NATIONAL POS-TSUNAMI LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES WORKSHOP

Colombo, Sri Lanka 8-9 June 2005

REPORT

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1. Introduction More than 75 representatives of key stakeholders involved in the tsunami response convened in Colombo on the 8th and 9th of June 2005 for a one-and-a-half day ‘Lessons Learned and Best Practice’ workshop. The representatives were from national, provincial, and district government, community representatives, INGOs and NGOs, IFIs, donors and the private sector. The workshop focussed on the issues arising during the first eight weeks after the tsunami. The workshop was developed in partnership with the President’s Office and the UN. Opening remarks were delivered by Mano Tittawella, Senior Director General and Senior Advisor to the President and Mr Miguel Bermeo, UN Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator. Their comments highlighted that even though the tsunami was an exceptional event, there were many lessons to be learned and challenges to be overcome. They acknowledged the unprecedented public response and the dedication and commitment of both government and non-government actors in responding to the disaster. Those present were reminded that tremendous effort had been demonstrated by all actors and that such a complex response could not be expected to be flawless and without problems. Huge achievements had been realised. The most important step to take now was to learn from what has transpired and make recommendations for improvement to deal with current and future issues. It was also recognised that Sri Lanka is subject to a wide range of hazards and disasters, not of the magnitude of the 26th December 2004 tsunami, but still significant and necessitating thoughtful, realistic and robust disaster management preparedness plans. There was also significant emphasis on the need to closely consider institutional preparedness and to focus on standards, guiding principles and values which should form part of an overarching framework for emergency and reconstruction initiatives. Co-ordination and communication mechanisms were also singled out as subject areas for the workshop to examine in detail. Ensuring equity and transparency with all communities within the affected districts was also mentioned as an important guiding principle. This was followed by three presentations from Mr Tilak Ranaviraja, Chairman of the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR); Mr Ganesh, District Secretary Jaffna and Mr Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA).These presentations highlighted many of the positive achievements of the emergency relief period whilst also drawing attention to a range of critical issues that were to be examined in depth during the workshop. From the presentations and the subsequent discussion, issues including ports and customs issues; communication systems; distribution networks; law and order; the need for decentralisation of authority; conformity with standards and Sphere principles; coordination between all government administrative structures at district level and coordination within and between all other actors; education on potential risks; capacity building of existing

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structures; the need for quality information and evaluation of initiatives were all brought into sharp focus. Participants then joined four working groups: • Institutional and Legal Framework • Response mechanism and Stand-by Arrangements • Coordination • Early warning and Awareness Raising The groups were made up of a diverse range of actors who shared experiences and knowledge and drew attention to important lessons that had been learned and further developed these into a range of recommendations for future action. These are summarised below. More detailed working group findings and recommendations can be found in the annex. The workshop findings represented a constructive review of how to improve disaster management in the future. Most if not all countries experiencing the enormity of devastation caused by the tsunami would be found wanting in their disaster preparedness status. The workshop was held over one and a half days and in such a limited time frame it was only possible to flag key points that need to be examined further by individual agencies. 2. Areas for Improvement and Recommendations 2.1 Legal Framework A pressing need was identified for disaster risk management legislation and mechanisms with trained professional staff in readiness. Recommendation Set up an institutional framework for disaster risk management. Operationalise the Disaster Management Act (no. 13 of 2005). Develop a five year plan for disaster risk management. 2.2 Early Warning Mechanisms There was no early warning system to raise the alarm regarding the impending tsunami. There are few formal mechanisms for warnings covering the range of hazards which Sri Lanka potentially faces. Recommendation The government needs to adopt a strategic approach to early warning and disaster mitigation. This needs to be incorporated into an over-arching disaster preparedness strategy, covering a broad range of potential disasters, and be decentralised to the district level.

