NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : CHANGING PATTERNS OF RUSSIAN POLITICALDISCOURSE : A Dictionary of RussianPolitics, 1985 - Presen t

AUTHOR : Elliott Mossman

CONTRACTOR : University of Pennsylvani a

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Elliott Мossman

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER :

805-04-

DATE : December, 199 1

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided bythe National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Theanalysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o fthe author .

"Changing Patterns of Russian Political Discourse :

А Dictionary of Russian Politics, 1985 - Present "

An Executive Summar y

The changing patterns of Russian political speech since 198 5

reflect the breakdown of "command" political structures an d

increasing recourse to a "war of words" over the tokens o f

legitimacy : nation, the West, the restoration of history ,

ecology, human rights .

Background . Totalitarian states use political discourse t o

create an illusion of legitimacy : words in these "logocracies "

are stripped of their normative meanings and given new meaning b y

those who control usage . As the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu put s

it, the Soviet regime historically has been an oligarchy

characterized by a monopoly on language . 1 The monopolisti c

practices began with Lenin's efforts to replace the Frenc h

revolutionary vocabulary with a special terminology of Leninis t

coinage and usage, but it was Stalin who perfected the monopol y

on language . Linguistic choice diminished as he strove fo r

axiological contrast with no linguistic neutral ground ; the

regular use of superlatives eliminated grounds for

differentiation ; the language was extensively bureaucratized an d

militarized, in an effort to reduce the dichotomy civil-military ;

finally, East and West took on Manichean properties in th e

language, with loan words stigmatized and Slavic roots revered .

Quantitatively, the end result of this rigid control ove r

1Libеr, No.2 (August 22, 1990), p .3 . The point is not lost o nsuch spectator-participants as Vaclav Havel : see his "Words onWords," New York Review of Books, January 11, 1990, p .6 .

language was that, until the 1960's, the standard vocabulary o f

Soviet newspapers had been reduced to 1,500 words, wit h

practically no new political speech evident .

Language dissidence, in reaction to the Leninist an d

Stalinist legacy, became the hallmark of political speech in th e

1970's and 1980's . Many of the terms that were canonized earl y

in the Gorbachev era derive from the dissident struggle to ope n

up a political discourse stifled by the State-Party monopoly .

The loan word "consensus" arrives in Russian in the writings o f

Andrei Sakharov, and then migrates to Gorbachev's vocabulary, as

do several of Gorbachev's early policy labels : for example ,

Sakharov's "Memorandum to the General Secretary TSK КРSS Comrade

L .I . Brezhnev," 1972, long circulating in samizdat and only

officially published in the registered press in 1990, is the

earliest identified source of the pattern of proximate occurrence

"glasnost' -demokratizatsiia in opposition to zastoi . "

Glasnost' . The logocratic practice that dominated Sovie t

Russian political speech for seventy years remains visible in th e

new words coined since the emergence of glasnost' in 1987 ;

indeed, glasnost' is prima facie evidence of logocentric policy .

"Perestroika" is a prominent example of the state's remainin g

capacity to strip a word of meaning : it is so discredited

linguistically that it is now the object of parodies, such a s

"perestruktirovanie" and the pejorative "perestroishchiki"' Th e

tendency in Soviet politics toward "an all-embracing idle chatte r

spilling over into linguistic meretriciousness" was criticized a s

2

one of seven centrifugal tendencies in Soviet society in а

prominent 1989 analysis of Soviet politics . 2 It is more likely ,

however, that diversification of political discourse is а welcome

development in а society starved for pluralism .

Countervailing linguistic strategies have also developed i n

the period of glasnost', many of them marked linguistically b y

the political struggle with the logocracy :

-- words coined in the dissident and later the democrati c

press are "coopted" into official discourse ;

-- foreign loan words are borrowed heavily from English ,

mostly from the domain of the social sciences ;

-- words with negative, often anti-nationalist connotation s

are attributed to the democratic opposition ;

-- words from a military vocabulary are used to legitimiz e

bureaucratic functions ;

-- structural features of the language are employed t o

create categories of political opposition to the status qu о ante ;

-- words are coined to fill "empty sets" in the Leninist

political vocabulary .

It is clear that political discourse is increasingly an arena fo r

the struggle to disestablish the centrist logocratic tradition .

Language, Nation and the West . Political speech has been

most reactive to the idea of nation unleashed by glasnost' . The

18th century term "rossiiane" has been retrieved to refer to the

2Academician G .V. Osipov et al, Sotsial'naiaisotsial'no-politicheskaia situatsiia v SSSR : sostoianieiprognoz, Moscow :Moscow State University Press, p .4 .

3

ethnically Russian population, as distinct from the Russian -

speaking (russoiazynchnyi) population that has preempted the ter m

russkii . Archaic syntax and other stylistic devices are employed

in order to evoke Russian as distinct from modernized Europea n

roots .

The most heated battles occur over the legitimate term for a

political phenomenon . Conservatives introduce veзternizm as a

term to stigmatize the liberal tradition of zapadnichestvo ;

entrepreneurial activity is lampooned by the ludicrous coinag e

individual'shchik ; overtones of National Socialism ("Lebensraum" )

are invoked in zhiznennoe prostranstvo ; Solzhenitsyn bids t o

replace perestroika with a set of terms deriving from obustroit' .

