Measuring and Evaluating CSDP Impact: The Case of EU-NATO Relations

Submitted by Roy H. Ginsberg

Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies

Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr. Chair in Government

For the Twelfth Biennial International Conference of the

European Union Studies Association

Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011

Not for Attribution Without Author’s Written Consent

Comments Welcome at rginsber@skidmore.edu

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Preview

This study of the impact of the European Union (EU) on the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) is featured in a new book written by Susan E. Penksa and the

author, entitled The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact.1

The

volume evaluates the impact of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) civilian

and military crisis management operations on the union itself; on nonmember states who

are host to or affected by EU operations; on other international security providers; and on

global security governance. By defining and identifying criteria for evaluating impact, the

authors offer a basis for their own and other analyses of CSDP effects. The authors

demonstrate that the union is already a niche international security provider. Theoretical

insights from historical and rational choice institutionalism point to the important

interplay of EU member states and institutions in CSDP decisionmaking—and to the

related process of Europeanization or institutional learning. Building on that

conceptualization, the authors posit that EU foreign policy—and its crisis management

instrument, CSDP—are not likely to vanish so long as there is a union that exists to serve

the interests of the member states.

In offering a nuanced, sober, and concrete examination of the effects of CSDP, Ginsberg

and Penksa eschew such wildly unsubstantiated generalizations about the role of the

union in the world as: ―the EU is dying,‖ the union is ―falling as a power in the world,‖ or

the union is becoming a ―superpower.‖2 Theorists, practitioners, and pundits have often

tended to dismiss or underestimate the union’s impact in international affairs. Yet little is

known empirically of the value of the union in the wider world to its own member states’

interests—and to those outside the union. Three common mistakes are made when

considering the union’s external effects.

One mistake is to evaluate the EU as an international political and security player as if it

were a state, which it is not. Another is to assume that because the EU is not a state, it

cannot have common foreign and security policies, which it does. On the Westphalian

world stage, the union is still an unfamiliar actor. A nuanced approach to understanding

the EU as a global security player requires a careful examination of the union for what it

is (its values and functions); what it does and chooses or fails not to do; and what it is

becoming. Another mistake is to view CSDP in ahistorical terms. An historical

perspective places CSDP in a six decades-long process of regional integration; it allows

scholars to compare the birth pains of CSDP to those of earlier foreign policy

developments of the union, such as European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 and

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. These initiatives, around which

much skepticism converged, empowered the EU over time to develop the scope for

impact. For instance, EPC was the forum that facilitated a common EU policy at the

1973-1975 East-West negotiations in Helsinki that helped turn the tide of communist rule

in Eastern Europe. In its turn, CSDP should be viewed as a catalyst for change in how the

EU makes and executes foreign policy actions.

This paper focuses on the impact of EU foreign policy and CSDP on NATO where the

two organizations have common or complementary interests or operations. In some

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instances, the impact has been nil or marginal (in Iraq and Afghanistan), but in others, the

impact has been considerable and even significant (Macedonia, Georgia, Somalia, and

Sudan). Many studies of CSDP to date have examined the impact of operations on the EU

itself or on host states. However, the logic of extending the study of the impact of CSDP

operations to other international security providers is evident in this paper. The EU as a

foreign policy actor has always been heavily influenced by external demands, interests,

and expectations. The more the union attracts other security providers (states and security

organizations) to take part in and/or coordinate with EU operations, the more the union

becomes a magnet for new contributors in future operations. The more nonmember states

and international security organizations gain experience working with the EU in host

states or on the high seas, the more a process of international learning occurs. If the

future of EU foreign policy and CSDP are to rest on solid foundations, both institutional

learning and international learning have to occur as they feed back into future sources of

new EU international security action.3 The study of the EU’s impact on NATO and other

security providers is a measure of the changes taking place in EU foreign policy and in

international security.

Significance

The EU began in the mid-twentieth century as a regional system of international relations

based on post-war reconstruction and reconciliation through economic integration. It has

evolved into an important and unorthodox player in—and contributor to—the

international system. The union widely engages in international diplomatic, commercial,

humanitarian, legal, and economic development affairs and it promotes the rule of law

and democratic government in its bilateral relationships. EU foreign policy evolved in

response to external pressures on the union to act in international politics and security

more broadly—and certainly beyond the confines of trade and aid diplomacy and

multilateral functional cooperation. Having established itself as the largest, richest, and

most influential bloc of capitalist democracies in the global political economy, the EU

began to recognize that it needed to gain influence in international politics and security

commensurate with its influence in international economics and diplomacy. Moreover,

the world has never waited for the EU to sort out how to respond to external demands.

By the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of communism and the wars of national

dissolution in former Yugoslavia, the EU introduced into the treaty framework the

explicit objective of developing coherent common foreign and security policies in order

to allow it to draw on all the levers of foreign policy. The member states recognized that

it was untenable that their union was unable to defend its values and interests and to

contribute to a more stable and secure world. The momentum grew in the 2000s to bring

security instruments into the reach of EU foreign policy, especially during and after the

Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999. Between 2000 and 2002, the EU established the institutions

of CSDP and identified needed civilian/military capabilities to deploy personnel abroad.

In 2003, the union had begun to deploy CSDP civilian and military crisis management

operations. The first steps in international security were modest. Deployments were

generally limited to permissive security environments, i.e., regions where the union was

not likely to face heavy casualties. This cautious approach was wise for a new and untried

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actor in international security with limited capabilities. Never before in the annals of

international relations has a union of states fielded civilian and military personnel abroad

to promote a more stable and secure world.

The challenge of drawing effectively on the full toolkit of international security

instruments is common to all international security providers, whether single states or

international organizations. In other words, the challenges the EU faces in deploying

crisis management operations in a comprehensive approach that utilizes all security

instruments—in conjunction with other security providers and NGOs—are those faced by

other state security providers and international organizations. However, the EU faces

challenges in the field of international security unique to a group of states that is neither a

military alliance nor a single sovereign state.

The world needs the EU to contribute to international security. Few would argue that the

EU should desist from contributing to international security. There is plenty to do to

enhance security in a dangerous world with few actors willing and able to help prevent

and end conflict—and engage in postwar stabilization. The EU can reach deeply into its

own memory and experience to provide an example of a lasting postwar interstate

settlement. It is uniquely situated to do so.

Why now is it important, timely, and relevant to investigate the effects of EU civilian and

military crisis management operations? Four among other reasons come to mind: over 70

percent of member state publics support EU foreign and security policies; external

demand for CSDP operations has grown; there is interest outside in how the union will or

could contribute to global security governance; and the Lisbon Treaty is an opportunity

for the union and its member to improve the coherence and effectiveness of their

international security policies and actions. Although one is under no illusion about the

speed with which to a new European External Action Service will be created—few

question the logic of a more effective representation and handling of the policies and

interests of the member states abroad when acting under Treaty law.

In many respects, CSDP is an internal and external manifestation of European

integration: internal as it reflects member states’ values, preferences and security

interests; and external as CSDP was established by the members to complete and improve

EU foreign policy—and enhance the security of the union on, around, and beyond its

borders. An unstable world threatens the interests and values of the union and its member

states. In evaluating CSDP, it is impossible to isolate its effects from EU foreign policy—

of which CSDP is a new addition and critical link. Most studies to date have rightly

focused on the impact of CSDP operations on the ground (host states and societies) and

on the institutional machinery and capabilities of the union itself. However, there are

other important measures of evaluating CSDP impact that have not been fully explored in

the literature to date. For examples, CSDP has impact on nonmember states who

participate in CSDP operations (Canada, Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey) or

whose national security interests are affected by such operations (Kenya by the EU

antipiracy operation, Russia by the EU Georgia monitors, Serbia by the EU Kosovo rule

of law mission); on international functional organizations (IAEA, FAO, WFP, UNICEF,

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UNRWA, UNHCR) with whom the EU cooperates/coordinates to enhance security; and

on international security organizations (UNDPKO, NATO, AU) with whom the EU

cooperates/coordinates to help prevent and end conflict and engage in post-conflict

stabilization.

Measures of Evaluation

CSDP, the planning and implementation arm of EU foreign policy, is the framework of

institutions and procedures for deployment of EU operations for civilian and military

crisis management. EU foreign policy refers to the range of foreign policy actions,

capabilities, and instruments of the union and its member states when they act

collectively in international politics and security.4 Global security governance refers to

the processes of international and comprehensive cooperation among state actors,

international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to enhance stability and

security in regions at risk of war, during war, and after war ends.

A daunting task faced by analysts is how to evaluate the union’s scope for agency, or

influence, in international politics and security. How do we know impact when we see it?

And when we do see it, how do we measure it? Measuring the impact of a foreign policy

actor that is not a nation-state is difficult but not impossible to do. Impact occurs when

EU foreign policy or CSDP activity has the effect of influencing an international

political-security situation—and the perceptions and/or interests of international security

providers and nonmember states. The external effects of CSDP operations are measured

by subjective means (normative or cognitive)—what others perceive to be the union’s

effect, and by objective or empirical means—what the EU does or does not do in fact.

Subjective measures include the effect of how well the union pursues its own foreign

policy values, norms, and preferences enunciated in the European Security Strategy; the

outside world’s perception of EU foreign policy actions and CSDP operations; and the

outside world’s expectation of what the EU is becoming or what it aspires to be—its

putative influence. If the union is to become a recognized international security provider

others must perceive the union as a credible contributor. If security providers perceive

CSDP as worthwhile, they will be inclined to offer personnel (police officers, combat

soldiers) and/or capabilities (helicopters, naval vessels) in future operations. The more

the EU attracts security providers to take part in its operations, the more the union attracts

new contributors. Some non-EU security providers want to contribute to international

security but may prefer not to join a NATO, UN, or other operation—or are unable to act

on their own. The EU is seen as a viable option that before did not exist.

For examples, the Israelis, Palestinians, and Egyptians, who perceived the union to be an

impartial mediator/observer, asked the EU to oversee the opening and operation of the

Gaza-Egypt border at Rafah in 2005 (now closed). Similarly, the Russians and Georgians

viewed the union as an impartial mediator/observer and consequently accepted the

deployment of EU peace monitors to the troubled border regions. The EU and NATO and

the EU and ASEAN partnered to put into effect lasting ceasefires in Macedonia and

Indonesia, respectively. However, the EU declined a request by the UNDPKO in 2008 to

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deploy a military crisis management operation to help the UN in the eastern DRC provide

relief to refugees fleeing the fighting between governmental and rebel forces in North

Kivu. In this case, the UN perceived the need for EU assistance and the EU declined.