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2.3 Risk Awareness Education There was almost no awareness amongst the Sri Lankan people of a potential risk from a tsunami or other natural disaster. There was no knowledge of what action to take in the event of a disaster such as a tsunami or earthquake. Recommendation Target schools, universities, public administration bodies for awareness raising education and workshops. Take advantage of current activities to build in awareness training to other initiatives. Consider using disaster scenario planning operations as ‘trial runs’ to test the effectiveness of preparations. 2.4 Response Mechanisms The effectiveness of the response varied by district. Those districts that have experienced floods, cyclones and conflict-related disasters in the past had more experience of operating in an emergency environment. District committees and local task forces worked well in some districts. Recommendation Coordination was identified as the single most critical issue. Have a single recognised source of information at each level of administration (national, district, division). Develop robust processes and mechanisms able to withstand the demands of a complex emergency. The coordinating agency must be integrated with other implementing agencies. 2.5 Centralisation of Authority At the district level it was felt that while all responsibility lay with the District Secretary, they did not always have the authority to take independent action and mobilise resources. Also the over-centralisation has a de-skilling effect on the districts rather than an empowering and up-skilling effect. Clarity concerning what powers have effectively been decentralised is needed so that the provinces and districts are clear on the level of authority and the amount of resources available for their mobilisation. Recommendation Decentralise authority to the districts. Invest in training and capacity building of district structures and mechanisms. Ensure that all districts have staff with disaster management training. Ensure that policy decisions affecting the districts are clearly communicated. 2.6 Co-operation between local government structures It was noted that there was inadequate linkage and command and control structures between district secretaries, provincial councils, municipal authorities and other public bodies (horizontal cooperation). This led to delay in mobilisation of resources and underutilisation of resources. It was noted that informal mechanisms operated in some districts which minimised the negative impact of this disconnect.

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Recommendation Develop formal lines of communication and chain of command between all public bodies in the districts particularly for use during times of emergencies 2.7 Co-ordination within the government and among and between other actors (UN; NGO; private sector) The tsunami created a highly complex situation with hundreds of new agencies arriving in Sri Lanka and existing agencies experienced substantial growth. This caused coordination difficulties and disconnects between the centre and the districts, and between different actors at the field level. In addition it has made needs assessment more difficult and the output of assessments less reliable. Some NGOs have also operated independently of available coordination mechanisms, making coordination more complex. The large influx of emergency staff from both UN and international agencies inevitably means that staff arrive with little briefing on the country or culture. This lack of awareness or potential lack of cultural sensitivity can create tensions and should be avoided wherever possible and could to some extent be mitigated with appropriate briefings. Recommendation Develop coordination plans and pre-test them. Assign coordination responsibilities to the GAs as well as all appropriate authority and resources so that they can meet those responsibilities. Further develop the Centre for Non-Government Agencies (CNGS) and ensure that roles and responsibilities and clarified. Introduce national procedures to ensure adherence to standards and policy guidelines/principles. Develop appropriate linkages with the private sector to better coordinate during times of emergency. Support NGO coordination bodies, with timely and accurate information, presentations from government and UN staff; utilise them for consultation and provide access to policy makers and practitioners so that the coordination bodies can support and brief the NGO community. UN and INGOs to review briefing procedures for new staff entering the country during emergencies. 2.8 Communication and Information While communication and briefings soon after the tsunami were felt to be useful and timely, there was criticism that information did not flow as effectively in later weeks. At times different arms of the government presented conflicting information or statistics on the same subject. This led to duplication of information collection, time wasted attending meetings with limited or confusing output. Also there was a lack of knowledge about where information was being held. At times valuable information was available, but key actors were unable to access it.

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Recommendation Develop information protocols. Ensure that during emergencies lines of communication are kept open, regular briefings occur, and key actors have access to information. Streamline information sources. Review information sources and methodologies. 2.9 Building the Capacity of Existing Mechanisms Since the tsunami new mechanisms and structures have been developed, some temporary and some more permanent. Some of these were inevitably developed in haste and staffed by volunteers, resulting in not all staff having the necessary skills and experience. It was felt that the priority should be on building the capacity of existing structures rather than opting for new structures, as long as the existing structures have potential and can absorb the capacity improvements. Recommendation As part of disaster preparedness planning, ensure that an adequate number of personnel receive training and other development opportunities, so that they are available in times of emergency. 2.10 Protection and Gender Issues While this subject was not dealt with in depth, it was recognise that during this type of complex emergency some groups will be more at risks than others. There have been a range of incidents negatively affecting both women and children, both at the time of the tsunami and in the weeks that followed as certain social conditions deteriorated. Recommendation Government and UN agencies responsible for protection, should review procedures and processes currently in place in order to ensure all possible measures are taken to minimize risk. 2.11 Role of the Military Approximately forty three foreign military forces gave assistance during the emergency period. Coordination of such a large number of forces is inherently complex. On the whole it was felt that military operations were very successful and coordination was reasonably effective. However, there were periods of underutilisation and mechanisms need to be developed to minimise this occurrence. Recommendation Appoint clear focal points for contact and ensure that these are closely linked to the emerging needs on the ground. Review the effectiveness of the mechanisms frequently.

