who represent Nepal’s vari-ous constituencies can influence policy deci-sions through direct and active participation.Those now excluded are unlikely to partici-

Exclusion causesunequal humandevelopment—which, in turn,perpetuatesexclusion

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2 Nepal Human Development Report 2009

pate as effectively as the advantaged groupsbecause of their lower level of human de-velopment and endowment as chapter twopresents, along with their marginalisation andsocio-political repression. Inequalities in en-dowment not only create, but cause exclu-sion. Consequently, inequality and exclusionmust end simultaneously in all its dimensions.

Rather than prescribing a particular form ofpolitical system, a specific federal structureor otherwise, this Nepal Human DevelopmentReport 2009 examines some of the essentialfeatures of democracy and democratic struc-tures that distribute power to many. Theseinclude a fair electoral system, democracywithin political parties, a federal structure anda significant decentralization of power andresources to bring governance closer to thepeople and to expand their access to basicservices.

While the Report focuses on state transfor-mation and state-building, it also infers thatnation-building and the viability of a strongnation-state is essential to lasting peace andsustained human development. To this end,the Report advances an agenda of ten keypoints for political inclusion, lasting peace andhuman development.

Exclusion and inequality—perennial evils for NepalAs the first chapter of the Report shows,there are at least seven categories of exclu-sion and inequality in Nepal; their roots lie inthe country’s diverse geography, society andculture. This highly variegated diversity hasnot been well accommodated by a narrowdefinition of national identity based on theHindu religion, a unitary state, and a heredi-tary monarchy dominated by ruling Hill elitesuntil very recently. It is not surprising that thisconstellation of exclusions has been contestedby Dalits (oppressed people), Janajatis includ-

ing Tharu (indigenous peoples), Madhesis (ingeneral the inhabitants of plains) and women.

Today, Nepal stands at the crossroads of re-defining both nation and state. As this Re-port points out, the country has been under-going multiple transitions:

from a monarchy to a republic;from authoritarianism to democracy andhuman rights;from a hegemonic to an inclusive andparticipatory system of governance;from a state wholly pervaded by onereligion to secularism; andfrom a heavily centralized unitary systemto one characterized by decentralizationand autonomy at the regional and locallevels.

For these reasons, Chapter 2 presents Nepal’scurrent Human Development Index (HDI),and other related indices that show the exist-ing patterns of unequal human developmentand the need for a socioeconomic “leap” forthe country to reach the level of its neighboursin South Asia. The text examines the urban-rural divide, the differences among develop-ment and ecological regions, and the sevenmajor caste and ethnic groups, as well as 11such groups by their regional identification.

Although human development has improvedat the aggregate level, the gap betweenadvantaged areas or caste/ethnic groups anddisadvantaged ones is either widening or re-mains constant. Thus, the Dalits, Muslims andJanajatis who have had lower levels of hu-man development continue to suffer today.Moreover, the level of human developmentof women is still lower than that of men,and women still lack equitable access to op-portunities and resources. Thus, continuedexclusion and inequality has provided an en-vironment for the mobilization of excludedgroups against an exclusionary state. This Re-port therefore holds that development policy

Today, Nepalstands at thecrossroads of

redefining bothnation and state

Overview

3Nepal Human Development Report 2009

must be framed and implemented by thesegroups themselves. Consequently, it empha-sizes power-sharing through inclusion—through fair representation and effective par-ticipation of the excluded in the political sys-tem.

Digging deeper into three components ofHDI—life expectancy, education, and in-come—reveals that improving the level ofeducation for excluded groups could rap-idly improve their capabilities and open newoptions and freedoms. Of the three HDIcomponents, the contribution of life expect-ancy is highest, while that of education isexpanding. This points to the need for in-creasing public allocations to education,which is generally pro-poor.

Getting the peace process right:today’s foremost needAchieving lasting peace is no small under-taking in a post-conflict society. It requires:

dealing with a divided past,managing the high expectations ofpeople in the present, andlooking towards a shared future througha process of participatory constitution-making, among other activities forbroadening and deepening democracy.

Without emphasizing wider participation, thegovernment risks jeopardizing the peace pro-cess and thereby forestalling both socioeco-nomic and political transformation.

Dealing with the past involves providing jus-tice to the victims and punishing the perpe-trators of the conflict. Given Nepal’s longhistory of impunity, Nepalis throughout thecountry are calling out for justice. Littleprogress on transitional justice has taken placesince hostilities ceased. Of the several com-missions set up under the CPA, the one thathas evoked the greatest contention has been

the establishment of the Truth and Recon-ciliation Commission (TRC). Its delay stemslargely from the late start of participatoryprocesses in the formulation of the TRC bill.

The TRC provides an entry point to transi-tional justice. This justice can be retributive—based on criminal prosecution—or restor-ative—based on mediation. Restorative jus-tice is increasingly used as a major instrumentof reconciliation, since it gives greater weightto making restitution to the victim and thevictimized community than to punishing theoffender. Because victims are central to re-storative justice, the process makes offend-ers directly accountable to the person or com-munity they have victimized. The long tradi-tion of “Kshama” (forgive and forget, ratherthan take revenge), inherent in Nepali cul-ture, gives restorative justice considerablescope in consolidating the peace process.

Another prominent issue of dealing with thepast remains the future of the qualified anddisqualified members of the Maoist army.As Chapter three shows, key questions re-main the return of land and other property,along with the reconstitution and reorgani-zation of the armed forces. Discharged com-batants should also play a key role in restor-ative justice efforts at the local and commu-nity levels; they must become part of com-munity healing, reconciliation and rebirth.

The issue of the present is how to:manage popular expectations throughrestoring the rule of law; andincrease access to public goods and ser-vices, including justice.

These have a direct bearing on human de-velopment, especially that of the poor andthose otherwise excluded. As is so often thecase worldwide, the poor and the excluded,who need critical services, including legal as-sistance, lack access to such help. Even in

Restorative justicemakes offendersdirectlyaccountable to theperson orcommunity theyhave victimized

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today’s Nepal, there are individuals who lackidentity either because of lack of citizenshipor because of landlessness. They are there-fore barred from benefiting from the lawand policies, especially in seeking redress forthe exploitation of the powerful. Corrup-tion has also been a major factor in keepingthese marginalised citizens from availing them-selves of legal procedures. To enhance accessto justice, indigenous practices in this area atthe local level need to be examined, adaptedto contemporary needs and laws, and pub-licly promoted.

In addition to restoring the rule of law, im-proving service delivery enhances human de-velopment in post-conflict situations, especiallyin terms of health care, education and localsecurity. In this area, the most important factoris the reconstitution of local governance bod-ies. At this juncture, the establishment of LocalPeace Committees provides an opportunity forundertaking peace-building initiatives at the com-munity level. Such bodies tend to be more in-clusive than those originating at higher levels ofauthority because they bring together govern-ment organizations, political parties and civilsociety bodies that bridge NGOs, private en-terprises, and the victims themselves.

The elaboration of a new constitution for ashared future is critical. While its preparationby the 601 members of the Constituent As-sembly provides legitimacy, a major challengeis the effective participation of all these mem-bers because their levels of endowment andempowerment differ immensely. Conse-quently, CA members should not be the onlyconduit for public input into the eventual lawof the land.

There is no one model for a peace process,just as there is no single model of develop-ment. Thus far, the peace process has beencharacterized by a “one issue at a time” ap-proach. This has slowed progress and lim-ited decision-making authority in the hands

of an elite few. Practically speaking, it hasalso meant an almost exclusive focus onpolitics at the expense of development. Nowthere is a need for balancing the political anddevelopment agendas.

Power-sharing throughreform of the political systemDeclining voter turnout, weak internal demo-cratic processes within the political parties,limited oversight of justice and security in-stitutions, confusion over competencies andaccountability, and a lack of clear delinea-tion of roles and responsibilities between thecentre and local levels are all key challengesof effective democratic governance inNepal. The fourth chapter of the Reportexplains how representation and participa-tion can be further enhanced by choicesaround the electoral systems, the internal or-ganization of political parities, and decen-tralization.

The nature of the electoral system of a coun-try determines to a large extent how inclusivelyits population is represented in the political sys-tem and how meaningful this participation isfor human development. This Report focuseson three criteria to gauge the extent to whichNepal’s present electoral system gives its citi-zens a voice in decision-making and thus fos-ters their development:

the inclusiveness of Constituent Assembly;the accountability of assembly membersselected under the electoral system; andthe stability of the political system.

The analysis of the electoral system in thisReport identifies:

how a first-past-the-post electoral sys-tem can create a spurious majority withlow representation of excluded groupsin the political system;how the recent adoption of the mixedelectoral system, with a higher propor-tion of seats allocated through the Pro-

There is no onemodel for a peace

process, just asthere is no single

model ofdevelopment

Overview


portional Representation (PR) system inthe election of a 601-member Constitu-ent Assembly, resulted in an inclusiveAssembly—but arguably at the cost ofpolitical instability; andhow this resulted in a delay in forming acoalition government, which even whenfinally seated, lacked the broad consen-sus on controversial issues critical to thesuccess of the peace process.

A careful review of the mixed electoral systemagainst the backdrop of upcoming state re-structuring is therefore necessary for determin-ing the future electoral system of Nepal.

Again, an equitable representation of differentcaste and ethnic groups in the legislature can-not exist even under the PR electoral system ifthe party organizations do not represent thediversity of regions and cultural groups, anddo not use democratic procedures in their owndecision-making. Unfortunately, the internal de-mocracy of a party in Nepal, as reflected bythe make-up of party organization and struc-ture, tends to diminish with time. Moreover,the parties have been less transparent and demo-cratic in their decision-making for some time;their senior leaders hold high positions for manyyears, thus limiting the options and develop-ment potential of other members. More im-portantly, their delivery on their election mani-festos is at best, thin. Civil society has not playeda consistently active role to make party leadersaccountable to voters and thereby strengthendemocracy at the grassroots level.

Nepal has had a highly centralized politicalsystem since its unification in 1768. The heavyconcentration of power and resources inKathmandu has been itself both a symptomand a cause of exclusion. The restoration ofdemocracy in 1990 brought with it furtherefforts to strengthen local bodies in the de-velopment process. Of all Nepal’s efforts inthis direction, the most promising was the1999 Local Self-Governance Act. It included

the devolution of basic services, such as edu-cation, health, drinking water, agriculturalextension, and rural infrastructures. However,Nepal has never realized complete decen-tralization; perhaps because of a lack ofpolitical will, decentralization has been some-what limited to its administrative dimensionrather than reaching towards its full political,social and fiscal potential. Governance wasneither adequately open to citizens nor suffi-ciently close to them. Thus, the excluded con-tinued to be excluded. They challanged thegovernance system. Their demands for a fed-eral structure represent an effort literally to re-form a self-perpetuating system which in theirview, simply has not delivered.

Federalism has both meritsand limitsState restructuring boils down to questionsof federal structure given the third amend-ment to the Interim Constitution of Nepal2007. Although the details of this structureare not spelled out in the Interim Constitu-tion, the document clearly defines the objec-tive of federalism as “[bringing] an end todiscrimination based on class, caste, language,gender, culture, religion and region.”

A federation may be born of the formalassociation of previously independent enti-ties (“aggregation”) or the restructuring of aunitary state (“disaggregation”). The formerhas generally been easier to set up, and is basedon the consent of the separate units. It in-volves the establishment of only one newunit—the federal government (with a trans-fer of limited powers). In addition, the re-gions have already well-established systemsof government and laws, identities, andboundaries, which more or less guaranteetheir viability.

By contrast, federalizing by “disaggregation”raises many more challenges, including thenumber of regions and their boundaries, the

A federation maybe born of theformal associationof previouslyindependententities(“aggregation”) orthe restructuringof a unitary state(“disaggregation”)

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levels of governance and the sharing of poweramong them, the dismantling of some of thestate structures and the establishment of gov-ernments at different tiers, together with theelaboration of the authority and appropriatelaws for each level.

There are two fundamental bases for design-ing federal structures: cultural (caste/ethnicity)and territorial. The experience of federal coun-tries reveals that ethnic federations face greatersocial and political problems than the “terri-torial” ones. In a territorial federation, the rightsand obligations of individuals are based onresidence in the region; personal characteris-tics like language, religion or culture are largelyirrelevant. By contrast, in an ethnic federation,the land itself has ethnic and cultural dimen-sions. It is perceived by a community as its“homeland”, vested with religious history orhighly charged associations or, in a far morecommon way, is regarded as the physical spacein which a particular community holds a tra-ditional numerical majority.

Federalism in Nepal, if devised properly, canpromote human development, among oth-ers, through:

increasing the political representation andparticipation of even disadvantaged re-gions and groups at the centre;allowing citizens to influence governanceinstitutions directly;enhancing the efficiency and accountabil-ity of regional governments, and im-proving service delivery; andgiving them easier access to local offi-cials who speak their language.

These merits can also be found in decentral-ized governance under a unitary structure.However, the extent and depth of benefitsdepends on the openness of the institutionsand the degree of democracy in governancein general.

Federalism is not a panacea. Despite the prom-ises of federalism, it is unlikely that it can de-liver all that is expected of it. Because Dalitsare scattered all over the country, they do nothave a true constituency at the regional level.The situation of women and poor people issimilar—they are everywhere. In case of theJanajatis, there are constituencies, but only atthe district level. This requires that power befurther devolved so as to rest in the hands ofthe local authorities. Consequently, it would benecessary to complement the powers of theregional authorities with additional resources;the central government would have to assumeresponsibility for providing these resources and,at least initially, administering their disbursement.

Federalism is likely to succeed where thereare established traditions of democracy andthe rule of law. Further, it benefits from:

autonomy arrangements that have beennegotiated in a democratic and partici-patory way;an independent dispute settlementmechanism;proper constitutional guarantees for thefederal arrangements; andlimits on the central power to intervenein regional government.

It must also be remembered that democraticstructures are necessary for the exercise andprotection of federalism. Democratic politicsin a region both compel regional leaders toprotect autonomy and empower them to doso. At the national level, they encourage the gov-ernment to abide by the constitution and seekconsensus with the regions. Generally, multi-ethnic federations have better prospects of suc-cess than those that are bi-ethnic.

A ten-point agendaSuccessive Governments of Nepal havemade attempts to address exclusion and in-

Power must befurther devolvedso as to rest in

the hands of thelocal authorities

Overview


equality but none has successfully broken thevicious cycle. Making exclusion go away forall time requires not a sporadic effort, but acontinuous and systemic change to societyand to the whole gamut of state policieswhich could occur when those who werepreviously out come into the governancestructure. Therefore, to end exclusion, first,the political system and state structure mustundergo significant changes, and, second,such changes require peace to achieve genu-ine progress. Against the backdrop of statetransformation outlined above, this Reportputs forward a ten-point agenda for action.

1. Review and devise a mixed electoralsystem that is appropriate for NepalIt is unlikely that a viable, modestly-sized par-liament for the future Nepal can representfairly all the 103 castes and ethnic groups ofthe country, even with the adoption of a com-plete PR system. But this need for wider rep-resentation is now difficult to ignore becausepopular demands for inclusion and identityremain at the forefront of the nation’s politi-cal life. Therefore, a mixed electoral systemmay need to prevail for some time to come.Several possibilities remain for a compromisebetween the plurality and PR forms in a mixedsystem, depending on the caste and ethnicmake-up and the governance structures of theregional divisions and the centre under a fu-ture federal structure. The proportion of seatsallocated may have to be different betweenthe centre and the region, and again, acrossthe regions, depending on their cultural char-acteristics and their needs and demands forinclusion.

2. Democratize the political partiesBecause reforming the mixed electoral sys-tem cannot alone ensure the inclusion and par-ticipation of all caste and ethnic groups andregions at the centre, the democratization ofpolitical parties is of the utmost necessity forpolitical inclusion and systemic integration.

Indeed, if the parties are not democratic, trueinclusion can emerge only with difficulty evenwith elections conducted under the full PRsystem. Among other factors, this requiresmaking political parties inclusive in their make-up, and transparent and democratic in theirdecision-making.

3. Bring governance closer to the peopleDespite the fact that 335 (58%) of the 575elected CA seats have been allocated undera PR system to a number of excluded groupsand regions, several caste and ethnic groupsstill do not have a single member to the CA.And given the need for a legislature of vi-able size in the future, it will be difficult torepresent all the caste and ethnic groups in aunitary state structure. There is a strong casefor wider and more equitable representationthrough a federal structure.

Chapter 5 draws attention to the merits anddrawbacks of area-based federations, as wellas those based on caste and ethnicity, alongwith the possible weakening of governancein Nepal’s “dis-aggregation” from a unitarystate into a federation of regions. Given thehigh diversity of Nepal’s physiographic andsocial mosaic, there is a need for asymmetri-cal federal arrangements in which the regionsof the federal state do not all have the samepowers.

Country experiences reveal that, federalism islikely to succeed where there is an establishedtradition of democracy and rule of law. Thepre-conditions for the success of the forma-tion and functioning of federalism include will-ingness to form the federation, trust, a strongsense of a common political community andcommitment to national unity, basic agreementon values, the rule of law, supremacy of theconstitution, and judicial interpretation and en-forcement. Of them trust and accommoda-tion are the vitals—they can make the differ-ence between total failure and disintegration of

Making exclusiongo away for alltime requires nota sporadic effort,but a continuousand systemicchange to societyand to the wholegamut of statepolicies

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the state or a viable and vibrant political, socialand economic system.

Nepali federalism must be flexible andhome-grown, developed and decided by itsown citizens with their effective representa-tion and participation. This needs to be but-tressed by adequate provisions that bolsterdemocratic principles, enforce rule of lawand foster relations between diverse com-munities and regions.

4. Protect the interests of the poorand the excludedAlthough federalism can help promote po-litical and economic inclusion, strengthen theeconomy, increase public participation andpromote human development, it will by nomeans solve all the problems of inclusionand social justice that this Report raises. Thesocioeconomic diversity of Nepal, along withits marked regional differences in resources,may call for a federalism that accords dif-ferent degrees of autonomy and competenceto different regions with regard to particularissues. This may still require a strong centre.Moreover, to promote human development,the federal system must be accompanied bya variety of constitutional devices anchoredin social justice. These supplementary devicesand mechanisms have to be primarily the re-sponsibility of the central government—andthey must be formulated as national poli-cies, although their implementation will in-creasingly require consultation with regionalgovernments.

The Interim Constitution 2007 requires con-siderable homework on the design and struc-ture of a federal system that must, in additionto the other functions of a state, honour theUnited Nations declarations/conventions on:the rights of indigenous peoples (13 Septem-ber 2007) including ILO Convention 169 (27

June 1989); the elimination of discriminationagainst women (18 December 1979); theelimination of all forms of racial discrimina-tion 1965; and most importantly, the twoseminal human rights covenants, respectivelyon civil and political rights, and on economic,social and cultural rights (19 December 1966).

5. Build a strong nation-stateOnly a strong state can control power and de-volve it; guarantee the rule of law; eliminateimpunity; implement development policies ef-fectively; mediate among diverse social groups;and create conditions for political stability, de-velopment and peace by undertaking the re-construction of the country’s economic andsocial fabric. The basis of the state or of thepower structure is the nation. Therefore, a statecan be strong when it has a strong nation, how-ever diverse its peoples.

Cultural differences can trigger violent con-flict when state policies are discriminatory. Butthere does not need to be a trade-off be-tween diversity and unity, nor between peaceand respect for diversity. Both can move to-gether well if one respects the other’s cultureunder multi-cultural policies of the state.

In its process of transformation, Nepal hasrecently discarded a number of unifying fac-tors of the past—including the monarchy, asingle official language and religion, a nationalanthem, and a national code of dress. None-theless, all its citizens have common rights andobligations that can eventually contribute to asense of national identity and cohesion in tan-dem with the preservation of cultural diver-sity. Moreover, the making of the constitu-tion offers the possibility of influencing thenation-building process towards establishinga set of common ideas, values and institu-tions that will serve vital elements of the bur-geoning of a collective national identity.

Nepali federalismmust be flexible

and home-grown,developed and

decided by its owncitizens with their

effectiverepresentation

and participation

Overview


6. Build a strong sense of citizenshipand political communityBuilding a strong sense of citizenship requiresthe representation and participation of indi-viduals who are committed to non- violenceand who respect the views of others. As hasoften been the case in Nepal, many citizensare voicing their opinions through violentprotests rather than existing institutions. Thishas affected service delivery and trampledthe rights of many, most of whom are poor.There is need for a vibrant civil society thatdoes not work as a clientele of a politicalestablishment. Citizens should not merelyclaim rights and freedoms, but also fulfil theirmany obligations, among these:

respecting the country’s laws,recognizing the rights and freedom ofothers,eliminating discrimination, andobserving justice in their daily activities.

Moreover, political parties have to form apolitical community rising above their mem-bers’ personal interests and those of their par-ties. Such a sense of citizenship and the devel-opment of political community are necessaryfor the successful conclusion of the peace pro-cess and the making of the new constitution.

7. Provide ‘citizenship rights’ througha functioning stateIn order to manage people’s expectations, theNepali state must perform all the functions of asovereign state, including the provision of pub-lic goods and services. It must enforce the ruleof law, which demands improving citizen ac-cess to justice, ensuring the independence of thejudiciary, and giving the legislature its due power.The constitution must therefore make provisionsfor guaranteeing the integrity of the legislature—the body that in principle protects the funda-mental rights of citizens at large and of excludedgroups. However, providing citizenship rightsrequires a loyality and trust from the citizens, whonot merely claim rights and freedoms but alsofulfill their many obligations.

Moreover, economic and social policies with afocus on excluded groups are necessary for ad-dressing unequal human development, and at-taining rapid human progress. Targeting basicservices including education and health forwomen, Dalits and Janajatis together with changein other policies is necessary. This social empow-erment needs to go hand in hand with economicempowerment through the provision of de-cent employment opportunities.

8. Ensure representation and theparticipation of different stakeholdersin the peace processBased on the lessons learned through the earlysteps of the formation of the Truth and Rec-onciliation Commission, it is recommended thatthe other mechanisms for transitional justice im-plied in the CPA, along with the institutions andpolicies framed for the transformation, be in-clusive and participatory. It is also necessary toensure the implementation of United NationsResolution 1325 aiming at protecting and em-powering women both during armed conflictand afterwards. Similarly, in designing integra-tion and rehabilitation strategies, their intendedbeneficiaries, including both combatants andconflict victims, should participate.

9. Devise and implement a socialreintegration plan and build the capacityof Local Peace Committees to fosterreconciliation and support socialreintegrationThe successful social reintegration or reha-bilitation of disqualified Maoist army per-sonnel and internally displaced persons willbe crucial. Past social reintegration efforts andthe current situation point to the potentialof four particular thrusts for building the ca-pacity of the individuals involved:

non-formal education;agriculture and livestock;vocational skill training; andmicro-enterprise development.

There is need fora vibrant civilsociety that doesnot work as aclientele of apoliticalestablishment

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Such initiatives call for linkage with varied sup-port organizations closely linked with the pro-vision of financial services and markets.Sustainability also demands increasing employ-ment opportunities, especially for joblessyoung people. This requires a sustained eco-nomic growth which is not only high but alsoinclusive and employment-intensive. There isthus a need for increased private investmentin addition to public funding.

There is also a critical need for building ca-pacity at the local level, including that of theLocal Peace Committees, which are so far thesole organizations being created at the locallevel in post-conflict Nepal to support localdevelopment and promote peace-building.Assistance from both multilateral and bilat-eral donors will be needed for the capacity-building of the peace committees—in whichthe long experience of the United Nationssystem can be put to good use.

10. Ensure effective participation ofCA members and citizens in themaking of the constitution and forminga new collective identityFinally, participatory constitution-making isa must if it is to foster nation building andbe owned by every Nepali citizen. The 601members of the Constitutional Assembly re-flect far greater inclusion than past bodieswith comparable mandates. But unless themembers faithfully and fairly reflect the viewsof those who elected them, their decisionson state structure and forms of governancewill not be sustainable. The making of the

constitution must thus go well beyond theambit of the CA and its members and reachout to the Nepali population as a whole.The process of constitution-making is almostas important as the content of the text. Al-though the process so far adopted seems suf-ficiently participatory, several challenges re-main. Of these, the most important ones arehow to further broaden and deepen partici-pation in the days ahead, and, even more im-portantly, how to analyze and incorporatethe views expressed by these hundreds andthousands of people during the participa-tory process.

Need for a new frontier—transformation of societyAll the above agenda, including state restruc-turing and the making of the constitution, needan environment which is peaceful, with dailydeference to the rule of law, and, most im-portantly, where there is a will for consensusand compromise among different actors.Without a politics of consensus and compro-mise, the peace process will be endangered.Similarly, unless society eliminates its exclusion-ary practices, state transformation can do littleto help individuals feel free to develop anduse their capabilities to the fullest extent pos-sible. Thus, the ultimate need is both a demo-cratic state and a democratic society. State trans-formation must advance hand in hand withthe transformation of Nepali society—andrequires investing in human development, adevelopment that aspires to freedom for allpeople.

Participatoryconstitution-making is a

must if it is tofoster nation

building and beowned by everyNepali citizen

Statetransformationand humandevelopment

1CHAPTER

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An ambitious theme for ambitious times

Multiple transitions and highexpectations

Human development, human securityand state transformation

The sources and dimensions of exclusion

Exclusion—a recapitulation

Consequences of conflict onhuman development

The Nepali comprehensive peaceaccord—its content and follow-up

The post-CPA documents

Statetransformation

and humandevelopment

1Chapter

State transformationand human development

1Chapter

An ambitious theme forambitious times

ith the election of the Constitu-ent Assembly (CA) on 10 April2008, Nepal entered into a new

phase of discussion on the kind of polity itwants to become. Its constitutional future andrelated political decisions will significantlyinfluence the human development prospectsof Nepali citizens. To examine the effectsof those decisions on human development,this Report aims to stimulate conversationsfrom a human development viewpoint soas to give a broad spectrum of opinion toCA members, peace-building architects,policy-makers, and citizens at large duringthe next two years. The determination of thecountry’s future political system and its own-ership and legitimacy will derive in largemeasure from the level of citizen participa-tion in its design and from how other vitalelements of the Comprehensive Peace Ac-cord (CPA) are carried out.

The size and comprehensiveness of the agendafor state transformation, together with the req-uisite peace-building measures, are both fun-damental to the prospects for human devel-opment in Nepal. Consequently, this NepalHDR focuses primarily on two areas:

political transformation, including staterestructuring, the electoral system, andthe internal democracy of the politicalparties involved; andthe nature of peace-making itself,through varied reconciliation and rein-

tegration measures that can enhance par-ticipatory constitution-making and statetransformation.

While the first of these areas concerns politi-cal transformation, the second involves pro-viding an enabling environment for statetransformation. Both efforts look forwardrather than back. The Report tries to outlineways in which to sustain the peace processand ultimately strengthen Nepal both as astate and as a richly diverse society.

With the CPA as a starting point, this Reportattempts to explore the relationships betweeninclusion, peace and human development, andthe role of state transformation as a means tothese ends. It argues that if inclusion is to besustained in future, it also requires the fairpolitical representation and integration of vari-ous cultural groups and regions in nation build-ing. The Report invites all Nepali stakeholdersto engage in the debate on the structure ofthe state, the modes of democracy they want,and the ways in which they can reconcile theirdifferences harmoniously.

Multiple transitions and highexpectationsNepal has so far produced three NationalHuman Development Reports (NHDRs): thefirst, issued in 1998, reviewed the level anddistribution of human capabilities and offeredpolicy suggestions to improve them; that of2001 concentrated on the relationships be-

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tween poverty reduction and governance; thelast, published in 2004, examined the mani-fold links between popular empowermentand poverty reduction. With differing empha-ses, all three explored the issues essential toinclusive political and socio-economic trans-formation and clarified the reciprocal natureof both these areas in good governance. To-gether, these Nepal Human DevelopmentReports (HDRs) argued that economic growthis a means towards human development ratherthan an end in itself. Subsequently, they advancedthe idea that equitable human development callsfor good governance and citizen empower-

ment, among other factors. These assertions be-came enshrined in the peace agreements thatbrought Nepal’s long civil war to an end andculminated in the Comprehensive Peace Ac-cord (Box 1.1)—the basis of this fourth NepalHDR effort, which focuses on the theme ofstate transformation and human development.

Implicit in Nepali peace agreements, includ-ing the CPA and the Interim Constitution2007, is the transformation of state and so-ciety to make human development moreequitable. The CPA envisages an inclusive,democratic and progressive state restructur-

Economic growthis a means

towards humandevelopment

rather than anend in itself

2007 Apr Former Maoist rebels joined the interimgovernment, thereby moving into the po-litical mainstream.

2007 May Election for a Constituent Assembly waspostponed to November 2007 and againshifted to 10 April 2008.

2007 Oct United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Nepal’s parties to resolve theirdifferences to save the peace process.

2008 28 Feb The Nepal Government and the UnitedDemocratic Madhesi Front signed an eight-point agreement, which brought to an enda 16-day long general strike in the Tarai.

2008 10 Apr A Constituent Assembly election was heldthroughout the country.

2008 28 May The first meeting of the Constituent As-sembly was held; it formally abolishedthe monarchy and proclaimed Nepal a re-public as stated in the Interim Constitu-tion of 2007.

2008 15 Aug A Government under Maoist leadershipwas formed.

2008 Dec 14 Committees, including 10 thematic, 3process and 1 constitutional committee,were formed, and the drafting of a newconstitution began.

2009 Apr All the committees collected informationand views of people administering a ques-tionnaire in their field visits.

Source: Adapted from BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1166516.stm)

1990 The multi-party system was revived anda new 1990 constitution of Nepal wasprepared.

1996 13 Feb The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)launched the People’s War.

2001 1 Jun King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and otherclose relatives were killed.

2001 Nov A state of emergency was declared aftermore than 100 people were killed in fourdays of conflict.

2005 1 Feb King Gyanendra dismissed Prime MinisterDeuba and his government, declared a stateof emergency, and assumed direct power,citing the need to defeat Maoist rebels.

2005 Nov The Maoist rebels and seven political partyalliance agreed on a programme aimed atrestoring democracy.

2006 24 Apr King Gyanendra agreed to reinstate par-liament following a 19-day Janandolan(people’s movement or uprising) with vio-lent strikes and protests against directroyal rule. GP Koirala was appointedPrime Minister.

2006 21 Nov The government and Maoists signed theComprehensive Peace Accord, declaringa formal end to a 10-year rebel insurgency,and transforming the Nepali state.

2007 Jan Maoist leaders were elected to parliamentunder the terms of the Interim Constitutionof 2007. Violent ethnic protests demand-ing regional autonomy erupted in thesoutheast part of Nepal.

BOX 1.1 A chronology of key events leading to the current state of Nepali polity

1

State transformation and hum

an development


ing that eliminates the centralized and unitarycharacter of the state in order to addressthe concerns of women, Dalits, indigenousnationalities, Madhesis, and more generally,the oppressed and the neglected under pastregimes. This includes minorities and thosewho live in the “backward” regions. In short,the “New Nepal” aims at ending discrimi-nation based on class, caste, language, gen-der, culture, religion and region.

This naturally leads us to consider how thedistribution of power can unite the differingstrengths of the country’s varied populationgroups, whether these Nepalis are character-ized primarily as women, Dalits (oppressedpeople),1 the Adivasi Janajati2 (indigenous na-tionalities or peoples, often termed Janajatis),Madhesi3 (in general, the inhabitants of thecountry’s Plains, as opposed to its Hills) orpeople who live in areas remote from urbancentres (Figure 1.1). A vast literature alreadyexists on marginalisation of these groups. ThisReport concentrates instead on how each andall can increase their political participation withthe support of new and revised state policiesthrough state restructuring. In short, this NepalHDR will focus on state transformation asone means of social transformation to endexclusion and discrimination.

Since the end of the Cold War, most con-flicts are not contests between countries butrather internal disputes as disparities amongtheir citizens have become increasingly evi-dent. Nepal has proved to be no exceptionto this global trend. Its people have foughtfor equal representation and participation intheir state and society on several occasions—as recently as the movements of 1990 and2006. The popular mandate of the 2006April movement and uprising—or“Janandolan”—called for peace, democracyand progress by ending discriminationthrough a restructuring of the state. Deny-ing or postponing further the fulfilment ofthis demand for fair representation and eq-

uitable participation in power-sharing posesgrave risks of a relapse into conflict.4

Second—and far more positively—with in-creased consciousness of developments be-yond Nepal’s borders, its citizens began look-ing not only to increased income, educationand health, but a greater stake in their gov-ernment and society, notably a greater voicein determining state policies. More impor-tantly, they want to live in the dignity andself-respect accorded by equal opportuni-ties and treatment. As the UNDP Global2004 HDR stated, democracy and equitablegrowth do not guarantee universal inclusion.But almost all people want the right to speaktheir own language, practice their religion ofchoice, and participate in shaping their cul-ture. They want to choose to be who theyare or wish to become. Conversely, whilediversity does not inevitably lead to clashes,exclusion, humiliation and suppression of-ten erupt into violence (Box 1.2).5

In today’s Nepal, citizen demands for inclu-sion, participation, and autonomy—even forself- determination—constitute a claim tomore freedoms, more choices and more op-tions than they have hitherto known. This isno more nor less than the fulfilment of theirpotential—which, in turn, enriches humandevelopment as a whole. For this, the country’sinhabitants look to a new Nepal—one that isjust rather than exclusionary; peaceful rather than

In today’s Nepal,citizen demandsfor inclusion,participation, andautonomyconstitute a claimto more freedoms,more choices andmore options thanthey have hithertoknown

FIGURE 1.1 The broad social mosaic of Nepal, 2001

Source: Annex 1.1

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violent; stable rather than erratic; and functionalrather than failed state.6 Stability translates intoa restoration of the rule of law and the pro-vision of basic services and infrastructuresthat fulfil basic daily needs as these are nowunderstood worldwide.

This Report argues that ensuring the rightsof poor and the excluded calls for changesin policies and laws and their proper enforce-ment. This requires:

that these people be represented in thelegislature and participate in its framingof policies;that their voices be heard and heeded inthe government, where these policies areexecuted; andthat they have prompt, equitable accessto the judicial system, where the laws areapplied and interpreted.

Together, these reforms constitute the actualmeaning of political inclusion, as the term isused in this Report. Inclusion demands equi-table representation and effective participation.It entails civic knowledge, resources and insti-tutions. Otherwise participation is only token.

Political inclusion requires state transforma-tion. Changing the political power structuremeans establishing a system of broad anddeep democracy that is open to citizens sothat they can voice their views openly andwithout fear. Such a system must also offeropportunities for those who have been ex-cluded to move to the forefront of devel-opment. These characteristics translate into ademocratic polity, which mandates the inclu-sion of all citizens, and democratic gover-nance institutions that are accessible to thosethey govern.7

The country’s recent multiple transitions can-not be overlooked for they have significantimpact on state transformation. Nepal hasmoved:

from a monarchy into a republic thatpromises a wide spectrum of freedoms;from authoritarianism to a conception ofdemocracy that rests on the realization ofhuman potential as set out in the 1948Universal Declaration of Human Rights;from hegemonic to participatory gov-ernance;from a system of national governancederived from one particular religion tothe prevalence of a generally secular per-spective; andfrom a heavily centralized unitary systemto one of decentralization and autonomyat varied sub-national levels.

Most of the transitions outlined above in-volve the “national question”—the place ofcultural groups, including ethnic communi-ties, in the country and its state, together withequitable power-sharing among these differ-ing populations. In short, Nepal is making amomentous transition from a hierarchicalsociety, which determined one’s place in re-lation to others, by gender, by caste and byethnicity, to one that stresses human dignityand equality.

The Global 2004 HDR dealt with the theme of cultural liberty forhuman development, arguing that states must act to createmulticultural policies to prevent discrimination on the grounds ofreligion, ethnicity, and language. The expansion of cultural free-doms, as opposed to their suppression, is the only sustainableoption for promoting stability, democracy and human develop-ment within and across societies. The Report dispels the mythsthat have been used to deny the expansion of cultural freedomsin light of the knowledge that diversity is neither a threat to stateunity, nor a source of inevitable clashes, nor an obstacle todevelopment. Instead, cultural freedom lies at the core of humandevelopment—the ability of people to choose who they are.Having multiple individual and group identities does not neces-sarily weaken a citizen’s sense of nationality. On the contrary, itcan strengthen loyalty to the country as a whole.

Source: UNDP 2004.

BOX 1.2 Cultural liberty for human development

Ensuring therights of poor

and the excludedcalls for changes

in policies andlaws and their

properenforcement

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Human development, humansecurity and state transformationTwo broad schools of thought have tendedto dominate thinking about human progress.The growth school holds that economicgrowth is the engine of human development,i.e. that as societies become wealthier theymake greater provision for basic social ser-vices like education and health which in turnbuilds human capital.

Unlike the growth school, the human devel-opment school holds that growth does notautomatically trickle down; that increases inincome do not automatically bring about im-provements in human lives; and that people’sprogress, not income growth, constitutes theend of development. For these reasons, theadvocates of human development concen-trate on the policies that best utilize the in-come growth that a country attains. Thesepolicies need to be pro-poor, pro-women,pro-excluded and pro-environment. In par-ticular, they need to build on the four pillarsof human development:

efficiency or productivity;equity;empowerment; andsustainability.

This means that efforts to expand the mac-roeconomic activities towards higher growth(productivity) must take place hand in handwith policies that:

give all citizens access to opportunities(equity);enable people to make the choices theywish (empowerment); anddo both without reducing the optionsof future generations (sustainability).8

Human development concerns not only wid-ening people’s choices, but providing an en-vironment in which they can exercise theiroptions freely and safely. Development there-fore entails security—notably the human se-

curity approach introduced by the globalHuman Development Report of 1994 andlater enlarged by Human Development Report2005. Security, however, is only one dimen-sion of safeguarding this exercise of choice(see Box 1.3).

Violent conflict obstructs choice and thereby lim-its human development in at least four ways:

It curtails the possibility of living a long,healthy life by infecting, crippling andkilling people;It restricts their options for obtainingknowledge and exercising their intelli-gence by substituting force for reason;It reduces their possibilities for attaininga decent life by destroying wealth of allkinds; andIt shrinks their opportunities for collec-tive decision-making because it inhibitsand even prevents dialogue.

Inclusive growth and development cannottake place without the inclusion and encour-agement of everyone who can potentiallycontribute to the nation and to society fortheir own development and for that of oth-ers. In short, development requires democ-

The humandevelopmentschool holds thatgrowth does notautomaticallytrickle down

The Commission on Human Security defines human security asthe protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways thatenhance human freedoms and fulfillment.” Human security meansprotecting fundamental freedoms. It means protecting peoplefrom critical threats and situations that menace their well-being.It means fostering processes that build on people’s strengthsand aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmen-tal, economic, military and cultural systems that together givepeople the building blocks for survival, livelihoods, and dignity.

Human security is far more than the absence of violent conflict.It encompasses human rights, good governance and access toeconomic opportunity, education and health care. It is a conceptthat comprehensively addresses both “freedom from fear” and“freedom from want.”

Source: Commission on Human Security 2003.

BOX 1.3 What is human security?

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racy and the transformation of the state tofoster two of democracy’s prime determi-nants: increased representation and enhanced par-ticipation.

All people everywhere—in both economi-cally advanced and low-income countries—need to exercise the full complement of theirrights: civil, political, social, cultural and eco-nomic.9 This Report holds that civil andpolitical rights can ensure the effective useof socioeconomic rights, and that socioeco-nomic rights enable people to use their civiland political rights effectively.10

The sources and dimensionsof exclusionNepal’s wide range of physical and socialdiversity, including its marked spatial varia-tion in resources, has created and perpetu-ated the differences in the living conditionsof its population. The country has 103 casteand ethnic groups (including two unidenti-fied groups) speaking 92 languages.11 Caste,ethnicity, language, and religion remain themajor sources of cultural identity.

Even in 21st century Nepal, one can see atleast the following seven sources of inequal-ity and exclusion:1. unequal gender relations that stem from tra-

ditional socio-cultural structures that de-fine the formal and informal rules forwomen’s participation in relation to op-portunity, decision-making, access to re-sources, and control over them;

2. caste differentials due to social stratification bythe hierarchies stipulated by the MulukiAin (the national code of 1854) that char-acterized Dalits as “untouchable”;

3. caste and ethnicity differences resulting from thenorms and socially defined practices of dominantcaste groups that define the degree and formof discriminatory practices towards dis-advantaged Adivasi Janajatis;

4. linguistic discrimination arising from thedomination of the Nepali language overthe other native tongues and the conse-quent exclusion of non-Nepali speakers;

5. religious differences, which act similarly,favouring Hinduism above other faithsand belief systems;

6. spatial exclusion that derives from isolationin geographic areas remote fromKathmandu and other urban centres, orfrom state-biased policies that affect thedisadvantaged regions; and

7. geo-political discrimination: an exclusion linkedto location that also reflects socio-politi-cal differences, notably the distinctionbetween the Pahadi (Hill dwellers) and theMadhesi (plain dwellers).

All these stratifications have been reinforcedby government policies, especially the party-less political system (Panchayat) of 1960,which proclaimed Nepal a “Hindu King-dom” and Nepali or Khas “the only officiallanguage.” Simultaneously, it ignored Nepal’smulti-religious, multinational, multicultural,and multilingual character and created a“Khas” linguistic and cultural chauvinism.The policy survived even after the restora-tion of democracy in 1990.

Thus, despite high social diversity, the state im-posed a single Hindu religion and Nepali lan-guage upon all the country’s distinct popula-tions, opening the way to pervasive exclusionand discrimination. While spatial discriminationhas played some role in the civil war, such asthe origins of the Maoist conflict in the Mid-Western, the poorest development region (asdemonstrated in chapter 2 of this Report), othertypes of discrimination and exclusion haveloomed large, especially the following:

Gender-based discriminationand exclusionGender-based discrimination is rampant inNepali society. It affects all women, what-

Civil and politicalrights can ensure

the effective use ofsocioeconomic

rights

1


an development


ever is their economic status, caste, ethnicity,or regional affiliation. A patriarchalworldview is embedded not only in socialand cultural practices, but also in Nepal’s sys-tems of governance and its legal framework,permeating all aspects of the lives of womenand girls. Patriarchy also pervades the socialspectrum so that Dalit women face multiplelayers of exclusion.12

Women and girls lag behind men becauseof at least six factors:1. disparities in education;2. limitations on the rights of women to own

and inherit property until the recent past;3. poor health, especially in the realm of

reproductive health;4. low access to labour markets, employ-

ment and productive assets/resources;5. gender-based violence; and6. lack of fair representation in decision-

making.

Nepali women have long raised their voicesagainst these oppressions and have made re-markable strides in addressing policy barri-ers and improving participation. They have,for instance, secured the allocation of one-third of CA seats to women. They have alsowon women’s right to provide citizenshipto their children.

Caste-based discriminationCaste-based discrimination became an orga-nizing principle of the national code of 1854,the Muluki Ain, for consolidating Nepal’s di-verse peoples into a nation state. The codedefined caste in terms of ritual “purity” and“pollution.” Brahmans and Dalits occupiedthe top and bottom ranks of this hierarchyrespectively, while the ethnic groups nowknown as Adivasi Janajatis occupied themiddle ground—with, however, numerousdistinctions among them as well.

This nationwide system governed all aspectsof social life, including marriage and food

exchange. It also gave rise to a caste-gearedbody of law in which the punishment ofwhat was considered criminal behaviourderived from an individual’s caste rather thanthe act with which he or she was charged.Although caste-based discrimination becameillegal in 1963, it continues to define interac-tions between social groups. It therefore spillsover, too, into the ways in which the descen-dents of the so-called low-caste groups ex-perience barriers to participation in Nepal’spolitical system and thus access to govern-ment opportunities, resources, and services.

Of all the caste and ethnic groups, Dalits havefared worst because they still hold the lowestposition in the caste hierarchy. They receivemuch the same treatment from indigenousgroups as from the other Hindu castes. Thebelief that Dalits are “polluted” not only seg-regates them from members of other castes,but also prohibits them from touching non-Dalits and their possessions. Additionally, Dalitsare denied entry into public places, such astemples and restaurants. A survey conductedin 2002 listed a total of 205 existing practicesof caste-based discrimination.13

Such practices and their implication haveundermined the health and education ofDalits, together with their interactions withmembers of other groups and their scopeof activities in a broad range of social sec-tors. To take only one example, Dalit chil-dren do not eat their midday meals withother children in some remote schools.Happily, with the general rise of Nepali lit-eracy and the awareness that the media hasplayed a large role in creating, especially since1990, these kinds of discrimination havebegun decreasing, especially in urban areasand their vicinity. However, in the remoterural areas, especially those of the Mid- andFar-Western regions, as well as parts of theTarai, these customary cruelties still exist.They also deprive the country of talent itneeds for development.

Although caste-baseddiscriminationbecame illegal in1963, itcontinues to defineinteractionsbetween socialgroups

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Ethnicity-based discriminationThe imposition of various subtleties of theHindu caste system upon the ethnic fabricof Nepal has created negative effects forindigenous peoples or Janajatis and createdthe foundations for their exclusion. WhileJanajatis were placed initially on the middlerung of merchants, peasants and labourersin the caste hierarchy, they were subsequentlysub-classified according to their consump-tion of alcohol—and as being enslavableor unenslavable.14 Because Brahmans andChhetri neither drank alcohol nor were sub-ject to slavery, they were considered to besuperior to Janajatis. The designation ofNepali as the national language has beenidentified as yet another characteristic ofhigh-caste Hindu domination because itmarginalized indigenous and minority lan-guages and thereby enabled the Nepali stateto favour Hindu politics. Not surprisingly,current reform efforts embody a signifi-cant backlash against this tradition.

Janajati movements began as early as the1950s and widened considerably after 1990,reinforced by organizations that have grownout of the two interrelated issues of politi-cal demands and cultural or identity poli-tics. The political demands of Janajati in-clude transformation of the state so that itbecomes both more inclusive and repre-sentative of the country’s population as awhole and more responsive to the needsof all citizens. The Janajati movement callsfor a new constitution and a restructuringof the state through the establishment of afederal system that would enable ethnic au-tonomy and reserve positions for membersof indigenous groups in the governmentand other state-sponsored institutions. Re-defining the national identity of state to re-flect Nepal’s cultural diversity has beencoupled with a desire for secularism thatwould also affect national dress, nationalholidays, the national anthem, and even the

calendar. The fall of the monarchy in 2006opened the door to revivals of varied in-digenous histories, languages and festivals.15

Madhesi-based discriminationThe Shah/Rana rulers of Nepal viewedthe fertile Tarai lands as a source of rev-enue through tax and birtas or land grantsfor rewarding loyal subjects—largelyParbatiya courtiers, but also some locallandlords. The Parbatiya-dominated bu-reaucracy showed little concern for thewelfare of either the indigenous inhabit-ants of the Tarai including Tharu or theMaithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi-speakingHindu groups who periodically foundthemselves within the territory of theKathmandu-based Parbatiya rulers duringthe shifting of borders at various times inthe 18th and 19th centuries. For their part,these rulers paid little attention to the mar-ginal position of their Tarai/Madhesi sub-jects.16 Indeed, the caste hierarchy definedby the Muluki Ain simply ignored some25 middle-ranking Madhesi castes andJanajati groups from the Tarai area. Thosemissing included a number of “untouch-able” occupational groups such as theChamars, Mushahars and Tatma, who aretoday among the poorest people in Nepal.

Many individuals who belong to thesegroups are not even identified as citizensof the country and, until recently, have en-countered problems in obtaining certificatesof citizenship. The largely Parbatiya rulinggroup has tended to regard the Madhesiwho speak Awadhi, Bhojpuri and Maithilias somehow “non”- Nepali or “less” Nepalion the grounds of the languages they usedaily rather than the locations in which theylive. This cultural/linguistic criterion of citi-zenship has denied many Madhesi their iden-tity—creating difficulties in their attemptsto register their land in their own name,however long they and their ancestors may

Redefining thenational identity

of state to reflectNepal's cultural

diversity has beencoupled with a

desire forsecularism

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have occupied and worked the same lotsof Tarai earth. They therefore remain offi-cially landless. This discrimination was rein-forced by the Citizenship Laws of the 1960s,based on the vague phrase “of Nepaleseorigin” contained in the Constitution of1962.17

In addition, the Madhesis, Janajatis andother groups who are not fluent in Nepaliface stiff competition in the examinationsfor entry into the national civil service. Thislinguistic barrier, like that of the Janajatis,narrows Madhesis’ study options as well astheir futures in the decision-making bodiesof the government and administration. Inthe larger scheme of things, this stuntsNepal’s development as a whole as well asthat of the excluded and slighted groups.