Structurally, the language is employed to undermine a n

opponent's political doctrine, and often etymology (Slavic versu s

Western European) is one of the weapons as well . Thus, th e

democratic reformers attack the Center for its psevdoperestroika ,

while the hardliners counter with lzheperestroika ; Centrists try

to retain the socialist mantle with a campaign agains t

lzhesotsializm . The language is employed semantically an d

structurally in order to fill in the blanks in politica l

development that has been retarded by the exclusive Leninist

politics . А Leninist language in which there was only the term

sotsialisticheskii vybor is augmented by the coinage

demokraticheskii vybor . The democratic opposition's policy of

"destructivism" is visible in the category of coinages that

utilize the prefix "de-" : "deofficialization," "desovietization, "

4

"demonopolization," "departization," "deideologization, "

"destatization," "depoliticization . "

It is likely that the August coup d'etat and its aftermath

(dubbed the "August Revolution") will perpetuate the tendencie s

the previous six years of linguistic change have established .

"Debolshevization" has been added to the list, while th e

banishment of the Party has provided Soviet politics with th e

opportunity for a new term -- partization -- that is in harmony

with its root . Although Communist authority remains in what ar e

now termed "Communist refuges," most former Party members becam e

what are derisively termed "Communist mutants ." The struggl e

over a Western reference point in new vocabulary continues i n

post-coup speech (parteigenosse), as the massive borrowing o f

Western terms to describe unprecedented phenomena continues ,

e .g ., "collaborationist," "Regent of the Russian Monarchy, "

"junta" and "putsch . "

"A Short Dictionary of Russian Political Terms 1985-Present "

(available upon request from the offices of the National Counci l

for Soviet and East European Research), documents the use of a

representative 300 new political terms . It is the core of th e

2,500 entry "Keywords in Russian Politics since 1985 : A Lexica l

and Critical Commentary," to be completed by September, 1992, an d

published by Oxford University Press in 1993 .

5

September, 1991

Elliott Mossman

Changing Patterns of Soviet Political Discourse ,

1985 -- Present

Elliott MossmanUniversity of Pennsylvania

1

Soviet political discourse is undergoing а process of change in the era

of perestroika. In order to better understand the nature and extent o f

these changes we have to compare the patterns of th е present day and

traditional Soviet political speech.

The Soviet state as а totalitarian system is often c alled a logocracy, or

government by words, functioning to create an illusion of legitimacy, on e

that conceals reality while it retains an encoded connection to it . А specific

feature of Soviet political discourse has been that its primary element, th e

word, is stripped of immanent meaning and given new meaning by thos e

who control its use.

Vaclav Havel pointed out in his speech on th е occasion of receiving

thе West German publishers' and book dealers' Peace Prize that thе

essence of thе dissidents' fight for civil rights against thе communis t

totalitarian regime often consisted in unmasking а communist terminology

with its fictional semantics and restoring th е real meanings of words .

He said :

At last I reach thе beautiful word "peace." I have read it for forty

years in our country on every roof and in every report. An allergy to

this beautiful word has been created in me and my compatriots ,

because I know what it has designated for forty years : armies ,

powerful and gaining in strength, which allegedly ar е defending peace .

Sevеral Don Quixotes of "Charter-77" and their younger colleagues of

thе Independent Association for Peace succeeded in rehabilitating thi s

word and restoring its original meaning despite th е lengthy process of

systematica lly stripping the word "peace" of its proper sense and ,

moreover, filling it with a meaning opposite to its dictionary meaning .

2

We had to paу dearly for this semantic "perestroika," i .e., for turning

thе word "peace" upside down . Almost all the young leaders of th e

Independent Association for Peace have served prison terms of several

months. But it was important: one word was saved from total

devaluation. And this, as I am striving tо explain here, is far fro m

saving only one word. It is saving something more important .

All thе important events of th е real world -- beautiful and ugly - -

arе always preceded by a prelude in thе sphere of words. 1

Characteristic features of totalitarian language were described man y

times in some detail . The first to do it was Victor Klemperer wh o in 1946

gave a brilliant first-hand description of thе political language of Nazi

Germany, calling it "th е Language of thе Third Empire" (Lingua Tertii

Imperil) or Nazi-Dеutsсh.2

Thе role of a "new language" as a tool of totalitarian oppression in th е

Soviet Union was better understood only after an analogous language ha s

been formed in Nazi Germany, although its main features had been

properly analуz еd by A.M. Sеlishсhеv as early as 1928 .3 After thе

introduction of thе term "Newspeak" by George Orwe ll in 1948, has been

borrowed into many languages, bringing a better recognition of th е terrible

consequences of language manipulation in totalitarian societies . Since

Poland began its struggle for reforms earlier than other Fast European

communist countries, much has been accomplished there to d еsсribе

communist "Newspeak." А special study of thе language of communis t

propaganda was published Warsaw in 1979 . 4 In thе most recent Soviet

discussions, thе analogy of thе German Nazi language and Soviet Russian

Newspeak has been advanced by some democrats as an axiom . 5

3

The main features of thе Soviet political language, which formed in

Lenin's time, but achieved full development under Stalin's rule and persis t

to this day arе the following :

1) a tendency to axiological contrast and a lack of neutra l

expressions ;

2) ritualism linked with pragmatism;

3) а magical character, that is, а tendency to create a pseudoreality;

4) arbitrariness as regards th е choice of themes ;

5) thе redefinition of concepts ;

6) propagandistic expression together with thе widespread use of

superlatives ;

7) thе bureaucratization of language;

8) thе widespread introduction of military terminology ;

9) thе widespread use of abbreviated forms .6

Thе epoch of glasnost initiated an open discussion of many sombre

aspects of thе Soviet political system, including th е manipulation of

political language. For example, Anаtоlii Strеlianуi, a popular liberal

essayist, called thе current practice of tabooing certain concepts by not

giving them direct and clear designations "communist bashfulness ." He

wrote: "Wе would rather have our tongues ripped out than openly call a

private craftsman a private craftsman, a workers' enterprise a workers '

enterprise, а gathering of citizens meeting freely and independently of th е

authorities a free and independent gathering ." 7

Commenting on thе fact that even thе latest edition (1 97 9) of thе

Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary omits thе entry ложъ (lie) which is a key

notion for thе understanding of thе nature of Soviet political language an d

all thе law terminology, th е Soviet philosopher G . Guseinov writes:

4

The key word, rejected from the beginning by ideology . . . is squeezed

into а zone of total specific silence : it the house of а hanged man

nobody mentions the rope.

