Neg

1NC

1NC – Democratization CCP instability causes transition – structure and movements GFS 12 – A Service of the Economist’s Intelligence Unit (Global Forecasting Service, “Social and political disorder undermine stability in China” http://www.gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gr&articleid=846) RMT

In theory, the CCP structure is designed to allow the leadership to be guided by the masses, whose opinion is channelled up through the party structures . For this reason, the five-yearly party congresses are in principle the CCP's supreme agency , outranking even the PSC . In practice, the country imposes a Leninist top-down management style. So although the new leadership is theoretically meant to be chosen by the central committee, with input from lower party cells, in practice it is the current PSC members who tend to choose their successors, with input from powerful party elders and various CCP factions. Once the new party leadership is in place, the associated changes in the state government will take place around March 2013 at the annual session of the National People's Congress.

As a result, political uncertainty will continue well after the changeover . It is as yet impossible to say whether one faction will be able to use Mr Bo's fall to secure a dominant position, but it seems unlikely: the structure of China's political system suggests that the next leadership will again reflect the fine balance of power between conservatives and (relatively) liberal reformers within the CCP. As expected, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will take over as president and premier respectively in early 2013, following their elevation to the number one and three positions in the CCP at the party congress in late 2012. Nevertheless, the new government's anti-corruption drive could well prove destabilising, with, for example, the deputy party secretary of Sichuan province, Li Chuncheng, the highest-profile individual so far to be caught up in the campaign. He is unlikely to be the last, however,

In his departing speech in early November, Hi Jintao, the CCP's leader since 2002, warned that China's development is "unbalanced , unco-ordinated and unsustainable ". In reality, China's leaders have little choice but to reform if they are to sustain China's economic growth and boost the flagging legitimacy of the CCP. But there is a risk that internal party manoeuvres will produce a less than effective set of leaders.

Conclusion

Sh ould the Communist Party become distracted as the new set of leaders seek to establish themselves, opponents of the present order - ranging from aggrieved minorities (including Tibetans and Muslim Uyghurs), to on-line democracy campaigners - may take the opportunity to step up their activism. This may only be further encouraged by the leadership's unwillingness to permit any easing of its grip over the affairs of state: in his outgoing speech, Mr Hu was steadfast in his defence of the one-party system, and his probable successor has shown little predilection for political reform. Given that China has in effect been the engine of

global economic growth over the past few years, any signs of instability would damage global economic confidence, as well as having substantial potential knock-on effects on those countries that have directly benefited from China's economic boom (including, in particular, commodity exporters).

Democratization solves Chinese aggression – cmr, checks and balances, scrutiny and transparency Pei 11 - Minxin, Minxin Pei is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China, U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations, Shanghai International Studies University, Harvard University, University of Pittsburgh(MINXIN PEI, June 22, 2011 http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/22/peace-democracy-and-nightmares-in-china) RMT

One of the most important changes democratization would bring to China is a new civil-military relationship . This issue has not received adequate attention in discussions about how civilian control of the military influences a country’s external behavior. In the case of China, it is a critical factor. As we all know, at the moment, the Chinese military is un der the control of the ruling Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ). It is not a national army, which would be politically neutral and loyal to the Chinese state not to a particular political party. The mission statement of the People’s Liberation Army is revealing: its top priority is to defend the political monopoly of the CCP. Understandably, the CCP has made it abundantly clear that it will not allow the military to become a national army. If China became democratic , the Chinese armed forces would be much less subject to political manipulation and more loyal to national interests. This fundamental change alone would reduce the likelihood of conflict between China and its neighbors .

A democratic China would also have real political checks and balances . Opposition parties and civil society in a liberal democracy play an important part in constraining the freedom of action of the ruling party in national-security policy . At the moment, the CCP’s national-security policy is completely unchallenged. But that would change if China had well-organized opposition parties and strong nongovernmental organizations that could force the leadership to justify and seek public support for its agenda.

The military establishment itself would be placed under greater scrutiny in a competitive political system as well. Opposition parties and NGOs would raise questions about defense expenditures and force the military to be more transparent regarding its doctrine and capabilities.

Democratic institutions would also make the national-security- policy -making process more open and accessible to different interest groups. As a result, advocates for peace and cooperation would have the ability to rally public opinion and influence policy . Taken together, these institutional checks and balances would make the ruling party and the military more accountable.

No doubt, democratization in China would bring an enormous expansion of press freedoms and would fundamentally change the political dynamics of public discourse on national-security issues. At the moment, the lack of freedom of the press makes it very difficult for the Chinese public to gain a well-informed view of issues critical to the country’s national security. Take the Taiwan question, for example. The mainland’s official press coverage of Taiwan is so distorted that it is impossible for ordinary Chinese people to have a decent understanding of the history of the matter, its complexity and the risks of a military conflict. If China were a liberal democracy, press freedom would allow far more open and objective discussion of foreign-policy issues. Hawkish views would be countered by more moderate voices. Nationalist sentiments would be constrained by more cosmopolitan perspectives. And dangers of an aggressive foreign policy would be readily apparent.

Impact

2NC – Democracy Good Chinese democracy causes global democratic peace Gilley 05 -- Bruce Gilley (Ph.D. 2008, Princeton University) is an Associate Professor of Political Science. His research centers on democracy, legitimacy, climate change, and global politics, and he is a specialist on the comparative politics of China and Asia, (“China’s Democratic Future”, pg. 246-248, Accessed 7/7/16, HDA) If it has not already been brought into serious question by the continued spread of democracy to every corner of the world, Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a world dominated by a “clash of civilizations” rent between a liberal and progressive West and a conservative and benighted “other” should be given a final burial by China’s embrace of democracy. It will confirm that the real clash in our world remains a clash of just versus unjust political conceptions, between dictatorship and democracy or minimal democracy and full democracy, not between some imagined, essentialized, and monoistic “cultures.” The very terms “East” and “West” will finally be exposed as so bereft of any cultural or social meaning as to be virtually useless in our modern world except as geographic shorthand. Still, if democracy is merely the most efficient and fair mechanism for organizing a polity—any polity—then its meaning will continue to change as each finds new ways to improve that mechanism. While “history” as defined by the monumental struggle between the notion of the political equality of individuals and rival conceptions appears to have ended, it will go on being spun out in competing conceptions of democracy. Debates about issues like compulsory voting, fair electoral systems, money in politics, judicial review, and the like will be the dominant “historical” issues of our time. As an ongoing experiment in best-practice politics, democracy is sure to be influenced by its practice in China, which will come to the game with a rich tradition of indigenous innovation and, arguably, deeper cultural roots in the essential principles of democracy such as tolerance, compromise, and egalitarianism . How will democracy change as a result? There has been much recent discussion in the West of a “democratic malaise” where the associational and norms-oriented life of a democracy is breaking down. Many scholars see the democratic waves of the past as having ended and the old democracies in a state of slow regression. Some countries are thought to be stuck in minimal democracies of dispersed power but not true equality. To some, the value of political power is unequal, some freedoms more cared for than others, and economic justice unachieved. If modern-day social contractarians are right, a failure to achieve these things make a democracy’s claim to goodness very thin indeed. It is here that China’s democratization may play a vital role . Most Chinese scholars harbor the hope that China will “surpass” traditional forms of democracy as practiced in the rest of the world —especially the imagined “Western model”— and introduce to the world a new system that will be “even better.”2 This is the so-called “surpass sentiment” (chaoyue qingxu) mentioned earlier. Of course, there is not a little bit of cultural chauvinism at work here, the desire for China to retake its rightful place as the dispenser of civilization to the world’s benighted peoples, especially the stubbornly dynamic West. Even so, we should not rule out, nor rue, the possibility that China will pioneer a unique version of democracy. As one Western scholar notes: “It remains possible that some day the Asian, perhaps even the Chinese, vision of the best form of government will become the dominant vision.”3 If so, it would be a cause for celebration because everyone benefits when a more just system is available. Many Chinese scholars conjure up a new form of political order that is both strongly democratic and strongly social-oriented. One talks of the emergence of a “creative ambiguity,” in China which defies easy labels, in which a “mixed economy” with a state sector will exist alongside “mixed politics” with elements of both liberal democracy and social democracy.4 Others seem to echo classical republican political theorists of the West with dreams of “deliberative democracy” (shangyi minzhu)5 or “policy democracy” (zhengce minzhu) in which people’s considered views on issues actually translate into outcomes.6 Here, elections lose their pride of place as the hallmark of democracy, being replaced by other mechanisms for contesting state power and proposing interests and views of the good. One Chinese scholar anticipates a vast laboratory of democratic experimentation which, given the sheer size of the country, would create a whole new lexicon of democratic forms and theories: “There are actual opportunities for transcending historically known systems and they might be seized by a conscious people.”7 There is much here that meshes with recent thinking on democracy in the West, which stresses issues like social capital, popular deliberation, equality of political opportunity, and

more. In other words, the ongoing struggle to move from mere formal democracy to a substantive democracy of equal citizens will be helped by China. Its efforts at “real democracy” may inspire and push established democracies to “deepen” their own democratic experiences . One Indian author has said that “the future of Western political theory will be decided outside the West,” noting, rightly, that India would loom large in.

China is key to global democracy—size and modelDiamond 0 --- Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. At Stanford University, he is professor by courtesy of political science and sociology, 2000 (Forward of “China and Democracy,” edited by Suisheng Zhao, p. ix-x, Accessed on 07-11-2016, Accessed at https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gUzJAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=china+communist+party+regime+stability+democratization&ots=Bw1TEon4LZ&sig=gTqZFOry0q_XGgrkFJpvOhN2yRw#v=onepage&q=china%20communist%20party%20regime%20stability%20democratization&f=false, ES) **note: OCR used

For the long-term future of democracy there is no more important country than China. This is true simply by virtue of China's size. It is a nearly continental country, and its population is one-fifth of all humanity . It is the cultural, if no longer national, homeland of millions of Chinese immigrants to other countries. If its economic development continues without a catastrophic interruption, its commercial, scientific, intellectual, cultural, and (potentially less benign) military dynamism is bound to be felt increasingly throughout Asia and the rest of the world. Barring an economic and ecological implosion, China is the emerging superpower of the twenty-first century. If, on the other hand, there is an implosion, the conscquenccs will be destabilizing for all of Asia, and indeed the world.

One need not subscribe simplistically to the theory—some call it "doc- trine"—of a democratic peace to appreciate how the democratization of China could contribute to regional and international peace and security. A China gov- erned by open and transparent politics, constitutionalism, a rule of law, and the deliberative procedures of democracy would be a China more likely to resolve its conflict with Taiwan through peaceful accommodation. Indeed, the Republic of China on Taiwan has declared a democratic constitutional system on the mainland to be a precondition for unification. Practically, it is difficult to imagine a political formula for unification that would not heavily rely on a federal or confederal constitutional framework, and this could only be credible and meaningful politically within the larger context of democracy, buttressed by an independent judiciary.

Beyond the Taiwan problem, a China governed by the more comprehensive architecture of democracy —not just competitive, free, and fair elections at all levels of power, but a pluralistic civil society, a free press and intellectual life, institutions of horizontal accountability, and a rigorous, independent judicial system—would be a more responsible regional neighbor and global actor . It would be better able to control the corruption and organized crime that other- wise threaten to undermine the security and legal orders of many countries. By

controlling corruption, redressing social grievances, removing unpopular rulers, managing political conflict, negotiating new political bargains with regional and ethnic minorities, and compelling the state to respond to severe and grow- ing ecological problems, a genuinely democratic system would refurbish politi- cal legitimacy and thus enhance the long-run political stability of China. Even within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) there is growing recognition that China must evolve more open, responsive, accountable, and participatory polit- ical structures, or else risk rising political instability, even turmoil.

Democracy is key to the effectiveness of institutions – the UN, The IMF, and the WTO Kendall 16 - Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.. July 15th (“How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order”, Center for Strategic and International studies, available online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order, accessed 7/25/16, HDA)

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad . Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states . In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies . Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenge s . Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its

partnerships with other democratic nations . A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the curren t global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.

2NC – Democracy key to Chinese EconDemocracy would help Chinese economy in the long runGilley 05 -- Bruce Gilley (Ph.D. 2008, Princeton University) is an Associate Professor of Political Science. His research centers on democracy, legitimacy, climate change, and global politics, and he is a specialist on the comparative politics of China and Asia, (“China’s Democratic Future”, pg. 35, Accessed 7/7/16, HDA)

None of this is to diminish the modest achievements of the CCP since it began undoing the damage it wrought in the first 30 years of its rule. Since 1978, and as part of its bid to remain in power, the Party has affected a successful transition to a market economy and a more free society. It has opened China to the world and integrated it with the rest of the Asian region. The CCP-led government picks up the trash, catches robbers, issues passports, and manages a stable currency. The trains even run on time. It is better than the state of anarchy into which some nations have fallen. But is this the standard against which we should hold China? Given its cultural endowment, there is no reason why China is not the Germany or Japan of Asia. Instead, it is a relative backwater by every measure except that of brute size , hardly a mark of success. Democracy would not make China perfect, but it would make it far less imperfect than dictatorship does. There is virtually no issue—be it the enforcement of business contracts, the response to health crises, the making of policy through public input, or the conduct of an effective diplomacy—that would not be improved by a successful democratic transition in China. Many if not most of the problems of China—like casino stock markets, financial crisis, environmental degradation, AIDS crisis , high suicide rates, misgovernance, and international credibility problems —are to a large extent a direct result of CCP rule. CCP rule is the biggest generator of political instability in China. As mentioned, global experience shows that whatever a country’s problems and whatever its inherited legacies, democracy almost always makes things better than they were under dictatorship. To take Asia, democracy does not turn Thailand into Singapore but it prevents it from becoming Burma. Democracy does not turn Taiwan into Japan but it prevents it from becoming North Korea. The Philippines and India, two cases of large poor countries that are whipping-boys for antidemocratic advocates, would probably have broken up long ago into failed states were it not for democracy.

China must transition to democracy to maintain long term economic stabilityTwinning 12 - Daniel Twining is director and senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads a 15-member team working on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West through a program of convening and research spanning East, Southeast, and South Asia. He previously served as a member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff responsible for South Asia and regional issues in East Asia (2007-9); as the foreign policy advisor to U.S. Senator John McCain (2001-4); and as a staff member of the U.S. Trade Representative (1997). October 28th (“Democracy can make China a

great power”, Financial Times, available online at https://next.ft.com/content/b9b742d4-1f60-11e2-b273-00144feabdc0, accessed 7/12/16, HDA)

As China undergoes its once-a-decade political transition, Chinese and westerners alike wonder whether its new leaders will put the country on a path to openness and transparency. This is morally desirable. More to the point, political liberalisation is a strategic imperative if China is to sustain its rise toward world power status. The new leaders have their work cut out – from the bursting of China’s demographic bubble and the limits of state-led growth to the suspicion of well-armed neighbours. Yet these problems are intensified by – and inherent to – the nature of the country’s political regime. Its system of bureaucratic authoritarianism creates incentives for corruption and repression , as the Bo Xilai drama revealed. Western media investigations into the family fortunes of incoming president Xi Jinping and outgoing premier Wen Jiabao have suggested that members amassed extraordinary wealth in ways that correlate with the political success of their patriarchs. This is not a people’s republic. China’s state-directed economy has generated rapid growth for three decade s. But it has also produced imbalances. China has overinvested in real estate and heavy manufacturing; state-owned enterprises are often run by politicians rather than businessmen; banks dispense loans at non-market rates on the basis of non-market principles; currency manipulation and intellectual piracy generate retaliation by trading partners. Meanwhile, labour costs (and labour unrest) have increased. Government suppression of information has stymied indigenous technological breakthroughs. This has echoes of how political choices in the 15th century – privileging government mandarins over entrepreneurs – closed China off to early industrial development and imperial expansion, ceding a 500-year advantage to the west.

