Lund University

Department of History

HISK01

Tutor: Ulf Zander

Examinor: Yvonne Maria Werner

Media and the ‘Miracle of Munich’

British Media Reports on the Munich Crisis, the Munich

agreement, and its consequences

André Chiesa

Table of contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1

1.1 In retrospect – What we know that they didn’t .................................................. 2

1.2 Purpose and Research Question ......................................................................... 3

1.3 Scope and limitations ......................................................................................... 4

1.4 Previous research ................................................................................................ 4

1.5 Material and method ........................................................................................... 7

1.6 Theory – Media and agenda setting ................................................................. 10

2 Historical context .................................................................................................. 13

2.1 Re-militarization of the Rhineland, and plans of action ................................... 13

2.2 Anschluss .......................................................................................................... 14

2.3 The Munich crisis ............................................................................................. 15

3 Analysis .................................................................................................................. 17

3.1 Anxiety and fear of war (September 1st – September 14th) .............................. 18

3.2 New hope and betrayal (September 15th – September 26th) ............................. 20

3.3 A new meeting (September 28th – September 29th) ......................................... 24

3.4 “Peace for our time” (September 30th – October 1st) ....................................... 28

3.5 Days of justification – and criticism (October 3rd – October 7th) ..................... 35

4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 46

5 References .............................................................................................................. 49

6 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 56

6.1 The Munich Agreement ................................................................................... 56

6.2 Sudetenland ...................................................................................................... 58

1

1 Introduction

Munich, like Vietnam, is a metonym. If Vietnam is now shorthand for the misconceived cause,

obdurately pursued to deadly effect, Munich has sustained for seventy years its meaning of

shameful betrayal, weakness, and capitulation.

- Kate Mcloughlin1

In the end of September 1938, about eleven months before the German

invasion of Poland, which marked the start of the second World War, the leaders

of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy met in Munich to settle a dispute

regarding the so called Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. The Sudentenland, mostly

comprised by the districts Bohemia and Bavaria, was home to many German

speaking citizens, which prompted Nazi Germany to claim a “historical right” to

the region, wanting it to be incorporated in the Greater Germany. Only about six

months earlier, in March the same year, Adolf Hitler had a similar policy when he

initiated the annexation (German: Anschluss) of Austria.

At the time, both France and Great Britain saw the agreement as a way to

avoid yet another war in Europe, and for Germany, it was a great victory and yet

another region incorporated into their Third Reich. Czechoslovakia, while

agreeing with the terms of the agreement under the threat of war, felt betrayed by

the Allied powers for not taking a stand against the Nazi regime.

In this thesis, I will look at British newspaper reports regarding the Munich

agreement. The aim is to identify the different reactions from the different papers,

as well as any British arguments for and against the agreement. I will adopt the

theoretical framework of agenda setting, analysing how media sets the agenda in

the societal discourse. In this case, it means analysing in what way different

British newspapers seek to convey their “reality” regarding the time surrounding

the negotiations which led to the signing of the Munich agreement.

1 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 543

2

1.1 In retrospect – What we know that they didn’t

In 2016, almost 80 years after the Munich agreement was signed, it is easy to

look back at the actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, as well as

the actions of France, Germany and Italy, and point at what went wrong. The

politics of appeasement can easily be criticized after decades of research within

history, political science and other disciplines. We also have a more grand

perspective when we look at the events prior to the expansion of the German

Reich. Looking back, the imperial ambitions of Hitler were obvious, and it can be

hard to see the logic behind the appeasement.

Indeed, the Munich agreement has been considered such a failure that it

became a “measurement of failure”, used to be recalled when other politicians

have made similar mistakes. As McLoughlin puts it:

“Vietnam was called Richard Nixon’s Munich after George McGovern’s trip to Hanoi; Jeane

Kirkpatrick played the Munich card to justify Ronald Reagan’s intervention in Nicaragua; and,

most recently, the failure of Munich-style appeasement has been cited in support of the Bush/Blair

invasion of Iraq, most notably by Donald Rumsfeld”. 2

However, going back to 1938, only 20 years after the First World War, one of

the deadliest wars in the history of mankind, the threat of yet another war proved

to be one of the most significant variables in foreign relations. It is also important

to understand that the British did not think that they could win a war against

Germany, and definitely not against Germany and its allies. 3 Meanwhile,

Chamberlain could not count on the Soviet Union to come to Czechoslovakias aid

in case of a German attack. Nor could he count on the help of any German

resistance, as Hitler was undoubtedly a popular leader.4 Anxiety was rampant

when the Sudeten crisis developed, and the leaders of the free world (that is, Great

Britain and France) wanted to guarantee a lasting peace, no matter the cost.

2 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 545f 3 Shepardson, 2006, A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered, The Midwest Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 81-

99, p. 82 4 Ibid. p. 84

3

By using Czechoslovakia as a bargaining chip, they were hoping to guarantee

peace for generations to come, by “correcting” the errors made during the Paris

Peace Conference. There was also the issue of British (and French) economy.

With a costly world war only 20 years back, the economy was still recovering,

and was it not for US support, the economy might have collapsed. This made the

prospects of hasty rearmament all but non-existent.

This lack of information and perspective is, of course, even more true for the

public and the media at the time. Information shared with the media was (and by

all means still is) limited, and for the general population, it is even more true.

Today, when many political documents have been made public, we have access to

information that was not available to the general public in 1938. Thus, the public

was heavily dependent on the media.

1.2 Purpose and Research Question

The main purpose of this thesis is to look at media reports made with regards

to the then newly signed Munich agreement. In a pre-digital age, local media

outlets had the power to “set the reality”, and shape public perceptions and

agenda, and analysing their power over information, we can further our

understanding of agenda setting in the age before television and internet. My

research question is as follows:

How did British newspapers depict the Munich crisis, the Munich

agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, shortly after the

agreement was signed?

This question also leaves open for a secondary question:

What are the general differences between different newspapers, regarding

the way the agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, was

reported, and how could these differences be explained?

4

1.3 Scope and limitations

In the process of going through relevant material, I noticed that there is an

abundance of sources that will be helpful to my analysis, to such an extent that I

had to limit the scope, with regards to how many days I will cover. Originally, the

thought was to analyse the period between September 1st and October 31st,

roughly one month before the agreement was signed, until one month after the

signing. Instead, I will analyse articles written between September 23rd and

October 7th, excluding September 25th and October 2nd, being Sundays5. Earlier

publications will also be used to provide context, but will not be used as a main

part of my analysis. Since the research question prompts me to focus on the time

after the agreement was signed, most of the analysis will focus on the period

between September 30th and October 7th.

1.4 Previous research

Before moving on to the core of my research, some words need to be said

about the previous research related to the Munich agreement, and the politics of

appeasement which led to the signing of the agreement. There is, of course, not

possible to present all the research on the subject, but I have chosen to present

some literature that I found both helpful and relevant to my research.

Vít Smetana, a Czech historian, have written an extensive book (In the

Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942) on

the relationship between Great Britain and Czechoslovakia during the time

surrounding World War II. This is done by, among other things, going through

British parliamentary documents to see how the Czechoslovakian question was

discussed within the halls of power.

5 Newspapers were not printed on Sundays.

5

Reading Smetana’s book, the distinction between then and today, regarding

the issue of German claims on Czechoslovakian territory, becomes apparent. Not

only was it conceivable for politicians to let Germany take control over the

Sudeten areas, but rather was it desirable.

In 1934, Edward H. Carr, a Foreign Office analyst and famous historian, said

that “the Germans needs Sudentenland”, and Thomas Inskip, Minister of the Co-

ordination of Defence, saw no reason to defend even the existence of a

Czechoslovakian republic. Meanwhile, Sir John Simon questioned the very

existence of the state, and Sir Joseph Addison, British Minister to Czechoslovakia,

telegrammed from Prague of “inferior Slavs” and a nonviable “artificial country”.

Addison’s deputy, Robert Hadow, got his primary information from Sudeten

German leaders, including those with Nazi sympathies.6 In addition to this, the

British government repeatedly overestimated the potential of the German army,

which made the fear of war even greater. With a vast empire, increasingly harder

to maintain because of conflict, a war would be a catastrophe for Great Britain. 7

Smetana also, albeit briefly, discusses the British media and it’s role during

the time between the Anschluss and the Munich agreement, stating that British

newspapers were “an influential catalyst of public opinion”, that there was a

consensus regarding the subject of the Sudeten crisis, and that appeasement was

the right way to move forward. The Times, for example, promoted the politics of

appeasement, where a lasting peace should be secured at any cost.8

Kate McLoughlin’s Voices of the Munich Pact brings into light a few articles

on the crisis surrounding Czechoslovakia, including one from The New York

Times, where the Czechs are described as the very opposite of the frenzy and

blaze Hitler had shown in his speech in Nuremberg speech on September 12th.

6 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942, p. 44f 7 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942. p. 46f 8 Smetana, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942. p. 47

6

In the article, the author points out that the people of Czechoslovakia shows a

great deal of “self-control and calm nerves”, even in the face of the German

threat. 9

In A Ghost of Appeasement, R. Gerald Hughes re-visits the Munich agreement

and its legacy. He points out that after the Second World War, the Munich

agreement was a source of great shame for the British, and it was often used as an

argument for and against certain political stances. 10

Furthermore, the consequences of the agreement was apparent also after the

war, as Czechoslovakia – as so many other Eastern European states – became a

communist state, arguably since the divide between Sudeten Germans and non-

Sudeten Czechoslovakia cut the ties to the West.11 During and after the war, there

was an unwillingness to concede that the agreement was a failure, and that the

British knew fully well that the “sacrifice” of the Sudeten areas wouldn’t please

Hitler, as that would imply that Chamberlain would have been in league with the

Nazi regime.12 It would take until 1990 until the British, through then Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher, apologized for the agreement and the politics of

appeasement in the 1930’s.

Though newspapers have been previously analysed, for example by

McLoughlin mentioned above, there have not been any extensive research with

regards to more peripheral newspapers and their articles on the topic. What makes

this interesting is that the newspapers used in this thesis are local, and therefore

did not reach as many readers as, for example, The London Times. More about

why this is interesting will be elaborated on in sub-chapter 1.6.

9 McLoughlin, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p. 543-562, p. 552 10 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of

Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 690 11 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of

Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 699 12 Hughes, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement, Journal of

Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716, p. 706

7

1.5 Material and method

In this thesis, I have conducted a qualitative text analysis (content

analysis), in which I have chosen a sample from a database, which holds

relevance to my research question. The material I’ve analysed was obtained

through an online library called The British Newspaper Archive. I have used their

search engine to find relevant articles that I have used in my research. Since the

results are shown in pages, and not separate articles, the quantity of material will

be measured in pages instead of the number of articles. Most pages have two or

more articles, varying in length, dealing with the subject of the Munich

agreement, its prologue and subsequent reactions. In my analysis, I have gone

through 195 pages dated between September 2nd and October 7th.

