mceer/ncree response: preliminary report on the 921 taiwan

RESPONSE

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In the early morning hours of September 21, 1999,a devastating earthquake struck the central regionof Taiwan. This earthquake became known as the

921 earthquake or the “Ji-Ji” or “Chi-Chi” earthquake.The magnitude of the 921 earthquake was MS = 7.6(Richter scale) or ML = 7.3 (the system used in Taiwan).There were 10 aftershocks greater than magnitude 6.Of these, an ML = 6.8 occurred about 30 hours and 120hours after the main shock, respectively. An ML = 5.3aftershock was recorded as long as 260 hours latercausing collapses of already damaged structures. Asof October 8, the death toll stands at more than 2,350.Over 8,700 people were injured, and dozens remainmissing. Approximately 10,000 buildings/homescollapsed and over 7,000 more were damaged.

The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engi-neering Research (MCEER) and the National Center forResearch on Earthquake Engineering (NCREE) havehad a research collaboration agreement to carry outfundamental earthquake engineering research in areasof mutual interest since 1995. Shortly after the 921earthquake, we, as representatives of the two Centers,discussed the possibility of an MCEER-NCREE

workshop,which subse-quently tookplace on Oct.3-5, 1999 inTaiwan. The

purpose of the workshop was to identify importantshort-term strategies/actions for post-earthquakerestoration and research needs, including specificcooperative projects for investigators from both centersto work as teams based on the 921 experience.

The workshop began with a briefing led by Profes-sor Loh on the earthquake. This was followed by a briefpresentation by Paul Flores, EQE, on short-term restora-tion strategies following the Northridge earthquake andby Mr. Tomio Saito, Director of Hyogo Prefecture inJapan, on Kobe’s experience with short-term restorationstrategies. The group then began its reconnaissancemission with a visit to Taichung. The next day wasdedicated to reconnaissance, with MCEER and NCREEinvestigators paired together to focus on specific areas.

On the third day, participants made brief presenta-tions concerning their field observations, discussed themechanics of authoring reconnaissance reports, andidentified additional individuals to contribute to thereports. Their preliminary reports are included in thisissue of MCEER/NCREE Response and are also avail-able on our web site at http://mceer.buffalo.edu. A moresubstantial reconnaissance report will be published inthe coming weeks.

National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering

PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM MCEER-NCREE WORKSHOPON THE 921 TAIWAN EARTHQUAKE

by George C. Lee and Chin-Hsiung Loh

A Summary of Earthquake Reconnaissance Efforts of the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research

Damage tobuildings andbridges waswidespreadthroughout theepicentral area.

Surface faulting caused major damage to the Shih-kang Dam.

Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research

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GEOLOGY AND TECTONICS OFTAIWANby Chin-Hsiung Loh and George C. Lee

The island of Taiwan is located at a complexjuncture between the Eurasian and PhilippineSea Plates. North and east of Taiwan, the

Philippine Sea plate subducts beneath the Eurasianplate to the north along the Ryukyu trench, whilesouth of the island the Eurasian plate underthruststhe Philippine Sea plate to the east along the Manilatrench. Taiwan, therefore, occupies an unstableregion between these two subduction systems ofopposite polarity. Seismicity is extremely active onthis island. Taiwan can be divided into two majortectonic provinces, separated by a narrow, lineargeographic feature known as the LongitudinalValley. The western province, which comprises themajor part of the island, is composed of Tertiarysediments that have undergone varying degrees ofmetamorphism and induration and is associatedwith the Eurasian continental shelf. Thus, tectoni-cally, the Longitudinal Valley also assumes the roleof a suture zone between the two plates.

The western province resembles a deformedmiogeosyncline with clastic sediments more than 10km thick deposited upon a pre-Teritary metamor-phic basement. It is usually divided into severalphysiographic sub-units based on rock type or ondegree of deformation. Faults or other structuraldiscontinuities often bound these units.

CORRELATION OF EARTHQUAKE ACTIVITY

WITH GEOLOGIC STRUCTUREFew earthquakes can be unequivocally related to

known geologic structures in Taiwan. The exceptionsare those limited number of cases where surfacerupture is known to have been associated withspecific earthquakes. The locations of faults areshown in Figure 1. In western Taiwan: Meishan fault,March 17, 1906; Chihu and Tuntzchio faults, April 21,1935; and Hsinhua fault, December 5, 1946. Thesefaults are shown as heavy lines in Figure 1. Somehigh-angle reverse faults in central Taiwan have beenrecognized to be associated with large-magnitudeearthquakes.

CONTENTS

Geology and Tectonics of Taiwanby Chin-Hsiung Loh and George C. Lee PAGE 2

Geotechnical Issuesby Thomas D. O’Rourke and Meei-Ling Lin PAGE 4

Damage to Critical Facilitiesby Tsu T. Soong and George C. Yao PAGE 6

Building Damageby Michel Bruneau and Keh-Chyuan Tsai PAGE 9

Bridge Damageby Ian G. Buckle, Kuo-Chun Chang and Jenn-Shin Hwang PAGE 11

Lifeline Damage: Electric Power Systemsby Masanobu Shinozuka, Gee-Yu Liu and Chin-Hsiung Loh PAGE 13

Applications of Remote Sensingby Masanobu Shinozuka, George C. Lee, Zhe-Jung Chen andChin-Lien Yen PAGE 14

