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SEPTEMBER 2015
NAVIGATING THE ROAD THROUGH PARIS COP-21 GUIDE FOR MEDIA
TOM BURKE, NICK MABEY & LIZ GALLAGHER
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About E3G E3G are the independent experts on climate diplomacy and energy policy. Our senior leadership has a combined 75
years’ experience advising Government, business and NGOs and a wealth of insight into what climate change means
for societies. E3G works to accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy. We build the
broad based coalitions necessary to deliver a safe climate, we bring independence to an extremely polarised discussion, and we hold policy makers to
account on their promises.
We have been involved in climate diplomacy from the very beginning, and have a deeper understanding of the
process of COP-21 than anyone outside of Government. In short, E3G provide
the independence and expertise necessary to distil what really goes on in
Paris. www.e3g.org
Contact Tom Burke Email: [email protected] Tel: +44 (0) 7710 627616
Nick Mabey Email: [email protected]
Tel: + 44 (0) 7949 758771 Liz Gallagher Email: [email protected]
Tel: + 44 (0) 7920 461838 Berlin office
Neue Promenade 6 Berlin, 10178 – Germany
Tel: +49 (0) 30 2887 3405 Brussels office
Rue de la Science 23 1040 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)28 93 92 12
London office 47 Great Guildford Street London SE1 0ES, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7593 2020
Fax: +44 (0)20 7633 9032 Washington DC office 1250 24th Street NW
Suite 300 Washington DC , WA 20037 United States
Tel: +1 202 466 0573 © E3G 2015
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CONTENTS
About E3G ........................................................................................................................ 2 Contact ............................................................................................................................. 2
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ 3
WHY PARIS MATTERS ...................................................................................................... 4 News hooks and milestones ............................................................................................ 4
COP-21 ............................................................................................................................. 6 What makes Paris different? ........................................................................................... 6 What do we know so far? ................................................................................................ 7 What will happen when? ................................................................................................. 7 What are the elements up for negotiations? .................................................................. 7
What’s the political context? ........................................................................................... 9
What are the risks to a strong agreement in Paris? ........................................................ 9 Life after COP-21? .......................................................................................................... 10
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 12 UNFCCC and the history of COP .................................................................................... 12
Who is impacted? .......................................................................................................... 15 Who are the key players? .............................................................................................. 17
Cheat sheet .................................................................................................................... 19 Where else is useful for information? ........................................................................... 23
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WHY PARIS MATTERS A changing climate affects the prosperity and security of every single person on the
planet. The increasing tempo and severity of climate driven events – floods, droughts, wildfires, typhoons – is bringing this home to families and communities everywhere. The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris this December takes place at a critical moment.
The risks to governments of ambitious action to tackle the problem are lower. The costs of low carbon technologies are falling rapidly. The risks to governments of failing to act are, however, growing. Events and the work of climate scientists are combining
to persuade large majorities of people throughout the world of the need to act. A successful agreement in Paris will accelerate the transition to the low carbon economy necessary to keep the climate safe. It will establish an enduring framework within which government can work together to keep the rise in global temperatures
below 2°C. It will shape the development of the real energy economy in the months
and years after Paris.
This briefing sets out how the world has arrived at this critical juncture, what will happen in Paris and after, what E3G expect the shape of the agreement to look like and the risks to its successful conclusion.
E3G will be closely following and commenting on the political dynamics in the run-up
to and during COP21. CEO Nick Mabey and policy lead Liz Gallagher will be in Paris throughout the conference, and Chairman Tom Burke will be in London and available
for commentary and insight. With a combined 75 years’ experience, together they can provide your readers and viewers with an independent expert perspective of what’s
really going on.
News hooks and milestones Between now and the conference itself (30 November – 11 December) there are a
number of key events and milestones to frame reporting around: Date Event Significance
tbc Oct UNFCCC Text published
The co-chairs will publish the new text ahead of the Intersessional.
9-11 Oct IMF/World Bank meetings, Lima
The annual meetings of Finance Ministers and representatives from International Financial Institutions will meet to discuss how they will contribute to ‘shift the trillions’ away from fossil fuels towards clean energy. In addition, it is likely
that there will be announcements amongst donors
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on how they intend to reach $100bn p.a. by 2020.
12-13 Oct EU Commission INDC Conference, Rabat
Ministers from Europe and many other developing countries will hold discussions regarding what additional ambition is required to deliver a 2°C agreement.
15-16 Oct EU Heads of State Council, Brussels
EU Leaders will be preparing their mandate ahead of the COP in Paris. Likely to include an emphasis on Europe position on the long-term goal and finance.
19-23 Oct UNFCCC Intersessional, Bonn
Negotiators will attempt to streamline the text enabling further revision. Likely challenging issues will be legal nature and finance.