All of them will not be referenced, since some information might not be

wholly relevant or provide new information, but nonetheless, all articles have

been thoroughly examined. The main period of analysis, September 23rd until

October 7th, consists of 146 pages of material, and are divided as follows:

8

In addition to the numbers of pages listed here, I have analysed another 49

pages of material, dating between September 2nd and September 22nd, a period

characterized by a number of relevant events prior to the negotiations that led to

the Munich agreement. Since the archive does not contain articles from major

newspapers, such as The Daily Mail or The Times, the articles are often found in

smaller newspapers, such as The Scotsman, Northern Whig, Western Morning

News, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Hull Daily Mail.

Even though the lack of publications from bigger newspapers is unfortunate, it

is in itself not a problem, since it is also interesting to analyse the peripheral

media actors during this time (or any other time, for that matter). It might not give

us the large picture in the same way as the national newspapers would, but

nevertheless, the number of different newspapers are more than satisfactory to

provide a good basis of analysis. Even so, since most articles are purely

informative, many newspapers, be it The London Times or The Scotsman, have the

same sources, such as telegrams, statements, etc. The difference in reporting

rather lies with how this information is mediated, and it is this difference that my

analysis explores. It is also worth noting that several newspapers in my analysis

had their own correspondents, both in Great Britain and abroad, giving different

newspapers different perspectives on the same events. In that regard, there is no

difference between different newspapers, no matter the size.

It should also be noted that the author of any given article is more often than

not unknown, as they are not signed in the same way as more modern articles.

This presents several issues that are worth mentioning, even though they may not

affect the analysis itself.

First of all, not knowing the author behind articles makes it harder to take note

of any tendencies among different authors, and explore any consistencies (or

inconsistencies) between different texts. If authors were presented, I could’ve

more easily assess any personal or ideological “twists” made from article to

article. Second, it makes it somewhat harder to differentiate between regular

articles, written mainly with the purpose to report news, and editorials, which are

more often written from a personal perspective, with a more agenda setting

purpose.

9

However, both of these issues can be handled, and have indeed been handled,

by using a more inclusive research question and method. The research question is

structured in a way so as to include not only editorials or letters to the editor, but

also “pure” news reports. Meanwhile, my method is not only used to identify any

ideals or opinions behind obviously tendentious text, but is also used to read

between the lines of regular news reports to see if the same event is reported in the

same way, independent of the newspaper and, if not, see in what way it is done

differently. Therefore, I have analysed all texts related to the Munich agreement,

as well as articles dealing with the subject of the Anglo-German non-war pact.13

Since the articles are often written in a vivid language, more like a form of

story-telling than strict news reports, I have chosen to reflect this rhetoric within

the analysis, sometimes writing in the same manner. Since one of the main aims

of this thesis is to highlight any linguistic/rhetorical differences between different

newspapers, it is important to convey these differences in a convincing way.

Being in essence a descriptive analysis, it is important not only to convey what

was written, but also how it was written.

Unlike the quantitative text analysis, the qualitative one uses a more in-depth

reading of the material, isolating the relevant from the irrelevant.14 The method is

suitable for analysing texts such as manifestos, novels and newspapers. It is

sometimes used in studies related to mass communication, for example by

analysing the prevalence of a certain topic within different media sources.15 For

this study, the first step was to choose central terms to find articles that could be

of use in my analysis.16 Second, I have made a “mapping system”, where I

systematize my material, putting it in different categories based on sub-questions

which will help me to answer my main research question.17

13 These two news were often reported side by side, as they were both signed at the same day, with the presence

of Chamberlain 14 Esaiasson et al, 2007, Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, p. 237 15 Bergström & Boréus, 2005, Textens mening och makt – metodbok I samhällsvetenskaplig text- och

diskursanalys, p. 44ff 16 Such as Munich, Chamberlain, Czechoslovakia, etc. 17 Esaiasson et al, 2007, Metodpraktika, p. 238f

10

For example, the answer to “what does The Scotsman write about the

Czechoslovakian perspective on the Munich agreement?” will help me see one

perspective of the reports. Do they consider this at all? Do they see the

Czechoslovakian sacrifice as an appeasement to Germany, or as something

necessary to secure peace? Or perhaps both? All such questions are relevant to the

bigger picture, and can be seen as units of knowledge, which I use to produce my

answer.

Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus notes that a content analysis often aim to

find out “to what extent something is valued as positive or negative and/or if there

is a difference in such a valuation between different sources...”.18 The

“something” here is the Munich agreement, and the sources are, as have been

mentioned, the newspaper articles I have chosen in my sample. Regarding what

constitutes a positive or negative valuation (claim) about the agreement, it is quite

straight-forward: Is the agreement condoned or condemned, and in what way?

This, then, gives me the answer to my question “How did British newspapers

depict the Munich agreement, and the British role in the negotiations, shortly after

the agreement was signed?”.

1.6 Theory – Media and agenda setting

Agenda setting theory can be traced back almost a hundred years, to Public

Opinion, written by Walter Lippmann in 1922, though the term “agenda setting”

did not come to life until the second half of the 20th century.

In short, agenda setting is based on the assumption that the media is a main

producer of our perception of the world, and “shaping political reality”.19 Since

the people cannot observe the entire world themselves, they often look to media

for a “piece of reality”.

18 Bergström & Boréus, 2005, Textens mening och makt, p. 47 19 McCombs & Shaw, 1972, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.

36, No. 2. (summer, 1972), pp. 176-187, p. 176

11

McCombs and Shaw used the theory of agenda setting in their study of the US

1968 presidential election, looking for a connection between the opinions of the

voters and what the media reported on. In their study, they came to the conclusion

that the media has significant power on what the voters saw as important issues.

A central assumption within the theory of agenda setting is that truth is a matter

of perspective. Thus, in my case, it is the perspectives that the newspapers are

publishing that constitutes the “truth”.

However, the content of this piece of reality depends on the distributer, i.e. the

media. If newspapers put a lot of effort into reporting about a certain issue, this

issue is likely to be perceived as more important.20 The power of media in regards

to shaping the agenda has grown significantly since the development of the

internet and social media.21 Even so, such a development have not changed the

principle behind agenda setting. Even in 1938’s Great Britain, most people had

access to certain information through media, and newspapers, together with radio

broadcasts, were the main sources of information.

So, what place does the agenda setting theory have in my research? First of

all, the framework is an essential part of how I read my material, and was used to

help me to answer my main research question. Was there any bias concerning the

agreement and the British role in the negotiations, and if so, in what way?

Second, the number of articles published any given day gives a certain

indication on how prioritized the issue of the Munich agreement is. Also, while

analysing the articles, I can see when, and in what way, different perspectives are

being brought into consideration. If one newspaper would, for example, write

page after page filled with positive responses regarding Chamberlain’s role in the

negotiations, while the Czechoslovakian perspective is left out, that tells us a lot

about how the paper prioritize what they wish to convey to their readers.

20 Kingdon, 2014, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2nd ed.), p. 57 21 Buse et al., 2012, Making Health Policy (2nd ed.), p. 77

12

As previously presented, my material consists of local newspapers, which

reached only a fraction of the British population. This stands in contrast with

newspapers like The London Times, which potentially reached millions of

readers.22 Not reaching as many readers, small newspapers does not have the same

agenda setting potential as bigger newspapers, which might have certain

ramifications with regards to priorities, bias, etc.

Of course, since this is not a comparative analysis, where I compare smaller

newspapers to bigger ones, I cannot provide any results proving (or disproving)

such a hypothesis. However, this research could provide a basis for such a study.

22 London population was around 8 million in 1938

13

2 Historical context

2.1 Re-militarization of the Rhineland, and plans of

action

Ever since the end of the First World War, and the treaty of Versailles,

Germany had paid dearly for its role in the Great War. Demoralized, demilitarized

and economically weak, dissatisfaction grew among its citizens. Looking to the

West, seeing only the capitalist, democratic power forcing them to their knees,

and to the East, seeing the threat of communism, the growing Nazi party made

promises of a Greater Germany, which would restore Germany to glory. Even

though this idea was praised by the German people, they still feared yet another

devastating war, which opted Adolf Hitler to depict himself as a man of peace.23

The first act of German expansion took place in March 1936, when Germany

re-militarized the Rhineland (German: Rheinland). This was in direct violation of

articles 42 and 43 in the treaty of Versailles, in which it is stated that any military

presence is forbidden within the demilitarized zone. Violating this agreement

would be “… regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory to

the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world”.24 It was also

in violation of the treaties of Locarno from 1925, which reaffirmed the importance

of non-aggression and “territorial status quo”.25 This was undoubtedly a risky

move, and could’ve been answered by French military countermeasures.

23 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938: The History of the Peace Pact That Failed to

Prevent World War II, chapter 2: Building a Greater Germany 24 Treaty of Versailles, 1919, article 44, via https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-

0043.pdf, accessed 2016-11-06 25 Treaties of Locarno, 1925, article 1 and 2, via

http://www.fransamaltingvongeusau.com/documents/dl1/h2/1.2.3.pdf, accessed 2016-11-08

14

In addition to France failing to produce any countermeasure, Belgium now

withdrew from the Locarno pact, and ended their alliance with France and Great

Britain, weakening the collective defence of the Western powers.26

Later that year, on November 5th, Hitler held a secret meeting with his top

military and political advisers, dealing with the issue of war against (mainly) the

Western powers. For Germany to be victorious in such a war, the Eastern front

needed to be secured, which would be done by – in one way or another – take

over Czechoslovakia and “eliminate them from the very beginning”.27

2.2 Anschluss

In the beginning of 1938, Hitler’s plans to further expand his Greater Germany

proceeded. Since the previous year, Austrian Nazis had increased their presence –

and violence – on the streets of Austria, increasing the pressure on the Austrian

government. Hitler engaged in what can be considered nothing more than

blackmailing, by threatening Austrian chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, demanding

Austria to be absorbed into the Reich. Failure to concede such a transition would

“force” Hitler to resort to military action.28

Hitler’s sights on Austria weren’t new, but a previous alliance between

Austria and Italy delayed any German attempts to intervene. In his war to conquer

parts of the African continent, Mussolini was plagued by a persistent resistance,

and asked Hitler for help. Hitler offered to help, but on the condition that Italy left

its alliance with Austria. Mussolini agreed, thus leaving Austria vulnerable. Being

abandoned by Italy, Chancellor Schuschnigg turned to Great Britain for

guarantees of protection in the event of German aggression, but to no avail.29

26 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 267 27 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 269 28 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 290ff 29 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938, chapter 3: Austria and the Anschluss

15

On March 12th, the German army crossed the border into Austria, and it did

not take long until the country of Austria sized to exist, now being part of Hitler’s

Third Reich. Once again, the European powers failed to response to the German

expansion, and it became clear that the British Prime Minister, Neville

Chamberlain, did not show any interest in halting German expansion.

Not only did Chamberlain look on while Austria was taken over by Germany,

but he also made it clear that Great Britain would not guarantee support to

Czechoslovakia in case of German aggression. Nor would he guarantee that the

British would stand beside France if the French were called upon to defend

Czechoslovakia, an obligation given in the Franco-Czech pact.30 With this

knowledge, Hitler had certain assurances when it came to his future plans for

Czechoslovakia.