The social force, which seized the language, first said that it wil l

eliminate only the superfluous in the language, but then promised to

eliminate everything that is not " truth." Thе speaker of language, who

lоуallу adapted himself to the conditions of the experiment to remain

its user, needs exact instructions, and he finds them at every step . As

every latest instruction, introducing new rules, eliminates all th e

preceding ones, the language speaker is developing strong speec h

habits : suspicion of the truthfulness of the text and respect for the truth

of the subtext, contempt for dimwittedness, a preference to define an

object instead of its cognition via th e word...8

Speaking of the same techniques of Soviet political language

manipulation, a Soviet lawyer, N.S . Barabasheva, observed that Georg e

Orwеll 's thesis, "no concept, hence, there are no realia", was widel y

practiced in Soviet legal literature . For examр lе, the entry проституция

(prostitution) is absent in the latest edition (1987) of the Soviet

Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, which leads to the inference that in 198 7

prostitution did not exist in the Soviet Union . She writes that the formula

" под руководством коммунистической партии" ("under the

leadership of the Communist party"), common in Soviet legal acts, wa s

endowed with a magic quality -- success in an activity, without Party

responsibility for its ехесutiоп . 9

The description of the brainwashing techniques of Sovie t

propaganda is a popular subject in the contemporary Soviet liberal press .

These are :

5

1) tagging (positive tags for everything communist, negative fo r

everything non-coмmunist);

2) preaching of hatred for everything non-communist ;

3) maniрulаtiоn of information (te lling of semi-truth and lies) ;

4) concealing thе true views of thеir opponents ;

5) borrowing of slogans (for example, thе "Moral Code of thе Builder of

Communism" was modeled on th е Christ's Sermon of thе Mount) .10

Much of what is called thе process of glasnost and perestroika has

been played out not in reality, but in th е sphere of words. Leading Sovie t

sociologists see one of thе main reasons for thе failure of this process o f

glasnost and perestroika in "all-embracing idle talk which is turning into

mere verbiage ." 11 In their verbal exchanges both Soviet reformers an d

counter-reformers arе using thе same traditional devices of Soviet politica l

discourse. Perestroika did not bring with it th е destruction of th е

traditional Soviet political language with its tagging habits and use o f

hackneyed phrases . Its main structure and patterns survive, and new

branches arе simply grafted onto thе old treе. Vaclav Havel warned thе

international community of this phenomenon :

The splendid word 'perestroika' which is giving hope sounds today

throughout thе entire world. All of us believe that hope for Europe and

thе whole world looms behind this word .

But I confess that in spite of this, I am speaking of fear that thi s

word must not become a new incantation, must not turn into a cudgel ,

with which someone is thrashing us . I am not worried about my own

homeland: on thе lips of its rulers this word sounds approximately th е

same way as "Our Gracious Sovereign thе Emperor" on thе lips of

Shveik .

б

I am worried about something else: that the same statesman wh o

rules now in thе Kremlin is tossing accusations (maybe out of despair )

at thе striking workers, or mutinous nations and minorities, or

unwanted ideological minorities that endanger perestroika . I

understand that it is immensely difficult to fulfi ll this gigantic task

which he took upon himself, that everything is hanging by a thread ,

and almost anything may tear this thr еаd, and then all of us together

will fall into an abyss. But, nevertheless, I ask : this "new thinking, "

does it contain serious traces of thе old thinking? Do not we hear an

echo of old stereotypes of thinking and power-language rituals? Doe s

not thе word "perestroika" begin here, there, and everywhere to

remind us of thе word "socialism," especially when it is used to bea t

about thе head thе same man who was for so long and so unjustl y

beaten with thе word "socialism"? 12

Evaluating thе signs of successful survival and persistence of

traditional Soviet totalitarian discourse after 1985 we may indicate som e

of thе salient features of the modern Soviet political speech that confirm

this trend:

1) prеsегvatiоn of traditional keywords of Soviet political discourse:

контрпропaгaнда (counter-propaganda) ,

эконоmический саботаж (economic sabotage), врaг перестройки, нации (enemy of perestroika,

nation), саботажники (saboteurs), террористы (terrorists) ,заговорщики

(plotters), духовные диверсанты (spiritual saboteurs), агенты (agents) ,

Отечество (Fatherland), etc . ;

2) preservation of thе long-practiced and proven techniques of denigratin g

an opponent:

7

а ) ca ll ing anу opponent of the communist regime а fascist (e .g. ,

демократы arе often referred to by Soviet conservatives asфашисты

[fascists], hence thеу arе also called either)демократы-фашисты

[democrats-fascists] and демофашисты [demo-fascists]) ;

b) tagging an opponent by a word in inverted commas or precede d

by лже - (false-) and псевдо- (pseudo-) (e.g ., democrats arе called by thе

conservatives "демократы" ["democrats"], лжедемократы [false-

demoсrats], and псевдодемократы [pseudo-democrats]) ;

