Terrurisnl unci Politico/ Violence, 20:415-433, 2008 Copyright t Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN' 0954-6553 print/1556-l836 online DOl 10.1080/09546550802073367trnal of

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Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways mming. Loring. Toward Terrorism

CLARK McCAULEY AND SOPHIA MOSKALENKO

.:qucncy Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, 58 8~ Pennsylvania, USA

TrOnSt11

8. :20()6. This article conceptualizes political radicalization as a dimension of increasing)tlicl' \)j' extrernity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support 0.( intergroup conflict and vio­

lence Aeros's individuals, groups, and J11aSS publics, twelve mechanisms of radicali­r~:IJlI/J zation are distinguished. For ten of these mechanisms, radiculization occurs in a J\.-'LL':-;~l'\..: context of group identification and reaction to perceived threat to the ingroup.

The variety and strength of reactive mechanisms point to the need to understand rudicalization-s-including the extremes 0.1 terrOriSJ11--0S emerging more [rom the dvnamics of intergroup conflict than from the vicissitudes n.1' individual psychology

Keywords pyramid model, radicalization, terrorism

ln this article we describe mechanisms of radicalization relevant to understanding the origins or terrorism. We must immediately acknowledge that the idea of mechunistn IS somewhat different in different domains of social science, sometimes with conflict­ing definitions used within a single discipline. 1,2 Here we use mechanism in the gen­eral sense traditionally employed in Psychology: "the means or mariner 111 \\ hieh something is accomplished. Thus, the mechanism of vision includes the physica. stimulus and the physiological and neural processes involved ,,~

Clark iv1cCaule) IS Professor of Psychology and a director of the Solo-non Asch Center for Study of Eihnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College. and a co-director or the ~Jtl\..)n(l]

Consortium for Stud) of Terrorism and Responses to Tcrrorism (NC-STi\RT). Sophia ivloskaknku received her Ph.D. In SOCIal Psychology: from the Umvcrsu . uf Pl'IHb) h .uu.: 111 200-l She I" a pos.doctoral fellow at the Department of Homeland Sccurit . au.l ;t IC''lI..'dfL'h

fcllov at the National Consortium for Study of T er rorrsm and Resp(ln~,-'~ t\..) 'I crr oru.m (NC-STA.RT)

I'll b research was supported by the Unncd States Department \..11' IL)lnelltnd \l'CUfl t~

through the National Consortium for the Study of Tcrrorrsm a nd Re~l'nn~c\ to l'l'IT\)rI:-.Ill

(STA RT ). g. ran t nuIII be r N00 1405 10629 H 0 VVcver. any 0 pin Ion ~. rind ing:-.. d n<..1 (() 111...:1 Ll:-; I(I n" or rccornmcudauorr- In this document are those of the author., and do nut l1ecc:-:<\nl,\ rc't'kl't \1('\\:"> ott h« U,S l)eJ!tlrtlneIll of Homeland Securu , Ihe authors arc grutci ul 1\) ( r.u , 1,!f'll'l-­

and Tony Marsella fur comments and suggestions in response to draft \·C'r:-']\..)!1", llf thi-. p~lpl'r

and thank three a nonyITIOUS reviewers for numcrous helpful suggestion- . .t\ddrc"s correspondence to Clark Mct..auley SOl0I110n Asch Center fur St ud , l)!' Ft hno­

political Confl.ct. Bryn Mawr College, ]01 N Merro n Avc. Bryn \LHy r P;\ 19()]() l -rnail CInCC~l uley((~: brynmawr.ed u

4/5

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Funcuonally. political rudicahza tion is Increased preparation for and commit­men t to Intergroup conflict Descnpn vely. r.idicnhzation means change in beliefs, feelings, and bchuvrors In directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacnficc 111 defense of the ingroup. I-lo\v does this happen? How do indrviduals. groups. and mass publics move toward contlict and violence'?

This question apphes as well to sta te prepara tion for conflict as to non-state pre­p.uauon for confhct A state and Its citizens are radicalized in the run-up to interstate conflicts and war. and. as evident III the lJ .S. after the attacks of September 11, 200 1. 111 state response to tcrronsm as well. But con11110n drscourse about radicalizauon focuses on non-state groups that represent a challenge or threat to the state. Similarly, tcr rorism as a means of poliucal control is predorrunantly government work." but CCHnIllC)Jl dISCO urse aSSOCICi tcs tcrrorrsm with the acnons of non-sta te groups. In this pa per. we focus on the conl111011 usage in which radicahzation refers to increasing l'\trcllllt) of non-state challenges to state authority. We aim to show. however. j-h)\\ state action can contribute to radicahzation of non-state groups.

Radicalization in the Pvramid Model

Individual and Mass Radicalit.ation

Ihere are many possible meanings of rudrcalizntion. but 1l10St of the relevant distmc­t Il)llS can be represcn ted with the usual social psychological distinctions among bchcl. feelIng. and behavior. Of course it is rndicalization of behavior that is of greatest practical concern In a poliucai context this means increasing ume. money, risk-tak mg. and violence In support of a political cause. As every political cause is assocratec wuh a particular group that cares about this cause. \ve may equally ,')(l~, that behavioral radicahza tion means increasmg time. money. risk-taking. and violence III support of Ll political group.

If at a given point III time VVt' compare those who are more and less behaviorally cornnuued. \VC are likely to find differences in both behefs and feelings. Social move­men t activists arc Iikely to share more than non-activists the beliefs or "frames" that the movement uses to summarize and convey its mission. 5 Anti-poverty activists. for Instance, tend to set' eli ffcrer: t ca uses of poverty than non-activists. 6 Radicalization of many kinds may be associated WIth a syndrome of behefs about the current situauon d nd its history: i We arc a special or chosen grou p (su pcriority) who hu ve been unf.urly treated and betrayed (mjusticc). no one else cares about us or will help us (dr-.trust ). and the SItuation IS dire our group and our cause are in danger of cxtinc­non (vulnerability).

Similarly those who do I110rC arc 1ike ly to have different and stronger feellngs ~ l)

a ho ut the confhct tha n those who do less. (, Acuvixts are likely to feel 1110re sadness and humihation with group Iuilurc-. 1110re joy and pride with group success. more a nger and fear at the perfidy or VIolence of the enemies of their ca use

'These tcehngs are the cxprcs-ion of gruup rdcn t ification: caring about wha t ha p­pens to the group. cspcciallv in rclut ions with other groups.]O Group Identification can even lead to feelings of guilt about \vrongdoing perpetrated by others. if the lHhcrs are mcn1bcrs of the group Identified \vith. 11

l~he hlunan capacity to care about large and Inlpcrsonal collectI\'itlcs as If they \vere an extended fanlily is the founda­tIon of mass politics. and the pre-requIsite for national. ethnic~ and relIgIOUS group conflict l~, l.~

Becausc t

feeIIng~. t hC t the pyramid the) are figh1

support 1'0 I' t 1

of the pyrun

Amencans \V

powerful that citizens.·· 1

..;

From ba­n urnbel'S but way of think terror.st , fron to the ex t rem

R aliicali;atiou

Lcononu-n., d

poinung out money, (\ nd ) advancing th. borne by the Ll group CdU\\:

an) a(1\ancc T'hc CL1SS

sornc kind or ILl \\ 0 r g (1 \ \.' ITl

vid u;l! n« .r..l: gro Llp no 1'111:-' )

can 1Jt' difTil'\.! kind of gruup cacl: 111l'1l1bcr SOCIa! puru..ln all When grn a larger 11111111

-rhll~ r~tdl

xma11 g.n)Llps. al« ay-. l'hc ~I

glll~l! /\] ()~le(

TIl 0 S t I~ \.. )J) 1hl

born hers \\ l'rL

III .1\1 ()acd~\

Radicaliz::ltiu

/\s I nJ ll'(l ll'd 1

Indl\'iduab ~lt

~b cOll\eYLd r

1

Mcrhanistn, (JI R(I(li('LII!~(I[il)11 4ji

j C0111 mu- BccaLlseterrU rl;) 1s arc t'e\\ 111 rc1atIC) n to all tho Sl' \\.11 u ~ hd ret hell' bel iefs and in beheis, feel.nus. the terronsts ma , be thought of as the apc.. of ~I pvr.unid )..+ 'The base of p VIolence the pvrunud is COll1 posed of ttlI \\'110 sym pa tl:IlC \\'itIt the gu~l!~ the terrorist; say ? How do t hC) (Ire fightin g Io1'. InN 0 rthe rn Ire 1and. 1'0 r Ins tan cc. the hl.I~ cur t hc IIYra n11 d 0 f ) ~ upport for the IRA was all those who agreed .. Br:ts OLI t '. In the U.S .. the base -state pre­ of the pvr.umd of support Cor anu-govcrnrnent acuon I~ the flIrt) percent or ) interstate Amcrtca ns who agree that "The federal governmen t has become xo large and r 11,200 L powerful that It poses an immediate threat to the rluhts and lrccdomx of ord.narv

.,j" ~ .;

icalization cu izcns.