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3. Best Practices and other positive roles • NDMC performed a very useful information management function for CNO • CNO provided a valuable ‘one-stop-shop’ service . Under one roof almost all

key functions and line ministries were represented. Particularly valuable for the hundreds of new actors (and media organisations who probably helped raised large amounts of funds for Sri Lanka) who would have struggled to find their way from line ministry to line ministry criss-crossing Colombo

• Social service departs and the co-operative system played a valuable role

initially • District and Divisional Secretaries showed tremendous commitment under

enormous pressure • The UN immediately activated its emergency response capacity • Existing INGO and NGOs mobilised within hours and redeployed resources

from around the country • Pre-existing relationship between the UN and NDMC proved indispensable • The private sector mobilised within hours and contributed very significantly in

the early critical weeks • The military and police deployed quickly and effectively to support those

effected and minimize secondary problems • The people responded magnificently, traditional self-help played a role • Religious, ethnic and cultural differences were forgotten as overwhelming

compassion was shown • Individuals volunteers and holiday makers worked tirelessly in the early days

and weeks setting positive examples • In the north the Military, the LTTE and civil society worked together to provide

relief • The media played an important supportive role in provision of information • Food distribution was very well coordinated setting examples to other sectors • Individuals with awareness of the tell tale signs of a tsunami saved lives by

hurrying people away to safety, and thereby also proving the value of awareness raising campaigns

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ANNEX I

National Lessons Learned and Best Practice Workshop

8th and 9th June 2005

Agenda

Day one 8th June 08:30-09:00 Registration/Coffee 09:00-09:10 Welcome by Miguel Bermeo, UN Humanitarian/ Resident Coordinator 09:10-09:20 Opening speech by Mano Tittawella Senior Director General and Senior Advisor

to the President 09:20-10:20 Brief overview of the response to the tsunami crisis by:

Dr. Tara de Mel (to be confirmed) Mr.Tilak Ranaviraja (TAFOR) Mr.Ganesh (District Secretary, Jaffna) Mr Jeevan Thiagarajah (CHA)

10:20-11:00 Discussion with above panel

11:00-11:15 Coffee break 11:15-11:30 Presentation of the objectives of the workshop and explanation of working

groups by moderator (David Evans) 11:30-13:00 Working groups: discussion on lessons learned, key achievements and issues

A. Institutional and Legislative Framework

B. Stand-by Arrangements C. Response Mechanisms D. Coordination E. Early Warning and Awareness Raising

13:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Working groups (continued) 15:30-15:45 Coffee break 15:45-16:55 Plenary: presentation of working groups’ findings and discussion 16:55-17:00 Day one wrap-up

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Day two 9th June 08.30-09.00 Coffee 09:00-09:30 Feedback and summary of Day 1 findings by moderator 09:30-11:00 Working groups: discussion on key measures to make improvements

A. Institutional and Legislative Framework

B. Stand-by Arrangements C. Response Mechanisms D. Coordination E. Early Warning and Awareness Raising

11:00-11:15 Coffee break 11:15-13:00 Presentations and discussion of key findings 13:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-14.30 Wrap-up and recommendations

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ANNEX II

WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES

SESSION 1 Working Group A: Institutional and Legislative Framework 1) What existed prior to the tsunami • A National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) was established in 1996, but

it did not have legal powers • The Department of Social Services within the Ministry of Social Welfare had

district-level Social Service Officers • RRR • CGES system • Cooperative system • Social Service Act • Public Security Ordinance • Provincial Council System (health, education, etc.) • District/Divisional Administration • In some districts there were District Disaster Management Committees,

Divisional Disaster Management Committees and village-level Committees • There were no procedures for donors/bilateral agencies to work directly with the

provincial council system • There were precedents for IFIs to work with sectoral departments and agencies • There were no procedures for structured involvement of the private sector • There were precedents for structured involvement of religious institutions • A number of NGOs had experience in working on disaster management and had

established relationships • The Armed Forces and police had an emergency response mechanism • NGOs • UN Disaster Management Team • UN Agencies had a capacity for emergency response 2) How these institutions, systems and mechanisms fared during the tsunami

crisis • The NDMC performed very useful information management functions as a part

of the Centre for National Operations (CNO) • The CNO was established to match the perceived scale of the disaster and the

resulting huge and spontaneous international response. It essentially performed a central government level function, and did not help much at the district level

