democratization and human security

7/28/2019 Democratization and human security

1/20

Democratization and

human security

HUMAN SECURITY RESEARCH AND OUTREACH PROGRAM


2/20

Democratization and

human security

May 2006

Preface 1

Expert participants 2

Executive summary 3

Final report 6


3/20

1 Democ ratization and human security May 2006

Preface

This Fast Talk Team report draws upon the findings of an expert consultative

process conducted by the Human Security Research and Outreach Program,supported by the Human Security Policy Division (GHS) of the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The Fast Talk Team conceptwas developed to provide DFAIT with a timely and flexible means to accesshigh quality policy-relevant research with the objective of:

generating perspectives on new or emerging issues;

refreshing thinking on existing issues; or

enhancing the effectiveness of conferences and workshops bydeveloping a pre-conference dialogue which helps to frame issues, focus

discussion, and build expert consensus.

Fast Talk Teams bring together officials seeking policy development input withprominent Canadian and international experts through a three-stageconsultation process that can be completed in a time frame as short as 1-2weeks. First, 4-6 experts are identified and asked to provide short 3-5 pagewritten responses by e-mail to specific policy questions developed by DFAITofficials. Sec ondly, the officials and experts review the responses andparticipate in a 2-3 hour conference call to discuss them. Finally, a reportsummarizing the key findings of the written submissions and the c onferencecall discussion is provided to all Fast Talk Team members for final comment

and then circulated to officials.

The purpose of Fast Talk Teams is to generate policy-relevant research. Theydo not attempt to establish new policies for DFAIT or the Government ofCanada. Thus, the views and positions provided by this paper are solely thoseof the contributors to this research project and are not intended to reflect the

views and positions of DFAIT or the Government of Canada.

The Human Security Policy Division would like thank the Fast Talk Team leader,J eff Senior, DFAIT and C anadian International Development Agencycolleagues, as well as the expert participants for their contributions to this Fast

Talk Team effort.


4/20


Expert participants

Sevenexperts participated in the March 2006 Fast Talk:

Timothy Sisk

Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Studies

University of Denver (USA)

Robert Miller

Executive Director

Parliamentary Centre (Canada)

Jane Boulden

Canada Research C hair in International Relations and Security Studies

Royal Military College (Canada)

Cheryl Hendricks

Head of Southern Africa Human Security Programme

Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)

Patrick Merloe

Senior Associate and Director of Electoral Programs

National Democratic Institute (USA)

Goran Fejic/Judith Large

Head of Programme/Senior Programme Advisor

Democrac y Building and C onflict Management

International IDEA (Sweden)


5/20


Executive summary

The promotion of democratic institutions and values has become an integralpart of efforts to prevent conflict and promote sustainable peace. Yet, the

process of undergoing democratic change carries with it the potential toheighten political tensions and aggravate risks to human security. Mostcontemporary conflict is found within states undergoing political transition,and much of it is organized along ethnic, racial or sectarian lines. Democraticinstitutions or practices, such as free speech, political parties and elections,can be used in ways that might pacify -- but that might also intensify andfurther entrench deeply-rooted differences along such lines.

In view of the considerable emphasis placed on democratization in pre- andpost-conflict environments, with its inherent potential to ameliorate or

aggravate threats to human sec urity, the Human Security Policy Division(GHS) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Internationa l Trade (DFAIT)conducted a Fast Talk to probe some of the key questions surrounding thisissue. What do we need to understand better about democratization inorder to lessen the prospects for political violence and enhance humansecurity? Where can countries like C anada add value in efforts to promotedemocracy abroad? What should we aim to accomplish multilaterally andbilaterally?

Fast Talk results

The first segment of this exercise focussed on the current state of knowledgeabout democratization, including its relation to conflict; and on some of thegeographic and thematic areas in which Canada might have a greatervalue-added role to play in promoting democracy abroad. Highlights includethe following:

Democratization is seen as an integral part of comprehensive efforts toprevent conflict and build sustainable peace. However, our knowledgeof how best to combine two broad agendas democrac y assistance, onone hand, and conflict prevention/ resolution, on the other is generally

underdeveloped, and the two agendas are occasionally pursued atcross-purposes.

The sequencing of democratic reforms is crucial to success and tomitigating prospects for political violence. It is also a subject about whichinsufficient empirical work has been done. Although dec isionsconcerning sequencing are highly context-specific, and need to involvenational stakeholders, a wider set of cases might be studied, with a view


6/20


to extracting some general lessons about the sequencing of democraticreforms in different contexts. Such work could be of use not only tonational actors, but also to regional or multilateral bodies such as the UNPeacebuilding C ommission, among others.