TBC Nov Pre-COP, location
tbc
Chance for Ministers to come together to discuss
some of the crunch issues ahead of the COP.
15-16 Nov G20 Leaders, Turkey
G20 Leaders Summit will be the last time leaders congregate ahead of the COP. Some elements up
for discussion include the potential for stranded assets of fossil fuels if Paris succeeds.
27-28 Nov CHOGM, Malta Leaders from the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand will be locked in the same room as those from India and many small island states right
ahead of the COP, making it a convenient time for vulnerable countries to pressure their richer
counterparts to take more ambitious action.
28 Nov Paris Mobilisation Campaigners from across the globe will march, urging governments to take ambitious action in
Paris.
30 Nov – 11 Dec
COP-21, Paris The Leaders are expected to attend the first few days of the COP and the Ministers will arrive in the
second week.
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COP-21
What makes Paris different? In 2009 the world tried to secure a legally binding agreement on climate change in Copenhagen; it didn’t succeed. This time around, we have learnt our lessons:
> Paris viewed as an enduring regime – the previous big agreements have attempted to capture climate action over a limited timeframe. Paris will help to provide certainty to a range of timescales, both short-term and long-term. This marks a significant shift in countries’ sincerity and understanding about the scale
of the challenge.
> US and China are now both engaged – before Copenhagen, these two major
emitters were not collaborating constructively to reduce emissions, both viewing each other with suspicion rather than as peers. They have since made a series of
very significant commitments which have been fundamental in building momentum and trust ahead of Paris.
> We have pledges ahead of the COP – before Copenhagen the status of the pledges and expectations around what particular countries could offer (especially
from China) were unclear, resulting in diplomatic frustration. Today we have all the major economies’ pledges on the table, these pledges are locking in
engagement and demonstrating the world is ready for an agreement in Paris.
> More climate legislation in place – only a handful of countries had climate
legislation in place ahead of Copenhagen. Now, 75% of GHGs are covered by legislation1.
> Climate action is good for growth – new analysis2 has demonstrated that climate action is good for growth and economy recovery. This is shifting the perceptions of political and economic decision-makers about the co-benefits from
decarbonisation.
> Renewables are a credible alternative to power the global economy – in 2009,
renewables were not considered a mainstream source of energy. In the last 6
years incredible investment in renewable means that a low carbon future seems more realistic and tangible.
> More voices calling for action – ahead of Copenhagen many NGOs mobilised their
supporters to demonstrate and call for an ambitious deal. Right now, the voices have broadened to include the Pope, progressive business, investors, campaigners, mayors and world leaders who are engaging and calling for a strong agreement. Climate change is no longer seen as only of concern to
1 http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/new-study-finds-75-of-global-greenhouse-gas-covered-by-national-targets/
2 http://2014.newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NCE_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
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Mon Tues Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Week 130 Nov – 6 Dec
Week 27 – 13 Dec
Some Leaders Attend
Ministers Arrive
Likely Public Negotiations Likely Closed Negotiations
Likely Closed Negotiations
environmentalists, but is viewed as a concern for those concerned with prosperity and security.
> Decoupled fossil fuels from growth – ahead of Copenhagen emissions were
beginning to fall in many countries due to the economic crisis. In 2014, growth in carbon dioxide from the power sector stalled, whilst the global economy continued to grow.
What do we know so far? In 2013 all countries agreed that they should get their pledges ready early, to avoid
confusion and mismanaged expectations ahead of the Summit. Most major
economies have put forward their pledges (Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions – INDCs)34. We know that all the mitigation efforts so far won’t deliver an outright 2°C outcome in Paris. Therefore additional elements are required to make sure Paris keeps us on track for meeting 2°C.
What will happen when? The official agenda of the Paris COP is still not confirmed. However, informal
intelligence and looking back at previous COPs suggests the following type of rhythm can be expected:
What are the elements up for negotiations? Paris is not only about countries’ mitigation pledges. There are other elements which must be agreed to ensure countries can implement their actions and build an enduring regime, these include:
> Legal Nature – the hesitation and domestic opposition by countries such as the US, China and India to replicate a Kyoto-like system poses some challenges in how
3 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
4 http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/03/paris-2015-tracking-country-climate-pledges
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we create a robust and accountable agreement. The Paris outcome will include a range of legal instruments. Legal nature is one element to measure the political intent of countries, but not the only benchmark.
> Long-term collective goal – 2°C is the obligation all countries have agreed is
necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. However, many companies and investors find this goal difficult to measure their spending against. Therefore
having something more operational that governments, investors and others can benchmark their decisions against will help to make 2°C meaningful for the real-economy.