• Horses were changed at mid-course: the creation of the CNO, intended to upscale the coordination mechanism, undermined the pre-existing but nebulous coordination arrangements

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• The CNO was a stop-gap measure; it was terminated abruptly before its responsibilities were mainstreamed to more appropriate mechanisms

• Similar institutional displacement occurred in international agencies • Non-conventional mechanisms in conflict-affected areas worked well in some

cases • Community mechanisms worked well in the initial response phase • Social services departments, the CGES and the co-operative system played an

important role in relief/response • District/divisional secretariats worked very well • MPCS, their infrastructure and network played an important role, although their

capacity was insufficient • Religious institutions, private sector and their networks played a big role • Sectoral departments at the district level played an important role • The health sector, despite its limited infrastructure and capacity, played a

significant role • The armed forces and police played a significant role in rescue and relief • The commitment of government staff at all levels and across all sectors almost

made up for the lack of capacity and mechanisms • The UN Disaster Management Team got mobilized immediately • UN agencies immediately activated their emergency response capacity 3) What went well • The national and international outpouring of assistance was spontaneous and

fabulous • Immediate establishment of the NDMC website by UNDP – a centralized

source of information within the first 24 hours • Expression of compassion transcending existing ethnic and religious divides • Pre-existing dialogue and cooperation between UN agencies and NDMC proved

to be critical and indispensible in the first 8 weeks • Mobilization of existing health and nutrition monitoring systems to contain any

potential spread of public health problems and avoid cases of malnutrition 4) What needs to be improved • Psycho-social care (its coverage, timeliness, quality, etc.) • Appropriate application of objective criteria (Administration) at the operational

level and subjective judgement (Political) at the policy level • Devolve and decentralize power and authority to the provincial, district,

division and local authority levels, GN levels (principle of subsidiarity) • Public information and communication for affected people • Public consultation/grievance redressal mechanisms • Coordination at all levels between all stakeholders • Information collection protocols, so as to avoid repetition; consult with relevant

authorities at the district level • Efficiency – reduced transaction time

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Working Group B: Stand-By Arrangements 1) What existed prior to the tsunami • Overall, there were no pre-disaster arrangements, except social services. • There was some capacity to divert certain goods quickly, e.g. GoSL/WFP food

stockpiles. • There was a latent capacity in certain areas in communities, and in both

domestic and international organizations due to previous disasters. • In places where goods were available, there was no overall disaster

preparedness plan which would have allowed resources to be used most effectively, including by giving authority to local stakeholders.

• Few organizations have the financial luxury to keep stockpiles of goods and contingency funds on standby. Exception: MoSS – some limited human and financial resources.

• A National Disaster Management Centre existed, but was unable to cope with the magnitude of this disaster.

• District Secretariats had a certain capacity. • Pre Disaster arrangement in DPDHS Office, for an emergency. • There were no pre-disaster arrangements for an environmental disaster. • There was no plan to make effective use of available trained people. • There was no authoritative system where decisions could be made quickly. • There was no information sharing or awareness among organizations and

institutions. 2) How these institutions, systems and mechanisms fared during the tsunami

crisis • Some districts who had faced conflict had more experience in facing disaster

situations 3) What went well • The tradition of community self-help used to good effect. • The Armed Forces, police and LTTE deployed quickly for the emergency. 4) What needs to be improved • Pre-disaster mapping of resource availability and capacity is needed and needs

to be communicated widely. • Permanent stand-by arrangements need to be identified and put in place at all

levels. • Vulnerability analysis and disaster prevention. • Procedures and plans for harbours and airports, and for land transport.

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Working Group C: Response Mechanisms 1) What existed prior to the tsunami • District-level committees/task forces, under the chairmanship of the

Government Agents (GAs), able to evacuate people, with the help of local government departments and local NGOs.

• National-level: National Disaster Management Centre, linked to GAs in affected districts.

• Civil society. • Various government departments (e.g. Health, Water) have systems and some

resources in place that can be mobilized for disasters. • In general, response mechanisms for smaller disasters (local floods, etc.)

existed. • The history of civil war has resulted in some capacity to respond to bombs,

evacuations, etc. • Existence of complete administrative/governance structure from national to

village level. 2) How these institutions, systems and mechanisms fared during the tsunami

crisis • The district-level response was good, given the limited resources and authority.