Similarlv, ~. 1'0111 base to apex. lughcr levels or the pyr.nrud arc assocIated wu h decreased vork," b:lt number- but increased radicahzauon or beliefs, feellng:~. and beha , II.' r"-l Thus one ps. In Lhb \\'a) o f t hInk 1ngab0 U t rad 1ca 117a tI U 11 I~ t 11 atit b thl' g l' ad 1Cnt th ~ ltd 1St 111 gu1she s increasmg 1crrun~t~ from then base or sympatlu/crx. How do mdrv idua ls mov c Irorn the base however. to the extremes of tcrronst violence at the apex'?

Radicalization in G'roups

lconomr-t-, and political scicntist« uSing a ra tiona l-chouc lr.unc« or k arc fond 01

pU I11 tI ngUll t t11 at ind IVId uab sho uld be reluctel nttl) L' U n1n11 t re ~ 11 rl':--'0 II rceS 0 f trmc ,

n10ncy. a 11d risk -ta kin g to advancC thC c (I usc 0 r ~ I LIrgl' gr0 LlP T hl' bc 11 Cfi1S 0 f nt distinc­

"lhancing the group are available 10 all group member». \\ hcrcu : the costs arc ns among borne h) the acti \ IstS. Th us the rutiona 1 choice for (111 uid I\ lei uul \\ ho cares abo U1 that is of

a group cause 1~ tl) do nothing. let other individuals P~l~ thl' l'llsl"-l. (lIH1 ncuefit froll1 e, money. till) advance for the group as (I Ircc-ridcr.!" d cause is

'The' cL.iSSIC answer to the pro blern of n10bIlI71 ng ind I\'Id u.:b 1'1.) r ~()CI~d action I" ly equally

some kind of coercion. that is. punishment for frcc-ridlng. ('~k't-l'](111 nl~l) C0I11e fn)111king, and

la« or gu\crn111enl regulation (if Iree-rrdcr-, l'(111 be dl"l'L1r(ltl~l) Ilk'[l1iIICdL from l11dI­\ Id ua1 Ino rali 1) (111 tern a I nor111S). 0 r IrU1u inCo r111 (tl r~ IL'l' - tu-LIl'i..' "-I (Inc't io n~ (sn1~ III

haviorally gruup norms). Particularly 111 a sma ll grlHIl'. pt'r~Ji.)}l(tl I1lura]il) dIHl group l1orn1~

:ial 111ove­ can be d i1'ficult to Scpa rat e ~ bec a II ~ c ind i \ id II (I] Jnn r:tIit~ i ~ us Ll (Ill) anl~ hu rcd 111 son 1C nles" that

kind of group COllsensus. And in ,I ~lnall LIce-to-Ltc\..' ~l'l)UP \\ Iil"Il' l~dl'h 111c111ber and tivists. for each n1cn1ber·s behavior i~ knO\\1l to 01hl'r~. SOCI~tl rl'\\ard~ for partll'lpatIun and lization of

SOCIal puni:--,hn1cnts for fret'-riding Ct111 n1ake hch:t\ ior~tl CUJnnlltnJl'nt ra110nal aner , situation

all. \Vhcn g.roups can be linked through conln10n JllC1l1blT"-I or l\Jlll111l1n lcaJer~ Intl)1ave been

(- I Ia r gt' r n1lilt1- gr 0 up 0 r g a 111 za t i0 11. SOCi(tI ,lCt I 0 11 bee 0 1'nCs 11II ,,~ I bk' U 11 a 1a r g cl' SC(11 c . III help us -rh Ll~ radie (l 11 L a 11 0 11 and te ITl)r is111 arc 111 d de pl)~ sihL: h ~ bri 11 g111 ~ III d 1\ 1d II abin t0 of extinc­

sIn a11 g r I.HI P~, Son1etiIII est 11esc g rOllp ~ ;II\' 1I n kl'd 1n1() a LIrgL' r u r~ dIll/ d11011. b II t 11 ()1

dh\'dYS. -rhL' sl11all gn)llp is ncceSS:ll") rlH' dl'tlun. hut 1hl' l)rt2:1111/<llil)/1 IS J1l)t fhe 01'1­~r feelIngs gin a1 l\ I Qacda \\ asan 0 rga 11 1Z(I t ion 0 f g rn Ll Jl~' 0 I" l'l'11:--, . b1I ttl)cLI~ th\_' f) r 0 up,",> a rl' -e sadness

n1()~ 11 Y 011 thel r ()\\ nand disco 11nect cd fro In (l n) L~ rgl'r ()rgal11/~ltll)11 l'he 1\/1 ad nd :ess. 1110rc h01l1 bel'S \\'l're ~I pparell tly 1110 rc a sc Ir-·o rgd 111/1 ng ~ll1d II f2ru uI' 1ha 11 ([ l,:e 11 c 111 hed ded

111 Al ()aclLIvvhat hap­1t ifica t ion :[s, if the

l~adicalization of Individuals., (;roups., and l\;las~es are about e founda­ i\S ll1(jlcated 111 the rrecelhllg diSCUSSIon. r(ldlC(llIz~111l)11 Cdl1 UCl'ur at different k'veb.

)US group I nd IVidua ls are r (I die ali zed by pel's 0 n (11 g rI l'V (1 nee S (I 11 ci b~, ]lll' 11 tit Y-p- n Hlp gn ev(InccS

as conveyed by nlass nlcdia, runlOL or the testI1l1()n~ l)r utheJ':1, 11ld1\ Idllal~ (lrl~ abl)

'Table 1. Pathways to violence: Mechanism, of political radicalization at individual. group, and mass-public level-

Level of radicalization

Indivrdua

Group

l\!Iass

Mechanism

1. Personal victimiza tion 2. Political grievance 3. Joining a radical gro up-ithc slippery slope 4. Joining a radical groupvthe power of love 5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups 6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 7. C 0 In petit ion for the same bas e 0 f support 8. Competition with state power--condensation 9. Within-group cornpctitionvIissioning

10. Jujitsu politics 11. Hate 12. Martyrdom

rudicahzed as mern bel'S uf small face-to-face groups Poliucal groups and ITIaSS publics are rudicahzed In confhct with states and with other political groups. Each or these levels requires Separate attention Table 1 identifies the twelve mechanisms Lit three levels that \VC wil] now describe.

I. Individual Radicalization by Personal Victimization

Tlux IS a path much CIted In explanations of suicide terrorists. Chechen BLJck Widows are described as seeking revenge against Russians for their own experience of rape or for the deaths of their menfolk. 17 Tamil Tigers of the suicide brigades called "Black Tigers" are often described as survivors of Sinhalese atrocities. Accounts of Palestinian suicide terrorists often CIte revenge for IDF attacks on neighbors or loved ones as a motive for self-sacrifice.

The importance of personal grievance as a motive for terrorism goes back a t least as far as R uss1a11 le 1'1'0 rists 0 f the 1ate 18OOs. Th us And rc1 Zh elyabo v, a lead er 0 f ter­rorist organization People's Will and a mastermind of a n urnber of political assassina­nons, including the coordinated bombs that killed Czar Alexander II, sought out terrorist activity in a pledge to revenge the many wrong» by the monarchist regime he experienced first hand. 10 The rape of his favori tc a un t by their landrnastcr. Ignored by local pohce: his dismissal from universi ty without righ t to reapply for participa ting In an innocent protest ag.unst arbitrary grading practices: and finally, a four-month j.ul sentence for sending a friendly note to an imprisoned friendv-thcsc grievances shaped and hardened Zhclyabovs resolve to usc violence against the ruling elite.

Data are hard to come hy on how many terrorists, or how many suicide terror­ist», have a personal hist ory of victimization that miuh t explain their sacrifice or course there may be individuals with such a history who nevertheless would not have moved to violence without seeing their victimization joined to the victimization of their ethnic or national group. That is, the percentage with a history of personal victimization is an upper bound of the power of a personal-revenge explanation. rather than a reliable cst imate of this power. J\ social psychological view would be

that pers is frame;

Sornenrn response example. cabin to feared a:

Ano 1999 aft: postman alone in

SiI1l1 people 11

2002. Ivl extort te Muham titled \VI

Cast individu the inch Ill e11 t---- <:1

with wh of Islam

Mo degree c

suffered al ty fur disorde: to recru radicals

An gncvan( Hale gr but lost In 2005 Lcfko» impo-s:

3. huliv

J\S Just dcnly u

Into a trust~d

asked t.

20. r =

Mechanisrns oj' Rudicalizatio.: 41c)

.lividual, that personal grievance IS unlikely to account for group sacrifice unless the personal b framed and interpreted as representative of group grievance.

2. Individual Radicalization by Political Grievance

S0111etlITIeS an individ ual IS moved to individ ual radical acuon and VIolence in slope response to political trends or events. Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber. is one

if love example Over eighteen years, Kaczynski emerged occasionally frOITI his wilderness cabin to send letter bombs to people representing the technological progress he

:i threa t feared and detested. rport Another example IS Buford Furrow, who turned himself In to police in August ensation 1999 after wounding five at a Jewish Community Center and later killing a Filipino

postman He seems to have been a devotee of white supremacist groups but acted alone In planning and carrying out these attacks.