Exclusion—a recapitulationAs stated earlier, exclusion and inequality inNepal exist among regions and groups andwithin particular groups. Mountain regionor the Mid-Western Development regionremains always at the bottom of the hu-man development ladder. Yet the hierarchi-cal caste, ethnic and gender relations thatstructure the interactions of daily life at thefamily and community level among groupsof Tarai-Madhes origin have always beenmore restrictive than those in the Hills. Forexample, the HDI level was highest for theMadhesi Brahmans, whereas it was lowestamong the Madhesi Dalits of Tarai(0.625vs. 0.383) in 2006. Huge disparities prevaileven in this relatively homogeneous Tarairegion that is now requesting autonomy.Moreover, within a single caste group, thereis inequality across regions: the Hill Brah-mans and Chhetris have a HDI of 0.612and 0.514, which are less than that of theirMadhesi counterparts. On the other hand,among the Tarai Janajati, HDI falls below

that of their counterparts in the Hill andMountain regions (0.470 vs. 0.507).

Given these widespread differentials in allbroad caste and ethnic groups, will a federalstructure sought by the Madhesi or Janajatipeople ensure human development acrossthe board without supplementary constitu-tional devices?

The reasons for both domination and ex-clusion differ widely among all the disad-vantaged groups despite their political, eco-nomic, social and cultural parallels. Forwomen, the chief obstacle to human de-velopment is patriarchal society; for Dalits,it is the hierarchal caste-based system; forthe Janajati, it is identity, culture (religionand language) and resources; for Madhesiit is language and regional autonomy; whilefor the people of the Mid-West, it is apaucity of resources closely bound up withtheir deprivation of physical connectivityto better-developed areas. The vicious,self-reinforcing cycle of discrimination andinequality discussed earlier would seem bestweakened—and eventually eliminated—byincreasing equality of representation instate structures. This translates into statetransformation.

Each of the groups suffering discriminationcan also look to international law for mod-els of transforming the state in accordancewith its own needs and priorities. For women,for example, there is an enormous corpusof legal standards best summed up by theConvention on the Elimination of All Formsof Discrimination against Women of 1979and its supplementary Protocol. Janajatis caninvoke Articles 3 and 4 of United NationsDeclaration on the Rights of IndigenousPeoples, adopted by General Assembly on13 September 2007. Dalits may wish to re-examine International Convention on the

Will a federalstructure soughtby the Madhesior Janajati peopleensure humandevelopmentacross the boardwithoutsupplementaryconstitutionaldevices?

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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-nation 1965, and the two international Cov-enants on Human Rights of 1966, that onCivil and Political Rights and that on Eco-nomic, Social and Cultural Rights—or, per-haps more simply, the Universal Declarationof Human Rights of 1948, from which bothCovenants stem (Box 1.4).18

Consequences of conflict onhuman developmentWe cannot forget that the ten years ofarmed conflict in which Nepal embroileditself from 1996 on produced a culture ofviolence marked by massacres, torture, dis-appearances, displacements, and a generalanticipation of terror that eclipsed faith inthe state and paralyzed individual and groupefforts to rebuild structures of governance.More than 13,347 people had been killedby the end of 2006, approximately 8 per-cent of them women and more than 3 per-cent children. Political activists, agriculturalworkers and police personnel also becamemajor victim groups, amounting to some72 percent of the total killings. In addition50,356 people were displaced by end 2004,the greatest number in the Mid-Western De-

velopment Region.19 Even after the signingof the CPA in November 2006, another 551people were killed in 2007 and 541 in 2008.20

Overall, the conflict took its highest toll inthe rural and less-developed areas and re-gions, such as the Mid-West and Far-WestDevelopment Regions, as well as in ex-cluded groups of population, includingrural agricultural labourers—in short, thegroups most vulnerable in terms of botheducation and material assets. Even in theless developed region such as the Mid-West, the number of killing varies widelyacross districts of the region from 30 inHumla to 904 in Rukum district with aregional average of 324 persons (see Fig-ure 1.2). Maps 1.1–1.3 vividly depict the re-lationship between the extent of sufferingand levels of human development. While lowlevels of human development may havecaused the onset of civil war from the Mid-West Development Region, the perpetuationof the conflict certainly brought them lower.It may also have resulted in a further deep-ening of Nepal’s spatial inequality.

The conflict also has had a direct impact onthe income dimension of human developmentby cutting employment opportunities. Indeed,the economic growth rate of the 1990s—4.8percent—sank to 2.8 percent during 2002/03–2006/07, largely because of insecurity thatdecreased investment from the private sectorand reduced the use of public expenditure.The fighting damaged physical infrastructure,along with the schools, health centres and othersocial facilities worth five billion rupees thatserved largely the rural poor.21

School damage and the use of school build-ings as shelter by both the rebels and statesoldiers, coupled with the presence of im-provised explosive devices around someschools, resulted in high drop-out rates, es-

Women andvarious caste and

ethnic groupssuffering

discrimination canalso look to

international lawfor models of

transforming thestate in

accordance withtheir own needs

and priorities

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination, 1965.The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.The International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 1966.The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimina-tion Against Women, 1979.Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-grading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.The convention on indigenous and tribal peoples, 1989.

Source: UN websites.

BOX 1.4 Key conventions ratified by Nepal

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pecially for girls. The restrictions imposed onthe mobility of rural people, together withthe inability of outreach staff to visit healthfacilities, continues to curtail access to qualityhealth services by many who need themmost, particularly women, children and vul-nerable groups in remote areas. Some ex-perts estimate that public health care droppedby 25 percent because of insecurity and dif-ficulties of movement alone.22 This figuretakes no account of the psycho-social effectsof conflict, including losses in social capitalin terms of the destruction of mutual trustand confidence.

Over and above these kinds of loss, the war-ring parties targeted media institutions andjournalists and thereby attacked people’s rightto information. In the name of security, au-thorities on both sides forbade the informalgatherings of small groups in public places.

Even peaceful demonstrations were met withstate violence—that ultimately led to the col-lapse of the state itself. This pattern has mani-fested itself worldwide and points to the in-terdependence of peace-building and human

Source: INSEC 2005 and 2007.

MAP 1.1 People killed across development regions, Nepal, 1996-2006

Source: INSEC 2005 and 2007.

Range and average number of people killed in adistrict, Nepal, 1996-2006

FIGURE1.2

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Source: Annex 2.3, Table 1.

Source: INSEC 2005.

MAP 1.2 People displaced across development regions, Nepal, 1996-2004

MAP 1.3 Human development index across development regions, Nepal, 2006

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development. Without peace, human devel-opment is not possible and, without humandevelopment, peace is not sustainable. Bothrequire inclusion and participation—whichcan come through restructuring state anddeepening the democratic political system.Although the conflict came to a halt after thesigning of the Comprehensive Peace Accordby the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the thenCommunist Party of Nepal (CPN - Maoist)—now called Unified CPN (Maoist), this accordwas followed by the uprisings of the Janajatiand Madhesi for a more inclusive state andgovernance structure. Still ongoing in theTarai, this struggle puts their demands foridentity and inclusion with fair representationand participation at the core of the transfor-mation of the state.

The Nepali comprehensive peaceaccord—its content and follow-upThus far, several agreements have beensigned during the course of Nepali peaceprocess (Box 1.5).23 Signed on 21 Novem-ber 2006, the CPA has four major com-ponents:

political and socioeconomic transfor-mation;management of armies and arms;ceasefire provisions and measures fornormalization; andprotection of human rights and funda-mental rights.

This multi-sectoral Agreement is consistentwith a human development and human se-curity approach because the various dimen-sions of security and development are takeninto consideration to promote a sustainablepeace process.

Of the four components of CPA, the firstcomponent deals mainly with longer-termchanges, and includes provisions such as:

removing all powers from the monar-chy (3.3);

adopting a democratic political system(3.4);state restructuring in an “inclusive, demo-cratic, and forward-looking” manner forending discrimination (3.5);creating a common minimum programmeof “socio-economic transformation… toend all forms of feudalism” (3.6);dealing with land issues (3.7, 3.10);establishing rights of all citizens to edu-cation, health, housing, employment andfood sovereignty (3.9)generating a common plan for socio-eco-nomic development (3.12); andproviding enhanced employment oppor-tunities (3.13).

The subsequent three components all focusmore on immediate issues, beginning withthe management of armies and arms. Two

Without peace,humandevelopment isnot possible and,without humandevelopment,peace is notsustainable

22 Nov 2005: 12-point understanding between seven politi-cal parties and Unified CPN (Maoist) to restore peace, resolv-ing a decade-long conflict.18 May 2006: Proclamation of the House of Representativesthat it assumes all the state powers until the formulation of anew constitution.25 May 2006: Code of Conduct for a ceasefire agreementbetween the Government of Nepal and the Unified CPN(Maoist) to translate the accord into lasting peace.16 Jun 2006: 8-point agreement between senior political lead-ers of seven political parties and Unified CPN (Maoist) tomove the peace process forward.9 Aug 2006: Letters by the government and Unified CPN(Maoist) to the United Nations requesting the cooperation inthe peace process.8 Nov 2006: Decisions of the Meeting of high- level leaders ofthe seven political parties and Unified CPN (Maoist) on thegovernance of the country.21 Nov 2006: Comprehensive Peace Accord between sevenpolitical parties and Unified CPN (Maoist) to end conflict.8 Dec 2006: Agreement on Monitoring of the Management ofArms and Armies.15 Jan 2007: Proclamation of Interim Constitution 2007.23 Dec 2007: 23-point agreement between the seven politicalparties to reach a consensus on holding the CA election by mid-April 2008, among other steps towards consolidating peace.

Source: MOPR 2007A and MOPR records.

BOX 1.5 Key building blocks of peace process in Nepal

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critical clauses in this section are 4.4, whichcalls for a “special committee” to be consti-tuted by the Interim Cabinet for the purposeof carrying out the “supervision, integration,and rehabilitation” of the Maoist army com-batants, and 4.7, which calls for the “right-sizing” and “democratic restructuring” of theNepal Army.

The provisions of the permanent ceasefireecho the May 25, 2006 Code of Conductagreement and set out measures for “nor-malization,” including mechanisms for tran-sitional justice. The CPA calls for the creationof a National Peace and Rehabilitation Com-mission and a high-level Truth and Recon-ciliation Commission to “probe into thoseinvolved in serious violations of human rightsand crime[s] against humanity in [the] courseof the armed conflict for creating an atmo-sphere for reconciliation in the society” (sic)(5.2.5). It also calls upon both sides to ac-count publicly for the disappeared within 60days (5.2.3); to allow the respectful return,rehabilitation and reintegration of the dis-placed (5.2.8); and to resolve any problemsthat arise on the basis of mutual agreement(5.2.9).

The final component covers the rule of lawand protection of rights. The CPA makesclear that “the Nepal Police and the ArmedPolice Force shall continue the task of main-taining lawful arrangements and peace andorder...” (5.1.6), thus placing responsibility forsecurity squarely with these two bodies. TheAgreement also prioritizes compliance withhuman rights, fundamental rights, and hu-manitarian laws—reiterating many of therights referenced in the preamble and otherparts of the Code, and including far-reach-ing commitments to end discrimination andimpunity, to ensure the right to freedom ofmovement, food security and private prop-erty, and to give special protections to work-ers, women, and children.

On a variety of challenging questions, theCPA was purposefully left open-ended inorder to produce a document to which allsides could agree. However, the parties didpledge to continue dialogue on these issues.This continued dialogue has been one of thegreatest strengths of the peace process, car-rying it forward at times when all signs indi-cated that it was on the verge of collapse. Atthe same time, this working method has alsodelayed conclusive outcomes. It has allowedboth sides to sign agreements to which theyare not genuinely committed by using lan-guage vague enough to permit differing in-terpretations and deadlock. Continued ne-gotiation has sometimes prolonged the pro-cess for months at a time on a single phrase.

The possibility of putting off difficult prob-lems by promising to agree in the futuremeans that the transition process has beenslow and fragile, fraught with bargaining fornew demands, with little assurance of finalresolution—save for hope that somehowthings will keep moving forward. However,immediately following the signing of theCPA, concerns were raised about both themechanism used to negotiate the Agreementitself and the timeliness laid out in the docu-ment. Further, the CPA put forward whatproved to be extremely overambitioustimelines, calling for Constituent Assemblyelections by June 2007 and for all parties tomake public the whereabouts of the disap-peared within 60 days, with no clear mecha-nism to ensure meeting these deadlines. Thus,the need for political accountability remains.

The post-CPA documents

The Interim ConstitutionOn 15 January 2007, the Government of Nepalpromulgated an Interim Constitution to coverthe transition period prior to the ConstituentAssembly’s drafting of a new constitution.

The need forpolitical

accountabilityremains

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Many of its clauses echo the spirit of the CPA.The Interim Constitution essentially eliminatesa political role for the monarchy during the in-terim period, and declares Nepal a secular stateinstead of a Hindu Kingdom. Furthermore, itlays out key procedures and rules for the elec-tion of the Constituent Assembly. Most nota-bly, it is the first Nepali constitution promul-gated in the name of the sovereign people ofNepal (as opposed to the King).

Upon its promulgation, however, the InterimConstitution encountered criticism from avariety of groups, including members of thenational legislature and constitutional law-yers.24 Among their concerns, they put fore-most the apparently excessive powers givento the executive branch; this included mak-ing the Prime Minister both the head of gov-ernment and the head of state.25 The criticsalso objected to several clauses that appearedto compromise the independence of the ju-diciary, along with the decision of the SPAand the then CPN (Maoist) to write their ownparty names into the new Constitution (inclauses 38, 45, and 139). The strongest pro-tests, however, came from the historicallymarginalized groups, especially the Madhesis,who claimed that they were being treated assecond-class citizens. Moreover, even as heworked for the adoption of the draft, PrimeMinister Girija Prasad Koirala expressed thebelief that the document contained flaws thatwould require amendment in the future.

This pronouncement proved prescient: as ofthe time of this writing, the Interim Consti-tution has been amended six times since itspromulgation and is going to be amendedagain. The changes thus far have addressedsuch issues as federalism, the rights ofmarginalized groups, the electoral system, theabolition of the monarchy, and provisionsregarding the presidency, the primeministership, and other key positions.

Agreements with historicallymarginalized groupsFollowing their widespread participation inthe April 2006 Janandolan, marginalizedgroups had expected the Interim Constitu-tion to devote more direct attention to is-sues of inclusion.26 In January 2007, Madhesiactivists burned copies of the document andfounded a Madhesi Andolan (MadhesiPeople’s Movement) that went on to changethe course of the peace process and resultedin amendments to the Interim Constitution.The Movement refocused the debate on is-sues of identity and exclusion. Other groupsalso launched protest movements and bandhs(strikes), but the Madhesi Movement was byfar the most prominent.27

Because of the protests, the ensuing violence,and overall insecurity in many areas, the Min-istry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR)opened negotiations with representatives ofthe marginalized groups. Over a period ofmonths, numerous agreements were signedwith organizations such as the Madhesi JanadhikarForum, the Nepal Federation for Indigenous Na-tionalities, Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj, the UnitedMadhesi Front, the Federal Republican NationalFront, and the Federal Limbuwan State Coun-cil.28 Nonetheless, like the agreements betweenthe SPA and the Unified CPN (Maoist), theseaccords await implementation.

Inclusion—the core of a transformationagendaThe Nepali peace agreements and majordocuments, including the CPA and the In-terim Constitution, all look to the transfor-mation of state and society for promotinginclusion and a more equitable development.Two key policies reflect this orientation:

state restructuring or establishment of ademocratic federal republic of Nepal; anddeveloping and implementing a minimumsocioeconomic improvement programme

The Nepali peaceagreements andmajor documents,including the CPAand the InterimConstitution, alllook to thetransformation ofstate and society

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The CPA envisages an inclusive, democraticand progressive state restructuring by elimi-nating the centralized and unitary form ofthe state in order to address the concerns ofwomen, Dalits, indigenous nationalities,Madhesi, the oppressed, the neglected andminorities and backward regions by endingdiscrimination based on class, caste, language,gender, culture, religion and region. Trans-lating the CPA into permanence is thereforethe first and foremost step for promotinginclusion and restoring lasting peace. How-ever, these transformations require imple-menting the other components of the CPA.

In order to implement the inclusionagenda of the CPA, this Report provides

Translating theCPA into

permanence istherefore the firstand foremost step

for promotinginclusion and

restoring lastingpeace

inputs for discussion from the point ofview of human development. Towardsthis goal, chapter two of the Report pre-sents the facts and figures on spatial andsocioeconomic exclusion that serves asa basis for attaining the rise of citizens;chapter three discusses how to move thepeace process ahead so as to provide anenabling environment for the transfor-mation of the state. Chapters four andfive demonstrate how inclusion can beenhanced through a reform of the po-litical system and the restructuring of thestate. The last chapter provides a set ofpolicy recommendations and sugges-tions for promoting inclusion and humandevelopment.

Unequalhumandevelopment

2CHAPTER

Human development andits measurement

Human development in South Asia

The Nepal human development index

The gender-related development index

The gender empowerment measure

Poverty and human development

Caste and ethnicity andhuman development

Inequality in educationaland health outcomes

To sum up…

Unequalhuman

development

2Chapter

person’s status in Nepal is deter-mined largely by her or his birth-place, sex, age, and caste/ethnicity,

apart from education and income. Differencesin these features, together with deep-seated so-cioeconomic and cultural discrimination, havegiven rise to disparate human development out-comes across different geographical areas,along with differing caste and ethnic groups.Nonetheless, all Nepalis are citizens, each en-titled by law to the rights set out in the country’sconstitution and the United Nations covenantson human rights. This chapter concentrates onhuman development inequalities by geographicareas and by caste and ethnic groups; subse-quent chapters will explore paths towards in-clusion and participation in governance struc-tures through which those who are now ex-cluded can fulfill their birthright as citizens andthereby influence policy and institutions for theirown development.

Human development and itsmeasurementHuman development aims at enlarging people’schoices. These can be infinite. They can alsochange over time. Like income, inclusion andparticipation represent important choices. To-day, people seek not only to increase their in-comes, but also their education, their social sta-

tus and their personal dignity. They want to takepart in various groups and organizations so asto exert influence on the state and on society.Income is only one means to that end.

The concept of human development has beenevolving and expanding since the 1980s, whenit was launched by the eminent economistsand philosophers, Mahabub ul Haq andAmartya Sen. Because of its multi-dimensionaland cross-disciplinary nature, human devel-opment can be measured in a variety of ways.One of the best-known methods involves thecalculation of composite indices.

The first, developed in 1990, is known simplyas the Human Development Index (HDI).Related indices soon emerged—among these,the gender-related development index (GDI),the gender empowerment measure (GEM),and the human poverty index (HPI). Whenthe indices are used for inter-group compari-sons at the regional level and across variouscaste and ethnic groups, they can help us iden-tify who is excluded where. This often opensthe way to changing the structures—especiallyrepresentation in governance institutions—thatcan enhance people’s lives in a number of di-mensions. It can also help guide Nepalis toshape the features of the federal structure forwhich the country is preparing.

Humandevelopment aimsat enlargingpeople’s choices.These can beinfinite. They canalso change overtime

Unequal humandevelopment

2Chapter

A


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22222The HDI measures average achievement inthree dimensions:

a long and healthy life, as measured bylife expectancy at birth;knowledge, as measured by the adult lit-eracy rate, combined with the school en-rolment ratio; anda decent standard of living, as measuredby Gross Domestic Product per capitain purchasing power parity in US dollars.

The concept of HDI and its related indicescan be explored further in the technical noteof Annex 2.2.

Human development inSouth AsiaNepal’s HDI was the lowest of the five coun-tries of the South Asian Association for Re-gional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2005. Thishas persisted for the last three decades—withthe exception of 1990 and 1995, when Nepalranked just above Bangladesh (see Figure2.1).1

The main reason for low HDI in Nepal com-pared to other SAARC countries is lower

per capita income. Per capita income signifi-cantly increased in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indiaand Maldives between 1992 and 2005; theother two SAARC members, Pakistan andSri Lanka, had already attained higher levels(see Figure 2.2). Thus, Nepal whose HDIposition was higher than Bhutan’s in 1992,has ranked below that country in recent yearsbecause of Bhutan’s remarkable incomegain—approximately a 5-fold rise in percapita income as compared to a 2.3-fold in-crease in that in Nepal.

The increased intensity of Nepal’s conflict isa major reason for the country’s low eco-nomic growth and its concomitant low percapita income, especially since 2001.2 Thegrowth rate during the Tenth Plan period(2002/03 - 2006/07) was less than 3 per-cent. However, the effect of conflict on lifeexpectancy and educational attainment, theother two components of HDI, was lowbecause they are stock variables, whose val-ues tend to accumulate over time; they aretherefore less volatile than per capita income.This suggests that a significant leap in Nepalisprogress during the post-conflict period willdepend on a higher and more inclusive growthrate, together with a gradual increase in theother two components.

The Nepal human developmentindexMeasuring and analyzing human developmentfor 75 districts and 103 caste and ethnicgroups in Nepal can provide a comprehen-sive base for determining just how demo-cratic and open the national political systemactually is. Efforts to calculate at those levelsof disaggregation are hampered by lack ofcomprehensive, up-to-date and reliable data.It is difficult to go beyond these levels, as thenational household (sample) surveys in Nepalare conducted to provide estimates of well-being indicators only for large areas; 6 re-

In 2005 Nepal’sHDI was the

lowest of the fivecountries of the

South AsianAssociation for

RegionalCooperation

Source: UNDP 2006 and 2007.

HDI trend of some SAARC countries at the interval of5 years, 1975–2005

FIGURE 2.1


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gions have been defined under the NepalLiving Standards Survey (NLSS) and 13 sub-regions under the Nepal Demographic andHealth Survey (NDHS).3 Moreover, the HDIcalculated for different caste and ethnicgroups from small (area-based) samples can-not be that robust. Taking into account theselimitations, this time the HDI has been mea-sured only for the following areas and groups:

the whole country;urban and rural Nepal;3 ecological belts;5 development regions;13 sub-regions (a cross-section of 3ecological belts and 5 regions, withWestern, Mid-western and Far-westernmountain combined in to one as ‘WesternMountain’ because of the small samplesize)4; and11 caste and ethnic groups.

Although these levels of disaggregation are lim-ited for the purposes of inclusive planning andmonitoring, they nonetheless provide a solidpoint of departure. The HDI values are com-puted largely on the basis of data from theNDHS 2006, and the NLSS 2003/04. Furtherdetail is given in Annex 2.1, and the computedindices are given in Annex 2.3 and 2.4.

The Nepali HDI estimated in this Report is0.509 for the year 2006, a figure lower thanthat of the global human development re-port for 2007/08 (0.534). The difference arisesfrom discrepancies in methodology and data.5

HDI throughout the country varies widely byurban-rural divide, by ecological belt, and bydevelopment region and sub-regions (see Fig-ure 2.3, Table 2.1 and Map 2.1). On average,urban dwellers have much higher human de-velopment than their rural counterparts: 0.630vs. 0.482; those who live in the Hills enjoy thehighest standards, while those of the Moun-tains have the lowest. Among the development


Comparison of three sub-indices of HDI of SAARCcountries, 1992 and 2005

FIGURE 2.2


Human development index across areas andregions, Nepal, 2006

FIGURE 2.3


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MAP 2.1 Human development index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006

ΔΔΔΔΔ (HDI 06–Region Value Rank Value Rank HDI 01)

Nepal 0.471 0.509 0.038

Urban/rural residenceUrban 0.581 1 0.630 1 0.049Rural 0.452 2 0.482 2 0.030

Ecological regionMountain 0.386 3 0.436 3 0.050Hill 0.512 1 0.543 1 0.031Tarai 0.478 2 0.494 2 0.016

Development regionEastern region 0.493 1 0.526 2 0.033Central region 0.490 3 0.531 1 0.041Western region 0.491 2 0.516 3 0.025Mid-Western region 0.402 5 0.452 5 0.050Far-Western region 0.404 4 0.461 4 0.057

Source: UNDP/Nepal 2004 and Annex 2.3, Table 1.

HDI in 2001 HDI in 2006

TABLE 2.1 Change in human development index, Nepal, 2001 and 2006



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regions, the Mid-Western region has the lowestlevel of development, and of the 13 sub-re-gions, it is lowest in ‘Western Mountain’ thatconsists of three sub-regions: Western, Mid-Western, and Far-Western mountain (Map 2.1).

When Kathmandu is excluded, the HDI valuefor Nepal drops to 0.494 from 0.509, and theHills and Central Development Region movefrom the top to lower positions (see Figures2.4–2.6). This implies a higher disparity betweenthe people of Kathmandu and those outsidethe capital. Murshed and Gates (2005) foundthat the extent of relative deprivation of thepeople in the remote rural districts of the Hillsand Mountains is very high, and argue that thelack of development in these areas fuelled theMaoist insurgency. Apart from these citizens,some of the predominantly Madhesi districtsalso rank among the least developed in termsof human development indicators.6

The HDI over timeHuman development has improved overtime, but the trend of spatial inequality gen-erally continues to be roughly the same (seeTable 2.1 and Map 2.2). In particular, the HDIvalue increased by 8 percent from 0.471 in2001 to 0.509 for the whole country in 2006,an annual rate of 1.6 percent. Yet there hasbeen no change in the status of rural or ur-ban areas and ecological regions, as the HDIranking shows (Table 2.1). However, thereis a change in the ranking of developmentregions. In 2001, the Central DevelopmentRegion stood third; by 2006, it had movedup to the first place. This derives in partfrom the fact that development centres onKathmandu and that those who could af-ford to do so moved from the rural areasto Kathmandu during the conflict. By con-trast, as in 1996 and 2001, the people ofFar- and Mid-Western development regionsstill rank lowest. Insecurity in the last tenyears has further affected public servicesand private activities more in rural than in

Insecurity in thelast ten years hasfurther affectedpublic servicesand privateactivities more inrural than inurban areas



Human development in Nepal:with and without Kathmandu

FIGURE 2.4

Human development acrossecological zones: Hills withand without Kathmandu

FIGURE 2.5


Human developments acrossdevelopment regions:Central region with andwithout Kathmandu

FIGURE 2.6


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22222

urban areas, preserving the pre-war dispar-ity. It also implies shortcomings in thegovernment’s policy on growth with equity.Political inclusion of disadvantaged groupsand areas consequently appears a logical start-ing point for pro-poor policy.

Gender and human developmentThe Human Development Report 1995 intro-duced the Gender-related Development In-dex (GDI) and Gender EmpowermentMeasure (GEM) to measure inequality be-tween women and men. The GDI measuresgender disparity by adjusting average achieve-ments to reflect inequalities between femaleand male in the three dimensions of HDIoutlined above. GDI therefore falls wher-ever men outrank women in achievement lev-els. Thus, the greater the gender disparity inbasic capabilities, the lower a country’s GDIcompared to its HDI.

While GDI focuses on capability, GEMshows the use of those capabilities in taking

The GenderEmpowermentMeasure and

Gender-relatedDevelopment

Index measureinequality between

women and men

advantage of opportunities in life. Focusingon women’s opportunities, the GEM cap-tures gender inequality in three key areas: par-ticipation and decision-making power in po-litical and economic affairs and power overeconomic resources.7

The gender-related developmentindexAs measured by Nepal GDI, the differencein capabilities between women and men islow for the entire country, but higher forsome areas and regions than others; theseinclude the countryside in general and, moremarkedly, the Mountains and the Mid-West-ern Development Region, implying the lowlevel of human development of women inthose areas (Figure 2.7). At the sub-regionallevel, the situation of women is worst in theMid-Western and Far-Western Hills andMountains, the Central and Western Moun-tain sub-regions (see Map 2.3, and Annex2.3 Table 2).

MAP 2.2 Human development index across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006

Source: Annex 2.3, Table 1; UNDP/Nepal 2004; and NESAC 1998.


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MAP 2.3 Gender-related development index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006

Trends in gender inequalityThe Human Development Report 1995 introduceda formula for measuring gender inequalityrelative to HDI: a simple difference of GDIover HDI expressed as a percentage of theHDI. Thus, higher the value, higher the gen-der inequality becomes.8 Gender inequality iscomputed on this basis for the year 2001 and2006 and presented in Table 2.2. Overall, gen-der inequality decreased in all the ecologicaland development regions and sub-regions in2006 as compared with 2001, but the mostsignificant decrease was found in Mid- andFar-Western Mountains. Moreover, the ratioof GDI to HDI presented in Map 2.4 showsan improving trend for the status of women.

The main reason for this improvement is theincrease in life expectancy of women, whichhas surpassed that of men in recent years.9Together with increasing enrollments of girls,this may have narrowed the gender gap. How-ever, this rate of decrease in gender inequality



The ratio ofGDI to HDIpresented in Map2.4 shows animproving trendfor the status ofwomen

Gender-related developmentindex across areas andregions, Nepal, 2006

FIGURE 2.7


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22222is dwindling. It slowed more markedly from2001 to 2006 than for the previous 5 yearsbetween 1996 and 2001 (Figure 2.8).10 Thisimplies that greater resources will be requiredfor a future shrinking of gender inequality.

The gender empowerment measureAlthough the decrease in gender inequalityimplies an improvement in the relative capa-bilities of women, their representation and par-ticipation remains lower than that of men inthe political, economic and professional do-mains. This is illustrated by the gender em-powerment measure (GEM). Women’s shareof earned income was about one third ofthat of men, while their participation in politi-cal processes was only a fifth of the male rate.The gap widens further in their professionaland administrative employment (See Annex2.3 Table 3). Notwithstanding, a landmark to-wards enhancing women’s representation wasthe affirmative action which led to womenholding one-third of the total 601 seats ofthe new constituent assembly in April 2008.

MAP 2.4 GDI/HDI ratio across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006


PercentRegion 2001 2006Nepal 4.0 2.0Urban 3.3 1.9Rural 4.9 2.3Mountain 6.0 3.0Hill 2.7 1.7Tarai 5.9 2.4Eastern region 3.7 1.9Central region 4.7 2.6Western region 2.9 1.0Mid-Western region 4.2 2.4Far-Western region 6.7 3.0Eastern Mountain 3.1 1.0Central Mountain 3.5 2.9Western Mountain 2.0 4.8Mid-Western Mountain 9.5 4.8Far-Western Mountain 10.1 4.8Eastern Hill 2.8 1.7Central Hill 3.5 2.2Western Hill 2.0 0.4Mid-Western Hill 4.1 2.0Far-Western Hill 8.4 5.0Eastern Tarai 4.5 2.1Central Tarai 7.8 3.1Western Tarai 4.0 2.8Mid-Western Tarai 4.1 0.8Far-Western Tarai 4.0 2.2

Note the values are calculated using {(HDI-GDI)/HDI}*100 as introduced in HDR 2005.Source: SHDI calculation based on data from UNDP 2004 and Annex 2.3.

Percentage shortfall of GDI overHDI by region, Nepal, 2001 and 2006

TABLE 2.2


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The participation of women also varieswidely by geographical area. Between 2001and 2006, the GEM in Nepal improved bya factor of 1.27. But a wide disparity per-sists: GEM varies from 0.391 in WesternTarai to a high of 0.538 in the Eastern Moun-tain Sub-Region (Map 2.5). Women in ruralareas, the Mountains and the Tarai and espe-cially those located in Mid-Western and Far-Western Development Regions participateless in political and economic decision-mak-ing, and have less power over economic re-sources (see Figure 2.9).

Whatever progress has been made, the dis-crepancies in the GDI and GEM values pointto a persisting exclusion of women in deci-sion-making and control over resources. Heri-tage lies at its root—the historic exclusion im-posed by patriarchal society and exclusionarystate policies. A study conducted for Genderand Social Exclusion Assessment in 2005,

The discrepanciesin the GDI andGEM valuespoint to apersistingexclusion ofwomen indecision-makingand control overresources

MAP 2.5 Gender empowerment measure across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006



Trends in genderinequality by region, Nepal1996, 2001 and 2006

FIGURE 2.8


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22222found 32 provisions that discriminate on thebasis of religion, caste and ethnicity, and 176provisions in 83 pieces of legislations that dis-criminate against women.11 As is the case withNepal’s general population, the first step toending such disparities lies in the inclusion andempowerment of women.

Effect of increased femaleparticipation on GEMFemale participation in the parliament was dis-mally low in the past elections. With the provi-sion of 33 percent quota for women in theConstituent Assembly (CA) 2008, femaleparticipation increased significantly. The GEMimproved by 17 percent at the national levelfrom an index of 0.496 to 0.581, with an in-crease in all the three ecological belts and fivedevelopment regions. However, at the sub-re-gional level, a decrease in GEM can be noted


Gender empowermentmeasure acrossareas and regions, Nepal, 2006

FIGURE 2.9

FemaleChange in Representation

GEM 2006 GEM 1 GEM (%) in CA (%)

Nepal 0.496 0.581 17.0 32.4Eastern Region 0.516 0.591 14.6 30.3

Central Region 0.511 0.614 20.2 36.5

Western Region 0.488 0.548 12.3 29.2

Mid-Western Region 0.431 0.531 23.2 35.8

Far-Western Region 0.456 0.475 4.2 20.9

Mountain 0.468 0.489 4.6 22.6

Hill 0.515 0.601 16.7 33.6

Tarai 0.469 0.562 19.9 33.2

Eastern Mountain 0.538 0.439 -18.4 9.1

Central Mountain 0.489 0.548 12.1 28.6

Western Mountain 0.413 0.435 5.4 33.3

Mid-Western Mountain 0.413 0.424 2.6 30.8

Far-Western Mountain 0.413 0.271 -34.4 11.1

Eastern Hill 0.529 0.631 19.4 37.5

Central Hill 0.534 0.630 18.0 36.0

Western Hill 0.518 0.590 13.8 32.4

Mid-Western Hill 0.410 0.518 26.3 38.2

Far-Western Hill 0.396 0.350 -11.7 13.3

Eastern Tarai 0.483 0.558 15.5 29.8

Central Tarai 0.467 0.580 24.2 38.1

Western Tarai 0.391 0.414 5.9 21.2

Mid-Western Tarai 0.488 0.587 20.2 35.3

Far-Western Tarai 0.469 0.554 18.2 31.6

Change in gender empowerment measure due to provisionof quota for women in 2008 Constituent Assembly

TABLE 2.3

Note: GEM 1 includes women participation in parliament in 2008, whereas the values of other two indicators are of 2006GEM 2006 provides a single estimate of three sub-regions because of small sample size as mentioned earlier.Source: SHDI calculation based on data from Annex 2.3; and election portal [www.nepalelectionportal.org]


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in three sub regions: Eastern Mountain, Far-Western Mountain and Far-Western Hill as aresult of low female representation in the CAfrom these areas. Female representation in thesethree sub-regions ranges from 9 percent to 13percent, whereas in the 10 other sub-regions itranges between 30 to 38 percent and in thelast two it is between 21–29 percent (Table2.3). Positive policy intervention can thusincrease representation. However, such apolicy should be implemented at wider levelof disaggregation and further expanded toother areas of decision making.

Poverty and human development

The human poverty index (HPI)Human poverty is much more than incomepoverty. People are poor not only becauseof low income, but also because of theirlow access to opportunities or their partici-pation in them. From the human develop-ment perspective, poverty is regarded as astate in which the opportunities and choicesmost basic to human development are de-nied (UNDP 1997). Human poverty there-fore expands from income deprivation tocapability deprivation into impaired humanfunctioning. Introduced in 1997 as a mea-sure of an extended definition of povertybeyond income, the HPI shows depriva-tions as contrasted with the capability orwell-being measured by HDI.

The HPI value for Nepal is estimated at 35.4,a figure fairly close to the HPI (38.1) reportedin the global Human Development Report2007/08. Like other indices, HPI varies byareas, regions and sub-regions. Human pov-erty is higher in rural areas and the Mountainbelt. It is highest in ‘Western Mountain’, andin the Far-Western Hills—1.6 times higher thanthat of Central Hills, where HPI is lowest (Fig-ures 2.10 and 2.11, Map 2.6 and Annex 2.3Table 4).12

Human povertyis much morethan incomepoverty. Peopleare poornot only becauseof low income,but also becauseof their lowaccess toopportunities ortheir participationin them

Human poverty in ruraland urban Nepal, 2006FIGURE 2.10


Human poverty indexacross areas and regions,Nepal, 2001 and 2006

FIGURE 2.11


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HPI over timeHPI fell from 39.6 in 2001 to 35.4 in 2006for the whole country (see Figure 2.11). Al-though the decline was found across all geo-graphic divisions, its magnitude varies sig-nificantly with ecological belts and regions(see Map 2.7). Between 2001 and 2006, thelarger decline took place in the Mountain andHills rather than the Tarai; among develop-ment regions, the decrease was higher in theFar-Western and Mid-Western DevelopmentRegions (Figure 2.11).

A comparison of values of the four indicesacross different areas points to the follow-ing trends:

Human development improved at thenational level, but showed high variationfrom one area to another;The population of the Mountains rankedlowest and the Hills highest, whether

capability or deprivation used as the baseof human development measurement;By development region, the people of Mid-Western and Far-Western Developmentregions showed lower HD levels; thesituation of women was also worse;Despite general improvement, rate ofchange of the indices varied disproportion-ately across the areas and were generallyhigher in those already better off. However,the GDI improvement rate was higher inthe remote Mid- and Far-Western Moun-tains, mainly because of the very low statusof women in those areas.

These findings imply that despite the gov-ernment policy of balanced regional devel-opment, the regions and areas most deprivedin the past remain deprived today. This sug-gests a need for renewed emphasis on theirdevelopment. This failure stems in part from

Despite thegovernment policy

of balancedregional

development, theregions and areasmost deprived inthe past remaindeprived today

MAP 2.6 Human poverty index across eco-development regions, Nepal, 2006



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the lack of fair representation and participa-tion of people from the poor and deprivedareas, and the rule by the centre and the moreadvantaged regions. This in turn suggestsbringing governance closer to citizens. More-over, the improvement of human develop-ment at the national, but at very varied ratesacross the regions, suggests the need for dis-aggregated data collection and analysis ofinformation by areas, by gender and by casteand ethnic groups.

Caste and ethnicity andhuman development

HDI across the caste and ethnicgroups of NepalAs indicated at the beginning of this chap-ter, the HDI has been estimated for 11 casteand ethnic groups, following the broad clas-sification of Bennett and Dahal (2008). These

groups and subgroups and their HDI andother details are given in Annex 2.4 for someadditional groups over those presented infigures 2.12 and 2.13.

The comparison of HDI presented hereshows that HDI varies more widely by casteand ethnicity than by geographical area. Theypoint to a need for targeting caste andethnicity within a particular belt or region.For example, within the same Tarai belt,Dalits have the lowest HDI value, whereasBrahman and Chhetri have the highest (0.383vs. 0.625, as shown in Figure 2.12).

The people of three caste and ethnic groups—Madhesi Brahman and Chhetri, Newar andHill Brahman—have a higher HDI value (0.6and above)—than that of Dalits and Janajatis,both from the Hills and the Tarai. Muslimshave an index value of 0.401 - lower thanthat for Dalits as a whole, but higher than

HDI variesmore widely bycaste andethnicity than bygeographical area

MAP 2.7 Human poverty index across eco-development regions, Nepal 1996, 2001 and 2006



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Madhesi Dalits (see Figure 2.12). These re-sults are very similar to that of the inclusionindex constructed by Bennett and Parajuli(2008) given in Box 2.1.

Of the three components of the HDI, edu-cation is the most significant driver. This ac-counts for the wide gap between the Brah-man/Chhetri and other castes. The lower HDIfor Dalits, especially Tarai Dalits and Mus-lims, derives largely from their very low edu-cational attainment compared to other com-ponents of HDI (see Figure 2.13). Their lowhuman development or capability hinders theirrepresentation and participation—which, inturn, perpetuates their low level of humandevelopment. Unless broken with help fromthe state, this cycle can only continue.

Income poverty across the caste andethnic groupsIn tandem with Nepal’s human develop-ment indices, the country’s poverty inNepal decreased by 26 percent during1995/96–2003/04, with wide variations


Human development index by majorcaste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2006FIGURE 2.12

Human development index and its components by major caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2006FIGURE 2.13


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by areas and caste and ethnicity. A largerproportion of people were poor in theMid-West development region than in theothers (see Table 2.4). By caste and ethnicgroups, poverty characterized a lower pro-portion of Newars and Brahman/Chhetri(14% and 18% respectively) than of Dalits,Muslims and Hill Janajatis, whose rateshover between 41% and 46%, significantlyhigher than the national average of 31 per-cent (Table 2.5). However, anecdotal evi-dence points to higher inequality in eachof the caste and ethnic groups.

Decreases in poverty rates have also been veryunequal, ranging from 6 percent among Mus-lims to 46 percent among Brahman and Chhetriduring the period 1995/96–2003/04. Nation-wide, poverty decreased by more than 20 per-cent in all but Hill Janajati and Muslim groups.This inequality has resulted in an increase inthe Gini coefficient from 0.34 to 0.41.13

Like the variations in consumption and con-sumption-based poverty mentioned above,income also varies significantly across differ-ent caste and ethnic groups. Annual average

Decreases inpoverty rates havebeen very unequalacross the casteethnic groups

To identify the excluded caste and ethnic groups thatneed the government support most, the National PlanningCommission developed an inclusion index in 2008. Thisindex consists of three sub-indices: poverty or economicexclusion; human capability; and political participation,and each of these combines several indicators. The com-putation of the inclusion index has been carried out for80 caste and ethnic groups using the small area estima-tion method. However, it has not been done by genderfor all the castes and ethnic groups because of the smallsample size of national household surveys and the prac-tice of collecting income data at the household ratherthan individual level.

According to the computed values of social inclusionindex, the most excluded group is the Mushahar withthe lowest value. When all the 80 groups are com-

bined into 11 caste and ethnic groups, as this NepalHuman Development Report does, the most excludedgroup is Madhesi Dalit, followed by Hill Dalits, Mus-lims and then Tarai and Hill Janajatis, respectively.The value of the inclusion index ranges from 19%among Madhesi Dalits to as high as 94% among theNewars, reflecting high discrimination between casteand ethnic groups.

By gender, significant differences appear in the levelof the exclusion, with higher gender differences amongDalits, followed by Muslims and Tarai Janajatis. Thisimplies that excluded caste and ethnic groups havehigher gender differentials as well, indicating a greaterdegree of discrimination against women.

Source: Bennett and Parajuli 2008.

BOX 2.1 Status of social exclusion in Nepal, 2006

per capita income was highest for Newarsand lowest for Dalits. While per capita in-comes in rural areas lag behind those in ur-ban areas, the per capita income of rural TaraiBrahmans/Chhetri is significantly higher thanfor Dalits and Muslims in urban areas. Butthe per capita income of a rural Brahmanindividual is less than half of the urban Brah-

Poverty head count rate (%)

ChangeSector 1995/96 2003/04 in Percent

Nepal 41.8 30.8 -26Urban 21.6 9.6 -56

Rural 43.3 34.6 -20

Development region

Eastern 38.9 29.3 -25

Central 32.5 27.1 -17

Western 38.6 27.1 -30

Mid-Western 59.9 44.8 -25

Far-Western 63.9 41.0 -36

Ecological belt

Mountain 57.0 32.6 -43

Hill 40.7 34.5 -15

Tarai 40.3 27.6 -32

Source: CBS 2005.

Geographic region

Poverty incidence bygeographical areas, Nepal,1995/96 and 2003/04

TABLE 2.4


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By occupationalgroups, poverty is

highest amongagriculture wage

labourers,followed by small

farmers whocultivate their

own land

man individual. The discrepancy is evenhigher among Newars, but lower amongMuslims and Dalits (see Table 2.6).14

Variations in income povertyby socioeconomic characteristicsApart from caste and ethnicity, the incidenceof poverty varies widely by other character-istics, including the following:

sector of employment or occupation;

level of education of household head;demographic composition of household(household size, number of children); andthe amount of land a household pos-sesses.

By occupational groups, poverty is highestamong agriculture wage labourers, followedby small farmers who cultivate their ownland. The decrease in poverty in these twogroups was also disproportionately low com-pared to others, implying that poverty per-sists across generations. Additionally, povertywas found to be higher among the landlesshouseholds, larger families or those withlarger numbers of children, and among thehouseholds with illiterate heads.

Income poverty by genderIt is difficult to establish directly that womenas a group are poorer than men in terms ofper capita income or consumption becausepoverty in Nepal is measured at the house-hold rather than at the individual level. How-ever, it is safe to say that poor women out-number poor men. Women’s access to the

Average Average Average Averageper capita income household per capita urban per capita rural

(NRs.) size (NRs.) (NRs.)

Nepal 15,000 - 28,957 12,534All Brahman/Chhetri 18,400 - 33,731 15,674Hill Brahman/Chhetri 16,200 5.78 34,678 13,628

Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri 23,900 5.54 32,408 21,465

All Dalits 10,000 - 19,381 9,026Hill Dalits 8,830 5.64 18,602 8,018

Tarai Dalits 13,200 5.98 20,460 11,927

Newar 26,100 6.43 36,600 14,660All Janajati 13,300 - 25,750 12,216Hill Janajati 13,500 5.97 26,448 11,987

Tarai Janajati 12,700 9.68 14,106 12,719

Musl im 10,200 8.29 11,563 10,126Tarai middle castes 11,300 7.22 12,736 11,212

Source: DFID and World Bank 2005.

Average per capita income by caste and ethnicity, Nepal, 2003/04TABLE 2.6

Poverty headcount rate

Caste and Changeethnicity 1995/96 2003/04 in Percent

Nepal 41.8 30.8 -26Brahman/Chhetri 34.1 18.4 -46

Dalits 57.8 45.5 -21

Newar 19.3 14.0 -28

Hill Janajati 48.7 44.0 -10

Tarai Janajati 53.4 35.4 -34

Muslim 43.7 41.3 -6

Tarai middle caste 28.7 21.3 -26

Others 46.1 31.3 -32

Source: CBS 2005.

Poverty incidence by casteand ethnicity, Nepal, 1995/96and 2003/04

TABLE 2.5


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household’s productive assets and to thepooled household production and incomeis mediated by men, and even if aggregatehousehold income is somewhat above thepoverty line, this does not guarantee that thewomen of these households have secureaccess to an adequate share of householdresources.15 In accordance with the othernorms of patriarchal society, women alsotend to lag behind men in access to almostall available opportunities and resources.

Inequality in educational andhealth outcomes

LiteracyDespite significant improvements in edu-cational attainments, inequality persists inliteracy rates across all regions, castes andethnic groups and by gender. Three layersof exclusion continue: exclusion because

Despitesignificantimprovements ineducationalattainments,inequality persistsin literacy ratesacross all regions,castes and ethnicgroups and bygender

of remoteness leading to low access toschools; exclusion because of caste andethnicity; and exclusion because of gender.According to the 2006 NDHS, amongwomen of 15–49 years, less than a quar-ter of Madhesi “other caste” groups couldread or write, whereas more than four-fifths of Madhesi Brahman and Chhetriwomen were literate (Table 2.7). By con-trast, among Madhesi Brahman, men’s lit-eracy rate was 94 percent against only 83percent for women. The inequality is higherin the Tarai/Madhesi group than theMountain/Hill group (see Annex 3, Tables16 and 17). These relative inequalitiesdeepen beyond the primary level (see An-nex 3, Table 16–19).