E.g. sectoral meetings called by GA • The response of civil society was effective, although at the beginning it was

poorly coordinated • Mechanisms were not strong enough to deal with the scale of this disaster • There were multiple institutions, multiple channels of authority • At the district level, there was a lack of capacity • There was a mechanism to coordinate foreign assistance at the central level,

including the military. 3) What needs to be improved • Better coordination, information flow from national to district level and vice

versa • Written authority is needed to give complete control to a single agent at times of

disasters • This authority needs to be supported with adequate resources and powers • Better capacity to coordinate and monitor all actors • Better information system • Capacity to screen for appropriate assistance • Capacity to absorb help from abroad • Skilled personnel trained to respond to specific disaster

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Working Group D: Coordination 1) What existed prior to the tsunami • At the district level, inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms were in place

among Government departments. • The districts had disaster management plans, but they did not cater for natural

disasters like the tsunami. The plans were not well documented or communicated to other stakeholders.

2) How these institutions, systems and mechanisms fared during the tsunami

crisis • The government relief mechanisms were initially coordinated through the

NDMC. The NDMC was not structured to coordinate the relief work after a natural disaster like the tsunami, however. Coordination was therefore soon moved to the newly-established CNO, which was specifically set up for the tsunami.

• At the district level, the GAs supervised coordination, and had a mechanism through which they communicated between themselves.

• During the first two months, the GA coordination structure related well to NGOs that were present in the country since before the tsunami.

• As the number of INGOs kept increasing, the GA and DS coordination mechanisms could no longer cope with them. The GA coordination meetings became less efficient.

• The massive influx of INGOs led to a large number of meetings, as well as to confusion and lack of coordination.

• As a consequence, the INGOs (and to some extent LNGOs) started to set up their own separate coordination structures or work independently.

• In the North and North-East, checkpoints were opened to allow relief-related transport through without delays.

• At these checkpoints, as well as at the airports in the North and North-Central, NGOs were given information about where to report before commencing their relief work.

• Just after the tsunami, many people took part in the relief work on their own initiative, but there was no mechanism to support them, nor general guidelines for the public to follow.

• 43 countries provided military support to Sri Lanka after the tsunami. At the national level, coordination of this support went through the joint operations headquarters (JOH), and functioned well.

• In some areas and sectors, UN agencies took on the role of ‘lead agencies’, becoming focal points for coordination.

• Aid supplies were shipped to some districts without distribution instructions from Colombo.

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3) What went well • Informal mechanisms at community level worked extremely well. Relief

assistance was provided and word-of-mouth functioned as an efficient and reliable communication tool.

• In the North, the military, the LTTE and civil society spontaneously worked together to provide relief assistance immediately after the tsunami.

• Many public servants were on holiday when the tsunami happened, but civilians and NGOs worked quickly to ensure efficient evacuation.

• Despite being directly affected by the tsunami, with buildings and records destroyed, some GA offices functioned as coordination mechanisms.

• Initially, GAs in all affected districts held daily coordination meetings that functioned well, and communicated with other government bodies, such as the military.

• Many media stations helped coordination by providing information on where to assemble, collect food and relief items, etc.

• Many individuals worked extremely hard to assist in the initial relief coordination. The amount of ‘volunteer’ assistance added to the efficiency of the immediate coordination.

• Food distribution functioned well, with various actors providing different types of assistance. For instance, the military provided cooked meals in some areas.

4) What needs to be improved • Identification of needs. • Coordination of the effective distribution of assistance. • Establishment of a central point or information centre in each community to

organize the distribution of aid. • More effective mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that INGOs conduct

their work in compliance with agreed standards and guidelines (for instance within shelter). Unequal assistance may lead to tensions within communities.

• A responsible body for transitional settlements is needed. A coordination mechanism is needed to ensure the safety, welfare and future of the residents in these settlements.

• In some districts and sectors, problems occurred between UN-agencies acting as ‘lead agencies’, and NGOs and INGOs. Taking over sector coordination should not mean taking over ‘exclusivity rights’ to certain sectors. A clear division should be established between ‘coordinating’ and ‘implementing’ agencies.

• Contingency plans must include clear divisions of responsibility and authority among and within sectors.

• Provincial councils must be better included in emergency relief work.