There are options for tempering aspects of the political process which

can assist in reducing zero-sum outcomes, thereby dampening incentivesfor spoiler violence and enhancing safeguards for human security.However, more could be done to sharpen our understanding of thenexus between democratic processes and conflict in a variety of cases.

The transition of rebel groups into political parties is a challenge faced bypolicy makers and practitioners alike. The anticipation and mitigation ofprospects for elec toral violence is another example of an area in whichmore work could be done.

For democratic assistance to be successful and a stabilizing influence, itmust aim to facilitate an indigenous agenda for political change. Itshould not be about (nor be seen to be about) the export of a pre-

packaged democratic product, or the imposition of foreign models.

Canada is well-perceived as a donor and is well-placed to assistdemocratic reform abroad for the reason (among others) that Canada isnot seen to carry a hidden agenda in assisting change which is oftenpolitically sensitive in nature.

Expertise on minority rights, tolerance, federal design, anti-corruption,fiscal policy and soc ial justice are among the thematic areas in whichCanada may have some particular value-added experience to offer.Geographically, parts of Latin America, Africa and Europe are areas onwhich Canada may wish to concentrate.

Political leadership and party training has not been a traditional area offocus for Canada, despite its importance within the spectrum ofdemocratization activities. The Canadian political party system may havesome strengths to offer in this regard.

A second part of the exercise explored the strengths and weaknesses ofdifferent channels (international and regional, multilateral and bilateral)through which democratic assistance can be directed, along with thedifferent ways in which democratic norms can take root and flourish. Resultsinclude the following:

UN technical assistance, peace operations, and reporting on humandevelopment are key examples of the practical contributions the UNmakes to the promotion of democracy. New opportunities to advancedemocratic practices will arise in the context of other UN activities,including the Human Rights Council, the Peacebuilding C ommission, andthe UN Democracy Fund.


7/20


Though the UN has the potential to confer the widest sense of legitimacyon the promotion of democracy, it is politically constrained with respectto achieving broader consensus on democratic principles and standardsby virtue of its membership.

The EU represents the strongest example of the expansion of democratic

norms and practices, albeit the example appears sui g ene ris. However,more work could be done to develop regional reporting and monitoring,reactions to non-compliance, and the use of incentives and sanctions toencourage democratic reform.

A number of regional and c ross-regional organizations have advancedsubstantially in their commitment to democratic principles, though theirdifferent histories, capacities and mandates offer different possibilities forengagement on the part of Canada and others.

The Commonwealth, the Organization for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), the AfricanUnion (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), andthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are amongthe organizations which represent the most promising opportunities forCanada to champion particular themes or countries, and to advancemultilateral/regional models of democracy.

Democrac y at the local level is often neglected and could form a moreimportant focal point in regional efforts to confront human securitychallenges in urban settings.


8/20


Final report

This final report summarizes some of the key ideas contained in the DFAITbackground paper for the session, the written submissions of our experts, and

in the subsequent conference call.

Democratization and conflict

What do we need to understand better about democratization and the

linkages between conflict and democracy?

Since 1990, the promotion of democracy has become an explicit focus of aidand foreign policy to an extent that was largely unforeseeable prior to theend of the Cold War. The key objectives in promoting democ raticgovernance are normally of two kinds. In the first instance, democratic valuesand institutions are seen as means to achieve desirable political or economicends, such as security (for states and individuals), peace, development andprosperity. Secondly, some of the core values of liberal democracy are takento have intrinsic merit and to be universal in scope, particularly insofar asliberal democratic systems of governance are predicated upon protection,participation, and accountability as defining elements of the relationshipbetween states and individuals.

A number of premises formed the basic parameters of this Fast Talk session:

The existence of mature, stable democrac ies is normally taken to bedesirable from the standpoint of enhanc ing prospects for internationalpeace and security. At the same time, the processof institutingdemocratic reforms over time with a view to arriving at a more stable,mature democratic form of government is challenging, and involvesimportant choices about the design of democratic institutions and thesequencing of assistance, among others.

Democratization can have the potential to exacerbate, as well as toameliorate, politica l tensions in particular soc ieties. As several panellistssuggested:

Dem oc ra t iza t ion ha s b oth c onf lic t -m it iga t ing a nd c onf lic t -

ind uc ing c a p a c it ies, but the la t te r a re of ten the f irst to e m erge

for ob viou s rea son s. The p roc ess invo lves de ep c ha ng es in the

st ruc tu re of p ow er and in the re la t ionsh ip b etw ee n the sta te


9/20


a nd its c it izen s. Tho se likely to lo se the ir p ow er a nd the ir

p rivi leg es will ra re ly surre nd er w itho ut som e resista nc e.