с ) borrowing thе terminology of th е opponents (e.g ., Sovie t

democrats, who were on thе Soviet left, were calling Soviet conservatives

правые [thе rightists], the Soviet Communist party in its counterattack o n

thе democrats in early 1991 started to call them правые [rightists] in

order to denigrate them and to turn thе tables on them) ;

3) preservation of thе traditional Soviet political terminology, and

enhancing its status by th е use of thе attributes новый (new) ,

обновленный (rejuvenated), e .g., новый Союз (new Union) ,

обновленный Союз (rejuvenated Union), новая Федерация (new

Federation), обновленная Федерация (rejuvenated Federation), or by

adding thе word обновление (renovation), e .g., обновлениесоциализма (renovation of socialism), обновление форм и методов

работы парторганиза ций (renovation of thе forms and methods of th е

work of party organizations), обновление Компартии (renovation of

thе Communist party), etc .

Soviet rulers over thе years seem to have used up most of thе

positive attributes for embellishing th е word социализм (socialism) -

победивший социализм (triumphant socialism), развитойсоциализм

(developed socialism), зрелый социализм (mature socialism) ; nоw, when

8

thе crisis of socialism in the USSR is an oрen secret, they сап call only for

oбновленый социализм (renovated socialism) ; but thеу could not find

any counterslogan to the liberal сoциал изм счеловеческимлицом"

("socialism with a human face"), borrowed into Russian from th е

Czechoslovak communist reformers of 1968 and now widely used b y

Soviet democrats while th е Communist ideologists prefer to use its varian t

гуманный социализм (human socialism) ; thеу had to adopt thе slogan

of Western social democrats "демократический сoциализм - (democratic

socialism) ;

4) thе basic structure of core communist slogans has hardly changed i n

recent years (thе aim is communism, thе principal moving force -- th е

Communist party, th е main subject -- thе Soviet people, thе main function

of a man -- work) . But as thе Soviet Union is transforming into a

multiparty society there arе certain changes in thе use o f communist

slogans . They become more universal in character and more varied.

Comparison of thе October revolution anniversary slogans for 198 8

through 1990 reveals that, as thе party was in retreat under thе pressure

of thе democratic forces in these years, thе essence of thе core slogans was

preserved, though thе frequency of thе main Communist symbols was

decreasing (e.g ., in 1988 Lenin was mentioned twiсе as великий Ленин

(great Lenin), once in большевики-ленинцы (Bolsheviks-Leninists), onc e

in марксизм-ленинизм (Marxism-Leninism), once i nленинская

национальная политика (Lenin's national policy) ; КПСС (CPSU - thе

Communist Party of thе Soviet Union) three times, of them once asпартия

(th е Рarty) 13 . In 1989 Lenin was mentioned only once and CPSU twi се , one

of them as партия (thе Party), but all other words and expressions abov e

(Bolsheviks-Leninists, Marxism-Leninism, Lenin's national policy) wer e

9

dropped . 14 In 1990, Lenin was mentioned once, and CPSU also оnсе , named

simply as партия (thе Party), while the other words of the 1988 slogan s

mentioned above were not used a t all.15

Gorbachev's aim in introducing perestroika in 1985 was not to

destroy thе communist doctrine, but to adapt it to modern conditions . It

would be appropriate to mention here that his very choice of thе terms

перестройка (restructuring), гласность (glasnost - openness, but not

свобода слова [freedom of speech]), демократизация (democratization ,

but not демократия [democracy]) shows th е limits of his reformist

approach. It would be instructive to lеarn what thе Communist Party

ideologists understand by glasnost . In thе latest Soviet dictionary of

political terms we find :

Glasnost - thе maximal openness and truthfulness in th е activity of

state and public organizations. Glasnost presupposes th е absence of

zones closed for criticism. .. But at thе same timе glasnost is not

synonymous with universal permissiveness, undermining of Socialist

values; it is invoked to strengthen socialism, th е socialist code of

morals. 16

Reading this definition it is difficult to understand what glasnost i

s is it thе maximum truthful description of events or is it th е necessity to

strengthen "thе socialist code of morals ." For in thе past years thе first was

often sacrificed for thе sake of thе second in thе USSR. 17

The limits of Soviet political innovations, as re flected in political

vocabulary, can be shown by thе following example . The Moscow mayor

Gavriil Popov published in 1990 his program of political and economi c

reforms in which he liberally used new political terms coined by th е Soviet

democrats, all of which started with thе prefix де - (de-) :

1 0

ия(defederalization),десов етизaция(desovietization) ,

денационализация (denationalization), etc. Sensing the dangerou s

character of all of these terms which imply thе destruction of existing

Soviet structures, thе conservative Soviet mass media viciously attacke d

Popov:

It happens that under thе simple and understandable "Down with. . .!" a

pseudo-theoretical basis is built, and then after a naked and primitiv e

negation an elegant "de-" is born: defederalization, desovietization ,

depolitization, etc. In order to let you understand thе truth I sugges t

that, instead of all of these "de-", use only one: "de-Popovization" . Try it,

and you will understand a lot . 1 8

On thе other hand, communist hard-liners arе calling their opponent s

,деструктивные силы (destructive forces) who aim at the "демонтаж

социализма" (dismantling of socialism) .