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Working Group E: Early Warning and Awareness Raising 1) What existed prior to the tsunami • No early warning system for tsunamis was in place in Sri Lanka or for the

Indian Ocean. It was therefore extremely difficult for any agency to detect and predict tsunamis arising from large earthquakes or from other tsunami-generating sources in the region.

• There was no capacity to detect the tsunami. • By the time PTWC issued a warning of a possible tsunami in the Pacific Ocean,

the eastern coast of Sri Lanka was struck by the tsunami. • The knowledge base and risk awareness activities on tsunamis in the

government, technical and operational bodies and civil society, was extremely poor. The last recorded tsunami – which was very mild –happened in August 1883. This lack of awareness made it difficult to react and take early actions even after receiving early warning indicators such as the tsunami in Indonesia or receding sea levels on the Sri Lankan coast line.

2) What went well • Some individuals with previous experience in tsunamis saved some lives after

detecting indirect signs of tsunami. 3) What needs to be improved • The government has to adopt a strategic approach in early warning, disaster

mitigation, and public risk awareness. • The early warning system, including permanent sea level stations, offshore

moored oceanographic buoys, improved seismic networks. This system has to be established in collaboration with Indian Ocean states.

• The public warning system, including providing information (through the mass media and other channels) and telecommunication facilities to support early warning systems at the national, district, division, and village level.

• Public risk awareness, including educating public servants, University students, schools children, NGOs, the private sector and the general public through formal and informal methodologies; carrying out Training of Trainers programmes; designing and distributing resource materials and disaster preparedness plans.

• Research and development in relation to disaster mitigation and management. • Capacity building. • Establish a permanent National Disaster Management Council.

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SESSION 2 Working Group A: Institutional and Legislative Framework 1. General recommendations to: • the Government: - Identify the focal ministry for disaster management - Include national financial institutions (Central Bank, etc.) in the Disaster Risk

Management Programmers (explore risk transfer mechanisms) - Invest in capacity building from local level upwards - Implement seriously the decentralisation and devolution of powers - Appropriate institutional/financial provisions to implement the Disaster

Management Act (No. 13 of 2005) - Prepare a roadmap (a time-bound action plan) for implementation of

comprehensive disaster risk management - Revise existing National Disaster Management Plan and operationalise it - Create a National Emergency Fund for disaster risk management with

appropriate incentive system for disaster risk reduction at appropriate level • the UN/international organisations : - Have a pre-existing dialogue with Government and other humanitarian actors to

better define the UN’s niche in small, medium and large-scale disasters - Take the lead in monitoring disaster risk and risk reduction/ preparedness

measures regularly - Train Government, international humanitarian actors and UN staff in the

country in UNDAC methodology for disaster assessment and coordination • local/international NGOs: - Create an in-country Disaster Management Team, in consonance with the

government framework, among NGOs and INGOs - Consciously build capacity and cooperate between INGOs and NGOs - Professionalise humanitarian response - Coordinate with the government at all levels - Use local capacity • the military (from foreign countries): - Continue to do its good work - Formalise the use of military forces in disaster response in the national disaster

management plans • donors: - Collaborate closely with the Government (Treasury) while bringing in external

resources (both in kind and financial) - Show flexibility in programming funds to meet sustainable recovery needs - Show sensitivity in programming and delivery to national development

objectives - Strike a balance between marketing and programming

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2. Specific recommendations: 1. Institutional Framework for Disaster Risk Management WHAT: Set up an institutional framework for disaster risk management;

decentralised and devolved implementation of the provisions of the Disaster Management Act (No. 13 of 2005).

WHO: National Disaster Management Council and Centre; Identified Ministry; UN HOW: Organise a national consultation on the institutional framework RESOURCES: Political decision to identify the responsible Ministry; funds and technical support BY WHEN: As soon as possible 2. Five Year Action Plan For Disaster Risk Management WHAT: Design and implement a five year Action Plan for Disaster Risk

Management, beginning with the 13 districts affected in the tsunami and other most hazard-prone districts (to include national/local Disaster Management Plans)

WHO: All stakeholders: vulnerable communities, local authorities,

divisional/district administration, provincial councils, national Government, relevant ministries, UN and other international agencies, local and international NGOs

HOW: Constitution of a Steering Committee (think-bank) at the national

level; consultation processes at local, intermediate and national levels; partnerships and resource mobilisation

RESOURCES: Human, financial and other resources BY WHEN: Initiate by the 3rd quarter of 2005