Dem oc ra t iza t ion c rea tes op p or tunit ies for hum a n sec urity

c rise s. From Alg eria in 1992 to Ira q in 2006, d em o c ra t iza t io n

(whe t he r hom e -g row n o r imp osed ) ca n be a cc om pa n ied bye sc a la t ing p o lit ic a l violenc e . Po lit ic a l tran sit ion s a re inhe re nt ly

d estab ilizing a nd invo lve d ee p -sea ted soc ia l cha ng e. The

unc er ta in ty tha t c ha ng e un lea shes stokes fea rs a nd c ont r ib u tes

to p ow er-a t -a ll-co st m en ta lit ies.

Most contemporary conflict is found within states undergoing politicaltransition, and much of it is organized along ethnic, racial, cultural, orsectarian lines. Democratic institutions or practices, such as free speech,political parties and elections, can be used in ways that might intensify, orpacify, deeply-rooted differences along such lines.

Notwithstanding the potential for democratization to exacerbate politicaltensions, it is normally taken to be an integral part of sustainable, long-term approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The fa ilure to p ut in p la c e m ec ha nism s a nd p roc esses tha t

a llow for the p ea c efu l reso lu tion o f the c om p et it ion for po w er ,

a nd the inc lusion o f the p op ula t ion in provid ing the b a sis for

the a uthorit y a nd leg it im a c y of g ove rnm ent , on ly inc rea ses the

p ote n t ia l o f reve rt ing to v io lenc e a s a m ea ns to a c h iev ing

g o a ls. The fa ilure to sup p o rt d em o c ra t ic p ro c e sses, relying

instea d on o utsid e o r on ly on el ite-or ien ted d ea l m a king , sets a

sta g e for insta b ility a nd und ermines hum a n sec urity in the

long er te rm .

In the words of one contributor, democratization can create a series oftemporal dilemmas. Democratic outcomes are desirable and seen as one ofthe surest ways to enhance long-term prospects for sustainable peace. At thesame time, democratization may, in the short term, be associated withelevated levels of political tension and risks to human security. One of the keychallenges is, then, to develop a keener sense of how to promote

democratic institutions and practices in ways that dampen the prospects forpolitical violence.


10/20


The state of democratization

What are the main gaps in our knowledge about democratization? Where

can Canada add value?

The first segment of the panels contributions focussed on two broad aspectsof the topic: our knowledge of democ ratization, including its relation toconflict; and some of the geographic and thematic areas in which Canadamight have a greater value-added role to play in promoting democracyabroad.

One panellist noted at the outset that democratization may take place infundamentally different types of states or transitional contexts. Democratictransitions in authoritarian states, such as those in Eastern Europe, presentchallenges that are often quite distinct from those faced in states emerging

from c ivil war and peace agreements, and from those in which conflict isongoing.

There was also some preliminary discussion of the notion that democrac yrequires minimal security, economic, and developmental pre-conditions for itto take root. However, the general view was that democratization should beseen as an integral and early part of long-term, sustainable approaches topeacebuilding and conflict resolution. Where democratization is seen assomething that should be pursued only after the attainment of other keysecurity, economic or development objec tives, significant challenges mayarise. One concern in this regard was that delayed democratization couldresult in the entrenchment of more authoritarian practices that are difficult toundo or reform at a later point in time. As several panellists noted:

Fol low ing c on f lic t , there a re far m ore c a ses of c ou ntries tha t set t le

in to a lig h t ly m od if ied a uthor ita r ia n ism tha n m ove forw a rd to

g enu ine d em oc ra t iza t ion . In the se c a ses, rea son s of na t ion a l

sec urity a re rea d ily a va ila b le to just ify lim it ing d em oc ra c y. Tha t is

w hy i t is c rit ic a lly im p or tan t to en sure tha t d em oc ra t iza t ion is a

c rit ic a l elem en t in the na t ion a l rec ov ery p ro g ra m s rig ht f rom the

sta rt . The a rgum ent tha t na t iona l sec urit y t rum p s d em oc ra c y nee d s

t o be c ha lle nged .

Dem oc ra t iza t ion p roc esses p resen t a c la ssic te m p oral d ilem m a .

Wha t m igh t b e d one in the shor t te rm to lim it v io lenc e , suc h a s

p rod d ing the p a rt ies in to a p ow er - sha ring p a c t , c ou ld w el l

und ermine the p rog ress of d em oc ra c y in the long er te rm b y

"f ree zing " p ow er re lat ions, as arg ua b ly ha s b ee n the c a se in Bosnia .