> Ambition mechanism – distinguishing Paris from other previous agreements is the importance of creating a regime to keep us on track for 2°C, rather than a one
off deal. This will be important to give the long-term collective goal teeth. The mechanism should enable countries to step forward regularly every 5 years and increase ambition.
> Transparency and accountability – the rules and assumptions which underpin
how countries count their emissions is crucial to ensuring environmental integrity
and avoid ‘creative accounting’. Verification is critical to ensure that countries understand the international expectations upon them to abide by the rules. These elements are crucial to provide other countries, corporates and investors
with the confidence that countries will abide by the rules and implement their actions.
> Financial support – many developing countries need financial support to help catalyse their own domestic actions both in reducing emissions and in adapting to
the impacts of climate change. Elements which are important are: the proportion of funding that goes towards adaptation, donors fulfilling their existing
commitments, the potential for quantifiable targets for richer countries and if new donors should be included in the future agreement.
> Adapting to the impacts – adaptation in the negotiations has been relatively
incremental, however the lack of funding available has resulted in less movement.
In particular, the adaptation agenda is looking at where the international community can add value to an issue which is widely considered local/regional and how to connect the levels of emissions reductions on the table with the
adaptation efforts required to prepare for the projected impacts.
> Loss and damage – as the impacts of climate change become more severe,
adaptation is no longer an option. In this case, countries are beginning to look at some of the implications for this unmanageable situation. One of the first issues this raises is how to attribute climate change to a specific event that causes loss
and damage, understand and document those impacted by such events and then identify how to redress their loss.
> Immediate ambition – as part of the agreement from Durban, countries
embarked upon a work programme to increase ambition immediately, before the new agreement in Paris kicks in. At present the discussions in the negotiations focus on technical analysis to identify areas of potential for more ambition. The
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elements up for negotiation focus on how to incorporate more political discussions into these negotiations to assure more pressure on countries to increase ambition.
What’s the political context? Political attention on climate change has dramatically increased over the past year. The political outcomes of the G7, driven by Germany, sent a confident political signal to the international community on the contours of the Paris agreement. Many new
constituencies like cities and progressive business are now active in demanding more from governments, and the US in particular has used its diplomatic sway to shape the
agenda for Paris. In addition, the slew of real-economy announcements including coal divestment, INDCs and investments in renewables are all contributing towards to the political momentum ahead of Paris. The economic and political tail winds are behind us for Paris.
The INDCs are a good start but not enough to get us firmly on track for a 2°C
trajectory. Paris must therefore build an enduring regime to enable the world to avoid unmanageable climate change.
The French Presidency is undertaking an impressive task of driving consensus and maintaining procedural clarity. Whilst consensus is a pre-condition for success, the
dominant dynamic is that of the US and China, currently driving the level of ambition in Paris. Both countries want a universal deal to assuage their domestic
constituencies, but the strength of ambition is not necessarily a priority for both. The absence of an alternative force to temper the US-China dynamic is resulting in these two countries having their own way.
However, the vested interest in securing an agreement in Paris by the Chinese, US and
the EU means that many traditional ‘spoiler’ countries such as Saudi, Russia and Venezuela are less likely to threaten the outcome, due to the consequences it would have upon their respective bilateral relationships.
What are the risks to a strong agreement in Paris? There are a set of variables which can impact the scale of ambition in Paris. These
include: Ability of the ‘Durban alliance’ to reappear in some shape or form – whenever
significant outcomes have been agreed at these events, it is usually the result of an alliance between developed and developing countries. Many of the vulnerable countries and the likes of the EU, Norway and Switzerland share common interests. However, some stumbling blocks such as lack of progress on a clear finance package frustrate the potential alliances. The self-organisation amongst the respective groups
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and their ability to engage in ‘reciprocity’ with each other is going to be important in increasing the probability of a more robust outcome. Which set of actors are being listened to – the majority of COPs engage Environment
Ministers. However, in Paris, if we are building a new regime which is to speak to a range of real-economy actors, then political leaders will be needed to convince investors and corporates that they mean business. So far, President Obama, Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande have been active in outreach and diplomacy. President Xi Jinping has shown he takes this issue seriously, but is the only
emerging economy leader to do so. If the outcome of Paris is going to be persuasive to the outside world, then it will require more heavyweight leaders from emerging economies to engage.
Setting up 2016 to turn the deal into reality – part of the challenge for the last remaining months and weeks are to try and cement climate onto the agenda of other international bodies such as the G20, World Economic Forum and the World Bank/IMF Spring meeting. It will be important for these stakeholders and real-
economy actors to respond to Paris, internalise what it means for them and look to
how they can go about implementing the outcomes and accelerate climate action.