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Working Group B: Stand-By Arrangements 1. General recommendations: - Mapping potential disasters, vulnerability, and resources - Contingency plans - Clear authority and single coordination body - Line up resources 2. Specific recommendations:

Target Group Recommended Action

Government – central level

- Appoint one permanent coordination body involving ministries, UN, NGOs, private sector

- Identify specific needs for different types & scales of disasters - Study & learn from regional/other countries’ approaches to dealing

with disasters - Explore the establishment of a regional disaster coordination

mechanism, to share lessons and resources regionally - Identify potential buffer stocks & resources that can be drawn on

(e.g. food through WFP) - Periodic evaluation of status of stand-by arrangements - Separate public relations and operations - Have stand-by pre-disaster information collection and maintenance

mechanism in place - Have national-level drills to evaluate how the system works

Government – district level

- Appoint a permanent body under the GA - Carry out decentralised mapping of available resources - Empower GA through legislation & access to resources - Train GA and other local staff - Link cluster of villages and cluster of local government offices - Have pre-assigned stand-by teams that can be mobilised

UN/international agencies

- Have sectoral representatives within the single coordinating body - Evaluate what each agency can offer in case of disasters; maintain

and regularly update this information within the main coordination body at the central and district levels

- Obtain commitment from each agency - Have geographically and culturally appropriate contingency plans

INGOs/NGOs - Evaluate what each organisation can offer in case of disaster; maintain and regularly update this information within the main coordination body at the central and district levels

- Obtain commitment from each organisation Foreign military - Ensure activities are integrated into the civilian response

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Working Group C: Response Mechanisms 1. General recommendations: - Coordination is key; it has to be backed up with an up-to-date information

system - The coordination agency has to be integrated with other implementing agencies

in the country - Have a recognised single source of information at all levels - Undertake awareness campaigns at all levels to inform people about their

vulnerability, stand-by measures, response mechanisms - Evaluate the capacity of communications systems to cope with disasters, and

upgrade as needed 2. Specific recommendations:

Target Group Recommended Action

Government – central level

- Policy, guidelines and established procedure for rapidly soliciting and screening goods, organisations and donations at the national level

- Humanitarian need & equity should be the guiding principle for all policies, actions, etc; these principles should be enshrined in legislation

- Clarity on policies such as the 100/200m rule

- Disaster prevention and mitigation activities should be identified and undertaken prior to disasters

Donors - Embassies should appoint one person responsible for helping screen offers of support from their countries

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Working Group D: Coordination The humanitarian community was dependent on the CNO. When it closed there was confusion as to whom to interact with at the government level. No information was provided on whether there would be a new structure. At district level, very little information or delayed information was relayed from the CNO. The ministries worked without communicating too much with the CNO. Upon its closure, there was no information on where to get information or coordination guidance, or where the coordination functions had been moved to. A lot of knowledge was suddenly dispersed. For at least a month, no one knew whom to contact at the government level. 1. General recommendations to: • the Government: - As part of a national contingency plan, develop an accommodation function at

the airports for systematic registration of and information to new INGOs. - The new national disaster management centre that is now being planned should

ensure continuity and independence from line ministries. - If the centre doesn’t function adequately in a future emergency, it should be

strengthened rather than new structures established; all efforts should be made to ensure that information is not lost.

- The centre should be set up in a way that enables it to expand in accordance to the magnitude of the emergency at hand. It should focus on surge capacity and plan on the organised employment of relevant available resources, such as the military. It should also be more coherent and streamlined and represent a pool of resources.

- As part of the national disaster management plan, the GA should be assigned coordination responsibilities at the district level, with authority and resources/capacity to manage any growing number of actors, activities and funding. Clear structures and procedures must be implemented, with the ability to bring in extra personnel if needed. The GA office should be organized in such a way that, for instance, the GA and the AGA can share tasks.

- Contingency plans and emergency procedures must encompass clear communication structures between the central disaster management centre and local bodies such as the local authorities, the Provincial Council and the Municipal Council. Regular communication between these entities will allow for a more streamlined coordination of disaster management and relief activities, and for the humanitarian community to better relate to the coordination mechanisms of the Sri Lankan authorities.

- The international community, such as NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and the UN, should all relate to this government structure.

• the UN/international organisations : - Update, strengthen and ensure the distribution/communication of standards and

guidelines for all relief sectors, adjusted to the local context and emergency at hand.