11/20


It was underscored by a number of panellists that there are options fortempering, modifying or defining parts of the political process in ways that willreduce the incentives for political violence. Pre-elec tion pacts or negotiationswere specifically mentioned as one way in which to reduce the zero-sumpolitical outcomes that can be assoc iated with elec toral victories or losses;resource- and power-sharing agreements can do likewise. However, it wassuggested that our understanding of the relationship between conflictresolution/prevention practices (power-sharing agreements; negotiationswith rebel movements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, etc.)and democratization efforts (the holding of elections, creation of politicalparties, public competition for electoral votes, etc.) is generallyunderdeveloped. As one expert noted:

Con f lic t mi t ig a t ion , p rev en t ion a nd p ost-co nf lic t expe rts, in a nd out

o f gove rnme n t , a nd d em oc ra c y p rom o t ion expe rt s do no t

su f fic ien t ly ap p rec ia te the langua ge a nd nuanc es o f the o the r

a rea to a c hieve c ro ss-fert iliza t io n a nd m a xim um syne rg ie s. This isrem in isc en t o f gap s b e twe en d em oc rac y and hum an righ t s

p romo t io n a de c ad e ago .

It was proposed that more could be done to extract lessons learned from avariety of cases in which democratic options were used to dampenprospects for political violence. For instance, more could be done to examinecases in which electoral system design and balance of power arrangementswere used to create possibilities for competitors to win stakes in governance,to use legal systems and devolution of powers to ensure minority rights andequitable distribution of state resources, etc..

All panellists addressed the issue ofsequencing. There was basic agreementthat:

sequencing is an issue that concerns decisions about which liberaldemocratic institutions and practices to emphasize at which point in time(as distinct from questions about how the promotion of democracy ingeneral should relate to the pursuit of other development, security, andpeace objectives);

such decisions will be highly context-specific;

their context-specificity makes it difficult to extract generally applicablerules about correct or ideal sequencing in democratic assistance;

however, general lessons learned about sequencing might be extractedfrom a wide set of democratization cases (about which there is a lack ofempirical studies), and such lessons might be useful points of reference ordeparture for entities such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission; and,


12/20


the involvement of a broad spectrum of national stakeholders in theprocess of arriving at sequencing decisions is vital. Sequencing decisionscannot or should not be pictured as the exclusive domain of donors andSpecial Representatives of the UN Secretary-General. The ownership, andperhaps bargaining, has to be nationally-driven as well.

As distinct from sequencing, the importance ofbalance in democracyassistance, i.e., the relative disbursement of aid to three key types of actors(state institutions, civil soc iety, and politica l actors), was underscored byseveral panellists.

A d em oc ra t ic sta te nee d s to b u ild it s c red ib ilit y . At the sam e t im e,

c it izen s ne ed to b e em p ow ered to test i ts t rustw o rth ine ss. Pol it ic a l

p a rt ies, p a rlia m ents a nd inde p end ent m ed ia h a ve a c ruc ia l ro le to

p la y, b ut a g a in, the ir p ote nt ia l ro le sho uld b e see n in the g iven

c o nte xt ( in som e situa t ion s, they c a n a lso p la y a d iv isive a ndc o nf lic t- ind uc ing ro le). In p la c e s w he re o ff ic ia l inst itut ions a re

them selves too d ee p ly invo lve d in the c on f lic t , c iv il soc iety

orga n iza t ions m a y nee d a st rong er sup p or t (e .g . wo m en 's

o rg a niza t io ns in the Ba lka n w a rs o f the ninet ies).

There was general consensus about the nature of democratization and thedesired relationship between those providing and receiving assistance.Panellists concurred that democracy should be understood orconceptualized as a processcomposed of a variety of elements bothinstitutional and cultural in nature. Democracy assistance often focuses on

politica l institutions and their reform. However, a vital component is thepolitical culture which surrounds and supports institutional reform. It wassuggested that our understanding of local political culture and indigenousinstitutions ones that can provide the local building blocks for democraticgovernance is often underdeveloped. Africa was cited as a specificgeographic example, though similar comments might apply equally well toefforts to assist democratic reform in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

The a ssum p t ion ha s la rg ely b ee n tha t a lib era l d em oc ra t ic c ulture

w ill sim p ly rep la c e o the r p o lit ic a l c ultures if the inst itut ions a nd

p roc esses a re in p la c e . Th is d oe s not a p p ea r to b e the c a se, a nd

instea d , we see its d om est ic a t ion b y oth er cu ltures, of ten

und ermin ing d em oc ra t ic inst itu t iona l a rra ng em ents. We nee d m ore

a na lyses on p o l it ic a l c u ltu res, and w e nee d to d isc ern which of the

a sp ec ts o f those c u ltu res w e c a n use to fac ilit a te d em oc ra c y and

wh i ch nee d to b e d isp lac ed , as w e ll as a pp rop ria t e m ec han ism s

for do ing so.