Similarly. John Allen Muhammad, with his protege Lee Boyd rv1alvo, killed ten people in the Washmgton area in 47 days of sniper attacks in September and October 2002. MuhcUD 111 ad, a con vert to] sIamand black sepa rat iSIll. wasat tem p tmg to extort ten million dollars with \VhICh to found a pure black comrnunuy in Canada.:" Muhurrmad has not been forthcoming about his motivation. but It appears he Iden­

id mass tified WIth what he perceived to be the victimization of black people in the U.S. )s. Each Cases of individual radicalization to political violence, that is, cases in which the hanisms Individual acts alone rather than as part of a group, are relatively rare. In such cases.

the Individual is likely to have some association with a larger intellectual InOY'e­mcnt ---as Kaczynski related to a larger movement of survivalists. as FUITO\V associated with white supremacists, and as Muhammad participated for a penod in the Nat ion of Islam.

n Black 1\;1 0 re than inany 0 the r ca tego ry 0 f radicali zat ion. the re i saprob ability 0 f some penence degree of psychopathology. Psychiatric testimony at hIS trial indicted that Kaczynsk: »rigades suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The prosecution did not seek the death pen­roci ties. alty for Furrow because he had a history of inpatient hospital treatrnent for mental ack s on disorder. Groups of radicals. especially those who get as far as ter rorrsm. are unlikcl ,

to recruit or tolerate the unreliability that goes with psychopathology. Individualist at least radicals can be responding. at least in part, to their private demons.

or of ter­ An interesting example of the difficulty of separatIng personal and group sassma­ gnevance is Matt Hale, who in 1998 was the leader of a white supremacist group. .ght out I-fa1e graduated from law school, passed the bar exam. was hired by a lav firm.

regime but lost his job when the Illinois Bar dented his law license on the basis or racism ignored In 2005, Hale was sentenced to prison for soliciting the murder of federal Judge Joan cipating Lcfk ow 'The personal and political are so closely intertw.ncd In this case tha t It h

<month impossible to say what Hale would have done had he been granted hIS la\\ license evanccs elite. ~ terror­ 3. Individual Radicalization ill Joining a Radical Group- The L~"'lippery Slope

fice. or As Just noted, it IS rare that an individual moves from syrnpat luzcr to activist by sud­lot have denly undertaking some major risk or sacrifice. Typically an mdividuals progress rtion of Into a terrorist group is slow and gradual, with many smaller tests before being iersonal trusted in more important missions. and with many non-violent tasks before being mation, asked to use gun or bomb (for Red Army Faction and Basque El-A recruus, see note ould be 20. p. 237: for IRA recruits see note 21),

c j\·/c( 'uu/c'~ and S. Moskalenl:o

Of course there arc occasior:a. examples of an individual moving from sympathy to extreme violence In a single grant step. Wafa Idriss, the first female Palestinian suictdc bOI11beL seems to ha ve carried out her mission within two weeks of deciding to becon1casuiC1deb0 n1be r. A1tho ugh 1tis bey 0 nd 1he sc0 pe 0 f the prese nt paper to exanune tlus question systernaucally. we believe that example, of giant-step transi­tion to VIolence are notable precisely because they are relatively uncommon.

A VIVId example of gradual radicalization comes from Della Porta." who quotes an ltahan militant as follows: ..A choice [made] in cold blood, such as "now 1 will become a terrorist: [did] not exist It \\ias a step- by-step evoluuon, which passed through a kind of hUI11an relation that I had wit h Guido, and with the people I worked with.'

The power of step-by-step self-persuasion through one's own behavior is well studrcd In SOCIal psychology. Hundreds of experiments have shown a strong ten­dency for self-: usti fica uon after an individ ual does something stupid or sleazy. /\n iudividua. who IS sucked Into saymg a dull experiment is fun, or into writing .i n essay In favor of' a cause the mdivrdual disagrees with, is likely to find reasons t tJ ]ustif, the beha VIOl" the experiment wasn't half bad, keeping Communists 1'1'0111

spcakmg on campus IS a good idea. Dissonance theory:" understands this tendency JS an effort to reduct' the mconsrstency between positive self-Image and bad beha­\ lUI' In other words, It IS easter to find reasons for what we do than to do what we rind reason for.

Perhaps the rnust stnking example of the power of self-radicalizauon is found In one of the experimen tal varia uons in trod uced by Milgram" in his famous studies of obedience. In the baSIC paradigm. normal individuals who draw the role of teacher in ~l psychology experiment \\'111 give high levels of shock to a protesting "victim (actu­ally an accomplice of the experuncnter ) who drew the role of learner. Complete obe­drencc req uircs the teacher to r.usc the shock administered for rrustak es from 15 to .+50 volts in 15-volt incrcmcn ts. About 601~/1) of teachers are completely obedient.

Less well known is the varration in which it is not the experimenter who comes up with the idea of raising the shuck level with each mistake. In this va rratron. a "co­teacher" (another accomplice of the experimenter) asks and grades the questions, while the naive teacher gi\'t:s the shocks. The experimenter, summoned away for a "phone call.' IS no longer in the room when the "co-teacher" C0111es up wuh the idea of raising the shock level wnh each mistake. Despite the absence of the experimenter and hIS authorny. 201 or teachers progress to admimstering 450 volts. ; '1)

The dis son an ce exp Ia nat ion 0 f the 2O' I~) \vhog0 all the \N ay is t hat each shoc k becomes a reason to give the next shock. The closely graded shock levels represent iJ kind of slippery slope In which refusing to give the next shock requires recognizuig that there was sometlung wrong wnh giving the last shock. If 30n volts was ok. hov, can .~ 15 volts be wrong? But If ] 15 volts is wrong, how can 300 volts be right'?

In Milgrams studies, the dependent variable is radicalization In behavior, not In thoughts or feelings. The latter were not measured. and there is no way of kno\vJng whether increasing shock levels were assoc.aicd with changes in perception of and (1t1itude to \V a rd the victi111

In another famous study, LInlbardo25 was able to demonstrate radicahzauon In

behaVIor of one group of pclrticipant::; (playing roles of prison guards) to\vard another group (playIng the role of prisoners). PsychologIcally stable nlale student volunteers \verc ranclon1ly assigned to act as either a guard or a prisoner in a simu­lated prison enVIronlncnt. Left to their O\VI1 deVIces, over the course of Just a fev\ days. the guards gradudlly escalated their abuse (111 the form of hUIlliliation and

arbitrary pL to tcrmin.u.

As 111 f\ PrIson Exp\ ing trea trnc

to mak mg 1

suggestiv« r his increasi­to how 11'1 u fact that hi for thernscl

1~here 1

harms othc

In drssona n power of SI

shppery sin and JUS t ific

'ThIS is the I about terro uons wu h l

betr.iy the net \\ ork 01

'Trust I

but love ~)I

c.m he (IS ~i

about hh n (BR) mad.: neal siiu.u i for the pel

Gcrrn.: undcrgroui vr:... thu: "1l1{

1Il)n~ throu polillcal 11'

11 urnbel' 01

l)l'\ ~)l

togcl her j

BR and ll~

the \'otL' Ll l\ ftcr

grlHlp h 11

group (01

]}zrnlf) 11

lhell ~ruur

Cel U~l.'. \\'e r

I~ [ t' CIi, IJ1i.\1)1) o] RLI.li('{/ Ii~ ([ ti() n 4:.!1

01 sympathy arbu ra ry punishment) toward the pnsoners to the: degree that Zrmburdo was forced Palestinian to terminate t hc experiment

of deciding .As in Milgra ms experiment. tcchng« and bchcf-, were not measured durmg the ~nt paper to Prison Lxpcrirncnt. But there IS an obvious progressron toward I110rc' dchumaruz­-step tra nsi­ Ing tre.u mcnt of the prisoners. starung nom muk iug them do push-ups. moving on lTIOn. ton1a kin g the n1 eat fiIthy fo0 d. an cl end ing \\'Ith furc1ng the m to act 0 ut sex ua 11 J

10 quotes an suggestive plays In post-experiment interviews. one of the "guards" suggested that fill become a hIS increasingly cruel treatment of the "prisoners" \\'ClS the result or hIS curtosity as

19ha kind of to how much the "prisoners" would let him get (1\\ ~l) \\ .th I-ur thl~ guard. the 1. " fact that he \\'cn t too fa r 1Sthe fa uItof the ' .pn son er~ ,. \vhod Id not stand up

rvior is well for themse Ivcs.

strong teo­ There IS then a pattern of slowly mcreasmg radical behavior behavior that 1 or sleazy. harms others-- In both the Milgranl experiments and Zrmbardos prison experiment. into writing In dissonance experiments and in Zimbardos poxt-cx pcrrrncnta. inquirv. \Ve ~ee the

'ind reasons power 0 l self-persuasion In j ustilying one's own beha \- ior Sell-rad ica li7ation IS a

urns ts from slippery slope or increasmgly extreme behaviors. wuh mcrcasmul , extreme reasons lis tendency and Jlist ifica nons icing the slope.

i bad bcha­do what \VC

4. Individual Radicalization in Joining a Radical (;r(}lIp-~1'11(: Power of'Love t is found In IS studies of ThIS b the path to radicahzation that has received most ,lttCIlthJIl In rcccn t .hcorizing if teacher in about tcrrorism.r" Individuals are recruited to a tc rrorrst group \ lei personal connec­

.tim (actu­ nons with existint; terrorists. No terrorist wants to try to recruit someone who might

mplete obe- betray the terrorists to the authorities. In pracucc. tln- means rcciuiuns; lr om the

from 15 to network of friends. lovers, and family.