Thus the union had a negative impact on the UN as it did not provide assistance that the

UN had hoped to have and perceived the EU would offer.

The union may also have empirical impact in international security for what it does (or

does not do). Objective or empirical measures include concrete evidence and proof of

action and effects—what the EU does: documented, quantifiable, and verifiable data

based on primary sources. In The EU in Global Security, Ginsberg and Penksa conducted

interviews of CSDP principals in the EU and the host states as well as officials of other

international security providers. In evaluating the external impact of EU foreign policy

and CSDP operations, the range of impact varies. In other words, there is no one degree

of impact. The union’s impact on external security actors ranges in levels of effect from

nil to marginal political impact and from considerable to significant political impact.5 For

examples, the union had

nil impact when the EU could not expedite aid to the victims of the 2004 Asian

tsunami because its members did not have needed long-range transport planes—or

when Belgrade ignored ceasefires sponsored by the European Community in the

early 1990s;

marginal impact on NATO after the deployments of its modest police training

missions in Iraq (2005) and Afghanistan (2007) and given the constraints on the

EU’s ability and/or willingness to deploy more significant crisis management

operations in nonpermissive security regions;

considerable impact on the UN when EU troops assisted the UN to provide

security during the 2006 Congolese presidential and parliamentary elections—and

when in coordination with ASEAN in 2005 the EU oversaw the peace agreement

in Indonesia between rebel forces and the government by offering its good offices

to ensure that arms were laid down; and

significant impact in 2003 when the EU with NATO pressed rebel forces and the

Macedonian government to agree to a peace accord, which helped to avert war—

and since 2008 when the EU began escorting naval vessels carrying UN food aid

to millions of starving Somalis.

Ginsberg and Penksa introduce in their new volume measures of external impact that

embrace functional and political impact as well as impact that occurs over time and in

ways both intended and unintended. For the purposes of this paper, the author focuses on

strategic impact—impact on international security providers who participate in,

coordinate with, and are otherwise affected by CSDP operations. For example, NATO

was able to reduce or eliminate its assets and personnel in BiH for redeployment to

Afghanistan as the EU deployed its own military crisis management operation in BiH.

Once EU military forces were rotated in and out of Bunia in northern DRC in 2203, UN

forces were able to redeploy. EU observers on Georgia’s administrative borders with

South Ossetia and Abkhazia reduce, although do not eliminate, the possibility of a

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resumption of war. The EU-ASEAN ceasefire mission in Banda Aceh helped raise the

costs of a return to war by Jakarta and the rebel forces, and thus helped to secure peace.

Identifying the source that generated impact requires nuance and an appreciation for

understanding how influence is manifested over time and by what players. In some crisis

management operations, one security provider (the UN or NATO) hands responsibility

over to another provider. For example, before the deployment of the EU’s Georgia

monitoring mission, the UN and OSCE were the privileged security providers with

existing operations. Yet in other operations, different providers operate concomitantly.

For example, in Kosovo, the EU and NATO missions provide security and divide

responsibilities on an informal basis between commanders, yet both come under the legal

authority of the UN. Thus, it is a complex but necessary matter to identify who has

relative impact in any one area of crisis management when the work of different security

providers is fluid and overlapping. Moreover, security providers may be cooperative and

competitive at the same time as they each seek to carve out their space and influence in

international security. At times, security providers cooperate as in Kosovo (NATO and

the EU). At other times, providers compete for influence while operating concomitantly

(NATO and EU run separate but coordinated operations to aid AU peacekeepers in Sudan

through the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa).

Explaining the Start-Up of CSDP Operations

The theoretical and empirical literature on EU foreign policy in general, and CSDP in

particular, is growing. However, little systematic field-based research has been conducted

on the myriad effects of CSDP operations on the union itself, on host states—and their

societies and surrounding regions, and on other international security providers. Only a

few scholars apply theories of international politics to EU foreign policy and CSDP.

Chief among them include are the works of Hill and Smith (2005), Anderson (2008) and

Gross (2009).6 The absence of empirically-based theoretical work helps to explain the

scope for misunderstanding and misinformation about the EU as an international actor.

The author asks (and tries to answer) a core question. What drives the union to initiate a

CSDP operation? No one theoretical perspective explains the complexity of phenomena

surrounding the startup of a CSDP operation. Christopher Hill wrote in 1978 that ―what

you see (theoretically) may well depend on where you sit, but what seats give you the

best view in the house?‖7

Three of the best seats are occupied by political scientists who

offer a good view of either the scenery of EU foreign policy (neorealism and historical

institutionalism), the starring actors (rational choice institutionalism) as they interact with

one another, or the preferences of the actors (social constructivism) as they interpret their

roles.

A neorealist perspective begins with the structure of and distribution of power in world

politics and its impact on the commercial, political, and other interests of the member

states as they make decisions in the EU foreign policy context. Neorealists are not blind

to the importance of domestic political actors, the values and norms about world affairs

that decisionmakers construct, or the impact of global phenomena that transcend state

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borders. However, they tend to emphasize states as unitary actors in pursuit of power—

and the distribution of power internationally. The changing distribution of global power

restricts or enhances the member states’ influence in world affairs. During the cold war

bipolar international system, the union had little room for influence in a world dominated

by two superpowers. However, today there are international systemic incentives and

opportunities for EU foreign policy influence in a world far less hierarchical and

hegemonic—and far more pluralistic in the distribution of political and economic power.

When it is in the national interests of the constituent states to act in foreign and security

affairs through the EU framework, rational actors will do so. For example, the British and

French at St. Malo recognized that it was in their national interests for the union to have

what became CSDP, given the unsatisfactory way the union was able to exert influence in

former Yugoslavia and the overshadowing of the European national military

establishments by superior American air power and technology. When national foreign

policies are pursued collectively within the union, the EU will be a primary vehicle for

national interests. For example, the deployment of the UN-requested CSDP military crisis

management mission—Operation Artemis—to the Ituri region of the DRC in 2003 was in

France’s national interests. France sought and received the CSDP imprimatur for a

mission it wanted to do to assist the rotation of UN peacekeeping troops in Bunia. In a

CSDP operation, France could both reduce its own transaction costs, sharing them among

other member states, and gain the legitimacy afford by the EU itself.8

When national foreign policies are best pursued independently of the union, they will be

pursued as such—and the union will not be a primary vehicle for national interests. For

example, Germany opposed the UN Secretary-General’s request for the deployment of a

CSDP military crisis management operation in eastern DRC in 2008 (mentioned

previously) given, among other reasons, a risk-averse political culture coupled with

concerns about the feasibility and objectives of the request due to the union’s limited

capabilities. Therefore, the neorealist perspective is useful in explaining and anticipating

the limits to EU foreign policy and CSDP operations. A neorealist perspective recognizes

the primary importance of states in pursuit of national interests on the world stage where

they seek to advance gains and minimize losses. EU foreign policy action is likely to

occur only when it is in the rational and national interests of member states to cooperate

at the EU level. The neorealist gives short shrift to European interests, preferences, and

values. Whereas the neorealist perspective focuses attention on where the EU and its

member states fit into the structure of world power, institutionalists are interested in the

interplay of—and dynamic and creative tension between—member governments and EU

bodies in the formulation and execution of EU foreign policy, including CSDP.

As the union’s principals, member governments delegate authority to the union’s

agents—for examples, the Council and the Commission—to implement their decisions.

Institutionalists find that in collective action the transaction costs are lower—and the

potential for more efficient and effective action greater than if the individual member

states had pursued their interests separately. Moreover, as EU bodies help shape and

implement EU foreign policy and CSDP decisions, they increase the scope of their

influence—or agency.9 Institutionalists often focus either on historical or rational choice

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reasons for why EU bodies seek to expand their scope for international agency. Rational

choice institutionalism, given its cogency in explaining the dynamic between member

states and EU bodies in the decision to launch and modify operations, is of particular

interest when explaining why some CSDP operations are launched, and others are not.

An historical institutionalist perspective focuses on the long-term development of the

CSDP institutions. For example, the PSC began modestly and has unexpectedly evolved

into a cohesive committee with a high level of interpersonal trust among the

ambassadors, a shared esprit de corps, and a collective commitment to pioneering foreign

policy cooperation.10

Historical institutionalists posit that member governments’

decisions to grant authority to the union to build new CSDP institutions and conduct

operations can lead to two things: an unexpected or unwanted increase in those

institutions’ scope for autonomous agency—given the propensity of institutions to

enhance their scope for agency; and a backlash against those institutions such that

member governments seek to take back delegated authority—given the tension between

defense and security issues, hallmarks of state sovereignty, and the need to reduce

transaction costs by cooperating within a collective institutional context.

However, rational choice institutionalists have an answer for why a power take-back may

be unsuccessful. Principals may seek to curtail or take back agency but find that they

cannot, lest costs exceed benefits. Within this dynamic tension between principal and

agent, institutionalists stress the processes of Europeanization and institutional learning

as important to EU foreign policy decisionmaking. Europeanization here refers to the

process of learning habits of cooperation at the EU level such that member state

representatives and EU bodies work together. As the union gains experience fielding

international operations, it gains traction and confidence so long as institutional learning

takes place. Institutional learning refers to the explicit objective of learning by doing,

learning from past mistakes by changing and improving procedures, and feeding back

into the foreign policy system newly improved operations.

Over time principals find that by cooperating in EU they reduce their transaction costs,

limit the likelihood of free riders, and ensure that the full influence of the group action is

felt. Although some of the larger states, particularly the two permanent members of the

UN Security Council, France and Britain, retain significant global influence, overall even

they—with countries large (Germany) and small (Portugal)—benefit from collective

action when compared to individual action carrying less weight at more expense.

The influence or agency of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) is an example of the

value of a rational choice explanation of how CSDP works. The recommendations made

by the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) in EUMC on CSDP actions are usually accepted by

the PSC—and thus by extension the member governments themselves. For example, the

EUMC recommended that the PSC approve the UN-requested military crisis management

operation in Chad and the establishment of the EU naval operation off the Somali coast.