The era of perestroika, which lasted for at least five years (1985 -

1990; now we often hear of постперестройка [postperestroika]) may b e

divided into twо periods: 1985-1987 -- aппаратная перестройка

(perestroika done by thе apparatus) and after 1988 -- демократи ческая

перестройка (democratic perestroika) . If during thе first period it was

thе party and state apparatus who set thе pace of perestroika from above ,

during thе second period thеir firm control over thе process got out of

hand.

It is during thе first period that most of thе terminological

innovations came from above and, precisely, from Gorbachev himself . It

was as if thе populace, frightened by decades of repression and used to a

carefully supervised political vocabulary, first tasted some new, very

limited freedom of expression . During thе second period, however, thi s

1 1

situation changed drastically and new terms started to b е coined by the

larger society .

The real innovator in political vocabulary was not Gorbachev himsel f

but his closest advisers and speech writers (such as A . Iakovlev, G .

Shakhnazarov, and others) who, extremely well versed in th е history of

Marxism-Leninism and Russian history and well acquainted with thе

writings of Soviet dissidents and with modern Western political culture ,

suggested to Gorbachev new terms and expressions .

Whу does Gorbachev consider перестройка (perestroika) to be thе

most important of his thrее slogans гласность (glasnost), ускор ение

(acceleration) and перестройка (perestroika)? А possible explanation for

it was suggested by M. Kaganskаiа . 19 Gorbachev's perestroika is thе second

Soviet perestroika. The first one was intrоduсеd by Stalin in thе 1930s .

Stalin used twо synonymous terms реконструкция (reconstruction) and

перестройка (restructuring) . The first one meant technical

reconstruction, thе building of industry, and thе second -- thе

restructuring of consciousness, th е creation of a new Soviet man, who will

be an atheist and a devoted communist . Stalin also used thе word

перестройка to designate restructuring of Communist party organizations .

It is symptomatic that L . Kaganovich, who was Stalin's right hand man ,

suggested recently in an interview that Gorbachev's perestroika is a

continuation of a process started in Stalin's times .

He said :

We have to act decisively, to explain to thе people what has

happened, because thе people suffer without an explanation . А wide

discussion should be started, but thеу say that it is against perestroika .

Why? Not at all . I am for perestroika, for reforms . My report of thе XII I

1 2

Party Congress on the organizational proms ems of the Party started

dirесtlу with the word "perestroika" . 20

Gorbachev defines perestroika as "революция сверху " (revolution

from above) which has to create обновленное общество (renovated

society) . Developing this idea of renovation, Gorbachev writes :

. . .It will be a renovated society . We began such a serious matter, a

very difficult one . But it is possible to interpret and evaluate facts in

various ways. There is a parable: a wayfarer approaches people wh o

are building an edifice and asks the builders : what are you doing? One

of them answers with irritation: look, we are hauling the devil's stones

from morning to evening . . . Another one got up from his knees,

straightened himself up and said : you see, we are building a Temple! 2 1

Gorbachev sees Soviet society renovated by perestroik a

as a Temple (he writes the word Храм [Temple] with a capital X) . At the

same time he sees perestroika as a direct continuation of the Bolshevi k

October Revolution . By using the word perestroika as a key word of hi s

reforms Gorbachev is pursuing a polemical objective : his second

perestroika will be an exact opposite to Stalin's first perestroika, associated

with terror. His perestroika will be done by the whole Soviet society, an d

not by the proletariat only, and it will bring renovation to the whole

society .

By the same reasoning the key word glasnost could not serve as the

centerpiece key word because it is directly associated with Tsar Alexande r

II's liberal policies, removed in time and not immediate in Soviet history .

The teрм "ново е политическое мышление " (new political

thinking) is a new one (as its synonym Gorbachev use sфилософия

(philosophy) . Both refer to international relations and are connected with

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an appeal to деидеологизация межгосударственных отношений" (de-

ideologization of intergovernmental relations) and nриоритет

общечеловейеских ценностей " (prio гity of universal human values) .

But some of his other teðms arе closely connected with thе Russian

cultural tradition and Orthodox Christianity . Such arе thе terms

соборность " (conciliarism) and мир " (mir, thе Russian village

community) . The first one was introduced by thе founder of thе Russian

slavophile movement Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860), and thе second was

one of thе main concepts of thе slavophile movement. Other of his terms ,

such as "духовность" (spirituality), ду ховнoе возрождение " (spiritual

revival), "нравственность" (morals), "нрав ственное очи щение (moral

purification), милосердие " (charity), refer to purely religious values.

It can be easily shown that most of Gorbachev's key words and

slogans were borrowed from thе vocabulary of Soviet dissidents of thе 60's

and 70's, and particularly from thе Samizdat writings of A. Sakharov and

A. Solzhenitsyn, who called for ликвидация застоя (liquidation of

stagnation."23), for гласность (glasnost), конвергенция систем

(convergence of systems), консенсус (consensus), правoвое государство

(law-governed state), духовность (spirituality) ,демократизатция

(democratization) . For example, Solzhenitsyn wrote in 1969: "Glasnost ,

honest and full glasnost - this is th е first condition of a healthy state in any

society." 22 Sakharov demanded in his memorandum to L . Brezhnev "thе

liquidation of stagnation ." 23 The word "glasnost" is mentioned in thi s

memorandum nine times .

Having heavily borrowed political terms from dissidents, Gorbachev

seems to interpret them in his own way . He was more than once accused of

it by Soviet democrats . А leading Soviet democrat lu . Afanas'ev wrote :

1 4

The followers of thе Advanced Teaching in the person of th e

President of thе USSR (who was "elected" in thе worst traditions of th е

Stalinist "constitutional democratism") and his team willingly operat e

within thе whole set of democratic terms borrowed from "the former

dissident" A. Sakharov, among them with th е term "consensus" .