Understanding Paris as an enduring regime rather than a one off deal – how governments, corporates and citizens understand what Paris is and is not will be important to judging it. Understanding that the pledges on their own will not be
sufficient and that Paris will need to build an enduring regime to keep us on track is essential to interpretation and implementation in the real-economy.
Known unknowns at the end game – many countries which have been traditionally
difficult in the negotiations could pose a last minute challenge to the consensus amongst the parties. Venezuela, Poland and Argentina have elections near the COP.
In addition, Russia has on occasion caused controversy. These end-game tactics can often create confusion and disrupt the potential for a more ambitious agreement. However, an known unknown could be an iconic weather event. The COP’s have previously been venues where bad news is broken; Typhoon Haiyan and the
devastating impacts upon the Philippines saw a profound shift in the emotional and political dynamics within the talks.
Life after COP-21? The interpretation of Paris should not dwell on the deal in the room but the impacts
on the world. Paris will look ambiguous to the untrained eye. A sufficient but imperfect outcome in Paris shouldn’t be classed as a failure. It is important to think of the road through Paris, for even with a strong agreement, the job will not be complete. Paris will likely give birth to a new agreement that will accelerate the pace and scale of decarbonisation. Some details will likely need further negotiation, and
the rest will need to be implemented in time for 2020 when the deal kicks in.
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Some key moments that will indicate what Paris means for the real-economy include: Date Event Significance
17-18 December
EU Heads of State Council
European Leaders will declare their verdict on the Paris outcome.
20-23
January
World Economic
Forum
Business and investors, alongside the global
economic elite will interpret what Paris means for their business models.
15-17 April World Bank and
IMF Spring Meetings
Finance Ministers and international financial
institutions will discuss how to respond to Paris.
26-27 May G7 Leaders, Japan Leaders from the G7 countries will discuss how to
respond to Paris.
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APPENDIX UNFCCC and the history of COP
1992 – Rio Declaration In 1992 countries from across the world came together to agree the Rio Declaration at the ‘Earth Summit’. This meeting created the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was set up to “stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The agreement is a Treaty, the
most binding form of international law, but doesn’t contain quantified commitments from countries; it acts to guide the principles of how all countries should address
climate change.
1995 – 1997 Kyoto Protocol Angela Merkel, the then Environment Minister for Germany, initiated the process
starting in 1995 whereby two years later countries came back together to get more precise about who needed to do what to stem climate change. In 1997, this lead to all
countries agreeing to join the Kyoto Protocol, which set out quantified targets for developed countries such as the US, EU, Japan, Australia, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, as well as those countries transitioning in the post-Soviet sphere. The
implicit expectation was that developed countries would go first, but there was intent that developing countries would take on commitments in future. The Kyoto Protocol
is notable because the US failed to ratify it, resulting in the US becoming an outlier in the negotiations until recently. The lack of US ratification frustrated developing
countries, and set back expectations they would join the next phase of the commitment. Despite no ratification by the US, the Kyoto Protocol went onto be an
effective tool to reduce emissions in Europe, and other countries benefited from climate friendly European products, standards and policies. The Kyoto Protocol was a relative success but as the challenge of climate change became more apparent, and the growth of the emerging economies accelerated, there was more to be done.
2009 – Copenhagen Accord In 2009, as the first set of commitments for the Kyoto Protocol were due to expire in
2012, countries began to think about what the next set of targets should look like and
how to encourage developing countries to take on targets as well. The political
context since Kyoto was very different. The rise of emerging economies and the beginning of the financial crisis were all creating a challenging backdrop to these complicated negotiations. The Copenhagen Summit stands out as an example of how the urgency of what needed to be done to keep the climate safe was not being matched by the preparedness of governments. The failure of diplomacy was evident,
with negotiators, Ministers and Leaders unclear about their partner’s intentions and the text they were working from. In the end, a few leaders from key emitting economies pulled together the Copenhagen Accord, which failed to gain consensus and endorsement of the negotiators in the final hours. The Copenhagen Accord was
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simply a political agreement. However, the Copenhagen Accord did spell out that 2°C is the limit for a safe climate.
2010 – Cancun In 2010 it was the turn of the Mexicans to host the Presidency of the. To pick up the pieces straight after Copenhagen, the Mexicans undertook extensive diplomatic
outreach to repair the damage that Copenhagen left in its wake. In the Cancun conference, the Mexicans secured all the elements of the Copenhagen Accord into a more detailed set of legal decisions. This agreement was more comprehensive than the Copenhagen Accord, striking a balanced package which covered all elements of the international climate change agenda including: adapting to the impacts of climate
change, financial support to countries coping with the impacts and transitioning to
the low carbon economy and securing more transparent and accountable reporting of emissions reductions. Critically, the Cancun Agreements codified 2°C as the threshold
of dangerous climate change, thus clarifying the overall goal of the UNFCCC. So soon after Copenhagen, this outcome rescued the climate negotiations and returned momentum to the talks.