.ibedicm Trust may dcterrnmc the network wu hm which radicals and terrOrIsts recrun.

who comes but love often detcrmrncs who will JOIn. The pull or rornauuc and comrudcl , lovl'

tion, a "co­ can be ass trongas pol itic~ in m0 vingindivIdLlaIs nit 0 an II ndel'gro Llnd grou p .4sked

~ questions. abo ut his III 0 t ivat ion s fo r go ing un derg r0 un d. a mCIII bl'r 0 f the Ituh a n 13 n gat c !Z 0 sse

away for a (BR) made t lus reply: "There are many thIngs I cannot cxpl.un by al1~tlyzlng the polr­lith the idea tical situation, .. as far a~ I am concerned it \VC:lS up to cmouon.il feelinE!-~. of p(l~sions

xperimenter for the people I shared my life wuh. ,-27

German militants of the Red Ann) Fracuon (H./\F) \\LTl' abl) dra\\ 11 111l() the

each shock underground by devotion to friends. "There IS \VldcSI,rc,ld agret-rllcllt among rc-carch­

Is represen t ers that 'most terrorists .. ulumately became members of [German] tcrror rst org.uuza­

recognIzIng tIons through personal connectlons \vith people or rl'ILltl\'l's LlSS()CI~lt~d \\'lth ctppn,priate ~,7as ole ho\v politIcal initIativcs. con1nlunes, self-supportIng org:lnIL;ltioll~,. or CUl11111iUces the

~ fIght? IlllI11ber of cuupk'~ and brothers alld sIsters \V(IS astonlshlngl) hIgh .. _~~ ..~'l

Lvior. not in DevotIon to conlrades can lead a clIque 01' rrIl'lld~ to Join ;\ tl~ITl)n~t group

of knov\'Ing toget her f\ccordlng to della Porta,J() "block rccrLlltln\~I)t" uccurred but 11 ror the

tlon of and SR. and the RAF. Sonletlnles a sn1all poli tIcal groll p \-\ lHIlLi hold :l lllectlng and If the v0 tc fav0 red j 0 i11i 11 g th(' un de l' gr0 It nd. a II \\'0 U Id J()111 tl'get hl' r

:alization in /\rtcr an Individual joins a radical grOllI'. 10\ e l'or frIeIllb and cornradcs 111 the

'ds) toward group is likely to increase further a~ conlnl0ll ~u;lls and l'0111111011 threat~ Illcrease

tale student group cohesion·~l (sec also Section 6 C;,.OllP R{/di('(/Ii~{[!l(}Jl under !SU!O!lOll ond

r In a Slmu­ ]'!?rcof). Intervie\\'s \vilh 30 long-terlll n1clnber~ or SlllIl I'elll led \Vhlte to cOllclLldc~~-""

Cjust a fe\v that group solidarity, along \vith hope of nlaking d difference i"lH' the group and Its

,liation and cau se, vve ret he l\v 0 st I'0 ngest fo rccs hoIdIn g n1IIiLlnt" togcthe r III the faceora rrest~

,r 1 ., 1 __ ...... /\fl'( (U{,'<l anti S, A/oskulcllko

d nd Loyal istat tuc k~ , T hu~ de v0 u 0 n to COm rades 1S not 0 n1y a fo rCe for J01 ning a ru.hcul group, It h equ~tlly or more Ll barncr to leaving the group,

vVhilt"-'" quotes one Rcpubhc.u: Lb follows. "Thcrcs times I've said to mysclt. 'Why? You're mad In the head, like,' But I Just can't turn my back on it ... there's too many ol my friends In j.ul. thcrcs too nlany of n1Y mates giver: their lives. and I've walked behind lvc walkc.i bclund too m.iny funerals to turn my back on it now,"

5. Group Radicalization ill Like-Minded C;roups

I here 1~ a 11 experur.cn utl mode1 of gro II p rad rcaliza non tha t has been referred to \ dnou~IJ as "risk . ~hlrt." ·'gJ"l.)UP extremity sluft.' or "group polarization," Groups ot strLlnger~ brought tugether to dISCUSS issues of risk taking or political opinion ~h()\\ cou-rsteru l. t\\'() or change: Increased agreement about the opinion atk irids

l~~lle. dnd (l ~hll'l In the average opinion or group members. The shift is toward 1l1lTelt~Cd ext 1''-'11111) on \VhICh('\ er side of the opinion is favored by I110St individ uals hc'fore dl~CllS~Iun ~-+ If m.» t md 1\'ld ua ls favor risk before discussion, the sh: It IS ll)\\ard increased rhk takIng. If 111l)St individuals oppose American foreign .ud before .hscus-non. the ~hI!'t b to\\ .ud increased opposition to foreign aid,

'The xhilt IS not ju-t Ll m.nter or go-along-to-get-along compliance: each group J nc" 111he r g1\ e~ hl)t 11 pre -ell~ l' U~ ~ 1l. )nand poSt-d1~c ussion 0 pin 1011 0 n a questiun 11a: rt'

that only the researcher scc-. Thus drscussion among individuals with similar values produces nucrnuhzco shrft toward more extreme opinions.

There arc current l, t\VO cxpla nauons or group extremity shift.3~ According to rclivunt orguJllellr\ thcor, , ~l cult ura lly determined pool of arguments favors one SIde of the Issue 1110rC than t hc other SIde. An individual samples from this pool In asses­~lng: lu-: or her mdrvidua l opmron. then in discussion hears new arguments 1'1'0111

others, \Vh1c11, COInIng Irorn the sanle pool, are mostly in the same di rection ~l s the indr, idual \\ as lcanlng The result IS that individuals are rationally persuaded by the imbalance or 11('\\ argun1ents heard In dISCUSSIon.

Accordmg to soc/of comparison theorv, opmion positions have SOCIal vulucs ~ t t tachcd tot hen 1 A 11 1nd I vid Lld 1~ feeI pressurc to \\'urd ag.reC1nen 1. 1hat is, pressurl' tn nlove their opillil)n~ to\\ard the I11ean opinion of the group. But the pressure is 11l)t un1Corn1 Inellv1d uab Inure cx t rCllle than average in the group-fa \'ored elircc­tle)n ·the ell rect Iun Ll\ ureJ by nlo~t ind1vld uals before discussion ----are 111Ure adrn1rcd -,() -rhey Llr~ ~cell a~ 111or~ devoted to the group, lllore able--in sunl, as better people. 'Thl~ C:\tLt statlls trLlnsLltc~ 11110 11lorc Influence and less change during group dISCUSSIon, \\'herCds Il1dl\lduLtls less extren1e than average In the gruup-favored dirc'c­tlon h(l\'l' less Intlul'11cL' ~lIHl chdngl' 1nOiT. No one \\'ants to be belo\\'<tverage III ~up­1'1l.)rt l)l' the grollp-Ll\'OreL! opInion, and the result I~ that the average opInIon hl'CC)nll'S Inore e.\tre111l' III the group-favored direction.

f\ \ivHJ d('~l:nptll.lJl ()j the pl)\VCr of SOCIal conlparison In rad}(:alI/ln~ the \Veather L1ndcrgruund, d ll.S Llntl-\\,ar group of the 1970s. is provided by ('ollier (\: Hor~)\vitL." \ViLhll1-group con1pctitlon for the status of being "1110st radIcal" 1l10\'cd the group to tc'rrUrISJl1 ~rhe hLdlnlark of this kind of radicaliL'ation l~ the cxtent to \VhI(h the pcrsona} beconlcs politiCIzed' every act is judged by political ~tandards. Including \vho ~leeps \vlth 'vvhon1

Both relevant argunll'l1t~ and sOl'lal conlparisol1 explanatIons are necessary to explaIn the pattern or expcrln1ental re~11lts,3o In support of relevant argunlcnts. resL'arch sho\\':-\ that 111an1pulatll1g drgurnents \vithout kno\vledge of posltioll~ can

change the S'

research sho. argumen t S C(1

rather than r, in a group of

6. Group Rau

The mode! f( small cornba t in the same 1 whose mernb on one anot

produces ext] closer than 1 sacri ficed the nade to save

Very hIg merit of gr oi:

of attraction reality create mern bership. security. Le~

tions of vali good and \\ 1 mean that l L

come frorn (\ 'Thus hl t

for mter nali. pull togethcl ancc - go-all the social re value. incl LIe

Groups group IS \ve, standards ()!

n1el1l bers art pen\ erful fell refonll or hI \vorld has c( the socla1 rc: and nlOraIi t reqUIre \-loh

Th IS JOl tar) traillin~

states. One 1 gro up goes 1

side threat 1

423

yself, '\Vh1") ·'s too many I've walked

referred to

n." Groups cal opinion

opinion at

t is toward individual­the shrft b

1 aid before

each gruup

restionna: rc nilar values

2cording to )rs one side )01 in asses-­nents from .tion as the rsuaded by

iciai val uc-: IS, pressure pressure IS

ored direc­-are nlore

11, as better inng group iored direc­"age in s.ip­ge opInIon

alizing the by Colhcr

1st radical" 1110n is the oy poliuca 1

ecessary to arguments. srtions CCll1

!v!echanisms (~( Radicalr:a tion

changethc s1Ze and d1rectIon 0 f the gr0 upshift. Ins upp0 rt 0 f soc 1a1 co 111 parison. research shows that knowledge of others opinions without knowledge of others' argurncnts can yet produce group shift. 'The two explanations are complcmentarv rather than redundant. Both conduce to increased similarity and increased extremity In (t group of like-minded individ uals.