Under-five mortality ratesThe Nepal Demographic and Health Sur-vey of 2006 found significant improve-ments in health outcomes despite the de-

Secondary SchoolLiteracy rate (%) or Higher Level Education

Caste/ethnicity Female Male Female Male

All Nepalis 54.5 81.0 29.3 53.5

All Brahman/Chhetri 68.6 92.8 44.4 75.4

Hill Brahman 82.1 96.9 59.5 86.5

Hill Chhetri 59.4 90.0 34.0 67.1

Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri 82.5 93.9 61.6 90.1

Madhesi Other Castes 24.2 72.0 12.1 44.5

All Dalits 34.8 59.9 11.8 23.2

Hill Dalit 46.3 69.0 16.0 26.4

Madhesi Dalit 17.2 48.5 5.2 19.2

Newar 74.6 93.5 46.1 70.0

All Janajatis 56.9 79.6 26.4 45.8

Hill Janajati 60.0 82.4 29.5 48.1

Tarai Janajati 51.5 75.5 20.9 42.7

Muslim 26.5 61.8 12.0 25.5

All Hill/Mountain Groups 63.4 86.9 36.1 60.5

All Tarai/Madhesi Groups 35.9 69.9 16.0 40.0

Others (unidentified) 62.3 97.4 20.8 75.8

Source: Annex 3, Table 16 and 17

Differentials in educational attainment by gender, and caste and ethnicity(15-49 years) Nepal, 2006

TABLE 2.7


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cade-long conflict. However, wide dispari-ties persist in health outcome indicatorsacross different caste and ethnic groupsand by gender. Among Dalit children, 95

out of 1,000 do not survive to their fifthbirthday; the corresponding figure forNewars is 43 (see Figure 2.14). Girls stillhave a higher mortality rate than boys. Theunder-five mortality rate of Tarai/Madhesicaste and ethnic groups is higher than thatof the Hill/Mountain groups. As wouldbe expected, access to health care, alongwith the nutritional status of children, tendsto worsen among the excluded groups, re-sulting into their low human development.

To sum up…The findings presented in this chapter suggestthat power relations have not changed signifi-cantly since the restoration of democracy in1990. Although human development has im-proved at the aggregate level, the gap betweenthe advantaged regions or caste/ethnic groupsand the disadvantaged is either widening orremains constant. Thus, the Dalit, Muslim andJanajati who have had lower levels of humandevelopment for generations, continue to suf-fer today. Moreover, the level of human de-velopment of women is still less than that ofmen, and the women still lack fair access toopportunities and resources.

Broadening representation and participa-tion has the potential to change powerrelations. The following chapters look intoways and means by which fair represen-tation and participation might be attained.

Source: Annex 3, Table 21

Under-five mortality rate by caste and ethnicity, andregional identity, Nepal, 2006FIGURE 2.14

Getting thepeaceprocess right

3CHAPTER

Dealing with the past

Managing expectations in the present

Where we now stand

Getting thepeace

process right

3Chapter

eace-building in Nepal requiresboth political and socioeconomictransformation. Rarely do coun-

tries have the opportunity to change theirmost basic principles, structures, symbols,and laws. To some Nepalis, what is now tak-ing place represents the achievement of long-held dreams. Others regard these events andtrends as dangerous moves towards anar-chy and national disintegration. The degreeto which the peace process itself is inclusive,transparent, and responsive to the needs ofthe Nepali people will in a large part deter-mine its ultimate success and, as a direct con-sequence, the pace of human developmentin Nepal. Some of the recommendationsput forward by this Report can be realizedin the short term. Others will require farmore time. We aim here to highlight areasfor further attention and renewed effort, andto suggest useful practices and lessons.

Dealing with the pastIn fragile post-conflict environments, peaceand justice often seem at odds with one an-other. To end violence, governments andother involved parties may wish to declareamnesties so as to ensure that all interestgroups participate willingly in the peace pro-cess. By contrast, advocates of justice oftendemand punishment for perpetrators, evenat the possible cost of endangering the peace;they maintain that one cannot have genuinepeace without justice.

The case of Uganda and the InternationalCriminal Court provides a recent exampleof this tension. In March 2008, the peaceprocess between the Ugandan Governmentand the Lord’s Resistance Army stalled in itsfinal stages when the latter’s representativesrefused to sign the agreement painfullyreached by both sides unless the InternationalCriminal Court dropped charges against theirleader, Joseph Kony.1 This case exemplifies abasic problem for Nepal: to keep the peaceprocess intact, sacrifices must sometimes bemade to ensure that all parties remain at thetable. However, if justice is compromised,the peace process becomes shallow and un-stable; it loses public credibility. Consequently,justice and peace must work hand in hand.

Nepal suffers from a long and entrenchedhistory of impunity. In the aftermath of1990 and 2006 Janandolans, the commis-sions created to investigate human rightsabuses—the Mallik Commission in 1990and the Rayamajhi Commission in 2006—both produced detailed reports that wereshelved without action.

Little progress on transitional justice has takenplace since hostilities ceased. The families ofthe 1,027 disappeared persons remain igno-rant of the fate or whereabouts of their rela-tives.2 Compensation has not yet been re-ceived by all the wounded or all the familiesof those killed. In many instances, proper-ties seized have not yet been returned.3 A

Little progress ontransitionaljustice has takenplace sincehostilities ceased

Getting the peaceprocess right

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ICTJ and AF organized focus group discussions for collectingNepalis’ perceptions on transitional justice in 2007. Upon theappointment of Commissioners of TRC in the future, a Dalitwoman in Baglung made a powerful statement that underlinedthe need for genuine consultation: “It should include both menand women equally. It should be someone who is selected bythe people. The process should be people-oriented and notcentre-oriented, and must include victims of the conflict, ex-cluded castes, ethnic groups, etc.”

This view is fully backed by United Nations Resolution 1325,which among other things, states that women need to be fullyrepresented at all levels of peace processes and that their rolein conflict resolution and peace-building should be enhanced(see Box 3.2).

Source: ICTJ and AF 2008, p. 37; and UN Security Council 2000.

number of displaced persons remain unableto return to their homes. To date, no indi-viduals on either side of the conflict havebeen held accountable for their roles in grossviolations of human rights. In his 2 January2009 report presented to the Security Coun-cil UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon ex-pressed this concern as follows, “Many peaceprocess commitments have still not beenimplemented. Despite repeated commit-ments to return property seized by Maoists,none of the agreements reached with theinterim government or the current govern-ment to establish a mechanism to monitorsuch return has been implemented….”4

Past studies and reports, including those ofAnnan (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler(2004), reveal the high risk of peace pro-cesses relapsing to conflict. In a report en-titled In Larger Freedom, the former Secre-tary-General of the United Nations, KofiAnnan, notes, “Roughly half of all countriesthat emerge from war lapse back into vio-lence within five years.”5 To prevent a resur-gence of hostilities in Nepal, the root causesof the conflict must be addressed, and open

wounds healed through reconciliation, jus-tice, and reparations. The recent rise of pro-tests among marginalized groups and increas-ing lawlessness in the Tarai already signal therisk of outbreaks of new form of hostili-ties if these root causes are not addressed.6

Reconciliation and transitional justiceReconciliation, a fundamental component oftransitional justice, has many meanings.7 Here,it is defined as the process by which a soci-ety acknowledges its past and comes to termswith its shortcomings and wrongdoings; re-builds the relationships among its citizens andbetween its citizens and the state; and attemptsto create a shared vision for the future.8

Historically, reconciliation is also embeddedin Nepali practices such as Kshama (forgiveand forget) and Mel Milap (reconciliation).Though reconciliation is often misconstruedas simple forgiveness, its social and politicalintent is broader: a process for rebuilding apeaceful society. It does not mean impunity forperpetrators, but a continuous and explicit pur-suit of truth and justice.

Collecting the views and perceptions of 811victims of 17 districts of Nepal in 2007, theInternational Centre for Transitional Justice(ICTJ) and the Advocacy Forum (AF) con-cluded that ensuring peace and justice inNepal requires a comprehensive approachto transitional justice, rather than ad hoc in-terventions. These organizations support thecreation of a commission to determine thetruth and to find the whereabouts of disap-peared persons. Participants in several focusgroup discussions demanded an inclusivecommission, as indicated in Box 3.1.9

A truth and reconciliation commissionNepal’s CPA calls for the creation of a Truthand Reconciliation Commission (TRC) fortransitional justice. TRCs have been used in anumber of post-conflict countries to pro-mote reconciliation, justice, healing, and repa-

Reconciliation, afundamental

component oftransitional

justice, has manymeanings

The demand for an inclusive truth and reconciliationcommission, NepalBOX 3.1

3

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rations on a nation-wide level. Perhaps thebest-known TRC is that of South Africa,which was formed in 1995 following the endof apartheid. Other countries that have em-ployed the TRC model include Chile, EastTimor, El Salvador, Peru, and Sierra Leone.Worldwide, the form of TRCs has variedwith national circumstances and the needs ofthe communities involved. From this broadspectrum, a number of clear principles andpromising practices have emerged to guidethe creation and work of these bodies:10

a need for broad public awareness, un-derstanding, and support for the goals,mandate, and working methodology ofthe TRC;the participation of all interested groups,including those of victims, civil society or-ganizations, human rights associations, gov-ernment representatives, political activistsand mental health care professionals;gender balance, especially given the increas-ing use of sex crimes as weapons of war;an open, transparent and inclusive selec-tion process;sufficient independence from the gov-ernment to ensure credibility and impar-tiality;a secure enough environment to permitboth victims and alleged perpetrators totestify without fear of violent conse-quences; andstrong connections with other transitionaljustice mechanisms, including other in-vestigative commissions, such as theCommission on the Disappeared, andclear procedures for criminal prosecu-tion.

The fact that more than three-fourths ofNepali women and more than two-fifths ofilliterate citizens have not yet heard of theTRC points to the need for a mass cam-paign to raise awareness of the reconcilia-tion processes and of the Commission it-self.11

In July 2007, the Ministry of Peace and Re-construction released a draft TRC bill forcirculation and comment to both domesticand international human rights groups, in-cluding the Advocacy Forum, the Office ofthe United Nations Office of High Com-missioner for Human Rights (UN/OHCHR), Amnesty International, HumanRights Watch, and the International Centerfor Transitional Justice. While these groupscongratulated the government for its pro-active stance, they also expressed reserva-tions about key provisions of the draft. TheNational Human Rights Commission ofNepal insisted that the government main-tain international standards of human rightsin formulating the TRC bill.

The main concern, raised in an August 2007report by OHCHR and echoed by othergroups, involved the provisions that wouldgrant amnesty to perpetrators of gross hu-man rights violations and violations of inter-national humanitarian law; those crimes citedincluded extrajudicial execution, torture, andthe disappearance of numerous persons.OHCHR noted that “Amnesty provisions [inthe draft TRC bill] which prevent prosecu-

UN Resolution 1325, adopted by the Security Council at its4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000, concerns the protection ofwomen and girls during armed conflict; and the promotion of agender perspective during peace processes. Among otherthings, it states that:

women and girls must be protected from gender-basedviolence and have their rights recognized both during andafter conflict;a gender perspective should inform peacekeeping operationsand peace agreements; andwomen should be fully represented at all levels of peaceprocesses and their role in conflict resolution and peace

building enhanced.

Source: UN Security Council 2000.

Protection of the interests of women: United NationsResolution 1325BOX 3.2

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tion for these offences are inconsistent withNepal’s obligations under international law.”12

Like other commentators, the HighCommissioner’s Office drew attention to thefollowing issues:

the bill’s general emphasis on promot-ing compromise and settlement overprosecution;the dangers of coercive reconciliation;the potential for government over-in-volvement in TRC proceedings; andthe need for public hearings and a finalreport.

The differences between the government andcivil society organizations grow out of im-plicit fears on each side. The government maybe concerned that:

too inclusive a process will result in alack of control; andan overemphasis on criminal prosecu-tion could harm the fragile balancereached by the peace and upset key con-stituencies.

By contrast, civil society groups may fear that:the government intends to marginalisethem in the TRC process, perhaps evenexclude them from it; andthe government will emphasize amnestyand thus impunity over justice.

Later, between December 2007 and Decem-ber 2008, the Ministry of Peace and Recon-struction organized four regional consulta-tions on the draft TRC bill, which were wel-comed despite some reservations about theirinclusiveness. The revised draft bill presentedat these consultations included improvementson the mid-2007 version, but requires fur-ther revision to ensure compliance with in-ternational human rights standards, includ-ing the independence of the Commission,amnesties, and increased witness protection.13

But there is no need to rush the TRC pro-cess as a whole. A thoughtful, transparent

and wide consultation will best serve bothinternational standards and the requirementsof Nepal. In addition, consultations at all lev-els should take into account the history ofimpunity in Nepal, so as to ensure that theTRC report will not be shelved as were thoseof the Mallik and Rayamajhi Commissions.This will require a broader representationthan that of the prior peace efforts.

Restorative justiceJustice has many faces: it can be retributivejustice based on criminal prosecution or re-storative justice based on mediation. Restor-ative justice is increasingly used as a major in-strument of reconciliation, since it is moreconcerned with restitution to the victim andthe victimized community than with punish-ing the offender. Because victims are centralto restorative justice, the process makes of-fenders directly accountable to the person orcommunity they have victimised.14

Restorative justice concentrates on repairingrelationships rather than on retribution. It is“concerned with healing victims’ wounds,restoring offenders to law-abiding lives, andrepairing the harm done to interpersonal re-lationships and the community.”15 It attemptsto provide a healing process for the victims,perpetrators, their families and friends, andthe community because all these entities areintimately involved in rebuilding relationshipsand together repairing the harm done. In thewords of those who champion this view,“restorative justice...advocates restitution tothe victim by the offender rather than retri-bution by the state against the offender. In-stead of continuing and escalating the cycleof violence, it tries to restore relationshipsand stop the violence.”16 In so doing, it asks“Who has been hurt? What are their needs?Whose obligations are these?”

Restorative justice allows communities to con-sider the broad context in which violationstook place in order to understand these

Restorative justiceis increasingly

used as a majorinstrument ofreconciliation,

since it is moreconcerned with

restitution to thevictim and the

victimizedcommunity thanwith punishing

the offender

3



wrongs better and thereby decide how theycan best be corrected. It also focuses on repa-rations, expanding the concept beyond finan-cial compensation to consider medium- andlong-term measures that improve health, edu-cation, and employment. The long traditionof “Kshama” (forget and forgive rather thanrevenge), inherent in Nepali culture, gives re-storative justice considerable scope in consoli-dating the peace process.

An increasing number of experts are pro-moting the benefits of restorative justice inpost-conflict environments. The Truth andReconciliation Commission of South Africaposited restorative justice as one of its foun-dational principles. So did the gacaca courtsof Rwanda, created after that country’s 1994genocide.

Let us bear in mind, too, that because Nepalis a collection of so many diverse cultures,local indigenous practices already exist forcommunity reconciliation in particular areas.Consequently, local community leadersshould be involved in designing and conduct-ing reconciliation efforts where they live. Butone must bear in mind that indigenous prac-tices often reinforce historical hierarchies andbiases that often exclude women, Dalits, andreligious minorities.17 Many people in thesecategories may in fact have borne the bruntof the conflict’s violence. In such cases, de-velopment partners can help build capacityby providing trained mediators, togetherwith the logistic and financial support suchexperts may need. These specialists can workunder the oversight of local peace commit-tees in districts.

Beyond retributiveand restorative approachesBecause economic and social injustice has beenboth a root cause and a result of Nepal’s con-flict, the country’s peace agreement reflects adeep commitment to redressing these inequi-

ties. Given the strong links that exist betweentransitional justice and development, attentionto the inclusion of women and hitherto ne-glected caste and ethnic groups in legal andinstitutional reforms can contribute significantlyto preventing future conflict.18 Future govern-ment efforts should therefore revise legisla-tion that does not meet international humanrights standards, especially discriminatorylaws.19 Even as late as 2005, as many as 32provisions perpetuated discrimination on thebasis of religion, caste and ethnicity, while 176provisions in 83 pieces of legislation discrimi-nated against women in Nepal.20 Fortunately,the April 2006 movement took important stepstowards eliminating legal exclusion by gen-der, caste, ethnicity and religion. The GenderEquality Act (2006) adopted by the InterimLegislature-Parliament called for an end to alldiscriminatory laws and regulations againstwomen, required 33 percent of those in gov-ernment and government-appointed institu-tions to be women, and strengthened lawsagainst domestic and other kinds of violenceagainst women.

Social Reintegration andRehabilitation of InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs)At the height of the conflict, as many as200,000 people were estimated to be inter-nally displaced in Nepal.21 Because of inse-cure conditions, people fled their villages fordistrict headquarters—some even beyond toKathmandu or across the open border intoIndia. The CPA guarantees IDPs the right toreturn, along with the return of their prop-erty. However, because no reliable compre-hensive data exists as yet, it is still difficult todetermine the number of IDPs who havesuccessfully exercised their rights and returnedhome.22

As of June 2008, the United Nations Officefor the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-fairs (OCHA) stated that between 50,000 and

Restorative justicefocuses onreparations,expanding theconcept beyondfinancialcompensation toconsider medium-and long-termmeasures thatimprove health,education, andemployment

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70,000 people remain displaced in Nepal.23

Its report asserts that “people are not likelyto register unless there are clear and tangiblebenefits” and that “the most vulnerable IDPsare still not registered and remain invisible”because they lack information about theregistration process and may fear its conse-quences. A disproportionate number of reg-istered IDPs are landowners, who havecompleted the process so as to seek com-pensation for lands seized during the con-flict.24 The majority of IDPs who intend toreturn to their original homes have alreadydone so, the report concludes.25

The reasons for non-return among IDPs in-volve both “push” and “pull” factors. The“push” factors, those that continue to keeppeople away from their homes, include con-tinued harassment by Maoist/Young Com-munist League cadres, violence by armedTarai groups and poor security and rule oflaw. Moreover, because their lands have beenseized by one or another faction, some fami-lies have nothing to which they can return.The “pull” factors, which keep people in thecities to which they had fled, encompass bet-ter access to services and quality of life,greater job opportunities, job choice, highersalaries, and greater access to governmentofficials. Many therefore prefer their new livesin the cities. But such preferences should notpreclude reparations, especially because manyrecent migrants belong to vulnerable groupswhose members are least likely to be includedon government registration lists—amongthese, women in general and hitherto ne-glected marginalized groups.

ReparationsReparations constitute one of the most tan-gible instruments of reconciliation. In thecontext of the peace process in Nepal, it islimited so far to providing financial com-pensation to the conflict victims so that theycan develop or redevelop sustainable liveli-

hoods. The Ministry of Peace and Recon-struction has been offering financial relief andassistance following the Norms and Guide-lines approved by cabinet in 2007, to the fol-lowing persons of the conflict victims:

Financial Assistance to the family of deadpersons:• Assistance of one hundred thousand

rupees to close relative;• Provision of scholarships to at most

three children until the age of 18 years;and

• Financial assistance of twenty fivethousand rupees to widows.

Provision of financial assistance towounded persons for treatment.Financial assistance for the loss or dam-age of properties.Financial assistance for the damage ofvehicles.Financial assistance of twenty five thou-sand rupees to persons disappearedmore than 30 days.Provision of skill training and foreignemployment to conflict affected personsand their families.26

The details of such support and other re-lief appear elsewhere.27

Integration of the armies andsocial rehabilitation ofdischarged combatants

Integration and rehabilitation of the Maoistarmy combatantsThe United Nations Mission in Nepal(UNMIN) began the process of registrationand verification of combatants and arms in2007 following the agreement between the po-litical parties of Nepal. The parties have agreedto verify the combatants on the basis of twobench marks. The agreement stated that thosewho: (i) were recruited in the Maoist army be-fore the ceasefire, 25 May 2006, and (ii) were

Many recentmigrants belong

to vulnerablegroups whose

members are leastlikely to beincluded ongovernmentregistration

lists—amongthese, women in

general andhitherto neglected

marginalisedgroups

3



18 years old prior to the ceasefire would beconsidered Maoist army combatants.28

In the initial round, a total of 32,250 Maoistarmy combatants were registered. Addition-ally, a total of 3,475 weapons of the Maoistarmy combatants were registered and stored.An equivalent number of weapons of theNepal Army was collected and stored un-der similar conditions. During the secondround, only 23,610 Maoist army combat-ants participated, meaning that 8,640 had leftthe cantonments and were thus automaticallydisqualified. Of those, 19,602 were verified,comprising 15,756 men and 3,846 women,and 4008 were minors or late recruits. Thusfar, the Joint Monitoring Coordination Com-mittee has provided a successful example ofcollaboration between the two forces andthe United Nations.

Article 146 of the Interim Constitution reads:“The Council of Ministers shall form a Spe-cial Committee to supervise, integrate andrehabilitate the combatants of the Maoistarmy…”29 Now a Special committee hasbeen formed, which has also constituted aeight-member Army Integration TechnicalCommittee.

The CPA also makes a commitment to the“democratization” and “right-sizing” of theNepal Army. However, it does not provideclear guidance about how these processesshould take place. In view of the lack ofclear guidance, this requires a decision fromthe highest political level. The Special Com-mittee and Army Integration Technical Com-mittee do not have a clear political mandateof taking such decision. Delaying this difficultdecision could further result in leaving theMaoist army combatants in the cantonmentsfor a longer time than what is expected.30

Even more critical are the mechanisms forcivilian control of the army, especially the

National Security Council and the Ministryof Defense. Now that the monarchy hasbeen abolished, it is essential to establishtrusted, transparent, and accountable institu-tions to oversee the military structure andprevent corruption by monitoring its financesand system of promotions.31,32 Those chargedwith these duties may well wish to examinethe experience of other countries that havedealt with similar issues. Recent examples, suchas Burundi and Sierra Leone, may prove use-ful. But the eventual solutions must beuniquely Nepali and tailored specifically tolocal context.

Rehabilitation of disqualifiedMaoist army personnelThe rehabilitation or social reintegration of4,008 members of the Maoist army whowere identified either as minors (2,973), oras recruited after 25 May 2006 (1035) dur-ing the UN-supported verification process,requires particular care. Like young peoplewho fought in areas as different from Nepalas the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, theminors amongst these Maoist army combat-ants should be included in the planning oftheir return to civilian life for successful rein-tegration into civil society.

UNMIN and the United Nations Children’sFund have continuously insisted upon theurgency of fulfilling the commitment to dis-charge from the cantonments those whowere minors on 25 May 2006, along withother personnel disqualified by UN verifica-tion. To support the discharge process,UNICEF, UNDP and UNFPA have devel-oped social reintegration programmes in con-sultation with the Ministry of Peace and Re-construction to address the special needs ofyoung people who were qualified as minors.

The army integration Special Committee re-quested the Government to proceed withthe discharge of disqualified Maoist army

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personnel from the cantonments on 11 Feb-ruary 2009. However, the process has notyet been started. On 5 May 2009 the Secu-rity Council called upon the government toimplement its commitment to discharge mi-nors in accordance with the international law.

Discharged Maoist army combatants can playan important role in restorative justice effortsat the local and community levels; they mustbecome part of community healing and trans-formation. Because it is often difficult for in-dividuals who have devoted so much time tofighting to move easily into the economic andsocial activities of peace, this element of rein-tegration requires particular attention and sup-port. The case of Burundi provides an ex-ample of such a process. There, former com-batants were provided with a “reinsertionpackage” that had five thrusts:

targeted community-based assistance;training and self-employment;continued education;entrepreneurship support; andemployment by existing enterprises andby the government itself.

Other United Nations experience dealingwith former combatants in both peacekeep-ing and non-peacekeeping operations, includ-ing Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia (Aceh), Liberia,and Sudan, can furnish other insights.33

Among others, UN organizations in Nepalhave developed such reintegration packages(Box 3.3).

Managing expectationsin the present

Restoring the rule of law andimproving justiceThroughout Nepal, citizens have called forthe restoration of the rule of law as one oftheir primary concerns. They want the lawadministered impartially by all actors in thesystem—from law enforcement personnel(the police) through the judiciary (judges andcourts) to those charged with this mandatein the Ministry of Home Affairs. Civil soci-ety also plays a critical role in this process,acting as an intermediary between the pub-lic and law enforcement authorities by pro-moting knowledge and awareness and by

Dischargedcombatants can

play animportant role inrestorative justice

efforts at thelocal and

community levels

UNDP Nepal, working in collaboration with UNMIN, UNICEFand UNFPA, and in close consultation with the Ministry ofPeace and Reconstruction, developed a strategy in 2008to provide social reintegration assistance packages. Theseconsist of (1) vocational training/apprenticeship, (2) agri-culture and livestock training, (3) micro-enterprise devel-opment, and (4) non-formal education—each with vari-ous options. These training and educational services willbe available in all five development regions and will rangefrom several weeks to one year. Special arrangementscan be made to facilitate participation of groups with spe-cial needs, such as lactating mothers and disabled youths.

To ensure the livelihoods of disqualified Maoist army per-sonnel, support and follow-up is planned after the comple-tion of training. This includes issuing tool kits and employ-

ment-related information, along with facilitating access tomicro-credit for those who choose vocational skill train-ing; providing agricultural inputs and basic equipment, fur-nishing small livestock, such as poultry and beehives, andthe linkage of this assistance with potential markets forthose who choose the agriculture and livestock trainingpackage. Similarly, for those involved in micro-enterprisetraining, the package provides grants of small-scale equip-ment, along with linkages to credit and output markets.

To support the effectiveness of the training and thesustainability of livelihood opportunities, the social reinte-gration strategy also features suggestions for severalfollow-up activities to be undertaken by the government.

Source: UNDP records.

BOX 3.3 Social reintegration package for the disqualified Maoist army personnel, Nepal

3



facilitating access to justice. All societies gov-erned by the rule of law strive to give citi-zens access both to the law and to legal as-sistance (whether certified lawyers or otherknowledgeable authorities), paid for bypublic funds if necessary. In this connec-tion, we should recall that the smooth func-tioning of rule of law plays a key role ineconomic development, investment, andgrowth—and therefore in human develop-ment.

The CPA clearly assigns the primary respon-sibility for creating a secure environment tothe Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force,under the direction of the Ministry of HomeAffairs. Weakened by the conflict, the NepalPolice and the Armed Police Force are nowworking to regain the trust of the public;they are frequently criticized for not havingadequate capacity, technical skills and equip-ment, and training. Additionally, many Nepalibelieve that police morale is low because ofinsufficient political backing from the cen-tral government, along with political inter-ference from high-ranking officers and poli-ticians. Such interference not only results inimpunity for perpetrators, but underminesthe will of the rank and file patrolmen tomaintain the fundamentals of law and or-der. Why take action if one’s work will ulti-mately be undone?

Further, weakness in the rule of law encour-ages the emergence of parallel structures,among these the Unified CPN (Maoist)-af-filiated Young Communist League and theCPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist - UML)-af-filiated Youth Force. Such groups dole outextrajudicial punishment to alleged lawbreak-ers. In addition, the political parties them-selves are also acting as surrogates for thestate, operating on a “consensus” basis toresolve all kinds of problems, whether po-litical or criminal.

To return the rule of law to its fundamentalplace in Nepal, the government must take sev-eral steps, among them the following:

visible political backing at the highest lev-els for the Nepal Police, the Armed Po-lice Force, Chief District Officers, andall who are legally responsible for im-partial law enforcement to carry out theirwork in a manner that is respectful ofhuman rights;the equal dispensation of justice, regard-less of the alleged perpetrator’s mem-bership in any group;a campaign that publicizes concrete ex-amples of effective law enforcement;further capacity-building for the NepalPolice and Armed Police Force, espe-cially in community relations-building ef-forts; many people are still traumatizedby the police and do not see them a forcefor their individual protection; andRecruiting local police officers. This prac-tice may also help to improve access tojustice in communities.

Additionally, both the state and local civilsociety must work to reduce impedimentsto accessing the justice system. These in-clude:

the high costs imposed by the legal sys-tem;the backlog of cases that severely slowsdown the judicial process; justice de-ferred can well become justice denied;lengthy and cumbersome court proce-dures;unfamiliarity or misunderstanding of le-gal terms and legal rules; andthe absence of key laws required forprosecution.

There can be no peace without justice, andthere can be no justice without the rule oflaw. As is often the case, the poor and theexcluded who need critical legal services

Weakness in therule of lawencourages theemergence ofparallel structures

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lack access to them. There are at least fourfundamental barriers to this access: a lackof legal identity, ignorance of legal rights,inadequate availability of legal services, andunjust and unaccountable legal institutions.Even in today’s Nepal, there remain indi-viduals deprived of legal identity either be-cause they lack formal citizenship registra-tion or because they are landless. They aretherefore barred from benefiting from thelaw of land, especially if they seek redressfrom exploitation by the powerful. Manyordinary Nepalis have little or no knowl-edge of their legal rights despite variousprogrammes aimed at fostering awareness.

Moreover, the formal court system in Nepalextends only to district headquarters and isencumbered by potential interventions frompolitical leaders. This is yet another mani-festation of the tendency of the justice au-thorities to intervene in the better off-re-gions and on behalf of the upper andmiddle classes. Even those citizens whoknow their rights cannot undertake legalaction because they cannot afford legal fees.Rising awareness, coupled with an inabilityto pay for legal services, leads to increasingfrustration among Nepalis. Despite effortsby the government and Non-GovernmentOrganisations to correct these shortcom-ings, improvements are scattered, little-known, and lacking in the rural areas wherethe need is the greatest. To enhance accessto justice, therefore, yet another significantstep could be an increased emphasis on com-munity mediation efforts (see Box 3.4).These not only cost far less in both time andmoney, but often meet local needs more ef-fectively than government action at higherlevels. Hardly least, such local mediation ef-forts provide an opportunity to cultivatepeace-building skills at the community level.Where communities choose to apply indig-enous practices to current cases, these tradi-tional local modes need to be examined,

adapted to contemporary needs and laws,and publicly promoted.

Corruption has also played a major role indiscouraging people from using the legalprocedures available to them. Those whoseek justice through official channels payhigher costs in time as well as money. Manyfind themselves forced to sell whatever theycan, including land. In addition, proceduraldelays tie up cases for years and years. Hencethe classic Nepali aphorism “Law for thepoor, immunity for the rich”.

Improving service deliveryIn addition to restoring the rule of law, im-proving service delivery enhances human de-velopment in post-conflict situations, especiallyin terms of health care, education and localsecurity. Indeed, many Nepalis question howfar the political transition can succeed withoutthe restitution of such services.

In this area, the most important factor is thereconstitution of local governance bodies.This entails functional devolution down tothe community level with appropriate checksand balances. To make service delivery moreeffective, a new Good Governance (Opera-tion and Management) Act of 2007 and itsregulation of 2008 have been adopted, alongwith provisions for integrated service de-livery centres to meet the needs of peoplebelow the district level. Donors can play animportant role in such efforts.

Despite earlier shortcomings in similar endeav-ors, the end of the conflict presents a uniqueopportunity to transform the way in whichgovernment reaches out to citizens. The fol-lowing general strategies may help:

Making service providers directly ac-countable to the community via localelections and frequent regular consulta-tions between the providers and thosethey serve;

There can be nopeace without

justice, and therecan be no justicewithout the rule

of law

3



Reducing corruption by increasing theuse of open book-keeping, social au-dits, and methods such as public hear-ings, radio broadcasts and non-verbalposters that allow people who are notliterate to also monitor project imple-mentation and spending;34

Increasing capacity-building, particularlyfor local user groups in rural areas sothat they can participate in planningproject budgets, monitoring project op-erations and conducting evaluations ofpublic service; and

Allocating adequate funds to projectsthat affect marginalized groups.

Widening representation andparticipationAs this Report has earlier pointed out, hu-man development concerns enlarging op-tions—of which income is only one. Peoplealso want to take part in the decisions thatdirectly effect their lives—the key principleof democracy. The disconnect betweenKathmandu and the rest of the country—mirrored by the disconnect between dis-

UNICEF supports an extensive network of Para-legal Com-mittees (PLCs) in Nepal. A total of 482 PLCs operating atthe VDC level are functional in 23 districts where theDecentralised Action for Women and Children is imple-mented by the Ministry of Local Development with thesupport of UNICEF. Para-legal Committees are comprisedof women from different cultural, socio-economic and re-ligious backgrounds.

Formed as early as in 1999 as part of an anti-traffickingintervention, PLCs initiated their interventions against allforms of violence, exploitation and abuse of women andchildren in 2002. They are supported by District ResourceGroups (DRGs), which are district-based groups of 10-12 lawyers and social activists who provide training,technical support, and monitoring to all the PLC groups intheir district.

PLCs deal with a broad range of cases, particularly thoseinvolving domestic violence, trafficking, early marriage,witchcraft, property disputes and polygamy. They medi-ate cases or refer them as needed to a range of localservice providers, including the courts. They also followup cases which they have referred as well as those theyhave mediated successfully, to ensure an ongoing fairoutcome. In 2008, out of 5,696 reported cases, 4,698(84%) were resolved by PLCs while 898 (16%) werereferred.

The community-based justice and mediation offered byPLCs is recognized as an extremely effective, holistic

and inexpensive means of attaining justice for women,children and other excluded groups even in placeswhere the formal justice system is accessible. PLCsalso play an extremely important role in prevention, pro-moting gender equity and women's rights through socialmobilisation and awareness-raising in their communi-ties. Through constant advocacy, they have createdspace for women to share 'private' abuses, as well asgradually changing the social context which allows suchabuses to occur.

The PLCs were able to operate even during the conflict,when many communities suffered from a vacuum of lawenforcement. This was due to their engagement in promot-ing the rights of women and children, and their neutrality,transparency, and impartial justice for the vulnerable groupswho are in the serious need of such support.

Because of the growing achievements of PLCs, the gov-ernment and other UN agencies have begun includingPLCs in their programmes and projects. The Local Gover-nance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP)of the Ministry of Local Development has used PLCs tomobilise community participation in local planning. Simi-larly, UNDP under its Access to Justice Programme isplanning to expand the PLCs; and UNICEF, UNFPA andUNIFEM will expand PLCs in 60 VDCs in four districtswhere their joint programme on gender-based violencewill be implemented.

Source: UNICEF Nepal.

BOX 3.4 Para-legal committees: a community-based protection mechanism in Nepal

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trict headquarters and rural settlements—has concentrated power in the hands of anelite. Fully implementing the peace processdemands that all Nepalis feel vested in thecountry’s development opportunities. Thismeans enlisting local people, as far as pos-sible, in peace-building activities that include:

Local Peace Committees (LPCs) andother peace-building efforts;The TRC and other transitional justicemechanisms;The constitutional process; andThe state restructuring debate.

This is all the more important because localinitiatives thus far have received relatively littleattention. While problems at the local leveloften cannot be resolved before the conclu-sion of a detailed agreement at the centre,local efforts can certainly have effects farabove their level, even in connection with se-curity and land return.

Local peace committeesProvision for LPCs has been made underarticle 8.3 and 8.4 of the CPA. Article 8.3provides that both sides [SPA and Maoist]are committed to resolve all types of com-mon differences or problems through mu-tual dialogue, agreement and understand-ings. Article 8.4 states that both sides ex-press their commitment to the fact that theInterim Council of Ministers shall, in orderto implement this Accord, ..., constitute theNational Peace and Rehabilitation Commis-sion, the truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion, and other mechanisms as per neces-sity, and may determine their working pro-cedure.

Since the CPA provides only broad guide-lines on many topics, LPCs could becomeimportant fora for discussion, implemen-tation, and peace-building at the grassrootslevel. Unfortunately, the Committees have

faced problems in the districts in whichthey have been piloted in 2006. Initially,their affiliation only with the Ministry ofPeace and Reconstruction has generatedmistrust. Although their official Terms ofReference call for an inclusive approach,they so far seem to have little involvementof women and other interested groups.This has led to their being perceived as“top-down” bodies controlled by themajor parties, rather than “bottom-up”representatives of their respective districts.Box 3.5 sums up the findings of an as-sessment of 28 LPCs commissioned bythe Ministry itself.35

The assessment culminated in a range ofproposals specific to individual LPCs, as wellas recommendations for the MOPR at thenational level. These included:

amending the LPC’s Terms of Refer-ence so as to make them more inclusive;preparing and circulating operationalguidelines and an ImplementationManual for the establishment and main-tenance of the LPCs;re-issuing instructions to the officials re-sponsible for organizing LPCs in districtswhere they had not yet been formed;andlaunching a capacity developmentprogramme for government officialsand relevant stakeholders so as to en-hance the functioning of the Commit-tees.

As a result, the Terms of Reference of theLPCs were revised and issued in early 2009with a view to institutionalizing their peace-building activities at the local level. The newmandate stresses responding to the concernsof local stakeholders for the practice ofdemocratic values and beliefs in develop-ing a sustainable peace, as well as in foster-ing an environment for the emergence of a

Implementing thepeace process

demands that allNepalis feelvested in the

country’sdevelopment

opportunities

3



just system by resolving the remaining ele-ments of conflict and promoting peace andreconstruction through mutual goodwilland a spirit of unity. Each of the LPCsmust now comprise 23 members, at leastone third of them women, along with in-dividuals chosen by Dalits, indigenous na-tionalities, Madhesi, and Muslims; repre-sentatives of conflict-affected sectors, aswell as spokespersons of civil society andthe private sector, including human rightsactivists and leaders of commerce and in-dustry. However, 12 of the 23 membersmust represent the district working com-mittees of the political parties present inthe CA. The LPC will serve until the newconstitution is completed and enacted.

Each Committee will form a nine-mem-ber local peace secretariat from its mem-bership to carry out its decisions; this secre-tariat, which will regularly report to the LPC,must include two women and equitablyrepresent the major political parties.36 Ad-ditionally, the LPC can also form a nine-member VDC or Municipality level PeaceCommittee. The Secretary of the VillageDevelopment Committee or the Execu-tive Officer of the Municipality will act asthe Secretary of the Peace Committee.

The resources of local bodies—District De-velopment Committee, Village Develop-ment Committee and Municipality—willsupport the operations of the LPC. TheCommittee can invite representatives fromdistrict line agencies, including the DistrictAdministrative Office, the District Devel-opment Committee, and the District Po-lice Office, as well as other bodies and in-dividuals working at the local level, to actas observers in the Committee meetings.The LPC agenda will necessarily be morepolitical than technical. However, its ac-tivities will help build capacities useful forreconstruction activities.

Transforming the LPCs into effective bod-ies will require donor support, including thatof the United Nations system. Globally,UNDP has extensive experience in fosteringthe development of local conflict preven-tion. UNICEF and other bodies of the in-ternational system have also been involvedin strengthening similar efforts. Ideally, a jointprogramme would prevent as well as resolveconflicts at the local level. Eventually, LPCscould become “bottom-up” institutions forpreserving peace and fostering democracynation-wide.

During February and June 2008, the MOPR interviewed 250persons, including Chief District Officers, leaders of politicalparties, representatives of civil society organizations andbusiness people so as to assess the LPCs. Among the key findingsare the following:

Most of the respondents welcomed the concept of LPCswarmly and characterized it as very desirable—indeed,necessary—to the transition period. They felt that it gavethem a forum for participating and contributing collectively tothe peace process at the district level. Some people, however,called the LPCs redundant because the “all-party”mechanisms, together with the existing district administrationand the district council, wield all decision-making power—and will continue to do so. They also pointed out that LPCswould work best only when a consensus government tookpower in Kathmandu.Some of the LPCs were very active, especially during theirfirst few weeks. Many contributed significantly to preventingelection-related inter-party violence during the run-up to theCA election, holding all-party meetings with civil societyinvolvement, reinforcing commitment to the electoral code ofconduct, mediating political disputes, and preventing minorconflicts from escalating.Although women and Dalits have been grossly under-represented in the existing LPCs, the number of civil societyparticipants has almost doubled that of political party membersin most of the Committees.The autonomy of the LPCs make them the only government-mandated bodies that can draw all major political and civil

society leaders together at the district level to work for peace.

Source: MOPR 2008A.

Assessment of Local Peace Committees in Nepal:some key findingsBOX 3.5

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Securing the future: a participatoryconstitution-building processTwo critical challenges now face Nepal: en-suring a participatory constitution-buildingprocess, and finding an appropriate balancebetween the country’s political agenda andits development needs.

Nepal has had six constitutions during in thelast 60 years.37 None except that of 1990drew upon a participatory process for itsdrafting and even then the collected infor-mation was hardly used. Arguably, even thatprocess seems to have been dominated by asmall expert body with close connections toboth the political parties and the palace. In-deed, the King proclaimed this constitution’spromulgation.

The result of these top-down proceduresexcluded large numbers of citizens from in-fluencing successive constitutional changesand from exerting significant political or eco-nomic power. Consequently, each constitu-tion was challenged as varying groups be-came able to articulate their grievances anddemand justice. The 2006 Janandolan can beread as a direct expression of the Nepalipeople’s desire to be included in their owndemocratic governance.

Participation of the CA membersThe Interim Constitution of Nepal containsa provision that a Constituent Assembly (CA)will prepare the new constitution of Nepal.After three postponements, the election ofthe CA was held on 10 April 2008, follow-ing a mixed electoral system discussed in thefollowing chapter.

The 601-member CA is sufficiently repre-sentative of different caste and ethnic groups,as well as of women, to give it legitimacyfor drafting the constitution. The formationof 14 committees with the delineation of

responsibilities end 2008 was a major stepforward (see Box 3.6).38

If necessary, minority CA members shouldbe allowed to speak in the language in whichthey are best able to express their views; asummary could be provided for othermembers in Nepali.39 Formal and informalprocedures should be utilized to ensure thatwomen and marginalized group represen-tatives are able to participate fully in the pro-ceedings so as to contribute to the credibil-ity of the process—and, more important,to contribute ideas that have not formallybeen voiced before. Given the history ofelite-driven political decision-making inNepal, this will not be easy. Religion andculture have already led senior male mem-bers to try to dominate the proceedings.Others have already protested.

The process of free prior informed consent(FPIC) from different social groups may al-leviate this sort of contention. The principleappears in the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,adopted by the General Assembly on 13September 2007, as well as in the Interna-tional Labour Organization Convention 169concerning Indigenous Peoples in Indepen-dent Countries. Following this process, con-cerned members of the Constituent Assem-bly might inform previously excluded groupsabout any discussion that involves them. Thiswould entitle members of such groups tospeak in successive meetings of the Assem-bly on the points that concern their rightsand practices.40

Participation of the broader communityCA Members should not be the only con-duit for public input. There are other meansof gathering people’s views on the contentof the future constitution. South Africa’s iswell known and involved three phases:

Two criticalchallenges now

face Nepal:ensuring a

participatoryconstitution-

building process,and finding an

appropriatebalance between

the country’spolitical agenda

and itsdevelopment

needs

3



eliciting public input before the formaldrafting;gathering public comments on the drafttext; andfinalization and adoption by SouthAfrica’s constitutional assembly.

In the first phase, a media department wascreated to publicize the work of the consti-tution-makers; all thematic committees ex-plicitly sought public input in their areas.Nearly 1.7 million submissions resulted, bothwritten and oral, including suggestions madevia the Internet, at public meetings andthrough telephone calls to a dedicated talkline. Through a face-to-face outreachprogramme, the members of the country’sparliament, assisted by local civil society or-ganizations, targeted communities that couldnot easily access information through printor electronic media—particularly those inremote areas and those with low literacyrates.

For the first time, many South Africans hadactive contact with their elected representa-tives. Over four million copies of the draftconstitution were circulated for comment,resulting in approximately 250,000 responses.The CA then held private meetings to nego-tiate contentious issues—a move that wascriticized, but also allowed for freer debate.Finally, seven million copies of the final docu-ment were distributed in all 11 official lan-guages, as well as a version with pictures ac-companying the text.41

This process provides some useful examplesfor Nepal, including:

Dividing the constitutional process intomultiple phases, each generating input;Creating a media or public informationdepartment that helps inform citizensabout the constitutional process, and al-lows for targeted monitoring to test how

well the message is being disseminatedamong various groups;Establishing a public submission mecha-nism that can handle vast numbers ofsubmissions, consolidate the informa-tion, and ensure that it reaches the ap-propriate committee;Holding public seminars in which CAcommittee members themselves inter-act with citizens particularly interested intheir handling of certain issues; andDistributing the draft text in Nepali andother native languages to foster publicownership of the final version.

All these steps point to introducing the idea ofa mechanism to further communication fordevelopment. It could broaden informationflow downward and allow voters, includingwomen and those who belong to marginalized

CA Membersshould not be theonly conduit forpublic input.There are othermeans ofgathering people’sviews on thecontent of thefuture constitution

Towards the end of 2008, the government made followingprovisions for preparing the new constitution:

Formation of 14 committees from the 601-member CA: 10subject committees, each preparing the draft on a specificsubject/section of the constitution in consultation with experts;three process committees to organize consultations withcitizen groups during the preparation of the constitution; andone constitution committee, responsible for compiling thesectional drafts and providing a legal basis for the constitution.The Constitution Committee will comprise at most 63 members,and the others at most 41.Once the constitution is compiled, it will be submitted to theCA for discussion. The draft will be revised in accordancewith the inputs and comments received. This revision will betaken to the districts for consultations facilitated by the threeprocess committees. The text will then be further revised toincorporate the comments and views submitted by citizensof each district.Finally, each and every section/point of the constitutionwill be discussed and, as far as possible, will be adoptedby consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, a vote

will be taken.

Source: Government of Nepal records.

Process adopted by the Government of Nepal fordeveloping the new constitutionBOX 3.6

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groups, to voice their needs and opinions andthus participate in decision-making that affectstheir lives. Indeed, a lack of voice is an integralelement of poverty. Access to information inlanguages and formats that people can under-stand and utilize is vital not only for furtheringpolitical democracy, but also helping citizensraise their living standards themselves.

Constitution-making can be a very conten-tious process. It poses serious risks of divid-ing any nation. Constitution-makers oftenlong for decision-making by consensus. Butprocedures such as those outlined above arelikely to foster a peaceful and constructiveatmosphere—which is more likely to leadto a product with broad support. Free priorinformed consent can strengthen the pro-cess. It translates into making a sovereignpeople the collective guardian of the law oftheir land, whatever the differences amongthem and whatever compromises theirelected representatives must make to harmo-nize those differences. Few peoples in his-tory have had a comparable opportunity.

Where we now standThus far, the peace process has been character-ized by a “one issue at a time” approach. Thishas slowed progress and limited decision-mak-ing authority in the hands of an elite few. Prac-tically speaking, it has also meant an almost ex-clusive focus on politics at the expense of de-velopment. Now there is a need for balancingthe political and development agendas.

Both public and civil society organizations inNepal should consider pressing for an in-creased emphasis on development during thispolitical transition period. A renewed focuson equitable growth and development willnot only be the most effective way to pro-vide a “peace dividend” for the people ofNepal. It can also offer another opportunityfor community healing, reconciliation, andrebuilding, and as a chance for communitiesto practice inclusion.

Such a strategy can also bring together Nepalipoliticians and the international community.Politicians have an incentive to focus on de-velopment in order to build up their constitu-encies and win the “hearts and minds” of vot-ers. The international community can also positlocal development as part of its wider goalto support Nepal’s peace process.42

There is no one model of peace process, justas there is no single model of development.The “best practices” of one country or soci-ety sometimes do not work for any other.While it is easy to criticize the government,political parties, civil society, donors and oth-ers for not doing enough to advance the tasknow under way, it is equally important to rec-ognize its enormity. Most important is con-tinuing to strive for the greatest possible in-clusion and participation of the Nepali peoplethroughout this period. Equitable representa-tion and participation must become the coreprinciples for the new Nepal—which formsthe subject of the chapters that follow.

Equitablerepresentation

and participationmust become the

core principles forthe new Nepal

Politicalinclusion andhumandevelopment

4CHAPTER

Revisiting political exclusion

The electoral system andhuman development

Internal democracy of thepolitical parties

Participation of citizensand their representatives

Unitary state structure and thecentralization of decision-making

Conclusion

Politicalinclusion and

humandevelopment

4Chapter

s the first chapter of this Reportpointed out, the exclusion ofwomen and various caste and eth-

nic groups in state organs spurred the 2006Janandolan (people’s movement). Ending ex-clusion through fair representation and partici-pation in the political system can enlarge op-tions and thus enhance human development.Given this premise, this chapter analyses howto open the political system fairly to all. In par-ticular, the chapter deals with an assessment ofthe electoral system, the internal democracy ofpolitical parties, and decentralization—all ofwhich have great influence on representationand participation in the process of democrati-zation. Before delving into these topics, though,a brief review of political exclusion is in order.

Revisiting political exclusionThe Shah and Rana polities of Nepal werefundamentally oligarchic, based on a narrowband of castes within a single religion. Thesefamily reigns depended essentially on adepoliticised general population, the tradi-tional army, and external support.