13/20


There was also convergence around the idea that democrac y should beconceived not simply as a static or ideal end state at which a process ofreform is aiming. Conceptually, democracy and democratization permitdistinctions of degree. It may therefore be more illuminating to situate statesand political practices along a continuum of being more or less democratic(in degrees or shades of democratic colour), as opposed to being picturedas either democratic or undemocratic in a black and white, or binary,fashion. The process of democratic reform should also be seen, as onepanellist expressed, as long, slow, risky, and reversible. It should be rooted inhome-grown, internal impulses toward political change; and it should bechampioned by local change agents, with local ownership of the reformprocess.

Dem oc ra t iza t ion is fund am en ta lly a n internal p roc ess exp ressing

the ne ed s a nd d esires of p eo p le fo r resp onsive , ac c ounta b le

g o vernm en t . The c ha llen g e is to f ind b et te r w a ys for the

inte rna t ion a l c om m uni ty to sup p or t those a sp ira t ion s. We kno w th a td em oc ra t iza t ion is a slow p ro c ess req uiring c on t inuo us c ha ng e a nd

lea rn ing , but the c om m on m etho d o log ies used in d e liver ing

d em oc ra c y a ssista nc e rem a in sho rt - term , d isc on t inuo us, a nd

d ep end en t on ou t side ag enc ies.

Panellists also agreed on some of main ingredients of what might bedescribed as the optimal (if not the actual) relationship between externaland internal actors between those that provide democracy assistance andthose that receive it. Democracy assistance should be fundamentally aimedat facilitating an indigenous agenda for political change. It should not be

about (nor be seen to be about) the export of a pre-packaged democraticproduct, or the imposition of foreign models. Integrity on the part of thoserendering assistance will be central to effectiveness and to a perception oflegitimacy on the part of the rec ipients.

Several of the panellists noted instances in which the reality or perception ofdemocracy promotion was at odds with this ideal, and was damaging for thesense of legitimacy or integrity surrounding foreign assistance. In Africa, theinconsistent application of conditionalities (where security or economicinterests might temper the stringency with which they are applied) was citedas one example. The militarization of democratic change in Iraq has also, inthe views of several commentators, harmed the image of an endeavour inwhich the perception of the means employed would appear to have adirect and important bearing on the achievement and legitimacy of theends sought.

One panellist noted that the question of sustained political will to back reformefforts arises both for rec ipients and for donors. Donors too often view the


14/20


holding of elec tions as an exit strategy for assistance. Donors naturally look forrapid and measurable results, whereas elections and democratic reformshould be seen more broadly as part of a larger and longer strategy forpursuing sustainable peace.

The re is a virtua l c o nse nsus, at lea st a t the rhe to ric a l le ve l, tha td em oc ra c y prom ot ion is a long- te rm , m ult i-fac e te d und er tak ing .

Non eth eless, w e h a ve see n insta nc es w he re i t is d ef ine d in p ra c t ic e

a s a n imm ed ia te, unid im en sion a l "m a g ic b ulle t " ... [How ev er ,]

e lec t ions c a nnot eq ua l an ex it st ra teg y .

There may be quite different risk levels that international donors are willing toassume in supporting democratic reform. For outside actors, often the mostimportant and more immediate objective in conflict situations is toachieve the cessation of violence. Once open hostilities have ceased ordiminished, national ac tors may be willing to assume greater risks in order to

achieve other desirable results, such as justice and democratic change, incontrast with the risk levels of outside actors/donors. Afghanistan was cited asan example in which some of the internal demands for justice have not beenmet due to insufficient security measures for witness and jury protection.

Suggestions and other ideas

A number of ideas or suggestions arising from (or, in some cases, separatefrom) the foregoing points were as follows:

The transition of rebel movements into political parties is a subject aboutwhich our knowledge is insufficient, particularly with respec t toencouraging and aiding such a transformation, interacting with suchgroups, and analyzing the extent to which involvement in elections andthe political process does (or can), in fac t, help to moderate such groups.Examples such as South Africa, where liberation movements transformedsuccessfully into political parties, could offer important lessons, whileMozambique provides a relatively successful example where emergencefrom c ivil war pitted former combatants against each other in a politicalprocess. In this context, the use of amnesty was mentioned by one

commentator as an example of a practice which, in some instances, willbe conduc ive to peace and political reform, while in others can bedisruptive from the standpoint of consolidating peace and democracy.