2NC – Expansionism Democracy solves Chinese aggression and preserves global stability Friedman and McCormick 0 - Edward Friedman graduated from Harvard in 1968 and is Currently a Professor at UM-Wisconsin, He received the Guggenheim Fellowship for Social Sciences in the US and Canada, Barrett L. McCormick, Barrett L. McCormick. Professor of Political Science, Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Major in International Affairs. Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1985 (“What If China Doesn't Democratize?: Implications for War and Peace” Jun 11, 2015, Google Books) RMT

To be sure, China's military might should not be exaggerated. But, ignoring the regional facts, places where China already is bullying neigh- bors is also a mistake. Illusions protect war-prone forces. Were China a democracy , there could be voices in a debate calling attention to millen- nia of Chinese wars of incorporation and expansion. A democratic debate in China might somewhat puncture virtually genetic notions of Japanese evil, Chinese purity, and an aggrieved China as the eternal victim. In a democracy, supporters of China-Japan reconciliation as more important than demands for endless Japanese apologies could ask, "Should Vietnam demand that China apologize and face history for the Ming [dynasty] invasion of Dai Viet in the fifteenth century, when Chi- nese commanders claimed 7 million killed and that the plains were turned red?" And should China apologize for any of the subsequent Chinese attacks on the Vietnamese state over the next four centuries. What should reparations be?" It might be possible in a Chinese democracy to get the viewpoints of china’s anxious neighbors into China’s policy debate . As in its 1999 view of war in Yugoslavia which brackets Kosovo victims of Serbian policy, Beijing sees no neighbors or minorities as victims of China.

China's expansionist chauvinism is not new ." Its invasion of Korea in 1950 was not a matter of simple defense; Mao very much wanted into that war." Also, the Chinese side provoked the 1969 conflict with Soviet Russia . In addition , China invaded Vietnam in 1979 and then kept harassing Vietnam while putting out stories that Vietnam was provok- ing China with border incidents. Beijing was also the backer of the genocidal Pol Pot ; Beijing was the major arms supplier of the murderous Khmer Rouge. It arms the murderous tyrants in Myanmar (Burma). It armed the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. Dictatorship precludes these huge facts from entering the political discourse in China.

2NC – Japan War Authoritarian Chinese Regime causes war with JapanFriedman 0 --- Edward Friedman, Poli Sci Professor Emeritus at University of Wisconsin, 2000 (“Preventing War Between China and Japan,” in the book “What If China Doesn’t Democratize?” edited by Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, publisher: M. E. Sharpe, not available online, p. 99, ES)

If China does not democratize, Beijing’s hostility to Tokyo could facilitate a war in the twenty-first century. In this section on “Sino-Japanese Relations” in his 1997 study of Asia’s Deadly Triangle, Kent Calder , a senior adviser to the U.S. State Department for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, foresees arms races, tensions, and flashpoints for war. The dynamics of these dangerous forces lie deep inside China’s authoritarian regime.

Democratization solves—historical examples proveFriedman 00 --- Edward Friedman, Poli Sci Professor Emeritus at University of Wisconsin, 2000 (“Preventing War Between China and Japan,” in the book “What If China Doesn’t Democratize?” edited by Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, publisher: M. E. Sharpe, not available online, p. 105, ES)

Consequently, peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century require a major change in Beijing-Tokyo relations, a move toward genuine consultation. This large change may be impossible unless China democratizes. Analogous transitions which illuminate what is at stake include initial efforts at democratization in Russia allowing, at least momentarily, an end to Cold War tensions, and, more clearly, post-World War II Germany-French reconciliation after Germany democratized. Prior to Germany’s democratization, from Napoleon’s invasion of Germany to Hitler’s invasion of France, France and Germany were regularly at war with each other. Mistrust, hate, and desires for vengeance suffused the relationship. Only the trust, transparency, and cooperation facilitated by democratization could, over time, reduce the hates and angers that provided the tinder that could be ignited into war by unfortunate incidents and domestically needed maneuvers. So I believe it is with China and Japan. Democratization , and getting past the passions of early democratization, are required for genuine China-Japan reconciliation. As French and Poles both decided to treat the post-Nazi German democracy as not responsible for Nazi crimes, so Chinese will have to change their view of democratic Japan if peace is to prevail.

2NC – Democratic backsliding badDemocratic backsliding collapses the international orderKendall 16 - Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.. July 15th (“How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order”, Center for Strategic and International studies, available online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order, accessed 7/25/16, HDA)

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising . The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are the ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline . Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system , but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order. In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.” Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.

Backsliding would create greater instability and would Kendall 16 - Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies in Washington, D.C.. July 15th (“How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order”, Center for Strategic and International studies, available online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order, accessed 7/25/16, HDA)

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics . Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned . Rising levels of instability , including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability . U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations. While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries. Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.

Yes Transition

2NC – Yes Transition: Empirics Empirics prove transition is possible Pei 13 - Margot Pritzker ’72 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.(Minxin Pei February 13, 2013 “5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/?allpages=yes) RMT

First, there is the logic of authoritarian decay. One-party regimes, however sophisticated, suffer from organizational ageing and decay. Leaders get progressively weaker (in terms of capabilities and ideological commitment); such regimes tend to attract careerists and opportunists who view their role in the regime from the perspective of an investor: they want to maximize their returns from their contribution to the regime’s maintenance and survival. The result is escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses. Empirically , the organizational decay of one-party regime can be measured by the limited longevity of such regimes. To date, the record longevity of a one-party regime is 74 years (held by the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union). One-party regimes in Mexico and Taiwan remained in power for 71 and 73 years respectively (although in the case of Taiwan, the accounting is complicated by the Kuomintang’s military defeat on the mainland). Moreover, all of the three longest-ruling one-party regimes began to experience system-threatening crisis roughly a decade before they exited political power . If the same historical experience should be repeated in China, where the Communist Party has ruled for 63 years, we may reasonably speculate that the probability of a regime transition is both real and high in the coming 10-15 years, when the CCP will reach the upper-limit of the longevity of one-party regimes.

Taiwan proves democratic transition is possibleDiamond 0 --- Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. At Stanford University, he is professor by courtesy of political science and sociology, 2000 (Forward of “China and Democracy,” edited by Suisheng Zhao, p. x-xi, Accessed on 07-11-2016, Accessed at https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gUzJAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=china+communist+party+regime+stability+democratization&ots=Bw1TEon4LZ&sig=gTqZFOry0q_XGgrkFJpvOhN2yRw#v=onepage&q=china%20communist%20party%20regime%20stability%20democratization&f=false, ES) **note: OCR used

If Chinese communist leaders decide to look around for a model of con- trolled , gradual, phased democratization led from above, they need look no fur- ther than to the island across the strait that they claim as a part of China: Taiwan . There, a decadent Kuomintang (KMT), which had suffered the trau- matic loss of political control over the mainland in 1949, began to defend and reconstruct its rule on the

foundation of more limited government (what Thomas Mctzger has called an "inhibited center"), with local electoral competi- tion taking place under the overall control of the single, ruling party. There, elections gradually became more competitive over time, as the ruling party slowly gained in self-confidence and political capacity, and as a diverse assort- ment of independent candidates gradually cohered into an opposition network, the dangwai, and then, in 1987, into an opposition party , the Democratic Party . Gradually, the Republic of China evolved from a failed state that had to flee the mainland, to an inhibited and increasingly pluralistic —albeit still auto- cratic and repressive—political center, eventually to what Mctzgcr calls a "sub- ordinated" political center, giving extensive freedom and autonomy to its citizens and allowing for many arenas of decision making.1 In somewhat differ- ent language, one could say that Taiwan gradually shifted (and South Korea more rapidly) to democracy from what Robert Scalapino calls an "authoritar- ian pluralist" system "wherein political life remains under the unchallenged control of a dominant-party or single-party regime; strict limits are placed on liberty ...; and military or national security organs keep a close eye on things," but there exists a civil society with some autonomy from the state and some capacity to express diverse interests, as well as a mixed or increasingly market- oriented economy.2

2NC – Yes Transition: Internet The internet makes democratization possible Liu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

Finally, the transformation of traditional media is contributing to democratization . In the 1990s, the weekly newspaper Southern Weekend was the symbol of liberal journalism. Today, it is only one of many such papers. Despite increasing censorship, more and more newspapers and magazines are exhibiting liberal inclinations including the Southern Metropolis, Window for the Southern Wind, Liao Wang, Cai Jing, New Century, and Xiaoxiang Morning. The most revolutionary changes, however, have come through the internet. The estimated number of netizens in China reached a phenomenal 485 million by June 2011.38 Of course, cultural change takes time, but more and more netizens are detaching themselves from the authoritarian regime . One indicator of such detachment is the growing political cynicism: ‘‘eight glories and eight shames,’’ the moral principles advocated by the Hu—Wen leadership, have inspired more jokes than respect. Words like ‘‘democrazy,’’ ‘‘freedamn,’’ ‘‘fewman rights,’’ or ‘‘harmoney’’ have been coined to ridicule political conditions. Although it is true that the Chinese government has succeeded in repressing free speech online through its multilayered censorship mechanisms, it has so far failed to control online activity in at least four areas.

First, the government cannot completely block the flow of information, because many people have learned how to ‘‘climb over the Great Fire Wall’’ with special software . An interesting story is that of Feng Zhenghu. Seen as a political troublemaker by the Shanghai government, Feng was forbidden to return to China from Japan. From November 2009 to February 2010, he lived in Narita International Airport in Japan, protesting his treatment. In the pre-internet era, his struggle would have caught little attention, but Feng used Twitter to update his daily activities. Although the Chinese Twitter community is a small one due to government restrictions, it was big enough to keep the story alive. Eventually, the Shanghai government was embarrassed into allowing Feng to return.

Second, there is much information available online in politically ‘‘gray’’ areas. In the past five years, the internet in China has become a political theater full of sensational dramas . The plight of Deng Yujiao, a Hubei girl who stabbed a local official to death when facing a rape threat in May 2009, generated enormous outrage when her story was published online, as did the 2009 ‘‘hide-and-seek’’ story in which a Yunnan police station attributed the mysterious death of a detainee to a hide-and-seek game, but many people found the story too ridiculous

to believe. In 2010, when a Jiangxi family burned themselves to protest the demolishment of their home, their relatives updated their sufferings online. Such stories are ‘‘gray’’ because local governments usually do not like them to be reported but have no discretion to control the information online. In addition, Chinese netizens have learned to invent ‘‘gray’’ language, or euphemisms, to deliver their messages about politically sensitive issues. For example, ‘‘eight square’’ signals a discussion of the June 4th movement, ‘‘being invited for a cup of tea’’ means being recently warned by the security police, and ‘‘being harmonized,’’ unsurprisingly, means being repressed. The top leaders sometimes get nicknames for the convenience of discussion. Such are the guerilla war skills to bypass online censorship.

Thirdly, the internet is becoming a tool for organizing political action. The Xiamen ‘‘walk’’ in 2006 and Guangzhou ‘‘walk’’ in 2009 for environmental causes were both partially organized through online communities . The Qian Yunhui case of 2010, in which the government and many netizens argued over the reason for a peasant’s death (the government said it resulted from a car accident while netizens attributed it to political retaliation since the peasant had been organizing fellow villagers for land rights), generated so much publicity that some netizens conducted independent investigations. It is true that such activists are still very few because of information control and political risk, but the phenomenon of coordinating action through the internet not only helps to maintain solidarity among activists but also provides a channel for political dissidents to connect with the grassroots, a dangerous coalition in the eyes of the CCP.

Fourth, the internet is fostering a general ‘‘social capital,’’ which may not have immediate political implications but can cultivate a democratic attitude i n the long run. Despite government control, many reading, traveling, discussion, charity, and sports groups, among others, are thriving online. If Harvard professor Robert Putnam’s thesis39 that pro-social networks are pro-democratic has an element of truth, the explosion of social interaction and associations online can help to facilitate China’s transition toward democracy

In summary, we contend that Chinese culture is not obstructing democratization to the extent that some suggest . Cultural traits themselves are mixed . Many conservative tendencies are superficial, and the political culture is in flux. Intellectual leadership is moving toward liberalism, the traditional media are opening up, and the internet is becoming a cultural arena which the state is too clumsy to effectively conquer.

2NC – Yes transition: protests Party stability/legitimacy key to stop protestors Scott 7 – Murray, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (“Communist Party Strategies For Containing Social Protest” http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Tanner_ks.pdf) RMT

The fundamental aim of the party’s internal security is to buy the party time and space to address these problems, while taking away from citizens t he option of large-sale organized political activism or opposition to the party. Under Hu Jintao, the Party’s security specialists have continued an important tren d begun under Jiang Zemin – trying to develop more sophisticated , lower violence politicng methods that would contain protest while avoiding any popular backlash that could spin out of control. Even more than under Jiang, Hu’s leadership emphasizes bottling-up petitioners and protestors in local areas and forcing local officials either to find ways of resolving fundamental problems or repressing unrest.

The twin elements of Beijing’s social stability strategy create a structure of incentives and risks from citizens. Through the economic and political half of this approach, the Hu government appears aimed at encouraging citizens to keep faith that the Central government really cares about their concerns, and persuade them that the CCP regime is still their best hope for the future. An important aspect of this involves the scape-goatting local officials. Citizens are encouraged to believe that the real blame for their problems lies not with the CCP’s authoritarian system itself, but with the small number of venal officials who won’t obey the law. The internal security strategy aims at getting disgruntled citizens to believe that they have no option but to accept and work with the current CCP system and that they would still be taking a very dangerous risk to seek such options. The strategy threatens those who try to organize dissent – even formally legal dissent – with serious repression. “Rank and file” protestors also certainly risk detention and punishment. But internal security officials are officially urged to try to avoid alienating majority of citizens by publicly recognizing the legitimacy off their complaints and avoiding the use of ham-handed, indiscriminate violence that risks turning small-scale non-violent protests into mass riots.

K2 democracy Sudworth 15 – John, British Broadcasting Company (“Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters return to streets” 1 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-31079840) RMT

Those who took to the streets in Hong Kong said they needed to stand up and be counted, if only to protect existing freedoms . That means exercising the freedom to march even if no-one in power is listening.

Some of the younger marchers put the low turnout down to fatigue, saying large numbers would pour back on to the streets when the moment was right . But one 60-year-old cautioned against youthful optimism, warning that Hong Kong

would have to wait for the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party before seeing genuine democracy.

That party has comfortably outlived many predictions of its demise. It is watching events in Hong Kong closely and will see a low turnout as vindication of its strategy to avoid force and overt direction of events while making no compromises on political reform.

At this point, Beijing will feel it has won the battle - if not yet the war - and is likely to carry on shaping Hong Kong's political destiny according to its own design.

China has promised the semi-autonomous territory direct elections in 2017, but ruled that candidates had to be vetted by Beijing.

Pro-democracy legislators - who hold about 40% of the seats in the Legislative Council - strongly oppose the move.

Protester Julia Choi told the AP news agency that pro-democracy candidates "would not even be nominated, so this is pseudo-universal suffrage, we do not have the rights to elect who we want".

Many demonstrators carried yellow umbrellas - the symbol of the political campaign . A large banner caricaturing Hong Kong's Chief Executive CY Leung read: "Reject fake democracy, we want real universal suffrage."

But speaking on local radio on Sunday, Lam Woon-kwong of the Executive Council, H ong Kong 's top policy-making body, warned protesters: "You can't threaten the central authorities."

2NC – Yes Transition: Globalization Yes Transition – Globalization Liu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

Most of the extant works on democratization in China tend to focus exclusively on internal factors, treating external factors as secondary or even marginal in shaping China’s political transitions. This view might seem self-evident given the strong ability of the Chinese government to resist external interference in China’s internal affairs. However, the role of international factors cannot be excluded altogether as ample evidence demonstrates that they do influence a nation’s prospects for democracy.

In the field of international relations, a number of scholars have identified various causal mechanisms to explain why and how non-democratic countries have embraced democratic norms and human rights values. External actors usually influence a country’s democratization process through pressure and persuasion . For example, one recent study examined the way in which the European Union played a significant role in the diffusion of democratic norms and institutions in Europe.55 In the case of China, three external forces may affect democratization: the contagion effect, the spread of liberal norms, and practical benefits.