Until the fall of Shah Dynasty in May 2008,the Nepali state continued to rely on thesebulwarks. The country’s rulers persisted inthinking that the assimilation, not accommo-dation, of all excluded caste and ethnicgroups into the broad Gorkhali culturewould be the foundation of even the mod-ern state. The conquest of the Kathmandu

valley by the king of Gorkha in 1768 laidthe foundations of monoculturalism and theabsorption of all other cultural and socialgroupings into this superficial political unity.

This approach to nation-state building lastedfor 240 years. A unitary state structure be-came the means of maintaining Nepal’s eth-nic mosaic intact. The unifier, King PrithviNarayan Shah, limited his army to a few casteand ethnic groups and instructed his succes-sors to restrict recruitment to four commu-nities: the Khas, Magar, Gurung and Thakuri.All others, collectively called prajas, were in-eligible.1 Thus, the Newar and Madhesi com-munities were excluded from army service.

Although the rule of the Rana dynasty cameto an end after 104 years in 1950, the newregime suppressed democratic trends. Thesubsequent era of party politics (1951–60)failed to consolidate the democratic move-ment and thus paved the way for a royalcoup that introduced the partyless Panchayat(village council) system in 1961.

The year-long unrest of 1979–80 culminatedin the King’s calling for a referendum, whichappeared to reaffirm popular confidence inthe partyless Panchayat system. The Hill com-munities called for recognition of their cul-ture and the right to participate as equals inthe nation-building task. They also demandedthat Nepal be declared a secular state in whichthey and other non-Hindu religious groups

The Shah andRana polities ofNepal werefundamentallyoligarchic, basedon a narrowband of casteswithin a singlereligion

Political inclusionand humandevelopment

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could share power and resources on the basisof equality with the two dominant castes, theBrahman and the Chhetri, whose membersoccupied most elective posts from top to bot-tom—with few places for women. Yet eventhe 1990 constitution declared Nepal a “multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent,indivisible, sovereign, Hindu (emphasis added)and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom”.

In 1990, the multiparty system came to poweronce again. The constitution of 1990 incor-porated four basic unchangeable elements asguiding principles:

the sovereignty of people,constitutional monarchy,a multiparty system, andrespect for basic human rights.

In practice, however, all the main political par-ties including Nepali Congress and Commu-nist Party of Nepal (UML) behind the consti-tution violated the spirit of popular sovereignty.Political action reverted to the Palace on 1 Feb-ruary 2005. The political parties looked uponthe monarchy as the source of power.

Even after the restoration of multi-party sys-tem in 1990, Nepal’s bureaucratic structure hadnot fundamentally changed. However, since the2006 Janandolan and the CPA, Nepal has un-dergone considerable political transformation.Box 4.1 sets out the major steps forward. Muchremains to be done, especially in the social realm.But this Report deals primarily with the trans-formation of the state for fair representationof excluded groups as enunciated in the CPA.To this end, the chapter analyses Nepal’s elec-toral system and political parties; the chapterthat follows deals with federal provisions forfurther accommodating the excluded groupsand regions equitably.

The electoral system and humandevelopmentThe nature of the electoral system of a coun-try determines to a large extent how inclu-

sively its population is represented in the po-litical system and how meaningful this partici-pation is for human development. This Re-port focuses on three criteria to gauge the ex-tent to which Nepal’s present electoral systemgives its citizens a voice in decision-making andthus fosters their development:

the inclusiveness of the national legislature2

or the current Constituent Assembly;accountability of assembly members se-lected under the electoral system; andstability of the political system.

Inclusiveness of the Legislature

A backward glance towards exclusivityThe 1990 constitution of Nepal adopted thefirst-past-the-post (FPTP) or plurality electoralsystem. Despite its advantages over the pro-portional representation (PR) system and its usein some of the biggest democracies in theworld—among these, India and the UnitedStates of America—the FPTP system does notmeet the needs of a poor and pluralistic soci-ety like that of Nepal. Here, it has strengthenedthe hegemony of a small number of large par-ties at the expense of their smaller identity-ori-ented counterparts, various caste and ethnicgroups and, far more generally, women.

First, FPTP does not permit small politicalparties to elect parliamentarians in proportionto the popular vote that they receive. In thecase of excluded groups, the National People’sLiberation Party of indigenous nationalities,with 1.1 percent of the popular vote, and theNepal Sadbhawana Party, with 3.3 percent,received zero and five seats respectively in the1999 election. Under proportional represen-tation, these two small parties would haveobtained three and seven seats, respectively.By contrast, in the same year, the Nepali Con-gress Party received 36.1 percent of the popu-lar vote, but won 55.1 percent of the parlia-mentary seats. This kind of artificial majorityenables a large party to form a governmentwithout winning a majority at the polls.

The nature of theelectoral systemdetermines to a

large extent howinclusively itspopulation is

represented in thepolitical system

and howmeaningful this

participation is forhuman

development

4

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Working Journalists Bill 2007, 6 August 2007: amongother this has made provision of provident fund, minimumsalary, treatment compensation, capacity building, and limit-ing media houses to keep only 15% journalists on contract.

Ratification of ILO Convention on Abolition of Forced Labour,16 August 2007.

Ratification of ILO Convention 169, 22 August 2007:this will ensure the rights of Janajati with regard to culture,land, natural resources, education, traditional justice, re-cruitment and employment conditions, vocational training,social security and health, as well as the development of amechanism for consultation and participation in governance.

Ratification of ILO Convention 105, August 2007: Itbanned forced labour.

Provision of Quotas of Posts in the Nepal Policeand Armed Police Force, October 2007: This reservedquotas for women and marginalized groups.

Memorandum of Understanding between Ministryof Peace and Reconstruction and the Badi Commu-nity, 16 October 2007: It made the provision of the right totake citizenship with the surname of their choice, an endto the forced use of derogatory surnames; and free school-ing for children of the Badi community.

12th amendment to the Nepal Police Regulations, 8November 2007: It amended that regulation to provide forrecruiting 32% indigenous nationalities, 28 % Madhesis, 15%Dalits, 20% women and 5% from the “backward regions”.

90-point government’s programs and policies, 10September 2008: the main priorities included constitution-making, the peace process, socio-economic transforma-tion, role of private, public and cooperative sectors in eco-nomic progress and special plans for the Karnali region.

Ordinance on Social Inclusion, 2009: It makes the pub-lic service inclusive. The proposed ordinance reserves45% of posts to women, Adivasi Janajati, Madhesi, Dalit,people with disabilities and residents of “backward re-gions”, while filling vacant posts through free competition.

Source: OHCHR 2007A; and http://www.nepalresearch.com/crisis_solution/papers/fes_2007_ nepal_december.pdf; and http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/50218toc.html

Citizenship Act, 26 November 2006: removed someaspects of gender-based discrimination, e.g., permittingboth father and mother to transmit citizenship to their chil-dren; further enabled Madhesi/Tarai people to obtain citi-zenship, among other progressive steps.

Ratification of Protocols of Convention on the Rightsof the Child, 2007: concerned the protection of childrenin armed conflict and prohibited the sale of children andchild prostitution.

Interim constitution 2007, 15 January 2007: pro-nounced Nepal a secular state; recognized the right oftraditionally marginalized groups; provided the right to non-discrimination and the right not to be subjected to untouch-ability as fundamental rights.

Amendment Bill of Interim Constitution, 9 March 2007:amending Article 33 (D), the Bill has stated that Madhesis,Dalits, ethnic Janajatis, women, labourers, peasants, thedisabled, backward classes and regions will be providedwith a proportional representation in the state. Similarly, amend-ing Article 138, the Bill said that the present centralized andunitary model of the state will be restructured so as to makeit inclusive and democratic, with a federal system in place.

Election to Members of the Constituent AssemblyAct 2007: adopted a mixed electoral system with both theFPTP and PR systems.

Right to Information Act, 18 July 2007: guaranteed ac-cess to official documents to any citizen, excluding onlythose papers related to the ‘investigation, inquiry and pros-ecution’ of crimes and those which jeopardize the “harmoni-ous relationship between various castes or communities”.

Agreement with Bonded labourers (Kamaiya), 25July 2007: Government signed an agreement that setsout a timetable for the allocation of land and other supportmeasures to ex-Kamaiyas.

Civil Service Bill, 3 August 2007: amended the Civil ServiceAct 1993. Among others it provided seat reservation to ex-cluded people and backward regions, and trade union rights.The reservation/ quotas in the civil service are as follows:women (33%), Janajati (27%) Madhesi (22%), Dalits (9%),persons with disabilities (5%), and backward regions (4%).

Second, the FPTP system cannot hope to fairlyrepresent a country that comprises as many as103 castes and ethnic groups and 92 languages.The 1999 pattern of representation in legisla-ture did not basically differ from that of theNational Panchayat during the party-less era.Brahman/Chhetri and Newar domination con-

tinued after 1990 in the three parliamentary elec-tions of 1991, 1994 and 1999, giving these threegroups’ representation disproportionate to theirshare in the total population3 at the expenseof the excluded caste and ethnic groups. Thelatter thereby lagged behind in influencingpolicies conducive to their development.

BOX 4.1 Inclusive provisions after the CPA, Nepal, November 2006

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Women fared even worse. According to the1990 constitution, at least 5 percent of parlia-ment members were supposed to be female.Yet in the general elections of 1991, of 1,345candidates for the Lower House, only 79women (5.9%) entered the fray, and only eightcandidates could win in a House of 205 mem-bers. In the National Assembly of 60 mem-bers, three women were inducted by using boththe methods of co-option or nomination andelection. Thus, the representation of womenwas limited to 11 members (3.9 percent in theHouse of Representatives and 5 percent in theNational Assembly). Similarly, in the 1999 par-liament, there were altogether 21 women (12in the lower house and 9 in the upper house),including the King’s nominees of the secondchamber. Only one woman member becamea Minister—of the Ministry of Women andSocial Welfare—in the inordinately large 32-member Council of Ministers.

Moreover, many of the women membersof the parliament either came from high-caste families or were the close relatives ofmale leaders. So the competition was heavilybiased against those who ran on their per-formance records, including long service inthe political parties.4

The electoral system for the 2008 CA electionThe Interim Constitution 2007 made a pro-vision for a mixed electoral system for the

2008 CA election, in which the FPTP methodwas used to elect 240 members, while the other335 came to office through PR method. Eachvoter received two ballots, one to vote in theFPTP competition for candidates in singlemember districts, the other for PR. This kindof combination, aimed at uniting the best ofboth systems, now exists in as many as 34countries.

Nepal was divided into 240 geographic elec-toral constituencies for electing one memberfrom each constituency under the FPTP system.People cast their vote to choose a candidate.Nine political parties won seats in the Constitu-tional Assembly under this system. Of these, theUnified CPN (Maoist) secured the largest num-ber of seats—120 members (Box 4.2).

335 members were elected under the pro-portional representation system, assumingNepal as a single electoral constituency. Eachparty submitted a closed list of candidates tothe Election Commission before the electionand voters cast vote for their party of choicerather than for individual candidates. Basedon the number of the total votes received inthe poll, the 335 seats were proportionally al-located to the 25 parties that had securedsome votes then. Each party selected its rep-resentatives from the closed list it had sub-mitted before. Although voters had no con-trol on selecting a CA member, the parties

The InterimConstitution

2007 made aprovision for amixed electoralsystem for the

2008 CAelection.

The mixed electoral system, with a higher proportion ofseats allocated to the PR system, did not provide an oppor-tunity for any political party to secure a majority in the Con-stituent Assembly. Altogether, 9 parties represented the CAunder the FPTP, whereas as many as 25 (now 24 with themerger of Janmorcha with Unified CPN (Maoist)) partieswere seated under the PR system. The Unified CPN (Maoist),which had argued for the PR system, suffered a great dealfrom the mixed electoral system because it won 50% of theseat under the FPTP (120 seats out of 240), but only 100under the PR system and 9 as nominees. Having obtainedonly 229 seats in a house of 601 members, it could not form

a majority government. The Nepali Congress Party secured109 and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 104 seats.The other parties, such as Madhesi People’s Rights Forumand Tarai Madhes Democratic Party, ranked fourth and fifth,securing 52 and 20 seats, respectively.

Therefore, while the PR system increased the range ofrepresentation, it did so at the cost of a coalition govern-ment, forcing the larger parties to build consensus and worktogether—the two Mool Mantra: Sahamati and Sahakarya—upon which the success of the peace process depends.

Source: http://www.nepalelectionportal.org

BOX 4.2 Results of CA Election, Nepal, 10 April 2008

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had to ensure the inclusive quota requirementspresented for different caste and ethnic groupsand backward region5 in Figure 4.1 whilechoosing their respective candidates. The quotawas equally divided between males and fe-males.

Composition of the current CA:how inclusive is it?The CA reflects a fair representation of thevarious broad caste and ethnic groups, asFigure 4.2 and Table 4.1 indicates, but it doesnot quite do justice to Nepal’s Dalits. Andalthough women hold one-third of the As-sembly seats rather than the half that theirproportion in the country’s population mer-its on a purely statistical basis, this share isone of the world’s highest.

Although the FPTP system fairly representsgeography, the PR system does not since itsbasis of representation is caste and ethnicityrather than a given geographic area. For ex-ample, four of the 75 districts—Okhaldhunga, Rasuwa, Parbat and Pyuthanof Nepal—did not receive even a single seatunder the PR system, while all but Rasuwawere allocated two seats each under the FPTPsystem. This resulted from Kathmandu receiv-ing a disproportionate number of seats un-der the PR system. On the whole, however,the mixed electoral system seems to haveserved the heterogeneity of Nepal’s societyand geography quite well.

Accountability and stabilityHow the mixed electoral system meets thecriterion of accountability remains to bedetermined yet, as Nepal used this systemfor the first time in the 2008 CA election.An electoral system functions in principleas a key mechanism through which peoplecan hold their representatives responsible fordelivering on campaign promises. However,there is a clear difference in types of ac-countability between the FPTP and PR sys-

tems. While the former tends to make leg-islature members answerable to their con-stituencies, the PR system generally pro-motes loyalty to their party leaders. Sinceparty lists are closed in Nepal’s current PRsystem, voters are limited to choosingamong political parties rather than weigh-ing the merits of individual candidates.

How the mixedelectoral systemmeets the criterionof accountabilityremains to bedetermined yet

Source: http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php

Quota for excluded caste and ethnic groups andregion in the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008

FIGURE 4.1

Source: www.election.gov.np

Social representation in Constituent Assembly,Nepal, 2008FIGURE 4.2

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A mixed electoralsystem may wellbe necessary forNepal for sometime to come in

view of thedemand for

inclusion andidentity

Stability points towards the desirability of asingle-party majority government. But a PR ora mixed electoral system with larger propor-tion of seats allocated to PR, generally doesnot allow the larger party to form a majoritygovernment by itself. Because no party has se-cured a majority of seats in the current CAelection in Nepal, it took more than four monthsto form a government after the CA election.Similar delays resulted in taking some otherdecisions later than foreseen, including the for-mation of the Special Committee for the rein-tegration of the army. Given the context ofpost-conflict reconstruction, which can last wellbeyond the drafting of the new constitution, astrong and stable government is a necessity. Thisargument also applies to the FPTP system, whichgenerally provides an environment conduciveto forming a majority government.

A broad assessmentBecause Nepal’s present mixed electoral sys-tem gives different caste and ethnic groupsbetter representation than its predecessors, ithas offered an opportunity to even themarginalized groups and to the smaller par-ties to help define the destiny of the country.The FPTP system tends to foster accountabil-ity; the PR system ensures inclusion. In post-conflict societies, PR electoral systems are fairlycommon.6 The current mixed electoral sys-tem was designed so as to give excludedgroups a greater voice in the legislature; thiscan make individual citizens feel more secure.7

However, concerns have been raised aboutsome of the practicalities involved in imple-menting the PR system in Nepal—amongthese, the system of selecting the 335 candi-dates. The country’s legal framework allows asmall group of leaders within each politicalparty to select “winners” from their respec-tive candidate lists. This ensures that the partyelites maintain a tight control over candidates.8

In addition, the “Other Group” quota pre-sented in Figure 4.1 was originally meant torectify the under-representation of certaincaste and ethnic groups. But this quota hasnot been properly used. Had it been applied,the representation of Dalits would have risen.9

Despite some of the concerns raised above,a mixed electoral system may well be neces-sary for Nepal for some time to come inview of the demand for inclusion and iden-tity. However, the types of electoral systemand/or the proportion of the seats allocatedto FPTP and PR components call for a de-cision.10 The choice must take into accountthe following major considerations:

type of political system/governancestructure - presidential or parliamentary;degree of social diversity of the assemblyunder the federal structure—the number ofthe constituents (states/ regions) and the basisof their categorization/delineation;level of the legislature: central or regional;number of chambers of the legislature:one or two;total number of members in each cham-ber; andsharing of power between the central andregional legislative bodies.

Given Nepal’s high degree of ethnic and so-cial diversity and the need for a legislatureof manageable size, the electoral system atthe regional level should not necessarily beuniform across the entire country. Conse-quently, a PR system could be used in highly

Population groups FPTP result PR result Nomination Total

Hill Dalits 6 30 - 36

Madhesi Dalits 1 12 0 13

Hill Janajati 66 89 9 164

Madhesi/Tarai Janajati 13 30 7 50

Madhesi 48 76 4 128

Muslim, Churaute 7 9 1 17

Others (Hill Brahman, Chhetri) 99 89 5 193

Total 240 335 26 601Women 30 161 6 197

Source: www.election.gov.np

Social Representation in the ConstituentAssembly, Nepal, 2008

TABLE 4.1

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diverse regions and/or in the upper house.Otherwise, a FPTP or a mixed electoral sys-tem could be instituted.

At the centre, the ratio of seats allocated be-tween the FPTP and PR systems can be de-cided in part according to how strong a centreNepal needs to maintain political stability andto ensure the equitable development of thecountry’s diverse regions and groups. Amongothers, the need for a strong centre implies asmaller proportion of seats under PR, whichwill open a greater opportunity for forming amajority government. However, even at thenational level, the upper house of the legisla-ture can be elected through a full PR system.

Whatever the type of the electoral system, theconduct of the election depends on an elec-tion management process that takes into ac-count a number of factors, including the au-tonomy of the electoral commission, the neu-trality of the electoral supervisors, the civiceducation of the electorate, the transparencyof the election process, and how strictly theparties, candidates and voters obey the elec-toral code of conduct.11 Therefore, the roleof agencies involved in election is crucial.

Internal democracy of thepolitical partiesIn a democracy, political parties are vehiclesfor articulating the interests of differinggroups of people. Hence, they foster thehuman development of all. Although theyare hardly the only platforms for this pur-pose, they remain essential for recruiting lead-ers, structuring electoral choice, and organiz-ing governance. However, if the party orga-nizations do not represent the diversity ofregions and cultural groups, and do not usedemocratic procedures in their own decision-making, equitable representation of differ-ent caste and ethnic groups in the legislaturecannot exist even under the PR electoral sys-tem, let alone the mixed electoral system.

The proliferation of political parities can beviewed as a positive development, particu-larly for minority participation and represen-tation in the CA. Because the 1962 constitu-tion of Nepal banned political parties, onlya few underground parties existed. After1990, they multiplied almost exponentially,reaching 100 in the 1999 election—thoughthe 2008 CA election featured only 74. Thisdecrease may well have stemmed from therule that a party could be registered onlywhen it had at least 10,000 members.

However, the increasing proliferation of theparties also reflects a lack of internal democracyin those that were established; unable to accom-modate the interests of all their members, theysplit into smaller entities or formed new politicalgroups. Indeed, a lack of inclusiveness and de-mocracy led to the major parties seeing their so-cial base and credibility eroded.

After the restoration of democracy, in thefirst election of 1991, the Nepali CongressParty won a majority of 110 seats out of205 and formed the government. In the sec-ond election, in 1994, the Communist Partyof Nepal (UML) secured a greater num-ber and formed the government. However,they lost their popular base because of toomuch partisanship, the rise of bitter oppo-sition among factions, an unstable coalitiongovernment, deficits in internal democracy,and unhealthy inter-party relations. This maywell have resulted in decreasing voter turn-out, despite some rise in the 1999 election,over that of 1991 (Figure 4.3).

One of the factors most frequently cited byNepalis themselves for the country’s weak po-litical and economic performance is lack ofstatesmanship in the leaders; voters feel that partyleaders work for their individual interests orfor the sake of their party, even at critical mo-ments for the nation as a whole. The successof the 2006 Janandolan, the subsequent peaceprocess, and the Madhesi Andolan raised hopes

One of the factorsmost frequentlycited by Nepalisthemselves for thecountry’s weakpolitical andeconomicperformance is lackof statesmanshipin the leaders

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that new leaders would emerge to carry thecountry forward and improve levels of hu-man development across Nepal. Public expec-tations increased again after the ConstitutionalAssembly election; some put their faith in theUnified CPN (Maoist), others in the Madhesiparties to provide new leadership that wouldbe accountable and effective. Yet many havebeen dismayed by the continued aggressivebehaviour of the Unified CPN (Maoist) andits Young Communist League cadres, and ques-tion whether the party can really bring about a“New Nepal” while still relying on its old tac-tics. Others have expressed frustration with theMadhesi parties, claiming that they lost touchwith the people following their election. Over-all, many are disappointed with the willingnessof all parties to make promises that they havesubsequently proven unable to implement.

Currently, political parties in Nepal face thefollowing challenges:

A centralized political culture, centralizedorganizational structure and a reluctance tohold party conventions and elections atregular intervals to choose new leaders orthe central committee members. The samesmall group therefore holds key positionsin both the parties and the government fortoo long a time. Indeed, some parties havebeen led by a single person for several de-cades. All would probably profit from

adopting and strictly following rules thatforbid a single person to hold the formalleadership position more than twice.Political parties are exclusive in their struc-tures, in the ethnic/caste/gender make-up of their high commands and centralcommittees, and in their choices of can-didates. The composition of parties con-tinues to remain narrow and the core lead-ership of the parties comes from high-caste groups. Patronage routes deny op-portunities to other qualified members.A limited or full quota system in the pro-portion of membership from the differ-ent social groups could enhance the in-clusiveness and the organizational struc-ture of all the parties.Ad hoc policy decisions are the rule thanthe exception. These are frequently sub-jective judgments made by those at the top.The cadres suffer from a lack of clear di-rection and from ideological ambiguity,along with a general failure of their lead-ers to acknowledge the changed politicallandscape of Nepal after 2006. Far moreinternal homework remains to be done.Delivery on election manifestos is weakand has led to dwindling support. Reformmight well begin with clarifying policyplatforms, opening this process to the rankand file, and inviting rank-and-file par-ticipation in elaborating basic party ideas.A democratic polity calls for democraticpolitical parties.Intra-party rivalries also contribute signifi-cantly to shortfalls in delivery. Most ofthese clashes stem from personal ratherthan ideological differences. This leads tothe development of opportunistic alli-ances formed for short-term gains ratherthan the fulfillment of the agendas setduring the crisis period.Inter-party relations are also unhealthy andhave resulted in scuffles over trivial mat-ters that have led to delays in drafting theconstitution. The parties must work atdeveloping a political culture in which

Source: http://result.nepalelectionportal.org/report1.html; Dahal (2007), Electoral System andElection Management in Nepal in http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/civic_education/election_management.htm; and http://www.nepalresearch.com/politics/elections.htm

Party registered and contested, and voter trend infour elections, NepalFIGURE 4.3

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each gives public recognition to the oth-ers’ good work. This will help develophealthy criticism.Despite legal obligations to publish their fi-nancial records regularly, no party does so—even though this could well lead to the state’sproviding some portion of the funding forthe increasingly expensive election process.

There are several reasons for the deficiencyof internal democracy within the political par-ties, including a paucity of resources, personalinterest of party leaders, and inadequate over-sight from civil society and government.12

Civil society has not played an active roleconsistently to make the party leadershipaccountable to the voters and strengthendemocracy at the grassroots level. In theperception of many, this is because largenumber of active civil society members areaffiliated with a party seeking election.

While the Election Commission has success-fully conducted all the parliamentary and lo-cal elections, it has not been able to monitorand supervise effectively the activities ofpolitical parties because:

The Commission is too centralized, entirelylimited to the capital, and therefore cannotmonitor and supervise or facilitate a healthygrowth of the political parties at the locallevel. As Nepal enters a federal structure,strong branch offices are needed.It lacks sufficient authority. With its en-hanced status, the Election Commissionhas to be given all the powers necessaryto follow the international principles ofhuman rights as set out by the Inter-Par-liamentary Union in 1994.

Moreover, the Election Commission now per-forms all the electoral functions itself, includingthe appointment of election officers and otherpersonnel, as well as arrangements for all logis-tics, including ballot boxes, ballot papers, andthe updating of voter lists. All these activities

constrain it in the monitoring and improvementof the quality of elections. Provision should bemade to outsource some of these functions,including logistical arrangements.

Participation of citizensand their representativesAs the first chapter of this Report demon-strated, fair representation and participation arenecessary for human development. Participa-tion is defined as the involvement of people ineconomic, social, cultural and political activitiesthat affect their lives. Citizens can either partici-pate directly or through their representatives ororganizations. In the political processes, citizensparticipate through their legislative representa-tives or through politically oriented organiza-tions established under a country’s laws. How-ever, representation alone cannot fulfill citizeninterests unless their representatives participateeffectively in the making of policies and lawsthat benefit the groups they represent, espe-cially groups of the excluded.

People can engage in various ways, chieflythrough union activities, public discussions, citi-zen initiatives, petition-signing, and participa-tion in public protests. However, in Nepal,participation has largely taken the forms ofunion demonstrations and public protests.Generally trade unions, student unions, andother politically affiliated organizations andtheir community counterparts call for Bandha,the Nepali term for a strike. It takes variousforms, including Bandha of markets or road/transport systems.

Bandha has become so common that it isnow a norm of Nepali society. The UnitedNations Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs in Nepal recorded 755major events in 2008 alone.13 Every day ofFebruary 2009 was marked by Bandha; in-deed, the Bandha was called for by two tofive organizations during a day of the month,excluding the single day of the 15th.14

Civil society hasnot played anactive roleconsistently tomake the partyleadershipaccountable to thevoters andstrengthendemocracy at thegrassroots level

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The heavyconcentration of

power andresources in

Kathmandu hasbeen itself both a

symptom and acause of

exclusion

Despite their popularity, Bandha involve sig-nificant economic losses and thereby impactlivelihoods, especially those of the poor andday labourers not only in terms of wages,but of higher prices for food, fuel, and otherdaily necessities. The Federation of NepaliChambers of Commerce and Industries hasestimated a loss of NRs 28.7 billion duringa 20-day long Tarai Bandha in 2007.15

People’s participation in Bandha and other pro-tests is organized with little consideration ofthe population as a whole; very often, they dam-age the interests of the general public. Theyinvolve little public discussion and are some-times violent. They originate not only amongparty-affiliated organizations and groups, butare also triggered among the parties themselves.A particularly obvious example was the con-tinuous 59-day suspension of parliamentarywork in 2008 by the Madhesi-based regionalparties in their monopoly of the rostrum tovoice their demands. This was followed by a15-day rupture in April 2009. If such Bandhacontinue, it is unlikely that the constitution willbe ready by the end of May 2010.

Two main reasons for the violent protests are:(i) lack of public confidence in constructive andpeaceful means of change, and (ii) perceiveddelayed governmental response to public de-mands. Indeed, the government often takes noaction unless a protest becomes violent. How-ever, it should also be noted that public protestshave become so frequent that the state cannotdeal with all the stated demands without neglect-ing other vital governmental functions.

The Bandhas are generally politically motivated.Avoiding these protests lies in consensus amongthe political parties. Otherwise, this negative typeof participation will not only wreak economicdamage, but undermine public confidence indemocracy. Public figures and the media shouldtherefore raise awareness of the undesirable ef-

fects of Bandha, including its violation of therights of others.

Unitary state structure and thecentralization of decision-makingNepal has had a highly centralized politicalsystem since its unification in 1768. Earlyunifiers of the country, such as PrithviNarayan Shah and Bahadur Shah, felt that aunitary state-building structure could inte-grate the diverse caste and ethnic groupsthey had come to rule. Like most of theircontemporaries worldwide, they regardedinequality as an integral part of the humancondition. Vesting power in other state or-gans could well detract from the integra-tion they sought and was therefore unde-sirable. A high concentration of power andresources in the capital simplified the man-agement of the country, made quick deci-sions possible, and permitted an efficientuse of public revenue—in theory at least.

In Nepal, though, these advantages of unitarystructure became liabilities, especially duringthe partyless Panchayat era. They pervadednot only the government, but the few oppor-tunities offered by the private sector and withincivil society. In short, the heavy concentrationof power and resources in Kathmandu hasbeen itself both a symptom and a cause ofexclusion. Small wonder then that the reformefforts that began in 1970s and 1980s involvedthe formation of different commissions ondecentralization and the establishment ofPanchayat institutions at the village and dis-trict levels, even though their power becamelimited by the establishment of a central Min-istry of Panchayat and Local Developmentin 1984. But the restoration of democracy in1990 brought with it further efforts tostrengthen local bodies in the developmentprocess through the enactment of the LocalSelf-Governance Act of 1999.

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Decentralization and human developmentDecentralization can have both positive andnegative effects on human development. Itsbenefits include:

An increase in the participation of com-munities in decision-making;Bringing governance closer to people andthus enhancing accountability and accessto services; andEfficient use of funds in accordance withthe needs and priorities of communitiesat the local level.16

Full deconcentration, devolution and fiscaldecentralization can broaden the canvas ofrecruitment within neighbourhoods, allow-ing women and men of various castes andethnic groups to join different organizationsand fulfil responsibilities they had oncethought beyond their purview or abilities. Ifthis kind of decentralization is supported byother policies, such as recruiting front-lineservice providers who know local languages,it can increase the interface between localpeople and government structures.

Of all Nepal’s efforts in this direction, themost promising was the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act. It included the devolutionof basic services, such as education, health,drinking water, agricultural extension, andrural infrastructures. It initiated and increasedlocal grants, putting their management intothe hands of local bodies. As of December2008, 7,729 schools (around 30 percent ofthe total) were handed over to local SchoolManagement Committees; 69% of themwere primary schools. In addition, the man-agement of 1,435 health institutions wasgiven over to local level committees.17

Evidence abounds on the increase in educa-tional attainment and health improvement atthe local level, implying an improvement inhuman development. In recent years,women’s life expectancy has surpassed thatof men. However, the progress achieved

differed markedly from one group to an-other as outlined in chapter two, in largemeasure because Nepal has never realizedcomplete decentralization due to:

A marked lack of political will to extenddecentralization to its administrative andfiscal dimensions. The centre retained itsmonopoly on recruitment, revenue col-lection, and distribution;The appointment of regional administra-tors curtailed the powers of local authori-ties significantly;Some of the provisions of the 1999 Lo-cal Self-Governance Act contradictedexisting laws and by-laws;Role delineations between the central gov-ernment and local bodies were not madeclear; this was complicated by poor co-ordination between different governmentagencies and inadequate fiscal transfers tolocal authorities;Low capacity of local bodies, includingweak revenue- generating capacity at thelocal level;Lack of proper supervision, monitoringand auditing of local bodies; andIncreased conflict and insecurity after theimplementation of the decentralization actin 1999.

While some donors have supported the ca-pacity-building of local bodies, including Dis-trict Development Committees and VillageDevelopment Committees, such efforts needto be deepened and extended to other dis-tricts.18 However, in the absence of localbodies since 2002, efforts have become lessmeaningful in recent years.

The government has tried to redress a num-ber of deficiencies in fiscal decentralization.Capital spending has gradually been increasedsince 1999 and a greater share of resourceschannelled through line ministries are now dis-bursed directly to districts. The Interim Con-stitution of 2007 has also made special provi-sions for devolution and decentralization; re-

Of all Nepal’sefforts indecentralisation,the mostpromising was the1999 Local Self-Governance Act

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With the rise ofcitizens in 2006,inclusion has onceagain come to the

forefront in themaking of a newNepal. This newNepal demandsequality, liberty

and social justice inall spheres of life

source allocations among regions have beenmade more just and discrepancies betweenlocal, regional and central authorities are be-ing eliminated. The government and its de-velopment partners signed a letter of intent in2008 for implementing a harmonized ap-proach to strengthening the capacity of localbodies so as to speed up local developmentand improve service delivery with a focus onexcluded groups. However, the government’sdecision to restructure the nation into a fed-eral system has opened up again the issues re-lated to the division of the country into stateor regions; decisions about the structure oflocal government systems; fiscal decentraliza-tion; and the delineation of responsibilitiesamong the different tiers of government.

ConclusionThis chapter has argued that political exclu-sion is an outcome of an exclusionary politi-cal system characterized by certain featuresof the plurality electoral system, the lack ofinternal democracy of political parties, andincomplete decentralization. As a result, gov-ernance structures have not been openly eq-uitable. This inequity, coupled with the lackof an independent judiciary in recent years,and an increase in corruption, have limitedthe freedoms and options of the poor,women and other excluded Nepalis.

However, with the rise of citizens in 2006,inclusion has once again come to the fore-front in the making of a new Nepal. Thisnew Nepal demands equality, liberty andsocial justice in all spheres of life. That is whya new polity is emerging from the work ofthe CA. The transformation of the UnifiedCPN (Maoist) into a legitimate party of thesystem is also going to set a new example.How this party abides by the spirit of amultiparty polity with constitutional provi-

sions for the fulfillment of human rights asdefined by United Nations bodies has yet tobe determined.

Another trend in the emerging Nepal is thefading of traditional political ideology in con-trast to the surge of regional and ethnic inter-ests that had been managed by the mainlinepolitical parties until 2006. The success of anysingle party now depends on its support byregional and ethnic groups, particularly withinthe proportional representation system.

As of May 28, 2008, Nepal entered into anew phase of its historical development. Thelong-awaited formalization of a federal re-publican agenda by the first session of thenewly elected CA ended the 240-year oldmonarchical system. The drafting of a newdemocratic constitution by the CA, alongwith the termination of the monarchy, isexpected to put an end to many elements ofthe country’s heritage. The dramatic eventsof recent years have furnished us with manylessons we have yet to digest and assimilate.

Never in the history of Nepal have citizens atlarge involved themselves in such transformations.Excluded groups are now claiming their due shareof power and control over resources and repre-sentation in various organs of the state—so muchso that the political parties that fail to make de-mocracy inclusive face an eclipse of their earlierpower by new popular forces. The compositionof the new CA on the basis of the mixed elec-toral system has made it representative in form, ifnot yet in character, thus marking a major depar-ture from past patterns of representation. A fed-eral system based on national consensus is expectedby many to ensure both inclusion and empower-ment at all levels of the new polity. But makingfederalism practicable will require enormous studyby all those involved in political activity, especiallythe members of the CA.

Federalism andhumandevelopment

5CHAPTER

Challenges facing Nepal

Social inclusion—the core values and principles of the constitution

Federalism and human development

Federalism is not the panacea for every one

Designing the federation andinstitutional arrangements

To sum up…

Federalismand

humandevelopment

5Chapter

epal is now poised to adopt a newconstitution that could provide theframework for dealing with the

country’s problems of exclusion, includingthose involved in political participation, thathave troubled the country so long.

Elected in April 2008, the Constituent As-sembly (CA) has been given the task of draft-ing and adopting a new constitution withintwo years of its first meeting—which tookplace on May 28, 2008. Under the InterimConstitution, the CA has an unrestricted man-date to decide on the values, principles andinstitutions to be embodied by the constitu-tion—except in two important respects. First,Nepal would become a functioning repub-lic upon the first meeting of the CA, a con-cept which can accommodate a wide vari-ety of arrangements.1 For the interim, thefunctions and powers of the King were in-vested in the Prime Minister. Many peoplebelieve that the abolition of the monarchyhas in itself improved prospects of democ-racy, inclusion and secularism.

Second, Nepal must become a “progressivedemocratic federation” (Art. 138, asamended on April 13, 2007). Though thedetails of the federal system are not spelledout, its purpose is clearly stated: “to bring anend to discrimination based on class, caste,

language, gender, culture, religion and re-gion.” As in the case of instituting a repub-lic, the CA is free to decide on what kind offederal system would be established.2 How-ever, the state must be “inclusive” and “pro-gressive”, i.e., it must serve all citizens, in-cluding those who had earlier feltmarginalized. Indeed, the adoption of a fed-eral strategy stemmed in part from pressuresfrom marginalized communities.

This chapter examines the politics of iden-tity that are now central to debates on howNepal should be governed. We then turnto the ways in which federalism can con-tribute to enhancing the human develop-ment of all the country’s citizens. Ironically,the very concept of federalism has proveddivisive: a 2007 survey showed a clear op-position by the Hill people and supportamong those of the Plains, as well as amongMuslims.3 While the authors believe that fed-eralism can provide a framework for theresolution of questions of identity and fair-ness and equity among citizens and com-munities, it cannot by itself solve all theproblems of the country—and may indeedcreate problems of its own. We must there-fore look at constitutional devices and mea-sures that can supplement federalism so asto address the problems of discriminationand exclusion that are now so keenly felt.

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Challenges facing NepalAs earlier chapters have pointed out, Nepalnow struggles with the legacy of ten yearsof conflict in which 13,347 died and 1,027disappeared, while countless others wereraped, dispossessed, displaced, bereaved ortraumatized in other ways.4 Shame preventsmany of these war victims from publicly ac-knowledging the extent or depth to whichthey were affected. Worse still, the underly-ing causes of the conflict have not yet beenresolved. Nor have most of the results ofthe conflict been addressed. Poverty and dis-crimination on the basis of caste and ethnicitycontinue. So does marginalisation for otherreasons, including remoteness fromKathmandu and other centres. In short, thegrievances associated with the war persist andhave been increased by its results—amongthese, ineffective government, internally dis-placed persons, frustrated combatants, anda population suspended between cynicismand hope. Indeed, in some areas, low-levelconflict continues.

Consequently, Nepal is faced simultaneouslywith problems of nation-building and ofstate-building. As this Report has pointed outearlier, the country is undergoing multipletransitions:

from monarchy to republic;from authoritarianism to democracy andhuman rights;from a hegemonic to a participatory sys-tem of governance;from a state wholly pervaded by onereligion to secularism; andfrom a heavily centralized unitary systemto one characterized by decentralizationand autonomy.

Above all, the country is moving from a hi-erarchical society in which one’s place wasdictated by gender, by caste and by ethnicity,to one that aspires to making human dignityand equality its fundamental principles.

Although the 1990 Constitution of Nepalacknowledged that the country was ‘multi-ethnic and multi-lingual,5 it described the stateas indivisible and sovereign6 and created ahighly centralized government. It also declaredHinduism the official religion7 and madeNepali (in the Devanagari script) the soleofficial language; other languages were treatedas national languages.8, 9 The King, closely as-sociated with Hinduism and its caste socialstructure, was described as the symbol ofthe Nepali nation and the unity of the Nepalipeople. Further, the people of Nepal wereenvisaged as a “collectivity” and the asser-tion of identity on the basis of religion, casteor language was banned.10 Thus, the 1990Constitution not only established an exclu-sionary state, but actively endorsed it. More-over, the hegemony of the high-caste elite inthe major political parties was perpetuatedby the prohibition of sectarian and ethnicparties.11 A principle task of the state wasthe promotion among the people of Nepalof the spirit of fraternity and the bond ofunity on the basis of liberty and equality. 12

Nepal was not unusual in using the state toestablish the hegemony of a particular eliteor community and to define the entire popu-lation in its image. In this respect, the Consti-tution reaffirmed a much older tradition ofstate formation in Nepal13—and, indeed, ofmost existing states worldwide, whatevertheir constitutions proclaim. For this veryreason, the legitimacy and fairness of thisconcept of the “nation-state” has come un-der severe challenge in many parts of theworld. The roots of discontent lie in the eco-nomic, social and political exclusion of thenon-elite communities and their members,such as non-whites in the USA and citizensfrom former colonies in other Western de-mocracies. There is a close correlation be-tween poverty and ethnic minorities. Al-though a powerful case for a more inclusivestate system is based on the threat to the cul-

The underlyingcauses of the

conflict have notyet been resolved.

Nor have mostof the results ofthe conflict been

addressed

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ture of minority communities and thereforeto their identity, self-respect and social ori-entation, many ethnic protests and insurgen-cies are less about the preservation of cul-ture, religion or tradition than about the lackof access to the state and the economy. Inthis way, ethnicity itself becomes a social andpolitical force, a means to mobilize and or-ganize members of the community, as itsleaders advance claims for full participationin the affairs of the state.14

It has become increasingly difficult to resistsuch claims. Ethnic minorities now find sup-port in both moral and legal theories rootedin the ideas of justice and self-determina-tion. The international community urges po-litical leaders to agree on measures of self-government or power-sharing, putting boththe government and the insurgents under con-siderable pressure to find means to resolveinternal conflicts. Efforts today to suppressethnic loyalties, demands and organizationsresult largely in their gaining strength andreinforcing their potential to disrupt inter-nal order and existing good will. Fuelling adeep sense of grievance risks violent out-bursts, especially given the easy access to sup-plies of arms in international and regionalmarkets that prevail today.

Claims of identity have come to play an im-portant role in contemporary politics glo-bally. Identity, it is claimed, is critical to aperson’s sense of belonging and orientation;the recognition of his or her ethnicity is anessential component of that person’s dignityand self-respect. The denial of that identityis a manifestation of ethnic discrimination,the disparagement of other cultures and thedisregard of the legitimate right to protec-tion and development of the communitiesadhering to those cultures. The new politicsof identity and recognition is seen asemancipatory and an empowerment of thehitherto marginalized and oppressed com-

munities. It is the weapon of the weak. Bycontrast, redressing past injustice enrichessociety through safeguarding diversity. Mostpolitical thinkers today believe that every cul-ture can make some positive contribution tothe states in which they now find themselves.

These contemporary understandings of col-lective identities have led to the review ofthe foundations of the state and its institu-tional organization, emphasizing the need forthe political recognition of differences, to-gether with finding ways to promote the co-existence of cultural and ethnic communi-ties in peace and dignity. Consequently, in anumber of states, new norms stress the vir-tues of diversity. This reconceptualisation ofthe political community and the division andsharing of sovereignty have found their wayinto the constitution. Clear alternatives, basedon the political and legal recognition of eth-nic or “national” communities, to the singlenation state have emerged, among these:

modes of representation and participa-tion in public institutions and affairs;structures and distribution of power;the place of culture in the public sphere;andthe settlement of competing claims ofcommunities.

Often, these and various other ways of ac-commodating ethnic differences are groupedunder the rubric of “unity in diversity.”

As in many countries, a strong sense ofethnicity is most frequently a response to dis-crimination and deprivation. All the“marginalized” communities have suffered inthis way. For many long years, they have askedfor fair representation, fair treatment and fairopportunities. They have not rejected the state,but asked for their rightful place within it.Whether one looks at Nepali statistics for theeconomy, education, public service posts, rep-resentation in the legislature or the government,

Many ethnicprotests andinsurgencies areless about thepreservation ofculture, religion ortradition thanabout the lack ofaccess to the stateand the economy

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one comes away with an overwhelming im-pression of the monopolization of power,authority, and opportunities by Brahman,Chhetri and Newar.15 Dalits have been op-pressed for centuries, the Janajatis’ languagesand cultures have been ignored; women suf-fer from severe discrimination across thewhole of society; and Madhesis have long feltthat they were not accepted as Nepalis, andlabelled disparagingly as Indians.16 Mostpeople, especially in the rural areas, feel—withgood reason—that they cannot communicatewith state officials: most of these representa-tives of the central government do not speaklocal languages.

The resistance of the eight-party alliance tothe participation of the marginalized com-munities in decisions about the Interim Con-stitution and the future—in some cases, arefusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of theclaims of these communities—has prompteda vigourous development of ethnic politicsand organizations and disrupted the nationalunity of the Janandolan.17 In this way the tra-ditional elites, by their intransigence, have cre-ated a situation which was one of their worstfears. Smarting under their exclusion, Dalits,Janajatis, Madhesis, and women are formu-lating their own agendas and recommenda-tions for the new constitution. These include:

fair and effective representation in stateinstitutions;equality and elimination of all forms ofdiscrimination;affirmative action, including “reserva-tions” or quotas;secure citizenship;a secular state;political recognition of the diversity ofcultures and languages; andself-government through a federal typeof autonomy, preferably based on lan-guage and ethnicity.

Self-determination, understood in terms ofgroup rights, has in some cases become the

leading principle of state reorganization formany of these groups. Understandably, theelite is uneasy with this agenda—and not onlybecause it would chip away at its privileges.Yet the factors underlying these reform agen-das lie at the heart of Nepal’s problems andwill not go away. For stability and develop-ment, the constitution-making process mustdeal with it. Nepal faces the challenge ofsquaring the recognition of diversity with thebenefits of the “nation-state” (communitycohesion, common values, willingness to sac-rifice for the common good, prospects ofdemocracy, common public spaces, the ex-pression and development of culture). In aword, the constitution-making process isabout identity in a New Nepal, which em-phasizes common bonds and interests whilerespecting differences.

This calls for recognizing the representativesof these communities in the CA as full mem-bers, not supplicants. There are no simple oruniform solutions. The complexity of theethnic situation is bewildering. Nepal has aheady—but potentially productive—mixtureof race, caste, class, region, religion andethnicity, along with gender as a factor in eachproposed remedy. As indicated earlier in thisReport, the country comprises more than 103caste and ethnic groups, which speak morethan 92 languages, and adhere to differingreligions. Population and resources are un-evenly divided among regions, so that thereare also social and historical differences de-termined by topography. But this fragmen-tation also means that no group can be de-scribed as the majority. Hindus may be onesort of majority, but they are divided intosects, and also speak different languages aswell as come from different regions. TheNepali speakers constitute the largest linguisticgroup, but these speakers belong to differ-ent classes and religions. Dalits have certaincommon characteristics (including social op-pression), but they are divided by languageand region—and even caste. Janajatis repre-

Nepal faces thechallenge ofsquaring the

recognition ofdiversity with the

benefits of the“nation-state”

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sent a variety of groups in size and culturaltraditions and in varying degrees of integra-tion into the modern economy and statestructures.

Consequently, the most fundamental chal-lenge facing Nepal and the making of theconstitution is defining its identity in waysacceptable to its communities and regions.The constitution is more than the rebuildingof the state. The building or rebuilding ofthe state assumes a prior agreement to cometogether, to form a political community. Butwhen there is disagreement on the fundamentalvalues of the state or no sense of belongingto a common political community, the taskof the constitution is two-fold. The first is thebuilding of consensus, developing a frame-work for coexistence and cooperation amongcommunities based on social justice, and thenegotiation of national values and nationalidentity. In short, constitution-making is aboutnation-building rather than the reconstructionof a particular polity. The process is as im-portant as the substance of the constitution.State building—the “restructuring of thestate”—follows from the way the first task isresolved.

Marginalized groups are united in their op-position to the present dispensation, but di-vided on what remedies and policies mustbe pursued. The inherent clashes in ideas, aimsand practices of these communities mean thatcommon devices may not suit every one ofthem. Some of these devices may indeedconflict with one another. Federalism maymake sense for the Madhesis and perhapsthe larger Janajati groups, but it is unlikely todo much for Dalits or for women. Simi-larly, more diverse language policies are nota major concern of Dalits or women. Dalitswant the abolition of the caste system, whilethe agendas of other groups concern largelythe recognition of caste, ethnic and linguisticdistinctions.

This complexity also suggests that solutionscannot be based simply on ethnicity. Thereare more cross-cutting than overlapping dif-ferences, but even this should not obscurethe fact that on various points, the interestsof Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis and womenwould conflict. And even among the Brah-mans and Chhetri, there are poor peoplewhose needs must be addressed. So whileethnicity should not be ignored, constitutionalreform must be tied, broadly, to social jus-tice. The roots of the political and socialproblems that have caused such suffering tothe people of Nepal during the last decadelie not so much in ethnic differences as inpervasive injustice, massive discrimination andexclusion, and the failure of the state to de-velop constructively the notion and institu-tions of a common political community.There are many ways in which diverse iden-tities can be fostered while being accommo-dated within an over-arching national loy-alty; some of these are indicated in this chap-ter. Federalism itself, the principal focus here,is a device frequently used to acknowledgeand integrate diversity. Moreover, the cur-rent wave of recognition of language, reli-gion and culture of different caste and eth-nic groups by the state suggests that Nepalneeds to build its future laws and policies onsocial justice through the inclusion and par-ticipation of different social groups. This willalso foster recognition of multiple cultureand identities.