2.3 The Munich crisis

In May 1938, many in Europe feared war. In what came to be called the May

crisis, the powers of France, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union

feared a German attack on Czechoslovakia. In response, the Czechs mobilized,

while Britain, France and the Soviet Union stood united against potential German

aggression. Even though there were reports of German mobilization along the

Czechoslovakian border, no such reports could be confirmed.31 However, given

the prior actions of the Nazi regime, fear of aggression was hardly unfounded.

Nor was it, in retrospect, any surprise that the aggression later came to fruition.

During this crisis, Chamberlain urged the Czech government to grant certain

autonomy to some minorities in Czechoslovakia, even if this would mean

secession. Furthermore, the British government were open to the idea of the

Sudetenland being separated from Czechoslovakia.

30 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 315 31 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 323ff

16

Nor was it expected that the Soviets would come to aid Czechoslovakia, in case of

German aggression.32 The unwillingness to aid Czechoslovakia remained strong,

and British government officials where blunt, claiming that Czechoslovakia was

of no concern, and that France would stand alone if they were to support the

country against German aggression.33 With such clear signals, nothing was to stop

Hitler from intervening in Czechoslovakia.

32 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. p. 335f 33 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938, Chapter 5: Manoeuvring for Czechoslovakia

17

3 Analysis

Before moving on to my analysis, I few words should be mentioned about the

politics of appeasement which characterized Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy

prior to the Second World War. As written in the previous chapter, the Germans

violated the treaties of Versailles and Locarno without any real consequences.

Fearing a new war in Europe, the Western allies (France, Belgium and Great

Britain) stood passive in the face of German expansion, and Great Britain, having

a weak economy, as well as having a far-reaching empire to maintain, had a lot to

lose in a war.

The politics of appeasement was not unique for the Anglo-French alliance: the

League of Nations, while condemning actions such as the Japanese invasion of

Manchuria in 1931, did not react to these aggressions, and even though they

imposed economic sanctions on Italy when Mussolini decided to invade Abyssinia

(Ethiopia) in 1935, the results were very limited.34 Ever since the German policy

of expansion became apparent, the European democracies – few that they were –

still wanted to maintain peace almost at any price.35

After the de-militarization of the Rhineland, and the Anschluss, Chamberlain

remained passive, thinking that the best way to avoid a full-scale war is to appease

the Nazi regime.36 Such politics gave Hitler few reasons not to continue with his

plans of expansion, and Czechoslovakia was next in line. When the “diplomatic

clash” in Munich commenced, Britons held their breaths, hoping their Prime

Minister could maintain peace in Europe. It should though be noted that

Chamberlain was often an “active appeaser”. That is, he was often engaged in the

foreign politics, always taking a stand for peace during the threats of war.

34 http://www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-ww2/appeasement, accessed 2016-11-09 35 Shirer, 1960, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 254

18

3.1 Anxiety and fear of war (September 1st –

September 14th)

In the beginning of September, 1938, lurking disaster had been avoided. On

September 2nd, the Exeter and Plymouth Gazette wrote about the situation, and the

problems regarding German claims on the Sudetenland. Though the tensions were

decreasing, a threat still persisted. Even so, it would, the author argued, be a

mistake to assume that all Germans wanted war. More importantly, would they

really want a war with Great Britain? In any case, the foreign policy of the British

government were to be commended, and “the British public will […] support the

Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary in any moves which may be found

necessary.”37

The Scotsman provided its readers with much information on the crisis, having

their own correspondent sending regular updates on the situation. There was no

doubt in these reports that Hitler was the key figure, having all the power to take

“a step which may lead to a settlement of the problem, which, more than any other

at the moment, threatens the peace of Europe.”38 At this stage, the role of the

British government was limited, and the faith of Europe seemed to depend on the

actions of Hitler.

Western Morning News and Daily Gazette put the same emphasis on

Germany’s advantage on the issue, and their diplomatic correspondent wrote that

“it is for the German government and Herr Hitler now to say whether real

negotiations shall begin or whether the crisis shall continue and perhaps

develop.”39

The Derry Journal also reported on the issue, stating that the British

government remained passive, waiting for further developments.40

36 Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938, Chapter 5: Manoeuvring for Czechoslovakia 37 “Anxious Days”, Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 02-09-1938, p. 10 38 ”Momentous decisions for Hitler”, The Scotsman, 02-09-1938, p. 9 39 “Henlein has talk with Hitler”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 02-09-1938, p. 7 40 “Henlein meets Hitler”, The Derry Journal, 02-09-1938, p. 9

19

Reports on the situation were scarce the following ten days, and the reports

first became daily news on September 13th. This was not so much due to

development of the negotiations regarding the crisis, as it was about the escalation

of violence in the Sudeten areas. In the wake of this violence, which had resulted

in the death of several Sudeten Germans, Hitler increased his pressure on the

Czech government, and the world.

Western Morning News, reporting on Hitler’s speech to the Nazi congress in

Nuremberg, stating that it gave “no words to lessen fears of war, no word to

increase the hopes for peace”.41 Meanwhile, France took measures to meet the

ever-present threat of war.42

The Northern Whig and Belfast Post reported about activity in London, where

people gathered to show solidarity to Czechoslovakia, and to share their strong

criticism of the Nazi regime. It was written about a letter from “the democratic

people of London” to an embassy official, which objected to Hitler “insulting […]

the people of and Government of Czecho-Slovakia, to democracy in general, and

to Great Britain.”43

On September 14th, the headlines were all but optimistic. The Western Daily

Press and Bristol Mirror reported the situation as being the “gravest since 1914”,

as clashes between Czechoslovakian Nazis and the authorities in several cities

further increased the tensions between Germany and the Czechoslovakian

government.44 Sheffield Daily Independent likewise reported about the escalation,

printing their first page with the headline “Europe ready for war” to convey their

message of a Europe where “the war clouds are coming nearer”.45

The ambassador of Czechoslovakia visited (the British) foreign office to

reassure himself of British and France support in the crisis.46

41 ”Herr Hitler warns Prague”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 13-09-1938, p. 7 42 ”France will not be surprised”, Portsmouth Evening News, 13-09-1938, p. 9 43 ”Czech Crisis”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 14-09-1938, p. 8 44 ”Berlin’s Blame For Bloodshed”, The Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 14-09-1938, p. 12 45 ”Britain Forms Defense Plans”, Sheffield Daily Independent, 14-09-1938, p. 1 46 ”Britain Forms Defense Plans”, Sheffield Daily Independent, 14-09-1938, p. 1

20

By mid-September, the newspapers were yet to set an agenda for peace, and

calm the nerves of the citizens. Indeed, by this time, there was no real reason to

report on the British role in the crisis, as the government remained passive. The

newspapers were fully aware of the non-existent influence of the British at this

point.

3.2 New hope and betrayal (September 15th –

September 26th)

On September 15th, Prime Minister Chamberlain travelled to Munich to meet

with Hitler, and several newspapers saw it fit to put these news on the first page,

somewhat highlighting the significance of this event. Derby Evening Telegraph

shared a positive view on this development, reporting that Mr. Chamberlain was

met with warm greetings in Munich, while crowds of officials, diplomats and

journalists, waving the Prime Minister goodbye, wished him good luck in his

endeavour.47 One of these journalists worked for The Gloucester Citizen and

shared his story, putting into words a glorious send-off of a Prime Minister they

“have never seen before”, with “the brilliant sunshine full upon him”.48

For now, the outlook was positive, not only because of the positive outlook of

Chamberlain’s role, but also because the fact that the German Foreign Minister,

Joachim von Ribbentrop, shared his optimism, not only about negotiating a

settlement regarding the Sudeten crisis, but also in creating good relationships

between Germany and Great Britain.49

Herbert Watson of Portsmouth Evening News wrote about Chamberlain as a

“sane leader in a mad world” and “supremely the man of peace”, also witnessing

about the optimism printed all across Britain.50

Chamberlain’s visit to Munich was short, and he returned home after only one

day abroad to consult with his ministry. The faith of Czechoslovakia remained

47 ”Premier and Hitler talks this evening”, Derby Evening Telegraph, 15-09-1938, p. 1 48 ”A man with job of work to do”, Gloucester Citizen, 15-09-1938, p. 1 49 ” ’Talks will bring a solution’ ”, Hull Daily Mail, 15-09-1938, p. 7

21

unknown, and further negotiations regarding the Sudeten crisis were waiting. The

Germans had since a while back demanded a referendum to deal with the issue (a

referendum aiming to get the Sudeten Germans to vote for leaving

Czechoslovakia), which was promptly denied by the Czechoslovakian

government.

However, the future were to be determined by the big powers (Great Britain,

France and Germany), and if a referendum were to be held, it would be through

negotiations, and not under threat of German aggression.51 Many speculations

arose about what was being said during the meeting between Chamberlain and

Hitler, and the Prime Minister’s quick return to London raised thoughts about

potential counter-proposals made by Hitler. It was also now the idea of “Four-

Power talk”,52 although tentatively, was reported to become reality in the near

future.53

Hitler, who had pushed to have a referendum about Sudeten secession, was

now reported to have put forth an even harsher ultimatum. According to French

sources, all Sudeten areas with more than 80 percent (Sudeten) German majority

should immediately cede to Germany, while areas with more than 50 percent

Germans should hold a referendum on the issue. If these conditions were not met

he would, it was reported, use force.54 The same day, France and Britain had

reached an agreement regarding the issue, opting for a peaceful solution, though

the policy needed to be developed further.55

The news of this agreement was reported by several newspapers, such as

Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette and the Dundee Evening Telegraph

and Post.56

50 Watson, ”The man of the moment is a man of peace”, Portsmouth Evening News, 15-09-1938, p. 8 51 ”Early Meeting of Cabinet”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 16-09-1938, p. 9 52 Talks between Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy 53 ”European crisis development”, The Falkirk Herald, 17-09-1938, p. 9 54 ”Reported offer by Hitler”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 19-09-1938, p. 7 55 ”Countries in complete agreement”, Gloucester Citizen, 19-09-1938, p. 1 56 See: “French cabinet confirms London plan”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 19-09-1938, p. 1

and “French cabinet’s decision”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 19-09, 1938, p. 1

22

With Chamberlain’s entrance into the negotiations, British newspapers got

more involved in the issue of the Sudeten crisis. On the 15th of September, the

number of articles on the subject exceeded, by far, the number of articles

published the previous ten days. Naturally, with their own Prime Minister entering

negotiations that could shapes the years to come, the interest increased. The

invitation of Chamberlain was not only seen as proof of the Germans willingness

to achieve peace, but also as an acknowledgement of the influence of the British

Empire.

With Hitler pushing for incorporating Sudeten territory into the German

Reich, and the Anglo-French agreement regarding a peaceful solution, the

situation in Prague looked grim. Being at the mercy of three super-powers, the

Czechoslovakian government had little choice but to accept any terms put forth.

All opting for a peaceful solution, the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia

remained under threat, considering that Hitler’s offer was technically a peaceful

one.