The contagion effect is vividly demonstrated by the recent democratic uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Globally, democracy has become the dominant form of government, with 116 countries in 2009 qualifying as electoral democracies. Among all 194 countries, 89 are free and 58 are partly free, according to the Freedom of the World 2010 report.56 Regionally, many Asian states have completed democratization in recent decades, including Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea, while countries such as Thailand and Vietnam are also moving toward constitutional democracy. India has often been criticized for lacking economic efficiency as a result of its democratic system, but in recent years, India’s economy has been growing at a fast pace, thereby seriously weakening the argument that democracy will slow the rate of China’s economic growth. Among the remaining non-democratic regimes in Asia, Myanmar held the country’s first elections in two decades on November 7, 2010; a week later, Aung San Suu Kyi, the long-time promoter of democracy in Myanmar, was freed from house arrest. Other liberal moves since then by the government seem to suggest that Myanmar is finally moving, though slowly, toward a more democratic regime.57

Research shows that autocracies are more likely to become democracies when neighboring states make the transition to democracy.58 Although it is unlikely that China will follow the model of the abovementioned Asian nations, their example will increase China’s confidence in democratization, in part because they all share a traditional Asian or Chinese culture to varying degrees. Moreover, democratization has not halted economic growth in countries such as South Korea and Indonesia.

In addition, globalization facilitates the spread of liberal norms , either through structural factors (e.g., trade and investment, information technology) or the deliberate efforts of global actors (e.g., multinational corporations, nongovernmental and international organizations, individuals). Trade and investment promote democratization for various reasons. Trade liberalization, for example, tends to initially increase income inequality, which in turn facilitates democratization by intensifying social discontent.59 Elites also have incentives to pursue democratization. Authoritarian rulers interested in gaining access to international funds have a strong incentive to hold multiparty elections because donors generously reward dictators who hold elections.60 Although China is not in desperate need of international funds, it does face a more hostile global business environment if it maintains its authoritarian system, as the increasing criticism China has encountered for its role in Africa reveals. For the sake of doing business, many countries would like to see a more liberal and transparent decisionmaking process in China. Capital mobility also means that China’s wealthy can easily transfer mobile assets to foreign countries, thus reducing the need to worry about redistributive policies resulting from democratization.61

Scholars have found that a peaceful regional environment also contributes positively to democratic transitions.64 Although much has been said and written about how such an environment has contributed to China’s economic rise, little attention has been paid to how it can influence democratization in China. It can increase the level of economic, social, political, and cultural exchange between China and the outside world, which will facilitate the spread of democratic norms and values. Democratization in China’s immediate neighborhood will also mitigate fears of chaos and instability in China, because democratization will be less likely to be seen as a conspiracy engineered by hostile Western forces.

2NC – Yes Transition – AT: Party Structure Party structure makes transition more likely Liu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

It should be noted that China’s ruling elites and the CCP do not comprise a monolithic entity . Under certain circumstances , it is possible for the ruling elites to split into multiple factions or camps . Such divisions can contribute to democratization. Political scientists Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter have argued that the struggle between hard-liners and soft-liners has both a direct and an indirect influence on democratic transitions.50 According to this logic, authoritarian elites will form factions to compete for power and legitimacy when it is very hard to reach consensus on critical social and economic issues. Certain political liberalization measures will be taken, and the more liberal leaders will seek support from civil society to balance the more conservative leaders. Although democracy might not be the ultimate goal of either coalition, the process can be a slippery slope that eventually leads to an unintended outcome.

In the case of China, the power of factions was manifested in the politics of the 1980s: the Tiananmen movement of 1989 was in a way the showdown between conservatives and liberals within the Party, although the conservatives led by Deng Xiaoping eventually defeated the liberals led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang, who were advocating more political reforms. The results were tragic, but show how political factions served to spur political and social reform in China. The key question is: will the CCP split into opposing factions again? To answer this question, one must examine the interplay of the next generation of leaders.

China is no longer ruled by strongman politics. No Chinese leader enjoys the kind of authority and legitimacy once enjoyed by Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.51 The new leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, will face tremendous challenges to their authority for two reasons. First, over the last two decades, the trend has been to prevent individual leaders from accumulating too much power. This means that Xi and Li will have less authority than previous leaders have had. Second, the increasingly stagnant nature of the Party will weaken the authority of China’s new leaders even further.

Since the Hu—Wen administration took over in 2002, the main social and economic policies have taken a more or less ‘‘left’’ turn.52 The slogan ‘‘harmonious society’’ arguably represents a major shift from the ‘‘growth at all costs’’ theme of Jiang Zemin’s era. The point here is that each new administration must develop distinctive policies and slogans. The upcoming Xi—Li administration is no

exception. What kind of catchphrases can they create to build upon Hu’s ‘‘harmonious society’’? It is increasingly difficult for China’s top leadership to be innovative without addressing issues of political reform.

We already have clear evidence that other ambitious leaders are challenging the future authority of Xi and Li. Many of China’s new leaders have comparable CVs, without either undisputed authority or unchallengeable support. Pushing political reform might become a way for certain leaders to expand their support base. The party secretary of Chongqing city, Bo Xilai, as mentioned earlier, has revived elements of Maoism, and when he comes to Beijing after the 18th Party Congress next year, he might promote this model to all of China. As a response, other top leaders of the next generation will have to either come up with their own version of political innovations or fall behind Bo in terms of influence and reputation.

There are signs that other top leaders of the next generation are taking action as well. Wang Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong province, has also publicly made remarks about a different kind of campaign: ‘‘liberating thought’’ and other political reforms . Rumors have been circulating that he wants to ease censorship in Guangdong. Many observers believe that Bo and Wang are seriously competing for one of the slots in the next Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 18th Party Congress to be held in 2012. It is hard to say with confidence that this is the case, but one thing is clear: increasingly fierce competition for power and influence will take place among ambitious leaders in the coming years, and rivals might try different political experiments to achieve their goals.

Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of future power struggles, several general trends can be identified: there will be greater competition for power within the Party, mainly because no single individual leader has ultimate authority. The top leadership will thus become less stable, particularly as the competition for power becomes public. Such competition will inevitably push ambitious politicians to rely more on public opinion to gain political support, as evidenced by Bo’s recent efforts in Chongqing. That competition will likely open up space for new political experiments.

2NC – Yes Transition – Popular Sentiment CCP collapse leads to democracy, People are ready to take controlPing 7 – Xin Ping is a writer for the epoch times (“Chinese Pro-democracy Forces Ready for CCP's Collapse”, The Epoch Times, available online at http://en.epochtimes.com/news/7-10-23/61127.html, accessed 7/11/16, HDA)

Recently I found that Chinese pro-democracy activists and many other forces are making active preparations for running the government after the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) collapses . I used to be acquainted with many pro-democracy activists in the past and was considered one of them. But I gradually lost touch with them. Our acquaintance resumed only recently when I ran into some of them, with whom I had a long talk. I was impressed with their changes. What shocked me most is that they have no more fear of the CCP. Instead they are confident and have no doubt in the eventual victory over the CCP. As they said, since they have seen every trick of the CCP, nothing can scare them away now. I told them about Falun Dafa practitioners’ peaceful and rational experiences in opposing persecution, which inspired them a lot. Indeed, Falun Dafa practitioners have set a great example for all Chinese people and have encouraged the world to stand up against persecution and tyranny. My pro-democracy friends told me that the CCP’s secret police , who used to be ferocious, are now treating them with courtesy, as if dealing with future political leaders. This is not as weird as it seems, my friends say, because the secret police, who have kept the top secrets of the country, know better than anyone else that the CCP will collapse soon. Trying to leave a way out for themselves, the secret police take care not to offend those who may become future leaders of China. The pro- democracy activists share the belief that the CCP is on the brink of its demise . This belief is in part built on the information they acquired from high-level Party officials. Some high officials are quite open-minded, and have a clear understanding of the evil nature of the CCP and its demise, so they have long been sympathizers and supporters of democratic movements. Other officials also have sensed the imminent collapse of the CCP, so they have wasted no time in connecting with democrats through various channels so as to leave a chance for their own future. The activists are concerned with the harm that the CCP has done, and continues to do, to China. As one of the activists said, if the CCP doesn’t die out within 10 years, the Chinese nation will perish. Another activist described the Chinese economy as an empty shell, pointing out that with a 50 percent non-performing assets rate of the national banks, a serious stock market bubble that has raised stock prices far past their value, and an astronomical deficit, China is now running mainly on foreign investments and will collapse immediately if such investments are no longer available. They also mentioned that according to a high-ranking army officer, if China goes to war with Taiwan in the next ten years, China will not be able to survive for a single week due to oil shortages. Therefore, the activists fear that the CCP will drag China into the abyss along with it. I was also impressed by their active preparations for the coming new China free of the CCP. What a friend said may be typical of their attitude: “The CCP has millions of troops, but so what? They have no chance to win.” According to the democrats, various forces in China are planning how to maintain social stability and keep the country running smoothly after the CCP’s disintegration. The activists told me that they have supporters everywhere in China, including senior Party officials. They are in the process of establishing a new party. The political bureau of the CCP knows their plan, and has been trying to deal with it. However the CCP doesn’t have enough power to stop this. Several years ago, the activists would have been in big trouble for doing this, but now, ironically, many Party officials are eager to please them. Things are really changing fast. Various forces within the CCP are also formulating what to do after the Party is gone. Some are looking for ways to escape the fate of a scapegoat, some have given up hope and are just counting the days, and the really smart ones are reaching out to the “foes of the Party” to seek a peaceful transi- tion into a society

without the CCP. Such people come from within the Party, the army, the police, and the common people. They share a sense of urgency and are eager to take action. The activists are sensi- ble. When I told them of the impor- tance of quitting the CCP and its related organizations, almost all of them agreed to announce their withdrawal from the CCP. After talking to these friends, I felt that the most pitiable peo- ple are the Chinese who still don’t know what’s going on. They don’t know the CCP has little time left, nor have they realized they have been cheated by the CCP for so long, and they have not found a way to the truth. Hope or perish? That’s the choice every Chinese has to make.

2NC – Yes Transition – Authoritarian Aging The CCP will collapse in the next 10 years, authoritarian aging and rising incomeDemocracy Digest 13 – The Digest is edited by Michael Allen, Special Assistant for Government Relations and Public Affairs at the National Endowment for Democracy. February 13th (“5 ways China could democratize”, available online at http://www.demdigest.org/5-ways-china-could-democratize/, accessed 7/11/16, HDA)

The conventional wisdom about China’s possible political futures is that the entrenched Chinese Communist Party (CCP), so determined to defend and perpetuate its political monopoly, has the means to survive for an extended period, says a leading China expert. “A minority view, however, holds that the CCP’s days are numbered [and that] a transition to democracy in China in the next 10 to 15 years is a high probability event,” writes Minxin Pei. Two principal causes of authoritarian decline emerge from decades of research and the accumulated experience of democratic transitions in roughly 80 countries over the past 40 years: First, there is the logic of authoritarian decay. One-party regimes , however sophisticated, suffer from organizational ageing and decay. Leaders get progressively weaker (in terms of capabilities and ideological commitment)….. The result is escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses. Empirically, the organizational decay of one-party regime can be measured by the limited longevity of such regimes.

2NC – Yes Transition – AT: Inevitable Gradual transition fails—doesn’t result in direct democracyWang 14 --- Tiancheng Wang, CEO of the National Committee of the Democratic Party of China, law lecturer at Peking University, spent five years in prison because of dissident activities, January 2014 (“China at the Tipping Point? Goodbye to Gradualism,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 24(1), p. 52-53, Accessed Online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/495752/pdf, Accessed on 07-14-2016, ES)

Two proposals that have received wide notice within China help to illustrate the gradualism of which Chinese intellectuals are so enamored. Back in the late 1990s, prominent law professor Ji Weidong came up with what he called the “rule of law first” approach. “It is unlikely that a multiparty contest will occur in the near future,” he wrote, “and [anyway] it will cause an extremely huge [amount of] chaos if direct election of members of the National People’s Congress is granted.”6 Instead he recommended a focus on building respect for the rule of law by 1) encouraging the institutionalization of judicial independence, and 2) persuading the CCP to start abiding by the constitution. But what chance is there, absent democratization, that those in power will respect the constitution and guarantee the independence of the judiciary? As if oblivious to this problem, Ji added that he not only found a democratic transition an unlikely prospect for the near term, but would advocate postponing one in any case for fear that it would not go well.

A second influential proposal calls for making the internal procedures of the CCP itself more democratic. This idea, too, is based on the assumption that multiparty competition will not happen anytime soon and would be overly risky if it did. The most commonly recommended device for cultivating democratic methods within the CCP is to ensure that the number of candidates for various posts exceeds the number of those posts. One suggestion is to expand the number of those “running” for seats on the CCP Central Committee by 5 or 10 percent every five years.7 Some scholars regard intra-CCP democracy as the best path to popular democracy.8 Yet they do not explain how intra-Party democracy is possible without the existence of popular democracy. Why would a party running a single-party, nondemocratic system want to adopt free, regular, and open competition for its key offices as part of its way of doing business?

In short, the gradualism favored by Chinese academics puts the cart before the horse . Deliberately failing to voice crucial demands —for direct national elections to be held after ending the ban on independent parties, for instance—will not serve the cause of kick-starting political reform. On the contrary, it will more likely allow the ruling CCP elite to avoid making meaningful changes as it carries on instead with its decades-old effort to postpone indefinitely China’s transition away from authoritarianism. Keeping quiet will only take pressure off the CCP and bolster the legitimacy of its single-party dictatorship. How, one wonders, can significant reforms occur if no one demands them?

Moreover, is slow and piecemeal reform really the least risky approach? The intention is clearly to keep the ruling elite feeling reassured that it can safely start

a reform process. But what is the inducement for this elite to accept any of the risk that might come from making the political system more open? The elite’s inclination—and surely it is not totally unreasonable—is to worry that any meaningful opening, even a minor one, may produce an avalanche effect that could leave the CCP stripped of its ability to control events.

Quick transition is key—prevents regionalism and breakupWang 14 --- Tiancheng Wang, CEO of the National Committee of the Democratic Party of China, law lecturer at Peking University, spent five years in prison because of dissident activities, January 2014 (“China at the Tipping Point? Goodbye to Gradualism,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 24(1), p. 53-54, Accessed Online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/495752/pdf, Accessed on 07-14-2016, ES)

To me, the case for a quick transition seems much stronger. It can be argued that once a political opening begins, the longer the span of time that elapses between liberalization and democratization—I call it the “L-D span”—the more risks and variables will come into play. This is especially so for a large country such as China, which has what Linz and Stepan call a “stateness problem.”9

Most of the world’s successful democratic transitions during recent decades have featured short L-D spans. Taiwan had a long transition to democracy (it lasted from 1986 to 1996), but almost all street protests took place after the key event, which was the ruling Nationalist Party’s surprising decision to tolerate the creation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in 1986. In a classic case of nonviolent resistance, Chile saw peaceful mass protests against the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–90) that stretched from 1980 all the way to 1989. Such protests are fine, but we should also bear in mind what is likely to happen over the course of a long transition. Based on his study of the transitions in Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, and Spain, Giuseppe Di Palma thinks that quick elections can curb chaos .10 And Yossi Shain and Juan Linz note in discussing Brazil that “the gubernatorial elections which gave to the opposition control of eleven governorships in the most populated states did not lead to the collapse of the regime.”11 If elections in China go forward first at the provincial level, however, I predict a less happy result: The country will disintegrate much as did the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia two decades ago .

There is a great danger, in other words, lurking in the bottom-to-top sequencing of elections that Chinese gradualists favor. They want to start with township voting, then see elections held in the counties and cities, then the provinces, and only then at the national level. But given China’s “stateness” issues—typified most starkly by the restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang that Louisa Greve discusses in her contribution to this symposium—such an order of elections will confound the transition and could even lead to secession attempts by the northwestern and southwestern “peripheries.” Linz and Stepan’s observations regarding the effects of different election sequences in Spain, the USSR, and Yugoslavia are instructive.12

In view of these concerns, my suggestion is that the founding election be a national one. Let China as a whole vote freely first, and only then hold open contests at the provincial level (which is the true “problem” level; purely local races might be held without as much danger to national unity). Holding the founding election at the level of the provinces would invite a focus on emotional “stay or go” issues, and could undercut the national government’s legitimacy and authority as well as wreck prospects for arriving at a “federalist” accommodation of the “ethnic” (non-Han) peripheries. Holding the first democratic election as a single event across all of China would, by contrast, offer a better chance to make citizens in every province feel that they have a stake in the country’s future, foster the rise of nationwide parties, and enhance the legitimacy and authority of the new democratically constituted central government.