Social inclusion—the core valuesand principles of the constitutionThe values and principles espoused by theeight political parties have been gleaned fromthe Comprehensive Peace Agreement, themost comprehensive accord among the ma-jor political parties, and the Interim Consti-tution. Both these documents are the prod-uct of negotiations among the political par-ties (substantially in pursuit of the goals of

Marginalizedgroups are unitedin their oppositionto the presentdispensation, butdivided on whatremedies andpolicies must bepursued

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the Janandolan of April 2006), which nowhave the people’s mandate to make the newconstitution and to ensure its acceptance andenforcement.

The 12-point agreement held between theseven parties and Unified CPN (Maoist) in22 November 2005 was marked more by acommitment to democracy rather than to therights of marginalized communities. How-ever, the 2006 Janandolan, led by communi-ties hitherto excluded from political and so-cial power, established a progressive reformagenda with particular attention to the con-cerns and aspirations of minority, marginalizedcommunities. This agenda was first reflectedin the eight-point accord between the sevenparties and the Unified CPN (Maoist) signedon 16 June 2006, when they agreed to “makea forward-looking restructuring of the stateso as to resolve the class-based, racial, regionaland gender-based problems through the elec-tion of the Constituent Assembly”.18 In anagreement on 8 November 2006 between thehigh-level leaders of the parties, a slightly moreelaborate form of this commitment wasagreed: “In order to end class, ethnicity, lin-gual, gender, cultural, religious and regionaldiscriminations and also to end the central-ized and unitary structure of the state, it shallbe restructured into an inclusive, democraticand progressive state” (Point 10). This wasexpanded in Article 3.5 of the CPA by iden-tifying groups or communities, includingDalits, against whom discrimination wouldbe ended. The CPA also committed the par-ties to socioeconomic rights: to food; health;education; and private property (Article7.5)—of particular relevance to themarginalized communities and to the poorermembers of otherwise well-off communi-ties due to pervasive poverty.

This fundamental transformation in attitudes,policies and commitments has been expressedin the Preamble and a number of Articlesof the Interim Constitution. The Interim

Constitution 2007 represents a considerableimprovement on the similar provisions ofthe 1990 Constitution. When providing foraffirmative action, beneficiary communitiesare mentioned and include Dalits (Article13(3)). The language in which the provisionagainst untouchability and racial discrimina-tion is expressed is longer, but not necessar-ily more extensive, than the preceding text.Real advance is manifest in Article 21, whichgives “women, Dalits, indigenous groups,Madhesi communities, oppressed groups, thepoor farmers and labourers, who are eco-nomically, socially or educationallybackward…the right to participate in statestructures on the basis of the principles ofproportionality”. An amendment of theInterim Constitution provides for propor-tional recruitment into the armed forces(Art. 144(4) A). The Interim Constitutionalso sets out specific rights of women andof children (Arts. 20 and 22).

The provision concerning exploitation hasbeen strengthened by two new clauses: (a) noperson shall be exploited in the name of cus-tom, tradition, and practice, or in any otherway; and (b) no person shall be subjected tohuman trafficking, slavery or bonded labour(Art. 29(2) and (3)). The Interim Constitutionalso guarantees the right to work (Art. 18 (1))and to “proper work practices” (Art. 30(1)).The cultural rights of minorities receive greaterprotection than in the former constitution (Art.17). These rights are reinforced by the articu-lation of various state responsibilities and poli-cies and directive principles (especially Article33(d) to (i)). All in all, the regime of the rightsof minorities and disadvantaged communi-ties represents a great improvement on previ-ous constitutions.

Federalism and humandevelopmentThe commitment of the major political par-ties to federalism came late—only after vio-

InterimConstitution

2007 representsa considerable

improvement onthe rights of

minorities anddisadvantaged

communitiescompared to the

similar provisionsof the 1990Constitution

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lent protests by Madhesis and Janajatis. Therewas no reference to federalism when theInterim Constitution was first promulgated,though the text made reference to decen-tralization and the restructuring of the state.Few people—certainly almost no one amongthose who made the decision—had any realunderstanding of the institutional structuresand functioning of federalism. The InterimConstitution itself provides no guidance onthe principles or substance of a federal sys-tem. The matter was therefore left entirelyto the CA—with the proviso that a high-level commission would make recommen-dations on the restructuring of the state.There have been fairly extensive discussionson federalism and explorations of the ma-jor federal systems.

Arguments for and against federalism inNepal have been vigorously articulated, moreon principles than on structures, the divisionof powers, and relationships between thecentre and federal units. Although all majorparties expressed support for federalism intheir manifestoes for election to the CA, thedegree of real commitment to it may be lim-ited.19 The insurgency in Nepal was not pri-marily about federation (as in Sri Lanka orthe Sudan); the key protagonists were con-cerned essentially about the control of theunified state. A combination of insufficientunderstanding of varied federal experi-ences elsewhere and lukewarm supportmay result in a weak system that cannotrespond to problems of inclusion and na-tional integration.

The constitution deals with various mattersconcerning the relationship between the dif-ferent levels of government. It sets out theresource and financial powers available toeach level, including the power to impose,collect and spend state taxes. Although inprinciple each level of government is free toexercise such power—subject to any consti-

tutional limitations, including the protectionof human rights—in practice it is often nec-essary for governments to coordinate theirpolicies or acts, or plan joint activities. Forthis purpose, machinery for intergovernmen-tal discussions and decisions is usually estab-lished. In some federations like India, the con-stitution allows the national government tointervene in regional matters in an emergency.If there is a dispute—for example, if onelevel of government has encroached on thepowers of another—the matter is usuallyresolved by the national courts, often theSupreme Court.

How these and other matters are dealt within constitutions varies a great deal from onefederation to another. Such matters as themethods of the division of powers and theactual division, the relative share of resourcesand revenue among different levels, the num-ber and size of regions, the scope of coop-eration between the centre and the regions,and procedures for dispute resolution de-pend on the characteristics of the country.Thus some federations give the bulk of thepowers (at least, the most important) to thecentre, others to regions. Some give all taxa-tion powers to the centre, but provide forthe sharing of the proceeds between the cen-tre and the regions. In some federations, oneregion may have more powers than others,such as Quebec in Canada.

Before we discuss dealing with the issues ofinclusion, we must look at the way in whichthe federation came about and at the under-lying criteria for the formation of regions. Afederation may be formed by the comingtogether of previously independent entities(“aggregation”, as in Australia, Switzerland,and the USA) or the restructuring of a uni-tary state (“disaggregation” as in Belgium,Ethiopia, Nigeria, Spain, and South Africa).The former has generally been easier to setup: It is based on the consent of the separate

There was noreference tofederalism whenthe InterimConstitution wasfirst promulgated,though the textmade reference todecentralizationand therestructuring ofthe state

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units. It involves the establishment of only onenew unit—the federal government (with trans-fer of limited powers). In addition, the re-gions have already well-established systems ofgovernment and laws, identity, and bound-aries, which more or less guarantee their vi-ability.

By contrast, federalizing by disaggregationraises a much larger number of issues, amongthese:

the boundaries and number of the regions;the levels of government;the dismantling of at least some struc-tures of the state;the establishment of numerous new gov-ernments and laws; andthe transfer of substantial powers andpersonnel to the new regions.

Moreover, almost all these issues are com-pounded by the fact that this type of fed-eration is often accompanied by controversyand has sometimes resulted from armedconflict, as in the Sudan and the USA duringits expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacificin the course of the 19th century.

The second distinction among federations liesbetween those based on considerations ofgeography and economy (“geo-economic”)or old boundaries (“territorial”), and thosebased on ethnic, linguistic or religious crite-ria (“ethnic”). The rationales of the two aredifferent: the first deals with distance, com-mon defense, democracy, responsiveness andaccountability, the other with self-determi-nation, identity and culture. With differentobjectives and purposes, they may producevery different kinds of federations. These dif-ferences become manifest in terms of thecriteria for regions, the number and size ofunits, the relationship between the regions andthe central government, the division of pow-ers among different levels, the salience ofculture and the politics of internal mobility.The dynamics of the two kinds are also dif-

ferent, the ethnic being perhaps more un-stable. Often, it has tended towards the pro-liferation of regions, and towards strainedrelations between both the regions and thecentre, and among the regions themselves.

It would therefore seem that ethnic federa-tions face greater social and political prob-lems than the “territorial”. In a territorial fed-eration, the rights and obligations of indi-viduals are based on residence in the region;personal characteristics like language, religionor culture are largely irrelevant. By contrast,in an ethnic federation, the land itself has eth-nic, cultural dimensions. It is perceived by acommunity as its “homeland”, vested withreligious history or emotions or, in a far morecommon way, the physical space in which aparticular community has a numerical ma-jority. In some federations of this last type,the members of that community have greaterrights than other inhabitants of this land, asin the former Soviet Union. The exercise ofregional power is in some sense tied toethnicity. It may be that the language of thedominant community in the region will bethe language of the government (as in Franceand India) or that its religion will have a spe-cial status (as in Switzerland), or that it willhave superior land rights (as in Brazil andColombia). Even if there are no special rights,the ethos and culture of the dominant com-munity will pervade the policies and prac-tices of the government. Several recent fed-erations have an ethnic orientation; the pre-cise rights related to ethnicity vary. The pur-pose of these federations is to acknowledgeand provide for cultural diversity and toempower politically and economically a com-munity that would otherwise be a perma-nent minority in the state. Federalism is acompromise between a highly centralizedstate and secession (as in the Oslo agreementbetween Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelamand the Sri Lanka government, north andsouth Sudan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Itrepresents a form of power-sharing. It is of-

Federalismrepresents a formof power-sharing

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ten forced on warring communities by theinternational community, and therefore is lessconsensual than the other, older federations.

How far could federalism resolve Nepal’sproblems of exclusion, the marginalisationof various communities, poverty and the lackof economic development, threats to na-tional unity, the ineffectiveness and lack ofaccountability of the government, and itscapacity and willingness to protect the rightsof the people? These factors are crucial forhuman development. Supporters of feder-alism say that the domination of the countryfrom Kathmandu (referring to excessive cen-tralism) has prevented growth elsewhere.Further, this domination is exercised by smallelite of Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars, re-sulting in acute discrimination against othercastes and communities—and serious deficitsin democracy. Two results of this concentra-tion are widespread poverty and the failureto respond to the needs of the people, par-ticularly in the rural areas of many parts ofthe country.

The experience of other countries shows amassive increase in political participationwhen they become federal—for example,India and Spain. Central institutions are or-ganized to allow for the participation of allregions in central governance. Normally, asecond legislative chamber is set up, or ifone already exists, it is reorganized, oftencomposed of regional representatives whoare usually elected by the residents, as such,of the regions. In some federations, eachregion has the same number of representa-tives, in some it is based on population (witha minimum number for the smaller regions).Regions are also represented in the othernational chamber, usually on the basis ofpopulation. The second chamber, where theregions are directly represented, plays a moreimportant role in state affairs than in a uni-tary system. It gives the people of even re-mote regions the opportunity to bring to the

attention of the central government theirpressing problems and to influence nationalpolicies. They also receive opportunities toinfluence policy and administration at locallevels. In a federation, regions have their ownelected legislatures and executives, with sig-nificant and independent powers. Here, citi-zen participation or influence can be direct,for they live close to the operations of theseinstitutions and their members and officialshave permanent local residence (with fewopportunities to visit Kathmandu).20 At thatlevel, quite small communities that cannotexpect to participate in—much less, influ-ence—national affairs can wield considerablepolitical power.

These constitutional arrangements also im-pact the organization and structure of po-litical parties. They give rise to regional par-ties, giving people a greater choice amongparties and the ability to influence party mem-bers. Political parties then have incentives tolearn about local issues and establish an ef-fective presence outside the capital city. Insome federations, regional parties play a sig-nificant role at the national level (as in Indiatoday), so that the national government hasto pay due attention to regional problemsand needs. Through regional institutions, in-formation about national affairs and poli-cies is disseminated locally, and people be-come aware of them and of how they them-selves fit into the national scene. Their un-derstanding of democracy and political pro-cesses grows.

Although it is not guaranteed, the establish-ment of regional governments often leadsto more efficiency and accountability. Almostby definition, the regional government willhave greater knowledge of local circum-stances, aspirations and obstacles to devel-opment, and is well placed to plan and ex-ecute appropriate policies. The regional gov-ernment will have incentives to promote eco-nomic and infrastructural developments, ex-

The experience ofother countriesshows a massiveincrease inpoliticalparticipationwhen they becomefederal

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The tapestry ofNepal’s rich and

diverse culturesand the genius of

its communitiesmust become thebackground fordeveloping the

new identity ofthe country andthe basis of its

nationalism

ploring local opportunities, which would leadto the emergence of new growth centres andthe creation of employment opportunities,reducing dependence on Kathmandu. More-over, this is also not against the principles ofsubsidiarity, which hold that a larger andgreater body should not exercise functionsthat can be carried out efficiently by a smallerbody. Instead, the former should supportthe latter and help to coordinate its activitywith the activities of the whole community.

The federal scheme for the sharing of rev-enue and the lobbying of the national gov-ernment by regional representatives shouldensure greater resources to the region for eco-nomic and social development. And if theconstitution adopts mechanisms for equaliz-ing development across the country, the lessdeveloped regions would receive a largershare of the national revenue. There shouldalso be improvements in the delivery ofwelfare services, due to a greater familiarityof officials with local needs. And since thefocus of most regional governments shouldinevitably be rural, disparities between ruraland urban areas should begin vanishing.

Moreover, it will be easier to involve peoplein state organs and in development projects.The residents will have easier access to localofficials, and should be able to deal with themin local languages. The regional governmentwill have an incentive to please the local peoplein a way that the central government seldomhas. Persons who until now were ignored ascandidates at elections because of their casteor region would now have opportunities tocontest elections to regional legislatures or ap-pointments to other institutions. Proficiencyin local languages, some of which will be-come official languages at the regional level,will enable persons hitherto handicapped bythe lack of command of Nepali to competein entrance examinations and to obtain postsin the civil service. Participation in regional and

local affairs will give people confidence in theirability to plan their own future.

People’s confidence and their self-respect willalso grow if regional governments promotetheir cultures and languages. For many com-munities, one of the most valued results offederalism would be the recognition of theworth of these cultures. Centuries of the deni-gration of their cultures and languages by rul-ing elites at first produced a sense of inferior-ity that is now developing into anger. Regionalgovernments will provide the framework forsustaining local languages and cultures—andbeginning to reverse the imposition of thevalues and cultures of others. The resurgenceof these languages, literature, music, dances,religions, and life styles will truly enrich thecultural diversity of Nepal. And with the prideand confidence that this creates, themarginalized communities will be better ableto participate in other public spheres, to worktogether with members of other communi-ties, and to strengthen national capacity andunity. The tapestry of Nepal’s rich and diversecultures and the genius of its communitiesmust become the background for develop-ing the new identity of the country and thebasis of its nationalism.

Federalism can also give voice to minoritiesat the national level, through arrangementsfor “shared rule”. Regional participation inthe second chamber of the legislature hasalready been noted. If regional parties be-come important, they will also be representedin the other chamber and, if the political sys-tem is parliamentary, they will also have rep-resentation in the national government (aspart of a coalition government, as is becom-ing the norm in India). There will also bepressures to reflect regional diversity in thecivil service, the judiciary and the armedforces. Regions can maintain a presence atthe capital through an office dedicated tolobbying federal authorities. Regional partici-

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pation in national affairs can also take placethrough membership in bodies for intergov-ernmental cooperation (like a fiscal commis-sion, a water authority, a development plan-ning department, or a unit for dispute settle-ment). The broad federal structure thus be-comes a node of centre-regional negotia-tions on a host of matters.

The granting of substantial powers to theregions often means that many problemsbetween the regions and the centre becomeintra-regional. The politics of language inIndia in the 1950s became the centre of in-tense conflict between Delhi, bent on Hindias the official language of the country, andthe southern states, which wanted due rec-ognition of regional languages, including thereorganization of federal units on linguisticgrounds. The issue united several states andtheir residents in a national campaign againstthe central government. But once the linguisticprinciple was granted and states reorganized,the pressure on Delhi was replaced by inter-nal differences and by competition withinstates. Centre-state relations subsequently im-proved, and it is generally believed that In-dian unity was strengthened.21

Federalism is not the panacea forevery oneDespite the promises of federalism, it is un-likely that it would deliver all that is expectedof it. Among the groups unlikely to benefitare women, Dalits, those whose class nowprovides grounds for discrimination, andsomewhat vaguely “oppressed and minor-ity communities”. They will benefit as mem-bers of the general public if the positivedevelopments noted above actually materi-alize. Although there is nothing to preventregional authorities from making progres-sive provisions for women or Dalits, theymay have no more incentive to do so thanthe national government. But Dalits are un-likely to have sufficient numbers in any re-

gion to exercise power at that level. In areaspredominantly populated by Dalits, they mayobtain some form of local autonomy withinthe region. And women will be in no differ-ent a position than in the country as a whole.However, it is possible that women may findit easier to participate in public affairs, in-cluding legislative debates, at the regional levelthan the national because their political activ-ity would involve less travel, fewer absencesfrom the family, and familiarity with localpeople. The position of women and Dalitsmay also depend on whether the federal orthe regional governments are likely to bemore sympathetic to their interests and wel-fare (Box 5.1), and on how the powers overmatters of particular interest are dividedbetween the national and regional govern-ments and which have policies for promot-ing the interests and welfare of these par-ticular groups. If federalization tends towardan emphasis on ethnicity and culture, it is pos-sible that both women and Dalits will be

Federalism does not necessarily ensure the rights of womenunless the authorities have a positive attitude towards them.Examples abound on this issue, among these:

When a conservative party took office in the Kelantan andTerengganu states in Malaysia, it introduced various restrictionson women, including some practices of gender segregation thatwere not traditional in Malay Muslim culture. In addition, the ChiefMinister of Kelantan discouraged Muslim women from takingemployment that would require them to work on night shifts.

In Canada, where considerable autonomy has been given to"First Nations", women have sometimes found that their rightsare threatened by the application of the traditional law of thosecommunities. This was so in the case of Sandra Lovelace, whohad been deprived of the right to own land and participate in thecommunity because she married an "outsider". Similar actionwould not have been taken against a man in the same situation.Her case was referred to the United Nations Commission onHuman Rights.

Source: Lovelace 1977; and Stark 2004.

The effects of federal structure on excluded groups—women and the attitude of the authorities: some examplesBOX 5.1

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handicapped, since both are in their differ-ent ways victims of religion and culture.22

Malaysia and Switzerland are instructive withregard to ethnic autonomy in respect of fed-erations, as are Native American reservationsin Canada and the USA. A particular formof this issue is likely to arise if there is a sys-tem of customary or traditional communitylaw that federal units or local communitiesare able to apply. If this is the case, manysuch systems have been in conflict with inter-national human rights standards. At the regionallevel, those who draft the constitution face achoice: favouring traditional law and practicein the hope that the community will advanceor as in case of the constitution of South Af-rica, customary law subject to internationalhuman rights standards.

With regard to Madhesis, it must be recalledthat the Madhes uprising in early 2007 putfederalism firmly on the national agenda—and into the Interim Constitution, only a fewmonths after its promulgation. In one sense,Madhesis have even more to gain from fed-eralism than the Janajatis, who have long ar-gued for it.23 That amendment also gaveMadhesis additional political representation(and easier access to citizenship cards) andled to changes in the electoral system for theCA, giving them the ability to play a majorrole in the design of the federation. Themovement gave particular prominence toregionalism as a geographical and demo-graphic concept, along with the sense ofidentity associated with it. Despite these gains,it is not clear that the Madhesi objective of“One Madhes, One Pradesh” (“pradesh”referring to a federal unit)—of convertingwhat many non-Madhesi regard as geo-graphical concept into a political and consti-tutional unit—is realistic. As Hachhethu(2007) has remarked, as a geographic unit,Madhes is the plains landscape from Siwalikhill range onwards and the Madhesi, as agroup, broadly encompass people of non-

Hill origin. He states, “… such ethnic andregional identity is contested as there is no-pan-Madhes identity, culturally, religiously, orlinguistically. The people of non-Hill originsare divided into three distinct cultural groups:Plains Hindu castes, Plains Janajati groups,and Muslims”. The latter two do not regardthemselves as Madhesi. The picture becomeseven more complex when one considers thatalthough the Tharu assert their distinct iden-tity, some are assimilated to the Madhesi.Hachhethu notes that the cultural differencesbetween the Plains Janajatis and the Plainscaste groups are as large as those betweenthe Hill castes and the Hill Janajati groups,and that Muslim identity is predominantly as-sociated with religion rather than region.24 Itis thus clear that the incorporation of the Tarai(as the Plains are often called) into the Nepalifederation may not be a simple affair, al-though the ethnic Madhesis would stand togain greatly from the federalization of theTarai; it would allow them to negotiate moreeffectively with the centre. The divisionswhich have emerged among the people ofTarai could lead to the kind of internal con-flicts and fragmentation that havecharacterised the North East of India, withthe frequent and troubled carving up of theoriginal Assam state.

Nor would the least developed regions, suchas Karnali, necessarily benefit from federal-ism, as is often claimed. While it is true thatsome proposals would not only grant theleast developed areas regional government,but also a higher degree of autonomy thanother regions, these suggestions stem fromthe assumption that autonomy would pro-mote development. Undoubtedly, such ar-eas require special attention and extra re-sources, but federalism by itself is unlikelyto increase such benefits. In general, better-off areas tend to attract personnel and re-sources. If officials do not have resourcesof their own, they will be hard put to secure

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them from the better-endowed regions ifthe constitution makes the allocation of na-tional resources a matter of regional need.As the authority of the central governmentin the regions is progressively reduced, theseareas may suffer from further inaction and itmay be more difficult to provide them witheven the most basic services. Consequently,it would be necessary to complement thepowers of these regional authorities with ad-ditional resources; the central governmentwould have to assume responsibility for pro-viding these resources and, at least initially,administering their disbursement.

Even if ethnicity is accepted as a criterionfor defining a region, there are seriousdoubts, that many indigenous or culturalcommunities could govern the area. Here,of course, a great deal depends on the basis,size and number of regions—all of whichare complicated by the fact that there are fewsubstantial, contiguous areas in which any oneethnic community has a clear population ma-jority. Moreover, the distinguished geogra-pher, Professor Pitamber Sharma, states thatone particular group constitutes a majorityin only 14 districts (nine of these are domi-nated by Chhetris).25 Groups that are domi-nant in one or more districts are also the mostdispersed, a consequence of mobility.Sharma observes that as a result, “there isconsiderable ethnic/caste diversity even inareas that have a dominant ethnic/castepopulation….Even among the Janajatis,there are dominant/majority and minorityJanajatis in the same geographical area.”26

Therefore, if a single group is to be given aregion of its own (as some groups haveclaimed), the area would have to be rathersmall. This would give rise to a large numberof regions, a large proportion of whosemembers would not even live there. Toomany small regions would also mean that fewregions would have the resources or the ca-pacity to undertake significant projects andnational coordination would be difficult.

It has been proposed that in a region with asignificant number of one caste or ethnicity(although short of a majority), the areawould in some sense be deemed to “be-long” to that group. This is reminiscent ofthe former Soviet Union’s theory of thetitular autonomous community, which hadspecial rights in that region. Moreover, suchan arrangement would create anxiety inother communities—and although theirrights would be fully protected in principle,it is not clear that they would feel the sameaffinity to the land as the dominant com-munity.

One way to circumvent this difficulty is cre-ating regions with substantial territory (popu-lated by various castes and ethnic groups)for matters in which scale is important, andestablishing additional tiers of governmentbelow the regional authority where a pro-portionally large ethnic group would enjoyautonomy in matters of particular concernto them. Partly for this reason, ProfessorSharma has proposed three tiers below thenational government: the regional, district andvillage/town levels. However, increasing thenumber of tiers would raise the cost of ad-ministration, a condition often overlooked.The concept of small autonomous areas likethis has found favour in some countries,among them China, Bosnia-Herzegovina andIndia’s North East. Though well worth con-sideration, this idea compounds the com-plexity already inherent in a two-tier federa-tion. Further, this complexity would spreadthin both financial and human resources.

Even in a two-tier federation, it would bepossible to specify the cultural and otherrights of minorities, particularly at the re-gional level. Conceiving of culture as exclu-sive to a particular community is restrictive.The strength of diversity lies not in enclavesof cultural communities—almost analogousto apartheid—but exchanges of culture, sothat every community has an interest and

The strength ofdiversity lies notin enclaves ofculturalcommunities—almost analogousto apartheid—but exchanges ofculture, so thatevery communityhas an interestand stake in theculture of itsneighbours

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Federations differin the nature of

the executive at thecentre, the electoral

system, thestructure of

parties, the role,structure and

influence of thefederal government,

and so on

stake in the culture of its neighbours. Thisis a promising basis for national unity, andcan perhaps be practised among the cul-tural communities in the region more easilythan on a national basis. This approachwould have to be supplemented by nationalpolicies on language and religion. The ex-perience of both Nigeria and India showsthat a major source of instability in a fed-eration is not necessarily differences betweenthe centre and regions, but differences be-tween different communities in the regionwhich spill over other parts of the country,and compel some form of federal inter-vention. Adequate protection of the rightsof minorities, and their participation, at alllevels of government is crucial for harmonyand stability.

Another possibility where culture is a domi-nant concern is establishing a communitycouncil for each group that has minority sta-tus in one or more regions to deal with thosecultural issues which affect that communitythroughout the country as a whole. Belgium,Hungary, Latvia and Poland are well-knownexamples of this sort of policy. Because ofinternal migration, many communities nowlive throughout large parts of the country,and the council device may provide a meansof communication and the cultivation oftheir cultural values and practices. However,bodies like these have either become politi-cally difficult to sustain, as in Belgium, ordwindle in significance, as in Hungary andLatvia.

Those who oppose “ethnic federalism” ar-gue that this approach would deter devel-opment because the regions would not bebased on criteria of economic viability. De-velopment planning would become difficultbecause “natural” areas for development(such as river basins) would be broken up.Further division of powers would furtherundermine the ability to plan for the entire

country. The costs of government wouldincrease dramatically, with several layers ofgovernment, additional legislatures, bureau-cracies, and perhaps courts, absorbing moneythat could otherwise increase welfare services.In addition, there are fears that corruptionwould increase, finding new avenues in re-gional authorities. For these and other rea-sons, administration would become ineffi-cient, and the delivery of services would suf-fer.

Serious political repercussions might alsoemerge. Regional minorities could suffer dis-crimination. Tensions might well arise be-tween communities dominant in differentregions, as well as among the dominant andsmaller communities within a region. Com-munal harmony would be disturbed. Region-alism, particularly along Nepal’s borders,would expose the country’s vulnerability. Thestate would become weak because of its ob-ligations in fulfilling regional interests, na-tional symbols would be undermined, andfederalism would become the first step to-wards the disintegration of Nepal.

One way to move forward is broadeningthe scope of the debate, which so far hasfocused almost entirely on the criteria forregional division rather than on institutionalneeds and technical requirements. As we havenow seen, there is considerable flexibility indesigning a federation, through which dif-ferences between the two sides can be nar-rowed. The design of the federation canalso be fundamental to its success. There isa tendency to assume that there is a “fed-eral model”, and to ignore the many waysin which federations vary and which influ-ence the functioning of the federation, withsignificant influence on ethnic relations orstability. Federations differ in the nature ofthe executive at the centre (parliamentary orpresidential), the electoral system(majoritarian or proportional), the structure

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of parties (the balance between national andregional parties), the role, structure and in-fluence of the federal government (whetherdominant as in India and Nigeria, or co-ordinate as in Canada), the distribution ofresources (oil being a major element in Ni-geria and Iraq), dispute settlement proce-dure (particularly value placed on media-tion and political conciliation), and so on.In India and Nigeria, the dominant role ofthe federal government has determined theunfolding of the federal relations. These arecritical factors to take into account in de-signing federal arrangements.27

The debate could benefit, too, from a moreobjective analysis of comparative federal ex-perience. What does the experience of feder-alization elsewhere show us? The record isuneven, especially where an element ofethnicity is involved. In India and Spain, con-cessions to ethnicity have undoubtedly strength-ened both national unity and the flourishingof cultural diversity. In the former Yugosla-via, ethnicity questions became the fault linesalong which that federation foundered. Tosome extent, these issues have also posedproblems in the former Soviet Union, as wellas in the original Pakistan federation. Today,secessionist movements are stronger in uni-tary states than in those that have become fed-eral. Indeed, federalism is often seen as a wayto end secessionist claims, as in the Osloframework for Sri Lanka, and the Sudan peaceagreement. It is also possible, through variedforms of division of powers, the structuringof “shared rule”, and consultative and coop-eration mechanisms, to strengthen bonds be-tween regions to the center consensually.

Minorities need reassurance and a measureof self-government, which federalism canprovide. It is equally true, however, that dis-crimination against minorities persists in someregions in ethnic federations, generally un-constitutionally and against federal and re-

gional laws. Both Nigeria and North EastIndia have manifested such problems. Tra-ditionally, minorities in regions have beenprotected through special powers lodged inthe national government. These include a vetopower on regional discriminatory legislation,a strong bill of rights that is binding through-out the federation, a proactive judiciary oncases involving discrimination, and, as indi-cated earlier, by giving minorities self-gov-ernment powers in selected areas. Political andreligious leaders can also contribute signifi-cantly to the cultivation of a national ethos.

It is also true that the costs of running a fed-eration usually exceed those of a unitary state.But the benefits, several outlined above, usu-ally far outweigh the costs in the long term,if not sooner. It is often pointed out that thefour or five leading federations are amongthe most prosperous and stable states. Costsand benefits can be measured neither by fi-nancial accounts nor a “zero sum” mentality.

Designing the federation andinstitutional arrangementsInstitutional design can avert many potentialproblems. Professor Ronald Watts says that“the function of federations is not to eliminateinternal differences, but rather to preserve re-gional identities within a united framework.Their function, therefore, is not to eliminate con-flict but to manage it in such a way that regionaldifferences are accommodated”.28 Institutionsimpact the organization and behaviour of po-litical parties, as well as the conduct of civil ser-vants and organized interest groups, either mod-erating or accentuating political conflict. Struc-tural features, of course, vary with context, butit is perhaps possible to draw some lessons fromcomparative experience.29

Federalism is likely to succeed where thereare established traditions of democracy andthe rule of law. Further, it benefits from:

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an independent dispute settlement mecha-nism;proper constitutional guarantees for thefederal arrangements; andlimits on central power to intervene inregional government.

It must also be remembered that democraticstructures are necessary for the exercise andprotection of federalism. Democratic poli-tics in a region compel regional leaders toprotect autonomy as well as empower themto do so. At the national level, they encour-age the government to abide by the consti-tution and seek consensus with regions.Moreover, Multi-ethnic federations havebetter prospects of success than those thatare bi-ethnic.

All in all, the preconditions for the successof the formation and functioning of feder-alism can be summarized as follows:

willingness to form the federation; trust;a strong sense of a common politicalcommunity and a commitment to nationalunity;basic agreement on values;the rule of law;supremacy of the constitution;equitable judicial interpretation and en-forcement; andwhere federations have arisen out of con-flict, frequent demonstrations of under-standing and the cultivation of relation-ships.

Sometimes federations have been structuredto give greater powers to some units than toothers, to recognize such factors as differ-ences in cultures, capacities, and histories (forexample, Quebec in Canada andBougainville in Papua New Guinea). Some-times, too, within a non-federal state a re-gion can be given autonomy (such as theGerman-speaking South Tyrol in Italy).

Some of these arrangements work well.Often, though, they create resentment anda demand from other units in the federa-tion for parity (which, in the case of Spain,has led to a fairly uniform federal struc-ture).

Some of these factors are the product ofhistory—about which not much can usuallybe done. Others are institutional, which hu-man ingenuity can adjust to the circumstancesof the country. The design of a federationinvolves both political and technical deci-sions—that are not always easy to separate.As this Report has explained earlier, the po-litical decision to federalize has already beenmade. It is now the responsibility of the CAto decide what kind of a federation Nepalshould have. Ultimately, the Assembly mustmake all decisions. But even political deci-sions depend on technical issues, especiallyas there has been little public discussion ondetails.

The CA might well derive great benefits fromsetting up an expert group to make recom-mendations on several critical issues in thedesign of the federation. These include thenumber and size of federal units, the numberof levels of government, fiscal arrangements,the distribution of powers, and the establish-ment of dispute settlement mechanisms. Sincecomponents of federalization affect mostaspects of the constitution—among these, thevery system of government—more than onecommittee would have to address federal is-sues. An expert group could also coordinatethe deliberations and decisions of the variousCA committees.

It is also necessary to recognize that the imple-mentation of a federal system will take sev-eral years. The Assembly should build into theconstitution, perhaps in the form of a sched-ule, the different stages and goals in the devel-opment of the federation, as well as the dates

Democraticpolitics in a region

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by which they must be achieved. In this waythe transfer of powers from the center to theregions could be phased over, say ten years,as the regions develop the institutions and per-sonnel they need to handle these powers. Itwould be necessary, at least for a period oftime, to send officials now working in na-tional ministries to the regions as they estab-lish their own local civil service bodies. Thiswill require organizing transfers of funds. Bothpublic servants and political leaders will alsoneed to learn about the mechanisms of thefederation. For all these purposes, the expertgroup or a special commission can assist agreat deal, providing both technical help andensuring that the time table provided by theconstitution or issued elsewhere is observed.

To sum up…Although federalism can help promote po-litical and socio-economic inclusion,strengthen the economy, and increase publicparticipation, it will by no means solve allthe problems of inclusion and social justicethat this Report raises. The socioeconomicdiversity of Nepal, along with its markedregional differences in resources, may call fora federalism that accords different degreesof autonomy and competences to differentregions with regard to particular issues. Suchis the case in both Italy and Spain. This mayrequire a strong centre. Moreover, it will benecessary to supplement federalism with spe-cific devices, many discussed in this chapter,

which the new constitution should feature.Ample provision for them already exists inthe Interim Constitution. These supplemen-tary mechanisms have to be primarily the re-sponsibility of the central government—andthey must be formulated as national poli-cies, although their implementation will in-creasingly require consultation with the re-gional governments.

A federation is not a neutral constitutionaldevice. There are different kinds of federa-tions. The adoption of one or another typewill have a major impact on how Nepal de-velops and how its people relate to their re-gion and to the centre. It will also affect rela-tions between communities and thereby theidentities of Nepalis.

While most countries like to call themselvesdemocracies and many say that they have fed-eral structure for promoting inclusion andparticipation, the very principles of democ-racy are defeated unless human developmentis actively fostered. Moreover, democracygoes well beyond government structures. Italso involves the democratization of the pri-vate sector and of civil society.

The ultimate need is both a democratic stateand a democratic society. Unless society elimi-nates its exclusionary practices, state trans-formation can do little to help individualsfeel free to develop and use their capabilitiesto the fullest extent possible.

Althoughfederalism canhelp promotepolitical andsocio-economicinclusion andincrease publicparticipation, itwill by no meanssolve all theproblems ofinclusion andsocial justice

Conclusion andrecommendations6

CHAPTER

Inequality as both causeand effect of exclusion

Reform the political systemfor equitable representation

and effective participation

Devise federalism for socialjustice, inclusion, and participation

Make the peace process right

Summing up

Conclusionand

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Inequality as both cause and effectof exclusion

his Nepal Human DevelopmentReport depicts vivid gaps acrossthe country’s different regions and

its caste and ethnic groups. These gaps be-come all the more pervasive with time bothfor the regions and the groups within them.This implies that the policies of the past havenot addressed exclusion and inequalities ef-fectively. This finding in itself is not new; pastreports have portrayed a similar picture.However, at this historic juncture, inequalityhas moved to the forefront of the nationalagenda with the country striving to end ex-clusion through state restructuring and thecreation of a new constitution for a Nepalthat can sustain peace, achieve justice and func-tion in such a way as to produce prosperityfor its citizenry as a whole.

This Report advances the view that becauseexclusion causes unequal human develop-ment—which, in turn, perpetuates exclusion—a special focus on the equitable representationand participation of excluded groups andregions will surely improve the quality of hu-man development. Consequently, the Reportexplores options for changes in the politicalsystem and the state structure that might bet-ter accommodate the interests of differentgroups of people. However, the Report alsodemonstrates that equitable representation

cannot alone resolve the problems of exclu-sion unless those who represent Nepal’s vari-ous constituencies can influence policy deci-sions through direct and active participation.Those now excluded are unlikely to partici-pate as effectively as advantaged groups be-cause of their political inexperience and short-comings in their endowments. Inequalities inendowment not only create, but cause exclu-sion. Consequently, inequality and exclusionmust end simultaneously in all its dimensions,including that of political action—a major featthat can come about only through consensusand cooperation.

Government has made efforts in the past, at amuch larger scale after the April 2006Janandolan, to reduce cultural, political andsocioeconomic exclusion. However, they re-quire a holistic approach with the provision ofother policies and their effective implementa-tion. This can be done when the excludedgroups are well represented and participate ef-fectively in the political system to change theoutcome in their favour.

To end exclusion, therefore it is clear thatfirst, the political system and state structureneed change, and, second, such change andprogress requires peace. In short, ending in-equality depends in large measure on politi-cal inclusion, whose prerequisite is peace. Wetherefore put forward the following key rec-ommendations.

Equitablerepresentationcannot aloneresolve theproblems ofexclusion unlessthose whorepresent Nepal’svariousconstituencies caninfluence policydecisions throughdirect and activeparticipation

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Reform the political system forequitable representation andeffective participationWhile the peace process opens the door formeeting the needs that became evident dur-ing the 2006 Janandolan, ending politicalexclusion, among others, remains para-mount to averting further violent conflict.A democratic polity offers greater oppor-tunities for participation than other formsof governance, and some forms of democ-racy promote greater participation than oth-ers. Democratic governance is also stronglyinfluenced by improvements in the electoralsystem and ensuring democracy within thepolitical parties. To this end, this Reportmakes the following recommendations:

1. Revisit the mixed electoral systemthat combines the first-past-the-post(plurality) regime with proportionalrepresentationNepal has used the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP)electoral system in its three parliamentary elec-tions since 1990. The results reveal that par-ties can obtain spurious majorities by win-ning approximately only one-third of thepopular vote, as pointed out in Chapter 4.The main benefit of the FPTP system is itsfostering of accountability and stability. Thatof the proportional representation (PR) sys-tem is its ensuring of inclusion. The FPTPpromotes stability, providing an opportunityfor forming a majority government, andmaking the candidates it elects accountableto their constituencies. On the other hand,while the PR system does not promise ac-countability directly to the people, it ensuresinclusion - the main demand of the Nepalisin the 2006 Janandolan. To promote inclu-sion, therefore, the government has used amixed electoral system, a combination ofFPTP (Plurality) and PR system with 58 per-cent of seats allocated to PR in the CA elec-tion of 575 seats held in April 2008. How-

ever, the mixed electoral system did not pro-vide an opportunity to form a majority gov-ernment.

In designing its future electoral system, Nepaltherefore has to find the right balance be-tween greater accountability and stability, onthe hand, and, on the other, greater inclusionin the current political context of Nepal. Thepost-conflict government needs both at-tributes for sustained recovery and recon-struction. Although the current CA of 601members (including 26 nominees) has per-mitted far greater scope of representationthan prior legislative bodies, it has provedunwieldy in producing solutions to urgentproblems. Moreover, a small country mov-ing towards a federal system probably willnot require a national parliament so large. Thishints at the limited possibility of representa-tion of all 103 caste and ethnic groups in amodest size parliament, even adopting the PRsystem in future. Discarding the PR systemcompletely can perpetuate the exclusion ofsome caste and ethnic groups. For this reason,a mixed electoral system that uses PR seemsto be the solution for some time to come.1

However, the type of electoral system forNepal, whether PR or FPTP or a combina-tion of both, should be decided upon thebasis of several factors that revolve aroundthe future political system and country’s gov-ernance structure. Thus, the electoral systemdepends on the type of political system thecountry chooses (presidential or parliamen-tary) and on the federal type and the struc-ture of its legislature (one or two chambers).Generally, the structure of the legislature issimilar at both the central and state levels,although the electoral system can differ fromone tier to another. Given a two-chamberlegislature, a different mix of FPTP and PRelectoral systems with different quotas forthe excluded groups could be adopted, de-

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pending on caste, ethnicity, and other socialfeatures of the regions/states.

In addition to the electoral system, the otherimportant criterion for broadening popularparticipation is making the political partiesmore inclusive and democratic than they havepreviously been.

2. Make political parties inclusive intheir makeup, and transparent anddemocratic in their decision-makingAs explained above, an inclusive electoral sys-tem such as PR cannot serve Nepal’s needsfor political inclusion adequately unless theparties themselves are inclusive in their struc-ture and democratic in their decision-making.Thus, unless the political parties follow demo-cratic principles by undertaking reforms toinclude more women and members of theexcluded castes and ethnic groups in their struc-tures—including their central, parliamentaryand other committees—their decisions can-not serve the interests of the excluded groups.

Today most of the political parties seems tolack organizational solidarity and efficiency,and find their support bases dwindling be-cause of their earlier failures in delivering onthe promises made in their electoral mani-festos. They need to sharpen their identity.They need to improve not only their trans-parency and participation, but also clarify theirpolicy platforms and make these available infull detail to their rank and file membership.Indeed, the process of platform-buildingmust become far more participatory.2

Although the proliferation of political par-ties after the end of the party-less Panchayatsystem in 1990 was natural, it now threatensNepal’s political stability. Together with thePR system, the sheer number of parties miti-gates against any one of them forming a vi-

able majority or coalition that can govern thecountry. Additionally, this increase has gonehand in hand with growing exclusion. Re-storing a greater measure of inclusivenesscould decrease the number of parties andincrease the country’s political stability. Tothese ends, this Report recommends for:

making party membership transparent;making rules that the parties guaranteetheir secularism, basing their platformson ideology rather than religion, languageor other communal characteristics;making the party organizational structureinclusive, involving the excluded groupsequitably;enforcing party law and rules more ef-fectively;following democratic processes in deci-sion-making and making them open andtransparent;making parties accountable themselvesto their constituencies; andfostering inter-party relationships anddeveloping a political community.

Devise federalism for social justice,inclusion, and participation1. Bring governance closer to the peopleby devising a federal structure suitableto the characteristics of NepalThe third amendment to the Interim Con-stitution 2007 specifies state restructuring asthe federal system. Despite the fact that 335of the 575 elected seats (58%) have been al-located under PR system to a number ofminorities, several caste and ethnic groupsstill could not send even a single member tothe CA. And given the need for a legislatureof viable size in the future, it is difficult torepresent all the caste and ethnic groups in aunitary state structure. Thus, wide represen-tation and power sharing lends weight tofederal arrangements.

Unless thepolitical partiesfollow democraticprinciples byundertakingreforms to includemore women andmembers of theexcluded castesand ethnic groupsin partystructures, theirdecisions cannotserve the interestsof the excludedgroups

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Chapter 5 drew attention to the merits anddrawbacks of area-based federations, as wellas those based on caste and ethnicity, alongwith the possible weakening of governancein Nepal’s “dis-aggregation” from a strongunitary state into a federation of regions. Howstrong a centre is needed in a resource-poorcountry that has both a highly diverse popu-lation socially and economically, together withmany marked physical differences, is an is-sue that needs to be decided upon throughwide consultation and discussion amongNepalis and their representatives. The extentof power sharing between the centre andregions could differ from one subject tothe other and from one region to the other.Given the diversity there may be a need forasymmetrical federal arrangements in whichthe regions of the federal state do not allhave the same powers.

In short, Nepali federalism must be flex-ible and home-grown, developed and de-cided by its own citizens with their effec-tive participation. And this needs to be but-tressed by adequate provisions of institu-tional arrangements that bolster demo-cratic principles, enforce rule of law andfoster relations between the diverse com-munities and regions. Without democraticprinciples and structures, federalism can-not provide the benefits that are envisaged.

In a federal structure, power needs to bedevolved and must ultimately rest in thehands of local authorities. Despite the in-troduction of decentralization as early as the1980s, the central authority has been reluc-tant to undertake devolution in all threespheres of the process—administrative, leg-islative and fiscal. Given recent constitutionalcommitments, as well as the principles ofgood governance, devolution has taken onincreased importance and should be care-fully carried out at the community level—irrespective of the type of federal structurethat emerges from the CA. The human and

financial resources required for this processmust be borne in mind.

2. Ensure the interests of the poor, women,Dalits, and other excluded groupswhile devising the federal structureThe Interim Constitution 2007 requires con-siderable homework on the design and struc-ture of the federal system that must, in addi-tion to the other functions of a state, honourthe UN declarations on the rights of indig-enous peoples (13 September 2007); on theelimination of discrimination against women(18 December 1979); and, most importantly,the two seminal human rights Covenants,respectively on civil and political rights, andon economic, social and cultural rights (19December 1966).3

These numerous obligations cannot be metby a federation based largely on ethnic fac-tors. It will not overcome the discriminationprevailing even within excluded castes and eth-nic groups at the neighbourhood and house-hold levels. Nor can a federal structure ensurethe development of poor regions like Karnali.It cannot safeguard the rights of women inany and all groups. Therefore, the restructur-ing of the state has to be guided by socialjustice, along with the democratic principlesof inclusion and participation. These needscan be met by a central government so longas the regions have not reached a certain thresh-old in terms of human development.

3. Build a strong nation-stateIn Nepal today, there is a significant dangerof a divergence between state-building andnation-building. This is a result of assimila-tion without choice—an unviable model ofintegration in the past.

Cultural differences can trigger violent con-flict when state policies are discriminatory,deepening inequality in political and socio-eco-nomic affairs between the different groupsand suppressing their cultural differences.

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There is no trade-off between diversity andunity, nor between peace and respect for di-versity. Both can move together well if onerespects the other’s culture under the multi-cultural policies of the state. But identitypolitics need to be managed to building astrong nation.

A state verges on failure unless it can per-form a number of fundamental functions,among these:

controlling violence and enforcing itslaws;collecting taxes;maintaining the loyalty of its citizens, aswell as their security; andsecuring international recognition.Otherwise it loses its sovereignty.4

Only a strong state can control power anddevolve it; guarantee the rule of law; elimi-nate impunity; implement development poli-cies effectively; mediate among diverse so-cial groups; and create conditions for politi-cal stability, development and peace by un-dertaking the reconstruction of the country’seconomic and social fabric.

This country, which will soon assume a fed-eral structure with regional autonomy, hasrecently discarded a number of unifying fac-tors—among these, the monarchy, an offi-cial language and religion, and a national codeof dress. These amount to significant lossesof social capital and identity. Nonetheless,all its citizens have common rights and obli-gations—of which many are still unaware—that can eventually contribute to a new senseof national identity and cohesion in tandemwith the preservation of cultural diversity. Themedia have an important role to play in thisimmense transformation.

In addition, a sense of national identity tendsto grow as a state matures. Consensus andcompromise can foster this sense tremen-dously. So can a constitution in which all

Nepalis feel they can claim some ownership.Its implementation can strengthen the feel-ing of national identity.

4. Build a strong sense of citizenshipand political communityThe restoration of democracy has increasedpeople’s aspirations without fulfilling theirexpectations. The rights enshrined in the In-terim Constitution include the rights to foodand work, the delivery of basic services, andabove all, guarantees of internal peace andstability. None of these legitimate demandshas been adequately addressed. This hasweakened the base of citizenship and in-creased clientelism. Many civil society actors,including private sector bodies, have becomethe clients of the political parties rather thantrue citizens. This has alienated the poor ingeneral, especially among the country’s farm-ers and agricultural labourers. If the state failsto address the basic needs and rights of thesecitizens, the country could well relapse intoconflict, especially after the immense growthof political awareness since the 1990s and itseven more rapid increase during the Maoistinsurgency. The state must promote devel-opment that is inclusive, is humane, and just.

