montagu chelmsford report of 1919

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REPORTON

Indian ConstitutionalReforms

CALCUTTASUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA1918


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Agents for the Sale of Books published by theSuperintendent of Government Printing, India, Calcutta

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.PAGE.

INTRODUCTION1. The Report ... ... ... ... ... i2. The inquiry has not affected war effort ... ... i3. Method of inquiry ... ... ... ... i4. Scope of the Report and meaning of terms employed ... ii5. Gravity of the task ... ... ... ... iii

PART I. THE MATERIAL.CHAPTER I. RECENT EVENTS IN INDIA6. The announcement in Parliament ... ... ... 17. A new policy ... ... ... ... ... 18. Morley-Minto reforms ... ... ... ... 29. Their character and reception ... ... ... 2

10. Decentralization Commission ... ... ... 311. The Imperial visit ... ... ... ... 412. Public Services Commission ... ... ... ... 513. Local self-government Resolution, 1915 ... ... 514. Activities of political leaders ... ... ... 715. Opposition to executive measures ... ... ... 716. Resentment of racial discrimination ... ... ... 817. Zeal for social reform ... ... ... ... 918. Demand for more liberal institutions ... ... ... 919. Imperial aspirations ... ... ... ... 1020. The outbreak of war. India's loyalty ... ... ... 1021. Disaffected groups ... ... ... ... II22. Attitude of the politicians ... ... ... ... 1323. Effects of the war. New sense of self-esteem ... ... 1324. Emphasis on self-determination ... ... ... 1425. The Home Rule movement ... ... ... ... 1426. Position of the Muslims ... ... ... ... 1427. Hindu-Muslim entente ... ... ... ... 1528. Need for a new policy ... ... ... ... 16

CHAPTER II. GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM29. Beginnings of British control ... ... ... ... 1730. First intervention by Parliament ... ... ... 1731. The Board of Control ... ... ... ... 1732. The Secretary of State for India ... ... ... 1833. Nature of Parliamentary control ... ... ... 1934. Establishment of Parliamentary supremacy ... ... 2135. Influence of Parliament on the Secretary of State and his Council 2436. Powers of the Secretary of State ... ... ... 2437. Development of British dominion ... ... ... 2538. The Executive Council of the Govemor General ... ... 2639. Growth of the provincial system ... ... ... 2740. The Presidencies ... ... ... ... ... 2841. The Lieutenant-Governorships ... ... ... 2842. The Central Provinces and Assam ... ... ... 2943. Baluchistan and the N. W. F. Province ... ... ... 2944. Minor administrations ... ... ... ... 3Q


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PAGEPART I. THE MATERIAL contd.CHAPTER II. GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM contd.

45. Sphere of the Government of India ... ... ... 3147. Relations with the provincial Governments ... ... 3148. Development of the existing system ... ... ... 3249. Supervision by the Government of India ... ... ... 3350. Extent of interference in provincial affairs ... ... 33

CHAPTER III. GROWTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS51. Introductory ... ... ... ... ... 3552. Beginnings of legislative power ... ... ... 3553. Results of the Diwani ... ... ... ... 3554. The Regulating Act, 1773 ... ... ... ... 3555. The Declaratory Act, 1780 ... ... ... ... 3656. Growing confusion of the legislative system ... ... 3657. Its simplification and correction ... ... ... 3758. Beginning of the Indian Legislative Council ... ... 3759. Defects of its early form ... ... ... ... 3860. Admission of Indians proposed ... ... ... 3861. Establishment of provincial legislatures ... ... ... 3862. Events leading up to changes ... ... ... 3963. The Indian Councils Act, 1861 ... ... ... 3964. Character of the councils thereby established ... ... 4065. Retrospect ... ... ... ... ... 4166. Th 3 Indian Councils Act, 1892 ... ... ... 4167. Lord Dufferin's Committee ... ... ... ... 4268. Lord Dufferin's views ... ... ... ... 4369. Introduction of elections for provincial councils ... ... 4470. Working of provincial regulations ... ... ... 4671. Elections for the Indian Legislative Council ... ... 4672. Reasons for further advance ... ... ... ... 4673. Statement of the problem in 1907 ... ... ... 4774. Dissatisfaction with the solution ... ... ... 4875. Salient features of the 1909 reforms. System of representation ... 4976. Abandonment of official majority in the provincial councils ... 4977. Legal recognition of the elective principle ... ... 5078. Right to move resolutions ... ... ... ... 5079. Nature of the advance made ... ... ... 5180. A legislative convention ... ... ... ... 5181. Conclusions ... ... ... ... ... 52

CHAPTER IV. THE MORLEY-MINTO COUNCILS82. Introductory ... ... ... ... ... 5383. Defects of the existing electoral system. Restricted nature ofthe franchise ... ... ... ... ... 5384. Large proportion of lawyers returned ... ... ... 5485. The official bloc. Its working ... ... ... 5586. Its effect on officials ... ... ... ... 5587. Effect on Indian members ... ... ,.. ... 5688. Effect on council proceedings ... ... ... ... 5689. Position of official members ... ... ... ... 5690. Position of provincial Governments ... ... ... 5791. Work of the councils ... ... ... ... 5892. The Indian Legislative Council. Influence of non-official memberson legislation ... ... ... ... ... 5893. Private members' ,,. ... ... 60


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PAGE-PART I. THE MATERIAL co*d.CHAPTER IV. THE MORLEY-MINTO COUNCILS contd.

94. Influences of the council on administration ... ... 6095. Attitude of the non-official members ... ... ... 6196. The provincial legislative councils ... ... ... 6297. Use of the right of interrogation ... ... ... 6398. Use of resolutions ... ... ... ... ... 6399. Mr. Gokhale's expectations from the reforms ... ... 64

100. Reasons for their non-fulfilment ... ... ... 66101. The present position ... ... ... ... 66

CHAPTER V. THE EXISTING STRUCTURE102. Relations between the Indian and the provincial Governments ... 68103. Their general character ... ... ... ... 68104. Financial devolution ... ... ... ... 68105. Financial system up to 1861 ... ... ... ... 69106. Evolution of the settlement system ... ... ... 69107. Settlements made g'wasi-permanent ... ... ... 70108. Famine expenditure. Settlements made permanent ... ... 71109. Defects of the system. Provincial expenditure ... ... 71110. Provincial taxation ... ... ... ... 72111. Provincial borrowing ... ... ... ... 73112. Codes of instructions ... ... ... ... 73113. Their justification ... ... ... ... 74114. Legislative control. Statutory restrictions on the powers of

provincial councils ... ... ... ... 74115. Restrictions resulting from previous occupation of the legislative

field ... ... ... ... ... 75116. Restrictions imposed by executive directions ... ... 75117. Administrative control. The need for uniformity ... ... 76118. Initiation of new policies ... ... ... ... 77119. Effect of responsibility to Parliament ... ... ... 77120. The Indian constitution not federal ... ... ... 78121. Provincial organization ... ... ... ... 78122. The administrative machine ... ... ... ... 79123. The district ... ... ... ... ... 79124. Local self-government ... ... ... ... 80125. Strength and weakness of the official system ... ... 81126. The place of the Indian Civil Service ... ... ... 81127. Effect of our proposals. In the district ... ... ... 82128. And on the services ... ... ... ... 83

CHAPTER VI. THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM129. Effects of British rule ... ... ... ... 84130. Purpose of present chapter ... ... ... ... 84131. Basis of a system of responsibility ... ... ... 85132. Conditions in India ... ... ... ... 85133. Immensity of the problem ... ... ... ... 85134. Extent of education . ... ... ... ... 86135. Distribution of wealth ... ... ... ... 87136. Extent of interest in political questions ... ... ... 87137. Political capacity of the rural population ... ... ... 88138. Interests of the ryot ... ... ... ... 88139. The politically-minded class ... ... ... ... 89140. Their relations to the masses ... ... ... ... 90J41. Divisions of Indian society ... t: . ,. T ... 91


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PAGE.PART I. THE MATERIAL concld.CHAPTER VI. THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM contd.