Without the consensus forged within the EUMC for these operations, it is not likely the

member governments would have agreed to such deployments.11

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At first there was significant skepticism within the EUMC about the decision to deploy to

Chad, given the shortfall in the number of troops offered by the members to ensure the

needs of the operations. However, the EUMC decided that the union could take over from

the UN as planned once it was known that France agreed to provide additional troops.

The EUMC played an indispensable role as a platform of dialogue and provider of

expertise and information critical to the final outcome.12

In the case of antipiracy efforts

off the Somali coast, the EUMC saw an opportunity to raise the profile of the union—and

an opportunity to cooperate with other naval forces in the area and to complement the

union’s other initiatives in the region.13

The EUMC expanded its scope for agency based

on the need to forge a consensus to avoid failure (thus its recommendations are prudent)

and on the committee’s sense of common purpose to do what is right for the union.

Similarly, the PSC has successfully expanded its scope for agency. Its influence in

foreign policy and security issues has gained relative to that of the permanent

representatives (COREPR) and of the political directors back in the national foreign

ministries. PSC induces member governments to adapt or change their initial position on

an issue when they do not fit into the dominant PSC discourse.14

For example, Germany

was initially opposed to the French proposal for the deployment of an EU military crisis

management operation to the DRC in 2003 to assist the rotation of UN peacekeepers, but

came around under pressure from within the PSC.15

The tension within the PSC between

the expectations of the ambassadors to cooperate and the instructions they receive from

their national capitals is predicted by rational choice institutionalism and its focus on

principal-agent analysis. The PSC has proven to be an important agent of

Europeanization in the foreign and security policy arena.

Whereas the neorealist and institutional perspectives focus on state and international

institutional actors in pursuit of rational interests, the perspective of social constructivism

posits that there cannot be a European Union foreign policy without a European identity.

European identity rests on the bedrock of norms and values that in turn inform and

stimulate EU foreign policy action and CSDP operations. Echoing earlier neofunctional

thought, constructivists remind us to focus on the existential nature of the EU. After all,

the member governments and their citizens voluntarily join, remain in, and abide by the

laws of the union they have created. The motivation to engage in European integration is

more than just a rational choice or an exercise in power politics. A main concept of social

constructivism of moment for students of EU foreign policy is Europeanization—the

process, as mentioned, of how European integration is internalized by individuals,

societies, and governments of the member countries and how a collective European

foreign policy identity is created.

Noteworthy examples of Europeanization at play in EU foreign policy decisionmaking

are again found in the workings and norms of the EUMC and the PSC. New members are

quickly socialized into the shared culture, norms, values, and language of the committee.

Members know each other, interact in similar military cultures, share a common belief in

what an efficient military can do, are senior military officers with long experience of

knowing what works and how to get things done, have worked at NATO or the UN, and

are keen to forge a consensus, particularly when they are not under strict orders linked to

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fixed national positions.16

Members of the committee are now incorporating civil and

legal dimensions into their military thinking, which in time could aid the union as it

begins to undertake ―civ-mil‖ operations. The willingness and ability of the EUMC

representatives to work well together are essential to creating a common security identity

and thus to the future of CSDP.17

Much of the same can be said for the PSC. Intensive

and high-level interactions in formal and informal settings among similarly trained

upwardly mobile professional diplomats produce a high level of intimacy and trust

concerning the perceived need to advance EU foreign policy cooperation.18

Impact on NATO

NATO is the world’s largest and most powerful military alliance—and only integrated

command structure. Its air strikes in BiH brought to an end the ethnic cleansing of

Muslims in the 1990s—after the EU had tried but failed to mediate a settlement. In

contrast, the EU is the world’s largest economic and monetary union with extensive

global diplomatic and economic relationships and influence. Its recent deployment of

military and civilian crisis management operations signals a willingness to contribute to

international security. The union’s evolution from a global economic-diplomatic player to

a niche security contributor has unsettled, challenged, and intrigued NATO.

The question of analyzing EU impact on NATO is a complex, daunting, and vexing

matter. The two have an interdependent yet enigmatic relationship—cooperative yet

competitive. Twenty-one EU members are in NATO and all but four have Partnership for

Peace (PfP) Agreements with NATO. PfPs allow for the exchange of classified

information when the EU and NATO work together. Although the two have been

neighbors in Brussels for sixty years, their formal interinstitutional structures of

cooperation are underdeveloped and anachronistic. Yet ―together apart,‖ the two provided

security for their members during the cold war: economic and diplomatic security

provided by the EU and military and political security provided by NATO. Moreover, the

EU and NATO helped contain the spread of communism during the cold war and

provided support for democratization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the cold

war. Today, despite evidence of interinstitutional competition, the two cooperate, even

coordinate, security missions from the Balkans and East Africa to Iraq and Afghanistan.

In The European Union in Global Security, Ginsberg and Penksa examine the impact of

EU foreign policy and CSDP on NATO objectives, interests, and deployments. NATO

and EU objectives are broadly similar: enhance their members’ security, contribute to

international peace and security and the rule of law based on a comprehensive approach,

and anticipate and respond to new security threats. If the union takes action in

international security that aids or harms NATO interests, NATO is affected. For example,

NATO deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere is affected by how much the union can

take over security tasks from NATO in the Western Balkans or contribute to security

elsewhere, as in Central and East Africa or the Southern Caucuses. NATO can then focus

its resources on new international security threats—cyber war, proliferations of WMDs,

and the growing threat to regional and world peace posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen and

other terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda, e.g. Somalia’s al-Shahab.

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In the early 1990s, the two organizations began to expand their respective memberships

to the newly democratic states in CEE—a process that developed in the absence of any

strategic dialogue between them on how to manage the demands each was placing on

applicant states to accede. Different and overlapping enlargement processes could lend

stability to the candidate states but also force them to make choices between meeting

NATO and meeting EU requirements for membership. Then, in 1994 and 1995, the

humanitarian disaster in BiH forced the EU to turn to NATO to act ―out of area‖ and use

air power to stop atrocities against humanity after EU diplomacy and UN peacekeeping

had failed. The limits of the union’s Balkans diplomacy laid the groundwork for the

creation and development of the CFSP in 1993—and CSDP in 1999 just when NATO

was beginning to project force out of area. As the EU demonstrated an uncharacteristic

tenacity to become an international security provider, the EU and NATO began to evolve

from decades of parallel existence to mutual recognition. The deployment of EU military

and civilian crisis management operations in the first decade of the 21st century

necessitated a more institutionalized dialogue. The scope for interaction grew in

response.

As the EU developed CSDP, some non-EU NATO members—the United States and

Turkey—grew concerned that the EU would made decisions that would affect their

interests without their say. The United States was opposed to CSDP if it meant the union

would develop alternative or duplicative capabilities for planning and intelligence.

However, over time the U.S. Government grew to accept CSDP as the union

demonstrated it could gain experience and traction in crisis management independently of

or in cooperation with NATO. In addition, the U.S. recognized that the union was not

going to generate the capabilities to compete with NATO. Thus, U.S. acceptance of

CFSP grew. Moreover, the atmosphere in EU-NATO relations has improved in recent

years as NATO and the U.S. accept the reality of autonomous EU crisis management

operations, as memories of divisions over the invasion of Iraq fade, and as France

returned to the NATO integrated command structure. However, as this section

demonstrates, the blockages remain to full EU-NATO cooperation at political level.

Just as the Americans are warming up to improved EU-NATO relations, the Turks are

growing more skeptical. Ankara is concerned that it is being locked out of CSDP

decisionmaking as its bid to join the EU loses momentum. It seeks to leverage formal

EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management to gain a greater role in CSDP and hasten

its EU accession negotiations.

In the post-cold war era, the EU and NATO separately grapple with new kinds of security

models: comprehensive security, human security, and security against new and evolving

threats. NATO is beginning to experiment with civilian crisis management and the EU

with military crisis management. As each organization defines and redefines its purpose

and function in international security, the room widens for both cooperation/coordination

and friction over competing aims. The EU and NATO thus need to enhance coordination

to avoid duplication of assets and waste of resources.

12

The EU-NATO relationship is Janus-faced. Cooperation is evidenced by the success of

joint EU-NATO efforts to contribute to a lasting peace in Macedonia and to lend stability

in BiH. In Kosovo, where informal agreements allow EU and NATO personnel in the

country to enhance peace and stability, there is cooperation at military level in the

absence of Berlin Plus or other formal accords. However, as covered in the following

sections, friction in EU-NATO relations is evidenced by the (a) inability to agree on

combined logistical support to AU peacekeepers in Darfur (resulting in duplication of

resources and coordination of NATO and EU airlift support actions by the AU at its

Addis Ababa headquarters); (b) inability of the two to work more closely and effectively

together to enhance security in Afghanistan, where the EU police training mission, a

minute element of a much larger and bloodier war, is dwarfed by the combat operations

of ISAF; (c) competition at a low but real level related to leadership of the international

antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden (resulting at times in a beauty contest, despite the

quiet coordination that occurs); (d) imbalance between NATO and EU military crisis

management capabilities and between high defense spending among some NATO

members and low defense spending among several EU members; and (e) continued

blockage to improved formal EU-NATO cooperation outside of the now-outdated Berlin

Plus Arrangement, due to the effects of the Cypriot conflict on EU-Turkish cooperation.

Interinstitutional Links and Issues

Despite the fact that the EU and NATO memberships substantially overlap, the road to

EU-NATO cooperation has been long, winding, and difficult, given how different the two

organizations’ missions are. The following chronology assists the reader in discerning the

major recent developments in EU-NATO relations. Twenty-one EU members are NATO

members (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not in NATO, but all

have PfP arrangements with NATO, save Cyprus). Among other things, PfP

arrangements permit and ease the exchange of classified information between NATO and

non-NATO members.

It was after the French and British agreed at St. Malo in late 1998 to create what

eventually became CFSP that the EU and NATO began to establish an interinstitutional

modus operandi. The two organizations made progress in enhancing links and

cooperation. This was particularly the case when in 2002 the EU and NATO reached an

agreement, the Berlin Plus arrangement, which permits EU access to NATO assets when

NATO does not wish to be involved in EU operations. However, no new formal EU-

NATO consultative arrangements have been developed since Cyprus joined the EU in

2007. The EU has not cooperated with NATO via the Berlin Plus arrangement since the

deployment of Operation Althea in BiH, given the impasse between Turkey and the EU

and Turkey and Cyprus over the divided island

EU-NATO coordination tends to occur informally on the ground where the EU and

NATO commanders are forced to engage in operational cooperation (Kosovo and BiH) in

the absence of formal arrangements agreed to at EU and NATO headquarters in Brussels.