Economic Considerationsby Stephanie E. Chang PAGE 16

Emergency Response and Short-TermRestoration by Paul J. Flores and James D. Goltz PAGE 18

Observations and Ideas for the Futureby George C. Lee and Chin-Hsiang Loh PAGE 21

Selected Bibliographyby Laura Taddeo PAGE 22

National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSWe would collectively like to acknowledge the contributions ofmany who aided our efforts while in Taiwan. The authors wish torecognize the generous assistance given by J.C. Hsu, NCREEadministrative section chief; Professor Howard Hwang, Univer-sity of Memphis; Mr. Sheng-Nan Lin, Taiwan Power Company;C.C. Lin, National Chung-Hsing University; Gin-Ong Liu, Profes-sor and Director, Center for Space and Remote Sensing Re-search; Ching-Yen Tsay, Vice Chairman of the National ScienceCouncil; Sheng-Ming Wang and Han-Wen Hsiao, Office of theNational Science and Technology Program; Mr. James Yeh,Deputy Director General and Mr. Wei Wu, Deputy Chief Engi-neer for Central Taiwan, Highway Bureau of the Ministry for Trans-portation and Communications; many other academic research-ers and professors including L.C. Chen, L.H. Chiang, L.C. Chou,H.W. Hsiao, H.C. Hung, C.H. Sun, H.K. Wang, S.M. Wang andS.C. Yeh; Jie-Ru Chen and Jung-Feng Chang, graduate researchassistants at Cornell University; and Jia-D. Shen, Ph.D. candi-date, University at Buffalo. Thanks also to Jim Goltz for sharinginformation gathered in the EERI reconnaissance effort.

The 1999 Taiwan Earthquake

1. Huangchi 2. Hsiaoyukeng 3. Sanchiao 4. Nankan 5. Shuanglienpo 6. Yangmei 7. Hukou 8. Hsinchu 9. Tapingti10. Chutung11. Hsincheng12. Touhuanping13. Szetan14. Shinchoshan15. Tuntzechiao16. Sanyi17. Chelungpu18. Changhua19. Tamoupu- Hsuangtung20. Shuilikeng21. Chenyulanchi22. Chiuchiungkeng23. Kukeng24. Meishan25. Chukou26. Muchiliao27. Liuchia28. Hsinhua29. Tsochen30. Houchiali31. Hsiaokangshan32. Chishan33. Yuchang34. Yenwu35. Fenshan36. Liukuei37. Chaochou38. Hengchun39. Ilan40. Chiaochi41. Lishan42. Meilun43. Coastal Range44. Yuli45. Chihshang46. Central Range47. Luyeh48. Lichi49. Chimei

Faults1

23

345 6

7

89

1012

1413

1516

1718

1920

2123

2422

2526

27

2829

30

31

3334

32

35

36

37

38

3940

41

41

4142

43

49

11

4446

45

4847

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THE 921 EARTHQUAKEThe 921 earthquake is believed to be associated

with the Chelungpu and Shuangtung faults. These twofaults are 10 km apart and subparallel. The hypo-center at Ji-Ji lies very close to the Shungtung faultand occurred at a depth of about 7 km, near theintersection with the Chelungpu fault. The faults areeast-dipping high-angle reverse faults with a signifi-cant left-lateral strike-slip component. Tracednorthward, the Chelungpu fault joints or becomesthe Sani fault. The Sani fault cuts the Pleistoceneupper Toukoshan formation near the west end of itseast-west portion, where the fault is interpreted as aright-slip fault. The 921 earthquake caused 7-8meters of displacement along certain sections of the

Chelungpu fault(see Geotech-nical Issues onpage 4).

More thanten thousandaftershocksoccurred. Figure2 shows the timesequence of theaftershocks with

Figure 1. Active faults in Taiwan.

Figure 3. Epicenters of aftershocks.

magnitudes greaterthan 4.0 within sixhours. The epicentersof these aftershocksare shown in figure 3.It is noted that theepicenters of theseaftershocks are almostall located in theeastern part of theChelungpu fault. Thisis consistent with thefault system. Basedon the strong motiondata collected by theSeismology Center ofthe Central WeatherBureau, Figure 4 shows the attenuation of the intensityof this earthquake in terms of PGA-values. Both twohorizontal directions’ PGA values are shown with theattenuation forms for comparison. The values ofdistance are calculated as the rupture distance. Thefigure shows good agreements between collecteddata and empirical forms.

A previous study on the Chelungpu fault reportedthat the maximum magnitude of earthquake to beexpected on this fault isabout ML=7.3. Thispredicted result is exactfor the 921 earthquakethat is associated withthe Chelungpu faultsystem. The constantenergy release model isused to estimate themaximummagnitude. Theresult is shownin figure 5.Including thedata caused bythe 921 earth-quake, themaximumcredible earth-quake magni-tude will beabout 7.5 localmagnitude inthe future.

1.6E+5

1.4E+5

1.2E+5

1.0E+5

8.0E+4

6.0E+4

4.0E+4

2.0E+4

0.0E+01990 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Year

Energ

y/E

(M=

4.0

)

Recorded Mu = 7.3000Calculated Mu = 7.4650Slop: .1511070E+04

1900-1999.9.21

Figure 4 (top). Attenuation of earthquakeintensity in terms of PGA values. Figure 5(bottom). Maximum credible earthquake asestimated by the constant energy releasemodel.