However, in this case, as in his other pseudo- гthе tогiсal exercises, M.

Gorbachev puts into "consensus" a meaning which is different from thе

one accepted throughout thе world: while thе universal democrati c

practice understands by "consensus" a general agreement on the basi s

of mutual compromises, for th е General Secretary of thе Centra l

Committee of thе CPSU this term means a universal unconditiona l

agreement, in essence, with a directive given from above by th е Central

Committee on thе basis of an "unanimous decision" taken there by th е

anonymous "decision makers" 2 4

Other important key words of Gorbachev's program, such a s

приватизация (privatization), плюрализм (pluralism), рынок (market) ,

рыночная экoномика (market economy) were almost never mentioned in

Samizdat and were borrowed by him from thе West, probably mediated

through Poland and Hungary, where these ideas were widely discusse d

and tried out.

It would be interesting to compare th е patterns of discourse in thе

official Soviet propaganda under Stalin, in th е Samizdat literature of thе

60's and 70's and in thе Soviet mass media today. The most fascinating fac t

is thе continuity of key words, ideas and slogans of struggle and

confrontation in all these three types of texts . We find in all of them suc h

key words as Браг (enemy), предатель (traitor), борьба (struggle) ,

война (war), бой (battle), фронт (front), соратник (comrade-in-arms), etc.

1 5

This kind of confrontation mentality developed by th е Soviet system

during decades of its indoctrination activity remained and remains a

telling characteristic sign of most of thе political texts produced in th еUSSR. It is especially strong today when terms like врагипepecтройкии

(thе enemies of perestroika) and враги нации (thе enemies of nation) arе

freely traded on thе Soviet political scene by all sides involved in politica l

debates.

The sources of modern Soviet political terminology ar е multiple :

Western ideas, traditional Russian political thought, Russian Orthodo x

religion, Soviet opposition to Stalin in thе 20's and 30's, etc .

Western terminology, especially Western economic terms , form

perhaps thе most significant stratum of neologisms in modern Soviet

political and economic discourse . Such arе thе terms рыночная

экономика (market economy), свободный рынок (free market), бизнес

(business), бизнесмен (businessman), имид ж (image), рейтинг (rating) ,

менеджep (manager), презентация (presentation), маркетинr

(marketing), конверсия (conversion), плюрализм (pluralism) ,фермер

(farmer), спонсор (sponsor), etc.

It is slightly absurd that th е Soviets arе introducing new

designations of institutions and posts according to a Western pattern ,

though thе essence of thе regime has hardly changed : президент

(president), вице-президент (vice president), парламент (parliament) ,

муниципалитет (municipality), etc.

In introducing Western terminology, modern Soviet rulers caused a

wide reappraisal of thе semantics of terms of Western origin which were

borrowed into Russian before, when thеy usually referred to Western

realia. For example, thе word бизнесмен (businessman) previousl y

1 6

referred only to Western businessman and had thе negative connotation о f

a wheeler-dealer . Nowadays, it refers also to Soviet businessmen and it s

connotation is, as a rule, a positive one . Thе words коррупция (corruption ,

мафия (mafia), рэкет (racket), рэкетир (racketeer) referred once only to

Western realia, while now the definition of these words in dictionaries ha s

to be revised as thеy denote also realia of modern Soviet life .

Another source of new terms arе authors likе Trotsky, who was in

opposition to Stalin, and leading figures of thе Russian emigration . Trotsky

was thе first to introduce into Russian thе expression Сталин и его

команда (Stalin and his team) which has gained wide currency now ; we

hear today of Горбачев и его команда (Gorbachev and his team) ,

Ельцин и его команда (Yeltsin and his team), etc .

А term coined by Trotsky in 1932 is сталинщина (Stalinism) which

is widеly used today. Thе Russian emigre religious philosopher N .A.

Berdiaev (1874-1948) introduced th е term русская èäåÿ (Russian idea) ,

which espoused Russia's moral and spiritual superiority over the world ,

particularly over the West, and Russia's mission to save th е world from

decadence .25 This notion was also discussed in th е Samizdat in thе 70's and

80's .

Today the term русская ид ея has become common and even

acquired an antonym. Speaking of their own national aspirations ,

individual Soviet republics speak of their националная идея (national

idea) which is thе opposite of thе Russian idea .

National movements in the present-day USSR provide a ric h

vocabulary of new political terms . In this way many new borrowings fro m

thе languages of thе repuЫics arе entering modern Russian political

discourse . These arе thе new names of repuЫ ics : Татарстан (Tatarstan) ,

1 7

Кыргызстан (Kyrgyzstan), Молдова (Moldova), республик a

Якутия -Саха (Republic of Iakutia-Sakha) ,Приднестровская ресиублика

(Dniester Republic), Гагазская республика (Gagauzian Republic) ; thе

names of armies and military units in th е republics :Армянская

на национaльнaя армия (Агmenian National Army), Мхедрио ни

Щевардени , Тетри Георги (Mkhedrioni, Shevardeni, Tetri Georgi - -

names of Georgian military organizations), айсзарги (aiszargs -- thе name

of а Latvian voluntary para-military organization), etc ; thе names of

Republican national institutions and posts (usually a revival o f

designations used in thе pre-Soviet period), e .g. : in Moldova - -примар

(mayor), примария (municipality), жудец (region), триколор (traditional

Rumanian flag), etc; names of various national movements :интерфрoнт

(Interfront -- organizations of th е Russian speaking population, supporting

thе Central Moscow government, in Baltic republics and Moldova) ,

Народный фронт (рорular front -- organizations in a number of repuЫ ic s

supporting refoгms and thе national sovereignty of a republic), Рук (Rukh

- thе biggest national movement in th е Ukraine), Саюдис (Sajudis - thе

Lithuanian national movement), etc.