142. Variety of local conditions ... ... ... ... 92143. Reasons for emphasizing the difficulties ... ... ... 92144. The justification of an advance ... ... ... 93145. Conditions of success ... ... ... ... 93146. Political education of the ryot ... ... ... 93147. Obligations of the landed aristocracy ... ... ... 91148. And of the smaller gentry ... ... ... ... 95149. Duty of the educated classes towards the ryot ... ... 95150. And towards agitation ... ... ... ... 96151. Duty of discouraging religious animosities ... ... 96152. Possible effect of the reforms ... ... ... ... 97153. Advance must be gradual ... ... ... ... gg154. Provision against religious dissension155. And for the protection of the ryot and other interests156. And for the services157. Position of the Native States ...158. Responsibility for foreign relations

CHAPTER VII. THE CONGRESS-LEAGUE SCHEME159. Introductory ... ... ... ... ... 102160. Provincial autonomy ... ... ... ... 102161. Composition of provincial executives ... ... ... 102162. The provincial legislative councils ... ... ... 104163. Minority representation ... ... ... ... 105164. Further safeguards for Muslim interests ... ... ... 105165. Financial powers ... ... ... ... ... 106166. Legislative powers ... ... ... ... 107167. Relations between executive and legislature ... ... 107168. Effect of resolutions ... ... ... ... 108169. Proposals without a precedent ... ... ... 109170. And fatal to good government ... ... ... 110171. The veto an illusory safeguard ... ... ... 110172. Proposals affecting the Government of India ... ... Ill173. Criticism of the scheme as a whole ... ... ... Ul174. Of its theory ... ... ... ... ... 112175. As a means of education ... ... ... ... 112176. TJnworkability in practice ... ... ... ... 113177. The negation of responsible government ... ... ... 113

PART II. THE PROPOSALS.PRELIMINARY

178. Reasons for a new policy ... ... ... ... ]17179. The logical outcome of the past ... ... ... 117180. Hopes for the future ... ... ... ... 118181. The education problem ... ... ... ... 118182. Retrospect of education ... ... ... ... 119183. Defects of the system ... ... ... ... liO184. Social factors ' ... ... ... ... ... 120185. Attitude of the ryot ... ... ... ... 120186. Chief needs at present ... ... ... ... 121187. Political importance of education ... ... ... 122188. Extent of the advance proposed in local bodies ... ... 122189. In Governments ... ... ... ^.. 123


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PAGE.PART II. THE PROPOSALS contd.PRELIMINARY contd.

190. In the Government of India ... ... ... 124191. In England ... ... ... ... ... 124192. Local self-government ... ... ... ... 125193. The Government of India's proposals ... ... ... 126194. Constitution of local boards ... ... ... ... 126195. Powers of local boards ... ... ... ... 126196. Panchayats ... ... ... ... ... 127197. Comments on this programme . . ... ... 128198. Scope of following proposals ... ... ... 128199. Treatment of backward tracts ... ... ... 129

CHAPTER VIII. THE PROVINCESDevolution to Provincial Governments

200. Financial devolution ... ... ... ... 130201. A new basis ... ... ... ... ... 130202. Complete separation of revenues ... ... ... 130203. Abolition of divided heads ... ... ... ... 131204. Famine expenditure ... ... ... ... 132205. Need for meeting the resultant deficit in the Indian budget ... 133206. The means of so doing ... ... ... ... 133207. The possible need for revision ... ... ... 135208. Provincial budgets and balances ... ... ... 136209. Code restrictions ... ... ... ... ... 136210. Provincial taxation ... ... ... ... 136211. Provincial borrowing ... ... ... ... 137212. Legislative devolution ... ... ... ... 138213. Administrative devolution ... ... ... ... 138

Provincial Executives214. Council government ... ... ... ... 139215. The structure of the executive ... ... ... 140216. Dualism set aside ... ... ... ... ... 140217. An alternative plan ... ... ... ... 140218. Our own proposals ... ... ... ... 142219. Relation of the Governor to ministers ... ... ... 142220. Additional members without portfolio ... ... ... 143221. Working of the executive ... ... ... ... 143222. Advantages and disadvantages of this plan ... ... 144223. Its justification ... ... ... ... ... 145224. A further proposal ... ... ... ... 145

Provincial Legislatures225. Composition of the councils ... ... ... ... 146226. The system of election and the franchise ... ... ... 147227. Communal electorates ... ... ... ... 147228. They are opposed to the teaching of history ... ... 148229. They perpetuate class division ... ... ... 148230. They stereotype existing relation ... ... ... 149231. The case of the Muhammadans ... ... ... 149232. Other minority representation ... ... ... 150233. Official members ... ... ... ... ... 151234.* Designation of members ... ... ... ... 151235, Standing^committees ... ^.. ... ... 152


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PART II. THE PROPOSALS contd.CHAPTER VIII. THE PROVINCES contd.

Provincial Legislatures contd.236. Control of business ... ... jg2237. Effect of resolutions238. Division of the functions of government ... 153239. Settlement of disputes ... ... 155240. Powers of intervention ... ... 155241. The justification of this division ... ... 155242. Alternative methods of division ... ... J5g243. Plan of divisional councils ... 15g244. Reasons for rejecting it ... ... 157245. Plan of provincial States ... ... . ... 157246. Reasons for rejecting it generally ... ... 15247. Means of securing the affirmative power of legislation 159248. By Government of India legislation ... ... 160249. By ordinances ... ... ... ... IgO250. Other proposals ... ... ... ... 161251. Advisory ordinance committees ,... ... 161252. Our proposals. Grand committees ... 161253. Procedure after reference to grand committee ... 162254. Treatment of mixed legislation ... ... 163255. Budget procedure ... ... ... 164256. Its difficulties and their solution ... ... 164257. Safeguards against difficulties ... 165258. Upper houses ... ... ... ... 166259. Relations of the services to the Government ... 167

Future Development260. Modification by the Government of India ... ... 167261. Periodic commission ... ... ... ... 168262. Other matters for consideration by the commission ... 169263. The importance of an electorate ... ... ... 169264. Matter for special consideration ... ... ... 170

CHAPTER IX. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INDIA OFFICE(*') The Government of India

265. The need for change ... ... ... ... 171266. The burden of work ... ... ... ... 171267. Present causes of delay ... ... ... ... 172268. References to the India Office ... ... 173269. Insufficiency of staff ... ... ... ... 173270. Inherent tendencies of an official Government ... ... 174271. The Governor General's Executive Council ... ... 174272. Increase in Indian element ... ... ... ... 174273. The Indian Legislative Assembly ... ... ... 175274. Representation of the provinces ... ... ... 176275. Nominated members ... ... ... ... 176276. Means of securing the affirmative power of legislation ... 177277. The Council of State ... ... ... ... 178278. Qualifications for membership ... ... ... 179279. Legislative procedure. Government Bills ... ... 179280. Private members' Bills ... ... ... ... 180281. Advantages of this procedure ... ... ... 180282. A possible objection ... ... ... ... 181


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PART II. THE PROPOSALS contd.CHAPTER IX. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INDIA OFFICE contd.

(i) The Government of India contd.283. Powers of dissolution, assent, etc. ... ... '... 181284. Fiscal legislation. Effect of resolutions ... ... 182285. Standing committees ... ... ... ... 182286. Questions and rules of procedure ... ... ... 183287. An Indian Privy Council ... ... ... ... 183288. Periodic commission ... ... ... ... 183289. Summary ... ... ... ... ... 184

(ii)The India Office290. Powers of the Secretary of State ... ... ... 184291. Delegation to the Government of Indi i. In transferred matters 185292. And in reserved matters ... ... ... ... 186293. Organization of the India Office ... ... ... 187294. Relations of the Secretary of State with Parliament ... ... 187295. A select committee on Indian affairs ... ... ... 188

CHAPTEB X. THE NATIVE STATES296. Introductory ... ... ... ... ... 190297. Position of the States ... ... .-.. ... 190298. Effects of the war ... ... ... ... 190299. Points of contact ... ... ... ... 191300. Modern influences ... ... ... ... 192301. Evolution of the Chiefs' Conference ... ... ... 192302. Effect of British policy. The term "Native States" ... 193303. Government intervention ... ... ... ... 193304. Interpretation of treaties ... ... ... ... 194305. Need for re-examination of the position ... ... 194306. A Council of Princes ... ... ... ... 194307. Standing committee of the council ... ... ... 195308. Commissions of inquiry into disputes ... ... ... 196309. And into cases of misconduct ... ... ... 196310. Relations with the Government of India ... ... 196311. Joint deliberation on matters of common interest ... ... 198312. Future position of the States ... ... ... 198

CHAPTEB XI. MISCELLANEOUS(i) The Public Services

313. The case for increasing the Indian element ... ... 199314. Limitations to this process ... ... ... ... 200315. Removal of racial distinctions ... ... ... 201316. Institution of recruitment in India ... ... ... 201317. Percentage of appointments to be made in India ... ... 201318. Improvement in the conditions of the European services ... 202319. Pay ... ... ... ... ... ... 202320. Pensions ... ... ... 203321. Leave ... ... ... ... ... ... 203322. Expatriation allowances ... ... ... 203323. Future position of the European services ... ... 204324. Work awaiting the English official ... ... ... 205325. Protection of service interests ... ... 205326. The Indian Civil Service ... ... ... ... 206327. Its future opportunity ... ... ... 206


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vinPAGE,PART II. THE PROPOSALS condd.