10

10

10

1010 10 10 10

3

2

1

0

0 1 2 3

Rupture Distance (km)

Horizonta

lA

ccele

ration

(gal)

E-W Direction

N-S Direction

PGA =29.08 (R+0.1464exp )

Norm Abrahamson Formula (Dash line)

PGA = exp

c = 9.6371c = -1.6828c = 6.00

c = -0.5478c = 0.3319

1 2

4 5

6

c + c (M-6)+[c +c (M-6)]ln R +C( )

1.20M 0.6981M -1.7348

1 2 342 2

6

Figure 2. Time sequence of aftershockswithin six hours, magnitudes greater than 4.

8.0

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.00 50 100 150 200 250 300

Mainshock

ML


GEOTECHNICAL ISSUESby Thomas D. O’Rourke and Meei-Ling Lin

The sources of permanent ground deformation ofmost importance during the 921 earthquake arelandslides and surface faulting. Although there

was evidence of liquefaction in fills at the Taichung portfacilities and in alluvial soils throughout the epicentralregion, the influence of soil liquefaction on the built andnatural environments was not as pronounced as theeffects of landslides and surface faulting.

LANDSLIDESThere were literally scores of thousands of land-

slides in the mountainous terrain within and adjacent tothe epicentral area. Most slides were relatively shallowslips in residual soils, typically involving depths of 2 to 5m. A large proportion of the landslides were consider-ably deeper and broader. The largest landslides werelocated at Tsao-Ling Mountain near the village of Tsao-Ling and Jio-Feng Err Mountain near the village ofNangkang. These landslides mobilized millions of cubicmeters of rock and soil that slid across adjacent rivers,creating large landslide dams. River blockage, espe-cially at Tsao-Ling, was accompanied by the formationof lakes that are flooding the upstream river valleys. Aswater rises, there is the potential for overtopping anddownstream flooding.

Figure 1a and b shows views of the landslide at itseastern and western margins, respectively. The land-slide is at the location of previous landslides thatoccurred in 1941, 1942, and 1979. The landslide wasgenerated primarily by failure of the Chin-Shui ShaleFormation that underlies the Chao-Lan Sandstone (seeFigure 1b). The shale is a friable, silty mudstone withweak cementation that deteriorates readily upon wettingand drying.

Recommendations for Short-Term RecoveryPlans are needed to deal with the landslide dams

along the Ching-Shui and Wushi Rivers. Landslidedams in the 1940s and 1979 at the Tsao-Ling site andsubsequent flooding when the dams were overtoppedprovide valuable data and experience with which toapproach the problem. In developing a plan, it will beadvantageous to calculate the volume of each landslidedam. Consideration should be given to the inflow rate,maximum volume of water stored, potential for acceler-ated filling due to tropical storms and typhoons, up-stream and downstream flooding, and options tomitigate the problem. Mitigation options include, but are

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not limited to partial excavation to reduce maximumimpoundment levels, construction of overflow structuresor diversion tunnels/conduits, blasting to release thewater, and monitoring and eventual downstreamevacuation.

An assessment of the remaining landslide anddebris flow potential would be useful to identify commu-nities and lifelines at risk from continued slope failureboth within and downstream of the deforested mountainareas. Debris flow hazards are especially severebecause the earthquake has loosened and failed aconsiderable amount of soil and rock in addition toexposing deforested mountains and hillsides to theelements. Consideration should be given to howdrainage features and flow paths have been altered bythe earthquake.

Plans need to be formulated for the reconstructionof Route 8 that take account of the increased vulner-ability to landslides associated with fractures andloosening of the weathered rock as well as its in-creased exposure to precipitation caused by theearthquake. The plans should balance risk mitigationrelated to control of future landslide activity with theneed for rapid reinstatement of the road.

Figure 1a (top). Eastern and Figure 1b (bottom). Westernboundary of Tsao-Ling landslide.


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Research NeedsThere is the need for a comprehensive decision

support system to identify and rank landslide hazardsand evaluate their impact on communities and lifelines.Whereas such a system should be calibrated forearthquakes, it should extend also to the influence offactors such as storms and floods. The opportunityexists for taking advantage of advanced remote sens-ing technologies and geographic information systems(GIS) to develop a graphical, multi-hazard approach tothe problem (see Applications of Remote Sensing,page 14).

SURFACE FAULTINGSome of the most notable ground failures associ-

ated with the 921 earthquake were related to thevertical and horizontal offsets generated by rupture ofthe Chelungpu fault. Vertical fault offsets in Feng-Yuanwere as high as 4 to 5 m, and were responsible forextensive building damage and collapsed structures.Surface faulting was also responsible for the failure ofthe Tung-Feng Bridge and Shih-kang Dam, both ofwhich spanned the Tachia Hsi River to the east of Feng-Yuan.

Fault rupture with a vertical offset exceeding 9 mwas responsible for failure of the Shih-kang Dam andsubsequent release of millions of cubic meters of water.This loss represents 40% of the raw water supply forTaichung County. Figure 2a is a photograph of thenorthern abutment area taken downstream of the dam,and Figure 2b is a photograph of the northern abutmentfrom the vertically displaced southern part of the dam.