13

Chronology of EU-NATO Developments19

2000 NAC and PSC met for first time to assess progress in bilateral relations

2001 EU and NATO exchanged letters on scope of cooperation/consultation;

first formal NATO-EU meeting at level of Foreign Ministers held in

Budapest; NATO and EU issued joint statement on Western Balkans

2002 EU-NATO Security Cooperation Accord reached (Berlin Plus); NATO

and EU agreed on framework of cooperation for the transition from

NATO to EU military crisis management in Macedonia

2003 first meeting of NATO-EU Capability Group held; NATO and EU issued

common Balkans strategy; first NATO-EU joint crisis management

exercise held; NATO-EU agreed to establish a permanent NATO liaison

team at EUMS and an EU cell at SHAPE; EU took over from NATO

responsibility for security in Macedonia under the Berlin Plus arrangement

2003-2005 lack of progress in NATO-EU Dialogue due to divisions over Iraq war and

blockage by Turkey of formal EU-NATO meetings/cooperation outside of

Berlin Plus and other limited areas

2004 NAC met with the PSC (with Solana) for the first time in 2004; EU

deployed military crisis management operation in BiH under the terms of

Berlin Plus, following the end of the NATO force (SFOR) there

2005 EU began to brief on a regular basis the U.S. and other EU partners after

PSC meetings in Brussels; NATO established a permanent liaison team at

EUMS; EU and NATO began informal ministerial dinners

2006 EU established cell at NATO’s SHAPE

2008 NATO and EU Secretaries-General met to discuss Kosovo

2009 NAC agreed to schedule a joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise;

NATO leaders welcomed EU efforts to strengthen capabilities; informal

meeting held between PSC and non-EU NATO members and EU

candidate countries; EU briefed NAC in an informal session on its

antipiracy naval action and invited NATO to brief the PSC on operational

issues of common interests

2010 NATO Secretary-General attended meetings of the EU defense ministers;

NAC and the PSC met at NATO HQ

There are ongoing dialogues at operational level in Kosovo and Somalia, yet the Cypriot

impasse continues to bedevil the formalization of the EU-NATO relationship.

The EU’s High Representative is invited to NATO foreign ministers’ meetings, but the

NATO Secretary-General is not invited to EU foreign ministers’ meetings. Indeed,

NATO Foreign Ministers have agreed in principle to broaden the NATO-EU dialogue on

strategic issues and strengthen NATO-EU cooperation, including informal meetings of

NATO and EU foreign ministers. It may be the case that the EU is not ready or willing to

interact with NATO at the same level that NATO is willing to interact with the union.

The union’s hesitation may also reflect internal divisions in the EU on the desired

relationship with NATO.

14

Although the NATO Secretary-General and the EU High Representative meet

periodically, NATO and EU Ambassadors to the NAC and PSC and representatives of

NATO and the EUMC meet more frequently to exchange information. However, these

meetings are not productive for two principal reasons. One, Turkey continues to block

high-level and formal political cooperation between NATO and the EU over the Cyprus

impasse, reiterating that since Cyprus is not a member of the PfP, NATO cannot share

information with Cyprus. Two, the EU has stated that it will not discuss cooperation and

coordination with NATO unless all EU member states are present.

EU and NATO ambassadors have met formally. However, as these meetings are

restricted by Turkey to discussion of joint operations under Berlin Plus (BiH) and issues

of military capabilities, informal dinner meetings are now taking place two or three times

annually to maintain the dialogue both at ambassadorial and ministerial levels in the

absence of formal mechanisms. More regular information exchanges between NATO and

the EU (EDA and Council) at staff level. For example, there is cooperation between the

EDA and Allied Command Transformation at NATO Norfolk concerning cooperation in

the area of cyber warfare.20

However, NATO and the European Commission hold no

meetings, despite the Commission’s participation in CSDP.

The two organizations have established liaisons or cells in each other’s organizations.

The EU’s small planning cell is located at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

Europe (SHAPE). NATO has a liaison office at the EU Military Staff. The EUMC is the

only CSDP committee whose members are doubled-hatted to the EU and NATO.

However, double-hatted EUMC officials spend most of their time at NATO headquarters.

Generals spend all but one day per week at their NATO offices even while working on

EU issues.21

They represent their governments to both the EU and NATO, with some

exceptions.22

For NATO, they advise NAC. For the EU, they perform the role of high

level military officers discussing views on what is happening on the ground in EU

operations; receive briefings from operational commanders; determine long-term

capabilities needs; deliberate on such issues as planning CSDP operations and

determining the necessary contributions from the member states; and discuss future

operations.

EU military commands are spread out over different headquarters. This question of

operational headquarters (OHQ) for CSDP military crisis management operations has

been a divisive issue in EU-NATO relations, but perhaps less so in recent years. General

James Jones, former Supreme Allied Commander—Europe and White House National

Security Advisor, has maintained that NATO and EU military OHQ ought to be co-

located in the future.23

Many member state officials, including some from the UK where

opposition to an OHQ for the EU has been pronounced, are taking seriously the need for

the union to have a modest OHQ. However, given British domestic political constraints,

coupled with EU-wide financial constraints, the UK has preferred an EU OHQ be located

at SHAPE. In contrast, Germany and France opt for the EU OHQ to be located in

Brussels, given the proximity to the EU institutions.24

15

The most important issue for the future of EU-NATO cooperation has to do with

capabilities that both organizations need in order to deploy military and civilian crisis

management operations. In 2003, the EU and NATO established a combined capability

group to discuss these and related issues among senior policymakers. Each has its own

capabilities targets; the union has ECAP (2001) and NATO has the Prague Capabilities

Commitment (2002). Each body has its own rapid reaction forces as well as its own set of

goals for procuring needed capabilities, such as helicopters. The union has its two battle

groups on rotation for six month periods ready for rapid deployment and NATO has its

Rapid Reaction Force. Thus far the union has found that it is faster and more efficient for

a member state to take the operational lead, given the slowness of dispatching a

multinational force. Others maintain that there has been no appropriate mission to date

for the deployment of the battle groups. Although NATO did deploy its RRF in

humanitarian missions to help victims of Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake, NATO

members too lack a consensus on usage in military crisis management operations.

The Western Balkans25

Macedonia was the first test of EU-NATO and EU-U.S. cooperation in helping to

mediate, defuse, and stabilize a volatile conflict between Albanian rebel forces and the

Skopje government. The principals, EU High Representative Solana and NATO

Secretary General Robertson, demonstrated the value of a coordinated approach. The

result of their coordination was to secure the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). Had

the two organizations and their leaders not worked effectively together to cajole and steer

the belligerents to a negotiated settlement, a civil or wider regional war could have

erupted in 2003. By playing a crucial, visible and effective role in preventing conflict, the

EU demonstrated its capacity to successfully engage in conflict prevention. This was

important to achieve not only to help stabilize Macedonia, but to raise the union’s own

confidence as a security provider and to gain acceptance of that role by other security

providers, principally the U.S., NATO, and the UN. In this section, we begin with the

EU role with NATO in securing the OFA and end with the union’s impact on NATO.

The EU and NATO engaged in unprecedented and extensive coordination, beginning in

early 2001, to secure the OFA. High Representative Solana and Secretary-General

Robertson together engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy between Brussels and Skopje

throughout the spring and summer of 2001. Each organization conditioned aid to Skopje

on its support for a negotiated settlement. The union pledged financial assistance,

diplomatic support, and the perspective of future EU membership. NATO offered the

deployment of a military force (Operation Essential Harvest) to oversee the

implementation of the terms of the OFA. NATO and the EU kept the negotiations on

track by softening ethnic positions and mending internal divisions within the different

political parties.26

For instance, Solana and Robertson together applied strong pressure to

enact the law on minority languages at local levels in Macedonia apart from Ohrid.27

Robertson and Solana—NATO and the EU—―played a crucial role in mediating the

ceasefire, establishing a government of national unity, and bringing Albanian and

Macedonian political leaders to the negotiating table to work out an agreement.‖28

16

The EU had a positive and significant impact on NATO. NATO could offer a

peacekeeping force to help secure the implementation of the OFA but needed the EU’s

inducements of economic assistance and the offer of future EU membership to bring

about a settlement. Had NATO and the EU not worked well together, and brought their

respective carrots and sticks to the table, a peaceful settlement may have proven elusive.

In addition, it was important for the EU and NATO to establish a working relationship;

thus there was a symbolic significance for interinstitutional relations that went beyond

helping Macedonia.

Macedonia invited the EU to assume responsibility for a follow-on mission to NATO’s

Operation Essential Harvest in order to oversee and complete implementation of the OFA

once NATO troops left. The EU responded by launching Operation Concordia in 2003

under the authorization of the UN Security Council. The EU force consisted of 350

lightly armed personnel from twenty-six countries. It was designed to contribute to

achieving a stable security environment to allow the government to implement the OFA.

The EU patrolled ethnic Albanian regions on Macedonia’s frontiers and engaged in

surveillance, reconnaissance, and other security tasks. EU troops provided protection not

only for EU monitors of the OFA but for those of the OSCE.

The mission, the first of its kind for the EU, operated under the terms of the Berlin Plus

Arrangement. Therefore, its success was important to the EU-NATO relationship as a

litmus test of what the two could do together. The union relied on NATO for planning

and logistical support. There was close coordination between the PSC and the North

Atlantic Council throughout the conduct of the mission. It was the first time that NATO

and the EU worked together on the ground and it was essential to each that the first

CSDP operation went well. For NATO, it meant the EU could share in the burden of

peacekeeping. For the EU it meant it could operate in a region with NATO support,

without which the operation would not have been possible.29

In 2003, Concordia was succeeded by an EU police mission deployment, Operation

Proxima, which helped solidify EU-NATO gains in securing a peace agreement. The

operation was requested by the Macedonian Government as a follow-up to Concordia.

Deployed from 2003 to 2005, Operation Proxima—the union’s first police mission—

consisted of two hundred officers and personnel. The EU sought to monitor, mentor,

advise, and reform the police, help fight organized crime, promote sound policing

standards, promote border management and the creation of a border police, and support a

political environment conducive to facilitating the OFA. Twenty-four EU member states

and Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine participated in the mission. The mission

was important to Macedonia as a measure of continued support for the country’s peaceful

transition and closer relationship with the EU.