CHAPTER XI. MISCELLANEOUS contd.(ii) The Army

328. Indian wishes ... ... ... ... ... 207329. Recognition of the services of the Indian Army ... ... 208330. British commissions for Indians ... ... ... 209

(Hi) Industries and Tariffs331. Political importance of the economic situation ... ... 210332. Weakness of India's economic position ... ... ... 210333. Indian suspicions ... ... ... ... ... 210334. Need for Government action ... ... ... 211335. The ' swadeshi ' movement and the boycott ... ... 211336. Reasons for a forward policy ... ... ... ... 212337. Military value of economic development ... ... ... 212338. Difficulties and potentialities ... ... ... ... 213339. Need for technical development ... ... ... 214340. Proposals of the Industrial Commission ... ... ... 214341. Fiscal policy ... ... ... ... ... 215342. Desire for a protective tariff ... ... ... ... 215343. Method of deciding the question ... ... ... 216

(iv) The non-official community344. The European commercial community ... ... ... 216345. Mission work ... ... ... ... ... 217246. The Anglo-Indian community ... ... ... 217

(v) Social Relations347. Social relations of Europeans and Indians ... ... 218348. Mutual obligations ... ... ... ... 219

CONCLUSION349. Conception of India's future ... ... ... 219350. Changes in the control by the Government of India ... 220351. And by the India Office ... ... ... ... 220352. And by Parliament ... ... ... ... 221353. Review of proposals ... ... ... ... 221354. Need for criticism ... ... ... ... 222355. Acknowledgments ... ... ... ... 222356. Conclusion ... ... ... ... ... 223

APPENDIX I ... ... ... ... ... ... 225APPENDIX II ... ... ... ... ... 232SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS ... 239


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INTRODUCTION.

Having now completed the inquiry which we were directed toundertake in the decision announced in theHouse of Commons eight months ago, we begto lay before His Majesty's Government this report of the conclu-sions to which we have come, touching the constitutional changeswhich are desirable in India, and to ask their assent to itspublication.

2. We have a preliminary point to make. It has been askedwhy the Secretary of State and the Govern-affected "S" effort^ ment of India are devoting time and energiesto the task of domestic reconstruction, whenthe whole activities of the authorities and the country ought to bebent to the supreme purpose of the war. Our report will, we hope,show how strong in themselves are the reasons for not postponing theconsideration of reforms. We can add that the calm atmosphere inwhich we hoped that our inquiry might be conducted has beenattained; and this has in itself been of no small assistance to theGovernment. It would be easy to rebut the criticism by a specificrecital of the part that India has played in the war. But we wishto avoid any appearance of either apology or glorification ; and there-fore we prefer to meet it simply by the formal and definite assurance,made with a full sense of responsibility, that the energies of theGovernment have at no time been diverted from the war by otherconsiderations however important.

3. We have also briefly to explain the means which we took tocomply with the direction that there shouldMethod ot inquiry. \1 M. j i T. *be a tree and informal exchange of opinionbetween those in authority at Home and in India. As soon as theannouncement was made in the House of Commons, the Governmentof India in Simla and a Committee of the India Office in Londondevoted themselves to the preliminary consideration of the problemsinvolved. The Secretary of State and those who accompanied himfrom England reached India in November. We began work atDelhi and then visited in turn Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay,receiving deputations at each of these places and giving interviewsto representative men. Efforts have been made to ascertain allshades of opinion. We have been throughout the inquiry in con-stant consultation with the members of the Government of India.We met the heads of certain provinces in Delhi in November, andthe presidency Governors and Governments in their own capitalslater on. On our return to Delhi a continuous series of conferencesbegan; there were meetings of the Secretary of State and thoseassociated with him and the Government of India ; meetings withall the Heads of provinces ; meetings with a Committee of the RulingPrinces; meetings of Committees to consider details; and frequentprivate interviews and informal discussions. We place our report


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therefore before His Majesty's Ministers as the record of opinionsformed after a very full and free discussion conducted in manyvarying ways with those whom we were instructed to consult. Weare only too conscious of the defects which must attend a reportproduced under the limitations of time which we thought it rightto impose on ourselves ; but we have tried to make it a self-containeddocument, so as to obviate any need for the presentation of papers.Indeed this short description of the methods by which the enquiryhas been pursued will show how difficult it would have been topresent papers which would give a consistent and consecutive viewof its progress.

4. In the course of our interviews with representatives of allScope of the Report and classes

of opinion we were made aware ofmeaning of terms employ- their wishes upon many important questionsed - which lie outside the scope of our presentinquiry. For that reason we make no mention of such matters inour report. Nevertheless they are receiving and will receive ourcareful consideration. We have tried to trace the growth of theexisting- structure and to indicate its defects. \ye have tried to ex-plain the conditions of the problem and to suggest the contributionswhich all concerned must bring to its solution. But we have notfelt it our duty nor necessary to our purpose to pronounce judgmenton the past, or to condemn individuals or classes or communities.Our concern was with the organization; and as far as possible wehave confined our comments to it. In several cases we have beencontent to indicate our proposals without going into details which itwould have taken us too long to explore ; or without explaining theexact means by which we intend that our suggestions should becarried out. On many such points there must necessarily be furtherconsultation between the Government of India and the India Office.Again we have often made use of compendious or convenient termswithout attempting to qualify or define them on each occasion withextreme precision. The language of our report should not be takenas embodying the exact terms in which the proposals should be ex-pressed in the legal instruments which will be needed to give effectto them. If we speak of India as self-governing, the phrase is aconvenient means of referring to the objective set out in theannouncement of August 20, namely, responsible government inIndia as an integral part of the British Empire. When we speak of" provincial autonomy " the words are to be understood as conve-niently summing up the position of the provincial Governmentswhich we have defined more precisely elsewhere in the report.When we speak of the action of a local Government or of theGovernment of India, the terms should be understood in referenceto the general powers of control exercised by the Government ofIndia and the Secretary of State in Council respectively. If vespeak of " Indian opinion " we should be understood as generallyreferring to the majority of those who have held or ore capable ofholding an opinion on the matter with which we are dealing. Wehave not forgotten that public opinion can rarely be unanimous,


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nor have we overlooked the fact that a public opinion which is theopinion of the population as a whole can be developed in India onlyas education spreads and as people learn to use the vote. We trustthat this explanation will be borne in mind by those who read ourreport.

5. We do not suppose that any words of ours are needed toexpress our sense of the gravity of the taskwhich we have attempted. The welfareand happiness of hundreds of millions of people are in issue. Wehave been called upon to revise a system of government, which hasbeen constructed by builders who like ourselves had no modelsbefore them, during a century and a half of steadfast purpose andhonourable aim ; a system which has won the admiration of critical

observers from many lands ; and to which other nations that foundthemselves called upon to undertake a similar task of restoringorder and good government in disturbed countries have alwaysturned for inspiration and guidance. England may be proud ofher record in India. She should have even greater reason forpride in it in future. Because the work already done has calledforth in India a new life, we must found her Government on theco-operation of her people, and make such changes in the existingorder as will meet the needs of the more spacious days to come ; notignoring the difficulties, nor underestimating the risks, but goingforward with good courage in the faith that because our purposeis right it will be furthered by all that is best in the people of allraces in India. But the fact that we are looking to the futuredoes not mean that we are unmindful of the past. The existingedifice of government in India is a monument to the courage,patience, and high purpose of those who have devised and workedit, to which before we set about explaining our own proposals it isfitting that we pay our imperfect tribute.


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PART IThe Material

B2


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Chapter I. Recent events in India.

T , 6. On August 20, 1917, the Secretary ofihe announcement in c T J3. , ' . > . JParliament. btate lor India made the following announce-ment in the House of Commons :" The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government ofIndia are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in

every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governinginstitutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible governmentin India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided thatsubstantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and thatit is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these stepsshould be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion betweenthose in authority at Home and in India. His Majesty's Government haveaccordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept theViceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroyand the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of localGovernments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodiesand others.