2NC – Yes Transition – AT: “Wont be a Democracy” Transition results in a democracyGilley 05 -- Bruce Gilley (Ph.D. 2008, Princeton University) is an Associate Professor of Political Science. His research centers on democracy, legitimacy, climate change, and global politics, and he is a specialist on the comparative politics of China and Asia, (“China’s Democratic Future”, pg. 137, Accessed 7/7/16, HDA)

In every transition from authoritarian rule, there is always a “democratic moment ” when the people inherit the burden of rule from the regime. The crowds of Lisbon who adorned the rifles of rebellious young officers with carnations in 1974 followed this with feverish spontaneous “assemblies” to make grand plans for the future. It is this sense of victory, the sense of having taken history into their own hands, that is really the democratic moment . In China, while the CCP may remain in charge of the state, responsibility for the future will now lie with the common man. Despite the elite-led nature of the pact and the strong elements of continuity, this will be a revolution indeed. The sudden end of CCP’s unchallenged monopoly on political power , coupled with the broader breakdown of state identity and ideology that will result, will fit any “commonsense” definition of revolution , even if there is no guillotine or Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. That was the retrospective lesson of the “silk revolutions,” in some Eastern European nations, and it will likely be the case in China as well.40 This may be symbolized by a formal political act that ushers in the demise of the PRC. Constitutional changes require the approval of two-thirds of the NPC, so any new regime that wanted to remove the CCP’s monopoly on power and embrace new rights would have to make this an early priority. Again, assuming the state crisis is serious and the democratic response enjoys general support, the NPC, although stuffed with CCP loyalists, could be expected to support the change. The actual sequence of events—from coup to carnations to assemblies— will be a mixture of necessity and choice. Clearly, the ideal sequence would involve a relatively short period from crisis and mobilization through to breakthrough and pact. Reality may not be as simple. Hard-liners may hold up agreement as they bargain for concessions. Reformers may hesitate if protests escalate. Eventually though, the deed is done. The PRC comes to an end, in fact if not in name.

Transition to democracy will last and be stableGilley 05 -- Bruce Gilley (Ph.D. 2008, Princeton University) is an Associate Professor of Political Science. His research centers on democracy, legitimacy, climate change, and global politics, and he is a specialist on the comparative politics of China and Asia, (“China’s Democratic Future”, pg. 151-2, Accessed 7/7/16, HDA)

History suggests that rapid and trouble-free democratic consolidations are the exceptions. In China itself, democracy failed in the Republican era, providing the conditions for a return to dictatorship. History is also littered with famous democratic failures. It took nearly a century for the French Revolution to lead to the foundation of a genuine democracy despite the democratic ideals of the revolution. Failures also grew out of Weimar Germany, Russia’s democratic revolution of February 1917, Japan in the 1920s, South Korea in 1961, Budapest and Prague in the early communist era, and many postcolonial transitions in Africa and Latin America. If we narrow our focus to the post-1970s democratizations, however, there are grounds for optimism. Most of the Third Wave transitions gave way to successful democracies, a reflection both of the stronger supporting conditions as well as the greater normative appeal of democracy by then. Of the 28 new democratic states created ou t of the collapse of Eastern European and Central Asian communist regimes in 1989–91 , for example, 25 were considered either consolidated or moving in that direction a decade later.1 Most of the modernday democratic failures have been in Africa, where a nonexistent civil society, economic distress, and ethnic conflict have savaged the foundations of political order. On that basis, there is reason to believe that China too will break the cycle of failure and achieve a stable democracy. It will begin its democratic age with a strong dose of normative support for democracy alongside the usual pragmatic supports related to the crisis of dictatorship. The belief within society that democracy will eventually bring about a “superior” point in terms of stable governance, a fair and just society, prosperous economy, and a settled international role will ensure that the difficulties of consolidation will not overwhelm the system.

Confucianism creates the cultural conditions to push for democracy Khoo 2014 - Serene Khoo is a Major in Republic of Singapore Air Force and has a B.S. from the National University of Singapore, March (“CHINA’S DEMOCRATIZATION PROSPECTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS”, Naval PostGraduate School, available online at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/41402/14Mar_Khoo_Serene.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 7/15/16, HDA)

Confucianism in particular has often been cited as an impediment to democracy. However, Fukuyama contends that Confucianism stresses the importance of education, which is the basic foundation of building a democracy . High literacy enables people to break out of the poverty

trap. With a higher standard of living, people will also look to other non-material aspects to enhance quality of life including self-actualization needs such as political participation. High levels of education also allow the population to be engaged in building democratic institutions . He further

argues that though Confucianism emphasizes respect for authority, commitment to family relationships supersedes political authority . Moreover,

Chinese society is inherently distrustful of authority and individual’s interests’ takes precedence. Therefore, it is rationalized that in such Confucian societies, it will be difficult to rally the people against a common cause.

Democracy is a process and is possible in chinaKhoo 2014 - Serene Khoo is a Major in Republic of Singapore Air Force and has a B.S. from the National University of Singapore, March (“CHINA’S DEMOCRATIZATION PROSPECTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS”, Naval PostGraduate School, available online at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/41402/14Mar_Khoo_Serene.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 7/15/16, HDA)

China has transformed tremendously since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms and his policy of “opening up” to the world in 1978. However, many scholars observe that the pace of political reforms continued to lag behind economic reforms. Nonetheless, even though China continues to operate as an authoritarian state, significant polit ical reforms have been instituted since 1978 . However, these political liberalizations have not led to democratization. Instead, China managed to achieve rapid economic growth without embracing democracy, akin to the many developmental states in Asia such as Taiwan and South Korea before their transition to a liberal democracy. It is not exactly true that China reject the idea of democracy. Many Chinese scholars have brought up democracy in their written works and widely discussed the merits of democracy such as Yu Keping’s “democracy is a good thing.” 103 Similarly, Chinese political elites have highlighted democracy in their speeches, interviews and white papers. However, democracy is a concept that is defined differently in different contexts. The notion of democracy in China could differ from person to person, just as the Chinese concept of democracy differs from the West. Therefore, it is important to set the record straight when examining the prospects of China democratizing. The benchmark used is critical to assess the gap between the current situation and Beijing’s likelihood of becoming a democratic state. Moreover, democracy is a process that requires continuous enhancements and conscientious consolidation to build upon the democratic practices and institutions.

AT: Transition War

2NC – AT: Transition War Chinese collapse inevitable and causes them to turn inward Friedman ’13 -- George Friedman, founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation STRATFOR, Geopolitical Weekly, July 23rd ( “Recognizing the End of the Chinese Economic Miracle”, Stratfor , available online at https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/recognizing-end-chinese-economic-miracle, accessed 7/7/16, HDA)Major shifts underway in the Chinese economy that Stratfor has forecast and discussed for years have now drawn the attention of the mainstream media. Many have asked when China would find itself in an economic crisis, to which we have answered that China has been there for awhile -- something not widely recognized outside China, and particularly not in the United States. A crisis can exist before it is recognized. The admission that a crisis exists is a critical moment, because this is when most others start to change their behavior in reaction to the crisis. The question we had been asking was when the Chinese economic crisis would finally become an accepted fact , thus changing the global dynamic. Last week, the crisis was announced with a flourish. First, The New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-recipient Paul Krugman penned a piece titled "Hitting China's Wall." He wrote, "The signs are now unmistakable : China is in big trouble. We're not talking about some minor setback along the way, but something more fundamental . The country's whole way of doing business , the economic system that has driven three decades of incredible growth, has reached its limits. You could say that the Chinese model is about to hit its Great Wall , and the only question now is just how bad the crash will be." Later in the week, Ben Levisohn authored a column in Barron's called "Smoke Signals from China." He wrote, "In the classic disaster flick 'The Towering Inferno' partygoers ignored a fire in a storage room because they assumed it has been contained. Are investors making the same mistake with China?" He goes on to answer his question, saying, "Unlike three months ago, when investors were placing big bets that China's policymakers would pump cash into the economy to spur growth, the markets seem to have accepted the fact that sluggish growth for the world's second largest economy is its new normal." Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs -- where in November 2001 Jim O'Neil coined the term BRICs and forecast that China might surpass the United States economically by 2028 -- cut its forecast of Chinese growth to 7.4 percent. The New York Times, Barron's and Goldman Sachs are all both a seismograph of the conventional wisdom and the creators of the conventional wisdom . Therefore, when all three announce within a few weeks that China's economic condition ranges from disappointing to verging on a crash , it transforms the way people think of China. Now the conversation is moving from forecasts of how quickly China will overtake the United States to considerations of what the consequences of a Chinese crash would be. Doubting China Suddenly finding Stratfor amid the conventional wisdom regarding China does feel odd, I must admit. Having first noted the underlying contradictions in China's economic growth years ago, when most viewed China as the miracle Japan wasn't, and having been scorned for not understanding the shift in global power underway, it is gratifying to now have a lot of company. Over the past couple of years, the ranks of the China doubters had grown. But the past few months have seen a sea change. We have gone from China the omnipotent, the belief that there was nothing the Chinese couldn't work out, to the realization that China no longer works. It has not been working for some time. One of the things masking China's weakening has been Chinese statistics , which Krugman referred to as "even more fictional than most." China is a vast country in territory

and population. Gathering information on how it is doing would be a daunting task, even were China inclined to do so. Instead, China understands that in the West, there is an assumption that government statistics bear at least a limited relationship to truth. Beijing accordingly uses its numbers to shape perceptions inside and outside China of how it is doing. The Chinese release their annual gross domestic product numbers in the third week of January (and only revise them the following year). They can't possibly know how they did that fast, and they don't. But they do know what they want the world to believe about their growth, and the world has believed them -- hence, the fantastic tales of economic growth. China in fact has had an extraordinary period of growth. The last 30 years have been remarkable, marred only by the fact that the Chinese started at such a low point due to the policies of the Maoist period. Growth at first was relatively easy; it was hard for China to do worse. But make no mistake: China surged. Still, basing economic performance on consumption, Krugman notes that China is barely larger economically than Japan. Given the compounding effects of China's guesses at GDP, we would guess it remains behind Japan, but how can you tell? We can say without a doubt that China's economy has grown dramatically in the past 30 years but that it is no longer growing nearly as quickly as it once did. China's growth surge was built on a very unglamorous fact: Chinese wages were far below Western wages, and therefore the Chinese were able to produce a certain class of products at lower cost than possible in the West. The Chinese built businesses around this, and Western companies built factories in China to take advantage of the differential. Since Chinese workers were unable to purchase many of the products they produced given their wages, China built its growth on exports. For this to continue, China had to maintain its wage differential indefinitely. But China had another essential policy: Beijing was terrified of unemployment and the social consequences that flow from it. This was a rational fear, but one that contradicted China's main strength, its wage advantage. Because the Chinese feared unemployment, Chinese policy, manifested in bank lending policies, stressed preventing unemployment by keeping businesses going even when they were inefficient. China also used bank lending to build massive infrastructure and commercial and residential property. Over time, this policy created huge inefficiencies in the Chinese economy. Without recessions, inefficiencies develop. Growing the economy is possible, but not growing profitability. Eventually, the economy will be dragged down by its inefficiency. Inflation vs. Unemployment As businesses become inefficient, production costs rise. And that leads to inflation. As money is lent to keep inefficient businesses going, inflation increases even more markedly. The increase in inefficiency is compounded by the growth of the money supply prompted by aggressive lending to keep the economy going. As this persisted over many years, the inefficiencies built into the Chinese economy have become staggering. The second thing to bear in mind is the overwhelming poverty of China, where 900 million people have an annual per capita income around the same level as Guatemala, Georgia, Indonesia or Mongolia ($3,000-$3,500 a year), while around 500 million of those have an annual per capita income around the same level as India, Nicaragua, Ghana, Uzbekistan or Nigeria ($1,500-$1,700). China's overall per capita GDP is around the same level as the Dominican Republic, Serbia, Thailand or Jamaica. Stimulating an economy where more than a billion people live in deep poverty is impossible. Economic stimulus makes sense when products can be sold to the public. But the vast majority of Chinese cannot afford the products produced in China, and therefore, stimulus will not increase consumption of those products. As important, stimulating demand so that inefficient factories can sell products is not only inflationary, it is suicidal. The task is to increase consumption, not to subsidize inefficiency. The Chinese are thus in a trap. If they continue aggressive lending to failing businesses, they get inflation. That increases costs and makes the Chinese less competitive in exports, which are also falling due to the recession in Europe and weakness in the United States. Allowing businesses to fail brings unemployment, a massive social and political problem. The Chinese have zigzagged from cracking down on lending by regulating informal lending and raising interbank rates to loosening restrictions on lending by removing the floor on the benchmark lending rate and by increasing lending to small- and medium-sized businesses. Both policies are problematic. The Chinese have maintained a strategy of depending on exports without taking into account the operation of the business cycle in the West, which means that periodic and substantial contractions of demand will occur. China's industrial plant is geared to Western demand. When Western demand contracted, the result was the mess you see now. The Chinese economy could perhaps be growing at 7.4 percent, but I doubt the number is anywhere near that. Some estimates place growth at closer to 5 percent. Regardless of growth, the ability to maintain profit margins is rarely considered. Producing and selling at or even below cost will boost GDP numbers but undermines the financial system. This happened to Japan in the early 1990s. And it is happening in China now. The Chinese can prevent the kind of crash that struck East Asia in 1997. Their currency isn't convertible, so there can't be a run on it. They continue to have a command economy; they are still communist, after all. But they cannot avoid the consequences of their economic reality, and the longer they put off the day of reckoning, the harder it will become to recover from it. They have already postponed the reckoning far longer than they should have. They would postpone it

further if they could by continuing to support failing businesses with loans. They can do that for a very long time -- provided they are prepared to emulate the Soviet model's demise .

The Chinese don't want that, but what they do want is a miraculous resolution to their problem. There are no solutions that don't involve agony, so they put off the day of reckoning and slowly decline. China's Transformation The Chinese are not going to completely collapse economically any more than the Japanese or South Koreans did. What will happen is that China will behave differently than before. With no choices that don't frighten them, the Chinese will focus on containing the social and political fallout , both by trying to target benefits to politically sensitive groups and by using their excellent security apparatus to suppress and deter unrest. The Chinese economic performance will degrade, but crisis will be avoided and political interests protected . Since much of China never benefited from the boom, there is a massive force that has felt marginalized and victimized by coastal elites. That is not a bad foundation for the Communist Party to rely on. The key is understanding that if China cannot solve its problems without unacceptable political consequences, it will try to stretch out the decline. Japan had a lost decade only in the minds of Western investors, who implicitly value aggregate GDP growth over other measures of success such as per capita GDP growth or full employment. China could very well face an extended period of intense inwardness and low economic performance. The past 30 years is a tough act to follow. The obvious economic impact on the rest of the world will fall on the producers of industrial commodities such as iron ore. The extravagant expectations for Chinese growth will not be met, and therefore expectations for commodity prices won't be met. Since the Chinese economic failure has been underway for quite awhile, the degradation in prices has already happened. Australia in particular has been badly hit by the Chinese situation, just as it was by the Japanese situation a generation ago. The Chinese are, of course, keeping a great deal of money in U.S. government instruments and other markets. Contrary to fears , that money will not be withdrawn . The Chinese problem isn't a lack of capital, and repatriating that money would simply increase inflation. Had the Chinese been able to put that money to good use, it would have never been invested in the United States in the first place. The outflow of money from China was a symptom of the disease: Lacking the structure to invest in China, the government and private funds went overseas. In so doing, Beijing sought to limit destabilization in China, while private Chinese funds looked for a haven against the storm that was already blowing. Rather than the feared repatriation of funds, the U nited S tates will continue to be the target of major Chinese cash inflows . In a world where Europe is still reeling, only the United States is both secure and large enough to contain Chinese appetites for safety. Just as Japanese investment in the 1990s represented capital flight rather than a healthy investment appetite, so the behavior we have seen from Chinese investors in recent years is capital flight: money searching for secure havens regardless of return. This money has underpinned American markets; it is not going away, and in fact more is on the way. The major shift in the international order will be the decline of China's role in the region. China's ability to project military power in Asia has been substantially overestimated . Its geography limits its ability to project power in Eurasia, an

endeavor that would require logistics far beyond China's capacity. Its naval capacity is still limited compared with the United States. The idea that it will compensate for internal economic problems by genuine (as opposed to rhetorical) military action is therefore

unlikely . China has a genuine internal security problem that will suck the military , which remains a domestic security force, into actions of little value . In our view, the most important shift will be the re-emergence of Japan as the dominant economic and political power in East Asia in a slow process neither will really want. China will continue to be a major power, and it will continue to matter a great deal economically. Being troubled is not the same as ceasing to exist. China will always exist. It will, however, no longer be the low-wage, high-growth center of the world. Like Japan before it, it will play a different role. In the global system, there are always low-wage, high-growth countries because the advanced industrial powers' consumers want to absorb goods at low wages. Becoming a supplier of those goods is a major opportunity for, and disruptor to, those countries. No one country can replace China, but China will be replaced . The next step in this process is identifying China's successors.