The effects of surface faulting in the 921 earth-quake are broadly similar to the surface faulting effectsof the August 17, 1999 Kocaeli earthquake in Turkey.Rupture of the Northern Anatolian fault during theKocaeli earthquake caused a highway bridge tocollapse and caused extensive damage to the mainTurkish naval base in Golcuk. Recent major earth-quakes, such as the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobeearthquakes, were not accompanied by surface faultingin heavily populated areas. The presence of severesurface faulting in both the 921 and Kocaeli earth-quakes demonstrates how destructive and disruptivesurface faulting can be, and encourages a more carefulconsideration of such effects along active faults inTaiwan and the U.S.

Recommendations for Short-Term RecoveryThe rupture of the Chelungpu fault differs at its

northern end from the surface trace that was mappedand reported on the most recent active fault maps ofTaiwan. The fault appears to turn sharply to the east

just north of Feng-Yuan where it intersects the northernside of the Shih-kang Dam. In the short-term, it isimportant to clarify the mechanism of fault rupture inthis area and to define better the fault trace and itssurface characteristics. Delineating the main faultrupture and establishing the occurrence of subsidiaryruptures, including coseismic movements on thenearby Tamoupu-Hsuangtung fault, are important foran improved understanding of both the near fieldtransient and permanent ground deformations gener-ated by the earthquake. Locating the active trace andstrands of the Chelungpu fault is also important forevaluating various options with respect to restorationof the Shih-kang Reservoir.

Plans need to be made for recovery of the watersupply in Taichung County. Of key importance for thisrestoration is a vulnerability assessment of the Shih-kang Reservoir site with respect to renewed move-ment of the Chelungpu fault. The reservoir is a criticalfacility, and relocation will be difficult, if not impracti-cal. It may be important therefore to utilize as muchof the current site as possible. Future use of the Shih-kang Reservoir requires careful consideration not

Figure 2a (top). View of northern end of Shih-kang Dam showingover 9 m of vertical offset at Chelungpu Fault and Figure 2b(bottom). View from uptrust side of Shih-kang Dam looking north.


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only of the Chelungpu fault and subsidiary ruptures,but of the current elevation differential at site, relocationof all or part of the dam, and the re-use, if any, ofexisting undamaged portions of the dam.

Restoration of the Taichung water supply is acomplex problem that requires a systems approach.For example, it may be advantageous to convey waterfrom neighboring water sheds via new transmissionpipelines, rather than rehabilitate the entire Shih-kangsite. A comprehensive plan should include a fullassessment of current earthquake damage to thereservoirs, treatment plants, and distribution network.

Research Needs

The destructive consequences of surface rupturingalong the Chelungpu fault, which was identified as arelatively low risk Category II fault, raises importantquestions about hazard identification and siting ofcritical structures in the vicinity of active faults. Landuse and development at California faults are controlledby state legislation, known as the Alquist-Priolo Act, thatplaces substantial restrictions on new construction inactive fault zones. Land use planning in Taiwan musttake account of its high population density and limitedoptions for land use. It will be advantageous to considera more systematic approach to fault mapping, assess-ment of rupture hazard and risk, and potential establish-ment of zoning and siting guidelines, especially forcritical structures.

Locations of underground pipelines crossing theChelungpu fault provide excellent opportunities toevaluate the performance of such facilities subjected tovarying levels of differential fault offset. Of specialinterest are welded steel pipelines for water trunk andtransmission operations, high pressure natural gas andliquid fuel, and oil insulated electric cables. The pipe-line age, diameter, wall thickness, type of steel, burialdepth crossing angle, and locations of adjacent bendsand tees should be documented in addition to soil type,pipe condition, and repairs.

Reconnaissance observations have shown thatmany structures, immediately adjacent to, but notlocated in the path of fault rupture were apparently notseriously damaged. This observation applies even tonon-ductile concrete frames and unreinforced masonrystructures. Similar observations have been made for theKocaeli earthquake. A systematic assessment ofstructures immediately adjacent to the Chelungpu fault,but not subject to permanent ground deformation,would help to clarify structural performance andapparent dynamic response very near the fault.

DAMAGE TO CRITICALFACILITIESby Tsu T. Soong and George C. Yao

C ritical facilities planned to be visited during theone-day reconnaissance tour included hospitals,schools, police stations and other public

buildings. While we had opportunities to inspectdamage in some of these structures, due to timelimitations, it was decided to concentrate our effortson hospitals. Three hospitals were chosen for theirstrategic value, extent of damage, and human andeconomic impact.

INVENTORYAccording to available information, there are

4,375 health care facilities within the six-countyseismic affected zone, of which 165 are hospitals.Some suffered significant nonstructural as well asstructural damage.

HOSPITALS VISITEDThe three hospitals chosen for more in-depth site

visits were: the Christian Hospital and the VeteransHospital in Puli, and Shiu-Tuan Hospital in Tsushan.All three are major health care facilities in theirrespective cities. The observations described beloware based on interioras well as exteriordamage inspectionsand on interviews withhospital officials.

Figure 1. The ChristianHospital sustained consider-able damage. Photos show(left) part of the exterior dam-age to the hospital; and(above) interior damage topartitions and ceilings.


CHRISTIAN HOSPITALA major facility in Puli and surrounding communi-

ties, the Christian Hospital is a 400-bed facility ofreinforced concrete (RC) construction consisting of anew (about 4-yr. old) section and an old (about 20-yr.old) section (see Figure 1).