Macedonia today is more stable and secure than it was at the time of the EU and NATO

deployments. However, the country continues to suffer from human rights problems,

corruption and crime, and proliferation issues that impede the start of accession talks with

the EU. Greece and Macedonia have yet to agree on a mutually acceptable name for the

republic. Nevertheless, the mission served NATO (and UN) interests in a country where

17

the international community had high stakes in stemming the tide of another Balkan war

and building the basis for a new and stable state in the heart of the volatile region.

There are two CSDP crisis management operations in BiH—one civilian in 2003, the EU

Police Mission (EUPM) and one military in 2004 (EUFOR Althea). Each has had

significant effects on NATO interests in BiH. The EUPM replaced the existing UN police

mission in the country. The purpose of the mission is to assist BiH in establishing a

professional multiethnic police service in close coordination with the EUSR. It focuses

on fighting organized crime, inspecting and monitoring police operations and

investigations, and offering assistance to enhance the operational capacity of the BiH

police system. The mission helped establish and works with new state agencies, such as

the Ministry of Security and the State Border Service. It also helped transform the BiH

Police Academy into one with enhanced powers to fight organized and other major crime.

The union deployed the UN-authorized EUFOR as NATO troops departed in 2004 and

has since been credited with having helped stabilize the country despite the divisions and

the limited size of the military crisis management operation. However, NATO retains a

small presence in BiH in order to provide assistance with security sector reform,

counterterrorism, and apprehension of war crimes suspects for trial at the ICTY. Seven

thousand troops were initially deployed from twenty-two EU and non-EU member states.

The primary purposes of this force are to ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace

Accords; maintain a secure and safe environment; support local authorities in combating

organized crime; provide support for the ICTY, including detention of indicted

individuals; and contribute to defense reform. The EU works with BiH authorities to

strengthen border controls, given concerns over the movement of terrorists and criminals

into EU territory through BiH—a traditional conduit for illicit east-west activity,

including drug and human trafficking. The Office of the High Representative, who is

double-hatted as the EUSR, has executive authority.

The EU mission is subject to the terms of the Berlin Plus Arrangement. NATO continues

to provide logistical and planning and command support to EUFOR. EU-NATO

communication occurs through the military committees of the PSC and NAC. In addition,

the EU High Representative and the NATO Secretary General discuss the work of

EUFOR. The union has a cell at Mons which coordinates operations with NATO, and a

liaison at NATO’s Joint Force Command Naples.

When evaluating the effectiveness of EUFOR, it is important to note that in recent years

the EUPM has taken over the lead function of enhancing security. An indicator of how

far the security situation has improved in BiH was the EU’s decision in 2007 to reduce

the number of EUFOR troops to 2,200, with plans afloat to withdraw EUFOR

completely. Still, the country’s three main ethnic communities are not integrating into a

single national political culture as hoped years ago at Dayton: Croatians look to Zagreb

and Serbs to Belgrade for leadership. Bosnian Muslims feel increasingly uneasy over

their potential isolation from the rest of Europe. However, a cold peace is better than no

peace, and with EU security assistance BiH enjoys more security and safety now than at

any time since the 1991–1995 war.

18

In sum, as Althea is a critical test of EU–NATO cooperation under the Berlin Plus

arrangement, it is worth noting that both sides state that operational cooperation on the

ground in BiH is very good despite the blockage of EU-NATO cooperation at political

level in Brussels. The overlap of SFOR and EFOR personnel has demonstrated the

experience EU and NATO troops offer one another. Approximately 80 percent of

EUFOR troops had served in SFOR. The EU’s presence in BiH allowed NATO forces to

redeploy in Afghanistan. Just as the EU mission helps free up NATO personnel to deploy

elsewhere, the operation attracts contingents from other states. Eighty officers and other

personnel from twelve non-EU member states participate in the operation: Albania,

Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland,

Turkey, and Ukraine. The more the EU and NATO together secure cooperation from

other security providers, the more the burden of conflict prevention and peacekeeping is

shared broadly.

Since 1999, Kosovo, which had been a province of Serbia, has been under the

administration of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), supported by NATO-led

peacekeeping forces (Kosovo Force or KFOR). After Kosovo declared independence

from Serbia in 2008, the EU was divided over whether or not to recognize the new

republic. Five of the twenty-seven members decided not to recognize Pristina but were

willing to support the deployment of the EU rule of law mission in 2009. Thus, the

union’s mission in the country is ―status neutral,‖ meaning the union supports the rule of

law without offering de facto recognition of an independent Kosovo. The EU is in charge

of economic reconstruction in cooperation with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and

cooperates closely with NATO regarding security issues on the ground, especially in

areas where there is a Serbian community (e.g., in Mitrovica, northern Kosovo).

In 2008, the EU deployed a police/rule of law mission of 1,700 police, customs, and

judicial officials to Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), where the union has executive

authority. Ninety U.S. police and judges participate in the mission. The Americans are

joined by personnel from Norway, Switzerland, Croatia, and Turkey. These states lend

their imprimatur to the EU’s mission, which increases confidence both in the EU and on

the ground. The mission, which took over from the UN mission (UNMIK), assists the

new national government to establish the rule of law, patrol national frontiers to prevent

criminal movements and other illegal activities, and deter clashes between the Albanian

majority and the Serbian minority in Mitrovica and elsewhere. While the presence of

NATO’s KFOR with its 16,000 troops is designed to avoid a resumption of hostilities, the

EU mission is responsible for deterring civil unrest and combating crime and corruption

by supporting the police and judiciary together.

It is difficult to evaluate the effects of the mission to date, not only because it is new but

because Kosovo is a very complex and politically-charged environment in which to

operate. EULEX and KFOR try to handle their respective operations without new UN

Security Council mandates, given nonrecognition of Kosovo by Russia as well as five EU

member states. Russia challenges the authority of EULEX and blocks the UNSC

termination of UNMIK as that would imply recognition of Kosovo. Still, EULEX is a

19

CSDP mission. The EUSR double-hats as the International Civilian Representative

(ICR), which means that out of one office the EU must try to help Kosovo while

representing the entire membership of the UN, including Serbia.

Since the territory is small, there are many opportunities, formal and informal, for the

members of the international community to work together and cooperate. The head of

mission of EULEX and the EUSR/ICR meet regularly. They are well advised to do so

and also to meet with the KFOR commander, as the problem for Kosovo and for the

entire international community in Kosovo is the sad reality that the territory remains one

of Europe’s largest conduits for human trafficking and other illegal activities. In addition

to the EUSR, the EU is represented by the commander of EULEX and the head of

mission of the European Commission office. Other players are the commander of

NATO’s KFOR and the multitude of foreign embassies, international organizations (UN,

OSCE, Council of Europe), and NGOs. The EU has to distinguish the value of its own

presence and, with the other security players, help Kosovo solve its security problems.

The EU works with Serbia given the latter’s influence over the Serbs of northern Kosovo.

The EU has scope for influence in moderating Serbia’s position inside northern Kosovo,

which helps NAT—and helps to moderate the Serbian stance. The more the EU can

encourage Serbia to assist with security and the rule of law in Mitrovica, the less likely it

is that the EU will depend on NATO to provide assistance in the event of unrest. For

example, EULEX works with Serb authorities to begin collecting customs duties on trade

between Serbia and Kosovo. If the EU can help establish the rule of law in Kosovo, it can

demonstrate the value of EU foreign policy in general, and CSDP in particular. It can

demonstrate to NATO and the UN its value as a security provider in the region. In so

doing, it spreads the burden of security among these other security providers, who can

then redeploy assets and personnel in areas of the world in far greater need of

stabilization.

Kosovo is where for the first time the EU and NATO have conducted joint operations.

Despite the challenges on the ground, EULEX and KFOR are working well together after

a rough start. After a dangerous situation occurred in December 2008 in Mitrovica,

EULEX police called in KFOR for assistance prematurely with adverse effects.

Previously, the two commanders agreed to parallel agreements with Kosovo to handle the

threat or outbreak of violence in what is known as the cascade of responsibility.

If a situation of potential violence occurs, the first responder is the Kosovo police. If the

Kosovo authorities require EULEX to intervene, the EU is the second responder, and if

the EU needs assistance, KFOR is prepared to intervene. Although it is a fact that the EU

needs to be able to handle risky security situations, it is also a fact that EULEX, given its

inexperience and limited capabilities, coupled with a culture of risk aversion, cannot

manage two crises simultaneously. Nevertheless, in spring 2009, the EU did not need to

call in KFOR reinforcements when it used tear gas bullets to contain the outbreak of

violence in Mitrovica as Serbs protested the return of Kosovar Albanians to reconstruct

their homes. So long as NATO and the EU commanders commit to working together

informally, Turkey will not exercise a veto, but if the agreement on the cascade of

20

responsibility were to be codified in Brussels, Ankara would veto it.

The EU patrols the north and maintains an office there, but does not patrol overnight. EU

judges have begun to hold trials in the north during the day. Since the EU has executive

mandate in Kosovo, its judges are holding trials and trying to reduce the huge backlog of

cases. EULEX is responsible for keeping open the District Court in Mitrovica and the EU

house where the Court has functioned since 2009. According to the EU, EULEX judges,

who work under difficult conditions, have handed down to date 24 verdicts at the

Mitrovica District Court. The aim of EULEX is for the court to become fully functional

with the return of local prosecutors and judges. The union aims to increase the presence

of EULEX in the north of Kosovo to combat organize crime. EULEX staff are the only

customs officers present at Gates 1 and 31 in northern Kosovo. EULEX officials report

that they have played a key role in reducing the level of smuggling along these two key

northern border points in joint cooperation with the Kosovo Police.

However, EULEX judges are stymied by the lack of prison space for those found guilty

of crimes and given jail sentences. The shortage of prison cells means the convicted have

to wait to serve a sentence. Another challenge of adjudicating in a region such as

Mitrovica and elsewhere is the fact that in a small country the accused, the accusers, the

judges, the prosecutors, the police, and the prison authorities all know one another. In the

absence of impartiality, it is difficult to ensure and dispense justice.