In thе conditions of confrontation of thе local population and the

Russian language population in th е national repuЫics thе following terms

have been coined : русскоязычные (Russian-speaking population - -

denoting people of any nationality living as a Russian-speaking minority i n

a national republic), оккканты (occupiers), мигранты (migrants) ,

коло исты (colonists) -- names given by thе national majority to thе

Russian-speaking minority in a republic ( рarticularlу in Baltic repuЫics

and Moldova) .

1 8

The Nazi racist terminology has been borrowed by the members of

the Russian nationalist organization Pamiat' : иудомасоны,

жидомасоны (Judeomasons), юде (Jew, cf. German Jude), etc. This movement created

terms сионизация (zionization -- the influence of Jews in Russian society)

and десионизация (dezionization -- the freeing of the Russian people o f

Jewish influence), and красные сионисты (Red Zionists -- Jews in hig h

government positions) .

A. Shafarevich introduced the terms русофобия (Russophobia - -

hatred of Russians by the Jews), Б о ьшой народ (Big people -- th e

Russians) and Малый народ (Small people -- the Jews) in his book On

Russophobia, a genuine Soviet version of Mein Kampf, published in 1989 ,

but wгitten and distгibuted in Samizdat for over a quarter of a century

before . 26

Traditional Russian political terminology, swept aside by the Octobe r

revolution and used since to denote only historical realia, has been revive d

together with the reinstatement of corresponding realia: гласность

(glasnost), mир (mir, Russian village соmmunity), дворянстю (gentry) ,

атаман (ataman, Cossack chieftain), казачий крyг (Cossack council) ,

земство (zemstvo, the elective district council in Russia, 1864-1917), уезд

(uiezd, the lowest administrative division), биржа (exchange), биржевик

(stockbroker), etc .

As some of the new political parties in the USSR (by some count s

there are over 1500 such parties) accepted names of parties which existe d

in tsarist Russia, corresponding terms have been revived : кадет (cadet ,

constitutional democrat ; the constitutional-democrat parry was a majo r

liberal-monarchic party in Russia[1905-1917]), монархист (monarchic ,

member of monarchic organizations in Russia in 1905-1907, which forme d

1 9

in 1911 the Русский монархический союз [Тhe Russian Monarchic Union]) ,

меньшевик (Menshevik, а member of а social-democratic movement

formed after а split with the Bolsheviks in 1903 ; it existed in Russia unti l

1918), эсер (а member of the socialist-revolutionary party which existe d

in tsarist Russia in 1901-1918), etc .

The authorship of many new political terms can be precisely

established. For example, thе term заединщики (zaiedinshchiks - the

name of an influential group of Russian nationalist writers, who strive for

an "integral and indivisible Russia" [ за единую инеделимую

Россию]) was coined by thе literary critic Tatiana Ivanova in 1988 ; thе

term обстроить and обустройство (to organize and organization) was

introduced by A. Solzhenitsyn in 1990 as an alte rnative to перестроить

and перестройка (to reconstruct and reconstruction) 27 ; thе term

манкурт (a person who forgot his historical roots) was first in troduced by

Ch.Aitmatov in 1981, негл асный помощ ник (covert assistant, an

euphemistic designation of a KGB informer) was introduced by thе head of

thе KGB, V. Kriuchkov, in 1990.

One of thе intriguing aspects of thе present liberals' and thе hard-

liners' speech is thе use by both sides of basically thе same Soviet political

terminology (thе old Stalinist one plus its many new elements, especia lly

in thе sphere of economics) to tu rn thе tables on an opponent. Thus we

have пропаганда and контрпропаrанда (propaganda and

counterpropaganda), реформа and контррефорmа (reform an

d counterrefоrm), нежная pеволюция (gentle revolution, i .e . а nonviolent

revolution, a term borrowed in 1989 from Czech) -- нежная

контрреволюция (gentle counterrevolution, i .e ., a nonviolen t

counterrevolution) . While it was thе liberals who started to call the hard -

20

liners необольшевики (Neobolsheviks), this term is now applied to them

by the hard-liners . Both sides call each other врагиперестройки

(enemies of perestroika) .

The prognosis for the future development of the Soviet political

terminology looks as follows . The basic body of terms and expressions o f

the totalitarian period will remain in use, being permanently revised and

enriched by new elements . The main problem seems to be not the

conservativism of the terminology itself, but the self perpetuating

bureaucratic style of speech used by ^11 the opposing forces . O. Latsis

writes: "We have to admit with sorrow that the democratic press of our

day is no less prone to express itself in stock phrases than th e

bureaucratized press of old times . Onlу the set of cliches has changed. The

place of the Great Lenin is occupied by the Evil Lenin, the place of th e

Glorious Way -- by 73 Years of Continuous Mistakes, and instead of

movement into a Bright Future thеy demand now the Return to

Civil izatiоп ." 28

The essence of the old Stalinist totalitarian regime has bee n

thoroughly described and criticized in the USSR (cf . its description by

terms like тоталитаризм (totalitarianism), командно-административныя

система (the command-administrative system) ,командно-репрессивная

система (command-repressive system), советская империя (the Soviet

empire), etc . But the struggle for reforms and for their successful

implementation will take a long time and its outcome is far from certain .