Peaceful Chinese democratization is possibleLiu and Chen 12 --- Yu Liu, associate professor of political science at Qinghua University and author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics, and Dingding Chen, assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, 2012 (“Why China Will Democratize,” Washington Quarterly, Vol 35(1), p. 51-56, Accessed Online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918, Accessed on 07-12-2016, ES)

Any discussion of China’s future democratization must involve how China’s ruling elites understand and implement democracy, and what incentives would push them to accept or adopt democratic institutions. Although structural and cultural factors shape political trends, the leadership often plays a crucial role in deciding the timing of democratization, as demonstrated by ‘‘the Gorbachev factor’’ in the democratization of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or the role of Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan. If Konstantin Chernenko had lived 20 more years, or if Deng Xiaoping had lived 10 fewer, the process and outcome of democratization in those countries might have been very different.

Three questions need to be addressed: First, do Chinese leaders embrace democracy in their discourse? Second, to what degree do they implement democratic practices or reforms with democratic characteristics? Third, how do faction politics affect the prospects of democratization, particularly how will the upcoming 18th Party Congress influence political reforms in the decades ahead? We also want to emphasize that political elites do not live in a political vacuum. The rise of an increasingly independent civil society will change both elites’ incentives and values in China.

Democracy Discourse

Despite China’s stellar record of growth over the last 30 years, Chinese citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with the ‘‘growth first’’ model and are demanding more social justice and equality.40 The CCP realizes this and its discourse on democracy has changed subtly in recent years. Premier Wen Jiabao is perhaps the leader who has raised the most hope about China’s political reform in recent times. In 2006, for example, he told a delegation from the Brookings Institute in the

United States, ‘‘We have to move to democracy. . .we know the direction in which we are going.’’ Wen mentioned three aspects of democracy: elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on checks and balances.41 Although he did not offer specifics about how to implement democracy, his remarks do represent a gradual shift from the old discourse of socialist democracy. Since July 2010, Wen has promoted democracy on more than seven occasions , including a special interview with CNN on many sensitive issues related to China’s political reforms.42 Most recently, in a meeting with entrepreneurs at the September 2011 World Economic Forum in Dalian, Wen again emphasized the importance of the rule of law, social equality, judicial independence, people’s democratic rights, and anti-corruption initiatives.43

Although different interpretations can be made of Wen’s recent remarks, there are other voices both within and outside the CCP also calling for faster and deeper political reform. The most notable Party theorist is Yu Keping, the deputy director of the Central Committee’s Compilation and Translation Bureau, who has put forward a theory of ‘‘incremental democracy ,’’ which emphasizes the orderly expansion of citizen participation in politics. His article, ‘‘Democracy is a good thing,’’ published in 2006, created a huge debate within the Party about the merits of democracy.44

Despite such positive trends, one might wonder if all the talk about democracy has any real impact on political development in China. We say it does , for several reasons. First, ev en if the democratic discourse is just speechifying, it can provide a weapon for civil society to mobilize and hold the Party accountable. It is interesting that, when protesting the persecution of three netizens attacked because of their speech online, demonstrators held a banner quoting Premier Wen, ‘‘Justice Is More Brilliant than the Sun,’’ in front of a local court in Fujian. Second, there is good reason to believe that some Party members are genuinely interested in promoting democracy in China . This is because they understand that the Party’s legitimacy cannot stem from economic performance alone but must be based upon multiple sources, including political legitimacy.45 Moreover, they probably understand that the Party will be able to hold on to power or protect its interests if it initiates the political reform and shapes the constitutional design rather than if it is driven out of power by others in a time of crisis. Of course, it is unrealistic to place hopes for democratization on mentions of democracy by Chinese political leaders, even if some are genuinely interested in promoting political reforms, as there is certainly strong opposition against democracy within the Party. Hence, even the much promoted proposal for intra-party democracy should be viewed with caution.

What’s equally important, if not more important, than the rhetorical incorporation of democracy into the Party’s discourse is, ironically, the CCP’s inability to come up with a coherent theoretical alternative to liberal democracy . President Hu Jintao’s attempt seems to be the concept of ‘‘Scientific Development,’’ 46 but the concept means so much that it actually means very little. The installment of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square in January 2011 raised suspicions that the CCP wanted to revive Confucianism as its official discourse, but the quiet and

mysterious removal of it in April 2011 suggests that the Party knows that it would be too much of a stretch to go from Communism to Confucianism. The general secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, has attracted attention with his campaign of ‘‘Singing the Red and Cracking down on the Black’’ (singing the revolutionary songs and eliminating crimes), but the blend of this semi-Maoist campaign and the market economy does not amount to any coherent ideology. The current ideological disarray might force some political elites to gradually turn to liberal democracy at some point .

Actual Reforms?

There is no convincing evidence that the Party is now engaging in meaningful reforms, although in some areas positive improvements have been made. One of the key themes of the ongoing discourse is that mechanisms must be developed to ensure intra-party democracy, with a system for the election, supervision, evaluation, and promotion of officials.

For example, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress in September 2009 stressed the reform of the party electoral system. ‘‘Public recommendation, direct election’’ is being quietly promoted in several areas. Interestingly in 2009, for the first time in the history of the CCP, some district offices in Nanjing elected the secretary and deputy secretary of the Party Committee. In June 2010, Nanjing became the first city to complete the city-wide ‘‘public recommendation, direct election’’ of grassroots party officials.47 Similar experiments have been conducted in other cities including Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chengdu .

How are these elections conducted? First, candidates recommend themselves to ordinary party members; second, candidates give presentations before the final vote; and third, candidates answer questions put forward by other party members. Some party theorists believe that such a trend toward the direct election of party officials is an irreversible process , as more cities and regions are adopting this system. Although there is no sign that the CCP’s top officials will be subjected to direct election anytime soon, it does show that the Party is gradually moving toward that ultimate goal.

In many other areas , however, political reform not only has not progressed, it has in fact backslid. Journalists complain that censorship has intensified rather than loosened in recent years. Many human rights activists and dissidents are frequently harassed, if not arrested.48 As for the independents running for seats in local congresses in 2011, the Party has used all sorts of measures to prevent them from being elected.49 However, we argue that the increasing paranoia of the Party and its frequent resort to ‘‘naked power’’ is a sign of desperation rather than confidence. It shows that the state has less and less capacity to persuade and co-opt. The intensification of censorship and repression can alienate the society further , which will in turn add more pressure on the state to reform.

Factional Politics: Democracy’s Friend

It should be noted that China’s ruling elites and the CCP do not comprise a monolithic entity. Under certain circumstances, it is possible for the ruling elites to split into multiple factions or camps. Such divisions can contribute to democratization . Political scientists Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter have argued that the struggle between hard-liners and soft-liners has both a direct and an indirect influence on democratic transitions.50 According to this logic, authoritarian elites will form factions to compete for power and legitimacy when it is very hard to reach consensus on critical social and economic issues. Certain political liberalization measures will be taken, and the more liberal leaders will seek support from civil society to balance the more conservative leaders. Although democracy might not be the ultimate goal of either coalition, the process can be a slippery slope that eventually leads to an unintended outcome .

In the case of China, the power of factions was manifested in the politics of the 1980s: the Tiananmen movement of 1989 was in a way the showdown between conservatives and liberals within the Party , although the conservatives led by Deng Xiaoping eventually defeated the liberals led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang, who were advocating more political reforms. The results were tragic, but show how political factions served to spur political and social reform in China. The key question is: will the CCP split into opposing factions again? To answer this question, one must examine the interplay of the next generation of leaders.

China is no longer ruled by strongman politics. No Chinese leader enjoys the kind of authority and legitimacy once enjoyed by Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.51 The new leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, will face tremendous challenges to their authority for two reasons. First, over the last two decades, the trend has been to prevent individual leaders from accumulating too much power . This means that Xi and Li will have less authority than previous leaders have had. Second, the increasingly stagnant nature of the Party will weaken the authority of China’s new leaders even further .

Since the Hu—Wen administration took over in 2002, the main social and economic policies have taken a more or less ‘‘left’’ turn.52 The slogan ‘‘harmonious society’’ arguably represents a major shift from the ‘‘ growth at all costs’’ theme of Jiang Zemin’s era. The point here is that each new administration must develop distinctive policies and slogans. The upcoming Xi—Li administration is no exception. What kind of catchphrases can they create to build upon Hu’s ‘‘harmonious society’’? It is increasingly difficult for China’s top leadership to be innovative without addressing issues of political reform.

We already have clear evidence that other ambitious leaders are challenging the future authority of Xi and Li. Many of China’s new leaders have comparable CVs, without either undisputed authority or unchallengeable support. Pushing political reform might become a way for certain leaders to expand their support base . The party secretary of Chongqing city, Bo Xilai, as mentioned earlier, has revived elements of Maoism, and when he comes to Beijing after the 18th Party Congress next year, he might promote this model to all of China. As a response, other top

leaders of the next generation will have to either come up with their own version of political innovations or fall behind Bo in terms of influence and reputation.

There are signs that other top leaders of the next generation are taking action as well. Wang Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong province, has also publicly made remarks about a different kind of campaign: ‘‘liberating thought’ ’ and other political reforms. Rumors have been circulating that he wants to ease censorship in Guangdong. Many observers believe that Bo and Wang are seriously competing for one of the slots in the next Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 18th Party Congress to be held in 2012. It is hard to say with confidence that this is the case, but one thing is clear: increasingly fierce competition for power and influence will take place among ambitious leaders in the coming years, and rivals might try different political experiments to achieve their goals .

Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of future power struggles, several general trends can be identified: t here will be greater competition for power within the Party, mainly because no single individual leader has ultimate authority. The top leadership will thus become less stable, particularly as the competition for power becomes public . Such competition will inevitably push ambitious politicians to rely more on public opinion to gain political support , as evidenced by Bo’s recent efforts in Chongqing. That competition will likely open up space for new political experiments.

Last but not least, we want to emphasize that the pressure coming from the emerging civil society, which we discussed in the first two sections, will have its impact on elites. The CCP does not live in a vacuum . The rise of a contentious society will increase the cost of repression for China’s authoritarian rulers, and when the cost of repression is too high , as MIT Professor Daron Acemoglu has argued, democratic reform probably becomes a rational choice for the elites to avoid a revolution.53

Also, the change of values in society might ‘‘trickle up.’’ University of Michigan Professor Ronald Inglehart argues that elites tend to be better educated, and education is positively correlated with liberal political views, which means elites are also affected by liberal views.54 Their interests might point them in a conservative direction, but cognitive dissonance between self-interests and values can reach a breaking point. Right now, the social pressure in China is probably not big enough to change the incentives of political elites, and the cultural shift of Chinese society has yet to reach a tipping point. But as argued earlier, there are reasons to believe the momentum of change is building, and even if they do not want to be, the elites might be forced into reform.

In sum, although there are few signs that the CCP is actively seeking political reform right now, political elites can be forced to take a role in China’s democratization. The inability to ideologically innovate leaves liberal democracy as a more and more prominent option . The likely factional struggle among the next generation of leaders might make adopting liberal reform a strategy for some contenders who are competing for power. Even as the political elites are slow to

change their minds, the rise of civil society will put more and more pressure on the state, forcing the regime to face people’s demands for rights of participation.

AT: Link Turns

2NC – AT: Growth Turn Economic decline leads to CCP democratization Ranasinghe 15 - Dhara Ranasinghe is an Associate Producer with CNBC.com, covering a range of topics including the global economy, financial markets and corporate news. Before joining CNBC, Dhara was a correspondent and sub editor with Reuters news agency in London and Singapore. She has reported on European Treasury markets, Asian economies and currency markets and edited company news stories. Dhara holds a Bachelor's degree in History from the London School of Economics. July 9th (“ Stocks rout could end with democracy in China”, CNBC, available online at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/09/stocks-rout-could-end-with-democracy-in-china.html, accessed 7/11/16, HDA)

A rout in Chinese stocks that Beijing is desperately trying to stem has deep political ramifications for the country's Communist part y, analysts say. Tumbling stocks add one more thing to the list of grievances among China's growing middle class that threatens to undermine the ruling Communist party, Charles Robertson, global chief economist at Renaissance Capital, said on CNBC's "Squawk Box Europe." The benchmark Shanghai Composite stock index has tumbled almost 30 percent in the past month, triggering a slew of measures to prop up a market where the vast majority of investors are from China's middle classes. "All non-oil exporting countries become democracies as they get richer and China is at that stage where I think it could be a democracy on a 5-10 year view," Robertson said. "The Chinese people are unhappy with corruption, unhappy with pollution – all the sorts of issues that led Taiwan to become a democracy in the 1980s and early 90s. I think the Chinese authorities don't want another reason , even for a few million Chinese, to be disgruntled with the Communist party and out on the streets, " he said, referring to the selloff. The Chinese Securities regulator on Thursday banned shareholders from selling large stakes in listed firms, boosting the Shanghai Composite almost 6 percent and stemming the correction for now. China , which has been ruled by the Communist party for more than 60 years, is at a crucial period of change , with the government trying to put the economy on a more secure long-term footing by shifting its main drivers to consumption from investment and exports. Renaissance Capital's Robertson added: "Growth is a factor in that democratisation process. If you see negative GDP it makes a political change from autocracy to democracy more likely." Analysts said that either way, the political implications from the slide in Chinese stocks and Beijing's reaction should not be underestimated. "While there are signs this morning that the rout may be abating, the reputational damage incurred by the turmoil throws into question both the authorities' commitment to liberalizing the financial sector and, more importantly, their ability to manage China's economic downturn," Nicholas Spiro, managing director at Spiro Sovereign Strategy, told CNBC. "The big risk is that the selloff, if not quickly stemmed, could undermine the entire reform process in China if the Communist party feels it's too much of a political risk." China's economy grew 7 percent in the first quarter of the year – its slowest pace since 2009. The extreme volatility of the stock market threatens that goal as well as raising the risk of a protracted slowdown in the world's second-largest economy, analysts said. "The reason I think there is a paranoia on stocks in Beijing is that anything that threatens below-6-percent growth threatens everything," Patrick Coveney, CEO of food firm Greencore, told CNBC. As a result, China had reacted "with massive force" and repeatedly intervened in the stock market.