6. Group Radicalization Linder Isolation and Threat

.ihc model for this kind of radicalization is the powerful cohesion that develops in small combat groups. Soldiers In combat are largely cut off from all but their buddies In the sa me platoon or squad. This Isolation is characteristic also of terrorist cells. whose members can trust only one another. As both soldiers and terrorists depend on one another for their lives In fighting the enemy. extreme Interdependence prod uces extreme group cohesion. This is a cohesion that can make group members closer than brothers. Recipients of the U.S. Medal of Honor Include 111(111y who sacrificed themselves to save others: some literally threw themselves 011 top of a gre­nade to sa ve their buddies. ~C)

Very high levels of cohesion in a group mean very strong pressures for agree­ment of group members. Group dynamics theory disunguishes between t\VO sources of attraction to a group: the value of 111 atenal group goals and the value of the social reality created by the group. Material goals include the obvious rewards of group membership. such as progress toward common goals, congeniality. status. and security. Less obvious is the social reality value of the group: there are many ques­tions of value for which the only source of certainty is group consensus. What is good and what is evil? What is worth work mg for. worth dying for'? What does It

mean that I am going to die'? Certainty about these crucial h U111an questions can only come from agreement with others.

Thus high cohesion bnngs high pressures for both behavioral cornph.mce and for Internalized value consensus. It is obvious to group members that they have to pull together in order to reach group goals, and the result In many cases is compli­ance-> go-along-to-get-along agreement that does not bring in terior certainty. But the social reality value of the group depends on internalizing group standards of val Il C, including 1110ral standards.

Groups differ in their power to set moral standards, The sociai reality value of a group is weak to the extent that members belong to other groups wit h competing standards of value. Conversely, the social reality val uc of a group is strong when members are cut off from other groups. ThIS principle IS the foundation of man, powerful forms of group-focused persuasion, including cult rccruu mg and thought reform or brainwashing. When cohesion is very high. as when an mdividuals social world has contracted to just the few friends In his combat group or his terrorist cell. the social reality value of the group is maximized. The group's consensus about val ue and morality acquires enormous power, including the power to Justify and even require violence against those who threaten the group.

This joining of cause and comrades In a high cohesion group IS the goal of nlI1I­tary training in every state, and is equally the foundauon of terrorist violence against states. One practical implication IS that something important happens when a radical group goes underground as a terrorist group, The combination of isolation and out­side threat makes group dynamics immediately more powerful In the underground

cell than In the radical group that preceded It. 'The power of relevant arguments and social cornpanson IS rnultipher! In an underground group.

7. Group Radicalirution ill Competition for the I.Sal11e Base 0.( Support

Groups In cornpetiuon for the same base of sympatluzers can, like individuals. gain status by more radical action 111 support of the cause:+o Analysts have suggested that the] 979 assassin.uion of Lord Mountbattcn by the Irish Republican Army in 1979 was an effort to compete wi th escalated attacks by the Irish N ational Liberauon Arrnv. and that the 1985 hijacking of both a ~rw A plane and the luxury liner Achille Lauro 'vvere attempts by Palestinian terrorists to gain advantage over rival groups.-+] 'Today It IS common to see more than one group claiming credit for a particular terrorist attack, even for a particular suicide terrorist attack.":'

Radrcahzation by competition is particularly clear in the case of the Arrncruan Secret Army for the LIberation of Armenia. ASALl\ first gained diaspora support by attacking Turks a t a tune when main-line Armenian organizations were only talk­Ing about rctribuuon for the Turkish genocide of Armenians. One of the older organizations (Tashriaks) responded to the new competition by establislunp Its own anu-Turk ish terrorist group. the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide .c+.~ Sirmlarlv. the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palcstme was forced to take up suicide terrorism despite its materialist Marxist logic when PFLP began to seem rrrclcvan t in the second intifada.-+-+

It is possible for a group to become too radical and lose its base of support. The line between higher status from more radicalization and lower status frorr: too much radicalization is fine and variable over time. That it IS possible to go over the lme is mdrcatcd by examples when the IR.A expanded us targets beyond what 11s republican sympat lnzers would accept: on such occasions the IRA would apologize and narrow ItS target range. a t least for a period of tinle.-+';;

Similarly, Pa lestinian su icidc ter rorisrn attacks against Israel slowed drama ti­

cally in the period after the Oslo Accords. I-lope of a peace agreement was asso­crated with decreased support for terrorism. as reported III polling of Palcstinrans. When the promise of the Oslo Accords was lost and the second Inti­fada began, polls showed support for terrorism rising to new highs even as the number of terrorrst attacks rose to new highs. It appears that in many cases terror­ism Increases with popular support for terrorism. but can decline if popular sup­port for terrorism declines. 1\11 too often, however. more radical action brings more stat us and more support to a grou p competing wi: h ot her groups to repre­scnt the sa me ca use.

An often-overlooked aspect of competiuon for a base of support b VIolence agamst competitors. About one quarter of the kilung in Northern Ireland \V~lS

Catholics kilhng Catholics and Protestants killtng Protestatlts.-+ cJ Both srdes killed suspected informers or individuals resisting the discipline militants sought to impose 'The IR. A in pa rtic u1a I' a tt aekedand killed thosc ignor ing IRA stn c t ures aga i11St sc11­ing drugs.

An extreme exam pIe of ingroup VIolence is the Tamil 'Tigers, who. In their rise to power, killed 1110re Tamils than Sinhalesco-+7 The L~rTE early wiped out compet.ng Tamil militant groups, and continued in 2006 killing individual l-eUl1I1 cntics and 'Tamil political opponents. An example that permeated the Western press was the

Ju1) 29, l0( the 1-'a1111 \ l [Jr. 1-1 ruche

From a threat [rom pressures Io pomt of vn after some I

our sacrific 'vVh1ch VIoII 1ngroup enl

8. Group J?

'ThIS form isis." ,A gr to make a 1

disobedicn of police 1

CIvil or hu rcprcssion dynaillic I'

uctivists. 1

or el1\ sit-In m. costs a~ t(

f11ltnlcnt ; are not \\1

vanc\..' :l rl'

and nOI\­

pu lice'. \\ to face 1

Sf1t'-Sl' leeI

den~ed ii rrh\~

her re~l'{\

in Germ nl()\'cnlC

111 (1erll1,

the Stud 'Vlctn:lll1

Rae1

bel \\ ccn uon tn kIlled In 'rile rcu \ III \CI1L'l

l)c1

M echanisms of Radicali:a tion 425

ments and July 29. 1999, suicide-bomb killing of Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam As a leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front and a Member of the Sri Lankan Parliament, Dr. Tiruchclvam was a leading critic of human rights abuses by the LTTE.

From a group dynamics point of view, threat from ingroup competitors is like threat from an outgroup enemy in producing high cohesion, with resulting high pressures for conformity and strong sanctions against deviates, From an individual

inals, gam point of view, when my friends and I are risking all for the cause, and especially ~ested that after some of our friends have died for this cause, no one can be allowed to betray iy in 1979 our sacrifice. The competition for in group support is a competition for survival, in jberation which violence against an outgroup enemy is often joined with violence against .er Achille

. . mgroup enermes.

groups,-tl

particular 8. Group Radicalization in Competition with State Power-s-Condensation

Armenian This form of radicalization has been a focus of research by social movement theor­a support ists.-t8 A group with weak and diffuse popular support attains sufficient organization only talk­ to make a public display: a rally ~ a protest march, a sit-in, or some other form of civil the older disobedience. The power of the state is exerted to quash the group, often in the form ishing its of police response that may include indiscriminate violence or S0111e abrogation of Armenian civil or human rights. The result is an increase in sympathy for the victims of state stine was repression and some mobilization of the group's sympathizers toward action. (This len PFLP dynamic is considered later in relation to mass radicalization.) For social movement

activists, however, there is another dynamic at work, a dynamic or condensation. port. The Of all those who take the first radical action--joining an illegal rally or march or too much sit-in-s-most are likely to respond to repression by giving up action. They see the the line is costs as too high to continue. Others will not be deterred and will increase their corn­

.publican mitrnent and escalate their action against the state. The determinants of this choice d narrow are not well studied, but probably those who bring a moral frame and personal grie­

vance are less easily deterred. In any case, the result of the interaction between state drarnati­ and non-state group is often a mutual escalation of violence between group and

vas asso­ police, with further peeling off of individuals whose radicalization is not sufficient >lling of to face increasing state pressure. The conclusion of this cycle of escalation and ond inti­ self-selection is likely to be that a tiny fraction of the original protest group has con­.n as the densed into a highly radicalized group that goes underground as a terrorist cell. ~s terror­ This cycle of reaction and counter-reaction has been described by della Porta in ular sup­ her research on the origins of the Brigate Rossa in Italy and the Red Anny Faction n brings in Germany." The Red Brigades condensed out of 1960s leftist student protest to repre­ movements in Italy; the RAF condensed out of similar leftist student protest groups

in Germany. Sprinzak" has described a similar trajectory by which a tiny fraction of violence the Students for a Democratic Society ~ who began with protest against the war in

and was Vietnam, condensed into the Weather Underground.