By this time, Hitler was no longer willing to negotiate, and the

Czechoslovakian government, now under great pressure from all sides, stated that

ceding the Sudetenland to Germany was prohibited under the constitution, and

that the question should instead be handled by the Hague Tribunal.57

When the news of the Anglo-French agreement reached the Czechoslovakian

people, the feeling of betrayal was great. Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror

wrote about disheartened citizens feeling that their country had been “sold to the

enemy […] by the nations which for 20 years they had regarded as their closest

allies and friends” to avoid war.58

Meanwhile, criticism rose among some British politicians. Winston Churchill,

who wanted the British to take a firm stand against the Nazis, shared the view of

57 ”Czechs unwilling to cede territory”, The Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 21-09-1938, p. 7 58 ”Czechs bitter at ’betrayal’ ”, Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 22-09-1938, p. 12

23

betrayal, and said that “the idea that safety can be purchased by throwing a small

State to the wolves is a fatal delusion”.59

There were also reports about small protests against the British stance on the

issue, where a small number of people gathered in Whitehall (a district in

Westminster), displaying posters with messages as “Britain’s honour lost to-day

will mean Britain’s peace lost to-morrow”.60 Northern Whig and Belfast Post

wrote about Emanuel Shinwell, Labour politician and Member of Parliament

(M.P.), who was critical towards the British position, sharing the position that the

policy of Chamberlain was a betrayal. He went further, claiming that the greatest

danger was “the gradual weakening of democracy and the readiness to yield to

force” and that it was the “blackest chapter in British diplomatic history.”61

Clement Atlee, leader of the Labour party (and future Prime Minister), saw

Chamberlain’s actions as something that “profoundly shocked British public

opinion”, and recalled the Labour party’s declaration that “the British

Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that it

will unite with French and Soviet Governments to resist any attack upon Czecho-

Slovakia”, claiming that a more firm stance against Germany would have the

support of the public.62 Still, Chamberlain maintained his position, saying that

“we must still make great efforts to save the peace of Europe.”63 Even so, it was

still Hitler who held all the cards.

Hitler had given Chamberlain a memorandum, where he explained his view on

the Sudeten problem, which were to be forwarded to the Czechoslovakian

59 ”Make stand against Nazi threat”, Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 22-09-1938, p. 12 60 ”Demonstrators at Whitefall”, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 23-09-1938, p. 1 and “Whitehall parade”, Derby

Daily Telegraph, 23-09-1938, p. 1 61 ”Blackest chapter”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 24-09-1938, p. 8 62 “Public Opinion ‘shocked’ “, The Gloucester Citizen, 26-09-1938, p. 6 63 “Prime Minister’s Statement”, Dundee Evening Telegram and Post, 24-09-1938, p. 1

24

government. Chamberlain also seemed eager to return to London, so that he could

initiate talks with his Government about the developments.64

As the crisis progressed, and Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement continued

to dominate British foreign politics, newspaper now made room for opposition.

With several prominent politicians taking a firm stance against the appeasement

of Hitler, the reports were no longer completely positive or completely negative.

The public was now given two sides: the continued prospects for peace, where

Chamberlain would be a key figure, and the stances of those viewing the

appeasement as treachery (against Czechoslovakia), and a risk, rather than an

opportunity.

3.3 A new meeting (September 28th – September

29th)

On September 28th, hope was on the rise. It was widely reported that, in the

middle of a speech given by Chamberlain in the House of Commons, the Premier

had received an invitation to meet with Hitler to discuss the crisis. The Gloucester

Citizen wrote about how “every government supporter sprang to his feet and cheer

after cheer for the Prime Minister rang out while members again demonstrated by

waving official papers.”65 Portsmouth Evening News reported “remarkable

revelations”, informing their readers that Chamberlain had once again been

invited to Munich to negotiate.66

In the Dundee Evening Telegraph, it was written about “the wrong turning”,

where the situation was compared to that of 1914, when then foreign secretary of

64 “Talks end: Chamberlain home to-day”, Dundee Courier and Daily Advertiser, 24-09-1938, p. 7 and “Last-

minute bid for peace by Premier”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 24-09-1938, p. 9 65 ”Peace: The hope”, The Gloucester Citizen, 28-09-1938, p. 1, see also “Reported European conference plan”,

The Dundee Evening Telegraph, 28-09-1938, p. 5; “Prime Minister tells the commons”, Portsmouth Evening

News, 28-09-1938, p. 12; “Prime Minister to see Hitler again”, The Hull Daily Mail, 28-09-1938, p. 1; 66 ”His efforts to save the world from war”, Portsmouth Evening News, 28-09-1938, p. 12

25

Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey, did his very best to prevent war, and turn Europe

towards more cooperation. Just as Grey had failed, so could Chamberlain.67

Thursday, September 29th 1938, was met with enormous expectations. The

“four-power talk” were to take place in Munich, where Adolf Hitler would host

the leaders of Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain), France (Édouard Daladier),

and Italy (Benito Mussolini). J. L. Hodson wrote in the Aberdeen Press and

Journal, wrote about “the four men […] who will shape your life and mine”,

speculating how the four leaders would shape the times to come. He wrote about

Chamberlain as a man with two sides, stating that…

“We saw him in action yesterday – calm, unruffled, steady, taking almost in his stride the

shaping of great history, turning from gloom to that tremendous ray of hope that burst upon us

– taking it more calmly than most of those who listened to that modest, most untheatrical

voice and manner. But we also heard him over the wireless, too – deeply stirred, deeply

indignant, that a world might be plunged to destruction because of failure to settle details of a

controversy already largely disposed of.”68

He went on, imagining how the meeting would go, and what role the Prime

Minister would come to play in the negotiations. Chamberlain was depicted as a

logical man, and a lover of birds, flowers and music. Hitler was described as a

dreamer, a “prince of demagogues” that can “exercise a powerful effect on all

who meets him”, be it through the ruthlessness he showed towards Schuschnigg

before the Anschluss, or the charming greetings of Mr. Chamberlain.69

The Dundee Evening Telegraph, also writing about the meeting that would

take place, wrote that if Europe were to escape the lures of war, it would be the

fine temper and pertinacity of Mr. Chamberlain that would, more than anything,

carry the day.70

Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail shared with its readers words from Australian

Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, who commended Chamberlain’s “superhuman

67 ”Current events”, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 28-09-1938, p. 2 68 Hodson, ”The four men of Munich”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 29-09-1938, p. 6 69 ”The four men of Munich”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 29-09-1938, p. 6 70 ”Current events”, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 29-09-1938, p. 2

26

efforts” in the negotiations.71 The Hull Daily Mail quoted an article from The

Rand Daily Mail, based in Johannesburg, where Chamberlain was praised for his

efforts, and that if the problem was solved, it would “earn for him the everlasting

gratitude of the nation which has produced so noble a son.”72

Raymond Burns, being published in both the Portsmouth Evening News and

Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, shared his notion that it was

“inconceivable” that the negotiations in Munich would fail, and that the meeting

in Munich illustrated “a cardinal point in British post-War foreign policy –

discussion of differences among the leaders of the four Western Powers”. Despite

the obvious optimism in the article, Burns did acknowledge that there were still

issues at hand, he maintained the position that the meeting in Munich would

indeed be a step away from war.73

This optimism wasn’t shared by all, not even, it would seem, the editors of

Portsmouth Evening News. The headlines on the following page told a different

story, where teachers and authorities worried about what would become of the

30,000 school children of Portsmouth in the event of war, and gas masks were

distributed across the city.74

In a short article in Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, one could

read about the crisis on the accounts of two American cabaret artists, Earl Leslie

and Flora Duane, who had come from Berlin to London. They told of the

Germans as a people that did not want to fight, and that Mr. Chamberlain was

regarded “in the light of a hero through whom peace would come.”75

On the same page, another article presented Chamberlain as a “remarkable

statesman” who had in the past three weeks “established himself as one of the

three or four greatest men in British history.” The author shared Burns’ notion that

71 ”World’s Eyes on Munich”, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 29-09-1938, p. 3 72 ”The world’s words of relief – and praise for Premier”, The Hull Daily Mail, 29-09-1938, p. 10 73 Burns, ”Four men at Munich”, Portsmouth Evening News, 29-09-1938, p. 6 74 ”What is to be done about the school children”, Portsmouth Evening News, 29-09-1938, p. 7 75 ”Mr Chamberlain as hero”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 29-09-1938, p. 2

27

it was hard to see how negotiations could fail, and finished the text with “God

bless Chamberlain. And God speed”.76

The Scotsman, having their own correspondent in Prague, offered another

perspective on the issue. In a short, but blunt, article, the author wrote about the

scepticism among officials in Czechoslovakia. He wrote that:

“Czechoslovakia would have liked to hear Mr Chamberlain explaining how the map which

was drawn up by Herr Hitler would create, in place of this solid and selfcontained Republic,

something that could not be called so much a State as a sort of native reserve in Central Europe in

which Czechoslovak people would be allowed to eke out an existence entirely at Germany’s

mercy.”77

Not only did this offer a perspective so distinct from the “at home” optimism,

but also told a story about the thoughts of the British appeasement of Hitler and

his aspirations. The author further made rhetorical points regarding the feelings of

the Czechoslovakian people and its leader, and how the country stood almost

forgotten, anxious, and praying for protection, while the big powers were to

discuss its fate.

Back in London, not much was needed to lift the spirits of the citizens. The

London correspondent of Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer wrote about how

the people of London, when reached by the news of a new meeting in Munich,

went from a disheartened state to a state of calm and good spirit. After some grim

days, laughter had once again returned to the streets of the capital.78

As with the previous two weeks of reporting, newspapers conveyed both

positive and negative opinions about the current situation, although the positive

certainly outweighed the negative. The Czechoslovakian perspective was almost

76 ”What we think”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 29-09-1938, p. 2 77 ”Prague and Munich”, The Scotsman, 29-09-1938, p. 11 78 ”News of Munich meeting as a tonic”, Yorkshire post and Leeds Intelligencer, 29-09-1938, p. 9

28

lost, and was it not for The Scotsman, the picture reaching the public would be

that of promise of peace, and a picture of their Prime Minister’s potential heroism.

Still, it was these promises that reached the general public, and with

Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette and Yorkshire Post and Leeds

Intelligencer writing about the positive mood in London, the obvious agenda was

to raise the spirits of the readers. With the meeting only hours away, expectations

were high, and despite some doubts among a few authors, optimism dominated

the news reports.