Poverty/Inequality causes transitionLiu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary

American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

The level of inequality in China also affects its prospects for democratization. The nation’s Gini coefficientthe standard measure of inequality, where 0 means everyone has exactly the same amount of wealth and 1 means one person has all the wealthreached 0.48 in 2010, one of the highest in the world.15 Even that value, according to Chinese scholar Wang Xiaolu, is a great underestimation, because ‘‘gray income’’unreported income often associated with corruptionis not included in the official data.16

In the early stage of China’s reform, increasing levels of inequality did not cause the CCP much trouble politically for two reasons. The first is the nature of China’s inequality. Due to various factors, the main source of inequality in China has traditionally been the urban—rural income gap; the intra-urban and intra-rural income gaps are not as great. In 2002, when the overall Gini coefficient reached 0.47, within both the city and the countryside the coefficient was still 0.37.17 Therefore, the wealth gap has not been as visible in China as it is in many other developing countries, where slums are located alongside gated communities. Such conditions have political consequences, because more visible inequality understandably fuels political discontent.In the early stage of China’s reform, increasing levels of inequality did not cause the CCP much trouble politically for two reasons. The first is the nature of China’s inequality. Due to various factors, the main source of inequality in China has traditionally been the urban—rural income gap; the intra-urban and intra-rural income gaps are not as great. In 2002, when the overall Gini coefficient reached 0.47, within both the city and the countryside the coefficient was still 0.37.17 Therefore, the wealth gap has not been as visible in China as it is in many other developing countries, where slums are located alongside gated communities. Such conditions have political consequences, because more visible inequality understandably fuels political discontent.

However, inequality has now become a major political issue. Abstract inequality is becoming more ‘‘real,’’ with increasing numbers of people from rural areas moving into cities where luxury shopping malls, apartment buildings, and restaurants are springing up, reminding the urban poor of what is beyond their reach. In a survey conducted in March 2010 by the Statistics Bureau of Shan’xi, 11,510 randomly selected Shan’xi residents were asked to express their ‘‘greatest wish’’ for the New Year.18 ‘‘Narrowing the income gap’’ ranked first, with 38.59 percent of votes. Trailing behind at a distant second and third were, respectively, ‘‘stabilizing housing prices’’ (10.27 percent) and ‘‘creating employment opportunities’’ (10.19 percent).

Growth helps the party Chin 16 - John J. Chin, Ph.D. Candidate Politics Department Princeton University (“The Longest March: Why China’s Democratization Is Not Imminent” January 15,

2016https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jchin/files/john_j_chin_the_longest_march_2016.01.15.pdf) RMT

(3) China’s economic growth bolsters performance legitimacy. Previous research has shown that democratic transitions are often preceded by acute economic crises that delegitimize the regime and generate discontent (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Although China’s growth will inevitably slow down, a “soft landing” is still possible. Many respected economists remain confident in China’s long-term growth potential (e.g. Fogel 2010; Subramanian 2011). Though short marchers often point to problems of over-investment and “ghost cities” (e.g. Cheng 2013), Chinese rural migrants unstoppable desire to move to cities mean an imminent property bubble may be premature also (Miller 2012b, Ch. 5). With the Renminbi recently becoming a global reserve currency at the IMF and with the People’s Bank of China sitting on trillions in reserves, it seems highly unlikely that China will be soon crippled by a Latin American-style debt crisis . On the whole, gloom on the economic front is not shared in the most recent forecasts of China’s economy by the OECD, World Bank, and IMF, which forecast a gradual decline in economic growth to over 6% growth by 2017. 22 To the extent China is poised for long-run economic growth (albeit at a lower level than in the past), this should bolster the CCP regime’s survival. But, to model the effects of economic crisis on democratization, I include a measure of the change in GDP per capita between five years and two years before the current year.

Aff

Democracy Impact Stuff

2AC – AT: Global DemocracyChina doesn’t create authoritarianism abroadNathan 15 --- Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Democracy, 2015 (“China’s Challenge,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26(1), Accessed on 07-11-2016, Accessed at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/565646, ES)

Chinese propaganda does not, however, cross the boundary of suggesting that democratic countries should adopt authoritarian institutions. That argument would contradict the themes of respect for sovereignty and cultural pluralism that dominate Chinese diplomacy. Indeed, Chinese propaganda does not explicitly characterize China’s system as undemocratic, instead describing it as “socialist democracy,” “Chinese-style democracy,” and “people’s democratic dictatorship,” among other locutions. Nor is the idea of “Asian values,” floated by officials in Singapore and Malaysia and endorsed by Chinese officials, meant to imply that there is any single political model suitable for all of Asia, but only that liberal democracy is not suited to all Asians. It is rare to find an argument, even by proregime independent intellectuals, that portrays the Chinese experience as a universal model that should be adopted everywhere. Yet despite these self-imposed limits, Beijing’s polemics, transmitted over its growing international media network, contribute to the weakening of democracy’s international prestige. And since everyone knows that the Chinese system is authoritarian (even if Chinese propaganda does not label it as such), the polemics enhance the prestige of nondemocratic rule.

2AC Democracy Bad Chinese democracy causes global war Keck 14 - managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues. (“Chinese Democracy: A ‘Nightmare’ Scenario for US” Zachary Keck October 22, 2014 http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinese-democracy-a-nightmare-scenario-for-us/) RMT

A democratic China would be a nightmare for the West , according to a leading former Southeast Asian former diplomat.

One of the paradoxes for the West is that it is better off with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power in China, Kishore Mahbubani, the Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore and that country’s former UN ambassador, told a D.C. audience on Tuesday.

Noting that the general consensus in the United States has long been that a liberal democratic China would be a more responsible global power, Mahbubani warned Americans to be careful what they wish for.

“ There is a strong nationalist sentiment in China” that derives from the view that China suffered a century of humiliation at the hands of Western and other foreign powers, Mahbubani pointed out. This sentiment is not relegated to the fringe of society; in fact, this conviction is often strongest among highly educated Chinese elites , especially those who have studied abroad in places like the United States and Europe.

The CCP currently keeps this nationalist sentiment in check, Mahbubani said. These forces would be unleashed, however, if China became a liberal democracy , which would be a “nightmare” for the Western world.

“I have no doubt that doubt China as a liberal democracy would be a much more nationalist, much more dangerous country” because “200 years of pent up anger ” would explode, Mahbubani predicted.

By contrast, the CCP is more interested in domestic issues, which are the key to its survival, Mahbubani argued. He also said that CCP leaders believe that time is on China’s side and thus see little reason to aggressively challenge the established global order. The paradox, then, according to Mahbubani, is that China is most likely to play the role of a responsible stakeholder in the global order if it remains under the control of the Chinese Communist Party.

“ If you are interested in global peace and security you may want to see the Chinese Communist Party remain in power,” Mahbubani told the largely American audience.

Indeed, Mahbubani added that “China has no interest in disrupting the global order” and on most global issues it is likely to continue deferring to the leadership of other countries for the foreseeable future. He did concede that this is not necessarily the case for important regional issues like North Korea and the South China Sea, where China is already more actively asserting itself.

Democracy doesn’t solve Chinese aggression or hypocrisy and hurts US leadershipHornat 12 - researcher in the Department of American Studies in Charles University in Prague. (Jan Hornat November 23, 2012, “Chinese Democracy Is No Goal” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinese-democracy-no-goal-7761) RMT

But unfortunately, democracy is not a panacea . In fact, a democratic China may not be much different from today’s China.

Democracies are not always exemplary international actors—take for example the United States . It failed to ratify international agreements such as the Statute of the International Criminal Court or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In fact, Washington has also manipulated with the value of the dollar, though in a more opaque manner than China: the 1985 Plaza Accord was arguably intended to limit growing Japanese imports to the United States. Furthermore, as an assertive actor in world affairs, the United States often circumvents international organizations such as the United Nations when in pursuit of national interests.

Before accepting a democratic China into the international system, it would behoove Washington to soften its superpower mindset toward Beijing. A democratically governed China would likely still have great power ambitions and Beijing could legitimately claim the role of the “second superpower” in the next decade.

Democratization would upgrade China’s political power and credibility in the international community. The United States and the European Union would forego the leverage of confronting China about its policies, as China’s laws would be the result of a popularly elected government.

New problems, which could destabilize democracy , might appear. For example, would Tibet and Xinjiang attempt to breakaway ? How would privatization of state firms and redistribution of land proceed? What would North Korea do in the midst of losing its only ally? If Chinese democracy could not meet growth rates of authoritarian China, how would the Chinese public react?

Like Western-style democracies, a democratic China may repudiate its non- interventionist doctrine and be more assertive in pursuit of its interests. Ho w would the United States react to a Chinese “coalition of the willing”? Democratic or not, China would still depend on a growing amount of natural resources and territorial disputes in the South China Sea would continue to disrupt regional security .

A democratic Chinese government would face significant obstacles, some unforeseen, that have toppled regimes or caused civil wars in the past. Indeed, China’s Communist Party claims that political liberalization would lead to “chaos.” At the same time, the party feels compelled to imitate democracy, creating a liberal façade to justify its rule. Whether real or imagined, Chinese democracy may not bring the effects everyone hopes for.

Link Turns

2AC – Growth Causes Democracy Growth causes CCP democracy Thomas 16 - Chase, Western Kentucky University ("The Prospect of Democracy: China’s Possibility of Political Reform" (2016). Honors College Capstone Experience/ Thesis Projects. Paper 596. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/stu_hon_theses/596) RMT

A third and final scenario could be that as China’s economy grows, so do e’s education levels due to increasing wages. As wages increase, the more likely parents can afford educations for their children and as urbanization is also rapidly increasing due to industrialization and a turn from the sleepy agrarian society, children are more likely to have access to education. Lipset’s argument that education and wealth correlate with democratic states , as well as with Nathan and Shi’s findings that the more educated a citizen is the more likely they are politically active. This could mean a democratic transition in China if more of the population becomes educated and wealthy , creating a large middle class and pressure domestically on the Chinese government to cater to economic and personal rights of Chinese citizens that could mean democratic style reforms. As more Chinese become wealthy, the more influence they have on the economic and political landscape of China. China, given these possible factors could democratize due to the economic growth in wealth of their own people.

Helping poor people causes CCP collapsePei 13 - Margot Pritzker ’72 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.(Minxin Pei February 13, 2013 “5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/?allpages=yes) RMT

Second, the effects of socioeconomic change – rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates , along with the improvement of communications technologies — greatly reduce the costs of collective action, de-legitimize autocratic rule, and foster demands for greater democracy . As a result, authoritarian regimes, which have a relatively easy time ruling poor and agrarian societies, find it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to maintain their rule once socioeconomic development reaches a certain level. Statistical analysis shows that authoritarian regimes become progressively more unstable (and democratic transitions more likely) once income rises above $1,000 (PPP) per capita. When per capita income goes above $4,000 (PPP), the likelihood of democratic transitions increases more dramatically. Few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000 (PPP). If we apply this observation and take into account the probable effect of inflation (although the above PPP figures were calculated in constant terms), we will find that China is well into this “zone of democratic transition ” because its per capita income is around $9,100 (PPP) today, comparable to the income level of South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s on the eve of their democratic transitions. In

another 10-15 years, its per capita income could exceed $15,000 and its urbanization rate will have risen to 60-65 percent. If the CCP has such a tough time today (in terms of deploying its manpower and financial resources) to maintain its rule, just imagine how impossible the task will become in 10-15 years’ time.

Growth empirically causes democratic transition Liu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

First, international experience refutes performance legitimacy. Democratization has taken place in many economically successful countries including Brazil, Chile, Greece, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan. Nations experiencing mid-level economic development seem particularly susceptible to democracy. In the late 20th century, in the so-called ‘‘third wave’’ of democratization, ‘‘twenty-seven out of thirty-one countries that liberalized or democratized were in the middle-income range.’’4 The cases most comparable to China, the states which share a similar cultural or historical heritage, illustrate this point. In 1988, South Korea and Taiwan, both of which had embarked on democratization , had a PPP (purchasing power parity) per capita GDP (gross domestic product) of $6,631 and $7,913 ($12,221 and $14,584 in 2010 dollars), respectively. In 1989, the PPP per capita GDP of the Soviet Union (later Russia) and Hungary, also both on the journey toward democratization, was $9,211 and $6,108 ($16,976 and $11,257 in 2010 dollars), respectively.5 China’s PPP per capita GDP in 2010 was $7,544.6.

Growth doesn’t make the party look good Liu and Chen 12 - Yu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China, and can be reached at lytsinghua@tsinghua.edu.cn. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American Politics. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China, and can be reached at ddchen@umac.mo.(“Why China Will Democratize” Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:1 pp. 4163 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918) RMT

The second challenge to the performance legitimacy view is the increasing gap between people’s expectations and the means of government to co-opt society. It is true that t he Chinese state is still very strong, with enormous fiscal, repressive,

and even normative strength. But growing faster yet are the expectations of ordinary Chinese. With the memory of the Cultural Revolution fading, the benchmark of good performance is shifting. Younger Chinese are increasingly unlikely to compare their living standards with those of the revolutionary years. The opening up of China and the rapid rate of urbanization have created a new set of reference points, and people increasingly take a secure lifestyle for granted, seeing education, medical care, and decent housing as welfare entitlements.

Increased income solves Democracy Digest 13 – The Digest is edited by Michael Allen, Special Assistant for Government Relations and Public Affairs at the National Endowment for Democracy. February 13th (“5 ways China could democratize”, available online at http://www.demdigest.org/5-ways-china-could-democratize/, accessed 7/11/16, HDA)

Second, the effects of socioeconomic change –rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates, along with the improvement of communications technologies — greatly reduce the costs of collective action, de-legitimize autocratic rule, and foster demands for greater democracy . ….. Few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000 (PPP)…..China is well into this “zone of democratic transition” China’s is “a robust regime surrounded by meta instability,” said Columbia University’s Andrew Nathan, outlining three possible scenarios at a recent National Endowment for Democracy meeting (above): collapse, resilience or democratization.

s

Transition

2AC - Speed Transition is inevitable – the squos fast collapse causes a war. Pei 13 - Margot Pritzker ’72 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.(Minxin Pei February 13, 2013 “5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/?allpages=yes) RMT

“Happy ending” would be the most preferable mode of democratic transition for China. Typically, a peaceful exit from power managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes through several stages. It starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused by many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption). Recognition of such a crisis convinces some leaders of the regime that the days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should start managing a graceful withdrawal from power . If such leaders gain political dominance inside the regime, t hey start a process of liberalization by freeing the media and loosening control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition leaders to set the rules of the post-transition political system. Most critically, such negotiations center on the protection of the ruling elites of the old regime who have committed human rights abuses and the preservation of the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime (such as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are concluded, elections are held. In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose such elections, thus ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is unfolding according to this script.

But for China, the probability of such a happy ending hinges on, among other things, whether the ruling elites start reform before the old regime suffers irreparable loss of legitimacy. The historical record of peaceful transition from post-totalitarian regimes is abysmal mainly because such regimes resist reform until it is too late. Successful cases of “happy ending” transitions , such as those in Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, took place because the old regime still maintained sufficient political strength and some degree of support from key social groups . So the sooner the ruling elites start this process, the greater their chances of success. The paradox, however, is that regimes that are strong enough are unwilling to reform and regimes that are weak cannot reform. In the Chinese case, the odds of a soft landing are likely to be determined by what China’s new leadership does in the coming five years because the window of opportunity for a political soft landing will not remain open forever. “Gorby comes to China” is a variation of the “happy ending” scenario with a nasty twist. In such a scenario, China’s leadership misses the historic opportunity to start the reform now. But in the coming decade, a convergence of unfavorable economic, social, and political trends (such as falling economic growth due to demographic ageing, environmental decay, crony-capitalism, inequality, corruption and rising social unrest) finally forces the regime to face reality. Hardliners are discredited and replaced by reformers who, like

Gorbachev, start a Chinese version of glasnost and perestroika. But the regime by that time has lost total credibility and political support from key social groups. Liberalization triggers mass political mobilization and radicalism. Members of the old regime start to defect – either to the opposition or their safe havens in Southern California or Switzerland. Amid political chaos, the regime suffers another internal split, similar to that between Boris Yeltsin and Gorbachev, with the rise of a radical democratizer replacing a moderate reformer. With their enormous popular support, the dominant political opposition, including many defectors from the old regime, refuses to offer concessions to the Communist Party since it is now literally in no position to negotiate. The party’s rule collapses, either as a result of elections that boot its loyalists out of power or spontaneous seizure of power by the opposition. Should such a scenario occur in China, it would be the most ironic. For the last twenty years, the Communist Party has tried everything to avert a Soviet-style collapse. If the “Gorby scenario” is the one that brings democracy to China, it means the party has obviously learned the wrong lesson from the Soviet collapse.