The role of other mechanisms such as truth and reconciliationcommissions should also be explored in this light.

There are a number of issues surrounding elections and violence thatcould be explored more thoroughly, including:


15/20


o the holding of elections in countries/contexts where conflict isongoing (with analysis of the prospects for achieving negotiatedsettlements to conflict);

o the development of predictors or indicators that would assist inanticipating electoral violence;

o further study of the use of pre-elec tion codes of conduct, pacts,agreements, etc., to foster a non-zero-sum view of the politicalimplications of elections, thereby reducing the incentives to spoilerviolence (subject to the important caveat that pre-election pactshave been criticized for entrenching the divisions of war andreducing the meaningfulness of elec tions when they occur); and,

o study of the role of civil soc iety organizations in mitigating thepotential for violence through violence monitoring (via earlywarning communication systems, election campaign monitoring,holding discussion forums, building youth campaigns againstviolence, moderating multi-party consultative committees, etc.).

It was suggested that Canada might consider establishing a commissionto explore democratization. Or, perhaps more modestly, Canada mightcommission additional research on themes such as those above, andothers, where the lessons learned would be relevant to entities such asthe UN Peacebuilding Commission and others involved in framingrecommendations on peacebuilding and democratization; and to thebest practices, principles, and/or norms that organizations may wish toadopt.

Canadian strengths

A number of views were registered on the subject of the extent to whichCanada has a unique approach or particular national/democratic strengthsin rendering democ racy assistance. It was suggested that Canada has apotentially very limited role to play with respect to promoting democraticreform in powerful non-democratic states; other states/contexts will be moreconducive or receptive to democratic change assisted by Canada.

One panellist indicated that Canada is not seen so much as unique, butrather as like-minded with other states of similar values and approaches.Norway and Sweden were offered as points of comparison. In very generalterms, Canada has a good record (peacekeeping and peacebuildingmissions were specifically addressed) and is not perceived to carry a hiddenagenda. As one panellist noted:

Cou ntries like C a na d a , Nord ic c ou ntries, Sw itzer la nd , and som e

o the rs have a n imp ortan t co m pa ra t ive a dva n tag e in the fa c t tha t


16/20


they a re no t pe rc e ived a s g lob a l p ow ers or fo rm er c o lon ia l p ow ers

w hose d em oc ra c y assistan c e m a y ca rry with it co nc ea led p o l it ic a l

or st ra teg ic a g en d a s. Hen c e, the ir b ila tera l assista nc e to

d em oc ra c y b u ild ing is like ly to ove rc om e m ore e a sily som e

susp ic ion s a nd relucta nc e.

A number of themes were suggested as potential strengths for Canada,including the linkages between democracy and social welfare/social justice,lessons learned from past peacekeeping missions, as well as federalism,minority rights, anti-corruption, fiscal policy, and policies promoting tolerance.Among the countries identified as ones in which Canada could possiblymake a significant contribution to the promotion of democracy were Sudan,Zimbabwe, Haiti, Burundi, Nigeria, Kenya, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Swaziland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Liberia, Nicaragua, countries inthe Andean Region (particularly Bolivia), and Sri Lanka.

Panellists expressed several views on the pros and cons ofpolitical partytraining. It was noted that Canada had originally opted in the late 1980s notto become involved in this aspect of democratization owing chiefly toconcerns about interference in the domestic politics of foreign countries.More consideration, however, is now being given to the thought thatCanada should do more in this area (be it through more funding, throughleadership training or parliamentary work, or, for instance, through thecreation of new Canadian capacities). With respect to the potentialdevelopment of new C anadian capac ities in this area, one panellistsuggested that Canada think carefully about the unique strengths of theCanadian political party system, i.e., how best to capitalize on unique

Canadian strengths or characteristics that would, were Canada to follow theexamples of Germany, the Netherlands, or the USA, make for a newcontribution to this kind of work. It was agreed that politica l party training isessential work within the spec trum of democratization activities (whetherundertaken by Canada or others), and that the delivery of assistance in thisarea places a premium on the integrity, impartiality, and inclusiveness withwhich the activities are undertaken.

Multilateral and bilateral options

What should we expect of the UN? Is democratization best pursued at the

regional level? What is best left to bilateral donors?

A second and shorter segment of the exercise focussed on the promotion ofdemocracy at international and regional levels. In particular, the group wasasked to reflect upon some of the strengths and weaknesses of the differentchannels (international and regional; multilateral and bilateral) through which


17/20


democratic assistance can flow or be directed, along with the different waysin which democratic norms can take root and flourish. Oral remarks werelimited primarily to the UN and regional organizations.