3.4 “Peace for our time” (September 30th – October

1st)

In the early hours of September 30th, what was to be called the Munich

Agreement was signed by Neville Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler

and Benito Mussolini. With the agreement, Germany was granted the right to cede

the Sudeten German territories, and that Czechoslovakian presence would be

continuously withdrawn until 10th of October, when the territory would be under

German dominion. In this agreement, it was also conceded that all Sudeten

German political prisoners should be released within four weeks.79

This, naturally, became the big news of the day in Great Britain, and once

again, Prime Minister Chamberlain was hailed as a hero. Thousands of telegrams

and letters were sent to Chamberlain’s residence, thanking him “for his work in

the cause of peace”, and the bells of Westminster Abbey would ring its bells to

welcome the return of the Prime Minister.80

In the same spirit of cheerfulness, the Dundee Evening Telegraph reported

about “a dawn of peace” in London, where people no longer had “drawn and

anxious faces”.81

79 The Munchen Agreement 80 ”Europe acclaims premier”, Derby Evening Telegraph, 30-09-1938, p. 1 81 ”Peace day in London”, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 30-09-1938, p. 1

29

Though recognizing the success in what had been achieved, The Dundee

Courier and Advertiser were a bit more restrained in their optimism, writing that

“… for the time being, at any rate, the black shadow of war has passed away” and

that “there will be a renewal of the outcry that a democratic country has been

surrendered to the Dictators”. However, the author also concludes that the

agreement is far better than the “unspeakable alternative of delivering over

millions of human beings to slaughter.”82

The Gloucester Citizen did not hold back in its praise of their Prime Minister.

On the front pace, in large, capital letters, it read “PREMIER’S TRIUMPH”, and

that peace had now been preserved. The paper praised Chamberlain, writing that

“our great Prime Minister has worked incessantly, when all others had well nigh

despaired, for the peace which we owe alike to his initiative, his sagacity and his

persistence.”83

Portsmouth Evening News were also adamant in their support and

acknowledgement of Chamberlain’s role in the negotiation process. Though some

credit was given to the other three leaders, Chamberlain was put on the highest of

pedestals, even receiving the credit for “bringing about the meeting and paving

way for Peace”. The praise continued, and it was written that “history will reserve

a special niche for the English Prime Minister, who saw the world slipping into

war, and unhesitatingly took bold, resolute, courageous, unprecedented steps to

stop the descent and save civilization from ruin all too plainly impending” .84

The Western Times shares a similar admiration for their Prime Minister,

writing that “thus, once again, has Mr. Chamberlain’s efforts to find a real peace,

been appreciated by the very man who seemed bent on war.”85 In truth, all knew,

82 ”Settlement”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 30-09-1938, p. 6 83 "Peace – and after”, The Gloucester Citizen, 30-09-1938, p. 4 84 ”The miracle of Munich”, Portsmouth Evening News, 30-09-1938, p. 8 85 ”The world ’breathes again,’ thanks to a great man”, The Western Times, 30-09-1938, p. 8

30

for it was fresh in memory, that it was Hitler who brought about the meeting when

he extended his invitation to Chamberlain.

Great Britain itself was also commended, for its calm and resolution during

the crisis. “Great Britain is still not afraid if being great” and “a weak Britain

would be a danger to the world […] and any nation which may dream of

aggression or wantonly provoke disorder is thus warned that there is one great

force on the side of Peace which cannot be either ignored or overawed”.86 In the

same paper, on the same page, Herbert Watson also praised Prime Minister

Chamberlain, as well as the nation as a whole. Chamberlain’s accomplishments

wasn’t only a great achievement on behalf of Great Britain, but a victory for all

mankind.87 So harmonious was the situation in fact, that children in Bradford had

seized gas masks, previously distributed as a precaution, using them as toys,

simulating war in the trenches that had been dug to protect from potential air

raids.88

The Scotsman’s correspondent in Prague once again tried to convey a

Czechoslovakian perspective, pointing out that they had no say in the negotiations

which would shape the future of their country. While Londoners cheered on the

streets, celebrating the peace so courageously secured by their Prime Minister, the

hopes of peace were nowhere near the minds of the Czechoslovakian people. At

the centre of the dispute, the general opinion was “that Mr Chamberlain does not

in the least understand the type of man he is dealing with in Herr Hitler, and is

allowing himself to be misled by facile optimism.”89

Not surprisingly, September 30th was seen as a great day for Great Britain.

War had been averted, and there was no doubt among journalists and editors

around the country who was the man of the hour. Their Prime Minister had

returned not only with a solution to the Sudeten problem, bringing an end to the

86 ”The world ’breathes again,’ thanks to a great man”, The Western Times, 30-09-1938, p. 8 87 ”A victory for mankind”, Portsmouth Evening News, 30-09-1938, p. 8 88 “Gas masks as toys”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette”, 30-09-1938, p. 8 89 ”Britain’s new proposals accepted by Prague”, The Scotsman, 30-09-1938, p. 11

31

crisis which had haunted Europe for months, but also with a document that would

guarantee peace between Germany and Great Britain.

Once again, it was The Scotsman who provided a dissenting view, giving the

impression that it was Hitler who won, and not the British. For others, the agenda

was to put Chamberlain, and in extension the British people, at the centre. After

the meeting in Munich on the 30th, Chamberlain had visited Hitler three times in

less than three weeks. Not once had Hitler come to London, and not once had

Hitler conceded to any counter-proposals that would give him any less than

dominion over the Sudeten areas. Yet, the “reality” conveyed by the newspapers

where almost in unison regarding Chamberlain’s diplomatic prowess.

As a new month commenced, news of the agreement kept on dominating the

newspapers. Like so many others, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser raised

Chamberlain to hero status. The unwavering willingness of the government, and

among the British people, were surely admirable, but it was the Prime Minister

who should be the recipient of the praise. However, it was not only Chamberlain’s

efforts in itself that earned him credit. Going to war to challenge the German

claim would, the author argued, be going to war for a bad cause. The author goes

as far as to say that Hitler had an “unchallengeable right on his side”, and that the

very creation of the Czechoslovakian republic after the First World War was “one

of the great blunders, if not one of the crimes, of the war treaties.”90

Of course, the seemingly endless cheers for the Prime Minister was not only

due to the Munich Agreement, but also due to the freshly signed (By Hitler and

Chamberlain) Anglo-German no-war pact, which would secure peace between the

two great powers.

With one visit to Munich, Chamberlain had not only brought the Sudeten

crisis to an end, but had also made sure that the people of Great Britain need not

90 ”The peacemaker”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 01-10-1938, p. 4

32

fear war, Sudeten crisis or not. It was, as Chamberlain put it, “peace in our

time”.91

Some remained sceptical, however. In the Gloucester Citizen, one author

wondered why the Home Secretary asked the people to go on with the Air Raid

Precautions (ARP), why gas masks were still distributed and why the trenches that

had been dug should not be filled in. The author worried there was perhaps “some

unexpected hitch […] lurking somewhere in the shadows to cheat all our hopes, to

undermine confidence, to withhold the final ratification of the Munich Peace Pact,

and even plunge Europe into war?”92

The Gloucester Citizen was one of several newspapers to offer more than

praise, and the Czechoslovakian sacrifice was not ignored. One of few European

democracies were now to cede territory to the German dictatorship, and the author

noted that it was just as much a surrender to the intimidations of Hitler, as it was a

victory: “The power and the will of the German dictator has prevailed over the

will of the free people…”93 This was one of a few, often short, articles dealing

with a Czechoslovakian perspective. More often than not, the voices

acknowledging the sacrifice made by, or rather imposed on, the small republic,

were all but lost in the deafening cheers of the British people celebrating the peace

secured by their Prime Minister.

Some newspapers also made space for criticism from other members of

Parliament, such as Harold Nicholson, member of the National Labour party, who

considered the signing of the Munich agreement a surrender, and that it would

only give peace for six months. Instead, Nicolson had hoped that Chamberlain

would have taken a “firm line” in Munich, to show the world that democratic faith

was stronger than fascist conceptions.

Instead, Britain succumbed to German pressure, betraying “a valiant little

country and a great democratic idea.”94 Meanwhile, the Gloucestershire Echo

91 ”British-German ’no war’-pact”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 01-10-1938, p. 5 92 ”To seek peace – and ensure it”, Gloucester Citizen, 01-10-1938, p. 4 93 ”The destiny of Europe”, Gloucester Citizen, 01-10-1938, p. 12 94 ”Six months’ peace!”, Nottingham Evening Post, 01-10-1938, p. 7

33

reported that Duff Cooper, a long-time critic of the appeasement policy of

Chamberlain, resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty, as a protest to the Munich

Agreement.95

The Scotsman dedicated almost four pages to the new developments, and

despite the “good news”, the peace was viewed more as a result of

Czechoslovakian surrender, than as something achieved by Chamberlain and the

other leaders. By “turning the other cheek”, it was indeed Czechoslovakia that

prevented war, since turning down the agreement would result in war.

Even so, the wisdom and tenacity of Chamberlain was commended, as there

was nothing he could have done to save Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Munich

agreement was necessary to negotiate a lasting peace. Not only was it seen as a

fair trade to give the Sudeten areas to Germany in exchange for peace, but the

very existence of Czechoslovakia was put into question: “It suited French policy

in 1919 to make Czechoslovakia as powerful as possible to be a guard upon

Germany’s southeast flank […] Was it worth a European war to confirm and

repeat the mistakes of the Peace Conference?”96

On the issue of Czechoslovakia, the correspondent in Prague had other

thoughts than the author of the article cited above. The sacrifice which was

deemed necessary by Britain brought nothing but despair to Czechoslovakia. The

correspondent wrote:“To the bitterness of this humiliation and defeat at the hands

of friends and allies is added resentment at the manner with which it was carried

out by a coalition of the four Powers who, it is felt here, have now imposed

Hitler’s will on Czechoslovakia”.97

Arthur Berriedale Keith, a professor at Edinburgh University, shares his

criticism of the agreement with the readers of The Scotsman. Keith saw the

95 “First Lord of the Admiralty resign”, Gloucestershire Echo, 01-10-1938, p. 1 96 ”Peace – and after”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 12 97 ”Bitterness and despair in Prague”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 14

34

agreement as the final step to grant Germany hegemony in Europe, and saw

Chamberlain’s actions as a submission to Hitler.98

Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror wrote of “three great scenes without

precedence in the history of statesmanship” when describing the homecoming of

Chamberlain. Despite the pouring rain, ten thousand people were reported to have

greeted the Prime Minister when he returned from Munich, to declare “peace for

our time”. The cheers seemed endless, when the people of Britain welcomed the

man who not only settled the Sudeten dispute, but brought with him a document

that would guarantee peace between Great Britain and Germany for years to

come.99

While Britain, and almost the rest of the world, celebrated the news, the

people of Czechoslovakia was in a state of mourning. A Reuter telegram reported

that people tried to hold demonstrations in the streets of Prague, and the radio

silence, which was initiated as a sign of national mourning, was only disturbed by

the occasional news report.100

In The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, the views of a few citizens,

regarding the Munich agreement and the newly signed peace pact between Great

Britain and Germany, were shared. The bishop of Exeter called it the triumph of

reason, and that the 30th of September 1938 was “a greater day even than

November 11”. Several prominent people, among them aldermen and mayors,

also shared their gratitude and optimism, praising their Prime Minister and the

peace he had secured.101 There was no doubt that this was a day for celebration.