Building a strong sense of citizenship re-quires the representation and participationof individuals who respect the views of oth-ers. Such a sense of citizenship and the de-velopment of political community is nec-essary for the logical conclusion of the peaceprocess and the making of the constitution.Peace is a prerequisite for the future progressof Nepal. Therefore, the peace processmust be managed well so as to move thenation ahead through state transformation.

Make the peace process rightSome of the steps taken by the governmentto ensure transitional justice have not beenopen and democratic and therefore have beenopposed in different quarters. These facts,coupled with ongoing impunity and disre-

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gard for the rule of law, as well as the lackof action in returning properties seized dur-ing conflict, has further complicated the peaceprocess in Nepal. In his report of 2 January2009 to the Security Council, the UnitedNations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon,expressed concern about the delay in inte-grating and rehabilitating Maoist army per-sonnel and inaction in implementing othershort-term peace building measures 5, andobserved that Nepal’s peace process contin-ues to flag:

“The integration and rehabilitation ofMaoist army personnel is critical to sustain-able peace, but it is only one of the chal-lenges facing Nepal. The need to implementother peace process commitments, improvethe security situation, especially in parts ofthe Tarai, end the prevailing impunity andaddress the wounds of the conflict, reachsufficient consensus in the drafting of a fed-eral constitution, promote inclusiveness ingovernment positions, including in the se-curity forces, and, above all, sustain suffi-cient cooperation among major politicalforces while those challenges are addressed,reflects the fact that the peace process inNepal is still a fragile one.” 6

In view of this assessment, and the findingsof the report, this Nepal Human Develop-ment Report advances the following sug-gestions for making the peace process right:

1. Provide ‘citizenship rights’ througha functioning stateThe legitimacy of the state begins in the eyeof the citizens. For a very long time, theNepali state has verged on failure or has hada “sovereignty gap” as defined by Ghani andLockhart (2008)—a gap arising from the glar-ing differences between its de jure sover-eignty—its recognition by its citizens and theinternational community—and its de facto sov-ereignty, which depends on its capability to

perform governance functions. While the gapalso derives from the political upheavals ofthe past 12 years, the state should by nowhave curbed the problems of impunity, en-sured the regular delivery of basic services,and offered some peace dividend. But thestate has not been able to ensure the rule oflaw, improve access to justice, exert full ad-ministrative control, or create citizenshiprights through developing and implement-ing social policy. Indeed, it has been unableto produce the “sovereignty dividend” ofsupport for its decisions and trust in the over-all system. Further, a vicious circle has begunin which various power centres vie for con-trol, multiple decision-making processes con-fuse government priorities, and citizens havebegun feeling disenfranchised.

Consequently, in accordance with the principleof the separation of powers, the Nepali statemust perform all the functions of a sover-eign state listed above. Arguably, the mostimportant of these is the enforcement of therule of law, which demands improving citi-zen access to justice, ensuring the independenceof the judiciary, and giving the legislature farmore power. The separation of powers is oneof the most important principles of democ-racy. It helps shield a country from both anar-chy and authoritarianism. If the implement-ing agency, the cabinet, also formulates lawsand provides judicial verdicts, democraticprinciples will be defeated. In a parliamentarysystem, the party that forms the governmenthas significant influence on the decisions madeby the legislature. The constitution must there-fore make provisions for guaranteeing theintegrity of the legislature—the body that inprinciple protects the fundamental rights ofcitizens at large and of minorities.

As indicated above, strengthening democracynecessitates the independence of the judiciaryand broadening access to justice. The formalcourt system badly needs capacity-building, the

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integration and institutionalization of legal aidservices, and a far better image, so as to raisepublic confidence. Beyond such basic reforms,given Nepal’s rugged terrain and the low leveleducational status of so much of its popula-tion, community mediation efforts at the locallevel must continue to deal with minor cases sothat the poor do not waste their time and re-sources in attempting to resolve a large num-ber of complaints through the district courtsand those above. Mediation efforts could helpreduce the backlog of cases. Donors have aparticular role to play in supporting training forlocal authorities and community leaders to ad-dress the justice needs of socially excludedgroups, of the poor and of women.

Moreover, economic and social policies with afocus on excluded groups is necessary for im-proving unequal human development, and at-taining rapid human progress. Targeting basicservices including education and health forwomen, Dalits and Janajatis together withchanges in other policies is necessary. This socialempowerment needs to move hand in handwith economic empowerment through the pro-vision of decent employment opportunities.

However, ensuring citizenship rights requirespositive participation by citizens as mentionedin chapter four of the report. Citizens shouldnot merely claim rights and freedoms, but alsofulfil their many obligations, among these:

respecting the country’s laws,recognizing the rights and freedom ofothers,eliminating discrimination, andobserving justice in their daily activities.

2. Ensure representation and theparticipation of different stakeholders,including the victims of conflict andcitizens at large in the formulation ofpolicies and the development ofinstitutionsThe CPA and Interim Constitution havemandates for forming various commissions,

including a Truth and Reconciliation Com-mission (TRC). To create the TRC, the gov-ernment drafted the relevant bill withoutsufficient consultation. This led to heavycriticism. Consequently, the governmentmust ensure the representation and partici-pation of different stakeholders, includingthe political parties, human rights organiza-tions, victim groups, women, children andother excluded groups. It is also necessaryto ensure the implementation of United Na-tions Resolution 1325 for protecting andempowering women both during armedconflict and afterwards as well as resolu-tion 1820 to end impunity for the sexualviolence that occurred during the conflict.

3. Ensure the participation of Maoistarmy combatants in choosing theiroptions in the process of integrationand/or rehabilitationThe development of an integration strategy willentail elaborating a new national security policyoutlining the size, elements, and the form ofthe security forces needed by the country. Alldecisions in this regard should be open andparticipatory, and taken at the highest politicallevel. The past debate and dissent on the issueof whether all or part of Maoist army per-sonnel are to be integrated has elicited a mixedreaction among different stakeholders. But aneffective solution must eliminate any impres-sion that entering the security forces requiresviolence or political manoeuvres. Such an out-come should therefore involve the representa-tives of Maoist army personnel in a thoroughdiscussion on issues and options. An assessmentof their needs and aspirations will require con-ducting individual and group discussion andinterviews among them.

4. Devise and implement a socialreintegration and rehabilitation planfor disqualified Maoist army personneland for internally displaced personsResolving the issue of IDP return and reinte-grating disqualified Maoist army personnel

Citizens shouldnot merely claimrights andfreedoms, but alsofulfil their manyobligations

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calls for stress on “push” factors, among thesepublic security, the return of land, and the ces-sation of violence by various groups. Address-ing these problems will have benefits that ex-tend well beyond the two groups directly in-volved to the citizenry as a whole.

Full implementation of both the IDP policyand directives, particularly in regard to assis-tance such as repairing and rebuilding homes,educational assistance, livelihood loans, andother means that help people make new be-ginnings is probably the most effective way ofsignalling that social reintegration will proceedsmoothly. As women and excluded minoritiesor castes are least likely to be found on thegovernment’s IDP registration list, their situa-tions merit special attention.

When the UN-led registration and verificationof the Maoist army combatants was completed,a total number of 2,973 were identified asminors. However, despite commitments madein the CPA and other related documents to theimmediate release of all children associated withthe armed forces or armed groups, no formalrelease of the identified minors have taken placeso far. Of particular concern is that the dis-qualified minors, who are still in the canton-ment, remain separated from their families, andare missing out education and other develop-ment opportunities.

Even though there has been no formal dis-charge of minors from the cantonments, aconsiderable number of children and youthassociated with armed forces or armedgroups have either been informally releasedor self-released. Many of them have faceddifficulties when returning to their homes andreintegrating back into their communities. Inresponse to the self-released and informallyreleased children and also in anticipation of aformal discharge of the minors from the can-tonments, UNICEF has initiated community-based support programme for the release,return and reintegration, which provides edu-

cation support, vocational trainings, psycho-social counselling and other related service toapproximately 7,500 children.

Many girls and women joined the Maoist tofight gender discrimination. Reintegrationtherefore should strive to build on the em-powerment they achieved during fighting andaviod that women and girls need to revertto their traditional submissive role.

Past social reintegration efforts and the cur-rent situation point to the importance of fourparticular thrusts:

non-formal education;agriculture and livestock;vocational skill training; andmicro-enterprise development.

Since not all individuals will need all four ofthese categories of assistance, the disqualifiedMaoist army personnel should be carefullyprofiled in accordance with the options thatwill best suit them. It should also be connectedto the already on-going programme of Chil-dren Associated with Armed Forces andArmed Groups (CAAFAG) run by UNICEF.However, the reintegration strategy must en-sure their livelihoods. To take only one example,programmes in non-formal education and/or vocational training will have little value—orsustainability—unless the targeted beneficiariesare engaged in some form of enterprise de-velopment and are supported in undertakingcommercially their agriculture and livestockactivities. Such initiatives call for linkage withvaried support organizations closely attuned tofinancial services and market needs. Particulareffort should be made to avoid gender stereo-typed support where women enter low paid“women-friendly” professions, while men gethigher paid and qualified jobs.

Sustainability also demands increasing em-ployment opportunities, especially for thejobless young people. This is particularly im-portant in the context of the current world-

Sustainabilityalso demands

increasingemployment

opportunities,especially for the

jobless youngpeople

6


endations


wide recession and the low growth rate ofNepal and therefore the low contribution ofthe per capita income component in humandevelopment, as shown in chapter two ofthis Report. The Nepali economy still reliesheavily on remittances from abroad—yetanother reason for stressing job creationwithin the country itself. This indeed requiresan economic growth—which is high andlasting but inclusive and with high employ-ment-intensity—thus a need for increasedprivate investment apart from the public one.

5. Build the capacity of local peacecommittees to assume responsibilitiesfor reconciliation and reintegration atthe local levelLocal Peace Committees are so far the soleorganizations being created at the local levelin post-conflict Nepal to support local devel-opment and promote peace-building. Suchbodies tend to be more inclusive than DistrictDevelopment Committees because they bringtogether government organizations, politicalparties and civil society bodies that bridgeNon-Government Organisations, private en-terprises and the victims themselves. By con-trast, the District Development Committeescomprise only the representatives of politicalparties and thereby risk spurring the kinds ofclientele formation that have earlier spurredconflict rather than true citizenship at the locallevel—yet can also lead socioeconomic recon-struction within their geographic scope. As-sistance from both multilateral and bilateraldonors will be needed for capacity-buildingof Peace Committees—in which the long ex-perience of the United Nations system canbe put to good use.

6. Ensure effective participation ofConstituent Assembly members, allpolitical parties, and citizens at large inthe making of the new constitutionDespite the fact that the CA is more repre-sentative than any other previously establishedinstitution, this is not enough to ensure a na-

tionally owned result. Unless the ParliamentSecretariat reaches well beyond those whohave obvious credentials for the job, even-tual support for the new constitution maynot be as widespread as desired. To do so,this Report suggests:

Making provision for enhancing knowl-edge and awareness of CA membersfor composing the new draft.Ensuring that participants can offer theiropinions in their native languages so thatthey can contribute fully and comfortably.Given the tight deadline, the shortcom-ings of the 1990 drafting process shouldbe carefully examined so as to avoidthese dangers, notably in the presenta-tion and analysis of information and itsfeedback to the drafting and finalizationof the constitution.Provide sufficient lead time for broadpopular consultation at the local level,managed as far as possible by NGOsand civil society bodies so as to have thegreatest possible educational impact.Observe carefully the pertinent provi-sions of Convention 169 of the Inter-national Labour Organisation Concern-ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in In-dependent Countries, 27 June 1989, aswell as the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13September 2007.

7. Form collective identity in theprocess of constitution makingThe CPA and Interim Constitution focus onstate building. However, there is a need forcollective identity formation for nation build-ing. Cultural inclusion should form the foun-dation of such a collective identity. This requiresremoving exclusionary traditions, institutions andcustoms and building a collective identity whichaccommodates all 103 castes and ethnic groupsand treats all the regions equally.

Constitution making offers the possibility to in-fluence the nation building process towards es-

Local PeaceCommittees arethe organizationsbeing created atthe local level inpost-conflictNepal to supportlocal developmentand promotepeace-building.

Conc

lusi

on an

d re

com

men

datio

ns

66666


tablishing a set of ideas, values, and institutionsas a part of a collective national identity. There-fore, of the 14 committees engaged in makingof the constitution, especially the committee on de-termination of bases for cultural and social reintegrationhas to play a critical role in comprehending andincorporating the views of different groups ofpeople following a participatory process.

Summing upThe fact that unequal human development isboth a cause and result of exclusion pointsto the need for a two-fold strategy:

ensuring the equitable representation ofall groups in state structures; andenabling citizens to participate effectivelyin decisions concerning their develop-ment.

Although democracy is presumed to enshrinethese principles, they can function only ifsociety undergoes significant social and eco-nomic transformation. In other words, in ad-dition to ensuring civil and political rights,the state must also guarantee the social and

economic rights of the people. The state hasto invest disproportionately more both in thehealth and education and in income-gener-ating activities of the poor in order to closethe gap between those who are excluded andthose who are not. Unless these two trans-formations—political and socioeconomic—take place in tandem, true democracy is un-likely to endure. Indeed, political democracyin Nepal has repeatedly collapsed because itwas not accompanied by social transforma-tion. Each such collapse has set off yet an-other popular uprising.

As this Report has repeatedly pointed out, thereis no guarantee that a democracy can ensurethe rights of all, produce a strong state thatenjoys the respect of its citizens and offer ev-ery citizen equal respect. Nonetheless, these goalscan be attained if individuals not only strive tofulfil their rights, but also their obligations ascitizens towards the state and towards one an-other. All this can happen only when societyundergoes a decisive change towards inclusiveand equitable human development that increasesthe range of choice for everyone.

Constitutionmaking offers the

possibility toinfluence the

nation buildingprocess towards

establishing a setof ideas, values,and institutionsas a part of a

collective nationalidentity

Endnotes

Chapter 11 The term “Dalit” refers to “a group of people who

are religiously, culturally, socially and economicallyoppressed. They belong to different language andethnic groups. Dalits per se are not homogeneous.Their heterogeneity and hierarchy can be betterexplained in terms of three broad regional groups:(1) Dalits in the Hill community, (2) Dalits in theNewar community, and (3) Dalits in the Tarai/Madhesi community (see UNDP/Nepal 2004).However, some Dalit scholars hold the view thatthere is no Dalit in Newar community. The socialhierarchy of Nepali society as set out by the Na-tional Code of 1854 is given in Annex 1.2.

2 According to the National Foundation for Devel-opment of Indigenous Nationalities Act 2002 in-digenous peoples or nationalities are those ethnicgroups or communities who have their own mothertongue and traditional customs, distinct culturalidentity, distinct social structure and written ororal history of their own. Based on the above, thegovernment has identified 59 ethnic groups as in-digenous peoples or nationalities (see UNDP/Nepal 2004, p. 180).

3 The Madhesis are people who originated onNepal’s Plains, who live in the Tarai, and who feelmarginalised by modern Nepali nationalism, whichhas rested on the ideas of monarchy, a single Nepalilanguage, and a Hill-centric identity. This restric-tive concept has excluded Madhesis -- who speakvaried languages—among these, Maithili, Awadhi,Bhojpuri, Urdu and Hindi—and who have exten-sive cultural, social and kinship links with Indiancitizens living across the border in Bihar and UttarPradesh. These differences have led Hill Nepalisto view Madhesis with suspicion and to questiontheir fitness for citizenship.

4 Evidence abounds showing that if the state couldnot meet the growing expectations of people dur-ing the post-conflict period, a relapse into fighting

would take place (Annan 2005; and Collier andHoeffler 2004).

5 UNDP 2004.6 A failed state is the extension of a failing state,

which is defined by the Fund for Peace as beingcharacterized by such factors as a loss of physicalcontrol of its territory or a monopoly on the le-gitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimateauthority to make collective decisions; an inabilityto provide reasonable public services; and the in-ability to interact with other states as a full mem-ber of the international community. The commoncharacteristics of a failing state include a centralgovernment so weak or ineffective that it has littlepractical control over much of its territory; a fail-ure to provide public services; widespread corrup-tion and criminality; the proliferation of refugeesand involuntary movements of populations; andsharp economic decline [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_failure]. Also see Ghani and Lockhart2008.

7 While inclusion is not the opposite of exclu-sion, it calls for equitable representation andopportunities for otherwise participating in gov-ernance.

8 For details, see Haq 1996, pp. 16 – 20.9 According to Lee’s hypothesis, socioeconomic rights

are more important than the civil and politicalrights in developing countries. However, this ideahas been refuted by many others, including AmartyaSen (see Sen 1999).

10 Although the Report rightly points towards anongoing discussion about human rights—which itconsiders critical —the Human Rights-based Ap-proach sets out no hierarchy among different typesof rights. All rights should be pursued progres-sively and simultaneously. If it is true that somerights can generate others, it is also true that theabsence of some rights can erode those that hadearlier been considered fully realized.


Endn

otes

11 The proportions of population by different casteand ethnic groups, as well as by other features, canbe found in Annex 1.1.

12 DFID and World Bank 2006.13 Bhattachan et al 2002.14 See Annex 1.2.15 Hangen 2007.16 Bennett and Dahal 2008.17 Gaige 1976.18 The International Bill of Human Rights consists

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,the International Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights, and the International Cov-enant on Civil and Political Rights and its twoOptional Protocols. “...in accordance with theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, the idealof free human beings enjoying civil and politicalfreedom and freedom from fear and want can beachieved only if conditions are created wherebyeveryone may enjoy his civil and political rights, aswell as his economic, social and cultural rights.”

19 INSEC 2005, 2006 and 2007. See Annex tables1.6 - 1.8.

20 INSEC 2008 and 2009.21 The details are given in Annex 1.9.22 WFP and OCHA 2007.23 For the full text of the English and Nepali ver-

sions, please see: [http://www.unmin.org.np/?d=official&p=peace]. The complete list of all theagreements, understandings, terms of reference andother documents is given in Annex 1.4, and thecontents are given in MOPR 2007A.

24 Nepal News 2006; and Dhakal 2006. The NepaliParliament has been assigned twin roles: to workas a parliament, and as a Constituent Assembly toprepare the new constitution for Nepal.

25 Now that this has been resolved, the Prime Minis-ter is the head of the government and the Presi-dent is the head of the state.

26 The 2006 Janandolan is taken as the second in theseries that began in 1990. However, public move-ments had taken place before that date, led byBishweshar P. Koirala, Ganesh Man Singh, andPushpa Lal. The 2006 Andolan could therefore beviewed as the fifth in the series. This Report merelyreflects the usage of recent literature; its writershave no wish to discredit the previous Andolans.

27 There were as many as 29 armed Tarai groups;towards the end of 2008; since January 2009, thegovernment has been engaged in negotiations withthem in order to restore peace.

28 These agreements, together with all other previ-ous agreements, are well documented by the Min-istry of Peace and Reconstruction in its subse-quent publication (see MOPR 2007A).

Chapter 21 The HDI value for Bhutan and Maldives is available

only for 2005, but not for the preceding years. There-fore, the trend line of HDI is calculated only for theother five SAARC countries (Figure 2.1) The datawere taken from UNDP 2006 and UNDP 2007.

2 In fact, because of the civil war, less than three-fourthsof development/capital budget was spent during2002–06, when the conflict reached its pinnacle.

3 The national household surveys conducted in Nepalcan provide estimates at most for 15 sub-regions(a cross-section of five development regions andthree ecological belts); thus, estimates of 75 dis-tricts have to rely on census data available at theinterval of a decade. Therefore, despite the ut-most need for such indices at least at the districtlevel, their estimate can be computed only if re-cent census data are available.

4 A cross-section of five development regions and threeecological belts of Nepal gives 15 sub-regions as fol-lows: Eastern Tarai, Central Tarai, Western Tarai, Mid-Western Tarai, Far-Western Tarai; Eastern Hills, Cen-tral Hills, Western Hills, Mid-Western Hills and Far-Western Hills; and Eastern Mountain, Central Moun-tain, Western Mountain, Mid-Western Mountain andFar-Western Mountain. However, because of thesparse population of the western mountains and lim-ited size of the sample, the Nepal Demographic andHealth Survey (NDHS) 2006 combines the WesternMountain, Mid-Western Mountain and Far-WesternMountain into one domain called as ‘Western Moun-tain’ and provides a single estimate of the variables/indicators. Therefore, in tandem with the NDHS 2006,which is the main source of data, this report providesestimates only for the 13 domains/sub-regions. How-ever, in order to make the readers understand the15 sub-regions, the Maps of chapter two presentthe same estimate for the three sub-regions.

5 The Nepal HDR 2009 used mainly 2006 data,whereas the global HDR 2007/08 used the datafrom different sources and extrapolations.

6 UNDP/Nepal 2004.7 Focusing on women’s opportunities, the GEM cap-

tures gender inequality in three key areas: (1) politi-cal participation and decision-making power, asmeasured by women’s and men’s percentage sharesof parliamentary seats; (2) economic participationand decision-making power, as measured by twoindicators—women’s and men’s percentage sharesof positions as legislators, senior officials and man-agers, and women’s and men’s percentage shares ofprofessional and technical positions; and (3) powerover economic resources, as measured by women’sand men’s estimated earned income (PPP US$).

8 Chhetry 2006.


Endnotes

9 Usually, female life expectancy is higher than thatof males due to a natural advantage that femaleshave over males. In, Nepal, however, this wasthe reverse until recently. The life expectancy offemales was for the first time found higher thanthat of males in the 2001 population census.

10 Like figures 2.1 and 2.2, sources of data for fig-ure 2.8 are the UNDP global human developmentreports 2006 and 2007/08.

11 DFID and World Bank 2006, Box 9, p. 42.12 It is generally thought that HPI is the obverse of

HDI, although each has a different set of indicators.13 The trend of change in poverty has been analysed

using the data from the two rounds of NLSS sur-veys, 1995/96 and 2003/04 (see CBS 2005).

14 Multivariate analysis of consumption patternamong different caste and ethnic groups indicatesthat the socially excluded groups have to “pay acaste/ethnic penalty”. When the effect of vari-ables such as household size, proportion of chil-dren in household, the household head’s occupa-tion and level of education, land ownership, re-ceipt of remittances, residence, ecological loca-tion, etc., are controlled, the average per capitaconsumption of excluded groups such as Dalits,Muslims and Janajatis remains much lower thanthose of Newars and Brahmin/Chhetris, implyinglow level of consumption of these excludedgroups (DFID and World Bank 2006).

15 Wide differences prevail between men and womenin their possession of property such as land and housesand livestock. The proportion of households wherea woman owns a house was about 6 percent and sucha proportion in the case of land ownership was about11 percent, implying that these types of property aregenerally owned by men. In aggregate, in less thanone percent of the households did women own allthree types of property: land, house and livestock(DFID and World Bank 2005).

Chapter 31 Thomasson 2008.2 MOPR 2008B.3 Kantipur, (daily national newspaper), 15 December

2008. The paper noted that as much as 7,000 Bighaland of Dang, one of the 75 districts of Nepal,remain under the control of Maoists (1 Bigha isequivalent of 0.68 hectares).

4 United Nations Security Council 2009, para. 5. Aparliamentary monitoring committee has beenestablished to monitor the government, but hasnot yet produced significant results.

5 Annan 2005.6 Of the 551 people killed in 2007, 127 came from

10 Tarai districts of the East and Central

development regions. Moreover, of the 1,700 peopleabducted, 343 were from those Tarai districts (Fordetails, see INSEC, Nepal Human Rights Year Book2008, p. 3). In 2008, 18 government officials werekilled: 17 in the Tarai and one in the Hills (KantipurNews). The Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2009reveals that 541 individuals were murdered and729 abducted in 2008.

7 ICTJ 2006.8 Vinck and Pham 2008.9 The respondents of the ICTJ and AF survey stated

the beliefs that the whereabouts of those who havedisappeared must be discovered and that a commissionshould be established to determine the truth of whathappened and why, so that these atrocities will notbe repeated in future. They also clearly voiced theview that the perpetrators should be tried in nationalcourts for their crimes and should not be givenamnesty. Further, they asserted that the governmentshould provide victims with reparations, and thatthe country’s security sector and legal institutionsneeded significant reform (see ICTJ and AF 2008).

10 OHCHR Nepal 2007B11 ICTJ and AF conducted survey among 811

households to find about the awareness of theTRC. Asked whether they had heard about theTRC, 65 percent of respondents repliedaffirmatively, and 35 percent stated that theyknew nothing about it. Fewer women than menhad heard about the TRC—24 percent of all thewomen respondents compared with 40 percentof male respondents. An even higher proportionof illiterate persons (42%) had never heard ofthe TRC (see ICTJ and AF 2008, pp. 32–33). Infact, the proportion of respondents who had notheard of the TRC would perhaps have been higherif the question had been put to non-victims.

12 OHCHR Nepal 2007B.13 United Nations 200914 Zehr 1982.15 Maiese 2003.16 Maiese 2003.17 At times, indigenous practices and mediation can

violate human rights principles and international laws.18 There is strong link between transitional justice,

development and lack of discrimination betweenmen and women, as well as caste and ethnic groups.The peace-building initiatives unfolding in Nepalencourage a timely examination of thedevelopment of rights in transitional justicemechanisms. These rights comprise much more thaneconomic growth; they include a human rights-based process that aims at empowering marginalisedgroups. In Nepal, this must include women, whonot only bore the brunt of the conflict, but also


Endn

otes

continue to suffer systemic discrimination. Forfurther discussion, see Aguirre and Pietropaoli2008. There are also strong cases for taking actionto remedy social and economic inequality. Forfurther discussion, see Tafadzwa 2008.

19 CIDA. Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Peace-Building: an Operational Framework. undated.

20 Cited in DFID and World Bank 2006, p 42.21 OCHA 2008.22 OCHA. 2008.23 By the end of February, 2009, MOPR officials

had documented 52,163 IDPs; this number maywell rise by the completion of the enumerationprocess.

24 OCHA 2008.25 OCHA 2008. The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF)

has approved a US$ 5.5 million relief package forIDPs who return to their original homes. The NepalGovernment has also created a National Policy onInternally Displaced Persons that includesreintegration assistance and has created a set of“Procedural Directives” involving a consultativeprocess. However, while the Policy was approved inFebruary 2007, the Directives have not yet beenformally approved, thus delaying full implementationand resulting in “ad hoc assistance” at present. As of15 May 2008, US$ 3.8 million of NPTF funds hasbeen released, with support reportedly provided to29,772 persons (Ministry of Finance 2008).

26 For detail, see MOPR 2007B27 See Ghimire 2008.28 See Representative of the UN Secretary-General,

Ms Karin Landgren’s interview with Kantipurdaily, Sunday, 7 June 2009.[http://www.unmin.org.np/].

29 Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007.30 See Representative of the UN Secretary-General,

Ms Karin Landgren’s interview with Kantipurdaily, Sunday, 7 June 2009. [http://www.unmin.org.np/]. She also holds that it isimportant to address the questions of how manycombatants will join the security forces and when,what are the established criteria, and whetherthey will be integrated individually or collectively,and how many will be rehabilitated into society.

31 Jha 2008.32 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 2008.33 Resources regarding rehabilitation are available at:

http://www.unddr.org/index.php.34 Workshop on Local Governance and Pro-Poor

Service Delivery 2003.35 see MOPR 2008A.36 MOPR 2009.37 These six constitutions are as follows: (i) Interim

Constitution 2004 of Rana regime, (ii) Interim

Constitution 2007, (iii) Constitution of theKingdom of Nepal 2015, (iv) Nepal’s Constitution2019, (v) Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal2047, and (vi) Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063BS ( here all the years are expressed in Nepali yearof Bikram Sambat (BS) which exceeds by 57 yearsover the AD).

38 The 14 committees are (1) constitution committee,(2) committee on fundamental rights and directiveprinciples, (3) committee for protecting the rights ofminorities and marginalized communities, (4)committee on state restructuring and division of statepower, (5) committee on the determination oflegislative structure, (6) committee on stategovernance structure, (7) committee on judicialsystem, (8) committee on the determination of theform of constitutional bodies, (9) committee on theallocation of natural resources, revenue and economicrights, (10) committee on determination of bases forcultural and social reintegration, (11) committee onprotection of national welfare, (12) committee oncivil relations, (13) committee on public opinioncollection and coordination, and (14) committee oncapacity building and resource management.

39 The rules of the Indian Constituent Assemblyprovided that Hindustani (Urdu or Hindi) orEnglish could be used, but, if the President of theConstituent Assembly took the view that a membercould not express himself or herself in one ofthose languages, that member could address theConstituent Assembly in her or his mother tongueand a summary could be provided for members inEnglish or Hindustani. In Bolivia, the rules of theConstituent Assembly provided that plenary andcommittee sessions must use interpreters andtranslators so that members could expressthemselves in their mother tongues (Art. 52).

40 Bhattachan 2009B41 Barnes and De Klerk 2002.42 As Susan Goldmark, Country Director of the

World Bank in Nepal, has commented, “peace needsdevelopment and development needs peace.” NepalBiz News, 2008.

Chapter 4l Regmi 1999, p. 69. This information has been taken

by Regmi from the Royal Nepal Army Headquarters.For the information in Prithvi Narayan Shah favouredcertain castes and communities (Pande, Basnyat,Pantha, Thakuri and Magars), see Regmi 1995, p. 38.

2 Nepali parliament has been renamed as legislature-parliament during the transition period.

3 See Annex 3, Table 3 and 4; and Lawoti 2007.4 For more details on the dimensions of women’s

political activities, see Stephanie Tawa Lama, “Po-


Endnotes

litical Participation of Women in Nepal”, in DhrubaKumar, ed., Crisis of Governability in Nepal,Kathmandu, n.15, pp. 174-75.

5 The districts of backward regions are Achham,Kalikot, Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura,Mugu and Humla. They rank at lowest in HDIamong Nepal’s 75 districts.

6 Lake and Rothschild 19967 Source: [http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/

EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php.8 Source: [http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/

EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php].9 The “Other Group” is defined as communities not

clearly identified in the four other listed categories(see Figure 4.1). Some observers believe that whenthe “Other Group” was originally specified in theInterim Constitution, it was meant to provide af-firmative action for oppressed groups not alreadycovered by those previously listed, such as theMuslim community in Nepal. When Parliamentadopted this constitutional provision as an inte-gral element of electoral law, legislators chose todefine the “Other Group” as “everyone else inNepal”. This could result in the election of candi-dates under this rubric who come from groupsalready privileged in Nepali society, while otherpreviously disadvantaged groups, not covered bythe remaining quota definitions, would not obtainthe representation intended. This quota wouldhave been utilized better for allowing a larger num-ber of Dalits to be seated under the PR system, astheir share of representation in the CA remainsinsufficient. Besides these five quotas, there wasalso an overall 50 percent quota for the womenunder the PR system.

10 On November 22, 2007 former US PresidentJimmy Carter met many political actors of Nepal.He made several suggestions. On the election sys-tem he preferred a 70:30 ratio - 70 percent ofcandidates on a proportional basis and 30 percenton first-past-the post (see FES 2007).

11 Dev Raj Dahal. 2001. Electoral System and Elec-tion Management in Nepal, Democracy Nepal,FES. Kathmandu. undated. [http://www.n e p a l d e m o c r a c y. o r g / c iv i c _ e d u c a t i o n /election_management.htm].

12 In a revolutionary move to make political partiesof Nepal responsible, transparent and inclusive, abill was moved in the interim Parliament of Nepalin March 2007. Some of the provisions of the Billwere: (i) make it illegal for political parties to de-clare “bandhs”, and prohibit them from callingstrikes that would impact national economy; (ii)make it illegal to vandalise public or private proper-ties when organizing their programmes; (iii) intro-

duce the concept of State funding of political par-ties on the one hand and prohibit them from receiv-ing grants or donations from national and interna-tional organizations, foreign governments and anyindividual as well; (iv) asks parties to make theirexecutive committees inclusive and properly keepand regularly publicise the assets of their office-bearers; and (v) ask parties to audit their financialtransactions and present the reports to the ElectionCommission within six months of the completionof fiscal year. The Commission may impose fines onthe parties which do not abide by these provisions.However, the bill was not passed.

13 WFP 200914 See [www.nepalbandh.com]. It is a site that lists the

chronology of Bandhas, updating these events daily.15 WFP 2009. However, no scientific method has yet

been used to estimate the dimensions of such losses.16 Scott 2006.17 Administrative records of Department of Educa-

tion and Department of Health Services of Gov-ernment of Nepal.

18 UNDP had supported the capacity-building oflocal bodies in 66 of the country’s 75 districtsunder its Local Governance Programme.

Chapter 51 The first meeting of the CA was held on 28 May

2008, which implemented the country’s transitionto the status of republic.

2 See Article 138(1) and 138(3) of the InterimConstitution of Nepal 2007.

3 Despite the rise of ethnic and regional “nationalism”in Nepal in recent years, the Nepal Democracy Sur-vey 2007 found that an overwhelming majority ofrespondents (more than 90 percent) belonging todifferent groups, including Madhesis, said that theywere “proud” to belong to their own community andalso “proud” to be Nepali. For detail see IDEA 2007.

4 The respective sources of two figures are INSEC2007, and administrative records of Ministry of Peaceand Reconstruction, Government of Nepal, 2008.

5 See, Article 4(1) of the Constitution of the King-dom of Nepal, 1990.

6 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990.7 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990.8 See Article 6(1) of the Constitution of the King-

dom of Nepal, 1990.9 The Nepali language is, however, at least 300 years

old, even older than Nepali state; for a variety ofreasons, it seemed a “link” language.

10 See, Article 2 of the Constitution of the King-dom of Nepal, 1990.

11 See, Article 112(1) and provision 3 of Article 12(2)of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990.


Endn

otes

12 See, Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the Consti-tution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990.

13 See, for example, Werner Levi, “Government andPolitics in Nepal: I” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 21,No. 18, pp. 185–191; “Government and Politicsin Nepal: II” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 1pp. 5 -10.

14 see Tiwari 2009A.15 Gurung 1998.16 Dhakal 2007 [http://www. kantipuronline.com/

kolnews.php?&nid=101168].17 The point is more vividly expressed by the imme-

diate denunciation of the Interim Constitution bythe various marginalized communities immediatelyafter its promulgation. This eventually led tomonths of protests that forced the coalition part-ners to concede and seek to allay the concern bytwo amendments within the span of a fewmonths—albeit changes that still do not satisfythe protesting groups. See for example, the list ofgrievances of the groups:Madhesi- (http://www.kantipuronline.com/columns.php?&nid=99316; http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?nid=107147 ),Janajati- (http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=115885) andDalits- (http://www.jagaranmedia.org.np/jagaran-media-nepal-dalit-news.php?id=44)

18 The Maoists had, of course, made a commitmentduring the 1990s to advance the cause of Dalitsand other disadvantaged communities when theyannounced their insurgency. Point 20 of their 40points in 1996, stated that “All kinds of exploi-tation and prejudice based on caste should beended” and Point 21 that the “status of Dalits as‘untouchables’ should be ended and the systemof untouchability ended once and for all.”

19 Even the Maoists, who promoted the idea of fed-eralism and autonomy, seem to have turned theirback on federalism. For example, their party elec-tion manifesto says that laws passed by regions wouldneed the approval of the central government.

20 People in Nepal (as in many other countries) com-plain that the only time they see their Members ofParliament is when they come to ask for their vote!

21 Das Gupta 1985.22 See Cottrell 2008.23 For the impact of the Madhes movement, see

Hachhethu 2007.24 Hachhethu 2007, p. 3. In fact, Hill Janajatis are

divided by religion, but plain Janajatis are mostlyHindus.

25 Krishna Hachhethu says that there are 12 suchdistricts (with the majority of Chhetri in seven,Gurung in two and each of Tamang, Tharu andNewar in one district each). Hachhethu 2007,p. 11.

26 Professor Sharma’s views (and the tables whichshow ethnic distribution of population) are sum-marized on p. 14 of Ghai and Cottrell (eds). 2008A.See also Sharma 2008.

27 see Iff 2009 for a comparative analysis of Indiaand Nigeria using the disaggregation of institu-tional arrangements.

28 Watts 2008, p. 18129 These lessons are drawn principally from Ghai

2000; and Watts 2008.

Chapter 61 However, the proportion of the seats allocated to

FPTP and PR system could differ, depending onthe objectives sought. As political stability derivesto some extent from the type of the political sys-tem—higher in the presidential and lower in theparliamentary system—higher stability in a parlia-mentary system requires a legislature that can forma majority government. Consequently, other fac-tors being equal, FPTP works better for a parlia-mentary structure, while PR offers greater prom-ise for the presidential form.

2 See Centre for Studies on Good Governance andDemocracy (CSDG) July, 19, 2007 [http://w w w. f e s n e p a l . o r g / r e p o r t s / 2 0 0 7 /seminar_reports/report_CSDG.htm]

3 But the two covenants came into force on March23, 1976 and 3 January 1976, respectively.

4 Ghani and Lockhart (2008) specify ten functionsa state must perform; if the state cannot carry outeven one of these, it moves towards failure. Tothese social scientists, a strong state should havethe sole monopoly in the following four respects:firstly, it has to maintain a legitimate monopoly onthe control of violence, impunity and must en-force rule of law; secondly, it alone must have theauthority to collect taxes and counter any opposi-tion to this authority; thirdly, it must continuouslymaintain its citizens’ loyalty; and, fourthly, it mustobtain full international recognition.

5 These include the return of captured property, theformation of various committees—including the Truthand Reconciliation Commission—and informationconcerning those persons who have disappeared. Fordetails, see [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2802333/]

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Zehr Howard. 1982. The Little Book of RestorativeJustice. Good Books. Intercourse, PA.

Bib

liogr

aphy


WEBSITES[http://www.advocacynet.org/blogs/index.php/

2008/07/11/disappeared_persons_in_post_conflict_nep?blog=125] for number ofdisappeared persons during Maoist conflict.Disappeared Persons in Post-Conflict Nepal.Posted By: Heather.

[www.election.gov.np] for election relatedinformation in Nepal.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_failure] for statefailure.

[http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2007/seminar_reports/report_CSDG.htm] for good governance.

[http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm]for ILO conventions including convention 169.

[http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/50218toc. html]for news updates including bills passed during2006 - 2009.

[http://www.nepalbandhh.com] for number ofgeneral and other strikes in Nepal.

[http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php] for electionresults including that of CA 2008.

[http://www.nepalresearch.com/crisis_solution/papers/fes_2007_nepal_december.pdf] forinclusive provision after the signing of the CPA

[h t tp ://news.bbc. co.uk/2/h i/sou th_as i a/country_profiles/1166516.stm] for Chronologyof key event, Nepal.

[http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/24061/11714472431UNDPI_stocktaking_10th_round_table .pdf/UNDPI_stocktaking_10th_round_table.pdf and http://www.comminit.com/] for concept of communicationfor development.

[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2802333/] for reports ofSecretary-General submitted to Security Council.

[http://www.unddr.org/index.php.] for resourcesregarding rehabilitation.

[http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/]for convention on the elimination of all formsof discrimination against women, adopted bythe UN General Assembly, 18 December 1979.

[http://www.unmin.org.np] for interview with Ms.Karin Landgren, Representative of the UNSecretary-General, by Kantipur, 7 June 2009;and other information.

Annexes

Annex 1Basic information

Annex 2Sources of data, technical notes

and values of human development indices

Annex 3Statistical tables

Annexes

a

ANNEX 1:Basic information 1311.1 Percentage distribution of population by some social characteristics, Nepal, 2001 1311.2 Nepal social hierarchy, 1854 1321.3 Chronology of key events, Nepal, 1768–2008 1331.4 Building blocks in the Nepali peace process, 2005-2008 1351.5 Agenda for inclusion, Nepal 1361.6 Number of persons, women and children killed by state and Maoists,

Nepal, 1996-2006 1371.7 Number of persons of different occupations killed by state and Maoist,

Nepal, 1996–March 2005 1381.8 Number of displaced persons by 2004, Nepal 1381.9 Estimates of damage of physical infrastructures, Nepal by Mid May 2007 1391.10 Maoist 40-point demand, Nepal, February 1996 140

ANNEX 2:Sources of data, technical notes and values of human development indices 141Annex 2.1 Sources of data 141Annex 2.2 Technical notes—calculating HDI and other related indices 143

Annex 2.3 Values of human development index and other related indices 149TABLES1 Human development index, Nepal, 2006 1492 Gender-related development index, Nepal, 2006 1503 Gender empowerment measure, Nepal, 2006 1514 Human poverty index, Nepal, 2006 152

Annex 2.4 Human development by major caste and ethnicity 153TABLES1 Caste and ethnicity classified by major groups 1542 HDI value of caste and ethnic groups by four broad categories 1553 Human development by caste and ethnicity with regional divisions, Nepal, 2006 1564 Number of cases/observations used to calculate the mean years of

schooling, adult literacy and income for the 11 caste and ethnic groupswith regional divisions 157

5 Number of cases/observations used to calculate the mean yearsof schooling, adult literacy and income for the 20 caste andethnic groups with social and regional divisions 157

Annexes

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ANNEX 3:Statistical tables 1581581581581581 Representation of caste/ethnic groups and gender in the FPTP

electoral system of the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, April 2008 1582 Number of seats of political parties in CA election, Nepal, 2008 1593 Representation of different caste/ethnic groups and gender in

the house of representatives, Nepal, 1991, 1994 and 1999 1604 Representation of different castes/ethnic groups in parliament, Nepal, 1959–1999 1605 Representation of caste and ethnicity in different sectors

of society, Nepal, 1999 and 2005 1616 Representation of caste and ethnicity in state organs, Nepal, 1999 and 2005 1617 Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadership positions of

judiciary, executive, legislature and constitutional bodies, Nepal, 2005 1628 Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the central level

committee/bureau, Nepal, 2005 1629 Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadership

positions of Federation of Nepali Chamber of Commerceand Industry and Chamber of Commerce, Nepal, 2005 163

10 Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadershippositions of civil society organisations, Nepal, 2005 163

11 Class-wise caste and ethnic composition in gazetted level employees 16312 Recruitment of Police, Nepal, during May 2006–April 2008 16413 Women’s representation in local government, Nepal, 1997–2002 16414 Women’s representation in civil service by class and level, Nepal, 1991–2000 16415 A summary of events in the process of decentralization in Nepal 16516 Literacy by caste/ethnicity and regional identity: women 16717 Literacy by caste/ethnicity and regional identity: men 16818 Educational attainment by caste/ethnicity and regional identity: women 16919 Educational attainment by caste/ethnicity and regional identity: men 17020 Grade repetition and dropout rates by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 17121 Early childhood mortality rates by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 17222 Antenatal care by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 17323 Assistance during delivery by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 17424 Nutritional status of children by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 17525 Vaccinations by caste/ethnicity and regional identity 176

1

Annex


Population groups Number Percent

Nepal 22,736,934 100.0

ReligionHindu 18,330,121 80.6Buddhist 2,442,520 10.7Islam 954,023 4.2Kirant 818,106 3.6Others 192,164 0.8

LanguagesNepali 11,053,255 48.6Maithili 2,797,582 12.3Bhojpuri 1,712,536 7.5Tharu 1,331,546 5.9Tamang 1,179,145 5.2Newar 825,458 3.6Magar 770,116 3.4Awadhi 560,744 2.5Gurung 338,925 1.5Limbu 333,633 1.5Others 1,833,994 8.1

Caste and ethnic groupsHill/Tarai Brahman/Chhetri (B/C) 7,450,564 32.8Hill B/C 7,023,219 30.9Tarai B/C 427,345 1.9Tarai middle castes 2,938,827 12.9Dalits (oppressed castes) 2,675,182 11.8Hill Dalits 1,615,577 7.1Tarai Dalits 1,059,605 4.7Janajatis (indigenous nationalities) 8,460,702 37.2Hill Janajati 6,234,554 27.4Tarai Janajati 2,226,148 9.8Musl im 980,018 4.3Others 231,641 1.0

Source: CBS 2003, Vol. I; and UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006.

ANNEX 1.1Percentage distribution of population bysome social characteristics, Nepal, 2001

1A N N E X Basic information

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A

B

Hierarchy Habitat Belief/religion

WATER ACCEPTABLE (PURE)

1. Wearers of the sacredthread/tagadhari“Upper caste” Brahmanand Chhetri (Parbatiya) Hill Hinduism

“Upper caste” (Madhesi) Tarai Hinduism

“Upper caste” (Newar) Kathmandu HinduismValley

2a. Matawali alcohol drinkers(non-enslavable)Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar, Tribal/Thakali, Rai, Limbu Hill Shamanism

Newar Kathmandu BuddhismValley

2b. Matawali alcohol drinkers(enslavable)Bhote (including Tamang) Mountain/Hill Buddhism

Chepang, Gharti, Hayu Hill

Kumal, Tharu Inner Tarai Animism

WATER UN-ACCEPTABLE/Pani Nachalne (IMPURE)

3a. TouchableDhobi, Kasai, Kusale, Kulu Kathmandu Hinduism

Valley

Musalman Tarai Islam

Mlechha (foreigner) Europe Christianity,etc.

3b. Untouchable (achhut)Badi, Damai, Gaine, Kadara, Hill HinduismKami, Sarki (Parbatiya)

Chyame, Pode (Newar) Kathmandu HinduismValley

Source: DFID and World Bank 2005.

ANNEX 1.2 Nepal social hierarchy, 1854

1

Annex


1768 Gurkha ruler Prithvi Narayan Shah conquersKathmandu and lays foundations for unifiedkingdom.

1792 Nepali expansion halted by defeat at hands ofChinese in Tibet.

1814–16 Anglo-Nepalese war; culminates in treaty thatestablishes Nepal's current boundaries.

1846 Nepal falls under sway of hereditary Chief Ministersknown as Ranas, who dominate the monarchyand cut country off from outside world.

1923 Treaty with Britain affirms Nepal’s sovereignty.

Absolute monarchy1950 Anti-Rana forces based in India form alliance with

monarch.1951 End of Rana rule. Sovereignty of crown restored

and anti-Rana rebels in Nepalese Congress Partyform government.

1953 29 May, New Zealander Edmund Hil lary andNepal’s Sherpa Tenzing Norgay become the firstclimbers to reach the summit of Mount Everest.

1955 Nepal joins the United Nations.1955 King Tribhuvan dies, King Mahendra ascends

throne.1959 Multi-party constitution adopted.1960 King Mahendra seizes control and suspends

parliament, constitution and party politics afterNepali Congress Party wins elections with B.P.Koirala as premier.

1962 New constitution provides for non-party system ofcouncils known as “Panchayat” under which kingexercises sole power. First elections to RastriyaPanchayat held in 1963.

1972 King Mahendra dies, succeeded by Birendra.

Multi-party politics1980 Constitutional referendum follows agitation for

reform. Small majority favours keeping existingpanchayat system. King agrees to allow directelections to national assembly – but on a non-party basis.

1985 Nepali Congress Party begins civil disobediencecampaign for restoration of multi-party system.

1986 New elections boycotted by Nepali CongressParty.

1989 Trade and transit dispute with India leads to borderblockade by Delhi resulting in worsening economicsituation.

1990 Pro-democracy agitation coordinated by NepaliCongress Party and leftist groups. Street protestssuppressed by security forces, resulting in deathsand mass arrests. King Birendra eventually bows

to pressure and agrees to new democraticconstitution.

1991 Nepali Congress Party wins first democraticelections. Girija Prasad Koirala becomes PrimeMinister.

Political instability1994 Girija Prasad Koirala’s government defeated in no-

confidence motion. New elections lead to formationof communist government.

1995 Communist government dissolved.1995 Radical leftist group, the then Communist Party of

Nepal (Maoist), begins insurrection in rural areasaimed at abolishing monarchy and establishingPeople's Republic, igniting a conflict that wouldcontinue over a decade.

1996 13 February, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)launched people’s war.

1997 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba loses no-confidence vote, ushering in period of increasedpolitical instability, with frequent changes of PrimeMinister.

2000 Girija Prasad Koirala returns as Prime Minister,heading the ninth government in ten years.

Palace killings2001 1 June, King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and other

close relatives killed.2001 4 June, Prince Gyanendra crowned king of Nepal

after Dipendra dies of his injuries.2001 July, Maoist rebels step up campaign of violence.

Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala resigns overthe violence; succeeded by Sher Bahadur Deuba.

2001 November, Maoists end four-month truce withgovernment, declare peace talks with governmentfailed, and launch coordinated attacks on armyand police posts.

Emergency2001 November, State of emergency declared after more

than 100 people are killed in four days of violence.King Gyanendra orders army to crush the Maoistrebels. Hundreds are killed in rebel and governmentoperations during the following months.

2002 May, Parliament dissolved, new elections calledamid political confrontation over extending the stateof emergency. Sher Bahadur Deuba heads interimgovernment, renews emergency.

2002 October, King Gyanendra dismisses Sher BahadurDeuba and puts off indefinitely elections set forNovember. Lokendra Bahadur Chand appointedas Prime Minister.

ANNEX 1.3 Chronology of key events, Nepal, 1768–2008

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2003 January, Rebels and government declareceasefire.

2003 May-June, Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigns asPrime Minister; king Gyanendra appoints his ownnominee, Surya Bahadur Thapa, as new premier.

End of truce2003 August, Rebels pull out of peace talks with

government and end seven-month truce. Thefollowing months see resurgence of violence andfrequent clashes between students/activists andpolice.

2004 April, Nepal joins the World Trade Organisation(WTO).

2004 May, Royalist Prime Minister Surya BahadurThapa resigns after weeks of street protests byopposition groups.

2004 June, King Gyanendra reappoints Sher BahadurDeuba as Prime Minister with the task of holdingelections.

Direct power2005 1 February, King Gyanendra dismisses Prime

Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his government,declares a state of emergency and assumes directpower, citing the need to defeat Maoist rebels.

2005 30 April, King Gyanendra l ifts the state ofemergency amid international pressure.

2005 November, Maoist rebels and main oppositionparties agree on a programme intended to restoredemocracy.

2006 24 April, King Gyanendra agrees to reinstateparliament following a 19-day Janandolan withviolent strikes and protests against direct royal rule.Girija Prasad Koirala is appointed as Prime Minister.Maoist rebels call a three-month ceasefire.

2006 May, Parliament votes unanimously to curtail theking’s political powers. The government andMaoist rebels begin peace talks, the first in nearlythree years.

2006 16 June, Rebel leader Prachanda and Prime MinisterGirija Prasad Koirala hold talks—the first such meetingbetween the two sides—and agree that the Maoistsshould be brought into an interim government.

2006 21 November, The government and Maoists signa peace accord, declaring a formal end to a ten-year rebel insurgency. The rebels agree to join a

transitional government and place their weaponsunder United Nations supervision.

2007 January, Maoist leaders enter parliament under theterms of a temporary constitution. Violent ethnicprotests erupt in the southeast; demonstratorsdemand autonomy for the region.

2007 April, Former Maoist rebels join interim government,a move that takes them into the political mainstream.

2007 May, Elections for a constituent assembly pushedback to November.

2007 September, Three bombs hit Kathmandu in the firstattack in the capital since the end of the Maoistinsurgency. Maoists quit interim government topress demand for monarchy to be scrapped. Thisforces the postponement of November’s constituentassembly election.

2007 October, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urgesNepal’s parties to sink their differences to save thepeace process.

2007 December, Parliament approves abolit ion ofmonarchy as part of peace deal with Maoists, whoagree to re-join government.

2008 January, Elections for constituent assembly set for10 April. A series of bomb blasts kill and injuredozens in the southern Tarai plains. Groups therehave been demanding regional autonomy.

2008 8 February, Three Madhesi political parties—theMadhesi People’s Right Forum, NepalSadbhawana Party (SP-Mahato), and Tarai-Madhes Loktantrik Party—unite to form an UnitedDemocratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), a technicalalliance to negotiate collectively with the Seven-Party Alliance government and to engage in protestaction in the Tarai.

2008 13 February, The UDMF starts an indefinite strikein the Tarai that leads to the closure of governmentoffices, disruption of public services, declaration ofcurfews in certain districts and clashes betweenprotestors and the security forces resulting in thedeath of at least 50 people.

2008 28 February, The Nepal Government and theagitating UDMF signs an eight-point agreement,which brings to an end the 16-day long indefinitestrike in the Tarai.

2008 10 April, Constitutional assembly election is heldall over the country.

Source: Adapted from BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/

country_profiles/1166516.stm].

1

Annex


1. Twelve-point Understanding between the political parties2. Second understanding of Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the then CPN (Maoist)3. Proclamation of the house of representatives4. Code of Conduct for Ceasefire agreed between Government of Nepal and the Unified CPN (Maoist)5. Formation of National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct (NMCC) and Observer Team6. Decision of Interim Constitution Drafting Committee (ICDC)7. Press statement of eight-point agreement of the parties8. Agreement on the terms of reference of NMCC9. Press release of expansion of ICDC10. Procedures of the NMCC11. Press release of expansion of ICDC12. Dissolution of NMCC13. Extending time limit of ICDC14. Terms of reference of Local Peace Committees15. Letter of Prime Minister to United Nations16. Letter of Unified CPN (Maoist) to United Nations17. Press release of Summit I rounds of meetings18. Press release of Summit II rounds of meetings19. Decision of the high level leaders of SPA and Unified CPN (Maoist)20. Comprehensive peace accord between the Government of Nepal and Unified CPN (Maoists)21. Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies22. 23 point-agreement between the Seven Parties23. An understanding between the political parties to facilitate constitution amendment and peace process24. Understanding between the Government of Nepal and Association Related to the Civil Servants25. Understanding between Government team and Corporate Drivers Association of National Free Employees Union

Centre26. Understanding between Government and different indigenous groups27. Agreement between Government of Nepal and Madhesi People's Rights Forum, Nepal28. Agreement between Government of Nepal and Chure-Bhawar Regional Unity Society, Nepal29. Understanding between Government of Nepal and National Badi Rights Struggle Committee30. Agreement concluded between the Governments of Nepal and United Democratic Madhesi Front31. Understanding between Seven Parties and National Front for Federal Republic, Nepal32. Understanding between Seven Parties and Federal Limbuwan State

Source: MOPR 2007A.

ANNEX 1.4 Building blocks in the Nepali peace process, 2005–2008

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Social group Problem of exclusion Agenda for inclusion

DalitsCultural1. Caste discrimination 1. Secular state

Socio-economic 2. Low literacy 2. Free education3. Unemployment 3. Seat reservation4. Landlessness 4. Alternative livelihood

Political 5. Poor representation 5. Collegiate election

JanajatiCultural 1. Religious discrimination 1. Secular state2. Linguistic discrimination 2. Official status

Socio-Economic 3. Low literacy 3. Targeted education4. Unemployment 4. Affirmative action

Political 5. Poor representation 5. Proportional representation6. Subjugated in governance 6. Ethnic autonomy

MadhesiCultural 1. Linguistic discrimination 1. Official status

Economic 2. Employment discrimination 2. Recruitment in army

Political 3. Hill dominance 3. Regional autonomy4. Citizenship problem 4. Ascertain long term

residents vis-à-vis recentimmigrants

Source: Shakya 2007.

ANNEX 1.5 Agenda for inclusion, Nepal

1

Annex


Perc

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of t

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of t

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334

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937

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1

1999

328

141

469

443

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319

4.1

2000

180

219

399

178

256.

39

1019

4.8

2001

243

390

633

258

335.

25

1015

2.4

2002

3,26

61,

337

4,60

323

835

273

5.9

9132

123

2.7

2003

1,21

764

61,

863

138

2115

98.

529

3261

3.3

2004

1,60

61,

113

2,71

920

553

258

9.5

4258

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3.7

2005

815

709

1,52

489

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128

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2006

313

286

599

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34

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Anne

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Number of persons killed Total

Occupation State Maoist N o Percent

Agricultural workers 1,130 540 1,670 14.7

Teachers 52 74 126 1.1

Political workers 4,917 366 5,283 46.3

Police personnel 9 1,236 1,245 10.9

Common people 221 407 628 5.5

Students 166 124 290 2.5

Civil servants 34 451 485 4.3

Social workers 6 6 12 0.1

Business persons 39 78 117 1.0

Workers 98 49 147 1.3

Health workers 1 3 4 0.0

Army personnel 5 497 502 4.4

Photographers 1 3 4 0.0

Journalists 11 4 15 0.1

Law professionals 0 2 2 0.0

Prisoners 1 3 4 0.0

Dacoits 0 3 3 0.0

Engineers 0 1 1 0.0

Unidentified persons 752 109 861 7.6

Total 7,443 3,956 11,399 100.0

Source: Nepal Coalition of Human Right Defenders 2005; and INSEC 2005.

Development region Number Percent

Eastern 3,979 7.9

Central 4,791 9.5

Western 7,247 14.4

Mid-Western 27,581 54.8

Far-Western 6,758 13.4

Total 50,356 100.0

Source: INSEC 2005.

ANNEX 1.7Number of persons of different occupations killedby State and Maoist, Nepal, 1996–March 2005

ANNEX 1.8 Number of displaced persons by 2004, Nepal

1

Annex


(in thousand NRs)

Estimated cost Cost ofMinistry/department/organisation of damage Percent reconstruction Percent

Ministry of Local Development 596,446 11.73 161,722 3.78

Ministry of Water Resources 342,703 6.74 297,243 6.94

Ministry of Health and Population 417 0.01 130,130 3.04

Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation 354,461 6.97 377,123 8.80

Ministry of Education and Sports 20,960 0.41 44,984 1.05

Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 260,755 5.13 - -

Ministry of Industry and Commerce 72,768 1.43 69,709 1.63

Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology 3,209 0.06 - -

Ministry of Information and Communication 741,555 14.58 145,166 3.39

Ministry of Culture and Civil Aviation 134,747 2.65 26,550 0.62

Ministry of Physical Planning and Works 25,174 0.49 19,746 0.46

Ministry of Land Reform and Management 32,215 0.63 361,181 8.43

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - - - -

Ministry of General Administration - - - -

Ministry of Law and Justice and Parliamentary Affairs - - - -

Ministry of Defence 30,967 0.61 53,266 1.24

Ministry of Finance 4,666 0.09 2,270 0.05

Ministry of Home 2,428,646 47.75 2,428,203 56.69

Ministry of Women Children and Social Welfare 265 0.01 - -

Ministry of Labour and Transport Management 524 0.01 524 0.01

Other organizations

National Planning Commission 242 0.00 - -

Supreme Court 27,489 0.54 165,555 3.87

Election Commission 2,946 0.06 - -

Office of the Attorney General 201 0.00 - -

Public Service Commission 4,781 0.09 1 0.00

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority - - - -

Office of Financial Comptroller General - - - -

Total amount in thousand 5,086,137 100.00 4,283,373 100.00

Source: MOPR records.

ANNEX 1.9 Estimates of damage of physical infrastructures, Nepal by Mid May 2007

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EX

1.1

0

2

Annex


Sources of Data/ Indicators/ CalculatedPublications Organisation Components indices

NDHS 2006 MOHP Nepal, Life expectancy index, HDINew ERA Nepal and deprivation in longevity GDIMacro International Education index: adult GEMInc, USA literacy index and mean HPI

years of schooling indexEqually DistributedEquivalent Percentage(EDEP) for administrative andmanagerial; and professionaland technical positionsProportion of populationwithout safe waterProportion of underweightchildren under fiveyears of age and healthdeprivation index

National Census 2001 GON, Central Percentage share of male and HDIdata tape Bureau of Statistics female in total population GDI

Proportion of people not GEMsurviving beyond 40. HPI(Used for verificationof the 2006 index)

Sources of data, technical notes andvalues of human development indices

Continued to next page

ANNEX 2.1 Sources of data

TABLE 1 Major sources of data used to calculate the HDI and related indices

ment reports of the country were also used tosupplement the estimated figures from the NDHS2006, as well as to collate and verify them. Themajor objectives of these surveys, their samplesizes, data collection procedures and limitationsare presented in detail in the respective reports.A brief summary of data sources and its use inthis Report is shown in Table 1 below:

The major data source used to produce the hu-man development index (HDI) and other relatedindices is the Nepal Demographic and Health Sur-vey (NDHS) 2006 and Nepal Living StandardsSurvey (NLSS) 2003/04. Other data sources,such as Nepal Family Health Survey (NFHS) 1991and 1996, the National Census 2001, the LocalElection Data Tape, and earlier human develop-

2A N N E X

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Sources of Data/ Indicators/ CalculatedPublications Organisation Components indices

NDHS 2001 MOHP Nepal, (Used for the verification HDINew ERA Nepal and of the 2006 index) GDI

NFHS 1996 Macro International GEMInc, USA HPI

NFHS 1991 GON, Department ofHealth, Kathmandu

Local Election GON, Election Election data for parliamentary GEMdata tape Commission Nepal representation

National Account GON, Central Bureau GDP by sectors HDIof Nepal of Statistics, NPC, GDI

Kathmandu

NLSS 2003/04 GON, Central Bureau Income index: Per capita HDI byof Statistics, NPC, income by different caste caste andKathmandu and ethnic groups ethnic groups

NDHS 2006 MOHP Nepal, Education index: Literacy HDI byNew ERA Nepal and rates and mean years of caste and

Caste, Ethnic and Macro International schooling by caste and ethnic groupsRegional Identity Inc, USA ethnic groupsin Nepal: Further Life expectancy index: LifeAnalysis of 2006 expectancy by caste andNDHS ethnic groups

NFHS = Nepal Family Health Survey; NDHS = Nepal Demographic and Health Survey; and NLSS = Nepal Living Standards Survey

2

Annex


Human development indexThe HDI is a summary measure of human development thathas three dimensions:1. A long and healthy life measured by life expectancy at

birth;2. Knowledge, measured by an aggregate of the adult lit-

eracy rate (two-thirds) and the combined gross primary,secondary and tertiary enrolment rates (one-third); and

3. A decent standard of living, measured by gross domesticproduct (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP)US dollars.

An index is created for each of these three dimensions by choos-ing maximum and minimum values for their indicators. Perfor-mance in each dimension is expressed as a value between 0and 1 by using the following formula:

(actual value – minimum value)Dimension index =

(maximum value – minimum value)

Life expectancy indexThe life expectancy index measures the relative achievement ofa country in the number of years that people in a given populationcan expect to live at birth. It is a summary measure of mortalityin a population. Statistics on life expectancy are derived from amathematical model known as a life table, which creates ahypothetical cohort of 100,000 persons and subjects it to the age/sex specific mortality rates observed in a given population.

The infant mortality rate (IMR) has been computed for estimat-ing life expectancy at birth using 2006 NDHS data in thisReport. Both direct and indirect methods were used to calcu-late this index. Later, this was used to produce a table of theequivalent level of mortality using Coale and Demeny (1966)west mortality model. Several sensitivity analyses were per-formed to derive a robust mortality estimate.

Life expectancy has been calculated for both rural and urbanareas, ecological regions, development regions, eco-develop-ment regions, and for caste and ethnic groups. It is based on astable model technique that uses the distribution of population byage and sex. As none of the single mortality estimation tech-niques was sufficient to produce consistent indicators at the re-gional and sub-regional levels, this method has also been appliedin generating the crude death rate and the proportion of population atage (x) to calculate the life expectancy at birth.

The task of estimating life expectancy at birth index is verychallenging in a country like Nepal because other externalmeans of verification for a derived index are not yet available.Thus, performing the estimate depends on internal consis-tency checks; in this Report, these have been done by:

1. computing mortality rates using various direct and indi-rect methods and comparing the values of estimatedmortality; and

2. comparing mortality trends over years.

To undertake this kind of validation, data from other sources,such as the NDHS 2001, the National Population Census2001, and the NFHS 1996 have also been used. This hashelped to verify the estimates derived from the NDHS 2006data for this Report.

Education indexThe education index is constructed so as to measure the knowl-edge component of HDI. It shows a country's relative achieve-ment in both literacy and in enrolment ratios by merging theadult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) and combined primary,secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (one-third weight).

However, in this Report, as in its predecessor, the mean yearof schooling has been used as a substitute for gross enrolmentratio because:1. it captures the quality of education obtained by literate adults

and the educational attainment of young people (combinedenrolment ratio); this is not possible when the gross enrolmentratio (GER) alone is used;

2. generally, GER is overestimated because it derives fromenrolment-based government grants in school;

3. the data on tertiary enrolment is not available; and4. GER at the primary level in Nepal is significantly greater

than 100, implying that both under-age children and thesebeyond the primary level enrol, especially at primarylevel. Initially, the global human development report pre-ferred the use of the mean year of schooling; later, how-ever, GER was suggested because of the difficulty ofobtaining this type of data.

In the absence of the latest population census and comparablesurveys in Nepal today, the Nepal Human Development Reporthas estimated the adult literacy rate and mean year of schoolingfrom the NDHS 2006 data to compute the education index.Literacy rates and mean years of schooling were calculated forurban- rural areas, ecological zones, development regions,eco-development regions and for caste and ethnic groups.

Gross domestic productGDP is vital to measuring human development. However, it isnot the sole measure of progress (UNDP 1993). The economyof a country simply cannot be explained by the activities ofprivate households, as it consists of collective efforts by gov-ernment, formal businesses, households, and, last but notleast, non-profit Institutions.

ANNEX 2.2 Technical notes—calculating HDI and other related indices

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The GDP presents income in the form of compensation to allemployees, the gross operating surplus to all entrepreneursincluding those who are self-employed, and revenue to thegovernment at both the local and central levels in the form oftaxes and non-tax duties. The income data derived fromhousehold surveys can approximate only the first of thesecomponents – compensation to employees and some portionof mixed income at the household level by its working mem-bers. The other two components of income generation are notgenerally recorded through household surveys. Therefore,using GDP per capita rather than per capita income withinhouseholds is regarded as a better measure of a decent stan-dard of living.

The gender-related development index

While HDI measures average achievement, gen-der-related development index (GDI) adjusts aver-age achievement to reflect inequalities betweenmen and women in the same dimensions as thoseof HDI. The GDI thus adjusts the average achieve-ment of each region/sub-region and social groupsin all the three dimensions of HDI: a long and healthylife, knowledge, and a decent standard of living.

The calculation of the GDI involves three steps:First, female and male indices in each dimension

are calculated. Second, these indices in eachdimension are combined so as to reveal differ-ences in achievement between men and women.The resulting index is referred as the equallydistributed index. As suggested in the Human De-velopment Report 2006, the report has used aweighted formula that expresses a moderateaversion to inequality, setting the weighting pa-rameter, e, equal to 2 for gender-sensitive ad-justment. This is a harmonic mean of male andfemale value. Finally, in the third step, the GDI iscalculated by combining the three equally dis-tributed indices in an unweighted average.

Calculation of human development index: an illustration for urban population

Basic data table showing data to calculate HDI:

Life expectancy Adult literacy rate Mean years of GDP per capita

Region at birth (years) (% age 15 and above) education (PPP US$)

Urban Nepal 68.06 72.30 5.19

Computation of HDI components

68.06 – 25 43.06Life expectancy index: = 0.7176

85 – 25 60

72.30 – 0 72.30Adult literacy index: = 0.7230

100 – 0 100

5.19 – 0 5.19Mean years of schooling index: = 0.3459

15 – 0 15

Educational attainment index: [2(0.723) + 1(0.346)]/3 0.5973

log (3,149) – log (100) 1.4981147Adjusted GDP per capita (PPP US$) index: = 0.5757

log (40,000) – log (100) 2.60206

HDI output table:

Educational Human

Life expectancy attainment Income Sum of development

Region index index index three index

Urban Nepal 0.7176 0.5973 0.5757 1.8906 0.630

Maximum and minimum valuesused for calculating HDI

Indicator Maximum Minimumvalue value

Life expectancy at birth 85 25Adult literacy rate 100 0Mean years of schooling 15 0GDP per capita PPP$ 40,000 100

2

Annex


Calculation of gender-related development index:an illustration for urban population

Percentage share of population

Female 0.4836

Male 0.5164

Step one: Computing the equally distributed life expectancy index

Life expectancy

Female 70.18

Male 66.19

Life expectancy index

Female (70.18 – 27.5)/60 = 0.711

Male (66.19 – 22.5)/60 = 0.728

Equally distributed life expectancy index

[Female population share X (female life expectancy index)–1 + Male population share X (male life

expectancy index –1]–1

[[0.4836 * (0.711) –1 ] + [0.5164 * (0.728) –1 ]] –1 = 0.7197

Step two: Computing the equally distributed educational attainment index

Adult literacy rate (percentage age 15 and above)

Female 61.23

Male 83.36

Mean years of schooling

Female 4.345

Male 6.033

Adult literacy index

Female (61.23 – 0)/100 = 0.612

Male (83.36 – 0)/100 = 0.834

Mean year of schooling index

Female (4.345 – 0)/15 = 0.290

Male (6.033 – 0)/15 = 0.402

Educational attainment index

Female [2/3(0.612) + (1/3(0.290)] = 0.505

Male [2/3(0.834) + (1/3(0.402)] = 0.690

Equally distributed educational attainment index

[Female population share X (female educational attainment index)–1 + Male population share X (male

educational attainment index –1]–1

[[0.4836 * (0.505) –1 ] + [0.5164 * (0.690) –1 ]] –1 = 0.5849

Step three: Computing the equally distributed income index

GDP per capita

Female 1,786

Male 4,425

Adjusted GDP per capita (PPP US$) index

Femalelog (1,786) – log (100)

= 0.4811log (40,000) – log (100)

Malelog (4,425) – log (100)

= 0.6325log (40,000) – log (100)

Equally distributed income index

[Female population share X (female income index)–1 + Male population share X (male income index –1]–1

[[0.4836 * (0.481) –1 ] + [0.5164 * (0.632) –1 ]] –1 = 0.5490

Step four: Computing gender-related development index

Equally distributed Equally distributed Gender-related

life expectancy educational attainment Equally distributed Sum of development

Region index index income index three index

Urban 0.720 0.585 0.549 1.854 0.618

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The GDI uses different maximum and minimumvalues for female and male for the four indicators.For example, for the life expectancy of women,the maximum value is 87.5 years and the minimum27.5 years; for men the corresponding values are82.5 and 22.5 years, respectively (UNDP 2006).Similarly, the calculation of GDI requires separateper capita income in PPP$ for both sexes. The pro-cedure therefore begins with disaggregating percapita income by sex, using the standard set offormulae used in human development reports.

The minimum and the maximum values for the vari-ables used in calculating GDI for Nepal and the for-mula used for calculating the GDI at each of thethree steps mentioned above are given in the corre-sponding box that illustrates the computation of GDI.

The gender empowerment measureThe gender empowerment measure (GEM) usesvariables constructed explicitly to measure relativeempowerment of women and men in political andeconomic spheres of activity. This index focuseson women's opportunities rather than their capabili-ties and captures inequality in following three keyareas:

Political participation and decision-makingpower is measured by women's and men's per-

centage share in parliamentary seats. The par-ticipation of men and women only in local elec-tion at Village Development Committee (VDC)and municipality level is used to reflect the po-litical participation and decision-making power.Economic participation and decision-mak-ing is measured by percentage share ofmen and women in admin is t ra t ive andmanagerial positions, and in professionaland technical positions.Power over economic resources is measuredby women's and men's estimated earned income(PPP US$). It is calculated in the same way asGDI, except that the unadjusted rather than ad-justed GDP per capita is used.

The three indices—political participation and deci-sion-making, economic participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources—are averaged to derive the final GEM value (UNDP2006). For all variables, Equally Distributed Equiva-lent Percentage (EDEP), as used in the calculationof GDI, has been calculated assuming a value of 2for 'aversion to inequality'. The calculation processof equally distributed income index for GEM is simi-lar to that of GDI. The only difference is in theformula for calculating separate income per capitaindices for both sexes.

2

Annex


Calculation of gender empower measurean illustration for urban population

Percentage share of population

Female 0.4836

Male 0.5164

Step one: Calculating indices for parliamentary representation, administrative and managerial, and

professional and technical positions.

Percentage share of parliamentary representation

Female 18.10

Male 81.90

Percentage share of administrative and managerial position

Female 34.01

Male 65.99

Percentage share of professional and technical position

Female 34.97

Male 65.03

Equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) for parliamentary representation

[Female population share X (female’s share in parliamentary representation)– 1 +

Male population share X (male’s share in parliamentary representation – 1]– 1

[[0.4836 * (18.10) –1 ] + [0.5164 * (81.19) –1 ]] –1 = 30.28

Equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) for administrative and managerial positions

[Female population share X (female’s share in administrative and managerial positions)– 1 +

Male population share X (male’s share in administrative and managerial positions – 1]– 1

[[0. 4836 * (34.01) –1 ] + [0. 5164* (65.99) –1 ]] –1 = 45.36

Equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) for professional and technical positions

[Female population share X (female’s share in professional and technical positions)– 1 +

Male population share X (male’s share in professional and technical positions – 1]– 1

[[0. 4836 * (34.97) –1 ] + [0. 5164 * (65.03) –1 ]] –1 = 45.93

Indexing parliamentary representation:30.28/50 = 0.606

Indexing administrative and managerial positions: 45.36/50 = 0.907

Indexing professional and technical positions: 45.93/50 = 0.919

Combining the indices for administrative and managerial, and professional and technical, positions

(Index of administrative and managerial positions + Index of professional and technical positions)/2 =(0.907 + 0.919)/2

= 0. 9129

Step two: Calculating index for male and female income

Wf / Wm x eafSf = 3 AWf / Wm x eaf + eam

Sf YYf = 3BNf

Ym = (1 – Sf ) Y/ Nm 3 C

Yf – 100W (Yf ) = 3 D

40,000 – 100

Ym – 100W (Ym) = 3E

40,000 – 100

Equally distributed income index for GEM: IGEM = {Pf W (Yf ) –1 + Pm W (Ym )

–1 } –1 (4)

Where the symbols have their usual meanings, for example in urban Yf = 1786 $ Ym = 4425 $

W (Yf ) = (1786 – 100) / (40000 – 100) = 0.042256

W (Ym) = (4425 – 100) / (40000 – 100) = 0.108396

Equally distributed income index: [[0.4836 * (0.042256) –1 ] + [0.5164* (0.108396) –1 ]] –1 = 0.0616

Step three: Computing GEM index

GEM=1/3 (index of parliamentary representation + combined index of administrative, managerial, professional and technical

positions + equally distributed income index)

GEM urban = 1/3 (0.606 + 0. 9129 + 0.0616) = 0.527

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Human poverty indexThe human poverty index (HPI), a multi-dimensional mea-sure of poverty introduced in the Human Development Re-port 1997 (UNDP 1997), is a reverse image of HDI thatfocuses on human deprivation instead of human achieve-ment. While HDI measures average achievement, the HPI-1designed for developing countries measures deprivation inthe three basic dimensions of human development includedin the HDI and therefore brings together in one compositeindex the deprivation in each of the three basic dimensionsof human life—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and adecent standard of living.

Deprivation in three basic dimensions is measured as follows:Deprivation in a long and healthy life (P1) is measured by thepercentage of people born alive today who are not expected tosurvive to age 40; deprivation in knowledge/exclusion (P2) ismeasured by the adult illiteracy rate; and deprivation in eco-nomic provisioning/decent standard of living (P3) is measuredjointly by the unweighted composite value of two indicators:(i) the percentage of population without sustainable access tosafe drinking water (P31), and (ii) the percentage of childrenunder five who are underweight for their age (P32), that is, P3 =[ P31 + P32 ]/2. The HPI is calculated as outlined in HDR 2006with the assumption of a generalized mean a = 3.

Calculation of human poverty indexan illustration for urban population

Percentage of people

not expected to Adult

survive to age 40 illiteracy rate ((P31) + (P32))/2

Deprivation in Deprivation in Percentage of Percentage of Deprivation

longevity knowledge people without under weight children in economic

Region (%) (%) access to safe water under age 5 provisioning

( P1 ) ( P2 ) (P31) (P32) (P3)

HPI urban 9.1 27.7 10.01 23.0 16.0

HPI = [ 1/3 {P13 + P2

3 + P33 }]1/3

HPI urban = [1/3 {( 9.1)3 + (27.7 ) 3 + (16.0 ) 3}]1/3 = 20.57

2

Annex


Hum

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Anne

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2.77

43.

434

0.39

20.

486

103

0.99

2

Cen

tral M

ount

ain

0.44

164

.94

61.1

726

.85

56.8

01.

728

3.06

10.

352

0.45

288

0.96

9

Wes

tern

Mou

ntai

n0.

414

53.9

550

.35

21.5

667

.42

1.14

33.

481

0.49

00.

560

830.

951

East

ern

Hill

0.53

471

.43

67.4

944

.69

71.6

22.

822

4.09

50.

376

0.47

710

70.

983

Cen

tral H

ill0.

589

73.3

369

.46

47.0

376

.19

3.26

75.

172

0.45

80.

585

118

0.97

8

Wes

tern

Hill

0.54

771

.20

67.2

649

.78

70.6

03.

175

4.40

70.

406

0.47

511

00.

995

Mid

-Wes

tern

Hill

0.43

958

.55

55.1

436

.66

73.0

62.

485

4.05

50.

378

0.41

388

0.98

0

Far-

Wes

tern

Hill

0.42

163

.03

59.3

624

.62

75.0

81.

547

3.85

10.

369

0.36

684

0.95

2

East

ern

Tara

i0.

508

66.9

263

.07

39.5

368

.18

2.45

73.

926

0.40

70.

518

102

0.98

0

Cen

tral T

arai

0.46

364

.74

60.9

926

.80

61.2

91.

658

3.30

80.

408

0.51

493

0.96

8

Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

455

58.7

255

.30

36.7

369

.99

2.28

73.

894

0.40

10.

501

910.

973

Mid

-Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

477

62.7

260

.99

38.7

366

.23

2.53

33.

851

0.37

40.

485

960.

991

Far-

Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

492

68.1

964

.28

35.6

372

.46

2.37

44.

187

0.37

50.

432

990.

978

+ : d

eriv

ed u

sing

the

info

rmat

ion

from

the

Nat

iona

l acc

ount

.So

urce

: ND

HS

2006

and

NLS

S 20

03/0

4.

Gen

der-

rela

ted

deve

lopm

ent

TAB

LE 2

Gen

der-

rela

ted

deve

lopm

ent i

ndex

, Nep

al, 2

006

2

Annex


Gen

der

empo

wer

men

tW

omen

par

tici

pati

onW

omen

in

Wom

en i

nR

atio

of

estim

ated

fem

ale

mea

sure

in l

ocal

ele

ctio

npr

ofes

sion

al j

obs

adm

inis

trat

ive

jobs

to m

ale

earn

ed i

ncom

eR

egio

n20

06(%

)+20

06++

2006

++20

06++

Nep

al0.

496

19.3

329

.78

28.9

50.

375

Urb

an0.

527

18.1

034

.97

34.0

10.

386

Rur

al0.

474

19.4

026

.56

25.6

60.

313

East

ern

regi

on0.

516

19.2

031

.29

36.5

80.

365

Cen

tral r

egio

n0.

511

19.0

035

.13

28.4

80.

339

Wes

tern

reg

ion

0.48

820

.30

24.2

931

.88

0.40

7

Mid

-Wes

tern

reg

ion

0.43

119

.20

16.1

925

.33

0.41

2

Far-

Wes

tern

reg

ion

0.45

618

.60

40.5

915

.41

0.45

1

Mou

ntai

n0.

468

19.8

021

.89

28.0

80.

402

Hill

0.51

519

.90

34.5

231

.23

0.37

6

Tara

i0.

469

18.6

023

.95

26.6

00.

368

East

ern

Mou

ntai

n0.

538

19.5

037

.78

43.1

50.

373

Cen

tral M

ount

ain

0.48

919

.90

21.4

637

.78

0.35

8

Wes

tern

Mou

ntai

n0.

413

28.7

07.

0611

.05

0.39

4

East

ern

Hill

0.52

919

.70

45.5

032

.30

0.36

8

Cen

tral H

ill0.

534

19.6

039

.01

31.8

80.

326

Wes

tern

Hill

0.51

821

.10

31.2

935

.90

0.42

9

Mid

-Wes

tern

Hill

0.41

019

.30

10.7

027

.67

0.46

9

Far-

Wes

tern

Hill

0.39

618

.40

37.7

85.

720.

476

East

ern

Tara

i0.

483

18.8

020

.81

37.0

10.

361

Cen

tral T

arai

0.46

718

.30

28.2

321

.72

0.36

2

Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

391

18.4

07.

8726

.39

0.36

4

Mid

-Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

488

19.0

029

.07

27.8

70.

354

Far-

Wes

tern

Tar

ai0.

469

18.7

043

.15

16.4

80.

421

+ Thi

s in

form

atio

n is

tak

en fr

om th

e 19

97 lo

cal e

lect

ion

data

as

this

is th

e on

ly in

form

atio

n w

e ha

ve o

n w

omen

’s p

artic

ipat

ion

in th

e lo

cal e

lect

ion.

How

ever

, the

GEM

has

bee

n up

date

d us

ing

the

wom

en p

artic

ipat

ion

in C

A 20

08 (

See

Tabl

e 2.

3 in

Cha

pter

Tw

o of

the

Rep

ort).

++ E

stim

ated

usi

ng N

DH

S 20

06.

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 a

nd N

LSS

2003

/04.

TAB

LE 3

Gen

der e

mpo

wer

men

t mea

sure

, Nep

al, 2

006

Anne

x

22222


Pro

port

ion

of p

opul

atin

gPe

rcen

t of

pop

ulat

ion

Hum

anU

nder

wei

ght

child

ren

Adu

ltw

ith l

ife e

xpec

tanc

yw

ithou

t ac

cess

to

Rel

ativ

epo

vert

y in

dex

unde

r 5-

year

s of

age

illite

racy

rat

e<

40 y

ears

safe

dri

nkin

g w

ater

valu

eR

egio

n20

0620

0620

0620

0620

06N

epal

=100

All

Nep

al35

.438

.547

.614

.317

.55

100.

00

Urb

an20

.723

.027

.79.

110

.01

58.4

5

Rur

al38

.240

.751

.615

.018

.90

108.

09

East

ern

regi

on33

.732

.546

.111

.417

.72

95.3

4

Cen

tral r

egio

n35

.338

.548

.511

.912

.33

99.8

3

Wes

tern

reg

ion

33.2

38.5

44.3

13.8

15.9

193

.94

Mid

-Wes

tern

reg

ion

38.7

43.5

49.2

22.4

27.0

010

9.53

Far-

Wes

tern

reg

ion

39.0

43.1

51.3

17.2

24.2

311

0.35

Mou

ntai

n43

.340

.955

.321

.539

.01

122.

40

Hill

32.7

33.0

42.4

11.0

27.1

492

.41

Tara

i36

.942

.651

.015

.46.

1510

4.33

East

ern

Mou

ntai

n37

.635

.344

.712

.246

.26

106.

23

Cen

tral M

ount

ain

42.2

29.6

59.5

15.2

15.2

511

9.31

Wes

tern

Mou

ntai

n48

.147

.158

.129

.748

.90

135.

90

East

ern

Hill

34.3

32.1

42.8

8.0

37.1

396

.88

Cen

tral H

ill28

.222

.338

.96.

117

.91

79.7

2

Wes

tern

Hill

31.8

34.2

41.8

8.2

22.5

789

.85

Mid

-Wes

tern

Hill

40.0

46.0

47.6

23.0

36.8

111

2.98

Far-

Wes

tern

Hill

44.9

43.4

54.7

17.5

50.3

312

6.99

East

ern

Tara

i33

.832

.347

.512

.95.

4795

.71

Cen

tral T

arai

41.9

50.7

57.8

15.4

6.53

118.

42

Wes

tern

Tar

ai36

.045

.048

.122

.86.

0510

1.82

Mid

-Wes

tern

Tar

ai36

.837

.949

.317

.919

.57

103.

98

Far-

Wes

tern

Tar

ai35

.341

.648

.011

.412

.47+

99.8

8+ S

ince

ND

HS

200

6 di

d no

t pro

vide

this

info

rmat

ion,

we

used

the

sam

e da

ta u

sed

in th

e 20

04 N

epal

hum

an d

evel

opm

ent r

epor

t.

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 a

nd N

LSS

2003

/04.

TA

BL

E 4

Hum

an p

over

ty in

dex

, Nep

al, 2

006

2

Annex


Human development index ofmajor caste and ethnic groupsCaste and ethnicity are the basic elements of thesocial mosaic of Nepal. In the recent years, thedemand for data and indices by caste and ethnicityhas risen because of the increase in identity poli-tics, along with the need for disaggregated plan-ning. The 2001 Census has listed 103 groups butonly 101 groups are specified; and the two groupswhich are not specified are: (i) Dalit - unidentified,and (ii) Caste/ethnicity – unidentified. The NepalLiving Standards Survey (NLSS) 2003/04 found80, while the Nepal Demographic and Health Sur-vey (NDHS) 2006 enumerated only 75 groups intheir surveys, respectively.

As indicated earlier, the NDHS 2006 and the NLSS2003/04 are the two main sources of data availablefor computing the HDI of caste and ethnic groups inNepal. The NDHS 2006 provided the information ondemographic and health aspects while NLSS 2003/04 provided information on the economic dimen-sion. Despite demands for HDI estimates for all thecaste and ethnic groups separately, the nationalhousehold surveys rule these out because of theirlimited sample size. The actual sample size of theNDHS 200a6 was 8,707 households and for theNLSS 2003/04, 5,072 households. Moreover, theydo not capture all the caste and ethnic groups intheir sample surveys. To ensure the minimum num-ber required to estimate HDI by caste ethnicity in

Nepal, all the 75 caste and ethnic groups found inthe NDHS 2006 are grouped into seven main caste/ethnic groups and 11 caste/ethnic groups with re-gional divisions, as suggested by Bennett and Dahal(2008). This is presented in Table 1. However, apartfrom the 11 groups broken down by region, esti-mates have also been made for the following addi-tional 9 groups: (1) all Brahman, (2) all Dalits, (3)all Janajati, (4) all Hill Mountain groups with Newar,(5) all Hill Mountain groups without Newar, (6) allTarai/Madhesi groups with Muslim, (7) all Tarai/Madhesi groups without Muslim, (8) all Janajati in-cluding Newar, and (9) all Hill Janajati includingNewar. Altogether, then, HDI has been estimatedfor 20 groups and is presented in Table 3. Thenumber of cases used for the estimate is given inTable 4.

LimitationsThe HDI value calculated for caste and ethnicgroups in this Report has some limitations thatshould be considered before drawing any firm con-clusion. First, the HDI value is calculated by amal-gamating the 75 caste and ethnic groups into 20.Second, the data used in this study represent geo-graphic regions rather than caste and ethnicity.Therefore the estimates are robust only for thegeographic region for which the sample was de-signed. Third, because of the pooling of data fromthe NLSS and NDHS, the number of samplingshas been reduced further.

ANNEX 2.4 Human development by major caste and ethnicity

Anne

x

22222


7 Major groups 11 Caste/ethnic sub-groups All caste and ethnic groups

1. Brahman/Chhetri 1.1 Hill Brahman 1.1 Hill Brahman1.2 Hill Chhetri 1.2 Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi1.3 Tarai/Madhesi 1.3 Madhesi Brahman, Nurang,

Brahman/Chhetri Rajput, Kayastha

2. Tarai/Madhesi 2.1 Tarai/Madhesi 2.1 Kewat, Mallah, Lohar, Nuniya,other castes other castes Kahar, Lodha, Rajbhar, Bing,

Malli, Kamar, Dhuniya, Yadav,Teli, Koiri, Kurmi, Sonar,Baniya, Kalwar, Thakur/Hazam,Kanu, Sudhi , Kumhar, Haluwai,Badhai, Barai, Bhediyar/Gaderi,

3. Dalits 3.1 Hill Dalits 3.1 Kami, Damai/Dholi, Sarki, Badi,Gaine, unidentified Dalits

3.2 Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 3.2 Chamar/Harijan, Musahar,Dushad/Paswan, Tatma, Khatwe,Dhobi, Baantar, Chidimar, Dom,Halkhor

4. Newar 4. Newar 4. Newar

5. Janajati 5.1 Hill Janajati 5.1 Tamang, Kumal, Sunuwar, Majhi,Danuwar,Thami/Thangmi, Darai,Bote, Baramu/Bramhu, Pahari,Kusunda, Raji, Raute, Chepang/Praja, Hayu, Magar, Chhantal,Bankarya, Rai, Sherpa, Bhujel/Gharti, Yakha, Thakali, Limbu,Lepcha, Bhote, Byansi, Jirel,Hyalmo, Walung, Gurung, Dura

5.2 Tarai/Madhesi Janajati 5.2 Tharu, Jhangad, Dhanuk,Rajbanshi, Gangai, Santhal/Satar,Dhimal, Tajpuriya, Meche,Koche, Kisan, Munda, Kusbadiya/Patharkata, unidentifiedAdibasi Janajati

6. Muslim 6. Muslim 6. Madhesi Muslim, Churoute(Hill Muslim)

7. Other 7. Other 7. Marwari, Bangali, Jain, Punjabi/Sikh, unidentified others

8.1 All Hill and Mountain groups with Newar8.2 All Hill and Mountain groups without Newar8.3 All Tarai/Madhesi groups with Muslim8.4 All Tarai/Madhesi groups without Muslim8.5 All Janajati including Newar8.6 All Hill Janajati including Newar

Note: The categorization is the same as that of Bennett and Dahal 2008.

TABLE 1 Caste and ethnicity classified by major groups

2

Annex


Caste and ethnic groupsand human developmentOf the seven main caste and ethnic groups, the HDIof all Brahman and Chhetri ranks third (0.552) afterthe Newar (0.616) and other caste and ethnic groups(0.559). The HDI of Janajati falls somewhere in be-tween (0.494). The lowest value is that of Muslim(0.401), followed by all Dalits (0.424). However,across these seven castes and ethnic groups, widevariation emerges when they are disaggregated byregion. Of the 11 groups viewed regionally, the TaraiMadhesi Brahman and Chhetri have the highest levelof HDI, followed by the Newar, most of whom live inurban areas. By contrast, the Tarai/Madhesi Dalitshave the lowest level of human development (0.383),followed by Muslim (0.401) and all Dalits (0.424).However, because of the small number of sam-plings, this estimate may not be robust.

Table 2 presents the caste/ethnic groups in fourcategories ranked in terms of their HDI value, whichshows that the Brahman and Chhetri and the Newarhave the highest HDI irrespective of geographic re-gion. At the other extreme lie the Tarai Madhesi Dalits.

Among the three components of HDI, life expect-ancy has the greatest contribution among all caste/ethnic groups except the Tarai/Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri group, where education becomes a greatfactor. GDP per capita falls below the other twocomponents despite the fact that there is highervariation in household income as measured byhousehold surveys such as the NLSS. This mayindicate one of the limitations of using per capitaGDP as a HDI measure; it also suggests that unlessthe state provides more services to the poor aswell as the excluded, GDP per capita may have tobe adjusted by household income data for a moreaccurate estimate.

Educational attainment varies widely. It is higherfor Brahman/Chhetri and Newar than for the othercaste and ethnic groups. This implies that the HDIof Dalits and Muslim can be improved by investingmore in education. However, the lower value ofthe GDP per capita among most of the caste andethnic groups also suggests that a high and in-clusive GDP growth can play the larger role inhuman development.

Caste/ethnicity HDI value

Hill Brahman 0.612 - 0.625Tarai/Madhesi/Brahman/ChhetriNewar

All Brahman/Chhetri 0.507 - 0.559Hill ChhetriHill/Mountain JanajatiAll Janajati including NewarAll Hill Janajati including NewarAll Hill Mountain groups with NewarAll Hill Mountain groups without NewarOther

Tarai/Madhesi other caste 0.401 - 0.494All DalitsHill DalitsAll JanajatiTarai JanajatiMuslimAll Tarai/Madhesi groups with MuslimAll Tarai/Madhesi groups without Muslim

Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 0.383

TABLE 2HDI value of caste and ethnic groupsby four broad categories

Anne

x

22222


Per

capi

taLi

feM

ean

inco

me

Life

Hum

anR

atio

to

Cou

ntry

/ex

pect

ancy

Adu

ltye

ars

ofPP

P in

com

eex

pect

ancy

Edu

cati

onal

Inco

me

deve

lopm

ent

Nat

iona

lca

ste-

ethn

icity

at b

irth

liter

acy

scho

olin

gin

US

$in

dex

atta

inm

ent

inde

xin

dex

HD

IR

ank

All

Nep

al63

.69

52.4

23.

2115

970.

645

0.42

10.

4624

0.50

910

0.0

Cas

te e

thni

city

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

62.9

563

.65

4.40

2027

0.63

30.

522

0.50

220.

552

108.

45

Hill

Bra

hman

68.1

069

.93

5.40

2395

0.71

80.

586

0.53

010.

612

120.

13

Hill

Chh

etri

60.6

158

.40

3.69

1736

0.59

40.

471

0.47

630.

514

100.

89

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

/Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

63.8

983

.80

6.40

2333

0.64

80.

701

0.52

570.

625

122.

71

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

/oth

er c

aste

61.9

441

.85

2.30

1119

0.61

60.

330

0.40

310.

450

88.3

15

All

Dal

its61

.03

38.0

21.

7397

70.

601

0.29

20.

3804

0.42

483

.318

Hill

Dal

its60

.89

45.5

02.

0710

990.

598

0.34

90.

4001

0.44

988

.216

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

/Dal

its61

.26

27.3

21.

2174

30.

604

0.20

90.

3348

0.38

375

.120

New

ar68

.00

68.2

04.

6630

970.

717

0.55

80.

5730

0.61

612

0.9

2

All

Jana

jati

excl

udin

g N

ewar

62.9

151

.67

2.96

1405

0.63

20.

410

0.44

100.

494

97.1

12

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n/Ja

naja

ti63

.61

53.8

13.

0514

900.

644

0.42

70.

4509

0.50

799

.511

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i61

.55

48.1

12.

8112

240.

609

0.38

30.

4180

0.47

092

.313

Mus

lim

60.9

930

.32

1.60

890

0.60

00.

238

0.36

480.

401

78.7

19

All J

anaj

ati i

nclu

ding

New

ar63

.33

53.5

23.

1416

970.

639

0.42

70.

4726

0.51

310

0.7

10

All H

ill J

anaj

ati i

nclu

ding

New

ar64

.15

56.2

33.

3118

690.

652

0.44

80.

4887

0.53

010

4.0

7

All H

ill/M

ount

ain

grou

ps w

ith N

ewar

63.1

258

.47

3.67

1846

0.63

50.

471

0.48

660.

531

104.

36

All H

ill/M

ount

ain

grou

ps w

ithou

t N

ewar

62.8

657

.75

3.60

1699

0.63

10.

465

0.47

280.

523

102.

78

All T

arai

/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

with

Mus

lim61

.59

42.3

42.

3710

940.

610

0.33

50.

3993

0.44

888

.017

All T

arai

/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

with

out

Mus

lim61

.69

43.7

42.

4711

430.

612

0.34

60.

4066

0.45

589

.314

Oth

ers

66.3

557

.97

3.70

2227

0.68

90.

469

0.51

800.

559

109.

74

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 a

nd N

LSS

2003

/04.

TAB

LE 3

Hum

an d

evel

opm

ent b

y ca

ste

and

ethn

icity

with

regi

onal

div

isio

ns, N

epal

, 200

6

2

Annex


Population Population aged Number ofCaste and ethnic group under 15 years of age 15 and over households

Hill Brahman 3,849 2,877 551

Hill Chhetri 6,166 4,267 733

Tarai/Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri 282 216 37

Tarai/Madhesi other castes 3,629 2,459 360

Hill Dalits 2,282 1,488 312

Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 1,509 1,036 128

Newar 1,366 1,003 379

Hill Janajati 7,172 4,960 907

Tarai/Madhesi Janajati 4,228 2,985 270

Muslim 1,198 785 165

Others 708 521 31

Total 32,388 22,597 3,873

Source: NDHS 2006 and NLSS 2003/04.