" I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successivestages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom theresponsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, mustbe judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guidedby the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of servicewill thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence canbe reposed in their sense of responsibility." Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposalswhich will be submitted in due course to Parliament."

7. We take these words to be the most momentous utterance evermade in India's chequered history. Theypledge the British Government in theclearest terms to the adoption of a new policy towards threehundred millions of people. The policy, so far as Western com-munities are concerned, is an old and tried one. Englishmenbelieve in responsible government as the best form of governmentthat they know; and now in response to requests from India theyhave promised to extend it to India also under the conditions setout in the announcement. We need not dwell on the colossal

nature of the enterprise, or on the immense issues of welfare ormisery which hang upon its success or failure.The announcement marks the end of one epoch, and the begin-ning of a new one. Hitherto, as we shall show, we have ruledIndia by a system of absolute government, but have given herpeople an increasing share in the administration of the country andincreasing opportunities of influencing and criticizing the Govern-ment. With the development of the old system we shall deal here-after. For the moment, however, let us review the last stage, whichbegan with the reforms of 1909, in order to see how it came aboutthat the old familiar ways would no longer suffice for the well-being


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of the country and why the change should take the form set forth inthe words of August 20.8. Lord Minto told his legislative council in March 1907,that with the object of satisfying theconstitutional aspirations of that day, hisGovernment had been considering how to give the people ofIndia wider opportunities of expressing their views on how theyshould be governed. The increasing readiness of the landed andcommercial classes to share in public life and to render assistance

to Government, and the desire of the rapidly growing numbers ofeducated Indians to have a larger voice in administrative questionshad convinced both Lord Morley and himself that it was time tocarry to a further stage the,reforms effected in Lord Lansdowne'sdays. The underlying'J^a of the Morley-Minto changes, whichw^re.,Introduced in 1^09, was to associate the people to a greaterextent with Government in the decision of public question^ Withthis end in viewtme seat on the/Governor General's and 'one on eachof the provincial exeputive^emincils were in practice reserved forIndian members.^4ul the" legislative councils were enlarged, andall were given a real and substantial elected element, while theprovincial legislative councils were also given a non-official majority.The right of discussing questions of public interest was also con-ceded to the councils. This gave members a real opportunity ofexercising some influence on questions of administration and finance,and though the executive government was left free to act uponsuch recommendations as it though fit, the concession was regardedby persons of insight as perhaps the most important part of thechanges. The institution of nance committees of the councils alsogave the elected members a direct share in framing limited portionsof the budget. Their scope in this direction, however, was extremelyrestricted, being confined to the small margin of expenditure avail-able for optional schemes, that is such as had not already beendefinitely selected by the Government for execution. Not. only wasthe amount available small, but . in the nature of the case theschemes under consideration were generally of secondary import-ance. It was thought impossible to introduce a general system ofdirect election with territorial constituencies ; and indirect electionwas accordingly retained, except in the case of Muhammadans andcertain other special electorates.

9. The Morley-Minto reforms were essentially of an evolutionarycharacter: they were a natural extension ofregion.

haracter "* the previously existing system. Excessiveclaims were made for them in the enthusiasmof the moment, but in any case they cannot justly be described asembodying any new policy. The change was one of degree andnot of kind. Lord Morley himself emphatically repudiated theidea that the measures were in any sense a step towards parlia-mentary government. They were based on the fundamentalprinciple that the executive government should retain the finaldecision of all questions although some degree of popular control


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over legislation was established in the provinces by providing smallnon-official majorities. We shall examine in due course the claimthat the reforms would " really and effectively associate the peopleof India in the work not only of occasional legislation, but of actualevery day administration." But however this may be, there isno doubt that they constituted a real and important advance. Atfirst they met with a good reception. The Congress welcomed themand Mr. Gokhale spoke of their "generous and fair nature" butvery soon depreciatory criticism began to manifest itself anddissatisfaction has steadily increased.

10. It is almost a truism to say that any extension of popularDecentralization Com- control over an official system of governmentmission. must be accompanied by some relaxation ofthe bonds of superior official authority. It was appropriate, there-

fore, that even the reforms of Lord Minto's time synchronized withan attempt to relax the closeness of the control exercised by theGovernment of India and the Secretary of State over the provinces.Between the constitutional changes and the attempts at decentrali-zation a certain parallelism is discernible. The administration ofLord Curzon had been marked by a great period of investigatoryand constructive activity. Department after department, serviceafter service, was overhauled and a new programme of work laiddown for it. Principles were enunciated and standards set. New MJTdepartments or new authorities were created to relieve or to im-prove the existing machinery. All this tended to a marked concen-tration of authority in the hands of the central Government, againstwhich a natural reaction in due course occurred. In addition,provincial Governments were beginning to chafe under financialand administrative restrictions, devised for a more primitive system*which fettered them in their plans of individual development-Complaints were heard also that the prevalent unrest was due inpart to loss of touch between officials and the people. The districtofficer was said to be too closely bound by rules and regulations ;too much occupied in writing to his official superiors ; too much of amachine and too little of a personality. These reasons led to theappointment of the Royal Commission on Decentralization whichpresented its report in 1909. The report surveyed the relationsbetween the Indian and the provincial Governments, and alsobetween the latter and the authorities subordinate to them, andrecommended a series of measures having for their object therelaxation of control by higher authorities and the simplification ofadministrative methods.

It would be unjust in us to blame the Commission for not takinga broader view of their task. They stand on firm ground when theydefend the maintenance of close official control in India by theabsence of control by local parliamentary bodies : nor can they beaccused of want of foresight, since they recognized that if the locallegislative councils were granted material control over provincialfinance, a greater separation of Indian and provincial revenuesmust follow. Their work must be judged by the conditions of 1908


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and not those of 1918; it was the appropriate corollary to, and inkeeping with, the Morley-Minto changes. All we need say is that,if we mean to give the provinces a real measure of constitutionalliberty of action now, measures of decentralization far beyond thoseconceived by the authors of the report will certainly be necessary.

Even as things were, however, and under the drastic limitationswhich the system imposed, their proposals affected much of theframework of government; much time was necessarily occupied intheir examination ; and their results, which are contained in along series of Government orders and resolutions, have beenimportant and valuable, especially in the financial sphere.Between the years 1910 and 1917 the control of the Government ofIndia over local Governments has been appreciably relaxed in amultitude of details and much has been done both to free localbodies from official interference, and to delegate increased powersto the heads of departments both in the Government of India andin provincial Governments.

11. The year 1911 was made memorable by the visit of TheirMajesties the King-Emperor and Queen-The Imperial visit. TTI TJ. J.TT .c i i iEmpress. It was the first occasion on whichthe British Sovereign had set foot on the soil of his Indian

dominions. The feelings of the people are warm and quick, thesentiment of attachment to a personal ruler is strong, and the King'spresence among them was felt to be an act of Hoyal kindness andaffection, which stirred the heart of India to its depth. The visitproved the deep loyalty of the masses of the people, which HisMajesty's message of hope for the future did much to confirm. Asthe message from the Princes and peoples of India to the people ofGreat Britain and Ireland put it: "Their Imperial Majestieshave drawn closer the bonds that unite England and India, andhave deepened and intensified the traditional feeling of loyalty anddevotion to the throne and person of the Sovereign," and " we areconfident that this great and historic event marks the beginning ofa new era ensuring greater happiness,, prosperity and progress to thepeople of India under the a?gis of the Crown." By the R-oyalannouncement in the durbar at Delhi the partition of Bengal wasmodified, in a manner which inevitably disappointed the Muham-madans of Eastern Bengal but was of political value in allaying agreater grievance; and the simultaneous removal of the capital fromCalcutta to Delhi appealed to the popular imagination particularlyas a striking manifestation of the powers of State. But thesechanges are only germane to our purpose in so far as the despatchin which they were proposed produced a lively discussion of constitu-tional policy. After dwelling on the necessity ' in due course ' ofgiving Indians a larger share in the government and the difficultyof doing so while retaining the supreme authority of the GovernorGeneral in Council, the despatch stated " the only possible solutionof the difficulty would appear to be gradually to give the provincesa larger measure of self-government, until at last India wouldConsist of a number of administrations autonomous in all provincial


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affairs, with the Government of India ordinarily restricting theirfunctions to matters of Imperial concern." We do not propose todiscuss the interpretation placed upon this reference to provincialautonomy; but Lord Crewe expressly repudiated any idea that thedespatch implied a future for India on the lines of colonial self-government as the goal of policy.