2011 – The Durban Alliance South Africa hosted the 2011 COP in Durban. Many countries were keen to set a new
timeline for agreeing a comprehensive legal agreement to manage and reduce climate change. The negotiations were tense. Many large emerging economies were hesitant
about being bound into a new legal agreement on a similar level to their developed country counter parts, wanting to see the richer countries do more. A tactical alliance
was developed between the vulnerable countries in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the European Union. The so called
‘Durban Alliance’ pulled together the majority of the world’s countries to demand a legally binding treaty to be delivered by 2015, whilst setting up a work programme to look at immediate actions to increase ambition. The rationale for settling on 2015 as
the deadline was to allow for political cycles in the US, China, India and Brazil to take place; as well as allowing the low carbon economy to flourish and become a credible alternative to a fossil fuelled future. The outcome of Durban was a success, after the
famous Ministerial ‘huddle’ right at the end of the negotiations. Careful language was crafted to agree that the outcome of 2015 would have ‘legal force’.
The road to Paris In return for securing a legal agreement in 2015, many developed countries already
taking emissions reductions from Kyoto agreed to consider a second commitment period, which would cover their emissions out to 2020. The 2015 agreement would kick in by 2020 thereby putting all nations under one umbrella agreement. In 2012, Europe agreed to take part in the second commitment period of Kyoto, as did Australia, but other countries such as Japan and Canada refused to join.
Since 2012, climate negotiations have continued under two main tracks agreed in Durban. One is delivering the post-2020 deal; the deadline for this is the Paris COP this year. The second is looking at ways to increase ambition before 2020.
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Why do we need the international action on climate change? No country can control the climate alone. Climate change is more challenging than many other global issues because it is a race against the clock; delaying action makes lower climate risk levels unattainable. It also requires profound choices that impact broad national interest debates such as growth, development, national security and
energy. Tackling climate change requires synergies between national and international action. All countries stepping forward together to tackle the issue provides political cover for
leaders that others are doing their share. This opens up more domestic political space, raising the probability of a country doing more than it would unilaterally. Copenhagen forced climate onto domestic political agendas, meaning governments
had to take a position. European renewable energy targets would not have been agreed in 2007 without the prospect of global climate negotiations at Copenhagen. Chinese renewable energy targets mirror Europe’s own targets, with China’s growing solar industry initially dependent on Europe for the majority of its demand. Paris is
now pressuring countries to put forward their next set of emission reduction offers, known as intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs).
Whilst these INDCs are not enough to put the world onto an outright 2°C trajectory, the progress made on the international climate front has had the most tangible
economic impact that any other global diplomatic process has achieved in the last
decade. Recent announcements from the US and China demonstrate how international agreements inform and catalyse domestic levels of ambition.
Global agreements drive domestic ambition, but also rest upon it. Therefore, a global agreement should deliver a collective, simultaneously reinforcing signal to those who
will create and implement future climate action. Expectations and certainty are central to the effectiveness of a global agreement. Weak and inconsistent policies
send mixed signals about governments’ own intentions, creating “policy risks” and raising the cost of capital. An international agreement has the potential to act as a powerful macroeconomic policy instrument to shift investment away from fossil fuels and into clean energy. Only strong and simultaneous action can keep open the goal of limiting warming to no more than 2°C.
Why does 2°C matter? The extreme weather and economic impacts we’ve experienced to date resulting from less than 1˚C of warming will pale in comparison with the impact on human welfare, prosperity and security from twice as much warming. One degree may sound
like a small amount, but it’s unusual in our planet’s recent history, and small changes in temperature lead to enormous changes in the environment.
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To put it in context, just 5˚C of warming ended the last ice age, and 6˚C of warming would return the planet to the conditions when “Canadian Arctic was as balmy as Florida and lousy with crocodile-like animals called champsosaurs5.”
Climate change is a risk unlike others, where last-minute action can sometimes halt and reverse the threat. But with climate change, if we halted emissions tomorrow, the world would continue to warm and sea levels rise. We are now locked into risks we have accumulated in nearly two centuries. With each year, we add new risks.
The international community has agreed that 2˚C is the threshold of unmanageable climate change. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)6 and United Nations
Security Council7 (UNSC) have both stated that uncontrolled climate change poses a threat to international peace and security. In 2009, and on several subsequent occasions since, leaders have agreed to limit global temperature rises to below 2°C in order to prevent dangerous climate change. In addition, a range of analysis shows that global poverty reduction and development goals will be increasingly unattainable
– and current gains unsustainable – in an above 2°C world.