Population aged Population aged Number ofCaste group under 15 years of age 15 and over household

All Brahman/Chhetri 10,297 7,360 1,321

Hill Brahman 3,849 2,877 551

Hill Chhetri 6,166 4,267 733

Tarai/Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri 282 216 37

Other Tarai/Madhesi 3,629 2,459 360

All Dalits 3,791 2,525 440

Hill Dalits 2,282 1,488 312

Tarai Dalits 1,509 1,036 128

Newar 1,366 1,003 379

All Janajati excluding Newar 11,399 7,945 1,177

Hill Janajati 7,172 4,960 907

Tarai Janajati 4,228 2,985 270

Musl im 1,198 785 165

All Janajati including Newar 9,647 8,948 1,556

All Hill Janajati including Newar 8,538 5,963 1,286

All Hill/Mountain groups with Newar 20,835 14,595 2,882

All Hill/Mountain groups without Newar 12,765 13,593 2,503

All Tarai/Madhesi groups with Muslim 10,846 7,480 960

All Tarai/Madhesi groups without Muslim 19,469 6,696 795

Others 708 521 31

Source: NDHS 2006 and NLSS 2003/04.

TABLE 4Number of cases/observations used to calculate the mean years of schooling, adult literacyand income for the 11 caste and ethnic groups with regional divisions

TABLE 5Number of cases/observations used to calculate the mean years of schooling, adult literacyand income for the 20 caste and ethnic groups with social and regional divisions

Anne

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TABLE 1Representation of caste /ethnic groups and gender in the FPTPelectoral system of the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, April 2008

3A N N E X

Hill Brahman/ Janajati MadhesiChhetri/ excluding including Hill

Party name Thakuri Tharu Tharu Dalits Musl im Female Male Total

Unified CPN (Maoist) 56 40 16 8 0 23 97 120Nepali Congress 21 8 7 0 1 2 35 37CPN (UML) 18 10 4 0 1 1 32 33Madhesi People’sRights Forum, Nepal 1 1 25 0 3 2 28 30Tarai MadhesLoktantrik Party 0 0 9 0 0 1 8 9Sadbhawana Party 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 4Janamorcha Nepal 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2Nepal Workers andPeasants Party 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2Independents 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2Rastriya Janamorcha 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Total 98 62 66 8 6 29 211 240

Percent (a) 40.8 25.8 27.5 3.3 2.5 12.1 87.9 100.0

Proportion ofcaste/ethnicity intotal population (b) 30.9 23.1 31.5 7.9 4.3 50.5 49.5 -

Representationratio (a/b) 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.8 -

Source: Nepal Magazine 4 May 2008.

Statistical tables

3

Annex


FPTP PR GrandN o Political parties result result Total Nominees* total

1 Unified CPN (Maoist) 123 105 228 10 238

2 Nepali Congress 36 73 109 5 114

3 CPN (UML) 34 70 104 5 109

4 Madhesi People’s Rights Forum 29 22 51 2 53

5 Tarai-Madhes Loktantrik Party 9 11 20 1 21

6 Sadbhawana Party (Mahato) 4 5 9 1 10

7 Rastriya Prajatantra Party 0 8 8 - 8

8 CPN (ML) 0 8 8 1 9

9 CPN (United) 0 5 5 - 5

10 Nepal Workers and Peasants Party 2 2 4 1 5

11 Rastriya Janamorcha 1 3 4 - 4

12 Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal 0 4 4 - 4

13 Rastriya Janashakti Party 0 3 3 - 3

14 Rastriya Janamukti Party 0 2 2 - 2

15 CPN (Unified) 0 2 2 - 2

16 Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandi Devi) 0 2 2 - 2

17 Nepali Janta Dal 0 2 2 - 2

18 Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch 0 2 2 - 2

19 Samajbadi Prajantantrik Janta Party Nepal 0 1 1 - 1

20 Dalit Janajati Party 0 1 1 - 1

21 Nepal Pariwar Dal 0 1 1 - 1

22 Nepal Rastriya Party 0 1 1 - 1

23 Nepal Loktantrik Samajbadi Dal 0 1 1 - 1

24 Chure Bhawar Rastriya Ekata Party Nepal 0 1 1 - 1

Independents 2 0 2 - 2

Total 240 335 575* 26 601* Refers to 26 members nominated from various sections of society to make a 601-member CA.Source: Election Portal [http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php].

TABLE 2 Number of seats of political parties in CA election, Nepal, 2008

Anne

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TABLE 4 Representation of different caste/ethnic groups in parliament, Nepal, 1959–1999

1959 1967 1978 1981 1986 1991 1994 1999

ethnicity No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %

Brahman 30 27.5 30 24.2 27 21.9 14 12.5 23 20.5 77 37.7 86 41.9 77 38.7

Chhetri 34 31.2 47 37.9 46 37.4 41 36.6 43 38.4 39 19.1 40 19.5 44 22.1

Newar 4 3.7 15 12.1 10 8.1 9 8.0 7 6.2 14 6.9 13 6.3 14 7.0

Janajati

(except Newar) 21 19.3 21 16.9 28 22.8 36 32.1 29 25.9 48 23.5 38 18.5 35 17.6

Tarai high and

middle castes 18 16.5 11 8.9 11 8.9 10 8.9 10 8.9 21 10.3 24 11.7 27 13.6

Muslim 2 1.8 - - 1 0.8 2 1.8 0 0 5 2.4 4 2.0 2 1.0

Dalits - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Total 109 100.0 124 100.0 123 100.0 112 100.0 112 100.0 204 100.0 205 100.0 199 100.0

Source: UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006; and Neupane 2005.

Caste/

Note: Percentages may exceed hundred because of rounding up the decimals.

1991 1994 1999

Representation of different caste and ethnic groupsCaste/ Percentage ofethnic groups Population population

Hill caste groups 702,320 30.89 114 (55.6%) 129 (62.9%) 122 (59.5%)Brahman - - 37.6 42.0 46.3Chhetri - - 18.1 19.5 17.1Dalit 1,692 7.11 1(0.5%) - -

Kirat/MongolEthnic groups 501,131 22.04 34 (16.6%) 24 (11.7%) 28 (13.7%)Newar 124,532 5.58 14 (6.8%) 12 (5.8%) 14 (6.8%)Ethnic groups ofinner Madhes 251,117 1.11 1 (0.5%) - -Madhesi castes 3,464,249 15.24 18 (8.7%) 22 (10.7%) 29 (14.1%)

Madhesi Dalits 904,924 3.99 - - -Madhesi ethnicgroups 2,814,927 8.11 18 (8.8%) 14 (6.8%) 10 (4.9%)

Muslim 971,056 4.27 5 (2.4%) 4 (1.6%) 2 (1.0%)

Female 11,377,556 50.04 7 (3.4%) 7 (3.4%) 12 (5.8%)Male 11,359,378 49.96 198 (96.6%) 198 (96.6%) 193 (94.1%)

Source: CBS 2003; Election Portal [http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-system.php].

TABLE 3Representation of different caste/ethnic groups and gender in thehouse of representatives, Nepal, 1991, 1994 and 1999

3

Annex


BC

TSN

atio

nalit

ies

Mad

hesi

Dal

itsN

ewar

Oth

ers

Tot

al

Sec

tor

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

Supr

eme

Cou

rt16

110

00

00

00

00

016

11

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ncil

of M

inis

ters

208

41

51

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52

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3412

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l36

194

15

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20

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23

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7 -

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te i

n to

tal

popu

latio

n –

% (

b)31

.630

.922

.123

.530

.931

.57.

9 -

5.6

5.5

1.1

1.2

- 10

0.0

Rat

io (

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0.4

0.2

0.3

0.1

- -

1.8

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--

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Not

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ower

and

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s of

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cham

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re a

re n

ot in

clud

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ecau

se th

ere

was

no

low

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ouse

in 2

005.

BC

TS re

fers

to H

ill Br

ahm

an, C

hhet

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li and

San

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urce

: Neu

pane

200

5.

TA

BL

E 6

Rep

rese

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ion

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eth

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ty in

sta

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rgan

s, N

epal

, 199

9 an

d 20

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BC

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atio

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1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

Publ

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582

427

569

42

3614

--

373

114

Polit

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9793

2520

2611

-1

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--

166

139

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315

30-

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42-

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96

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943

98

18-

116

19-

-96

141

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568

44

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490

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60.

813

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te i

n to

tal

popu

latio

n –

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)31

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.922

.123

.130

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95.

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51.

11.

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0

Rat

io (

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1.9

1.9

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I) a

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erce

. Civ

il soc

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incl

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chie

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f diff

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TS re

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rahm

an, C

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ri an

d Sa

nyas

i.So

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pane

200

5.

TA

BL

E 5

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

of c

aste

and

eth

nici

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diff

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tors

of s

ocie

ty, N

epal

, 199

9 an

d 20

05

Anne

x

33333


Sector BCTS Nationalities Madhesi Dalits Newar Others Total

Supreme Court 11 - 2 - 2 - 15Commission for Investigationof Abuse of Authority 3 1 - - 1 - 5Election Commission 3 - - - 1 - 4Office of the Attorney General 1 - - - - - 1Office of the Auditor General 1 - - - - - 1Public Service Commission 2 1 1 - 2 - 6Council of Ministers 8 1 1 - 2 - 12Central Administration-Secretary or its equivalent 28 1 1 - 3 - 33Lower House - - - - - - -Upper House 25 4 4 2 3 - 38

Total 82 8 9 2 14 - 115

Percentage 71.3 7.0 7.8 1.7 12.2 - 100.0

Source: Neupane 2005.BCTS refers to Hill Brahman, Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi.

Political party BCTS Nationalities Madhesi Dalits Newar Others Total

Nepali Congress(Central Committee) 22 3 3 - 1 - 29CPN (UML-Central Committee) 31 4 1 - 6 - 42National Democratic Party 22 8 6 1 4 - 41CPN (Maoist-Polite Bureau) 18 5 1 - 3 - 27

Total 93 20 11 1 14 - 139

Percentage 66.9 14.4 7.9 0.7 10.1 - 100.0

Source: Neupane 2005. BCTS refers to Hill Brahman, Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi.

TABLE 7Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadership positions of judiciary,executive, legislature and constitutional bodies, Nepal, 2005

TABLE 8 Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the central level committee/bureau, Nepal, 2005

3

Annex


Special First Second ThirdS.N. Caste/ethnic groups class class class class Number %

1 Brahman 24 230 1,161 3,306 4,721 58.32 Chhetri 6 63 283 728 1,080 13.33 Dalit 0 3 11 60 74 0.94 Newar 7 68 374 703 1,152 14.25 Janajati (excluding Newar) 1 3 70 190 264 3.36 Madhesi, Muslim and Marwari 0 30 237 538 805 9.9

Total 38 397 2,136 5,525 8,096 100.0Percentage 0.5 4.9 26.4 68.2 100.0

Gazetted level

Organisation BCTS Nationalities Madhesi Dalits Newar Others Total

Nepal Press Federation 18 1 1 - 1 - 21NGO Federation 11 - 2 1 2 - 16Nepal Bar Association 14 2 - - 1 - 17Nepal Professor Association 14 - 3 - 2 - 19Nepal Teacher Union 12 1 5 - 6 - 24Nepal Medical Association 7 1 5 - 1 - 14Nepal Engineering Association 9 1 2 - 3 - 15Nepal Nursing Association 9 3 - - 3 - 15

Total 94 9 18 1 19 - 141

Percentage 66.7 6.4 12.8 0.7 13.5 - 100.0


Organisation BCTS Nationalities Madhesi Dalits Newar Others Total

Federation ofNepalese Chambers ofCommerce and Industry 16 2 14 - 27 - 59Nepal Chamber of Commerce 5 1 16 - 15 - 37

Total 21 3 30 - 42 - 96

Percentage 21.9 3.1 31.2 - 43.7 - 100.0


TABLE 9Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadership positions of Federation of NepaliChamber of Commerce and Industry and Chamber of Commerce, Nepal, 2005

TABLE 10Participation of caste and ethnic groups in the leadership positions of civil societyorganisations, Nepal, 2005

TABLE 11 Class-wise caste and ethnic composition in gazetted level employees

Source: Nijamati kitabkhana (civil service) records 2006.

Total

Anne

x

33333


Local bodies Total representation Share of women (%)

District Development Councils 10,000 1.5DDC 1,117 6.7Municipalities 4,146 19.5Village Development Committees 50,857 7.7Village Councils 183,865 2.1Ward Committees 176,031 20.0

Source: UNDP/Nepal 2004.

Caste/ethnicity Biratnagar Bharatpur Butwal Nepalgunj Dipayal Total Percent

Dalit 28 64 51 122 43 308 5.1Janajati 191 209 148 85 13 646 10.7Madhesi 570 421 250 308 29 1,578 26.2Women 142 118 100 46 33 439 7.3Others 423 490 559 776 810 3,058 50.7

Total 1,354 1,302 1,108 1,337 928 6,029 100.0

Source: Ministry of Home records.

% of women

Class Number of civil servants 1991 2000

Special 85 3.5 2.4First 633 5.1 4.1Second 2,719 4.9 3.2Third 7,418 5.3 5.2Non-gazetted 87,834 8.0 8.2

Total 98,689 7.7 7.8

Source: UNDP/Nepal 2004.

TABLE 12 Recruitment of police, Nepal, during May 2006–April 2008

TABLE 13 Women’s representation in local government, Nepal, 1997–2002

TABLE 14 Women’s representation in civil service by class and level, Nepal, 1991–2000

3

Annex


Year Events Impact

1951 End of Rana rule and advent Ushered new ideas for developmentof Democracy and welfare of the people.

1956 Tribhuvan Village Development Village Development Centres establishedProgramme introduced by and Block Development Officer appointedUS and Indian Aid to co-ordinate rural development.

1961 Introduction of Panchayat System Establishment of local institutions calledof Polity as the Panchayats at village and district

Levels.

1962 Promulgation of the Constitutionof Nepal 2019

1963 Viswabandhu Thapa Major Recommendations:Commission on Decentralisation of (a) Provision of district andAdministration village level cabinets

(b) Delegation of law and orderresponsibility to villages

(c) Enactment of Local Administration Act.

1966 Promulgation of Local Establishment of 75 districts in the place ofAdministration Act already existing 35 districts.

1967 Bhojraj Ghimire Major Recommendations:Committee to look into the (a) Decentralization of powerimplementation of decentralisation to local level institutions

(b) Appointment of Chief District Officer asDistrict Panchayat Secretary

(c) Provision of government financialgrants to local panchayats.

1968 Vedananda Jha Recommendation of administrativeCommission on Administrative Reform reforms and reorganization

1969 Jaya Prakash Committee to Major Recommendations:examine effectiveness of (a) Co-ordination among various centraldecentralisation scheme level ministries

(b) Formulation of District Level Plansby District Panchayat and itsimplementation byChief District Officer.

1970 Decentralisation Committee Recommendations made for thestrengthening of decentralization.

1970 Implementation of the Fourth Plan Regional planning was introduced during(1970–75) the fourth five-year plan. A growth pole

development strategy was conceptualizedunder which the country was divided into4 development regions each with agrowth pole.

TABLE 15 A summary of events in the process of decentralisation in Nepal

Anne

x

33333


Year Events Impact

1974 Implementation of District All district line agencies of developmentAdministration Plan ministries put under the authority of

Chief District Officer, and were maderesponsible for the formulation ofdistrict development plan.

1975 Implementation of Small Area Concepts of growth centres and growthDevelopment Programme corridors introduced in ten areas.

1976 Bhekh Bahadur Thapa Administrative reform was recommendedAdministrative Reform Commission both at central and local levels.

1976 Integrated Rural Development Projectslaunched with International Bank forReconstruction and DevelopmentAssistance.

1978 Implementation of Integrated The authority for formulating and approvingPanchayat Development Decision plans was given to the village and district

assemblies and Panchayats; service centreswere recommended.

1980 Creation of Ministry of Panchayat and The responsibility of coordinating all ruralLocal Development development projects and programmes

was assigned to this ministry.

1981 Formation of Decentralisation It worked out Decentralization Act 1982.Sub-committee

1982 Decentralisation Act 1982 Devolution of decision making powerto local level panchayats for theirdevelopment.

1984 Decentralisation Byelaws The Act was to be implementedall over the country up to 1991on a phase wise basis.

1999 Decentralisation Act 1999 The act and rules have set an2000 Decentralisation Rules 2000 unprecedented policy shift by legally endorsing

the concept of self-governance and devolution ofauthorities to localbodies. They clearly defined theobjectives, principles and policies, duties andresponsibilities, inter-agency relationship for localgovernance in the country.

Source: Updated from Tiwari 1991.

3

Annex


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06

TAB

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Wom

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Anne

x

33333


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oth

er c

aste

s44

.517

.010

.528

.00.

00.

010

0.0

481

72.0

All

Dal

its23

.228

.87.

940

.10.

00.

010

0.0

437

59.9

Hill

Dal

its26

.433

.88.

831

.00.

00.

010

0.0

243

69.0

Mad

hesi

Dal

its19

.222

.56.

851

.50.

00.

010

0.0

194

48.5

New

ar70

.020

.72.

86.

50.

00.

010

0.0

169

93.5

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)45

.824

.29.

520

.20.

00.

210

0.0

1,34

179

.6

Hill

Jana

jati

48.1

27.1

7.3

17.2

0.0

0.3

100.

078

382

.4

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i42

.720

.212

.724

.50.

00.

010

0.0

558

75.5

Mus

lim

25.5

25.9

10.5

38.2

0.0

0.0

100.

012

761

.8

Oth

ers

(75.

8)(1

4.1)

(7.6

)(2

.6)

(0.0

)(0

.0)

(100

.0)

107

(97.

4)

Tota

l 15

–49

year

s53

.520

.37.

218

.90.

00.

110

0.0

3,85

481

.0

Tota

l m

en 1

5–59

yea

rs49

.721

.37.

721

.20.

00.

110

0.0

4,39

778

.7

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

60.5

21.2

5.2

13.0

0.0

0.1

100.

02,

341

86.9

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

40.0

19.4

10.6

30.0

0.1

0.0

100.

01,

405

69.9

1 Ref

ers

to m

en w

ho a

ttend

ed s

econ

dary

sch

ool o

r hig

her a

nd m

en w

ho c

an re

ad a

who

le s

ente

nce

or p

art o

f a s

ente

nce.

Not

e: F

igur

es in

par

enth

esis

are

bas

ed o

n 25

-49

un-w

eigh

ted

case

s.So

urce

: ND

HS

2006

Sur

vey D

ata.

TAB

LE 1

7Li

tera

cy b

y ca

ste/

ethn

icity

and

regi

onal

iden

tity:

men

Perc

ent

dist

ribut

ion

of m

en a

ge 1

5-49

yea

rs b

y le

vel o

f sc

hool

ing

atte

nded

and

leve

l of

liter

acy,

and

acco

rdin

g to

cas

te/e

thni

city

and

reg

ion,

Nep

al,

2006

3

Annex


Hig

hest

lev

el o

f sc

hool

ing

Cas

te/e

thni

c an

dN

oS

ome

Com

plet

edS

ome

Com

plet

edM

ore

than

Num

ber

ofM

edia

nre

gion

al i

dent

ity

educ

atio

npr

imar

ypr

imar

y1se

cond

ary

seco

ndar

y2se

cond

ary

Tota

lw

omen

grad

e

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

38.4

11.3

5.8

27.5

8.7

8.3

100.

03,

539

4.1

Hill

Bra

hman

26.2

9.5

4.7

32.3

13.0

14.3

100.

01,

344

7.0

Hill

Chh

etri

47.4

12.0

6.5

24.6

5.4

4.0

100.

02,

099

1.0

Mad

hesi

B/C

13.4

18.9

6.0

22.7

21.4

17.5

100.

096

7.8

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s74

.69.

24.

210

.71.

00.

510

0.0

1,12

4-

All

Dal

its69

.015

.24.

010

.50.

80.

610

0.0

1,26

1-

Hill

Dal

its58

.820

.25.

014

.30.

80.

910

0.0

765

-

Mad

hesi

Dal

its84

.77.

52.

54.

60.

60.

010

0.0

496

-

New

ar32

.817

.14.

027

.39.

79.

110

0.0

453

4.0

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)54

.912

.66.

121

.32.

82.

310

0.0

3,81

6-

Hill

Jana

jati

48.5

15.0

7.0

22.5

3.8

3.1

100.

02,

433

-

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i66

.18.

54.

519

.11.

10.

710

0.0

1,38

3-

Mus

lim

77.6

8.3

2.1

10.1

1.6

0.4

100.

038

9-

Oth

ers

54.0

19.1

6.1

12.7

6.3

1.8

100.

021

1-

Tota

l53

.112

.35.

320

.64.

64.

110

0.0

10,7

93-

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

44.1

13.8

6.0

24.4

6.1

5.7

100.

07,

092

2.1

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

71.3

8.8

3.9

13.4

1.6

1.0

100.

03,

488

-1 C

ompl

eted

5 g

rade

s at

the

prim

ary

leve

l.2 C

ompl

eted

10

grad

es a

t the

sec

onda

ry le

vel.

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 S

urve

y Dat

a.

TAB

LE 1

8Ed

ucat

iona

l atta

inm

ent b

y ca

ste/

ethn

icity

and

regi

onal

iden

tity:

wom

en

Perc

ent

dist

ribut

ion

of w

omen

age

15-

49 y

ears

by

high

est

leve

l of

scho

olin

g at

tend

ed o

r co

mpl

eted

, an

d m

edia

n gr

ade

com

plet

ed,

acco

rdin

g to

cas

te/e

thni

city

and

reg

ion,

Nep

al,

2006

Anne

x

33333


Hig

hest

lev

el o

f sc

hool

ing

Cas

te/e

thni

c an

dN

oS

ome

Com

plet

edS

ome

Com

plet

edM

ore

than

Num

ber

ofM

edia

nre

gion

al i

dent

ity

educ

atio

npr

imar

ypr

imar

y1se

cond

ary

seco

ndar

y2se

cond

ary

Tota

lw

omen

grad

e

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

7.5

10.5

6.6

39.5

11.4

24.4

100.

01,

192

8.2

Hill

Bra

hman

3.4

4.2

5.9

39.0

13.3

34.3

100.

045

68.

9

Hill

Chh

etri

10.5

15.0

7.3

41.4

9.9

15.8

100.

069

07.

3

Mad

hesi

B/C

1.4

5.6

2.9

16.4

16.2

57.5

100.

046

11.2

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s24

.922

.28.

529

.310

.94.

210

0.0

481

4.3

All

Dal

its34

.134

.87.

918

.52.

91.

810

0.0

437

2.0

Hill

Dal

its24

.540

.29.

022

.90.

62.

910

0.0

243

2.6

Mad

hesi

Dal

its46

.228

.16.

513

.05.

80.

410

0.0

194

0.0

New

ar6.

514

.88.

728

.88.

932

.310

0.0

169

8.0

All

Jana

jati

(ex

clud

ing

New

ar)

21.0

24.0

9.2

34.6

5.5

5.8

100.

01,

341

4.5

Hill

Jana

jati

17.7

26.9

7.3

35.9

5.6

6.6

100.

078

34.

7

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i25

.520

.011

.832

.85.

24.

610

0.0

558

4.4

Mus

lim

42.0

22.2

10.4

22.5

1.4

1.6

100.

012

72.

5

Oth

ers

(6.7

)(1

4.1)

(3.5

)(4

3.9

)(1

5.4

)(1

6.5

)(1

00.0

)10

77.

2

Tota

l 15

–49

year

s18

.420

.18.

033

.28.

012

.210

0.0

3,85

45.

6

Tota

l m

en 1

5–59

yea

rs21

.520

.88.

030

.97.

611

.310

0.0

4,39

75.

0

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

12.7

19.5

7.3

36.3

8.1

16.2

100.

02,

341

6.7

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

28.9

21.6

9.5

27.4

7.2

5.4

100.

01,

405

3.9

1 Com

plet

ed 5

gra

des

at th

e pr

imar

y le

vel.

2 Com

plet

ed 1

0 gr

ades

at t

he s

econ

dary

leve

l.N

ote:

Fig

ures

in p

aren

thes

is a

re b

ased

on

25-4

9 un

wei

ghte

d ca

ses.

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 S

urve

y Dat

a.

TAB

LE 1

9Ed

ucat

iona

l atta

inm

ent b

y ca

ste/

ethn

icity

and

regi

onal

iden

tity:

men

Perc

ent

dist

ribut

ion

of m

en a

ge 1

5-49

yea

rs b

y hi

ghes

t le

vel o

f sc

hool

ing

atte

nded

or

com

plet

ed,

and

med

ian

grad

e co

mpl

eted

,ac

cord

ing

to c

aste

/eth

nici

ty a

nd r

egio

n, N

epal

200

6

3

Annex


Repetition and dropout rates for the de facto household population age 5-24 years who attended primary school in the previousschool year by school grade, according to caste/ethnicity and regional identity, Nepal, 2006

School grade

Background characteristics 1 2 3 4 5

REPETITION RATE1

EthnicityAll Brahman/Chhetri 28.0 9.6 7.8 8.5 5.0Hill Brahman (B) 18.2 10.1 5.1 5.6 5.4Hill Chhetri (C) 32.6 9.7 9.4 9.9 4.9Madhesi B/C 16.6 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0Madhesi other castes 29.9 4.1 6.3 5.5 5.3All Dalits 36.2 15.0 11.4 9.1 14.1Hill Dalits 37.1 18.7 13.5 9.4 18.7Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 34.4 4.4 5.1 8.0 0.0Newar 18.4 8.1 4.1 13.5 6.0All Janajati (excluding Newar) 27.6 12.0 11.5 13.5 11.4Hill Janajati 25.1 14.1 12.1 15.8 8.9Tarai Janajati 30.6 7.3 10.1 9.2 15.6Musl im 5.8 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Others 13.2 23.3 0.0 16.4 0.0Total (based on 7,681 households withcaste/ethnicity reported by men/women) 28.2 10.6 9.0 10.4 8.1Total (based on all 8,707 households) 28.0 10.6 8.8 10.4 8.3

All Hill/Mountain groups 28.3 12.5 9.9 11.5 7.6All Tarai/Madhesi groups 28.7 5.5 7.3 7.1 9.9

DROPOUT RATE2

EthnicityAll Brahman/Chhetri 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.8 2.3Hill Brahman 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.5 1.6Hill Chhetri 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.5 2.3Madhesi B/C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3Madhesi other castes 0.4 0.0 0.5 2.0 3.4All Dalits 0.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 0.5Hill Dalits 0.8 1.9 3.2 1.5 0.6Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 1.3 3.4 0.0 4.4 0.0Newar 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0All Janajati (excluding Newar) 0.8 0.4 1.0 2.1 7.3Hill Janajati 1.3 0.5 1.5 2.9 9.2Tarai Janajati 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.6 4.1Musl im 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 4.0Others 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6Total (based on 7,681 households withcaste/ethnicity reported by men/women) 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.8 4.1Total (based on all 8,707 households) 0.7 0.6 1.0 2.1 4.1

All Hill/Mountain groups 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.8 4.3All Tarai/Madhesi groups 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.8 3.91 The repetition rate is the percentage of students in a given grade in the previous school year who are repeating that grade in the current school year.2 The dropout rate is the percentage of students in a given grade in the previous school year who are not attending school in the current school year.Note: The NDHS 2006 has not collected the caste and ethnicity information from the household questionnaire, however, caste and ethnicity identity was collected from theindividual questionnaire such as that of the women questionnaire which has been administered to the women of age 15-49 years only. Therefore, while processing theinformation contained in the table, caste and ethnicity identity of household has been found identifying such information from women’s questionnaire; however, as all thehouseholds do not have eligible women of 1-449 years, it has become difficult to identify the caste and ethnicity household of about 1026 households. Therefore, total valuesof the indicators are reported for both the two totals: one for which the caste and ethnicity has been identified and the other for which it was not.

TABLE 20 Grade repetition and dropout rates by caste/ethnicity and regional identity

Anne

x

33333


Neonatal, post-neonatal, infant, child, and under-five mortality rates for the ten-year period preceding the survey, by caste/ethnicity and region, Nepal, 2006

Neonatal Post neonatal Infant Child Under-fiveCaste/ethnicity mortality mortality1 mortality mortality mortalityand regional identity (NN) (PNN) (1q0) (4q1) (5q0)

All Brahman/Chhetri 34 25 59 18 76

Hill Brahman 18 18 36 10 45

Hill Chhetri 42 28 70 23 91

Madhesi B/C 11 43 55 0 55

Madhesi other castes 44 19 64 24 86

All Dalits 44 25 68 23 90

Hill Dalits 41 28 69 28 95

Madhesi Dalits 49 18 67 15 81

Newar 24 12 36 7 43

All Janajati (excluding Newar) 36 24 59 22 80

Hill Janajati 34 22 56 22 76

Tarai Janajati 38 28 66 23 87

Musl im 56 13 68 13 80

Others 32 11 43 0 43

All Hill/Mountain groups 35 24 58 20 77

All Tarai/Madhesi groups 44 21 65 20 841 Computed as the difference between the infant and neonatal mortality rates.Source: NDHS 2006 Survey Data.

TABLE 21 Early childhood mortality rates by caste/ethnicity and regional identity

3

Annex


Perc

ent

dist

ribut

ion

of w

omen

who

had

a li

ve b

irth

in t

he f

ive

year

s pr

eced

ing

the

surv

ey b

y an

tena

tal c

are

(AN

C)

prov

ider

durin

g pr

egna

ncy

for

the

mos

t re

cent

birt

h, a

nd t

he p

erce

ntag

e of

mos

t re

cent

birt

hs r

ecei

ving

ant

enat

al c

are

from

SBA

,ac

cord

ing

to c

aste

eth

nici

ty a

nd r

egio

n, N

epal

, 20

06

Hea

lthPe

rcen

tage

assi

stan

t/Tr

aditi

onal

rece

ivin

gC

aste

/eth

nici

tyN

urse

/he

alth

MC

Hbi

rthan

tena

tal c

are

Num

ber

and

regi

onal

ide

ntity

Doc

tor

mid

wife

wor

ker

wor

ker

VHW

atte

ndan

tFC

HV

Oth

erN

o on

eTo

tal

from

SBA

1of

wom

en

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

28.9

28.1

9.4

11.0

1.3

0.1

0.6

0.0

20.6

100.

057

.01,

249

Hill

Bra

hman

42.7

32.9

7.9

6.4

0.6

0.0

0.3

0.0

9.2

100.

075

.640

6

Hill

Chh

etri

21.0

25.9

10.4

13.4

1.7

0.2

0.7

0.0

26.7

100.

046

.982

0

Mad

hesi

B/C

(67.

2)(1

9.1)

(3.3

)(5

.0)

(0.0

)(0

.0 )

(0.0

)(0

.0)

(5.4

)(1

00.0

)(8

6.4)

23

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s17

.722

.513

.814

.11.

90.

06.

10.

223

.510

0.0

40.2

486

All

Dal

its14

.825

.412

.513

.73.

70.

51.

00.

328

.110

0.0

40.2

594

Hill

Dal

its19

.522

.19.

412

.32.

90.

00.

00.

033

.810

0.0

41.6

355

Mad

hesi

Dal

its7.

930

.317

.115

.84.

91.

12.

50.

719

.710

0.0

38.2

239

New

ar46

.521

.97.

45.

41.

60.

00.

00.

017

.210

0.0

68.4

141

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)16

.117

.912

.915

.82.

10.

11.

20.

533

.510

0.0

33.9

1,33

1

Hill

Jana

jati

17.8

16.7

11.4

8.4

2.0

0.2

1.0

0.8

41.8

100.

034

.589

7

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i12

.520

.216

.031

.02.

20.

01.

80.

016

.210

0.0

32.7

434

Mus

lim

14.9

16.6

25.9

13.8

3.6

0.0

3.0

0.0

22.2

100.

031

.519

4

Oth

ers

(24.

8)(6

.2)

(22.

2)(2

4.4)

(1.6

)(0

.0 )

(1.6

)(0

.0)

(19.

2)(1

00.0

)(3

1.0)

71

Tota

l21

.222

.512

.513

.52.

10.

11.

60.

226

.210

0.0

43.7

4,06

6

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

24.4

23.1

10.0

10.0

1.8

0.1

0.6

0.3

29.6

100.

047

.62,

620

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

14.8

22.2

16.6

19.5

2.8

0.2

3.6

0.2

20.1

100.

037

.01,

376

1 SB

A in

clud

es d

octo

r, nu

rse

and

mid

-wife

.N

ote:

Fig

ures

in p

aren

thes

is a

re b

ased

on

25-4

9 un

wei

ghte

d ca

ses,

ther

efor

e th

e fig

ures

sho

uld

be u

sed

caut

ious

ly a

s th

ey a

re n

ot m

uch

robu

st.

MC

H =

Mat

erna

l and

Chi

ld H

ealth

; VH

W -

Villa

ge H

ealth

Wor

ker;

FCH

V - F

emal

e C

omm

unity

Hea

lth V

olun

teer

.So

urce

: ND

HS

2006

Sur

vey D

ata.

TAB

LE 2

2A

nten

atal

car

e by

cas

te/e

thni

city

and

regi

onal

iden

tity

Anne

x

33333


Pers

on p

rovi

ding

ass

ista

nce

duri

ng d

eliv

ery

Hea

lth

assi

stan

t/Tr

adit

iona

lP

erce

ntPe

rcen

tC

aste

/eth

nici

tyN

urse

/he

alth

birt

hR

elat

ive/

deliv

ered

deliv

ered

Blo

odN

umbe

ran

d re

gion

al i

dent

ityD

octo

rm

idw

ife

wor

ker

atte

ndan

tFC

HV

othe

rN

o on

eTo

tal

by S

BA

1by

c-s

ectio

ntr

ansf

usio

nof

bir

ths

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

14.8

10.8

4.2

7.5

2.8

51.9

8.0

100

25.6

4.6

0.9

1,65

2

Hill

Bra

hman

21.7

16.3

6.1

5.7

4.1

39.3

7.0

100

38.0

6.8

0.3

521

Hill

Chh

etri

10.2

8.2

3.4

8.0

2.2

59.2

8.8

100

18.4

2.9

1.1

1,09

9

Mad

hesi

B/C

(62.

9)(6

.7)

(2.7

)(1

7.3)

(0.0

)(1

0.3)

(0.0

)(1

00)

(69.

7)(2

7.9)

(3.2

)32

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s6.

19.

85.

333

.54.

439

.71.

110

015

.91.

60.

172

2

All

Dal

its5.

05.

52.

422

.12.

354

.28.

410

010

.51.

30.

284

8

Hill

Dal

its6.

27.

72.

310

.41.

159

.812

.610

013

.91.

30.

252

5

Mad

hesi

Dal

its3.

01.

92.

741

.24.

345

.21.

610

04.

91.

20.

132

3

New

ar31

.818

.13.

98.

21.

233

.73.

010

049

.95.

91.

818

2

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)8.

16.

24.

520

.71.

351

.77.

510

014

.31.

90.

41,

773

Hill

Jana

jati

9.4

6.4

3.8

5.7

0.9

63.6

10.2

100

15.7

2.4

0.5

1,21

6

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i5.

45.

76.

053

.52.

025

.61.

710

011

.20.

90.

255

7

Mus

lim

5.3

7.8

3.3

33.3

0.6

46.7

3.0

100

13.1

1.0

0.4

288

Oth

ers

34.4

1.8

1.3

13.7

0.0

46.2

2.5

100

36.2

1.4

0.0

80

Tota

l10

.48.

34.

118

.82.

249

.76.

510

018

.72.

70.

55,

545

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

12.1

9.2

3.8

7.3

1.8

56.6

9.3

100

21.3

3.2

0.7

3,54

2

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

6.2

6.9

4.7

40.3

3.0

37.1

1.6

100

13.1

1.7

0.2

1,92

11

SBA

incl

udes

doc

tor,

nurs

e an

d m

id-w

ife.

Not

e: F

igur

es in

par

enth

esis

are

bas

ed o

n 25

-49

unw

eigh

ted

case

s; n

ot ro

bust

bec

ause

of t

he fe

wer

num

ber o

f obs

erva

tions

.FC

HV

= Fe

mal

e an

d C

omm

unity

Hea

lth V

olun

teer

.So

urce

: ND

HS

2006

Sur

vey D

ata.

TAB

LE 2

3A

ssis

tanc

e du

ring

deliv

ery

by c

aste

/eth

nici

ty a

nd re

gion

al id

entit

y

Perc

ent

dist

ribut

ion

of li

ve b

irths

in t

he f

ive

year

s pr

eced

ing

the

surv

ey b

y pe

rson

pro

vidi

ng a

ssis

tanc

e du

ring

deliv

ery,

per

cent

age

of b

irths

ass

iste

d by

SBA

and

the

perc

enta

ge d

eliv

ered

by

caes

area

n-se

ctio

n, a

ccor

ding

to

cast

e/et

hnic

ity a

nd r

egio

n, N

epal

, 20

06

3

Annex


Hei

ght-

for-

age

Wei

ght-

for-

heig

htW

eigh

t-fo

r-ag

e

Stu

ntin

gW

asti

ngU

nder

wei

ght

Perc

enta

gePe

rcen

tage

Mea

nPe

rcen

tage

Perc

enta

geM

ean

Perc

enta

gePe

rcen

tage

Mea

nC

aste

/eth

nici

tybe

low

-3be

low

-2Z-

scor

ebe

low

-3be

low

-2Z-

scor

ebe

low

-3be

low

-2Z-

scor

eN

umbe

ran

d re

gion

al i

dent

itySD

1S

D(S

D)

SD1

SD

(SD

)S

D1

SD

(SD

)of

chi

ldre

n

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

18.1

47.1

-1.9

2.5

10.9

-0.8

7.8

34.7

-1.6

1,58

4

Hill

Bra

hman

15.2

41.1

-1.7

2.3

15.8

-0.9

7.4

35.6

-1.6

517

Hill

Chh

etri

19.9

50.7

-1.9

2.5

8.6

-0.7

8.1

34.5

-1.6

1,03

8

Mad

hesi

B/C

(6.8

)(2

2.3)

(-1.

3)(6

.4)

(8.6

)

(-0

.9)

(0.0

)(2

4.0)

(-1.

4)29

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s20

.252

.3-2

.03.

419

.8-1

.215

.048

.2-2

.067

6

All

Dal

its25

.156

.6-2

.23.

315

.4-1

.015

.148

.4-2

.078

7

Hill

Dal

its26

.257

.1-2

.23.

513

.2-0

.913

.545

.8-1

.949

6

Mad

hesi

Dal

its23

.355

.6-2

.13.

119

.2-1

.218

.052

.7-2

.129

1

New

ar9.

333

.1-1

.30.

02.

3-0

.32.

910

.2-1

.017

3

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)20

.148

.0-1

.92.

510

.6-0

.78.

835

.3-1

.61,

695

Hill

Jana

jati

25.3

53.3

-2.1

1.2

6.5

-0.5

8.1

33.0

-1.5

1,16

1

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i8.

636

.3-1

.55.

219

.6-1

.310

.340

.2-1

.753

4

Mus

lim

26.3

58.3

-2.2

2.8

17.3

-1.1

19.8

52.1

-2.0

257

Oth

ers

(17.

0)(3

2.2)

(-1.

7)(0

.0)

(6.3

)(-

0.7)

(11.

0)(2

6.1)

(-1.

5)86

Tota

l20

.249

.3-1

.92.

612

.6-0

.810

.638

.6-1

.75,

258

All

Hill

/ M

ount

ain

grou

ps21

.450

.2-2

.02.

19.

3-0

.78.

534

.6-1

.63,

385

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

17.9

48.4

-1.9

3.8

19.1

-1.2

14.5

46.7

-1.9

1,78

61 In

clud

es c

hild

ren

who

are

bel

ow -3

sta

ndar

d de

viat

ions

(SD

) fro

m th

e In

tern

atio

nal R

efer

ence

Pop

ulat

ion

med

ian.

Exc

lude

s ch

ildre

n w

hose

mot

hers

wer

e no

t int

ervi

ewed

. F

irst b

orn

twin

s (tr

iple

ts, e

tc.)

are

coun

ted

as fi

rst b

irths

bec

ause

they

do

not h

ave

a pr

evio

us b

irth

inte

rval

. In

clud

es c

hild

ren

who

se m

othe

rs a

re d

ecea

sed.

For

wom

en w

ho a

re n

ot in

terv

iew

ed, i

nfor

mat

ion

is ta

ken

from

the

Hou

seho

ld Q

uest

ionn

aire

. Exc

lude

s ch

ildre

n w

hose

mot

hers

are

not

liste

d in

the

Hou

seho

ld Q

uest

ionn

aire

.N

ote:

Fig

ures

in p

aren

thes

is a

re b

ased

on

25-4

9 un

wei

ghte

d ca

ses.

Tab

le is

bas

ed o

n ch

ildre

n w

ho s

taye

d in

the

hous

ehol

d th

e ni

ght b

efor

e th

e in

terv

iew.

Each

of t

he in

dice

s is

exp

ress

ed in

sta

ndar

d de

viat

ion

units

(SD

) fro

m th

e m

edia

n of

the

NC

HS/

CD

C/W

HO

Inte

rnat

iona

l Ref

eren

ce P

opul

atio

n.Ta

ble

is b

ased

on

child

ren

with

val

id d

ates

of b

irth

(mon

th a

nd y

ear)

and

valid

mea

sure

men

t of b

oth

heig

ht a

nd w

eigh

t.So

urce

: ND

HS

2006

Sur

vey D

ata.

TAB

LE 2

4N

utrit

iona

l sta

tus

of c

hild

ren

by c

aste

/eth

nici

ty a

nd re

gion

al id

entit

y

Perc

enta

ge o

f ch

ildre

n un

der

five

year

s cl

assi

fied

as m

alno

uris

hed

acco

rdin

g to

thr

ee a

nthr

opom

etric

indi

ces

ofnu

tritio

nal s

tatu

s: h

eigh

t-for

-age

, w

eigh

t-for

-hei

ght,

and

wei

ght-f

or-a

ge,

by c

aste

eth

nici

ty/re

gion

, N

epal

, 20

06

Anne

x

33333


Perc

enta

gew

ith a

Cas

te/e

thni

city

DPT

DPT

DPT

Pol

ioP

olio

Pol

ioH

epat

itis

Hep

atiti

sH

epat

itis

All

basi

cN

ova

ccin

atio

nN

umbe

ran

d re

gion

al i

dent

ityB

CG

12

31

23

12

3M

easl

esva

ccin

atio

ns1

vacc

inat

ions

card

see

nof

chi

ldre

n

All

Bra

hman

/Chh

etri

95.6

95.5

92.9

91.8

97.6

95.6

93.6

78.1

74.7

72.0

89.9

87.8

2.2

28.3

320

Hill

Bra

hman

97.8

97.8

97.8

96.8

98.8

98.2

97.8

87.5

84.6

81.2

92.9

92.0

1.2

31.1

104

Hill

Chh

etri

94.5

94.2

90.8

89.5

97.0

94.2

91.8

73.1

69.9

67.4

88.5

85.8

2.8

26.0

211

Mad

hesi

B/C

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

5

Mad

hesi

oth

er c

aste

s96

.496

.495

.290

.610

0.0

98.7

98.4

73.4

71.8

63.3

80.7

76.5

0.0

28.7

92

All

Dal

its84

.685

.082

.281

.395

.088

.081

.866

.959

.556

.671

.369

.64.

528

.713

7

Hill

Dal

its83

.584

.180

.179

.096

.786

.979

.368

.360

.155

.872

.870

.32.

630

.291

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

Dal

its(8

6.7)

(86.

7)(8

6.2)

(86.

0)(9

1.7)

(90.

1)(8

6.7)

(64.

0)(5

8.4)

(58.

2)(6

8.5)

(68.

3)(8

.3)

(25.

7)46

New

ar(9

8.8)

(98.

8)(9

7.7)

(96.

2 )

(100

.0)

(100

.0)

(98.

8)(8

5.6)

(84.

5)(8

0.0)

(96.

2)(9

6.2)

(0.0

)(5

5.4)

34

All

Jana

jati

(exc

ludi

ng N

ewar

)092

.890

.788

.787

.295

.793

.489

.378

.474

.172

.386

.884

.43.

435

.734

0

Hill

Jana

jati

90.4

88.2

85.6

84.0

94.4

91.3

86.4

72.3

66.2

64.8

83.3

80.3

4.3

32.6

241

Tara

i Jan

ajat

i98

.496

.896

.294

.998

.798

.496

.293

.493

.490

.595

.594

.21.

343

.299

Mus

lim

(96.

3)(9

6.3)

(92.

9 )

(86.

2 )

(96.

9 )

(92.

9 )

(92.

9)(6

7.4)

(64.

0)(6

4.0)

(77.

3)(7

6.8)

(3.1

)(2

3.2)

47

Oth

ers

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

14

Tota

l93

.492

.790

.488

.696

.994

.191

.176

.372

.369

.485

.082

.82.

731

.898

4

All

Hill

/Mou

ntai

n gr

oups

92.3

91.5

88.9

87.6

96.5

93.1

89.5

75.0

70.2

67.7

85.6

83.2

2.9

31.1

681

All

Tara

i/Mad

hesi

gro

ups

95.6

95.1

93.5

90.5

97.7

96.3

94.6

78.1

75.8

72.1

83.3

81.5

2.3

33.0

289

1 BC

G, m

easl

es a

nd th

ree

dose

s ea

ch o

f DPT

and

pol

io v

acci

ne.

Not

e: F

igur

es in

par

enth

esis

are

bas

ed o

n 25

-49

unw

eigh

ted

case

s.An

ast

eris

k in

dica

tes

that

a fi

gure

is b

ased

on

few

er th

an 2

5 un

wei

ghte

d ca

ses

and

has

been

sup

pres

sed.

Sour

ce: N

DH

S 20

06 S

urve

y Dat

a.

TA

BL

E 2

5Va

ccin

atio

ns b

y ca

ste/

ethn

icity

and

regi

onal

iden

tity

Perc

enta

ge o

f ch

ildre

n ag

e 12

-23

mon

ths

who

rec

eive

d sp

ecifi

c va

ccin

es a

t an

y tim

e be

fore

the

sur

vey

(acc

ordi

ng t

o a

vacc

inat

ion

card

or

the

mot

her’s

rep

ort),

and

per

cent

age

with

a v

acci

natio

n ca

rd,

by c

aste

/eth

nici

ty a

nd r

egio

n, N

epal

, 20

06

Nepal Human Development

ReportState Transformation and Human Development

Ne

pa

lHu

ma

nD

ev

elo

pm

en

tR

ep

ort

20

09

Sta

teTra

nsfo

rma

tion

an

dH

um

an

De

ve

lop

me

nt

Nepal

Nepal


State Transformation andHuman Development

The end of the Cold War worldwide generally moved the focus of armed conflict from clashes between states

to tensions within them. Preventing and averting civil war requires allowing all citizens to resolve their

differences through representation and participation in the various fora of state and society from the local

through to the national level. Redressing exclusion and inequality requires vastly different approaches to

varied sets of circumstances – political, cultural, social, economic, and those created by gender. This report

focuses especially on the structure of the state, emphasizing the importance of inclusion as a trigger for the

improvement in other dimensions as well.

As this Report argues, representation can become a catalyst for creating a society that offers greater equality

and justice to all in a number of spheres. And a significant change in political representation demands active,

equitable involvement of those now excluded from the processes of framing and implementing policy. This

calls first and foremost for opening state structures to participation by groups that have never before engaged

in governance. It means transforming the State and Nepali society as the vast majority of the country’s

inhabitants have known it through most of their lives. This report explores how reform of the electoral system,

enhancement of the democratic culture of political parties, and greater decentralisation can widen and

deepen the quality of representation and participation, and thus democracy.

Nepal has only recently emerged from a decade of civil war and is navigating a fragile peace. Protecting these

vital achievements requires managing popular expectations through rule of law, transitional justice,

improving access to services by the poor and excluded, fostering a sense of national community and creating

a new constitution. It also will entail managing a nation-building process alongside a state restructuring

project.

With the Comprehensive Peace Accord as a starting point, the Nepal National Human Development Report

2009 attempts to explore the relationships between inclusion, human development and the role of state

transformation as a means to these ends. It argues that if inclusion is to be sustained in future, it also

requires the fair political representation and integration of various cultural groups and regions in nation

building. The Report invites all Nepali stakeholders to engage in the debate on the structure of the state, the

modes of democracy they want, and the ways in which they can reconcile their differences harmoniously.

Without peace, human development is not possible, and without human development, peace is not

sustainable.

Nepal