Damage• New section sustained considerable damage fromthe main event on 9/21/99. Out of safety concernsprimarily due to nonstructural damage (power outage1,water damage, equipment failure, etc.), the buildingwas evacuated with patients housed in tents on thehospital ground. The building was immediately in-spected and considered safe. Upon interior cleaning,patients were returned to the building.

• The building suffered significant nonstructuraldamage again from the 9/27/99 M6.8 aftershock.Patients were again evacuated and housed in tempo-rary trailers with considerably reduced capacity(about 50 beds), with overflow transferred to otherarea hospitals.

• The first floor of the building remains open and isbeing used for emergency care, patient registrationand processing, command post, etc. (see Figure 2).

Consequences and Impact• A major part of the hospital is non-serviceableprimarily due to nonstructural damage.

• Drastically reduced capacity (10% of original) at atime when demand was the highest.

• Trauma to patients through two relocations.

• Drastically reduced services due to equipmentdamage.

• The lack of an earthquake emergency manage-ment plan probably made the situation worse.

RestorationRestoration is underway. It was estimated that

the interior will be restored and serviceable in twoweeks.

VETERANS HOSPITALAnother major hospital in Puli, the Veterans

Hospital is a 450-bed facility with two main RCbuildings (the Medical Center and the AdministrationCenter), built about three years ago and several older(about 25-yr. old) and smaller buildings (see Figures3 and 4).

Damage• New buildings sustained considerable damagefrom the main event. The Medical Building (Bldg. 1)was closed and the patients in the AdministrationBuilding (Bldg. 2), along with those in Bldg. 1, wereeither moved to the older buildings or transferred toother VA hospitals. About 220 patients remain at thehospital.

• Considerable nonstructural damage in Bldgs. 1and 2, including power failure, water damage, andequipment damage was observed. Bldg. 1 alsosustained considerable structural damage, probablydue to a lack of ductile detailing.

Consequences and Impact• A major part of the hospital is non-serviceable dueto both structural and nonstructural damage.

• Drastically reduced capacity (50% of original) at atime when demand was the highest.

• Trauma to patients due to evacuation.

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1The emergency generators also failed. They were located on thesecond floor of a separate building and, due to amplified accelerationon that floor, major components broke loose and rendered theminoperable.

Figure 2. The first floor of the Christian Hospitalremained open though the hospital suffered extensiveinterior damage.

Figure 3. An overview model of the Veterans Hospital in Puli.The two white buildings are the newest and both sustainedconsiderable damage.


8

• Drastically reduced services due to equipmentdamage.

• As in the case of the Christian Hospital, no earth-quake emergency management plan appeared to bein place at the time of the earthquake.

RestorationWhether Bldg. 1 is to be demolished or repaired

remains to be determined. Bldg. 2 is expected to berepaired within two weeks.

SHIU-TUAN HOSPITALShiu-Tuan Hospital is a 9-story, two-year-old RC

building with a 400-bed capacity. It is privately ownedand is the largest in Nantou County. The structure issituated about 120 m from the Tsa-Lung-Pu Fault withan uplift of approximately one meter at the site.

Damage• Structurally intact, it suffered considerable non-

structural damage as in thecase of the other two hos-pitals (see Figures 5 and 6).Interior damage was mostsevere at the second- andthird-floor levels where,unfortunately, some of themajor facilities, such asoperating and recoveryrooms, were located.

Patients were moved to open hospital ground andsubsequently transferred to other hospitals.

• Hospital closed.

Consequences and Impact• Trauma to patients due to evacuation and realloca-tion.

• Hospital closed, making the largest hospital in thisvicinity unavailable to patients and earthquake victims.

• Seven patients died due to stoppage of life-supportsystems.

RestorationRepair is underway and the process may take one

to two months. Funds for the repair remain to be found.

OVERALL OBSERVATIONSThe damage to the three hospitals and its impact

underscore the importance of addressingnonstructural issues. Performance of nonstructuralcomponents could be substantially improved, withattendant damage reduction, using rather simple andinexpensive means.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHORT-TERM

RECOVERY AND RESEARCH

• Review and improve current design and installationpractices in nonstructural components.

• Develop effective retrofit strategies.

• Review and improve current nonstructural seismicprovisions for hospitals and other critical facilities.

Figure 6. Damage to an exterior wall of the Shiu-TuanHospital in Nantou County.

Figure 5. Interior damagein the Shiu-Tuan Hospital.Shown are (top) fallen brickinside the hospital and(right) a damaged interiorglass brick wall.

Figure 4. The Veterans Hospitalsustained both exterior damage(above) and interior damage (left)to the newest buildings of themedical center.


BUILDING DAMAGEby Michel Bruneau and Keh-Chyuan Tsai

P reliminary data indicates that approximately5,000 buildings totally collapsed as a result ofthis earthquake, with 8,000 others partially

collapsed and countless others damaged to variousdegrees. While it will take considerable time and effortto inventory that damage to a level of refinement thatwill allow formulation of a reliable critique of currentbuilding codes and practices, preliminary observa-tions indicate that buildings that collapsed typicallyexhibited non-ductile reinforcing details compoundedby detrimental building configurations.