12. Lord Hardinge's Government were indeed less concerned toPublic Services Com- deal with what they conceived to be vaguemission, and distant aspirations than to satisfy what

they looked on as reasonable and practical claims. They wereanxious to give to Indians as large a share in the public services aswas consistent with the best interests of the country ; and in Septem-ber 1912 a Royal Commission was appointed to examine and reporton various matters connected with the public services of which themost important was :" Such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans, andthe working of the existing division of services into Imperial and provincial."The Commission visited India during the cold weathers of 1912-13 and 1913-14 and recorded an immense volume of evidence, officialand non-official, in each province. The evidence was naturally con-

flicting and there were occasions when it was tinged with racialfeeling. The report was completed early in 1915, but owing to theoutbreak of hostilities it was decided to postpone publication in thehope of avoiding controversy at a time when all energies should beconcentrated on the conduct of the war. But the report could notbe withheld indefinitely and was ultimately published in January1917. By that time the war had raised the pitch of Indian expect-ations to an extreme height, and we are not surprised that a reportwhich might have satisfied Indian opinion two years earlier wasgenerally denounced in 1917 as wholly inadequate. The Commis-sion proposed that some services should be entirely recruited inIndia and that the Indian element in others should be largely in-creased. But their assumption that British responsibility for Indiarequires a preponderating proportion of British officers in the secu-rity services did not commend itself to many Indian critics. Weshall return later on to the discussion of this question, and shallmake our own proposals. For a time at all events, owing to theintensity which nationalist feeling had acquired, and, we must add,the

tingeof racialism which had infected political discussion, the

effect of the report was to irritate rather than to satisfy Indianopinion.

13. Ever since Lord Ripon's attempt in 1882 to give reality tothe municipal boards and local cess corn-Local self-government mittees instituted in the sixties, Britisli ad-Kesolution, 1915. . , . T ,. , , , ^ ^r - -, -,mimstrators in India had looked to localself-government in town and country as affording the field in whichIndians might best be trained in the management of public affairs.We cannot doubt the soundness of this principle : indeed our ownproposals will be seen to endorse it. But the local bodies were ill-


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6

equipped with funds, and interest in local affairs and capacity tohandle them were slow in developing, and meanwhile the materialneeds of the country could not wait. What happened thereforewas that the educative principle was subordinated to the desire formore immediate results. The management of local affairs remainedin the hands of those who were most competent to handle them, notfrom bureaucratic lust of power, but because no other agencyreadily presented itself and district officers never had the leisurenor were given sufficient assistance to create one. The broad factremains that in a space of over thirty years the progress in develop-ing a genuine local self-government has been inadequate in thegreater part of India. Writing of local boards the Decentraliza-tion Commission said :" Critics of the present system have dwelt on the failure to develop the prin-ciple of election, and on the appointment of official presidents. The boards,it has been urged, have practically become a department of the Governmentadministration; their work is done by the official element within the boards them-selves, or by Government departments at the boards' expense; their proceedingsare subject to excessive outside control; and in present circumstances they cannever become, as Lord Ripon intended them to be, effective instruments of localself-government.

' ' While we do not go so far in suggestions for change as many who hold theseviews, we recognise that their assertions contain a large element of truth. Atthe same time those who expected a complete revolution in existing methods inconsequence of Lord Eipon's pronouncement were inevitably doomed to dis-appointment. The political education of any people must necessarily be slow,and local self-government of the British type could not at once take root inIndian soil We recognise, however, that much has alreadybeen done to carry out the objects which Lord Ripon had in view, and the addedexperience of a quarter of a century now renders it possible, we think, to attempta further practical development of local self-government.

It is apparent that, though in a lesser degree, there has been thesame lack of real growth in municipal boards as well.Lord Hardinge's Government took up the subject anew, and in1915 published a resolution setting forth their conclusions. Butthe field was so vast and the practical steps to be taken depended sogreatly on local conditions, that they felt unable to do more thanindicate the general lines on which advance should be made, andleave it to the local Governments to determine the pace and themethods which suited the circumstances of their own provinces. Sofar as municipal bodies were concerned the Government of Indiathought that the time was ripe for appointing non-official chairmen,granting elected majorities, and giving further freedom in regardto taxation, the framing of budgets, and control over establishments.Rural areas are naturally less advanced than municipalities andlocal knowledge and interest in public affairs are less common.Rural boards did not therefore afford the same scope for non-officialactivity, and the Government of India thought that they shouldstill be guided by official chairmen. But in other respects theywished to see progress made on the same lines as in towns. TheCommission had recommended the establishment of villagewith certain administrative in


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civil and criminal cases, and special sources of revenue. LordHardingc urged local Governments to make experiments in anyareas where a practical scheme could be worked out. The sugges-tion that the control of local administration should be placed undera local Government Board did not find favour with the Commission.These proposals were on the right lines generally. The Govern-ment of India were not in a position to press their views on theprovincial Governments, because from the nature of the case noauthority but a provincial Government has the necessary knowledgeto foster and develop local institutions; and yet the existing systemstill left the initiative in such matters to the Government of India,which alone controls the resources and reserves of taxation neces-sary to make such a development real. The comparative ineffective-ness of the conclusions of 1915 is to our mind another strong reasonfor giving the provincial Governments far more extensive powers.

14. We have shown that Lord Minto and Lord Hardinge wereby no means marking time. They ' soughtf p litical out and set in order many inventions ' in thedomains of decentralization, the servicesand the local bodies; and all these measures were part and parcelof one sound purpose ; but their endeavours were necessarily limited,just as were the constitutional changes of 1909, because the endof the policy had never been clearly and authoritatively set forth.

All this time Indian politicians were exerting continuous pres-sure to increase the pace of progress. The voice of criticism wasnever silent, but its tone showed a gradual change with the passingyears; the purely negative attitude of opposition gradually passedinto a more constructive policy. Criticism came to be combinedwith advocacy of progress, an(l with demands that became .steadilymore insistent for a form of government which would leave Indianafree to rule India in a manner consistent with Indian ideas. Thespirit of liberty was abroad and active. We can distinguish clearlythe directions in which political activities were mainly bent.

15. First, there was constant opposition to Government measureswhich were regarded as repressive. Let usOpposition to executive recaj} the situation broadly, keeping inmeasures. , ,, . . , . J 'mind that it is not germane to our mainpurpose to decide whether criticism was well-founded or not. Theordinary penal law and public opinion had failed to check the out-pouring of literature subversive of law and order and in some casesaiming at the overthrow of the British Government. It was provedthat a section of the press deliberately instigated to violence : andaccordingly in 1910 the Press Act was passed. At the time therewas general recognition of its necessity : and the leading politicianswere content with criticism of its provisions and offered no directopposition to its passage. But the Act, though by no means theobstacle to liberty of discussion that it is often represented, hassince become increasingly unpopular. The Seditious Meetings Act,1911, reproduced in a milder form a law Which had been in forcesince the disturbed year 1907; but the new Act was a permanent


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one while its predecessor was a temporary measure, and this pointformed the chief ground of attack. The Criminal Law Amend-ment Act, 1913, followed on the attempt to assassinate LordHardiiige in December 1912. It amended the Indian law ofconspiracy by making it penal to conspire to commit an offenceeven though the conspiracy was accompanied by no overt act inpursuance of its object. Criticism of all such measures hasgenerally taken the form of an appeal to abstract principles ofliberty and the inalienable rights of British citizens; objection isgenerally taken to the use of executive rather than of judicialsanction ; stress is laid on the advantages of conciliation ; it is oftensaid, to quote a non-official member of the Legislative Council in19.13,C" Trust begets trust; mistrust, or even the suspicion of it,engenders suspicion." ^ The Government's estimate of the situationis attacked as unduly pessimistic; the necessity for the measure isdenied; or it is urged that the political position will certainlyimprove and therefore the measure should be only a temporary one.In particular, notwithstanding the services which the CriminalInvestigation Department has rendered to the cause of peace andtranquillity, and so to the Indian people, by exposing and combat-ing the growth of revolutionary conspiracies, there has been muchcriticism of its activities as being too widespread.