Analysis suggests that limiting climate change to 2°C would avoid the most
catastrophic and irreversible changes to the climate system. However, it would still result in significant economic and social costs in all parts of the world, and pose existential threats to a few countries. Hence, under the UNFCCC, parties have also
agreed to review the adequacy of the 2°C target.
Warming beyond 4°C is recognised to be “incompatible with organised global community”8. This means civil order, productive capacity and growth are not possible.
Unmanageable climate change would go beyond our ability to adapt.
Who is impacted? Cities Cities are the centre of prosperity, cultural heritage and the key to global growth. But climate change threatens their prospects of development by pushing the poorest and
the emerging middle classes into poverty. Unstable cities means an insecure and unstable world with increasing health risks and resource insecurity. The world’s urban
population is forecast almost to double by 20509, increasing the number of people and assets exposed to climate change risks.
5 http://www.popsci.com/environment/article/2009-05/crocodile-reptiles-lived-arctic-55-million-years-ago-could-it-happen-again-0
6 United Nations. (2014). “Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015”.
7 United Nations Security Council. (2007). “Provisional records of the 5667 meeting of the Security Council”
8 8 http://fr.slideshare.net/DFID/professor-kevin-anderson-climate-change-going-beyond-dangerous
9 http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf
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Increased air pollution also poses a particular climate threat to cities, where rising temperatures will cause more respiratory deaths and suffering as a result of increased ozone pollution from trucks and cars in cities. As many cities are located in coastal areas, they are also more exposed to flooding and storm surges. For example, Hurricane Sandy in 2012 crippled the New York region, leading to a week-long shut-down of one of the largest container ports in the United States10. In poorer countries, cities attract informal settlements in slums where people are among the most exposed to extreme weather because they lack basic infrastructure. Cities are also dependent upon the hinterlands for resources and food. As climate change disrupts traditional resource availability, it will leave cities and their inhabitants exposed. Cities cannot be moved. They are significantly exposed to climate impacts and exposed to their national governments levels of ambition to tackle challenge.
The security community Military leaders in the UK and US have warned recently that cl imate change presents a growing risk to geopolitical stability, which in turn could affect nations’ security, prosperity and wellbeing11. A respected military advisory board, with highly ranked retired officers from all branches of the armed forces, evaluated the effects of climate change on national security. They found that climate change is becoming a catalyst for conflict12. Increased extreme weather, as expected under climate change, will threaten food security and in turn lead to migration, food insecurity and conflict, where Syria is an illustrative example. Syria experienced its worst recorded drought from 2006 to 2011.13 In 2008, rainfall in eastern Syria dropped to 30% of the annual average, devastating the wheat crop and contributing to the displacement of an estimated 300,000 to one million people.14 Migration to nearby cities led to urban unemployment, food insecurity and subsequent social unrest, contributing one factor towards the onset of civil war in 2011.15
10 Revi, A. and Satterthwaite, D., 2014. Chapter 8: Urban Areas. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Field, C., et al. (eds.).
Available at: https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf
11 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-446 and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends-
out-to-2045
12 http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2014/09/climate-change-as-catalyst-of-conflict/
13 Gleick, P., 2014. Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. Weather, Climate and Society, 6. 331–340.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1
14 Oweis, K. 2010. Eastern Syria grapples with drought, poverty. In: Reuters News. Jan. 27 2010. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/27/us-syria-drought-idUSTRE60Q5FW20100127
15 Gleick, P., 2014. Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria
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The development community The march towards poverty reduction is impossible without climate stability. Climate change will not only push the poor back into poverty, but according to the IPCC16, it will bring those on the cusp of the emerging middle classes back into poverty. It will undo development investment and progress gained over decades. The future middle classes – on whom national and corporate growth strategies depend – will not exist if climate change is left unmanaged. The World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said that climate change could “roll back decades of development”, and was a “fundamental threat to economic development and the fight against poverty.”17
The corporate and financial community Climate change is likely to significantly disrupt patterns of capital investment. The supply side of business models will become more vulnerable to volatile resource supply due to extreme weather events. One area that many business and investors have not well understood is that their value and the demand for their goods and services will also be impacted. The value of companies who rely upon increasing demand from emerging middle classes in developing countries will be compromised. The physical impacts of climate change will affect assets, liabilities and investments. Interpretations of the New Climate Economy Report18 suggest there is no such thing as business as usual. A political choice does exist; not choosing a low carbon pathway has economic consequences. Countries that fail to put in place a credible pathway to manage low-carbon development and climate risks will see investors become reluctant to commit towards long-term investments. A lack of clear and robust policy frameworks will bring with it the risk of costly retrospective policy changes and stranded assets. Lack of investment in climate resilience will increase the risk of shocks to supply chains and damage to infrastructure installations. At best, this will result in higher costs and lower growth. At worst, it will create a significant shift of capital to less productive but more liquid assets, or to lower risk investments.