The patterns of Soviet bureaucratic speech have pe r meated Russian

everyday speech too deeply, and even under the best scenario of quic k

and effective democratic refor ms it may take at least a generation to b e

2 1

gradually squeezed out of usage and replaced by а new, cardinally

different kind of Russian political language .

1 V.Havel, Slovo о slovakh [A Word about Words], "Russkaia Mysl"', " Paris, Nо .3799,October 27, 1989,1).5 .2 Victor Klemperer, Die unbewaltigte Sprache . Aus dem Notizbuch eines Philologer "LTI" ,Leipzig, 1948 .

3 A.M. Selishchev, Iazyk revoliutsionnoi epokhi. Iz nabliudeni .i nad russkim iazykomposlednikh let . 1917-192 6 . [The Language of the Revolutionary Epoch . Some Remarks o nthe Russian Language of the R еcent Years 1917-1926], Moscow, 1928 .

4 J"zyk propagandy. Opracowali S . Amsterdаmski, A. Jaw=owska, T. Kowalik, Warszawa ,Niezale/na Oficyna Wydawnicza, marzec 1979 .5 luri Mann, Govorim kak dumает . Zametki о iazyke, istorii о nas samikh [We Speak thеWay We Think. Notes on Language, History and on Ourselves], "Izvestia", No.16, January

18, 1991, р .7 .6 Cf. M. Bro<ski, Totalitarny j"zуk kommunizmu [Th е Totalitarian Language ofCommunism], in: "Kultura," Paris, 1979, No .12, pp.91-99.

7 A. StreLianyi, Nepоdkupnyi svidetel' [Incorruptible Witness], "Moskovskie Novosti" ,1988, No.21, May 22, p .3 .8 G.Ch. Gusejnov, Lozh' kak sostoianie sоznanhа [Liе as а State of Consciousness], "Voprosy

Filosofii", 1989, No .11, pр .67-68 .

9 N.S. Barabasheva, Slova, slova, slоva. . . (Leksika nashikh pravovykh aktov) [Words ,words, words . . . (Thе Vocabulary of our Legal Acts)], "Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo" ,1990, No.8, pр .82-90 .10 V. Lyzlov, Azу kommunisticheskoi propagandy [The ABC of Communist Propaganda] ,"Stolitsa", 1991, No.10, pp.15-1 б .

11 Sotsiаl'nа ia i sotsial' по-politicheskaia situatsiia v SSSR: sostoianie i prognoz [The Socialand Sociopolitical Situation in the USSR: the State-of-aп and a Prognosis], Mо sсоw,Moscow University Press, 1990, p .4 .12 V. Havel, ibidem, p .5 .

13 Prizyvy TsK KPSS k 71-i godovshchine Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsi i[Slogans of the Central Committee of CPSU for the 71 Anniversary of the Great Octobe rSocialist Revolution], "Pravda", 1988, No .298, October 24, р .1 .

2 2

14 Prizyvy TsK KPSS k 72-i godovshchine Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsi i[Slogans of the Central Committee of CPSU for the 72 Anniversary of the Great Octobe r

Socialist Revolution ], "Рrаvdа", 1989, No .305, November 1, p .1 .

15 Prizyvy TsK KPSS k 73-i godovshchine Velikoi Oktjabr'skoi Sо tsi аlistiсh еskoi revoliutsi i

[Slogans of the Centrаl Committee of CPSU for 01( 273 Anniversary of the Great Octobe r

Socialist Revolution], "Pravda", 1990, No.297, October 24, p .1 .

16 Kratkii politicheskii slovar' [A Short Political Dictionary], Moscow, Politizdat, 1989 ,рр .112-113 .17 A.Iu. Vladimirov, [Letter to the Editor], "Ogonek", 1990, No .32, р .4 .

18 Iu. Golik, Nigiliatina [Nihilism], "Pravda", No.65, March 16, 1991, р .4 .19 M. Kaganskaia, Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniia [Marxizm and the Problems o fLinguistics], "22", Tel Aviv, 1988, No .59, рр .117-1 5 5 .

20 Chto oni govoriat [What They Say Now], "Literatu rnaia gazeta", 1991, No .7, February

20, р .4 .21 M. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie [Perestroika and New Thinking] ,Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, р .2 .22 A. Solzhenitsyn, Pis'mo Sеkrе tari аtu SP RSFSR [A Letter to the Secretariat of th eWriters Union of RSFSR], 1969, "Arkhiv Samizdata", No .333 .23 A. Sakharov, Pamiatnaia zapiska LI .Brezhnevu i posleslovie k nei [A Memorandum toLI. Brezhnev and a Postface to It], "Arkhiv Samizdata", No .1136.

24 A. Afanas'ev, "Mesto i zadachi politicheskoi oppozitsii v SSSR" . Dukhovnyi zave tSakharova ["Thе Place and Tasks of the Political Opposition in the USSR ." The Spiritua l

Behest of Sakharov], "Dov еriе", 1990, No.8, р .6 .25 N. Berdiaev, The Russian Idea, New York, Macmillan, 1948 .26 A. Shafarevich, O rusofobii [On Russophobia], "Nash Sovremennik", 1989, No .6, р .l 1 .27 A. Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu {How We Should Arrange M аtters inRussia], "Literaturnaia gazeta", 1990, No .38, September 18, pp.3-б .28 O. Latsis, Maski . Kakoi politike sluzhat oni segodnia [Masks . What Politics They Serv eToday], "Izvestia", 1991, No.60, March 11, p .3 .

2 3