16. In the next place we may discern an ever-growing discon-tent with measures which were resented as""** evidei*e of.

cial discrimination. Againour concern is to take note of such feeling asan element in the conclusions to which we come hereafter ratherthan to pronounce a judgment on it. Race feeling is no new pheno-menon in India. It has always existed, but has been more bitterat some periods than at others. The spread of English educationand ideas, and the growing belief in the future possibilities of Indiawere doubtless among the causes which made nationalist speakersand writers vehemently resent any suggestion of discrimination onj& colour basis. We may mention, by way of illustration only, someof the matters which were specially attacked. The first is the pre-ference shown in the arms rules to " every European or East Indiansubject of His Majesty," who enjoys the privilege, denied to theordinary Indian, of possessing ordinary sporting arms and ammuni-tion without a license. Another grievance is what is described asthe denial to Indians of the right to bear arms in defence of theircountry. Although there was no statutory prohibition of the enrol-ment of Indians in the volunteer force, it was left to commandingofficers to admit or to exclude any would-be recruit, and while asmall number of Indians, mostly Christians, were admitted as mem-bers of volunteer corps, Indians generally were in practice notenrolled. The Indian Defence Force Act has made an attempt todeal with this grievance. Again there was the exclusion of Indiansfrom the commissioned ranks of the army. Indian officers form aseparate establishment from the British officers, and the highestand most experienced of the former rank lower than the most junior


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9of the latter. This particular disparity naturally came into specialprominence on the outbreak of the war.

Another grievance of a similar nature, which became moregenerally felt as the habit of travel increased, was the discriminationagainst Asiatics in the immigration rules and the municipal legis-lation of some of the Dominions. This stands on a different footing,because the grievance was not one created or removable by theGovernment of India, which indeed has steadily done its utmost tosecure redress; but its action has not always been appreciated andat times the Government of India has had to bear the odium ofthese grievances as much as if it had been responsible for them.

17. Thirdly, we find much energy directed to accelerating pro-gress in what may be called the moreZeal for social reform. ,humanitarian aspects ot government and

also in social or sectarian reform. Not that Government had beenidle ; on the contrary the long record of its activities does it credit ;but Indian opinion asked for more. The records of the legislativecouncils since 1910 are full of debates on resolutions to increase thegrants for education and sanitation. The speakers did not alwaysconsider where the extra money was to come from ; but if it had tobe found by reducing expenditure on some other service or depart-ment then the police were nearly always selected as the victim.Police expenditure and administration were a constant object ofattack ; while the treatment of prisoners and jail administrationalso attracted frequent attention. In 1913, and again in 1914,resolutions, which have since borne fruit, directed the attention ofthe executive government to the wrhole subject of prison manage-ment. In 1911, Mr. Gokhale introduced a Bill to establish asystem of compulsory primary education. The Bill was opposed byGovernment on technical and financial grounds and also by somenon-official members, but it received the support of the progressivepoliticians ; and, though defeated, it certainly sowed a seed that isbeginning to germinate in Bombay and other provinces. Proposalsfor new universities, both sectarian and provincial, wfere anothermatter in which keen interest was show^n. The Hindu UniversityBill was passed in 1915 and the Patna University Bill in 1917 :other projects have had to be deferred till the war ends. In thesphere of social reform we observe one notable advance. TheGovernment with public opinion behind them abolished indenturedlabouiu

18. We note at the same time a decided movement in favour ofwhat we may call the liberalization of ex-' isting institutions. The popular feeling infavour of council government in provincesreceived a stimulus when the new province of Bihar and Orissawas given an executive council. A proposal to set up a similarform of government in the United Provinces received the supportof the great majority of the non-official members of the Indian

Legislative Council. Its rejection by the House of Lords in 1915intensified the


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10pect that the desire for more liberal institutions derives somestrength from provincial emulation, since it is regarded as a sluron a province if an institution is denied to it which has been grantedto a sister province : of this tendency not merely the movement infavour of an executive council in the United Provinces, but alsothe demands for a high court for the Punjab and a chief courtfor the Central Provinces are instances. In August 1914 the pro-cess of equipping all but the smallest provinces with legislativecouncils was also completed by the institution of such a body in theCentral Provinces. The feeling against personal rule also findsexpression in the demand for the creation of district advisory coun-cils to be attached to district officers, which was a subject of debatein 1912 and has been supported in many of the addresses recentlypresented to us.

19. Finally we remark a growing desire to improve theImperial aspirations. *na f Indja in, th.e Empire. We havealready mentioned, m its social aspect,the movement for abolishing indentured labour. That move-ment had also another meaning. It was largely due to a feel-

ing that the indentured system gave the Dominions and Colonies awrong idea of India which hampered her in attaining her rightfulposition in the Empire. In 1913 we find the Indian LegislativeCouncil discussing the possibility of increasing Indian revenues bypreferential tariffs with the United Kingdom and the Colonies, anda year later, debating a proposal for a committee to report on theimprovement of the mail service between Great Britain and India.India's position in the Empire was clearly becoming a matter ofincreasing concern to the leaders of Indian opinion : and the claimfor representation on the Imperial Conference, which was made in1915 and cordially accepted by Lord Hardinge's and His Majesty'sGovernments, was fulfilled in ample measure in 1917, when a RulingPrince, a Lieutenant-Governor, and an Indian ez-Member of Councilattended the Imperial War Conference and shared in the innermostdeliberations of the government of the Empire.

20. We have tried to describe India's chief preoccupations atthe time when war broke out. The war has""' affected India in many ways, but above allit has become the predominant factor in the

present political situation. Whatever qualifications may be neededin the case of particular classes, the people of India as a whole arein genuine sympathy with the cause which the Allies represent.The reasons of the entry of Britain into the war appealed to theeducated classes and they have never faltered in their allegiance.However much they may find fault with the Government, they aretrue in their loyalty to the British Crown, and, as it would be easyto show from their own lips, they fully recognize and value thehigher aims of British policy. German ideas involving the sub-jection of the weak to the strong and the maintenance of the theorythat might is right fill them with repugnance and alarm ; and theGerman and sailors have


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11repeatedly been contrasted with the clean methods of the Allies.The spectacle of Indian troops going forth gladly to fight forjustice and right side by side with the British army appealedintensely to India's imagination. It was a source of legitimatepride and delight to her people that Indian regiments should bedeemed fit to face the most highly trained enemy in the world.The Indian Princes and the great landed proprietors respondedsplendidly from the very beginning of the war to the calls madeupon them. Many offered their personal services and several Prin-ces have been in the field. Offers of men and money at once beganto flow in, and we are proud to add that the steady flow of contri-butions has hardly diminished, though the war is now nearing theend of its fourth year. In the early days of the war considerabledisturbance of trade and prices occurred. This alarmed Indiancommercial circles, and during the first year of war money wasextremely scarce, and there were heavy withdrawals of deposits.Confidence was gradually restored, however, and markets improv-ed ; and a great expansion of industrial and commercial activitieshas since ensued. The rural population as a whole has beenaffected compartively little by the war otherwise than by the risein prices. For this reason it has been difficult to bring home tothem in their remoteness the real issues of the struggle and theobligations imposed by it. But this has not been the case in areaswhere recruitment for the army has taken place. There interesthas been awakened with remarkable results, especially in thePunjab, despite the events recorded in the succeeding paragraph,and every effort has been made to extend such areas and to open newones.

21. The loyalty of the country generally was emphasized by theattempts made by very small sections of theDisaffected groups. -i ,- , , 11 mi T -ipopulation to create trouble. The Bengalrevolutionary party, which had been active for many years beforethe war, scored a notable success in August 1914 by capturing a

large consignment of pistols and ammunition in Calcutta. Thearms were widely distributed and used in most of a series of out-rages which followed for some months to come. We now knowthat the Bengal anachists established communication both withGerman agents, and with agents of the revolutionary party outsideIndia known by the name of their propagandist journal as theGhadr (mutiny) party. They drew money from America and alsofrom German sources, and made plans for running arms andammunition into India and starting an armed rising: but theconspiracy was disclosed and the leaders eventually arrested. Theinfluence of the Ghadr party was, however, more obvious, andprobably more dangerous in other directions.In September 1914 occurred the unfortunate Komagata Maruincident. In its origin this was merely an attempt to defy theimmigration rules of Canada, Some four hundred Punjabis sailedfrom "ports in the Far Fast to Vancouver. They were not allowedto land, and after much delay sailed for India. Ghadr agents had