Overall, on the ground there is a broad stability within which economic reconstruction is

taking off with the benefit of foreign aid. Two persistent problems require agility and

creativity on the part of the EU. It needs to establish an effective presence in the north

with more effective outreach, and it needs to support the police to fight crime; the

judiciary so that there is a viable and efficient court system once criminal suspects are

arrested; and the prison system to implement sentences once there are convictions.

The EU and NATO share common concerns about Kosovo as a major conduit for human

trafficking and other illegal activity. The EU presence in Kosovo makes it difficult for

NATO forces (KFOR) to leave since the union is not united behind Kosovo’s

independence, Russia vetoes the work of UNMIK, and the union is not ready to take on

security tasks if the security environment turns less permissive. Kosovo is relatively

stable today. The EU helps create terms of stability that have significant impact on

KFOR. The cascade of responsibility between Kosovo police, EULEX, and NATO shows

how the EU and NATO can work together in the country outside of Berlin Plus, without

EU-NATO formal structures, and despite the lack of universal support for their two

missions in the country. In sum, although the EU and NATO have their own set of

responsibilities in Kosovo, EU-NATO coordination has been critical to the success of the

goal of both organizations. Fifteen thousand KFOR troops remain in the country.

Georgia

The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 helped refocus EU foreign policy

attention on the southern Caucasus. After all, the Russians invaded a democratic country

21

whose pipelines carry natural gas to Europe. The French EU Presidency negotiated a

ceasefire in August and an agreement with the Russians and Georgians in September to

deploy a monitoring mission on the administrative borders between South Ossetia and

Georgia and between Abkhazia and Georgia. The EU deployment was based on Russia’s

agreement to withdraw all troops from the security zones on the Georgian border adjacent

to the two breakaway regions and to allow EU access to all Georgian territory. Neither

has happened. No EU monitors have been allowed to enter the breakaway republics. This

has led some to suggest that the EU presence unintentionally extends de facto recognition

of new international frontiers, even though the EU is unambiguously supportive of

Georgian sovereignty over its entire territory and condemned the Russians for

recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The European Union Monitoring Mission was rapidly dispatched to the administrative

boundary regions and fully deployed by the end of 2008. The mission consists of 730

staff members supported by 117 local staff, costing about €500 million annually. The

union has carried out over 15,000 patrols since the mission’s inception. The OSCE and

UN monitoring missions in Georgia were not renewed in 2009, thus leaving the EU

behind as the only international monitoring presence in the country.

Russian troops withdrew from their Georgian positions outside Abkhazia and South

Ossetia. Monitors patrol the regions adjacent to the breakaway republics and report on

ceasefire violations. Incidents of violence continue to threaten the safety of EU personnel,

who are distributed in field offices across Georgia. The mission contributes to stability

and security and to confidence building as the EU lends its support to a lasting solution.

The EU’s Georgia mission is important to NATO, with whom Georgia has a PfP

agreement. The EU and NATO have common interests in an independent and democratic

Georgia. Moreover, pipelines carrying oil from the Caspian and Black Sea regions

through Georgia to EU and NATO members are another reminder of why Georgia is

important to core NATO security interests. NATO cannot deploy personnel to Georgia,

given the direct confrontation that would ensure with Russia, and given that the UN and

OSCE no longer have missions in the country. The EU thus acts in the interests of the

EU, NATO, and the UN in the country. The EU monitors offer a stable presence that is in

the interests of all sides to the conflict on one of the world’s political fault-lines. The

more the union can do to help stabilize Georgia’s border areas, the better it is for NATO.

The mission has an impact on Georgia, which counts on an international presence to deter

a Russian invasion. The Georgians are particularly keen to have the EU stay now that the

OSCE and UN have gone. However, they are very uncomfortable with the EU’s

deployment on only the Georgian side of the administrative borders, in contravention to

the terms of the EU deployment. The EU monitors are blocked from patrolling inside the

two breakaway republics; thus, they cannot observe conditions in those regions and

where the Russian are present. The inability to patrol all of Georgia adversely affects

Georgia’s sovereignty, for it gives an impression that the EU presence affirms new

international frontiers, which of course is not the EU’s intention. However, the EU

presence does calm Georgian nerves and also decreases the likelihood that Tbilisi will

22

take any action that would precipitate a Russian invasion. For all these reasons, the

mission is also consistent with core Russian interests. That is, EU monitors likely reduce

the possibility of a resumption of hostilities from the Georgia side, are not allowed in the

areas the Russians control, and unintentionally complement Russian interests in seeking

de facto international recognition of new borders.

The EU may have to remain in Georgia for a long time, now that no other international

security organization is deployed in the country. A sudden withdrawal could leave behind

a dangerous security vacuum on one of the world’s major international political fault-

lines. Although EU monitors continue to ask for entry at the borders with the two

breakaway republics, they are denied access; thus it is impossible for the EU to monitor

conditions and to develop relations with the authorities and peoples of these regions and

to offer development aid. The mission is the first of its kind for the Europeans. They

deployed quickly and are doing effective work in the country. The EU continues to work

on a coherent approach to Georgia, not easy with the presence of the EUSR for Georgia,

the EUSR for the south Caucasus, the head of the Commission delegation, the EU

member states present, and all the other governmental and nongovernmental

representatives. The EU continues to struggle to find the right balance among recognizing

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, maintaining relations with Russia in

order to deal with natural gas supplies and other critical issues, making contacts with the

breakaway republics, and deterring a resumption of hostilities. There is reason to be

concerned that the EU may be stuck in another frozen conflict for a long time.

Turkey

The long-running Turkish-Cypriot dispute pits Cyprus, an EU member since 2007,

against Turkey, a prospective member since 1999. The Turkish-Cyprus dispute is a major

impediment to advancing new and formal EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management

from Kosovo to Kabul. The frozen conflict on Cyprus adversely affects NATO interests

since the EU is limited in what it can do in coordination with NATO.

In the context of the negotiations for the conclusion of the Berlin Plus arrangement in

2002, Turkey expressed concern that EU-NATO cooperation should not discriminate

against non-EU NATO members. When Cyprus joined the union, Turkey grew even

more restless about further formalizing EU-NATO arrangements that included Cypriot

participation.

Turkey does not recognize the Nicosia government and demands recognition of the right

of the Turkish minority in the north of Cyprus. It does not permit Greek Cypriot ships to

enter and use Turkish ports and Greek Cypriot airlines to land in Turkey. The EU

demands Turkey recognize Cyprus, which would mean the withdrawal of Turkish troops

from northern Cyprus and the opening of Turkish ports to all of Cyprus. As a result,

Turkey blocks the movement of goods and persons from Cyprus through Turkey.

In a volley of tit-for-tat actions, Turkey blocks Cypriot membership in PfP. For its part,

Cyprus blocks Turkish participation in the EDA and otherwise limits its relationship with

23

CDSP. It also opposed the opening of new chapters for negotiation in the treaty for

Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey blocks EU-NATO meetings outside of Berlin Plus

arrangements since Cyprus is not a PfP member and thus not eligible to receive classified

NATO information. This means that formal arrangements to improve EU-NATO

cooperation in crisis management, for example, in Afghanistan are blocked by Turkey.

The EU says it will not have formal political discussions with Turkey outside of Berlin

Plus unless all its members are present.

The Cypriot blockage to EU-NATO relations has a significantly negative impact on

NATO in areas where the EU and NATO are codeployed (Afghanistan and Kosovo) and

where the two organizations need to make progress in developing needed capabilities for

rapid reaction while reducing wasteful duplication of resources. However, thought that

Turkey alone is responsible for the blockage of EU-NATO relations simplifies a

complicated affair. Cyprus, Greece, and some other EU member states share

responsibility for the status quo. In addition, some EU member states may wish to use the

Cypriot impasse as a veneer for a more covert policy preference—that is, to block Turkey

from joining the EU and/or to block a new EU-NATO relationship. The sooner the EU

and Turkey can work out a compromise over the division of Cyprus, the better relations

will be between the EU and NATO in the conduct of international security operations that

interest and involve both organizations.

Sudan and Somalia

When the AU requested that the EU and NATO offer assistance in moving AU

peacekeeping troops into Darfur in 2005, the two organizations were not able to agree on

who should respond. Moreover, there was no agreement on a division of labor regarding

how best to assist the AU. That is, neither the EU nor NATO was willing to defer to the

other for leadership. After discussions on cooperation failed, the EU and NATO operated

separate airlifts. The EU coordinates its airlift out of Eindhoven and NATO out of

SHAPE, but the two are actually engaged in the coordination of their air movements at

AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Put differently, the EU and NATO, each committed to

helping the AU but unwilling or unable to field a joint command, operate separate airlifts

in the same place and at the same time.30

Since 2009, the EU has operated a CSDP antipiracy mission—Operation NAVFOR-

Atalanta—off the coast of Somalia (hereafter referred to as the EU naval operation). The

union’s first naval operation responds to UN Security Council Resolutions in 2008 and

2009, which call on states and regional organizations to deploy naval vessels and military

aircraft to protect vulnerable vessels carrying food aid to Somalia under the UN World

Food Program (WFP) and to deter and prevent acts of armed robbery and piracy. The

objectives of the naval action are to escort shipments of food aid to Somalia and to deter,

repel, repress, and interdict piracy off the Somali.

The union’s operational headquarters is in Northwood (UK), home to NATO’s Allied

Maritime Command. Thus, there is EU-NATO coordination even though the EU naval

action is not subject to the terms of the Berlin Plus arrangement. Under its command, the

24

EU escorts shipments of WFP aid to port cities across the length of the Somali coast and

patrols waters in the Gulf of Aden, the southern Red Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean,

including the Seychelles. The area of operation is roughly equal in size to the

Mediterranean Sea. From 2008 to 2010, the EU escorted 75 WFP ships and over 400,000

tons of food supplies to reach 1.5 million Somalis. The EU naval operation consists of

twenty vessels and aircraft—with over 1800 personnel from eight EU member states,

Croatia, Montenegro, and Norway.

Military personnel in the EU operation are authorized to arrest and detain individuals

accused of piracy and armed robbery, and to seize vessels of pirates. The EU takes the

lead in cooperation among multinational, national and regional naval forces that operate

in the area to ensure information is shared to enhance disruption of pirate actions. The EU

recommends that each merchant vessel wishing to transit through the area register in

advance at the Maritime Security Center for the Horn of Africa Website to facilitate the

coordination of maritime traffic. It also advises ships to remain six hundred miles off the

Somali coast when possible. The EU participates in the work of the International Contact

Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia.