2AC – Transition War Perception of democratization causes war Pei 11 - Minxin, Minxin Pei is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China, U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations, Shanghai International Studies University, Harvard University, University of Pittsburgh(MINXIN PEI, June 22, 2011 http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/22/peace-democracy-and-nightmares-in-china) RMT

The only caveat about the prospect of a more peaceful democratic China is that the process of democratization within the country could be violent . The research on the connection between democratization and war shows that transitions to democracy are likely to lead to confli ct. In the Chinese case, such risks are highest in two ethnic-minority areas, Tibet and Xinjiang . Depending on the transition scenario, a collapse of CCP rule inside China could very likely inspire the hard-core secessionists in these two restive regions to declare independence. Under this scenario, Taiwan could follow suit. Such developments are almost certain to elicit a military response from Beijing, regardless of whether the democrats or the autocrats are in power.

Yes transition war—Beijing’s attitudeDiamond 12 --- Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, 2012 (“China and East Asian Democracy: The Coming Wave,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 23(1), p. 11, Accessed Online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/464202/pdf, Accessed on 07-12-2016, ES) **modified for ableist language**

Rowen’s projections were a bit mechanical in assuming that economic growth would necessarily drive gradual political change toward democracy in China. Instead, it seems increasingly likely that political change in China will be sudden and disruptive . The Communist Party leadership still shows no sign of embarking on a path of serious political liberalization that might gradually lead to electoral democracy, as their counterparts in Taiwan’s then-dominant Nationalist Party did several decades ago. Instead, the rulers in Beijing are gripped by a fear of ending up like the USSR’s Mikhail Gorbachev , who launched a process of political opening in hopes of improving and refurbishing Soviet Communist rule only to see [managed] it crumble and the Soviet Union itself fall onto the ash heap of history. Torn by intense divisions within their own ranks and weakened by the draining away of power and energy from the center to the provinces and a congeries of increasingly divergent lower-level authorities, China’s political leaders seem as [frozen] stuck and feckless on the grand question of long-term political reform as they are brisk and decisive in making daily decisions on spending and investments.

The PLA attacks Taiwan when stability begins to fade—even if we don’t win collapse we just need to win China perceives self weaknessChang 1 --- Gordon G. Chang, trustee of Cornell University and popular China expert, 2001 (“The Coming Collapse of China,” Random House New York, not available online, pp. 263-4, ES) **note: OCR used

“But Kinmen and Matsu would just be appetizers tor the PLA. Like a wolf, t he Chinese Communist Party will only be satisfied when it has the sheep in its stomach," said exile Wei Jingsheng, referring to Taiwan. The famous dissident knows that conquering outlying islands will not be enough, especially for military leaders who think they can swallow the entire enchilada. Senior Mainland generals have boasted that they can take the main island of Taiwan in one day. That statement is nonsense, so we assume they don't actually believe what they say. Yet grave miscalcu- lations and undiluted sentiments launch armies. When military leaders lose their sense of reality and political masters have their own selfish agendas, a nation can choose the wrong path. That's true especially if the survival of the Party is at stake. In the spring of 2000, Jiang Zemin commissioned briefings on the collapse of Communist and authoritarian regimes around the world. He undoubt- edly learned the theory that the Second World War deferred the demise of the Soviet Union by dampening corruption and reinforcing the notion of self-sacrifice. Perhaps Beijing talks war these days because China's leaders share the notion that minor hostilities, even a minor excursion such as China's forray into Vietnam in 1979. are generally beneficial for the People’s Republic. Or perhaps we are hearing those bellicose words because Beijing thinks that it is now or never. Taiwan is drifting away, and someday it will be too late to bring it back into the fold. Some think that if China has to fight, it should do so while there are still serving generals who have seen combat. In a few years' time all experienced officers will have retired, in- cluding Defense Minister Chi Haotian and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian, both of whom are scheduled to leave their posts in 2002. And the PLA argues that the time for an invasion is now, before Taiwan can rearm with the next generation of American weapons. So t he stars are aligned toward wa r . Twice Jiang Zemin has threat- ened conflict, and twice he has backed down. No government, especially one in a country' where "face" is critical, can afford to do that a third time. Beijing's leaders think that war will be popular, so it won't take much to start the next crisis. Maybe it will be a mistake or perhaps a de- liberate act, but the next crisis looks as if it will be the one that leads to conflict. And if there are hostilities, they will be the last for the People's Republic. We need a war, which we will lose," said a Chinese journalist in May 2000. "That will destroy faith in the present dynasty." If there is war, the Mainland will lose. And the losses will be high. For the Communist leaders, losing ten thousand or one hundred thousand soldiers is noth- ing," said one Taipei resident recently. "They consider the life of a Chi- nese worthless." The Party didn't even blink at its horrendous Korean War casualties and probably will not care about those in the future even if they are high. Beijing's leaders will just talk about glory and say that the human sacrifice was worth it . But that's not how our Wang

Chuanning will see it if his Jason is needlessly lost in a misconceived military adven- ture. Wang and grieving relatives may not immediately take to the streets, but the populace will lose its faith that the Communist Party can lead. It will be then that the Chinese demand the right to govern them- selves.

c

2AC - No transitionMilitary and police prevent democratization – other factors don’t apply Chin 16 - John J. Chin, Ph.D. Candidate Politics Department Princeton University (“The Longest March: Why China’s Democratization Is Not Imminent” January 15, 2016https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jchin/files/john_j_chin_the_longest_march_2016.01.15.pdf) RMT

Conditional Modernization: Why China’s Democratization Is Not Imminent

The previous section showed that in large-N forecasting models intentionally constructed to replicate the short march predictions of Henry Rowen and others, China is actually unlikely to democratize in the short term, and is only likely to do so by 2025 at the earliest . In this section, I show that the previous short march models may neglect key variables which bode for an even longer march to democracy. I highlight four factors here: (1) China’s military power, (2) China’s institutionalized processes for party leadership transitions and party control of the military (which make coups unlikely), (3) China’s economic growth, and (4) China’s trade openness. (1) China is a great power with tremendous military and repressive capacity. Recent work by Carles Boix (2011) and Kevin Narizny (2012) indicates that the hierarchy of power in the international system conditions the causal effect of development on democracy. Clients or former colonies of democratic hegemons (the United States and United Kingdom) are the states most likely to democratize. But as a great power or “ pole ” that sees itself as the center of East Asia (Friedman 2009), armed with a nuclear deterrent, and which is a net creditor rather than debtor nation, international pressure and spillover effects from democratic diffusion are less effective on China (Chin 2014, 112; Diamond 2008). Thus, even if there is a coming “wave” of democracy in Asia, China may well be the last to catch it , if it catches it at all. In the twentieth century, it took two catastrophic world wars to democratize the illiberal but capitalist Germany and Japan (Gat 2010). But a major power war to democratize a nuclear China is unthinkable. Conflict in Asia also bolsters Chinese leaders’ nationalist narrative that a strong state led by the CCP is necessary to protect China’s interests in the South China Sea, to reunify Taiwan, and restore China to national greatness. Whereas international and territorial peace fosters conditions favorable to democracy (e.g. Thompson 1996; Gibler 2012), China has one of the highest probabilities of being involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute in the world (Nordhaus et al. 2012); accordingly, China has made massive investments in the military (People’s Liberation Army, PLA) and its coercive apparatus (e.g. P eople’s A rmed P olice) which enhance its capacity to repress democratic opponents (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). I capture the theorized negative effects of coercive investments on democratization by including a measure of a country’s military power, the M Score. Developed by Phil Arena (2012), M scores improve on the traditional measure of power in international relations—the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CIN). M scores vary from 0 to 1, where high values indicate more military power than the global average (see data appendix for more details).

China’s M score doubled to 0.5 from 2000 to 2012, and in my benchmark forecast I assume a more modest upward trend, with growth of 1-3% a year until China reaches America’s current M score of about 0.9 after 2040

Party institutionalization solves CCP collapse Chin 16 - John J. Chin, Ph.D. Candidate Politics Department Princeton University (“The Longest March: Why China’s Democratization Is Not Imminent” January 15, 2016https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jchin/files/john_j_chin_the_longest_march_2016.01.15.pdf) RMT

(2) The CCPs institutionalization bolsters internal party discipline. Recent work by Michael Miller (2012a) shows that autocratic regime strength conditions the relationship between economic development and democratization. In particular, he finds that development actually reduces likelihood of violent leader removal. At the same time, greater development predicts democratization, but typically only in the wake of a rebellion, mass protest, or military coup. Svolik (2012) also presents data that shows most autocrats since 1946 have been overthrown in coups (not popular uprisings). However, a coup in China is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.21 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains a party (not state) army, and the CCP is vigilant against ‘statification’ (guojiahua) and ‘depoliticization’ (feizhengzhihua) of the PLA. Jay Ulfelder’s (2012) model of political instability ranks China only 94th out of 150 countries in the world. This is in no small part due to the fact that CCP succession politics are increasingly norm- bound (Nathan 2003). If Xi Jinping serves his full term, the next leadership transiti on (and potential succession crisis) will not take place until 2022 , after many optimists expect change. Prior research shows that one-party states like China’s are one of the most resilient forms of authoritarian rule (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), whereas military regimes are very fragile (Geddes 1999). To partially capture the stability of (institutionalized) party regimes, I control for whether an autocracy has a party regime or military regime (Geddes et al. 2014).

Transition is politically infeasible and would cause a war West 14 -John West is the executive Director at the Asian Century Institute which conducts research and analysis, and participates in policy dialogues to foster a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges of the Asian Century. March 22nd (“CHINA'S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE??, Asian Century Institute, available online at http://www.asiancenturyinstitute.com/politics/242-china-s-democratic-future, accessed 7/14/16, HDA)

But China's future may not necessarily be democratic . It is also possible to envisage even more complex scenarios. Here are two that spring to mind. In response to political and social chaos, the military could take over, taking China backwards in terms of economic and social freedoms, and economic development . China's left-wing , with its fond memories of Mao, has very strong support . A military takeover could be facilitated by a quick exodus of many members of the elite to safe havens, especially Western countries like the US, Canada and Australia, where they may already have permanent residence status or family members. Another scenario could even be the break

away of some provinces like Guangdong, which are very distant and economically independent from Beijing. The leaders of China's richest province could be very happy to become independent. What ever happens -- and something is bound to happen sooner or later -- social and political instability in China could have massive spillover effects on the rest of the world. As Minxin Pei argues, China's new leadership has a window of opportunity for a political soft landing . But the risk is that it will resist reform until it is too late. A recent document from the Communist Party's Central Committee General Office reportedly warned of the need to strengthen internet management against the dangers of western ideas and "erroneous currents of thought". And the new government, in power for only a few months, appears to have launched a new offensive, closing the social media accounts of some influential opponents. At this stage, continued social and political repression, rather than opening up, seems to be the policy.

They won’t transition to a democracy Bell 15 -- Daniel A. Bell is a chair professor of the Schwarzman Scholars program at Tsinghua University in Beijing and the director of the Berggruen Institute of Philosophy and Culture, may 29th (“Chinese Democracy Isn't Inevitable”, available online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/chinese-democracy-isnt-inevitable/394325/, accessed 7/5/16, HDA)

The flaws in China’s political system are obvious. The government doesn’t even make a pretense of holding national elections and punishes those who openly call for multiparty rule. The press is heavily censored and the Internet is blocked. Top leaders are unconstrained by the rule of law. Even more worrisome, repression has been ramped up since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 , suggesting that the regime is increasingly worried about its legitimacy. Some China experts—most recently David Shambaugh of George Washington University—interpret these ominous signs as evidence that the Chinese political system is on the verge of collapse. But such an outcome is highly unlikely in the near future. The Communist Party is firmly in powe r, its top leader is popular, and no political alternative currently claims widespread support. And what would happen if the Party’s power did indeed crumble ? The most likely result, in my view, would be rule by a populist strongman backed by elements of the country’s security and military forces. The new ruler might seek to buttress his legitimacy by launching military adventures abroad. President Xi would look tame by comparison. A more realistic and, arguably, desirable outcome would involve political change that builds on the advantages of the current system. But what exactly are the good parts of the Chinese political model? And how can they be advanced without repression? I believe the model can be improved in a more open political environment and, eventually, put before the people in a popular referendum. Chinese authorities have thus far shown no interest in instituting electoral democracy for top leaders. But that’s not the only shape political reform can take. In China, such change over the past three decades has been informed by three principles: the lower the level of government, the more democratic the political system; the optimal space for experimentation with new practices and institutions is in between the lowest and highest levels of government; and the higher the level of government, the more meritocratic the political system. The Chinese government introduced village elections in the late 1980s to maintain social order and combat corruption among local leaders; by 2008, more than 900 million Chinese villagers had exercised the right to vote. Voters don’t choose among political parties; instead, they directly nominate candidates and vote by secret ballot for a committee of candidates who serve three-year terms. Turnout has generally been high, and the conduct of elections has improved over time. The Chinese government has

good reason to favor democratic elections at the local level. In small communities, people are more knowledgeable about the ability and virtue of the leaders they choose. At the local level relative to the national level, policy issues are more straightforward, generating a sense of community is easier, and mistakes are less costly. In cities and provinces, the Chinese government tinkers with economic and social reform and then applies successes to the rest of the country, while detecting problems and making adjustments to policies before they spread elsewhere. This experimentation takes several forms, the most high-profile of which is the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which tested controversial market-oriented policies that were then extended across China. More recently, the government has tested initiatives that defy common assumptions about authoritarian rule, including recruiting non-state groups to provide healthcare for the elderly and protect the rights of workers. Acutely aware of the costs of its “economic growth above all” development model, the government encourages municipalities to experiment with more diverse indices for assessing the performance of government officials: Hangzhou, for example, prioritizes environmental sustainability, and Chengdu narrowing the income gap between rural and urban residents. It’s a form of experimentation that is made easier by China’s flexible constitutional system, which doesn’t enshrine a strict division of powers between different levels of government. Political stability at the national level ensures that successful trials can be replicated elsewhere in China. In a democratic system with parties that alternate in power, there is no assurance that promising new ventures will be maintained or expanded, which in turn means less incentive to experiment and innovate in the policy arena . The top of the China model is characterized by political meritocracy—the idea that high-level officials should be selected and promoted on the basis of ability and virtue. The ideal was institutionalized in imperial China by means of an elaborate examination system that dates to the Sui dynasty in the sixth and seventh centuries. These examinations were abolished in 1905—precipitating the end of the imperial system as a whole—but they have been reestablished over the last three decades. Aspiring government officials normally must pass public-service examinations—IQ-like tests with some ideological content—with thousands of applicants competing for each entry-level spot. They must perform well at lower levels of government, with more rigorous evaluations at every step, to move further up the chain of political command. Top leaders must also accumulate decades of diverse administrative experience, with only a tiny proportion reaching the commanding heights of government. For example, Xi’s four-decade-long ascent to the presidency involved 16 major promotions through county, city, and province levels, and then the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the top spot in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with reviews at each stage to assess his leadership abilities. Arguably, the Chinese political system is the most competitive in the world today.