A large percentage of buildings that collapseddue to the main shock or strong aftershocks are non-engineered one-to-three stories reinforced concreteframe structures constructed with brick in-fill partitionsand exterior walls. Many collapsed buildings had apedestrian corridor and open front at the ground floor,and only one wall at the back of the building along thestreet direction. This type of building damage ac-counts for the majority of the complete buildingcollapses near the epicenter due to severe groundshaking. Many school buildings suffered extensiveand severe damages (see Figures 1 and 2). The“short-column” type of damage in these reinforcedconcrete structures is rather common in the directionparallel to the exterior corridor outside the classroomswhere windows above half-height in-fill shortened theeffective length of almost all the columns.

However, in the affected area, more than two dozenmodern 10- to 15-story apartment buildings overturnedor collapsed (see Figure 3). These were reinforced

concrete momentresisting frames,most of themconstructed withcast-in-place 15cm thick exterior

walls and 12 cm thick partition walls. These buildingswere typically designed following requirements formoment resisting frames identical to the UniformBuilding Code (UBC) used in the United States, albeitgenerally one edition behind the latest published. InNantou County, where most of the damage occurred,the specified peak-ground-acceleration to consider fordesign is 0.23 g (for the 475 year return-periodearthquake), which translates into a design coefficient,Cd, of approximately 0.11 g for short period structures.Incidentally, that coefficient was 0.05 g from 1974 to1982, and 0.08 g from 1983 to 1996, before the higheraforementioned value was adopted in 1997. (Notethat Nantou is located in Taiwan’s Seismic Zone 2, andthat design forces of 22% and 43% higher are man-dated in Seismic Zones 1A and 1B, respectively.)Alternatively, the code permits the use of a slightlylarger seismic force to size members with somerelaxation on the ductile detailing of the reinforcement,following what is prescribed in the UBC. Surprisingly,many of the buildings that collapsed were engineeredand constructed in the last decade. However, noneexhibited evidence of ductile detailing. Many of themappear to have tall floor and open plaza features in theground level. Current seismic force requirements aregiven in Table 1.

Commonly encountered were failed columns withwidely spaced stirrups (unconfined plastic hingezone), splices with inadequate development length orlocated in the hinge region, light or non-existent jointtransverse reinforcement, stirrups with 90o, etc.Strong-beam weak-column systems might haveresulted in numerous story collapses following exces-sive column damage. This was particularly frequent inthe first story of buildings, as the larger openings andhigher story height translated into a lower structuralstiffness and strength, leading to “soft-story” mecha-nisms (see Figure 4).

Most steel buildings have been constructed in thelast decade. Steel frame buildings are quite common

Figures 1 and 2.Failure of non-ductile details.

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Figure 3. Failure of new construction.


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for buildings taller than 25 stories in Taichung City,about 50 km northwest of the epicenter. Damage tosteel buildings had not been reported at the time ofthis writing, beyond the collapse of a few old lightwarehouses typically having small built-up columns.However, experience in post-earthquake investiga-tions shows that such damage can take much longerto surface; steel structures being generally hidden andcovered by fire proofing. Brace fractures and otherdamage observed to bin and tank supports in manyaggregate-producing plants suggests that non-ductiledetails also exist in steel structures in Taiwan.

LESSONS LEARNEDFindings from this earthquake concur with those

from prior events, emphasizing the need for stringentenforcement of implementation of ductile detailingrequirements. All failure modes observed are wellknown and have been extensively described in thepast. In many instances, the contribution of non-structural partitions to seismic response apparentlyhad a positive impact. Although generally neglectedby the designer while considering lateral-load resis-tance, the use of reinforced concrete as infills trans-formed the structural system from moment frames toshear walls, and the greatly enhanced suppliedstrength may have more than overcome the in-creased demand resulting from the lower structuralfundamental period of vibration. This could explainwhy so many buildings survived where strong shak-ing peak ground acceleration exceeded 0.3 g.Unfortunately, in many cases, only a few such wallsor partitions existed at the ground level, whichproved fatal when ductile reinforcing details were notimplemented.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

SHORT-TERM RECOVERY• Given the extensive damage suffered by reinforcedconcrete buildings that clearly exhibit a lack ofductile detailing, it is essential that steps be taken toensure that only ductile details be used in all newconstructions and in the repair of damaged struc-tures. Furthermore, until further research findingsbecome available, buildings having “soft-story”characteristics should not be allowed in new con-structions.

In light of the fact that some of this knowledge iscurrently present in the enacted codes, it seems thatefforts must be directed, through education, profes-sional development, and legislation as appropriate,to ensure a better understanding and enforcement ofcapacity design principles and full implementation ofductile detailing.

• Seismic zonation maps must be critically reviewedto reassess the national seismic risk and desiredearthquake protection levels. This simultaneouslyentails a critical reassessment of the design-spectrain light of the new data.

• The extensive vulnerability of the existing buildinginventory, as revealed by this earthquake, must beaddressed before other equally destructive earth-quakes strike again in the country. Particular atten-tion should be paid to buildings having soft storiesand an open front. This requires the establishment ofpriorities, timetables, policies and criteria for seismicretrofit. It is not fiscally possible to retrofit all struc-tures in cities having extensive building inventories,but key post-emer-gency buildings(such as hospitalsand other criticalfacilities) requirespecial measures toensure that they willbe made available.In that perspective,passive energydissipation systems(such as thosedeveloped in Taiwanor abroad) couldplay an importantrole and are worthyof consideration.

