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  • Middlemen in Limit-Order MarketsMiddlemen in Limit Order Markets

    Boyan Jovanovic & Albert Menkveld

    B d J Beograd, June 22, 2011

  • BackgroundandMotivation

  • Middlemans overall inventory of ING (a Dutch Bank) over one trading day

    (proprietary trader)

  • Hard vs. soft information

  • Middleman reacts to news faster and in the right direction

    Speed (count) and direction (correlation)

    I b t N XIncumbent = NyX Entrant = ChiX

  • Comparing the blue circles 1.13/1.6 is roughly 2/3Therefore the middleman is in roughly 2/3 of the trades on ChiX,

    and in fewer than 1/5 of the trades on NyX

    Markets are thin.

  • Facts:

    Since Chi-X opened in 2007,

    1. Decline in bid-ask spreads by 35%

    2. Decline in Trading by 13%

    Also, Middlemen are

    a) Fastera) Faster

    b) More active when hard information is more volatile

  • Literature

    -- Foundations of the REE-- Foundations of the REEDubey Genakoplos Shubik 87 Wolinsky 90,Golosov Lorenzoni Tsyvinski 09

    -- MiddlemenRubinstein & Wolinsky 87 Li 98

    -- Limit-order mktsGlosten Milgrom 82 Goettler Parlour Rajan 09, Bi i & W ill 09Biais & Weill 09

  • winners curse

    Glosten & Milgrom 82Glosten & Milgrom 82

    i i hibi dwinners curse inhibits trade

    Q: do HFTs make things worse or better?

    A: Market survival & bid-ask spreads says betterA: Market survival & bid ask spreads says better

    Volume evidence says worse

  • y

    1

    y

    First-best

    0.5 transfer

    45

    1 x45

    0

  • V i 1 N d l ti t th t tVersion 1: No adverse selection at the outset

    Neither B nor S has signal on zg

    One-period (continuation value = zero)One-period (continuation value = zero)

    Fi t l k t ith t MFirst look at case without M

    Then add M

  • 1

    y

    TRADE

    0.5 (1+x)/2

    = 0.25

    1 x45

    0

  • 1

    y 0.5

    TRADE 2x

    0.5

    1 x45

    0 = 0.25

  • y0.5

    1

    Transfersamong

    0.5

    (1+x)/2amonginvestors

    2xTransfertoMiddleman

    1 x45

    0 0 250.25

    Trading through a middleman

  • Effect of M

    Bid ask spread go downBid ask spread go down

    Welfare & trade go down, but less than the change in shaded area

  • Conclusion: with no winners curse, M make things worse

  • Second-period subgame between M and B

  • Alpha = 0.42 Lambda = 0.9

  • Bid-ask spread

    welfarewelfare

    # trades

    C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto lambda

  • Bid-ask spread welfare

    # trades

    C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto theta

  • Bid-ask spread

    welfare

    p

    C ti t ti ith tComparative statics with respectto alpha

  • Conclusion

    Markets are thin

    M bring in competition

    Informed, yes, but passive & competitive

    Fall in bid-ask spreads GOOD

    Failure of trade to rise indicates crowding out BADFailure of trade to rise indicates crowding out BAD

    Market share evidence (Stiglers survivor test) GOODMarket share evidence (Stigler s survivor test) GOODOr is it a simple decline in entry costs? Still, customer has chosen to trade in new markets