.es killed Radicalization by condensation depends upon the strength of the affective tICS

) impose. between individuals, in particular ties to individuals who suffer from the state reac­

iinst sell­ tion to radical challenge. Comrades imprisoned cannot be abandoned: comrades killed in police shootouts or in prison are martyrs whose deaths demand a response.

.ir rise to The reaction in many eases is increased commitment to violence to pay back state

.mpeting itics and

violence. Della Porta5l offers a number of examples of individuals for whom the death or

was the imprisonment of a comrade was the instigation for joining a terrorist underground.

-126 c. AJcCou/(!y and S. Moskalcnko

Auger and revenge are no doubt important in this kind of reaction, but a kind of "survival guilt" may also contribute. Those alive and free feel guilty that a better man or woman is dead or in prison. Research toward understanding survival guilt has only recently begun.i ' and may playa part in understanding the political power of martyrdom.

This power is evident in an example offered by della Portar" "For example, Volker Speitel, one of the militants who worked in political groups that supported the RAF militants in prison, described how the death of Meins (by hunger strike) pushed him to the final step of joining the underground: 'Then the day carne when Holger Meins died ... For us this death was a key experience ... The death of Holger Meins and the decision to take arms were one and the same thing. Reflection was not possible anymore."

9. Group Radicalization ill Within-Group Competition-s-Fissioning

The within-group competition for status represented in social comparison theory can produce intense conflict. The downside of conflating the personal and the political is that differences of political opinion can lead to personal animosities-and vice versa.:" Some observers ha ve suggested that only common action against the state or another group can save a terrorist group from tearing itself apart.i"

Systematic data are lacking, but examples suggest that intra-group conflict leads often to splitting or fissioning of a terrorist group into multiple groups. The IRA pro­vides an obvious example, with many competing factions---Official IRA, Provisional IRA, Real fRA, Continuity IRA, fNLA--who sometimes targeted one another. Simi­larlya split within ASA LA was the occasion of killing between former comrades. 56

Intra-group competition can go beyond killing. A threat from members of our own group is likely to produce a feeling of contamination that requires not just death but torture and obliteration. Such was the fate, evidently, of 14 members of the Japa­nese United Red Army who in 1972 were found dead and dismembered in a group hideout.:"

From a group dynamics perspective, the tendency toward fissioning in radical groups should not be surprising. As already noted, cohesion leads to pressures for agreement within the group. When, as in an already radical group, perception of external threat produces very high cohesion, the pressure for agreement is very strong. An individual will seldom be able to resist the pressure of a unanimous majority, but a minority of two or 1110re individuals may be able to resist.i" When the pressure for agreement is very strong, the minority is likely to be expelled from the group---or obliterated.

Jo. AJass Radicalization ill Conflict with all Outgroup-r-Jujitsu Politics

This form of radicalization can be understood as a generalization of the group dynamics theory already described. In small face-to-face groups, outgroup threat leads reliably to increased group cohesion, increased respect for ingroup leaders, increased sanctions for ingroup deviates, and idealization of ingroup norms.i" In lar­ger groups, reference to cohesion is often replaced with reference to ingroup identi­fication, patriotism, or nationalism, but the pattern in response to outgroup threat is similar to that seen in sl11a11 groups. Consider the results of the 9/11 attacks on U.S.

politics.i" in increased su increased sa suggesting t ("they hate

Mass 1''­egy. Some t beyond the lized to ac beyond wh: using the el

Dr. Ay Under the 1 opined, An from behin countries, 1 Taliban \\:~

had expect support fo

J1. Mass J

It is often longed V10

'This tcnde DehllmanJ abstract ly. as follo~'s

are not hi Dehll

about hal! the war \' cohesion ( the Japan were even the war y\

Smnl.

the Germ London ~

Apparent puni tivc perhaps l

A lu: hatred S anger~ fc negativ"C a bad es~

many en

a kind of It a better vival guilt cal power

example, supported ~er strike) une when of Holger n was not

leory can . political -and vice the state

lict leads [RA pro­ovisional ter. Simi­ades.i" rs of our rst death he Japa­a group

1 radical lures for ption of

IS very mimous )8 When

ed from

~ group ) threat leaders~

) In lar-

I identi ­hreat is JD U.S.

NIechanisms of Radicalization 4 J 1 - I

politicsr'" increased patriotism visible in rallies, flags, banners, and bumper stickers; increased support for the president and for every agent and agency of government; increased sanctions for Americans challenging the consensus (Bill Maher sacked for suggesting the 9/11 attackers were not cowards); and reification of American values C"they hate us for our values").

Mass radicalization by external attack is so reliable that it can be used as a strat ­egy. Some terrorists have explicitly sought to elicit a state response that will carry far beyond the terrorists to strike terrorist sympathizers who have not yet been mobi­lized to action.v' The predictable result is to mobilize terrorist sympathizers far beyond what the terrorists can accomplish alone. We call this strategy jujitsu politics: using the enemy's strength against him. 62

Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri enunciated this strategy in his political memoir Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet. 63 If the shrapnel of war reach American homes, he opined, Americans will either give up their aims in Muslim countries or will come out from behind their Muslim stooges to seek revenge. If Americans move into Muslim countries, he predicted, the result will be jihad. Although the U.S. war against the Taliban was faster and cleaner of collateral damage to civilians than Al Qaeda had expected, the U.S. move into Iraq has indeed been associated with increasing support for radical Islam in Muslim countries.

II. Mass Radicalization in Conflict with all Outgroup-s-Hate

I t is often observed that groups in conflict, especially if the conflict involves pro­longed violence, become more extreme in their negative perceptions of one another. This tendency can become so extreme that the enemy is no longer seen as human.I'" Dehumanization is signaled by referring to targets as "pigs," "dogs," or, more

I

Iabstractly, "wheels" in the enemy machine. Della Porta'" quotes an Italian militant as follows: '" ... enemies are in a category, they are functions, they are symbols. They

I

I

are not human beings." I

Dehumanization can occur in interstate conflict as well. In WWII, for instance. I

I

Iabout half of American soldiers favored wiping out the whole Japanese nation once Ithe war was won. This radical opinion did not depend on membership in a high

cohesion combat group, nor did it depend on experience of losses in combat against I

I

Ithe Japanese. Indeed soldiers in training in the U.S., who had never been in combat, were even more likely than combat soldiers to favor exterminating the Japanese after

I

66 I

Ithe war was won. ISimilarly it has been observed that residents of English cities never born bed by I

the Germans during WWII were more bloody-minded and vengeful than residents of I

ILondon and other cities of southern England that felt the full fury of the Blitz.67

Apparently group identification in the context of group conflict can lead to radically I

I

Ipunitive attitudes even in the absence of personal victimization by the enemy­I

perhaps especially in the absence of personal victimization. I

A high level of categorical hostility toward another group is often described as I

Ihatred. Some theorists believe that hate is an emotion, perhaps a combination of anger, fear, and conternpt.i'" A more recent view is that hate is an extreme form of

I

I

Inegative identification that includes the idea that members of the enemy group share a bad essencc.i" In this view hate is not an emotion but the occasion of experiencing

I

I

Imany emotions, depending on what happens to the hated target. As above, positive I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

428 C. Mcc.auley and S. Moskalenko

emotions are occasioned when bad things happen to the hated group, and negative emotions are occasioned when good things happen to the hated group.

The idea that the enemy shares a bad essence can make sense of the impulse to attack all of them, without regard for age, gender, or civilian status. A group's essence is the hidden something shared by group members that gives them their tendency toward shared group characteristics.i" A group's essence is understood to be stable over historical time and immutable for the individual group member. If the essence is bad, there is nothing to be done--negotiation and education can no more make a difference than negotiation or education can make a difference in the essence of a tiger. If tigers threaten us and hurt us, all tigers are targets-old, young, in uniform or out of uniform.

/2. Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Outgroup-v-Martyrdom

The root meaning of rnartyr is witness, and there is something particularly powerful about a form of witnessing that takes the life of the witness. One way to think about the issue is to consider the psychology of persuasion, in which a credible source com­bines expertise and trustworthiness." A martyr is trustworthy insofar as it is difficult to see how an individual giving up life for a cause could be lying for some personal Interest or advantage. This leaves the question of expertise, and the social construc­tion of a martyrdom has to rule out the possibility that the martyr is "crazy" or otherwise unable to choose death freely.72 It follows that higher status martyrs make better witnesses: better educated, more successful individuals, with more life choices available, are seen as knowing better what they are doing when they give their lives for a cause.