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33.1,0.1,8.0,76.0=KC xam L52.0+D=W,51.0=

2891 VW WICKZ=

6.0,8.0,0.1=Z33.1,0.1,8.0,76.0=K

5.1,52.1,0.1=IC xam D=W,51.0=

7991

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C xam D=W,5.2=�y ,)DSW(2.1= �y )DSU(5.1=Fu � 1.2,5.2,9.2

VZICW

1.4 Fy u

=α

Table 1. Seismic force requirements in Taiwan.

Figure 4. Failure due to soft first story.


BRIDGE DAMAGEby Ian G. Buckle, Kuo-Chun Chang andJenn-Shin Hwang

H ighway damage was widespread throughoutTaichung and Nantou counties due to faultrupturing, collapsed or crippled bridges,

landslides, soil settlement and slope failures. Ten daysafter the earthquake, 45 kms of road remained closed,and another 400 kms, while open to traffic, weresubject to delay and capacity restrictions (Figure 1).

Many hundreds of bridges are located in theTaichung and Nantou counties but most escapedserious damage and suffered only minor distress suchas the settlement of approach fills behind abutmentback-walls. But approximately 10% of the bridgeinventory experienced moderate-to-major damageand those most seriously affected range from 3-spanto 28-span structures, including simply supportedreinforced concrete slab-and-girder superstructures,continuous steel plate–girders and long-span cable-stayed girders.

For example, Route 3 is a major north-southhighway running the length of Taiwan from Taipei in thenorth to Pingtung in the south. There are approxi-mately 65 bridges on this route as it passes throughTaichung and Nantou counties. Five of these bridgessuffered collapsed spans or were extensively dam-aged, such that the safety of the structure was in

jeopardy, requiring closure pending demolition orsignificant repair. Another five bridges on county andcity highways experienced similar distress, includingone new cable-stayed bridge. Table 1 gives a sum-mary of the pertinent data for these ten bridges. Figure1 shows their approximate locations on Routes 3, 129and 149, and their proximity to the epicenter at Chi-chiand the Chelungpu fault. All are considered to be inthe ‘near field’ and thus subjected to intense groundmotions both horizontally (up to 1 g) and vertically (upto 0.4 g), and average fault dislocations of approxi-mately 1.5 m horizontally and 3 m vertically.

Damage to these ten bridges included: overturnedbearings; shear failures in columns, pier walls, andcaissons; joint failures in column-to-girder connec-tions; loss of support for both normal and skewedsimple and continuous girders; cable fracture; abut-ment back-wall failure; and foundation failures due toslope instabilities, liquefaction, and fault rupture.Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 illustrate some of this damage.

LESSONS LEARNEDThe following set of lessons learned includes new

lessons, not previously seen so clearly, and some oldlessons that are to be remembered.

• Fault rupture, directly under or between bridgefoundations, is a catastrophic event and span collapseis inevitable if the dislocations are large.

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.4 ihs-uW 3 38/1891 CP 4 m7.43x81 426

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.01 gneg-gnahC 5 isHaihcaTssorcamadgnakh-ihSfomaertspudetacoL

Notes:1. Significant damage is defined as one or more collapsed spans,

and/or extensive structural damage that jeopardizes the safetyof the bridge requiring closure until repaired or replaced.

2. RC = Reinforced concrete superstructure3. Steel/RC = Steel superstructure/reinforced concrete substruc-

ture4. PC = Prestressed concrete superstructure5. Not visited in this reconnaissance effort, data not available at

this time

Table 1. Partial list of bridges with significant1 damage.

Figure 1. Highway closures and bridges with significantdamage in Taichung and Nantou counties.

11


12

• Near-field ground motions are intense and extremelypunishing on bridge structures, particularly olderbridges that have not been designed to modern codes.

• Long-span bridges are vulnerable in near-field sites.

• Ground failures precipitate structural failures.

• Engineered abutment back-walls and back-fills areessential to prevent span collapses even for continuousbridges.

• Generous seat widths are excellent insuranceagainst unintended actions such as ground failure androtation in skewed spans.

• Shear failures must be avoided in piers.

• Engineered shear keys are required to preventspans falling transversely from pier caps.

• Load paths through column-to-girder joints must bespecifically detailed, particularly for eccentric connec-tions.


RECOVERYRecovery strategies can be divided into three

classes:

• Immediate post earthquake period (1 to 90 days).

• Reconstruction of collapsed or crippled structures(3 to 12 months).

• The construction of new structures (1 year onwards).

The urgent need to reopen closed highways,immediately following a damaging earthquake,requires emergency powers to command the re-sources to construct bypasses around bridges with

collapsed spans, erect shoring, reinstate bearings, filland resurface settled approaches, and erect tempo-rary bridging (e.g., Bailey bridges). All of theseoptions are common sense and self-evident to bridgeengineers and emergency management personnel.

However, when design commences for the re-placement structures (the reconstruction phase), it isnot always clear how to proceed. It is unlikely that thecauses for collapse and sustained damage will befully understood and agreed at this time. Yet thedesign process cannot wait until all the answers areknown and must proceed. It is therefore recom-mended that a conservative strategy be adopted forthe reconstruction phase, to minimize the risk ofrepeating past deficiencies. For example, seat widthsmay be arbitrarily increased, shear keys strengthenedfor elastic response, shear and confining steel in-creased in columns, skew supports removed (or seatwidths further increased to allow for skew), eccentriccolumn to cross-girder connections eliminated,sacrificial spans installed in bridges that cross activefaults, and site specific hazard analyses performed forcritical bridges, including long-span bridges.