The EU has agreements with Kenya and Seychelles by which captured pirate and armed

robber suspects may be tried and imprisoned if found guilty. For example, the EU-

Kenyan accord stipulates that in exchange for EU financial support for the Kenyan

judicial and prison systems, pirate suspects interdicted and arrested by EU forces be

handed over to Kenya for trial. One wonders about burdening the legal system of a poor

country when EU member states could, but do not, hold such trials at home.

In 2009, the EU deterred pirate attacks and handed over 68 pirate suspects to Kenya for

prosecution. The EU has thus far transferred nine groups of pirate suspects amounting to

75 individuals to Kenya for prosecution in the national courts. The first judgment in the

Kenyan prosecution of pirates captured and arrested by a warship under EU command

occurred in September 2010. The Mobassa court convicted seven Somali men accused of

piracy for their attack on the FGS Spessart in March 2009.30

In terms of EU experience, the deployment was rapid. The member states generally claim

that the mission has gone surprisingly well for the EU’s first and that a sea mission helps

support CSDP overall. However, it is worth noting that coordination at sea is not as

challenging as coordinating a multinational military crisis management operation on the

ground. The EU cooperates with ships from Russia, China, Brazil, India, and Ukraine,

among others. Thus, when evaluating EU naval impact, one must take into account the

combination of all naval operations in coordination with the EU in the region. Although

the EU and NATO cooperate in antipiracy patrols, they also compete with influence and

credit when things go well. Neither organization publicly wants to cede leadership to the

other.

The EU coordinates with these antipiracy patrols. NATO first deployed Operations

Ocean Shield and Allied Protector in 2008 pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions

to assist with aiding WFP deliveries.31

In early 2009 NATO launched Operation Allied

25

Protector, a counterpiracy operation to improve the safety of international navigation off

the Horn of Africa, where naval vessels from 23 countries, including those of Russia and

China, have been deployed. NATO has conducted surveillance tasks, provided protection,

and suppressed and deterred piracy.32

In early 2009, the U.S. Navy also established a new

multinational combined task force (CTF 151) to conduct additional antipiracy operations

in and around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea.

Naval forces from the UK, Singapore, Turkey, Denmark, and other countries have joined

the task force.

Although EU-NATO cooperation is tightly cultivated at the Northwood (UK) operational

headquarters for the EU naval action and NATO has accepted the union’s lead in the

international antipiracy effort,33

there are hints of competition for influence and taking

credit in deterring piracy in the region. The truth is the EU, U.S., and NATO naval

actions in the region are engaged in needed and important antipiracy activity that

altogether covers an area including the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean,

and the Red Sea.34

However, the benefit of an EU-led mission is that the union has

accords with Kenya and the Seychelles to incarcerate and try pirate suspects arrested by

the union, while the U.S. and NATO do not. This give the EU more flexibility and

effectiveness in deterring piracy.

Thus, the more the EU can do to combat piracy, the better it is for NATO. Even though

there is some competition for determining which organization should take the lead in the

international antipiracy fight and who should get the lion’s share of credit, overall there is

more cooperation than competition. This is because of the immense territory that naval

forces from a variety of organizations and countries need to cover to seriously challenge

pirate acts. Moreover, counterpiracy is not enough to address the security situation off the

Somali coast. The EU offers significant humanitarian aid to Somalia through the

European Commission and security assistance through the deployment since 2009 of a

military crisis management operation in Uganda, where troops and police loyal to the

Somali government are trained.

When the EU began its assistance programs and its antipiracy mission, the Somali

transitional government was barely holding on to power. Now Al Shabab, the Somali

terrorist organization tied to al Qaeda, controls a significant part of the country and is

engaging in suicide and other bombings of innocent civilians in Somalia and in nearby

Uganda. Therefore, the EU is involved in and around one of the most dangerous regions

in the world. However, most agree that what the EU needs to do now is to support

stability and security on land in Somalia—much more difficult than by sea.

Afghanistan35

Approximately 300 civilian personnel from seventeen states participate in the EU police

and rule of law mission in Afghanistan, launched in 2007 at the request of the United

States. The mission, which builds on an earlier police mission in Kabul, is designed to

strengthen the capacity of Afghan police officers to enforce the rule of law. Officials of

the EU mission are now placed in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, where they train,

26

advise, and mentor senior police officers. The EU is also training Afghan police

commanders at the Kabul Staff College.

The EU deployed slowly and had trouble recruiting police officers to serve in

Afghanistan. The problems of police training and reform in the country are so vast that

they will dwarf what the EU proposes to do. The reach of the EU mission is limited by

Turkey’s opposition to an agreement between the EU and ISAF to provide security for

EU staff. This restricts EU staff to Kabul or regions of the country where Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), run by countries such as Germany, agree to provide

security. EU member states who are already contributing troops to ISAF—especially

Germany and the UK—are challenged to secure personnel for the training mission. In

other words, in Afghanistan, the member states, not the EU itself, are the main European

players. As early as December 2001, the European Council agreed that the member states

would take part in ISAF even if the EU itself did not deploy its own force to

Afghanistan.36

Twenty-three EU member governments account for approximately nearly

40,000 troops in ISAF and such EU member states as the Netherlands and Germany have

assumed ISAF command.

Although the union chose not to send its own military crisis management operation as

part of ISAF, it has carved out a significant political and economic role in terms of its

contributions to Afghan reconstruction.37

These efforts are coordinated through the office

of the EUSR, created on a German initiative in 2001.38

The EUSR has proven pivotal in

coordinating efforts by the member states. The EU is the world’s largest contributor to

humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction in the country through the programs of the

European Commission, especially ECHO. The EU, U.S., and Saudi Arabia co-chair the

Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group. The European Commission has drawn resources

from its rapid reaction mechanism for use in the country in 2001 and opened the

European Commission delegation in Kabul in 2002.

The EU struggles to acquire traction, have effect, and gain visibility for its policies and

programs in Afghanistan.39

For example, the EU gets overshadowed by the work of other

security providers, principally NATO’s ISAF, U.S. Forces, Germany’s PRT, which has a

long history of support for Afghan police training efforts, the UN agencies, and the work

of NGOs in the country. There are too many international security and humanitarian

players without leadership in the country, trying to help civil society. The EU is not able

to provide that leadership. Although ISAF has limitations in bringing security to the

streets for average Afghans, as the U.S. is coming to recognize. NATO resources dwarf

those of the EU, even in the area of police training. Whereas the NATO focus is on basic

police training on a large scale, the EU focus is on training and advising police leaders.

The main obstacle to EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan is that the EU police training

mission is not a Berlin Plus Arrangement. Thus the EU has no access to NATO assets

and capabilities.

Despite the issues related to capabilities, political will, and Cyprus, it is imperative that

the EU and NATO work together to defeat the Taliban. In the absence of an EU-NATO

political agreement on interinstitutional coordination, the representatives of the two

27

organizations in Afghanistan do engage in pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation, as

they do in Kosovo. For example, the EUSR and NATO senior civil representatives meet.

EU and NATO commanders have to keep their cooperation under the radar screen, since

Ankara seems to accept that low level of cooperation. However, for NATO, success is

Afghanistan is its primary focus. Failure is no option. Therefore, for NATO, cooperation

with the EU is more important than the EU’s perception of cooperation with NATO.

EU member states have participated in the surge of troops to ISAF in 2009 and 2010, but

the union itself as a player continues to have a marginal impact on NATO interests with

negative impact on NATO itself. Without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities to

support EUPM, the EU has to find ways to have influence. The U.S. has asked the EU to

do more police training. However, the EU is perceived by the U.S. to view Afghanistan

as a primarily American responsibility. The EU and NATO need to adapt to a new

security situation and, since the union in global security is still a work in progress and

slow to act with limited capabilities, a division of labor between the EU and NATO has

developed. However, the U.S. perspective is that the EU is not willing to take the risks

that NATO is.

Conclusions

The union has considerable and significant impact on NATO interests in the Western

Balkans—where the EU and NATO are or have been codeployed—and the Southern

Caucuses, where the EU lends stability on a dangerous international fault-line. Even

when the EU and NATO compete for influence, or cannot agree on a unified command,

the union exerts influence on NATO. Whether in the EU naval action to combat piracy

off Somalia’s coast or the EU airlift support action on behalf of the AU’s Sudanese

peacekeeping mission, the EU and NATO still coordinate in pragmatic ways that are

mutually beneficial even in the absence of more formal agreements. Yet, such ad hoc

arrangements among commanders on the ground are hardly satisfactory in the long-term.

They depend on individuals operating in a policy vacuum.

In Afghanistan, the impact of the EU police training mission is marginal when compared

to the much larger NATO police training mission and to the ISAF forces engaged in

combat operations. The EU as a whole still sees Afghanistan as primarily a

NATO/American responsibility even though 40,000 Europeans troops are deployed to

ISAF—and the union is such a large contributor to the reconstruction effort. It is well

worth emphasizing that there are divergent member state views on the extent to which

Afghanistan is a primary threat to European security interests, and not all member

governments see Afghanistan as equally important for action at union level, which

explains why the EU does not have considerably more impact.

The EU has marginal or nil impact on NATO perceptions of the wherewithal of the union

to deploy crisis management operations requiring speed, stealth, and lift power. Since the

EU and NATO memberships overlap, the slow progress among some EU members and

EU members of NATO in obtaining needed crisis management capabilities and

deployable rapid reaction forces with a global reach also weakens NATO’s reach,

28

especially in the area of comprehensive security. Some EU members also in NATO have

defense budgets that fall below NATO’s goal of holding spending at two percent of GDP.

NATO and its largest member, the United States (who spends seven percent of GDP on

defense) may view the EU has having nil or negative impact on those NATO members,

such as the UK and France, who manage to stay at or above that floor. The large defense

spenders perceive the others as free riders on those who carry most of the weight of

responsibility in international security.

Recent developments in the British, French, and German defense budgets affect the

capability of the EU to deploy future CSDP military crisis management operations.