The day after the agreement was signed, the consensus regarding the

achievements of Chamberlain was challenged. No doubt, the newspapers still put

98 Keith, ”After the crisis”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 15 99 ” ’It is peace of our time’, cries Prime Minister”, Western Daily Mail and Bristol Mirror, 01-10-1938, p. 7 100 ”Poland now talks ’grave developments’ ”, Western Daily Mail and Bristol Mirror, 01-10-1938, p. 7 101 Peace of the world can be assured”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 01-10-1938, p. 6

35

their emphasis on the peace which was now, at least to many, “guaranteed”, but

dissenting opinions, especially from politicians, got its fair share of publicity. It

would seem that several newspapers now wanted to change the view on

Czechoslovakia as “a faraway country”, and offer perspectives that was so close

to home. However, if one took part of such perspectives or not was highly

dependent on location, as some newspapers (such as Western Daily Mail and

Daily Gazette) still focused heavily on Chamberlain’s achievement and global

acclaim.

3.5 Days of justification – and criticism (October 3rd

– October 7th)

On Monday, October 3rd, there was a change of pace with regards to the criticism

ventilated through several newspapers. In The Yorkshire Post and Leeds

Intelligencer, Eleonore Rathbone, independent M.P. and critic of the politics of

appeasement, wrote that “only time can show fully what kind and duration of

peace has been bought and what price will be paid for it by the Czechs, ourselves,

and the world”. With regards to the resulting refugee crisis, she continued:

“At a time when Mr. Chamberlain’s influence stands so high, much may depend on what he is

prepared to do for these victims of his policy, whether by exerting his own influence or through

the instructions he gives to those who are to take part on our behalf in the execution of his plan.

And his actions may depend on how far public opinion at home is aroused on behalf of these

victims – these scapegoats by whose sacrifice some hope to have obtained immunity from the

tragedy of war”.102

James H. Mosey, Chairman of Gilling A.R.P. Committee, called the

agreement unjust, saying that “no agreement can be just that is forced at the point

102 ”Correspondence – Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer,

03-10-1938, p. 6

36

of a bayonet” and that “the Czechoslovak people are paying the price for our

respite…”. He urged other (A.R.P.) committees to send proposals to M.P’s, the

Prime Minister and the opposition, to “insist that an immediate world conference

[…] examine all maladjustments, economic, racial, social and political which

interfere with the right-living of the peoples of the world”, as he did not wish the

Czechoslovakian people to be the only ones to make sacrifices for peace.103

Hugh R. Lupton from Leeds sent a copy of a letter, meant for M.P. Osbert

Peake, to the newspaper, which got published. The letter contained a proposal to

reconstruct the Government, and some of the criticism went as follows:

“I am writing to inform you that I disagree with the action lately taken by the

Prime Minister and shall, if you continue to support his policy, be unable again to

record my vote in your favour”. He continues:

“… Although our failure to support the cause of Czechoslovakia has filled me with such

shame in respect of my country as I never thought to experience, the main cause of my dissent is

the short-sightedness of the action taken. It must be obvious to the whole world that the Sudeten

grievances were deliberately formatted by Hitler as a means to achieve his ends”.104

A text signed with the name C. E. G. Spencer also questioned the actions

taken by Chamberlain: “Try as we may to conceal it, the fact remains that that war

has been averted by surrender to threats of force, and the peace gained has been

won by substituting one injustice for another”. Philip R. Le Mesurier sent the

newspaper a copy of a telegram he had sent to the Prime Minister. The telegram

was short and concise: “Deplore utterly your latest surrender to German

dictation”.

Charles Davy from Kent wrote: “We must not try to justify our part in

demanding these sacrifices; this must be left for history to decide”, while also

103 ”Correspondence – Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer,

03-10-1938, p. 6 104 Ibid.

37

sharing his admiration for the Czechs, who had “given the world superb example

of courage and social discipline.”105

The Dundee Evening Telegraph wrote an article about Duff Cooper, who had

previously resigned in response to the Munich Agreement. Cooper had now given

up on his political career, but stated that “I have maintained something which is to

me of great value. I can still walk about the world with my head erect.”106

Excerpts of Cooper’s speech in the House of Commons was also published in

Hull Daily Mail and The Sunderland Echo and Shipping Gazette.107

Meanwhile, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette went another way,

focusing on the positive. The Bishop of Plymouth thanked God, and Chamberlain,

for the peace, and the Plymouth Conservative Club had sent a telegram to their

Prime Minister, informing him of their “heartfelt gratitude to you as

peacemaker.”108

The most negative words shared by the paper was those written by Isaac Foot,

who felt that the agreement had resulted in “relief and shame”, seeing the actions

taken as a necessary evil.109 In The Aberdeen Press and Journal “King’s message

of thanks to the nation” adorned the top of page 7, with several positive stories on

the recent developments. The King himself praised Chamberlain, stating that

“after the magnificent efforts of the Prime Minister in the cause of peace, it is my

fervent hope that a new era of friendship and prosperity may be dawning among

the peoples of the world.”110

The words of General Jan Smuts were also shared, and Smuts had stated that

“Mr Chamberlain appeared at the last moment to save the world from war”.111

105 ”Correspondence – Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer,

03-10-1938, p. 6 106 ”Mr Duff Cooper’s statement”, The Dundee Evening Telegraph, 03-10-1938, p. 4 107 See: ”Mr Duff Cooper’s speech”, The Hull Daily Mail, 03-10-1938, p. 1 and 10 and “’We should have been

fighting…’”, The Sunderland Echo and Shipping Gazette, 03-10-1938, p. 1 108 ”Plymouth gives thanks” and ”Sutton Division Conservatives”, The Western Morning News and Daily

Gazette, 03-10-1938, p. 5 109 ”Relief mixed with shame”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 03-10-1938, p. 5 110 ”’Calm resolve during these critical days’”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 03-10-1938, p. 7 111 ”Britain leads again”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 03-10-1938, p. 7

38

The Gloucester Citizen had a somewhat different approach, giving much focus

to Germany’s entrance into the Sudetenland, where Hitler was greeted with cheers

and flowers.112 Like several other newspapers on October 3rd, they also reported

Duff Cooper’s resignation.113 The editor of the paper also received multiple letters

that were published regarding the matter. Signed C. F. England, the author shared

his “immeasurable admiration and gratitude […] towards the supreme and self-

sacrificing effort of the Prime Minister”.114

Like some of the aforementioned newspapers, The Scotsman also shared some

views of the readers. Many wrote to The Scotsman, praising both the Prime

Minister and the Czechs. Writing under the signature “One of complete

insignificance”, one author called the Munich agreement “infamous”, seeing it as

a moment where Britain had chosen to “accelerate our humiliating retreat before

the dictators”, ending the piece with “The sun of Great Britain is not setting

gloriously, but in a dark and cloudy sky”. William M. C. Stewart, just like others

before him, called the agreement a betrayal of Czechoslovakia, but also took

comfort in the voices of those critical to the agreement.115

At this time, it was clear that the agenda had been changed to represent a more

nuanced discourse about the Munich agreement. Now, more than ever before,

several newspapers made way for extensive criticism of the agreement. It

represented a clear change, and the after celebrations had toned down, a more

critical debate opened up. Papers still had room for praise, but it was still negative

publicity that characterized the publications of October 3rd.

On October 4th, The Hull Daily Mail published two texts containing answers

to some of the criticism. One article conveyed the opinions of Sir Lambert Ward,

who saw it fit to look back to the treaties of 1919, asking if the very creation of

the Czechoslovakian republic was a wise choice at all. Ward had stated that “I do

112 ”Hitler enters Sudetenland in triumph”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1 113 ”Mr. Duff Cooper on his resignation”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1 114 ”Other people’s views: The peace – and after”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 4 115 ”Points of View – After Munich”, The Scotsman, 03-10-1938, p. 13

39

not think the Peace Treaty made the best of the somewhat inflammable material at

its disposal, especially about the setting up of the State of Czechoslovakia.”116

Another, shorter, article also contained similar criticism, where the legitimacy of

Czechoslovakia was questioned, while Chamberlain was commended for his

achievement, as it at least secured the existence of the Czechoslovakian state. The

author wrote that:

“The critics would have us remain at the status quo in Czechoslovakia despite the fact that for

19 years certain terms of the Versailles peace, including the creation of Czechoslovakia with

impossibly large minorities on military considerations only, have been the cause of European

unrest and danger.”117

Several other papers, including The Northern Whig and Belfast Post and Sheffield

Daily Independent, had big headlines, followed with extensive texts containing

criticism of the agreement, among them statements from Duff Cooper.118

The Aberdeen Press and Journal reported on the debate in the House of

Commons, where Chamberlain faced criticism from other members of Parliament.

Chamberlain had not responded directly to this criticism, but rather talked about

“the facts”, while having overwhelming support in the House.119 They also shared

a short text written letter from a Czech member of the International Council of

Women, in which it was stated that “we have been betrayed by our friends to

whom we have been faithful. You have betrayed us because you have been afraid

of force”. The letter ended with the words “I am proud of being a Czech. I am

ashamed of being a European.”120

The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, as well as The Western Morning

News and Daily Gazette, also reported on the political debate within the House of

116 ”Crisis settlement only one possible says Lt.-Col. Sir L. Ward”, The Hull Daily Mail, 04-10-1938, p. 4 117 ”We must be one guard”, The Hull Daily Mail, 04-10-1938, p. 4 118 ”Criticism of the Munich Agreement”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 04-10-1938, p. 8 and “Opposition

attack on Munich Agreement”, Sheffield Daily Independent, 04-10-1938, p. 6 119 “Premier explains Munich peace policy”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 04-10-1938, p. 7 120 ”’You have betrayed us’”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 04-10-1938, p. 9

40

Commons, reporting on the praise of Chamberlain and the criticism from Duff

Cooper alike.121

The Scotsman also reported on the debate, through their private correspondent.

In his report, he wrote about the wide support Chamberlain had in the House of

Commons, while also reporting “unmannerly interruptions” from the Socialists,

further stating that Chamberlain was not deserving the accusations put forth by his

critics.122 The paper also made way for some of their readers to put forth their

opinion. Some praised the Prime Minister, while others criticized the agreement.

Some also saw it fit to sympathize with the Czechs, and help them in their hour of

desperate need.

A text signed by Hector Macpherson declared it “unfortunate that so many of

your [The Scotsman] correspondents have rushed into print so hastily to criticise

the Prime Minister and to denounce the Munich Agreement”. He suggested that

the writers should ask themselves what would have been a reasonable alternative.

At the same time, he also acknowledged that the current state in Europe was

problematic, due to British and French passiveness during the mid-30’s, when

Hitler violated the treaty of Versailles and reintroduced conscription. Even so,

what was done was done, and the Munich agreement was a necessity, and

Chamberlain should be commended for his work.123

On October 5th, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser published an article, with

the agreement, and the subsequent debate, in focus. The author argued that the

121 ”Commons debate on the Czech crisis”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 04-10-1938, p. 8 and

“Great Britain Grants £10,000,000 Loan to Czechoslovakian Government”, The Western Morning News and

Daily Gazette, 04-10-1938, p. 3 122 ”London News”, The Scotsman, 04-10-1938, p. 10

41

agreement was not only a step forward, but went so far as to say “that of all the

beneficiaries of the settlement the Czechoslovak people have been the chief” and

that the monetary support the British would now give to the country was an act of

sympathy for a people that “had yielded to natural impulses and rejected the

Munich proposals”.124

The Gloucester Echo printed a letter to the editor, where the author

commented on the German claims on the Sudetenland. It was argued that “Hitler’s

policy to bring about a homogenous Germany is understandable and legitimate”,

and that the problem was within Czechoslovakia, a land that was “carved out of

the old ramshackle Austrian Empire” and where “the two races were on bad

terms”. In another letter, Chamberlain was praised and the author wrote that

“surely, the nation will express its approval of the extraordinary energy and

diplomacy of its Prime Minister by suitable reward for his success in averting an

unprecedented national disaster”.