It is generally agreed that the EU represents the strongest example of theconsolidation and expansion of democratic norms and practices through thecombination of a variety of political, economic, and security inducementsand incentives to democratic change. At the same time, it was noted thatthe EU experiment is rather sui ge ne ris, the conditions for which are not easilyfound elsewhere.

This is a ha rd situa t ion to re p lic a te ... . The p o te nt ial f ina nc ia l rew a rd s

for EU m em b ersh ip , w ith the a d d ed sea l o f leg it im a c y tha t c om es

w ith it in the internat iona l a ren a , a re p ow erfu l inc ent ive s. No o the r

reg iona l a c tors c a n p rov ide q u ite the sam e d ra w . Tha t do es not

m ea n the re a re n o inc en t ives a t a ll in o ther reg ion s, just tha t theEurop ea n exam p les sho uld no t nec essa rily b e ta ken a s rep lic a b le

m od els for othe r reg ion s.

There was convergence around the idea that the UN can play a useful role insupporting democratic reform, for instance, through technical assistanceencompassing elections and other aspects of the democratic process, alongwith peace support and other operations that are involved in state andinstitution building.

In p o st-wa r sta te s, the tra c k re c o rd o f UN tra nsit io na l a dm inistrat ions

in a t lea st m ov ing throug h a n in it ia l, ac c ep ted p ost -w a r e lec t ion is

rem a rkab ly g oo d . .. Where the UN is m o st like ly to b e d irec t ly

invo lve d in situa t ion s of d em oc ra t iza t ion tha t af fec t hum a n sec urity

a re the instanc es in w hic h m ult id im ensiona l p ea c e op era t ions a re

d ep loye d a nd the o rga n iza t ion takes a d irec t ro le in

d em oc ra t iza t ion : in oversee ing e lec to ra l m an a g em ent , c ob b ling

tog eth er inte rim g ov ernm en ts, prov id ing sec urity for po lling ,

m on ito ring hum a n r ig hts, and fac ilita t ing a sta b le, susta ina b le

outc om e a f te r e lec t ions a re he ld . Resea rc h ha s show n tha t UN

a c t ion s a re m ore suc c essfu l in g et t ing throu g h troub led tra nsit ion s

(a s in Sie rra Le o ne , Lib eria , or Tim o r), bu t t ha t tra nsit iona l pe rio d s

a re to o sho rt a nd d o n ot n ec essa rily lea d to sta b le sta tes.

A distinction was drawn between the practical (i.e., more operational) andpolitical realms of the UN. Despite the lack of a clear institutional home fordemocracy promotion at the UN, it was suggested that there were a varietyof entry points for advancing democratic reform at the practical level.Specifically mentioned were the newly-created Human Rights Council, thePeacebuilding Commission, the Democracy Fund, the Human Development


18/20


Reports produced by the UN Development Program, as well as the UNsmanagement of particular natural/health crises, the negotiation of treaties,etc., eac h of which would contain different points of intersection with thepromotion of democracy. At the operational level, one challenge is thatpeace support operations often work on the basis of short-term mandatesthat may not fully account for long-term (e.g. democratization) objectives.

At the same time, the extent to which the promotion of democracy ispolitically charged and contentious was noted. This includes a lack of clearinternational political consensus about the extent to which democracy is, infact, central to core UN purposes, namely, the maintenance of peace andsecurity and the promotion of development and human rights. In this regard,there was some divergence in the views expressed by the panel concerningthe extent to which support for democracy might ultimately come to be seenas part of the UNs raison dtre. One panellist noted that pushingdemocracy too firmly at the UN may serve to erode, for some, the

organizations legitimacy and the efficacy of its actions elsewhere:

The inst itut iona l he sita t io n is no t just a b o ut resp ec t for the no n-

in te rfe renc e te nets of the Ch a rte r, bu t b ec a use o f the st rong a nd

d irec t assoc ia t ion o f dem oc ra c y , a nd m ore pa rt ic u la rly

d em oc ra t iza t ion ef for ts, with We stern lib era l de m oc ra t ic sta tes. We

c a n a rgue tha t one o f the b ene f it s o f UN ac t ion o n

d em oc ra t iza t ion is tha t i t m igh t m it ig a te tha t im p a c t b y v irtue o f

the b roa d er me m b ersh ip of the orga n iza t ion . An a lte rna t ive

outc om e, how eve r, m ig h t be m ore like ly and m ore de t rim enta l. An

ac t ive d em oc ra t iza t ion m a nda te on the p a r t o f the UN migh t

und ermine the o rg a n iza t ion b y p la c ing it eve n m ore f irm ly tha n it

a lre a d y is, in the m ind s o f som e, un d e r We ste rn, esp e c ia lly US,

inf lue nc e. As a c on seq ue nc e, the a b ility to a c hiev e p rog ress in

o the r UN wo rk ma y be h inde red by a c t iv it y b roug h t ab ou t b y

resistan c e to UN ad voc a c y of d em oc ra t iza t ion .