Radical groups try to keep salient the memory of their martyrs. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam yearly celebrate three days of Martyrs' Day activities, includ­mg honoring the parents of dead heroes. Palestinians killed by Israel are remembered with portraits, graffiti, shrines, and rallies such as are often held in Martyr's Square in Gaza. Palestinian web sites offer videos made by suicide terrorists before their attacks.

As noted earlier in relation to Holger Meins's death by hunger strike, there is reason to believe that the political impact of martyrdom can be significant. Mahatma Gandhi's hunger strike against British rule in India is probably the most famous example, although this was not a fast to the death. Perhaps the strongest example is recounted in Ten Men Dead,73 the history of IRA and INLA prisoners who died on a hunger strike to protest British efforts to treat political prisoners as common criminals. The men died over a period of 73 days. Several hunger strikers were elected to the Irish or British parliaments, and many observers believe that the hun­ger strikes resuscitated a moribund Provisional IRA.

The social construction of martyrdom is under-theorized (but see note 74), and empirically under-developed, but the impact of martyrdom on mass audiences deserves close attention.

Radicalization as Opposition Politics

We began with a conceptualization of political radicalization as change in beliefs, feelings, and action toward support and sacrifice for intergroup conflict. We noted that these aspects of radicalization are only moderately correlated, and suggested

the value of we undcrto. mass levels.

We do r ones. No do radicaliza tic mutual relat here in rela understandi tions for im

Nor do discussed h. influences t

framework anyone of for a single aware, mul neither suff we suggest groups to r

This vi social mobi ways to e; S0111e indi. involvemer aries) and, another (1\

past in joir experience ment in an them to je politics.

Simila multi-Iacu tories." K 1

terrorists tion and ir personal 0

blems. 1~h,

and the de of pathvv'a

This '''Beconlll1 pIex in th. bear on a with terre

Still, 1

identified vidual rae;

I

429 Mechanisms of Radicalization

rnd negative

e impulse to . A group's ; them their understood

up member. ucation can jifference in argets----old,

'Iy powerful think about .ource corn­t is difficult ne personal 11 construc­"crazy" or irtyrs make life choices ~ their lives

Liberation ies, includ­.membercd vr 's Sq uare lefore their

ce, there is Mahatma

ist famous st example ; who died s common ikers were It the hun­

e 74), and audiences

in beliefs, We noted suggested

the value of differentiating these aspects both in conception and measurement. Then we undertook a review of mechanisms of radicalization at individual, group, and mass levels.

We do not suppose that the twelve mechanisms identified are the only important ones. No doubt more will be uncovered. But we do expect that the more powerful the radicalization, the more mechanisms will be implicated and the more artful their mutual relation and reinforcement. Thus we suspect that the mechanisms considered here in relation to political radicalization and terrorism may also be important in understanding thought reform, cult recruiting, military training, and state prepara­tions for interstate war.

Nor do we propose a single underlying theory uniting the twelve mechanisms discussed here. Indeed it seems unlikely that any single theory can integrate all the influences that bring individuals to radical political action, although a conceptual framework in which to view these influences may be possiblc.i:' It is unlikely that anyone of these mechanisms is sufficient to explain political radicaliza tion, even for a single individual. In every individual trajectory to terrorism of which we are aware, multiple mechanisms can be identified. Thus the twelve mechanisms are neither sufficient causes one by one nor instantiations of some larger theory. Rather we suggest that there are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism.

This view is consistent with previous research on psychology of terrorism and social mobilization. For instance, Linden and Klanderrnans" distinguish three path­ways to extreme-right political activism: continuity, conversion, and compliance. Some individuals show continuity in a lifetime of consistent political interest and involvement. Of these, some are consistently involved in the same cause (revolution­aries) and SODle are consistent only in their involvement in one extreme group after another iwondcrersv. Other individuals show a trajectory of sudden break with their past in joining an extreme movement (converts), often following a dramatic personal experience such as auto accident or rape. Finally there are individuals whose involve­ment in an extreme movement occurred through friends or relatives who persuaded them to join icompliamsv, although they had not previously had much interest in politics.

Similarly, Kimhi and Even 77 argue that " ... not only is suicide terror a complex multi-factorial phenomenon, but also seems to be a phenomenon of multiple trajec­tories." Kimhi and Even identify four motive-trajectories among Palestinian suicide terrorists. Religious motives for jihad and martyrdom, nationalist motives for libera­tion and independence of the Palestinian people, motives of retribution or revenge for personal or group victimization by Israelis, and motives of escape from personal pro­blems. These motives often overlap to considerable extent in particular individuals, and the degree of overlap gives again an indication of the multiplicity and complexity of pa thways to terrorism.

This complexity is well summarized in the conclusion of Horgan's chapter, . T . ,,7R I."TI 1" 1 h f ( f-- Becoming a errorist.tt' rnc rea ity IS t iat t ere are many actors 0 ten so COlTI­v

plex in their combination that it can be difficult to delineate them) that can come to bear on an individual's intentional or unintentional socialization into involvement with terrorism."

Still, it is worth noting that there is a reactive quality to most of the mechanisms identified. Of the twelve mechanisms, only t\VO are more relatively autonomous. Indi­vidual radicalization in joining a radical group-s-the slippery slope is a mechanism of

I 430

~r C. NfcCauley and S. Moskalcnko

self-radicalization via self-j ustification, in which new beliefs and values are adopted Reslin order to make sense of past behaviors. These new reasons then support more PIJlLt

extreme behavior in the same direction. Group radicalization in like-minded groups is also more an autonomous than a reactive mechanism: the events reacted to occur ExpJ within a group as arguments and individuals compete for acceptance. und

The other ten mechanisms reviewed are more clearly reactive. They begin from Jv1 ,-.Hand depend on a dynamic of opposition in which the significant events are the Jcwi

actions of others. Individuals react to personal victimization, to group grievance, tioni and to state action against friends and lovers. Non-state groups react to threat from the state, threat from other groups competing for the same base of sympathizers, and Nat'

Cauthreat from internal dissension. Mass publics react to state action that injures indis­criminately, to martyrs, and, in long conflicts, to a perception of the enemy as less

KIrr than human. Anu

The reactive character of these mechanisms is important because, as noted in the introduction, efforts to understand radicalization usually focus on the non-state

gallactors who are radicalized. Terrorism research, in particular, tends to focus on theIn-the terrorists-rather than on the situation they are in--or, more precisely, Seal

the situation they believe they are in. But these mechanisms do not operate only Poll in non-state groups challenging the state. The same mechanisms moving people toward radicalization and terrorism will operate as well in those who react to radi­ goo

cals and terrorists.I" Even a cursory look at the experience of the U.S., since the Athattacks of September 11, 2001, can suggest that those attacked have not escaped a

radicalization of their own. Sen The degree to which radicalization of non-state groups occurs in response to the

actions of others must be the starting point for understanding these groups. Political Th(

radicalization of individuals, groups, and mass publics occurs in a trajectory of Alaction and reaction in which state action often plays a significant role. Radicaliza­(1/ " l\).­

tion emerges in a relationship of intergroup competition and conflict in which both sides are radicalized. It is this relationship that must be understood if radicalization pOl'

is to be kept short of terrorism. 19S

anr

Notes (St

1. James Mahoney. "Tentative Answers to Questions About Causal Mechanisms.' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting for Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, Pel 2003.

2. Renate Mayntz, "Mechanisms In the Analysis of Social Macro-phenomena," Philoso­phy ofSocial Science 34 (2004): 237-259.

3. J. P. Chaplin, Dictionary of Psychology, 8th ed. (New York' Dell, 1975),285. H 4. R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994). of 5. David A. Snow and Pamela E. Oliver, "Social Movements and Collective Behavior:

Social Psychological Dimensions and Considerations," in Karen S. Cook, Gary Alan Fine and James S. House, eds., Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 571--599.

6. Donald W. Hine and Christina Jaymc Montiel. "Poverty in Developing Nations: A Cross-Cultural Attributional Analysis," European Journal of Social Psychology 29, no. 7 (1999): 943 -959.

7. Roy J. Eidelson and Judith 1. Eidelson, "Dangerous Ideas: Five Beliefs That Propel Groups Toward Conflict," American Psychologist 58 (2003): 182-192.

8. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta, eds., Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

I

Mechanisms of Radicalization 431

re adopted iport more

ded groups .d to Occur

begin from Its are the grievance

hreat from hizers, and ures indis­.my as less

oted in the

non-state focus on

. precisely.

erate only ng people ct to radi­

since the escaped a

inse to the ). Political jectory of .adicaliza­'hich both calization

chanisms, ~.

.lphia, PA.

. Philoso­

285. 1994). Behavior'

n Fine and Allyn and

~ations: A 29, no. 7

hat Propel

e Politics.

9. H. Flum, "Anger in Repressive Regimes: A Footnote to Dornmatior, and the Arts of Resistance by James Scott," European Journal ofSocial Theory, Special Issue on Anger in Political Life, ed. Mary Holmes, 7, no. 2 (2004): 171-188.

10. Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (2000): 602-612.