In another letter, however, the government was called a pacifist party “which

gives in at the moment a bully shakes his fist in its face, and that the agreement

did not result in peace with honour, but rather “a truce with dishonour”.125

The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer also shared some of the readers’

views on the agreement. One reader, professing himself as “an ordinary man in

the street, with first-hand experience of the horrors of the last war”, protested

against the criticism against Chamberlain. Once again, the very creation of

Czechoslovakia was questioned, and the heterogonous population, among them

many (Sudeten) Germans, was seen as a cause of conflict. The author finished his

text by claiming that Chamberlain was “entitled to the generous and unreserved

support of all men of good will”.

Another reader called it “a time of national humiliation” and “a shameful

business” that the Prime Minister had bent to the will of Germany. Others shared

123 ”Points of view: Munich Agreement and the alternative”, The Scotsman, 04-10-1938, p. 13 124 ”Czechoslovakia and the settlement”, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 05-10-1938, p. 6 125 ”Letters to the editor”, The Gloucester Echo, 05-10-1938, p. 4

42

their gratitude towards Czechoslovakia, wanting to see people come together to

help in what way they could.126

In The Hull Daily Mail, Diana Spearman, a candidate for the Conservatives,

praised Chamberlain’s achievement, and that one was to be deeply thankful for

“the disappearance of the nightmare of war”. She put forth a utilitarian argument,

stating that even though Czechoslovakia had made a great sacrifice, peace in

Europe was to be the prime objective. She also argued that the disadvantages of

Czechoslovakia had been “wildly exaggerated in some quarters”. Was it not for

the settlement, Czechoslovakia would, she argued, be the first (and worst) sufferer

in the event of war.127

At this point, there had been a drastic change regarding the content of

published material. Critics no longer seemed to be dissenters, and in some papers,

the negative views on the agreement outweighed the positive. While unity was the

dominating characteristic when the news of the agreement first reached the

newspapers, publications now shaped a reality where politicians and citizens alike

seemed divided over the question. Of course, within Parliament, the support for

Chamberlain seemed to still dominate the debate, but there was no doubt that the

agreement had created conflict, which was also manifested through the

newspapers.

On October 6th, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer wrote two whole

pages on the aftermath of the agreement. Winston Churchill was quoted on

126 “Correspondence: Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer,

05-10-1938, p. 7 127 Spearman, ”European War Threat Would Not Have Settled the Causes of War”, The Hull Daily Mail, 05-10-

1938, p. 4

43

several occasions, and he had called the settlement a “total, unmitigated defeat”.

He had also shared his worries about the future, warning about the growing

German army, asking “if the Nazi Dictator should choose to look Westward, as he

may, then bitterly will France and England regret the loss of that vast army of

ancient Bohemia…”.128 Churchill’s notions were met with considerable resistance

from other politicians, where Sir Henry Page Croft stated that Britain had not lost

any prestige, but rather that it was viewed as “the saviour of the world” by some

nations, and Thomas Magnay seconded the opinions of those pointing out the

problems regarding the creation of the Czechoslovakian state.129

October 7th, just about a week after the agreement was signed, The Western

Gazette shared the views of a few larger, national newspapers. From The Times,

praised the leadership of Chamberlain, saying that he had made way for a future

where threats of war had been removed. The nation was to show gratitude to their

Prime Minister. The Daily Herald had commented on Chamberlain’s role in the

negotiations, writing that “for the first time he [Hitler] has had to realise that there

are more forces in the world more powerful than the absolute will of a

dictator”.130

In The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, in a text signed E. H. Baxter,

criticism was directed to democracy itself. Like others before, the creation of

Czechoslovakia was brought into question, as it was seen as a result of when

“President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George arranged the map of Europe to their

satisfaction.”131

The writer blamed the League of Nations, the No More War Movement, the

Socialists and the Liberals for putting Great Britain in a situation where they “had

no friends, no influence, and no certainty that we could even defend ourselves”.

128 ”Danger to Britain and France”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-10-1938, p. 8 129 ”Sir H. Page Croft’s Reply to Mr. Churchill”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-10-1938, p. 9 130 ”Opinions of the press”, The Western Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 16

44

The heterogeneity of Czechoslovakia was also pointed out as an issue, since

“democracy is not very kind to minorities.”132

The Essex Chronicle published a few letters to the editor, dealing with the

Munich agreement. One writer the Prime minister for his courage in securing

peace, while another expressed his gratitude and payed “tribute to his wisdom and

great statesmanship” calling Chamberlain “our [Britain’s] Abraham Lincoln”.

Another writer criticized the agreement, writing that “Mr. Chamberlain seemed

determined to save the face and prestige of Hitler” and that “the only sure way for

the preservation of world peace is for the people of Britain to make a joint

declaration to stand alongside the people of France, the Soviet Union, and

Czechoslovakia against Hitler’s threats…”133

The Scotsman published a text, containing a report from their Parliamentary

correspondent, summarizing Chamberlain’s defence of the critique that was now

directed at him from, among others, Winston Churchill. The author called

Chamberlain’s speech “To-day’s outstanding event”, also showing that the

support of Chamberlain’s policy still had extensive support in Parliament.134

Western Morning News and Daily Gazette also hinted at the wide support of

Chamberlain, writing that “Mr. Churchill seemed quite surprised at the warmth of

the cheering when the Prime Minister rebuked him today”.135

The Northern Whig and Daily Gazette also shared with its readers a few letters

to the editor. One of these letters questioned the underlying argument regarding

the German claims on the Sudetenland.

The author argued that this claim was weak, as areas granted to the Germans

through the Munich agreement never belonged to Germany, but Bohemia.136

131 ”After Munich”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 07-10-1938, p. 7 132 ”After Munich”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 07-10-1938, p. 7 133 ”Correspondence – Letters from our readers”, The Essex Chronicle, 07-10-1938, p. 7 134 ”Premier replies to critics”, The Scotsman, 07-10-1938, p. 11 135 ”Our London Letter”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 6 136Bohemia had, before the creation of Czechoslovakia after the First World War, been an independent Kingdom

since the 12th century.

45

Another letter agreed that Czechoslovakia was indeed the biggest loser of the

agreement, but that the actions of Chamberlain was that “of a great realist”.137

By this time, the division between those for and against the agreement and

Chamberlain’s foreign policy, had become abundantly clear. The objective reality,

that is, the support of Chamberlain in Parliament, was reported as it was, although

some aspects of the debates were excluded in the reports. Letters sent to the

editors of the different newspapers showed a reality where the people were deeply

divided. The variation of opinions was greater, from unconditional praising of

Chamberlain, to the criticism towards how Britain had betrayed Czechoslovakia

and bowed to Hitler’s extortions.

137 ”Letters to the editor”, The Northern Whig and Daily Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 14

46

4 Conclusions

Looking at the general tendencies in the reporting during September and early

October, there have been some, albeit not extensive, differences in the reporting in

the different newspapers. Of course, the reports are skewed in a direction where

the British perspective is dominant, especially when it comes to texts written by

journalists and editors on respective newspaper. This is in no way a surprising

result, and absence of such a bias would be extraordinary. A basic assumption

within agenda setting theory is that the reality is, at least not fully, reported.

Indeed, covering all there is to cover would be impossible, which opts media

outlets to prioritize.

This process can be seen as a filtering system, which is used to filter reality,

and shape it, before conveying it. In this way, the specific newspaper can control

what will reach the public. Today, in a digital society, we are constantly

bombarded with information from thousands and thousands of sources, and can

often compose our own view of reality, based on several sources. However, in

1938, the situation was radically different. With fewer media outlets, the “power

over reality” was far more concentrated.

Looking back at McCombs and Shaw, their study about how media attention

affects voters can be compared to the reports written by editors and journalists,

and how it affects the readers. In this way, the letters that were sometimes sent

into different newspapers might also be shaped by the nature of the reporting of a

specific newspaper.

Northern Whig and Belfast Post published several reports and articles where

criticism of Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement was prominent. Several

M.P’s critical of the agreement were quoted and the Czechoslovakian perspective

was, in extension, brought to light.

The Scotsman stands out with their use of a Czechoslovakian perspective.

Having their own correspondent in Prague, they offer a unique perspective on the

crisis, especially during the most intense period around the end of September,

when the agreement was signed.

47

In addition to this, several articles focusing on the imposition on

Czechoslovakia were printed. This seemed to affect the readers, as many shared

their criticism of the agreement. This focus, which was consistent through the

crisis, and afterwards, was noticed by one of the readers, who sent a letter,

criticising The Scotsman for publishing so much criticism towards Chamberlain.

Until the days following the signing, most newspapers were characterized by a

plethora of emotions. The balance between hopes of peace and fear of war was

often uncanny, as the intensity of conflict increased. The hope was based on a

great belief in the diplomatic skills of Chamberlain, and the fear was based on the

threatening rhetoric that had been used by Hitler. During this period, the “filtered

reality” of the newspapers can be summarized by “hope for the best, prepare for

the worst”. Reports and information conserving the digging of trenches and

distribution of gas masks, while cheering Chamberlain’s efforts, is a clear

indication of this.

Other than this, the main differences does not lie between the different

newspapers, but rather between different publishing dates. The criticism towards

the agreement was widely reported in almost all of the newspapers, and letters to

editors often shared the criticism of different M.P’s (such as Churchill and the

newly resigned Duff Cooper). The relative optimism prior to this change could

perhaps be attributed to a form of “collective euphoria” among both citizens and

the media, celebrating the peace brought home by their Prime Minister. It could

also be a way for the media to calm down their readers, as to create tranquillity

among the British people. As my analysis did not explore differences using an

ideological perspective (that is, searching for differences between newspapers

with different ideological standpoints), it is hard to speculate about if there is an

ideological – more specifically, a patriotic or nationalistic – component which

opted for the rallying behind the British Prime Minister. The fact that letters from

readers often mirrored the pattern in the newspapers, the result fits in well with

previous research within agenda setting.

48

This study have also brought forth a medial perspective on the appeasement

politics of the 1930’s. Despite Hitler’s repeated aggressions, most notably

culminating in the de-militarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss, texts on

the risks of future aggression was surprisingly absent. Exempted from this are

those who early on reported with a Czechoslovakian perspective, such as The

Scotsman.

The anti-Czech attitude Vít Smetana have written about is also present, albeit

in a different manner. Since Smetana focused on the British parliament, where

these anti-Czech attitudes were apparent, while I was focusing on media, I did not

get the same results. Although many politicians were quoted in several

newspapers, any anti-Czech attitudes was not put forth. Instead, such opinions are

instead shared by readers. On several occasions, the very creation of

Czechoslovakia was questioned, and if not that, then at least Germany had a right

to the Sudetenland to “unite their race”.