It was noted that the variousregional organizationshave fundamentallydifferent histories, capacities, and mandates, and that there are thereforedifferent scopes for engagement on the part of Canada and others. Giventhat Canada is a member of many intergovernmental and regionalorganizations, it was suggested generally that these fora (particularly the UN,Commonwealth, OSCE and OAS) represent opportunities for Canada tochampion particular themes or countries, and to advancemultilateral/regional models of democracy promotion. Some concern wasexpressed about recent political tendenc ies within the OSCE and OAS, withthe suggestion that Canada might play a positive role in this regard. SADCand ECOWAS were identified as particular sub-regional organizations inwhich there would be scope for further work by Canada or others in assisting


19/20


with the normative, compliance, and operational aspects of regionaldemocracy promotion.

An im p ortant im p erat ive fo r reg ion a l orga niza t ion s is to m ore

ef fec t ive ly t ie rea c t ions to no n-c om p lia nc e w ith g lob a l a nd

reg iona l norms (on e lec to ra l f ra ud , fo r exam p le) . Mo n ito ring tend sto b e ep isod ic (dur ing e lec t ion eve nts, fo r exam p le) w h ile o f ten

non-c om p lia nc e w ith reg iona l stand a rd s takes p la c e d a ily and

unfo ld s ov er t im e, suc h a s rest ric t io ns on the m ed ia .

It was also suggested that more work could be done to explore the use ofincentives and sanctions in achieving greater compliance with regional andinternational norms, and that Canada might do more to assist the growth ofglobally-networked regional groups involved in delivering and pressuring fordemocratic change.

In addition to work at the international, regional and national levels, severalpanellists stressed that local-level governance is critica l, and also acommonly neglected point. It is often the local level at which citizens feel,and form judgments about, their political system and its ability to deliver keygoods. This should therefore be a primary area of focus in efforts to improveor re-establish the connec tion between citizens and their institutions in bothpre- and post-conflict settings.

Dem oc ra t iza t ion a nd g ove rnanc e a t the loc a l and m un ic ipa l leve l

a re d ef in ite ly im p or tant issue s, pa rt ic u la rly in the fra m ew o rk of

p ea c eb u ild ing op era t ions. The ro le o f loc a l d em oc ra c y in a

p e a c eb ui ld ing p ro c e ss is m ult i- fo ld : f irst , to p ro vide se c urity to th e

loc a l p op u la t ion throug h the estab lishm ent o f ca p a b le ,

a u tono m ous a nd leg it im a te loc a l author it ies; sec ond , to e nsure

tha t the d el ive ry of hum a nita ria n a id a nd b a sic serv ic es is b a sed on

tra nsp a ren c y, a c c ou nta b ility , p a rt ic ip a t ion b y be ne f ic ia ries, a

d irec t re lat ionship w ith loc a l a utho rit ies, a nd a g oo d u nd ersta nd ing

of loc a l nee d s; th ird , to d esig n loc a l go vernme nt f ra m ew orks tha t

a re sup p or tive of c onf lic t m a na ge m ent ; an d , fina lly , to invo lve c iv il

soc ie ty a nd , esp ec ia lly youth , in a ll p ea c eb u ild ing a nd

d em oc ra t iza t ion p rom ot ion ef fo rts.

At the same time, it was noted that local-level politics are invariably situatedwithin other political spheres that circumscribe and exercise control over thelocal level. Thus, engagement at provincial/state and national levels will benecessary as well. It was also noted that differences between urban and ruralsettings can strongly influence, or be elements of, politica l crises.


20/20


One panellist suggested that there is a good opportunity to bring a regionalfocus to bear on some of DFAITs work on democratization and humansecurity in c ities. One goal of programming in this area could be to facilitategreater linkages and networking among mayors, local councils, and city-levelnon-governmental organizations. It was suggested that this is especiallyimportant in Africa, where urbanization has concentrated democratizationand human security concerns in large, teeming cities. Efforts such as fosteringcross-border learning by the United Cities and Local Governments in Africamay be a fruitful regional initiative that would aim to improve professionalismamong those at the front lines of both democracy and human security.

democratization and human security

Documents