Chinese culture precludes democracy Chan 13 – Phil C.W. Chan is a senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (“Human Rights and Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?”, available online at http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/4/645.full, accessed 7/5/16, HDA)

It must also be noted that in China communism originated from within, unlike in Eastern Europe where it was imposed by the Soviet Union. Many predicted that the demise of communism in the Soviet Union would be followed with a collapse of the communist Party-State in China. China’s astonishing economic d evelopment in the past two decades, as opposed to almost complete economic breakdown that directly brought about the Soviet Union’s end, showed that its communist Party- State is unlikely to be torn down in the near future . Furthermore, as Schwartz suggests, one of the reasons Marxism–Leninism had its appeal to young Chinese was its theory of nationalism, which ‘provided a plausible explanation for China’s failure to achieve its rightful place in the world of nations’.19 In a survey of 700 Beijing residents in December 1995, more than 95 per cent of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they ‘would rather live in an orderly society than in a freer society which is prone to disruptions’.20 Nathan and Shi found the Chinese to be generally disengaged from their government. In

their survey conducted in 1990, 71.6 per cent of the 2,896 respondents considered their local government to have no effect on their daily life, while 71.8 per cent held the same view in respect of their national government.21 The authors suggested that the respondents had such apathy towards their local and national governments not so much because they thought that government policy would have little impact on their lives but out of a belief that government officials would not treat them equally given the hierarchical nature of Chinese society.22 Together with the enculturation in Confucianism which regards rights as not inherent in being a human but ‘[flowing] from the state in the form of a gratuitous grant that can be subjected to conditions or abrogation by the unilateral decision of the State’,23 the economic progress and benefits brought to the Chinese people as a whole (albeit not all of them individually) by China’s increased trade with other States have augmented the general contentment of the Chinese people with the Chinese leadership. External pressures may be stymied by ‘countervailing national norms and value structures that emphasized sovereignty and domestic cohesion more than human rights principles.’24 Thus, when seeking to foster the development and protection of human rights in China, one should heed Kent’s caution that ‘[i]n pitting the sovereignty and national prestige of one State against another they may have the counter-productive effect of mobilizing the very citizenry whose human rights are being abused in support of the abusing state.’25 When China and other like-minded States argue for national self-determination as derivative of the principle of State sovereignty and as a basis on which Western discourses of human rights and democracy may not be imposed or transplanted, they are engaging in the same discourses about human rights and democracy as Western States for the normative legitimacy of the discourses and their own preferred modes of governance. In automatically dismissing communitarian notions of rights (and duties) as incompatible with individualism and attendant notions of rights and freedoms, Western States and scholars are denying the right of other States and their peoples to decide the forms of society in and governance under which they wish to live.26 Democracy is not necessarily identical to popular sovereignty, and if a people decide that they desire a non-democratic form of governance for their State, it is not merely that non-democratic governance is part of their culture but also that it is accepted by the people as part of their culture, and an ‘appeal to a traditional culture against democracy is still an appeal to a form of populism’.27 Individualism demands that ‘We should respect their form of government because it is the form that they endorse, even though they do not themselves believe that the legitimacy of their form of government depends upon their own endorsement.’28 As Roth explains, in States where communism is subscribed to (by both the state and its people), Western notions of democracy qua elections undermine true and meaningful participation in the political process: In the Marxist-Leninist view, multi-party competition masks the inalterable structure of power rooted in the concentrated ownership and control of the major means of production, distribution and exchange. In conditions of social stratification, dissent and opposition party activity aimed at challenging the structure of social decisionmaking are effectively marginalized, as a particular social stratum holds de facto control over the major parties, the mass media, the sources of campaign financing, and other channels of influence. Even where politicians espousing

change are elected to office, the private sector’s stranglehold over the economy forces efforts at social transformation to yield in the name of preserving the ‘investment climate’. Voters are thus left merely to choose which representatives of private sector interests will administer a public sector of limited scope and autonomy.29 Furthermore, popular will may dissipate in the face of a democratically elected government failing its promises and duties to its citizens, while an authoritarian or totalitarian government may continue to be held by its people in esteem. Thus, ‘it cannot be said a priori that coups d’état, emergency rule, or even substantial periods of one-party or coalitional dictatorship violate popular sovereignty.’30

2AC - Inevitable CCP stability causes democratization Wong 15 - Ralph and Roz Halbert Professor of Innovation at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. He is also a Professor in the department of Political Science, where he holds a Canada Research Chair. (Joseph Wong March 27, 2015“When will China collapse? is the wrong question” http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/03/27/asking-when-china-will-collapse-is-the-wrong-question-to-ask/) RMT

But why do we presume that China – and the CCP – will only choose democracy when it is about to collapse? Is it not possible that an authoritarian regime may choose to concede democracy when it is still relatively strong ? Dan Slater (of the University of Chicago) and I are currently writing a book in which we show that contrary to the received wisdom about why autocrats concede democracy – hello Mubarak – the modal pathway of democratic transition in Asia has been led by regimes that are not weak but instead very strong .

The Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, a brutal dictatorial regime in the 1960s and 1970s, allowed the formation of an opposition party in 1986, lifted martial law in 1987 and conceded full democratic elections in 1992. And it made these concessions not when the ruling party was weak, but rather when the party was very strong. Indeed, the KMT conceded democracy not to concede defeat, but rather to remain dominant. And it has. Meanwhile, Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy, in many ways the model democracy in East Asia.

Democracy came to Taiwan not because of collapse but, rather the opposite. This same logic – conceding from strength – explains the transitions in Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and it helps explains what we are currently seeing in Burma, and what we might see in Singapore.

Why not in China? It would seem to me that at the present moment the CCP has nothing to fear with democratization. Into the future, once the regime begins to “crackup,” � however, the CCP will have everything to fear about democratization. It has always struck me that if I was a dictator I’d prefer to end up like the KMT in Taiwan and not Mubarak in Egypt.

Economic growth means that CCP transition is inevitable.Pei 15 - Minxin Pei is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China, U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations. He currently serves as the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, November 11 (“The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China”, available online http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/, accessed 7/1/16, HDA)

If long-term economic stagnation were to set in, the Chinese middle class’s support for the status quo will erode. Co-optation of the fast-growing middle-class—another

key pillar of the CPC’s post-Tiananmen survival strategy—has been enabled by the past quarter century’s economic boom. China’s secular economic slowdown will undoubtedly reduce opportunities, curtail expectations, and limit upward mobility for members of this critical social group, whose acquiescence to the CPC’s rule has been contingent upon its ability to deliver satisfactory and continuous economic performance. With the evaporation of elite unity, looming economic stagnation, and likely alienation of the middle-class, the post-Tiananmen model is left with only two pillars: repression and nationalism. Contemporary authoritarian regimes, lacking popular legitimacy endowed by a competitive political process, have essentially three means to hold on their power. One is bribing their populations with material benefits, a second one is to repress them with violence and fear, and the third is to appeal to their nationalist sentiments. In more sophisticated and successful autocracies, rulers rely more on performance-based legitimacy (bribing) than on fear or jingoism mainly because repression is costly while nationalism can be dangerous. In the post-Tiananmen era, to be sure, the CPC has employed all three instruments, but it has depended mainly on economic performance and has resorted to (selective) repression and nationalism only as a secondary means of rule. However, trends since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012 suggest that repression and nationalism are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the CPC’s survival strategy. An obvious explanation is that China’s faltering economic growth is creating social tensions and eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing the regime to deter potential societal challenge with force and divert public attention with nationalism. There is, however, an equally valid explanation that many observers have overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on delivering economic growth to maintain legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only because economic growth cannot be guaranteed and ever-rising popular expectations will be impossible to meet, but also because sustained economic growth produces structural socioeconomic changes that, as demonstrated by social science research and histories of democratic transitions, fatally threaten the durability of autocratic rule. Autocracies forced to strike a Faustian bargain with performance-based legitimacy are destined to lose the wager because the socioeconomic changes resulting from economic growth strengthen the autonomous capabilities of urban-based social forces, such as private entrepreneurs, intellectuals, professionals, religious believers, and ordinary workers through higher levels of literacy, greater access to information, accumulation of private wealth, and improved capacity to organize collective action. Academic research has established a strong correlation between the level of economic development and the existence of democracy and also between rising income and probabilities of the fall of autocracies.8 In the contemporary world, the positive relationship between wealth (measured in per capita income) and democracy can be seen in the chart below, which shows that the percentage of democracies (classified as free by Freedom House) rises steadily as income level increases. Partly free countries decline as income rises as well. The distribution of non-democracies, or authoritarian regimes, resembles a U-shape. While more dictatorships can survive in poorer countries (the bottom two-fifths of the countries in terms of per capita income), their presence in the top two-fifths of the countries seems to reject the notion that wealth is positively correlated with democracy. A

closer look at the data, however, shows that nearly all the wealthy countries ruled by dictatorships are oil-producing states, where the ruling elites have the financial capacity to bribe their people into accepting autocratic rule.9 Chinese rulers, if they take a look at the chart, should worry about their medium-to long-term prospects. There are 87 countries with a higher capita income, measured in PPP, than China. Fifty-eight of them are democracies, 11 are classified by Freedom House as “partly free”, and 18 are dictatorships (“not free”, according to Freedom House). But of the 18 “not free” countries with higher per capita income than China, 16 are petro-states (Belarus is included in this group because Russia provides it with significant subsidized energy). The two non-oil states are Thailand (a military dictatorship that overthrew a semi-democracy in 2014) and Cuba (also a Leninist one-party dictatorship). Of the 11 partly free countries, Mexico and Malaysia are significant energy producers while Kuwait and Venezuela are classical petro-states. What should give the CPC leaders even more cause to worry is that Chinese per capita income of $13,216 (PPP) in 2014 is comparable to that of Taiwan and South Korea in the late 1980s, when both began to democratize.10 If the experience of regime transitions in upper middle-income countries, including Taiwan and Korea, were applicable, the CPC should expect rising societal demand and mobilization for political change in the coming decade (some signs of such mobilization can already be detected).

Collapse inevitable—aging crisisDiamond 12 --- Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, 2012 (“China and East Asian Democracy: The Coming Wave,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 23(1), p. 12, Accessed Online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/464202/pdf, Accessed on 07-12-2016, ES)

Beyond the ongoing frustrations with censorship, insider dealing, abuse of power, environmental degradation, and other outrages that can only be protested by antisystem activity of one sort or another, there are, as Fukuyama notes, the big looming social and economic challenges that China faces as the consequences of its one-child policy make themselves felt in a rapidly aging (and disproportionately male) population . Jack Goldstone reports that China’s labor force stopped growing in 2010 and has begun shrinking half a percent a year, which “will, by itself, knock 2.2 percentage points off China’s annual economic growth potential.” Urbanization, a key driver of productivity increases, is also slowing dramatically , and the growth of education “has clearly reached a limit,” as the number of college graduates has expanded faster than the ability of the economy—even as it faces labor shortages in blue-collar industries—to generate good white-collar jobs.10

The Chinese economy will have to pay for rapidly rising wages and cope with industrial labor shortages even as it comes under pressure to finance pension, welfare, and healthcare benefits for the massive slice of the populace that is now moving toward retirement. Moreover, as it manages all this, China will need to address growing frustration among college graduates who cannot find jobs to

match their expectations. If the suspected bubbles in the real-estate and financial markets burst as these twin generational challenges are gathering force, political stability in the world’s most populous country may well become no more than a memory.

Economics not key—a transition is inevitable either way—if China’s economy grows it happens later, if growth slows it happens soonerDiamond 12 --- Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, 2012 (“China and East Asian Democracy: The Coming Wave,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 23(1), p. 12-13, Accessed Online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/464202/pdf, Accessed on 07-12-2016, ES)

Increasingly, the CCP faces the classic contradiction that troubles all modernizing authoritarian regimes. The Party cannot rule without continuing to deliver rapid economic development and rising living standards— to fail at this would invite not gradual loss of power but a sudden and probably lethal crisis. To the extent that the CCP succeeds, however, it generates the very forces—an educated, demanding middle class and a stubbornly independent civil society—that will one day decisively mobilize to raise up a democracy and end CCP rule for good. The CCP, in other words, is damned if it does not, and damned if it does. The only basis for its political legitimacy and popular acceptance is its ability to generate steadily improving standards of living, but these will be its undoing.

For some time, I suspected that Henry Rowen’s projections were a bit optimistic and that China’s democratic moment, while foreseeable, was still 25 to 30 years away. Now, as the need for a more open, accountable, and law-based regime becomes as obvious as the current leaders’ inability to bring one about, I suspect that the end of CCP rule will come much sooner, quite possibly within the next ten years. Unfortunately, a sudden collapse of the communist system could give rise, at least for a while, to a much more dangerous form of authoritarian rule, perhaps led by a nationalistic military looking for trouble abroad in order to unify the nation at home. But this would likely represent only a temporary solution, for the military is incapable of governing a rapidly modernizing, deeply networked, middle-class country facing complex economic and social challenges.

Whatever the specific scenario of change, this much is clear: China cannot keep moving forward to the per capita income, educational, and informational levels of a middle-income country without experiencing the pressures for democratic change that Korea and Taiwan did more than two decades ago. Those pressures are rising palpably now in Singapore and Malaysia. They will gather momentum in Vietnam as it follows in China’s path of transformational (even if not quite as rapid) economic development. In Thailand, continuing modernization over the next decade will change society in ways that will make democracy easier to sustain. In

short, within a generation or so , I think it is reasonable to expect that most of East Asia will be democratic. And no regional transformation will have more profound consequences for democratic prospects globally.

An incremental transition is key—collapse causes a transition warDiamond 14 --- Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. At Stanford University, he is professor by courtesy of political science and sociology, 2014 (part of “Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm” and interview with other Democracy analysts, Accessed on 07-11-2016, Accessed at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/535538, ES) **note: OCR used

Despite all China's innovations in using nondemocratic methods to get accountability and better governance, its system is in a very advanced state of decay. I think they are one financial crisis away from the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party because the hatred of the party and of its [End Page 96] corruption is now gathering so much steam. I wish that Xi Jinping would launch an incremental process of transition of the kind that took place across the strait in Taiwan; otherwise, I think there is a real danger . The PRC [People's Republic of China] looks strong, confident, and dynamic, but there is a lot of rot in the foundations and in public attitudes , and if they don't get going with incremental reform, things could unfold in a lot of interesting ways , including a sudden Soviet-style collapse. I don't think we should wish for this because there'd be a vacuum. There are no institutions, no opposition, no national parties, nor even any effective civic networks yet. The outcome could fall into the category of "Be careful what you wish for"—not a breakthrough to democracy but military rule or some kind of ugly, nationalistic, noncommunist, Putin-style leadership, which might make military moves on the disputed offshore islands to divert public attention from all its domestic frustrations. China will be a place to watch in the next ten to fifteen years.

2AC - Predictions failCant predict democratization Gilley 11 - Ph.D. 2008, Princeton University, Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University (Bruce Gilley, “Should We Try to Predict Transitions to Democracy? Lessons for China” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relation, http://www.web.pdx.edu/~gilleyb/ShouldWeTryToPredictTransitionsToDemocracy.pdf) RMT

Another group of reasons concerns meaning. If social terms could only be understood through interpretation of their local meaning, then prediction using cross-cultural terms like “democracy” is too blunt to be of any use. “We cannot achieve the degree of fine exactitude of a science based on brute data,” wrote one philosopher of meaning.9

Indeed, even if by sheer coincidence, a given term has the same meaning across all cultures today, its meaning will alter in the future in ways that we cannot predict. Predicting “democracy” in the future is useless since the meaning of democracy is sure to alter significantly.10 “Human science is largely ex post understanding…Hard prediction before just makes one a laughingstock.”11 We can accept the cautions of these insights without necessarily accepting their injunctions against the prediction of large-scale political change. An awareness of the difficulties of accurate prediction is certainly important , especially when wrongful policy decisions have fatal consequences. In China’s Democratic Future, I was explicit about these uncertainty levels.12 However, it is the comparison of the moral costs of inaccurate prediction with the moral and other costs of failing to predict at all that should decide whether prediction is worthwhile in spite of uncertainty. In almost every case, the latter are far heavier than the former. Indeed, the whole “risk industry” of consultants, insurance companies, and forward markets exists precisely because it is almost always better to predict something than to predict nothing at all.1

As to meanings, it is also true that the word democracy today implies a different (higher) standard than it did in the past . As Larry Diamond has noted, the higher standards, as well as the greater information available about abuses in the most distant lands, means that many regimes once called democracie s—PRI-ruled Mexico , apartheid South Africa, and today’s Singapore—no longer qualify as even minimal democracies .1 4 Yet the relevant question is whether meanings continue to hold enough similarity to be useful for the purposes of policy-making. In this respect, the answer is certainly, yes. Democracy’s core facet—the equality of persons in choosing leaders through free and fair elections—has not changed. The new meaning is just more robust than before. Some databases have been created that capture the changing meanings of democracy over time.15 Yet even taking into account those changed meanings, predictions in the past of “more democracy” would have been accurate, even if their magnitude was overstate d . As long as meanings change in accordance with the principles at stake—in this case the fair

selection of executives to government—prediction remains possible . It is only when concepts become totally “reconstructed” that prediction is futile. Yet on most topics that people spend time predicting in political science, this is not the case.