49

5 References

Literature

Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina, 2005, Textens mening och makt – metodbok I

samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys, Studentlitteratur

Buse, Kent, Mays, Nicholas, Walt, Gill, 2012, Making Health Policy 2nd ed.), Open

University Press, New York

Charles River Editors, 2015, The Munich Agreement of 1938: The History of the Peace

Pact That Failed to Prevemt World War II,

Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud, Lena, 2007,

Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, Nordstedths

Juridik AB, Stockholm

Hughes, R. Gerald, 2013, The Ghost of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the

Munich Agreement, Journal of Contemporary History, 48(4), p. 688-716

Kingdon, John W., 2014, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2nd ed.), Pearson

Education Limited, UK

McCombs, Maxwell E., & Shaw, Donald L., 1972, The Agenda-Setting Function of

Mass Media, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. (summer, 1972), pp. 176-

187

McLoughlin, Kate, 2008, ”Voices of the Munich Pact”, Critical Inquiry, spring 2008, p.

543-562

Shepardson, Donald, E, 2006, A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered, The Midwest

Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 81-99

Smetana, Vít, 2009, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia

from 1938 to 1942, Charles University, Prague

50

Newspapers (articles and pages, sorted alphabetically by newspaper name

and date)

The Aberdeen Press and Journal

”Reported offer by Hitler”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 19-09-1938, p. 7

Hodson, ”The four men of Munich”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 29-09-1938, p. 6

”The four men of Munich”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 29-09-1938, p. 6

”’Calm resolve during these critical days’”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 03-10-1938, p. 7

”Britain leads again”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 03-10-1938, p. 7

“Premier explains Munich peace policy”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 04-10-1938, p. 7

”’You have betrayed us’”, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 04-10-1938, p. 9

Derby Daily Telgraph

“Whitehall parade”, Derby Daily Telegraph, 23-09-1938, p. 1

Derby Evening Telegraph

”Premier and Hitler talks this evening”, Derby Evening Telegraph, 15-09-1938, p. 1

”Europe acclaims premier”, Derby Evening Telegraph, 30-09-1938, p. 1

The Derry Journal

“Henlein meets Hitler”, The Derry Journal, 02-09-1938, p. 9

Dundee Courier and Daily Advertiser

“Talks end: Chamberlain home to-day”, Dundee Courier and Daily Advertiser, 24-09-1938,

p. 7

”Settlement”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 30-09-1938, p. 6

”The peacemaker”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 01-10-1938, p. 4

”British-German ’no war’-pact”, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 01-10-1938, p. 5

”Czechoslovakia and the settlement”, The Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 05-10-1938, p. 6

Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post

“French cabinet’s decision”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 19-09, 1938, p. 1

”Demonstrators at Whitefall”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 23-09-1938, p. 1

“Prime Minister’s Statement”, Dundee Evening Telegram and Post, 24-09-1938, p. 1

51

“Reported European conference plan”, The Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 28-09-1938,

p. 5

”Current events”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 28-09-1938, p. 2

”Current events”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 29-09-1938, p. 2

”Peace day in London”, Dundee Evening Telegraph and Post, 30-09-1938, p. 1

”Mr Duff Cooper’s statement”, The Dundee Evening Telegraph, 03-10-1938, p. 4

The Essex Chronicle

”Correspondence – Letters from our readers”, The Essex Chronicle, 07-10-1938, p. 7

Exeter and Plymouth Gazette

Anxious Days”, Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 02-09-1938, p. 10

The Falkirk Herald

”European crisis development”, The Falkirk Herald, 17-09-1938, p. 9

The Gloucester Citizen

”A man with job of work to do”, Gloucester Citizen, 15-09-1938, p. 1

”Countries in complete agreement”, Gloucester Citizen, 19-09-1938, p. 1

“Public Opinion ‘shocked’ “, The Gloucester Citizen, 26-09-1938, p. 6

”Peace: The hope”, The Gloucester Citizen, 28-09-1938, p. 1

"Peace – and after”, The Gloucester Citizen, 30-09-1938, p. 4

”To seek peace – and ensure it”, Gloucester Citizen, 01-10-1938, p. 4

”The destiny of Europe”, Gloucester Citizen, 01-10-1938, p. 12

”Hitler enters Sudetenland in triumph”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1

”Mr. Duff Cooper on his resignation”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 1

”Other people’s views: The peace – and after”, The Gloucester Citizen, 03-10-1938, p. 4

Gloucestershire Echo

“First Lord of the Admiralty resign”, Gloucestershire Echo, 01-10-1938, p. 1

”Letters to the editor”, The Gloucester Echo, 05-10-1938, p. 4

Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail

”World’s Eyes on Munich”, Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 29-09-1938, p. 3

The Hull Daily Mail

52

”’Talks will bring a solution’”, Hull Daily Mail, 15-09-1938, p. 7

“Prime Minister to see Hitler again”, The Hull Daily Mail, 28-09-1938, p. 1

”The world’s words of relief – and praise for Premier”, The Hull Daily Mail, 29-09-1938, p.

10

”Mr Duff Cooper’s speech”, The Hull Daily Mail, 03-10-1938, p. 1, 10

”Crisis settlement only one possible says Lt.-Col. Sir L. Ward”, The Hull Daily Mail, 04-10-

1938, p. 4

”We must be one guard”, The Hull Daily Mail, 04-10-1938, p. 4

Spearman, ”European War Threat Would Not Have Settled the Causes of War”, The Hull

Daily Mail, 05-10-1938, p. 4

The Northern Whig and Belfast Post

”Czech Crisis”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 14-09-1938, p. 8

”Czechs unwilling to cede territory”, The Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 21-09-1938, p. 7

”Blackest chapter”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 24-09-1938, p. 8

”Criticism of the Munich Agreement”, Northern Whig and Belfast Post, 04-10-1938, p. 8

”Letters to the editor”, The Northern Whig and Daily Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 14

The Nottingham Evening Post

”Six months’ peace!”, Nottingham Evening Post, 01-10-1938, p. 7

Portsmouth Evening News

”France will not be surprised”, Portsmouth Evening News, 13-09-1938, p. 9

Watson, ”The man of the moment is a man of peace”, Portsmouth Evening News, 15-09-1938,

p. 8

“Prime Minister tells the commons”, Portsmouth Evening News, 28-09-1938, p. 12

”His efforts to save the world from war”, Portsmouth Evening News, 28-09-1938, p. 12

Burns, ”Four men at Munich”, Portsmouth Evening News, 29-09-1938, p. 6

What is to be done about the school children”, Portsmouth Evening News, 29-09-1938, p. 7

”The miracle of Munich”, Portsmouth Evening News, 30-09-1938, p. 8

”A victory for mankind”, Portsmouth Evening News, 30-09-1938, p. 8

The Sheffield Daily Independent

“Britain Forms Defense Plans”, Sheffield Daily Independent, 14-09-1938, p. 1

“Opposition attack on Munich Agreement”, Sheffield Daily Independent, 04-10-1938, p. 6

53

The Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette

“French cabinet confirms London plan”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 19-

09-1938, p. 1

””Mr Chamberlain as hero’”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 29-09-1938, p. 2

”What we think”, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 29-09-1938, p. 2

’We should have been fighting…’”, The Sunderland Echo and Shipping Gazette, 03-10-1938,

p. 1

The Scotsman

”Momentous decisions for Hitler”, The Scotsman, 02-09-1938, p. 9

”Prague and Munich”, The Scotsman, 29-09-1938, p. 11

”Britain’s new proposals accepted by Prague”, The Scotsman, 30-09-1938, p. 11

”Peace – and after”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 12

”Bitterness and despair in Prague”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 14

Keith, ”After the crisis”, The Scotsman, 01-10-1938, p. 15

”Points of View – After Munich”, The Scotsman, 03-10-1938, p. 13

”London News”, The Scotsman, 04-10-1938, p. 10

”Points of view: Munich Agreement and the alternative”, The Scotsman, 04-10-1938, p. 13

”Premier replies to critics”, The Scotsman, 07-10-1938, p. 11

The Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror

”Berlin’s Blame For Bloodshed”, The Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 14-09-1938, p.

12

”Czechs bitter at ’betrayal’ ”, Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 22-09-1938, p. 12

”Make stand against Nazi threat”, Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 22-09-1938, p. 12

”’It is peace of our time’, cries Prime Minister”, Western Daily Mail and Bristol Mirror, 01-

10-1938, p. 7

”Poland now talks ’grave developments’ ”, Western Daily Mail and Bristol Mirror, 01-10-

1938, p. 7

54

The Western Gazette

”Opinions of the press”, The Western Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 16

The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette

“Henlein has talk with Hitler”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 02-09-1938, p. 7

”Herr Hitler warns Prague”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 13-09-1938, p. 7

“Last-minute bid for peace by Premier”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 24-09-

1938, p. 9

“Gas masks as toys”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette”, 30-09-1938, p. 8

“Peace of the world can be assured”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 01-10-

1938, p. 6

”Plymouth gives thanks” and ”Sutton Division Conservatives”, The Western Morning News

and Daily Gazette, 03-10-1938, p. 5

”Relief mixed with shame”, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 03-10-1938, p. 5

“Great Britain Grants £10,000,000 Loan to Czechoslovakian Government”, The Western

Morning News and Daily Gazette, 04-10-1938, p. 3

”Our London Letter”, Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 07-10-1938, p. 6

The Western Times

”The world ’breathes again,’ thanks to a great man”, The Western Times, 30-09-1938, p. 8

The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer

”Early Meeting of Cabinet”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 16-09-1938, p. 9

”News of Munich meeting as a tonic”, Yorkshire post and Leeds Intelligencer, 29-09-1938, p.

9

”Correspondence – Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and

Leeds Intelligencer, 03-10-1938, p. 6

”Correspondence – Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and

Leeds Intelligencer, 03-10-1938, p. 6

”Commons debate on the Czech crisis”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 04-10-

1938, p. 8

“Correspondence: Readers’ views on the Munich Agreement”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds

Intelligencer, 05-10-1938, p. 7

”Danger to Britain and France”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-10-1938, p. 8

55

”Sir H. Page Croft’s Reply to Mr. Churchill”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 06-

10-1938, p. 9

”After Munich”, The Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 07-10-1938, p. 7

56

6 Appendix

6.1 The Munich Agreement

Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain,

France and Italy

GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement,

which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten

German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said

cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold

themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:

(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.

(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be

completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and

that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation

without damage to the said installations.

(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international

commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and

Czechoslovakia.

(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will

begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by

German troops in the following order:

The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the

2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the

territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of

preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international

commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

57

(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in

which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until

the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the

plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission

will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international

commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers,

Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor

modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be

transferred without plebiscite.

(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be

exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak

commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer

of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this

agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish

to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten

German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,

EDOUARD DALADIER,

BENITO MUSSOLINI.

58

6.2 Sudetenland

Sudeten area marked with stripes