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12not lost the opportunity of preaching revolt on board the ship, andthe Indian authorities decided to enforce the Ingress into IndiaOrdinance in order to prevent any agitation or disturbance on thereturn of the emigrants. The Sikhs were excited by the disem-barkation arrangements at Budge-Budge and started to march toCalcutta. They were taken back by a force of police and military,and suddenly opened fire at Budge-Budge on the police. Men -werekilled on both sides and the Sikhs scattered before they could besurrounded. Most but not all of them were rounded up, and theleaders were put under restraint in the Punjab where they formedu nucleus of disaffection, which led to the events described below.When the war broke out there had been a great stir among theSikhs in America, and the Ghadr organization began a campaignto induce them to return to start a revolution in India. Jn allabout 8,000 Sikhs came back to the Punjab from the United States,Canada, and the Far East, and we know that efforts were made tobring them all into the conspiracy. In most cases the attemptfailed and in respect of some three-quarters of the returningemigrants no action was necessary : but most of the dangerouscharacters on their arrival were interned. Some who had merelybeen restricted to their homes disregarded the orders, and joiningwith others who had not been interned, attempted to collect afollowing. In this they had little success, for the countryside asa whole remained loyal and quiet; but so long as they were active,the gangs were dangerous and made attempts to concert a risingin conjunction with any disaffected elements that they could findin regiments. Happily all miscarried, as in each case timelyinformation was given. But the position was full of seriouspossibilities. Political dacoities and murders of the type commonin Bengal began to be a feature of the disturbance and it wasapparent that the Punjab and the Bengal movements were in touch,and that the former derived direct stimulus from the latter. In,reitain districts of the Western Punjab widespread disorderensued, to which political, racial, and agrarian causes all contii-buted^ and the gravity of the situation convinced Lord Hardinge'sGovernment of the need for some special weapon to enable them todeal with it promptly. The Defence of India Bill was introducedinto the Indian Legislative Council and passed without delay.Inevitablv it was a drastic measure ; it gave to the Governor Generalin Council wide rule-making powers with a view to securing thepublic safety and defence of the country, and also provided for thecreation of special tribunals for the quicker trial of certain classesof cases in specially disturbed tracts. It was comparable to asimilar Act passed in the United Kingdom also as a war measure.The Bill was naturally rather a severe trial to the Indian electedmembers; as loyal citizens they supported its principle; but thevmade no secret of their aversion to. particular provisions and movedmany amendments against which Government used its officialmajority without hesitation as thev would have destroyed theefficacy of the Bill. The Act was immediately applied in thePunjab, and later elsewhere as circumstances demanded. During


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13a war the Government could not Lave relied on its ordinary judiciaryin dealing with conspiracy cases of such dimensions as those whichthe special tribunals were called upon to try.

22. We consider that the attitude of Indian political leaders inthe first stages of the war was worthy of allAttitude of the politi- Tll responded loyally to Lordcians. tr j j*7 f 1.Jdardinge s appeal tor the suspension 01domestic controversy, and through the legislative sessions of 1915showed a general desire to co-operate with rather than to hamperGovernment. But we must recognize that latterly a change hastaken place. As India settled down to war conditions, and lost alikeits first enthusiasm and its first alarm, the old tendency to criticismasserted itself : the Government was charged with having itselfdeparted from the principle of avoiding controversial legislation ;and the politicians retaliated not merely by raising controversialissues, but by pressing on the Government more and more extra-vagant demands. We imply no criticism upon the Government ofthe time when we say that in the light of subsequent events we areconstrained to wonder whether a bolder policy from the outset of thewar, and a franker inviting of India's co-operation in all forms ofwar effort might not have done much to steady men's minds. Thewar is far from being won. Unless it is won India's political aspir-ations are a vain dream. We would call the attention of Indianpoliticians to this obvious truth. But the war and the sentimentsto which the war has given expression have made political reformsloom larger in India ; and the fact that among all the preoccupationsof the war time was found for an attempt to solve the Irish problemand to consider questions of reconstruction encouraged Indianpoliticians to press their demands also. The change in theirattitude nowhere more clearly appears than in the difference betweenthe tone of the Congress of 1915 and that of 1916.

23. But for the real and lasting effects of the war on India'sdestiny we should look neither to theEffects of the war. generous help of the Princes, nor to theNew sense of self-esteem. ? i. -, -, ,-,loyalty oi the people as a wnole, nor to tne

misguided activities of revolutionary gangs, nor yet to the attitudeof the political leaders. They must be sought deeper and, we think,in two main directions. First, the war has given to India a newsense of self-esteem. She has, in the words of Sir Satyendra Sinha," a feeling of profound pride that she has not fallen behind otherportions of the British Empire but has stood shoulder to shoulderwith them in the hour of their sorest trial." She feels that shehas been tried and not found wanting, that thereby her status hasbeen raised, and that it is only her due that her higher status shouldbe recognized by Great Britain and the world at large. The warhas given an interest in public affairs to many thousands who wereindifferent before. Many men, using language familiar to them inthe past, claim that she should receive some boon as a reward for1-er services, but we do not think that this expresses the generalwell or We to that we find a


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14belief that India has proved herself worthy of further trust and ofa more liberal form of government, and that whatever changes aremade should be made in recognition of her own progress rather thanas the reward for any services which she has rendered.24. Further, the war has come to be regarded more and more

clearly as a struggle between liberty andn ^ despotism, a struggle for the right of smallnations and for the right of all people to ruletheir own destinies. Attention is repeatedly called to the fact thatin Europe Britain is fighting on the side of liberty; and it is urgedthat Britain cannot deny to the people of India that for which sheis herself fighting in Europe, and in the fight for which she hasbeen helped by India's blood and treasure. The revolution inRussia in its beginning was regarded in India as a triumph overdespotism; and notwithstanding the fact that it has since involvedthat unhappy country in anarchy and dismemberment, it has givenimpetus to Indian political aspirations. The speeches of Englishand American statesmen, proclaiming the necessity for destroyingGerman militarism, and for conceding the right of self-determin-ation to the nations, have had much effect upon political opinion inIndia and have contributed to give new force and vitality to thedemand for self-government, which was making itself more widelyheard among the progressive section of the people.

25. The movement found formal expression when on September1, 1916, the florae Rule League was formally

melt 6 H me Rule m Ve " establisned at a meeting in Madras, and amonth later nineteen elected members of theIndian Legislative Council submitted to the Government of Indiaa memorandum of proposed reforms. In December 1916 the Con-gress of Muslim League, in a series of memorable meetings held atLucknow, agreed to joint action in favour of political reform.Both bodies adopted the proposals now known as the Congress-League scheme, which was an elaboration of the proposal of thenineteen members with the addition of certain special provisions tosecure Muslim interests ; and both agreed also to co-operate with theHome Rule League in its propaganda.

26. As regards the Muslim League, a word of explanation isneeded. Throughout the troubled yearsPosition of the Muslims. inr*r -in 1 -\r i ^ -n19U7-10 the Muhammadans, with a tewunimportant exceptions, held severely aloof from the revolutionarymovement, and retained their traditional attitude of sturdy loyalty,secure in the feeling which the partition of Bengal and tlicconcession of communal representation in the reforms of 1909 hadstrengthened that their interests were safe in the hands of theGovernment. Since 1911 their attitude has been growing far lessacquiescent. Their first disquiet arose from the war which brokeout between Italy and Turkey in 1911, when Great Britain'sneutrality engendered some bitterness of feeling. It seemed toour Muslims in India that in deference to the religious suscept-ibilities of her million Great Britain to have


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15supported Turkey. Before this feeling had died down the re-partition of Bengal was announced. This was not only a severedisappointment to the community because it deprived them of whatwas essentially a Muslim province, but to many it came also as ashock to their faith in the Government which they regarded aspositively pledged to maintain the partition. The Balkan war wasg, further cause of estrangement. This was represented as astruggle between the Cross and the Crescent and led to much bitter-ness of feeling. Indian Muslims showed their sympathy for Turkeyby despatching a medical mission to her aid in December 1912 ;and a section of pan-Islamists began to teach that the first dutyof Muslims is allegiance to the Khalif, and founded a new organiz-ation the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba whose members took anoath to sacrifice life and property in defence of the holy shrineagainst non-Muslim aggressors. There were signs, however, of animprovement in Muslim feeling in the latter half of 1913, whenriots and loss of life in connexion with the partial demolition of aCawnpore mosque caused a temporary set-back. The Turks'recovery of Adrianople, the declaration of peace in the Balkans, andthe reaction from the passions aroused by the Cawnpore affairinduced calmer feelings ; but a fresh difficulty presented itself whenTurkey entered the war against us in November 1914. TheGermans counted certainly on being able to stir up disaffection inIndia, and lost no labour in trying to persuade Indian Muham-madans that Turkey was engaged in a jihad, or holy war, and thatit was their religious duty to take sides against England and herAllies. These enemy attempts wholly failed to affect the great massof the Muslim community. Keenly as they felt the painfulposition in which they were placed, they were admirably steadiedby the great Muhammadan princes and nobles and preserved anattitude of firm loyalty which deserves our praise and sympathy.In this attitude they were greatly helped by the public assurancesgiven by His Majesty's Government to the effect that the questionof the Khali fate is one that must be decided by Muslims in Indiaand elsewhere without interference from non-Muslim powers. Buta small section of extremists were quick to seize the opportunity ofmaking trouble and ventured on almost open avowals of disloyaltyagainst which the Government had no choice but to take action.27. Probably few communities could have passed througu so-rj. j ,, ,. prolonged a period of trial without someHindu-Muslim entente. r, . .,r . , m1 ,,.

