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Middlemen in Limit-Order MarketsMiddlemen in Limit Order Markets
Boyan Jovanovic & Albert Menkveld
B d J Beograd, June 22, 2011
BackgroundandMotivation
Middlemans overall inventory of ING (a Dutch Bank) over one trading day
(proprietary trader)
Hard vs. soft information
Middleman reacts to news faster and in the right direction
Speed (count) and direction (correlation)
I b t N XIncumbent = NyX Entrant = ChiX
Comparing the blue circles 1.13/1.6 is roughly 2/3Therefore the middleman is in roughly 2/3 of the trades on ChiX,
and in fewer than 1/5 of the trades on NyX
Markets are thin.
Facts:
Since Chi-X opened in 2007,
1. Decline in bid-ask spreads by 35%
2. Decline in Trading by 13%
Also, Middlemen are
a) Fastera) Faster
b) More active when hard information is more volatile
Literature
-- Foundations of the REE-- Foundations of the REEDubey Genakoplos Shubik 87 Wolinsky 90,Golosov Lorenzoni Tsyvinski 09
-- MiddlemenRubinstein & Wolinsky 87 Li 98
-- Limit-order mktsGlosten Milgrom 82 Goettler Parlour Rajan 09, Bi i & W ill 09Biais & Weill 09
winners curse
Glosten & Milgrom 82Glosten & Milgrom 82
i i hibi dwinners curse inhibits trade
Q: do HFTs make things worse or better?
A: Market survival & bid-ask spreads says betterA: Market survival & bid ask spreads says better
Volume evidence says worse
y
1
y
First-best
0.5 transfer
45
1 x45
0
V i 1 N d l ti t th t tVersion 1: No adverse selection at the outset
Neither B nor S has signal on zg
One-period (continuation value = zero)One-period (continuation value = zero)
Fi t l k t ith t MFirst look at case without M
Then add M
1
y
TRADE
0.5 (1+x)/2
= 0.25
1 x45
0
1
y 0.5
TRADE 2x
0.5
1 x45
0 = 0.25
y0.5
1
Transfersamong
0.5
(1+x)/2amonginvestors
2xTransfertoMiddleman
1 x45
0 0 250.25
Trading through a middleman
Effect of M
Bid ask spread go downBid ask spread go down
Welfare & trade go down, but less than the change in shaded area
Conclusion: with no winners curse, M make things worse
Second-period subgame between M and B
Alpha = 0.42 Lambda = 0.9
Bid-ask spread
welfarewelfare
# trades
C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto lambda
Bid-ask spread welfare
# trades
C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto theta
Bid-ask spread
welfare
p
C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto alpha
Conclusion
Markets are thin
M bring in competition
Informed, yes, but passive & competitive
Fall in bid-ask spreads GOOD
Failure of trade to rise indicates crowding out BADFailure of trade to rise indicates crowding out BAD
Market share evidence (Stiglers survivor test) GOODMarket share evidence (Stigler s survivor test) GOODOr is it a simple decline in entry costs? Still, customer has chosen to trade in new markets