CSDP could benefit if cuts are accompanied by new spending priorities for capabilities

needed (by NATO and the EU) for rapidly mobile forces in response to new security

threats and to the demand for EU contributions to crisis management operations. The

2010 Franco-British treaty on defense cooperation is one development that could result in

cost savings and improved capabilities that would benefit military and civilian crisis

management for both NATO and the EU is. The treaty sets out the parameters for new

collaboration on pooling, sharing, and deploying resources, capabilities, and personnel—

such as rapid reaction forces and training for and use of the A400M military transport

carriers—and cooperating on defense procurement and military research and

development. Franco-British treaty cooperation would ideally spill over into the EU-

NATO Capability Group, where more work is needed.

NATO professes a desire to coordinate with the union on capabilities and on crisis

management beyond the now outdated and limited realm of Berlin Plus; it recognizes that

a stronger and more capable CSDP, which it welcomes within the EU, would strengthen

capabilities both NATO and the EU need and thus seeks partnership. In NATO’s 2010

Strategic Concept, members stated that

an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic

area…The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO...NATO recognizes the

importance of a stronger and more capable European defense. We welcome the

entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for

strengthening EU capacities to address common security challenges…NATO and

the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in

supporting international peace and security. We are determined to…fully

strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, enhance our practical

cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated

planning to mutual support in the field, and cooperate more fully in capability

development to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness.40

For their part, many EU member states view CSDP as a new area of cooperation for the

union--an instrument for projecting a comprehensive and multilateral approach to

international security issues. The EU appears more inclined to limit than expand EU-

NATO cooperation. NATO offers a partnership that may scare off some Europeans, as

did Kennedy’s Grand Design in 1962 and Nixon-Kissinger’s Year of Europe in 1973.

The EU did not develop CSDP to be a partner of NATO, although this need not preclude

EU-NATO cooperation/coordination where interests converge and deployments overlap.

29

The irony is that now that NATO has recognized the EU’s growing importance in

international security, the EU itself struggles to find a common legal ground to formally

cooperate with NATO where both organizations are codeployed.

The Cypriot impasse continues to play out in the absence of formalized EU-NATO

coordination of deployments in Kosovo and Sudan/Somalia, but most significantly in

Afghanistan, where the two could act jointly in the common interest, but are hamstrung.

Since the Berlin Plus arrangement is about taking EU action with NATO assets when

NATO does not wish to be involved, it does not extend to areas where the NATO and EU

are involved. The default has been on-the-ground cooperation among commanders where

the EU and NATO are codeployed, but this is hardly a sound basis for the kind of

collaboration the NATO and EU need to have—and international security providers and

recipients require. Adding grist to the mill, serious discussions on capabilities

development and coordination, and responses to cyber warfare, antiterrorism, and

nonproliferation are not being held by the EU and NATO on a formal high-level basis.

Another default position—should the Cypriot impasse continue to impede EU-NATO

accord—is for the EU and the United States to step up their bilateral cooperation in these

areas.

There is surely cause for a sober assessment of the EU-NATO relationship. After all, the

EU is still developing as an international security contributor. It remains limited by its

own weaknesses in terms of capabilities, crisis management, political will, and aversion

to the risks associated with combat. For its part, NATO struggles to contribute to

comprehensive international security where the union may have more to offer in the long-

term. Despite the constraints on EU-NATO cooperation identified in this paper, there is

reason to think that the EU and NATO will inevitably intensify cooperation out of

pragmatic necessity.41

NATO and the EU are different organizations who need each

other. General Jones has stated that it would be unwise to make NATO-EU cooperation

harder than it has to be since few wish to see the two organizations compete to see who

has greater relevance.42

In sum, the Janus-faced allegory of EU-NATO relations to which we referred in the paper

must be qualified. Despite the competition, imbalance, and disagreements that occur

between two different, though related, organizations, the two coordinate more than they

compete. In many respects, the union—by virtue of its size and resources for some (not

all) crisis management operations—is a key interlocutor of NATO.

For what it does—the EU has impact on NATO. EU decisions on crisis management

deployments affect NATO interests—without NATO participation. The more the EU

deploys crisis management operations that allow NATO to end its presence in a region,

the more impact the union has on NATO. The success of EU efforts to enhance stability

and democratization in Macedonia, BiH, and Kosovo is intrinsic to NATO interests. No

other international security provider can take the place of the EU in the Western Balkans

now that NATO has left or is reducing its presence. NATO needs the union to succeed

there since NATO is already overextended in Afghanistan. For what it does not do—the

EU also has impact on NATO—whether in punching below its weight in Afghanistan and

30

Iraq or having no strategic objective in Pakistan, whose border with Afghanistan is

among the world’s most dangerous to local, regional, and global peace and stability.

However, it is what the EU is becoming in international security that most affects NATO,

and is hardest to evaluate. The union is well placed to play all of its foreign policy

instruments in a more comprehensive approach to enhancr security—and this is of

interest to NATO, which struggles to put the comprehensive approach into practice.

There are reasons to suggest that, despite the obstacles the union must overcome in terms

of political will and capabilities, it is likely to remain in Kosovo longer than KFOR, it

will increase its commitment to postwar reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it

will continue to expand its own and international efforts to curb proliferation of WMDs

and combat transnational crime and terrorism. No matter what the future holds for the

EU-NATO relationship, this paper demonstrated the scope for EU foreign policy impact

on NATO interests as a result of the deployment of its civilian and military crisis

management operations. However, informal forms of cooperation and coordination,

though pragmatic and promising, are still inadequate to the challenge of comprehensive

security in a new age of threats to the EU and NATO countries.

Theory should never be an after-thought of history. The paper begins and ends with a

probe about why CSDP operations occur. The neorealist emphasizes changes in the

distribution of power in the international system. The international system situates the EU

as a group of states attempting to respond to insecurity because it is in their interests to do

so. The decision to deploy a CSDP operation is an outcome of the creative tension

captured by the interaction between EU principals and agents (of rational choice

institutional theory) involved in EU foreign policy decisionmaking. The social

constructivist reminds us that EU foreign policy is not value-free. The union is the

world’s leading humanitarian aid organization. Europeans know from their collective past

the horrors of famine, disease, dislocation, and destruction that arise when wars happen

and after wars end.

Endnotes

1Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, The European Union in Global Security: The

Politics of Impact (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 2See Charles Kupchan, ―As Nationalism Rises, Will EU Fall?,‖ Washington Post, August

29, 2010, p. 5; Richard Youngs, Europe's Decline and Fall: The Struggle Against Global

Irrelevance (London: Profile Books, 2010); and Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream:

How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (New

York: Penguin Books, 2005) 3Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, The European Union in Global Security: The

Politics of Impact (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

4Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire

(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) 5For a detailed examination of the ranges of foreign policy impact, see Roy H. Ginsberg,

Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration

(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010)

31

6See Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds., International Relations and the European

Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Stephanie Anderson, Crafting EU

Security Policy in Pursuit of a European Identity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008); and

Eva Gross, The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in

European Crisis Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 7Christopher Hill, ―A Theoretical Introduction,‖ in William Wallace and William

Patterson, eds., Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe, (Farnborough: Saxon House,

1978), p. 8 8

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Cooperation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the

Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (Brussels: EUISS, 2010) 9In 1989, the author referred to the logic of collective foreign policy action as a ―politics

of scale.‖ See Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The

Politics of Scale (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989) 10

Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture (London: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2006), p. 134 11

Meyer, p. 134 12

Cross, pp. 16-22 13

Cross, pp. 16-22 14

Cross, pp. 17-18 15

Meyer, p. 134 16

Meyer, p. 16 17

Cross, pp. 16-22 18

Cross, pp. 16-22 19

The author wishes to acknowledge the work of and correspondences with Prof. David

Yost in compiling the data used in this chronology of EU-NATO developments. 20

Cross, p. 13

21Cross, pp. 18-19

22 Cross, p. 12

23Jones in David S. Yost, Nato’s Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept,

International Affairs, v. 86, 2010, pp. 489-422; David Yost, Interview with Retired

Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR in NATO Defense College, p. 2, 2008 24

Authors’ interviews, UK and German Foreign Office, London and Berlin, May 2009

25This section draws on data and analysis found in section draws on data and analysis in

James Hughes, ed., EU Conflict Management (London: Routledge, 2010); Eva Gross,

Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis

Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 209); Susan E. Penksa, ―Security

Cooperation, Complex Peace Support Operations, and the Blurring of Civil-Military

Tasks,‖ in Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf, eds., Rethinking Security

Governance: The Problems of Unintended Consequences (London: Routledge, 2010);

and Tobias Flessenkemper , ―Operation Proxima,‖ in Michael Merlingen and Rasa

Ostrauskaite, European Union Peacebuilding and Policing (London: Routledge, 2008)

26Gross, p. 33

27Hughes, p. 84

28 Gross, p. 33

29Hughes, p. 108. Moreover, some scholars opine that Concordia was more important for

its symbolic value than for ensuring security on the ground. After all, the threat of civil

32

war abated after the signing of the OFA. It was in this more permissive security

environment relative to the pre-OFA period that the union agreed to deploy its small

force. Nonetheless, it was important for the EU to demonstrate that it was capable of

deploying a military mission, however modest in its scope, in coordination with NATO.

French President Chirac, the Belgian EU Presidency (last half of 2001) and the Spanish

EU Presidency (first half of 2003) were looking for an early success of EU foreign policy

on which to build the nascent CSDP. For further analysis, see Gross, p. 33 30

Even when captured, pirate suspects can be released. For example, a Kenyan court in

November 2010 ordered the release of nine pirate suspects, claiming the country could

not prosecute them for a crime committed outside its territory. See ―Money in Piracy

Attracts More Somalis,‖ New York Times, November 10, 2010, p. A-10.

31Yost, p. 494 (2010)

32The challenges of different navies operating together are legion. Concerns over risk

duplication, the need for unified command, and intelligence-sharing have led for calls to

increase interinstitutional cooperation. Jason Aldereick and Bastian Giegerich,

―Navigating Troubled Waters: NATO’s Maritime Strategy,‖ Survival 52:4, pp. 13-20

33Jolyon Howarth interview July 29 2010. Yost, p. 494 (2010)

34Yost, p. 494 (2010)

35The author thanks Eva Gross for her study of the union’s civilian crisis management

operation in Afghanistan, on which this section draws for primary sources and analysis.

Eva Gross, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution (Paris:

European Union Institute for International Studies, 2009b) 36

Gross, pp. 39-42

37Gross, p. 43

38Gross, p. 43

39Gross, p. xx

40See NATO Strategic Concept at http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-

2010-eng.pdf

41Yost, p. 2

43Yost, p. 2