Who are the key players? Name Position Twitter handle
Christiana Figueres Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC @CFigueres
Laurence Tubiana French Diplomat leading the outreach with countries ahead of the COP
@LaurenceTubiana
Laurent Fabius COP21 President and French Foreign
Minister
@LaurentFabius
John Kerry US Secretary of State @JohnKerry
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). “Climate Change 2014. Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability: Summary for Policy Makers”. 17 World Bank, 2014. Turn Down the Heat.
18 http://newclimateeconomy.report/TheNewClimateEconomyReport.pdf
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Michael Zamat Cutujar Former UNFCCC Executive Secretary, advising the French Presidency
N/A
Miguel Arias Canete European Commissioner for Climate and Energy
@MAC_europa
Carole Dieschbourg Luxembourg’s Environment Minister, currently representing the EU
@DieschbourgC
Ahmed Djoghlaf Co-chair of the negotiations, Algerian N/A
Dan Reifsnyder Co-chair of the negotiations, American N/A
Raphael Azeredo Brazilian Lead negotiator and
Diplomat
@ItamaratyGovBr
Kwok Fook Seng Singapore’s climate envoy N/A
Prakash Javadekar India’s Environment Minister @PrakashJavdekar
Todd Stern US Climate Envoy @StateDept
Su Wei China’s Lead negotiator N/A
Xie Zhenhua Former Climate Minister, now Special Envoy on climate
N/A
Alf Wills South Africa’s Lead negotiator N/A
Tony de Brum Minister from the Republic of the
Marshall Islands
@MinisterTdB
Non-state experts Name Company +
position
Area of
expertise
Email/Twitter
Liz Gallagher E3G – Climate
Diplomacy lead
Global Politics,
EU politics, policy details
@LizGallagher
Ruth Davis E3G – Senior
Associate
Global Politics,
UK politics, policy details
@ruthdavis27
Nick Mabey E3G – CEO Foreign Policy
and Diplomacy, China
@Mabeytweet
Tom Burke E3G – Director Foreign Policy,
US and Extractives
politics
@tom_burke_47
Jennifer Morgan
WRI – Climate Director
Global Politics, US politics,
policy details
[email protected] @climatemorgan
Alden Meyer UCS – International
Climate Lead
Global Politics, US politics,
policy details
Ana Toni GIP – CEO Global Politics, Brazilian
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politics
Monica Araya Nivela – CEO Global Politics, Lat-Am politics
[email protected] @MonicaArayaTica @NivelaOrg
Mohammed Adow
Christian Aid – Climate Lead
Global Politics, African politics, policy details
[email protected] @mohadow
Alix Mazouine CAN France – COP21 Lead
Finance, French Politics
[email protected] @ClimatAlix
Christoph Bals Germanwatch – Director
Global Politics, German
politics
[email protected] @christophbals
Martin Kaiser Greenpeace International Lead
Global Politics, EU politics
[email protected] @martinkaisergp
Srinivas Krishnaswamy
Vashuda Foundation - CEO
Global Politics, Indian politics
Li Shuo Greenpeace
China
Global Politics,
Chinese politics
@LiShuo_GP
Erwin Jackson The Climate Institute – Dep.
Director
Global Politics, Australian
Politics
[email protected] @ErwinJackson1
Wael
Hmaidan
CAN
International Director
Global Politics,
Gulf politics
@whmaidan
Cheat sheet
$100bn In Copenhagen, and codified in Cancun, developed countries agreed to commit $100bn per annum by 2020 through public and private means to support climate action in developing countries. Donors have struggled to demonstrate what counts and what doesn’t towards meeting the $100bn.
Adaptation Efforts undertaken to prepare for and reduce vulnerability to changes resulting from climate change.
ADP The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) came out of the Durban meeting in 2011. It is effectively a work programme under the
Convention. The mandate of the ADP is to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to
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all Parties, to be completed no later than 2015 in order for it to be adopted at COP21 and come into effect and be implemented from 2020.
AILAC The Independent Association of Latin American and the Caribbean (AILAC) represents six regionally proximate countries with similar positions on climate change. AILAC is
officially comprised of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru. These groups have been instrumental in securing an understanding that developing countries can take climate action on their own, but can do more with finance.
ALBA ALBA, formally known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, is a
negotiating bloc with 11 member countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. It is associated with socialist and social democratic governments and operates under a vision of a Hispanic system of solidarity and mutual aid. The ALBA group has predominately focused on issues of justice and equity in the negotiations.