11. Sonya Roccas, Yechiel KIaI' and Ida Leviatan, "Who Feels Guilt? Collective Guilt, Moral Outrage, Exonerating Cognitions, Group Identification and Personal Values A1110ng Jewish-Israelis," in Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje, eds., Collective Guilt: Interna­tional Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

12. Clark Mcf.auley, "The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism," in Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions (Washington, DC: APA Books, 2001), 343-362.

13. Clark McCauley, "Jujitsu Politics: Terrorism and Response to Terrorism." in Paul R. Kimmel and Chris E. Stout, eds., Collateral Damage. The Psychological Consequences of America's rVar on Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006),45--65.

14. McCauley (see note 13 above), 45-65. 15. Gallup (2003) Question qn33_Fonn A. Retrieved March 5, 2006, from http://brain.

gall up.coru/documents / question.aspx?q uestion==145523&Advanced=0&SearchConType= 1& SearchTypeA 11 = federal(~)2 0government%2Oso0/0201arge(I'()20andc:!cl2Op0 werfu 1

16. Ashutosh Varshney. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality," Perspective on Politics 1 (2003): 85-99.

17. For this and subsequent references to people and events In the news, readers may try google or obtain relevant URL from cmccaule@brynmawr.edu

18. K. C. Tessendorf, Kill the Tzarl Youth and Terrorism in Old Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1986).

19. Carol Morello, "Virginia Court Upholds Muhammad Sentences: Sniper Could be Sent to Another State," Washington Post, April 23, 2005, 1.

20. Gerald H. Zuk and Carmen Veiga Zuk, "Negation Theory as a Cause of Delusion: The Case of the Unabomber,' Contemporary Family Therapy 22, no. 3 (2000): 329-336.

21. http://query.nytin1es.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9FOCEED61 E3CF937 A 15752COA9679C8B63&n=Topo/02fReference~~J2ITimes(~)20TopicS(!~l2fSubjectsoA)2fH(/()2fHate

(j';J20Crimes 22. Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. A C'0111­

parative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1995)~ 168.

23. John Sabmi, Social Psychology (2nd ed.) (New York: Norton, 1995). 24. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental VieH' (New York: Harper

and Row, 1974). 25. Philip G. Zimbardo, "Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Study" Videorecording

(Stanford, CA: Psychology Dept., Stanford University, 1971). 26. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 27. Della Porta (see note 22 above), 168. 28. Ibid. 29. Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists.' in Peter

H. Merkl, ed., Political Violence and Terror Motifs and Motivations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), 191-228 (p. 204).

30. Della Porta (see note 22 above), 168. 31. McCauley (see note 12 above). 32. Robert W. White, "Commitment, Efficacy, and Personal Sacrifice Among Irish

Republicans," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 16 (1988): 77-90. 33. White (see note 32 above), 83. 34. Roger Brown, "Group Polarization. ~~ in Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New

York: Free Press, 1986). 35. Ibid. 36. G. Levinger and D. J. Schneider. "Test of the 'risk as a value' hypothesis," Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology 11 (1969): 165--169.

4 ') ) ~- C. J'vlcCauley and S. Moskalenko

37. Peter Collier and David Horowitz. Destructive Generation (New York: Summit Books, 1989).

38 Brown (see note 34 above). 39. http://\vw\v.anny.Inil/clnh-pg/moh Lhtrn 40, Della Porta (see note 22 above, Chapter 4). 41. Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," in

C. Hendrick, ed.. Review of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1987): 231-256 (p. 238).

42. Mia M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: Thf Allure o] Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia U DIversity Press, 2005).

43. Laura Dugan, Julie Huang, Gary LaFree and Clark McCauley, Sudden Desistence Front Terrorism. The Armenian Army for the Liberation ofArmenia and the Justice Commandos o] the Armenian Genocide. Unpublished manuscript (2006).

44. Bloom (see note 42 above). 45. McCauley and Segal (see note 41 above), 237. 46, Marie Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth. Mapping Troubles-Related

Death» in Northern Ireland J969---J99~ (Derry Londonderry: INCORE, 1998), Table 12. 47 Rajan Hoole, Daya Bomasundaram, K. Sritharan and Rajani Thiranagama, The

Broken Palmyra. The Tanzi! Crisis in Sri Lanka, an Inside Account (Claremont, CA: The Sn Lankan Studies Institute, 1990).

4R Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, eds., Mobilization and Repression (Vol. 21) (Minneapolis, MN: LJniversity of Minnesota Press, 2005).

49 Della Porta (see note 22 above), 78-82. 50. Ehud Sprinzak, "The Process of Dclegitimation: Toward a LInkage Theory of

Political Terrorism," in Clark McCauley, cd., Terrorism and Public Policy (London: Frank Cass, 199]). 50-68.

51 Della Porta (see note 22 above), 168-169. 52. Edvvard S. Kubany, Fransis R. Abueg, James M. Brennan, S. N. Haynes, Frederic P.

Manke and C. Stahura, "Development and Validation of the Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI):~ Psychological Assessment 8 (1996): 428--444.

53. Della Porta (see note 22 above), 169. 54. Collier and Horowitz (see note 37 above). 55, Janusz K. Zawodny, "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations.' in Lawrence Zelie

Freedman and Yonah Alexander, eds., Perspectives on Terrorism (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983), 61-70.

56. Dugan. et al. (see note 43 above). 57 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977),125. 58. Solomon E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A MInority of One

Against a Unanimous Majority." Psychological Monographs 70, no. 9, 1956 (Whole No. 416). 59. John Duckitt and Kirstin Fisher, "The Impact of Social Threat on Worldview and

Ideological Attitudes," Political Psychology 24~ no. 1 (2003): 199--222. 60. Clark McCauley, "Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and

the Response to Terrorism" in Chris E. Stout, ed., The Psvcliologv of Terrorism Vol III (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 3 30.

61 Carlos Marighella. Mininianual of the Urban Guerrilla (J. Butt & R Sheed. Trans.) (Havana: Tricontinental, 1970).

62. McCauley (see note 13 above). 63. Ayman Al Zawahiri, Knights Under the Banner (~l the Prophet (200 1). Retrieved

March 11. 2004, from http) /www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aynlan_bk.htn1. 64. Della Porta (see note 22 above), 173-174. 65. Ibid. h6. Samuel A. Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine. Manon H. Lumsdaiue, Robin M.

Williams Jr., M. Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and lls Aftermath (Vol. 2) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949).

67. Robert A. Papc, Bombing to ~VjJl. Air Power and Coercion in VVOf (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

68. Robert J. Sternberg, "A Duplex Theory of I-late: Development and Application to Terrorism, Massacres, and Genocide." Review ~l General Psychology 7, no. 3 (2003): 299--328.

69. Edward E Four Ways of 1'1­(Washington, D.C

70. Nick H~lsl

Categories." Britis 71. Carl I I­

Communication E 72. Lacey Ba

JIVesrern lVorld (E' 73. David Be:

(New Yo rk: At 1an 74. Farhad K

(London: Pluto PI 75. Max Tayl

gical Process in th 585--601.

76. Annette 1 Right Activism In 213--228

77 Shaul Kl Victoroff, ed .. To (Washington. D.(

78. John I-Il)! 79. Christian

PoE tical Science (\ eds.~ Repression u vii-xh

Groups," 111

ls, CA: Sage,

rk: Columbia

'en Desistcnc» :/ Commandos

ubles- Related able 12. ragarna, The nt, CA: The

i/i~(lti017 LInd

~ Theory of idon: Frank

, Fredenc P. ill Inventory

vrcnce Zelic E: Scholarly

rity of One le No. 416). -ldvievv and

»rism and "Ill! Vul. III

ed, Trans.)

Retrieved

Roblll IV1. '(JI 71 ba t and

haca. NY'

lication to . 299-328

Mechanisms ofRudicalization 433

69. Edward E. Royzrnan, Clark McCauley and Paul Rozin, "From Plato to Putnam: Four \Vays of Thinking About Hate" in Robert J. Sternberg, ed., Psychology oj' flate (Washington, D.C.: APA Books, 2004), J-35.

70. Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild and Donald Ernst, "Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories," British Journal of Social Psychology 39, no. 1 (2000): 113-127.

71. Carl I. Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," Public Opinion Quarterly i S (1951): 635-650.

72. Lacey Baldwin Smith, Fools, Martyrs, Traitors: The Story of Martyrdom in the Western World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

73. David Beresford, Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987).

74. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's NCH' Martyrs (D. Macey, Trans.) (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

75. Max Taylor and John Horgan, "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psycholo­gical Process in the Development of a Terrorist," Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006): 585-601.

76. Annette Linden and Bert Klandermans. "Stigmatization and Repression of Extreme­Right Activism in the Netherlands," Mobilization. An International Journal 11, no. 2 (2006): 213-228.

77. Shaul Kimhi and Shcmuel Even, "The Palestinian Human Bombers.' in Jeff Victoroff, cd., Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: lOS Press, 2006), 308-323.

78. John Horgan, Psychology ofTerrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005), 105-- 106. 79. Christian Davenport, "Introduction: Repression and Mobilization: Insights from

Political Science and Sociology," in Christian Da venport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, eds., Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis, ~1N: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), vii-xh.