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• local/international NGOs: - Introduce self-governing mechanisms to ensure that INGOs structure their work

in accordance with agreed standards and guidelines, and that they operate in a conflict-sensitive manner. One such mechanism could be ‘forced membership’ in a humanitarian organisation consortium

2. Specific recommendations: 1. Establishment of a national disaster management structure WHAT: Establish a coherent national disaster management structure,

encompassing a central office that cooperates closely with district-level coordination centres based with the GA. Such a structure should be gender balanced and sensitive to the needs of beneficiaries, specifically in relation to gender. Procedures should ensure that the central office and the GA have access to sufficient surge capacities and that they involve local resources in a systematic manner. Procedures should also focus on systematic communication and information practices, including regular consultations with sector departments and other relevant entities.

WHO: The Sri Lankan Government. HOW: Through the new national disaster bill. The bill should include a

secretariat function tasked to establish the systems and procedures and develop and implement the necessary training of all relevant staff at the various levels. Mechanisms for allocating and sharing resources should be devised.

RESOURCES: A disaster response fund is needed. Implementation of plans and

procedures will depend on allocating earmarked funding (for training, etc.) to all relevant entities.

BY WHEN: Process should start immediately 2. Strengthen the Centre for the Non-Governmental Sector WHAT: Strengthen the body (currently the Centre for the Non-Governmental

Sector, CNGS) that registers NGOs and other relevant actors from the outset of an emergency

WHO: The central disaster management center. HOW: The registry should function as an open database of who-what-where

available to relevant stakeholders, to be used for relief coordination purposes. District-level registrations should feed into the central registry.

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RESOURCES: Resources are needed according to the scope of the task, in order to avoid this becoming a bottleneck.

BY WHEN: As soon as possible (as part of the new national disaster management

bill which recommends structures for district-to-national coordination and early warning systems)

3. Ensure adherence to relief standards and guidelines WHAT: Introduce national procedures to ensure systematic adherence to

standards and guidelines of relief work. WHO: Central and district-level coordination mechanism (as proposed

above). HOW: Upon arrival (at registry point), NGOs should be informed of these

standards and guidelines; their adherence to them should be monitored by relevant designated authorities.

RESOURCES: As necessary. BY WHEN: As soon as possible. 4. Ensure coordinated management of temporary settlements WHAT: Appoint a body responsible for the coordinated management of

temporary settlements. This body should i.a. be responsible for holding regular coordination meetings, training of staff, field coaching, etc.

WHO: District-level coordination function (see above). HOW: Delegate operational coordination to appointed body. RESOURCES: Financial resources, communication tools, vehicles, etc. BY WHEN: Immediately.

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Working Group E: Early Warning and Awareness Raising The Sri Lankan Government has prepared and submitted to UNESCO/IOC a proposal for the establishment of an Early Warning System for tsunamis in the country, in collaboration with regional initiatives. This system will include not only sophisticated technology (better telecommunications, technical instruments for detection), but also a community participatory approach integrating in the discussions district, division, community and grass root leaders to identify local and indigenous capacities and facilities to communicate warnings in a way that is adapted to the local culture and knowledge (e.g. through community radio networks, local TV channels, network of temples, etc.) An Interim National Committee on Disaster Mitigation and Management has been established under the Presidential Secretariat. Part of its role is creating tools and methodologies for increasing risk awareness in the country. 1. Recommendations: - Extend the Early Warning System to other hazards. - Early Warning System components should be integrated in the Disaster

Preparedness Plans that have been initiated by some District/Division authorities, with wide participation of stakeholders at grass root levels.

- The tools and methodologies for increasing risk awareness currently being developed should be adapted to the different target groups (political leaders, civil servants, University students, school pupils, and the general public at the district, division and grass root levels). Methodologies should be also adapted and should include workshops, formal training, inclusion of disaster risk management in University and school curricula, Mobile Vision Programs, media, etc., so as to bring the message to those living in remote areas.

- At the district level, take advantage of the current activities aiming to develop Disaster Preparedness Plans to create risk awareness among participants, especially encouraging risk mapping at grass root level. Include in projects by UN, NGOs, donors and in government initiatives budget lines for risk information dissemination (e.g. brochures, newsletters, etc.)

- Undertake risk and vulnerability studies at the national level with respect to potential hazards

- Prepare a plan for mitigating measures either by regulations or physical interventions.