Annex I A term used to refer to industrialised countries that were members of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero in 1992, and countries with economies in transition.
AOSIS The Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) represents 44 island and low-lying
coastal countries with similar development challenges and environmental concerns.
AOSIS lobbies and negotiates for small island developing states (SIDS) in the United Nations system. Climate change is an existential threat to many SIDS, and AOSIS has called for major global emissions reductions at every international climate
negotiation.
BASIC The BASIC group consists of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. These four newly industrialised countries came to prominence in the Copenhagen climate summit, and often argue for equitable development and consideration of common but
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDR-RC).
BAU Business as usual (BAU) is a projection of emissions if there were no additional climate action taken.
Carbon intensity The rate of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of an activity – in the international climate negotiations, generally in terms of gross domestic product.
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Cartagena Dialogue The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal alliance of around 40 developed and developing countries party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. The dialogue meets outside of the formal negotiations to discuss progressive climate objectives. It includes countries from Europe, AILAC and LDCs.
CBDR-RC A guiding principle as well as a source of contention in the UN climate negotiations, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR–RC)
takes account of a country’s historic contributions to climate change, as well as its ability to contribute to a global response.
COP The Conference of Parties (COP) is the governing body of the UNFCCC, composed of countries that have ratified the UNFCCC (Parties). The COP meets every year.
Copenhagen Accord The result of the 15th Session of the Conference of Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Accord included a
long-term goal of limiting warming to no more than 2˚C above pre–industrial levels, but excluded practical terms for achieving this goal.
G77 The Group of 77 (G77) is the largest group of developing countries participating in the
Paris climate talks. This group is very diverse and represents a broad variety of
interests and positions. Often the G77 is referred to as the G77+China, as China is not formally part of the G77 grouping.
GCF The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a fund set up through the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the intent to raise money to help developing countries to reduce emissions and cope with the impacts of climate
change. INDC
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are the actions and plans that countries intend to take to address climate change, submitted ahead of the Paris
negotiations.
LDCs Least-developed countries are 48 Parties recognised by the United Nations and under the UNFCCC for their “specific needs and special situations” and limited capacity to respond and adapt to climate change. LMDC
The Like Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) is a new negotiating bloc that
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represents over 50% of the global population. The LMDCs include Bolivia, Venezuela, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, China and India. The LMDCs contain a diverse set of interests ranging from countries where climate change poses a fundamental threat to their development as well as those who are major producers of fossil fuels such as
Saudi and Venezuela.
Loss and Damage A term used to describe climate impacts that occur when the limits of adaptation are reached. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has developed a work programme on loss and damage to help address the issue, particularly for the developing countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change.
LULUCF Describes a greenhouse gas inventory sector (Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry) which covers emissions and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from
direct human-induced land use, land-use change and forestry activities.
MEF The Major Economies Forum (MEF) was launched in 2009 as an informal forum to facilitate dialogue among major developed and developing economies in order to achieve a successful outcome in UNFCCC climate negotiations. Although the original
goal of the MEF was to help secure a successful agreement at the Copenhagen COP, the MEF is also meeting in preparation for the December 2015 Paris COP. Members
include Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, United Kingdom,
and United States.
Mitigation Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, either through sinks or by curtailing emissions at the source.
MRV MRV stands for Measurement, Reporting and Verification. It is the basis of the
methodologies, rules and accounting standards that countries must follow when reporting their emissions. The verification aspect has in the past been the most contentious aspect.
Party A country or regional economic organisation that has ratified the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol.
Sink According to the UNFCCC, a sink is “any process, activity, or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”
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SIDS In the UNFCCC negotiations, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have formed a negotiating block called the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), with 39 member states and 5 observers.
SBI The UNFCCC has two permanent subsidiary bodies, one of which is the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). The SBI advises the COP on the implementation of the UNFCCC.
SBSTA The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) advises the COP
on science, technology, and methodological issues.
The Umbrella Group The Umbrella Group is an informal group made up of non-EU developed countries. Its
formation occurred following the Kyoto Protocol, and its non-codified member list usually includes Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russia,
Ukraine, and the United States.
UNFCCC The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a near-universal climate treaty established at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The
COP21 will be the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties to the 1992
UNFCCC.
Where else is useful for information?
> ENB – daily updates on the details of the negotiations
http://www.iisd.ca/
> ECO – daily newsletter from the NGOs on the talks
http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco-newsletters
> The UNFCCC jargon can be disentangled via:
http://www.theroadthroughparis.org/glossary and http://www.rtcc.org/2014/11/28/jargon-busting-inside-the-world-of-the-un-climate-talks/