cleavage in their ranks. Ihe crumbling otIslamic kingdoms in Morocco and Persia had led Indian Muham-madans to cling more closely than ever to Turkey as the greatsurviving Muslim power in the world ; and when Turkey wa."=threatened first by Italy and then by the Balkan League the excitedfancy of many Indian Muslims saw in these events a concerted plotof the Christian Powers to make an end of Islam as a temporalpower. The re-partition of Bengal and also the check to the hopesentertained of a great Muhammadan university depressed the mindsof many honest Muslims with a sense of their inefficiency. Therewere those who, feeling mainly their political weakness compared


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16with tlie Hindus, wished to have done with agitation and excite-ment, to concentrate effort on education, and to rely on Governmentfor protection and fair play. Younger and keener minds, touchedoften with some fervour of pan-Islamism, were no longer willing" stare super antiquas vias." The advanced party prevailed in thecounsels of the Muslim League; in 1913 it proclaimed its adoptionof the cause of colonial self-government of a kind suited to Indiaand was warmly eulogized by the Congress for so doing. So far aspan-Islamic feeling affected the situation, that factor did not tendof course towards union with the Hindus ; but at the time strongercauses were at work to bring the advanced parties on both sidestogether. With them at all events the new nationalism producedby the war prevailed ; and at the meetings at Lucknow in Christmasweek, 1916, Congress and League came formally together, and theconservative portion of Muhammadan opinion which remained out-side the concordat was ignored. .This agreement, however, repre-sents the beginning of united action between Hindus and Muhani-madans which every well-wisher of India hopes will grow. Thelimitations of this union are discussed elsewhere ; it is not surprisingthat some considerable reaction has since occurred ; but none theless the Lucknow agreement was a beginning of which note must betaken, and which marks a change in the situation.

28. On all sides it was felt that the situation demanded newhandling. The latter part of LordNeed for a new policy. TT j ? . & 11Hardinge s term of office was largely devotedto a preliminary and informal examination of the changes whichwere possible and prudent; and Lord Chelmsford's first act was totake up the inquiry from the point where his predecessor left it, andto concentrate attention in the first place on a declaration of policy.The Cabinet's preoccupation with the war inevitably delayed thedecision of questions so delicate and complex; and while the discus-sions between India, the India Office, and the Cabinet were proceed-

ing came Mr. Chamberlain's resignation of his office as Secretaryof State. India had learned during his tenure of office, and espe-cially from the lips of her three delegates to the War Conference,how generously and steadfastly he had served her interests, and hisretirement was as much regretted in that country as in England.Meanwhile the difficulties of administration in India were rapidlyincreasing. Lord Chelmsford's Government felt that without thedeclaration of policy for which they were pressing, it was impos-sible for them to act effectively on a directed course. The announce-ment of August 20 cleared the situation and was hailed with almostas much relief by the authorities as satisfaction by the politicians.


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Chapter II. Growth of the Administrative System.

29. The supremacy of Parliament over British India is legally com-plete. But the process by which Indian affairsBegin linga of British became a matter of national concern was slowand gradual. At first the Company's settlerswere responsible only to the Directors, who derived their powers of

control from Charters given them by the Crown. There was then noquestion of sovereignty or territorial administration. But when thebattle of Plassey compelled the Company to assume the task of recon-structing Bengal, the astonishing position was created that a few com-mercial agents were handling the revenues of a kingdom in the nameof an emperor. The Company's peril of bankruptcy was the immediatecause of Parliament's first intervention ; but a more powerful motivewas the growing feeling in England, to which the opulence and arroganceof officials returning from India contributed, that the nation must assertits responsibility for seeing that the new and vast experiment of rulinga distant and alien race was properly conducted.

30. The beginnings of Parliamentary control are seen in Lord North'sRegulating Act which created and named theby first Governor General and Council. But futureappointments were still left to the Directors,with whom also the Home management remained. Parliament's first

attempt to provide for the ordering of Indian affairs has been con-demned with some reason as violating the first principles of administra-tive mechanics. It created a Governor General, who was powerlessbefore his own Council, and an executive that was powerless before aSupreme Court, itself immune from all responsibility for the peace andwelfare of the country a system that was made workable only by thegenius and fortitude of one great man. Such a structure could nothave lasted and the Act of 1781 swept away some of its worst anomalies.Meantime the facts that Indian territories were becoming involved inEuropean wars and that from the struggle the Company was emergingas the strongest power in the land made Parliament resolve to strengthenits control. Committees were appointed which reported adversely on theadministration ; and on their reports resolutions were carried requiringthe recall of Warren Hastings and the closer definition of the GovernorGeneral's powers. The Directors defied Parliament and retainedHastings. Fox introduced his Bill, which was defeated, thanks toGeorge Ill's famous intervention ; and Pitt, at the age of twenty-five, reformed the constitution of India.

31. Pitt's Act of 1784 set up as the supreme executive authority sixparliamentary commissioners for the affairs ofThe Board of Control. . u T> j


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18the Company and by a parliamentary Board which endured till afterthe Mutiny. From Lord Cornwallis' time onwards we may take itthat all administrative acts of the Governor General in Council,including annexations of territory, were done with the sanction ofthe national Government. The Company survived ; the Directorsstill had great powers of patronage and also the direction of theordinary Home business ; but before every renewal of the Company'sCharter, Parliament made a practice of holding an exhaustive inquiryinto the Indian administration. The most famous of these inquests isthat which resulted in the Fifth Report of 1812. Meanwhile theindefinite dominion derived from Moghul sources in the form ofDiwani (or revenue administration) of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa wasgradually overlaid by new sovereignty derived from Parliament. TheAct of 1813 while continuing the Company in actual possession,asserted the sovereignty of the Crown over its territories ; and theAct of 1833 declared that they were held in trust for His Majesty.It also directed that all Indian laws and also the reports of the newly-instituted Law Commissioners should be laid before Parliament.Finally in 1853 the right of patronage was taken from the Directors andexercised under rules made by the parliamentary Board of Control.We must not conclude, however, that the supremacy of the Presid-ent of the Board of Control left the Directors with no real power.Their position was still a strong one ; the right of initiative stillrested ordinarily with them ; they were still the main repositoryof knowledge ; and though the legal responsibility lay with Govern-ment, they exercised to the last a substantial] influence upondetails of administration.

32. When the Indian Mutiny sealed the fate of the greatestmercantile corporation in the world, the

' powers previously wielded both by the Courtof Directors and by the parliamentary Board

of Control passed to the Secretary of State for India. At the sametime with the Secretary of State was associated a Council, of which,as matter > now stand, nine members must have had long and recentservice or residence in British India. The legal powers of theCouncil suggest that it is to be regarded as in some sort the successorsof the Court of Directors ; but the practical raison d'etre of the Councilof India is that its members prDvide a parliamentary Minister, who isusually without personal knowledge of India, with experienced adviceupon Indian questions.

Like other Ministers of the Crown, the Secretary of State for Indiais a member of the parliamentary executive of the United Kingdom,and responsible to Parliament in accordance with constitutional prac-tice for his official acts. He has therefore and must have generallythe power of overriding his Council. But as an important exceptionto this rule it has been laid down, doubtless with the idea of protectingthe tax-payers of India from improper charges, that the vote of a


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19

majority in Council is necessary before any expenditure can be sanc-tioned or certain other specified matters decided ; and it follows thatto this particular extent Parliament has deliberately divested itselfof the power of interference. It could not, without first amending theGovernment of India Act, order any expenditure to be incurred fromIndian revenues which a majority of the Secretary of State's Councildeclined to sanction.

33. Let us now consider how Parliament actually exercises controlover Indian affair

montagu chelmsford report of 1919

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