As agreement is reached on the causes ofdamage, and improved design methodologiesdeveloped, the conservatism in the above approachmight be relaxed, and the bridge design coderevised for all future construction. A moratorium onnew construction might be considered until therevised code is available. But this may take severalyears to complete, and aninterim set of guidelinesmight be preferred insteadof a moratorium. Such a setof guidelines might bebased on the conservativeprocedures used for thereconstruction phase.

Figure 2 (below). Failure ofthe back-wall of the southabutment of the Ming-tsubridge (Route 3), leadingto the unseating ofadjacent spans. Figure 3(right). Shear crack in Pier1 of the Wu-shi bridge(Route 3).

Figure 4 (right). Rigid-bodyrotation of Pier 10 due to groundfailure under the E-jian bridge(Route 129). Figure 5 (below).Tilting of Pier 2 and subsequentcollapse of three spans of theShi-wei bridge (Route 3).


LIFELINE DAMAGE: ELECTRICPOWER SYSTEMSby Masanobu Shinozuka, Gee-Yu Liu andChin-Hsiung Loh

The September 21, 1999 earthquake in Taiwanseverely impacted Taiwan Power Company’sability to transmit and distribute electric power

to its customers. The authors visited Taiwan PowerCompany on October 4 (3:30-5:00 p.m.) where Mr.Sheng-Nan Lin, Chief Engineer, and his staff briefedus on the state of damage, repair and restoration ofthe system. The highlights of the briefing are pro-vided below, followed by the authors’ interpreta-tions, observations and tentative recommendationsfor short-term actions.

Regarding the 345 KV transmission system(Figure 1), a significant number of transmissiontowers suffered from structural problems, and weretilted and displaced causing a large number oftransmission lines to fail (marked with an X in Figure1). This in turn caused the initial blackout through-out the middle and north of Taiwan. In addition, 161KV (Figure 2) and 69 KV transmission systems in theaffected area also suffered from similar failures.Some substations and switchyards were alsodamaged, although the impact of their damage onthe entire power system was much less direct thanthe failure of transmission and distribution systems.A notable exception was the two switchyards atChung-Liaw (the south yard and the north yard) thatwere both significantly damaged. In fact, the loss of53 potential transformers, 46 lightening arresters,and many bushings on buses, in addition to otherequipment, rendered the yards inoperational. Thefunctionality of these two yards is pivotal to powertransmission in Taiwan, as can be seen from Figure1, and hence the functional loss of these yards wasat least partially responsible for the post-earthquakepower interruption.

As for repair and restoration, effort was made totransmit power from southern Taiwan to the north,which is highly dependent on the power generatedin the south and elsewhere. This was done first bysystematically completing emergency repair oftransmission/distribution lines, substations andgenerating stations that were initially damaged, andthen transmitting the power by bypassing theChung-Liaw switchyards. The rationing of electric

power to industry customers was lifted at the time ofthis writing (October 5, 1999) and it is expected thatrestrictions imposed on residential customers willalso be lifted on October 10, 1999, a few daysearlier than targeted. Construction of the third 345KV transmission line between Chung-Kang and Auh-Mei may be accelerated due to the governmentemergency decree that resulted from this earth-quake. However, it was reported that other optionsare also under consideration by Taiwan Power, forexample, to construct additional power generatingplants serving primarily regional areas, which mayprovide a socio-economically more viable solution tothe need of enhancing its network reliability andredundancy.


RECOVERYThe following observations and tentative recom-

mendations seem to be in order for short-termactions:

1. A large number of transmission tower failureswere apparently due to the fact that they are con-structed, obviously by necessity, over ruggedmountainous areas with steep slopes susceptible to

13

Figure 1. 345 KV electric power transmission system.


APPLICATIONS OF REMOTESENSINGby Masanobu Shinozuka, George C. Lee,Zhe-Jung Chen and Chin-Lien Yen

Applications of remote sensing for assessing theimpact of earthquakes on the natural and builtenvironment are a recent innovation, and it is

useful particularly when combined with geographicalinformation systems (GIS). The MCEER-NCREE team,accompanied by Dr. C.P. Weng of National ScienceCouncil, visited the Center for Space and RemoteSensing Research at the National Central University inChung-Li on October 4, 1999, where Professor G. Liu,the Center Director, and Professor A.J. Chen, PrincipalInvestigator of Ground Receiving Station funded byNational Science Council, briefed and provided theteam with the following items:

1. Hard copies of the orthorectified and coregisteredSPOT images with resolution of 6.25 m before and afterthe earthquake (April 1 and September 27, 1999,respectively) over a band of the affected area.

2. Images of a 25 km x 25 km area 50 km south of Tai-Chung (distance approximate) including Tsao-Linbefore (Figure 1) and after (Figure 2) the earthquake(April 9 and September 27, 1999, respectively). Theimage after the event identifies locations and sizes oflandslides by making use of NDVI (Normalized Differ-ence in Vegetation Index). Figure 2 clearly shows thelandslide locations caused by the earthquake. Three-dimensional images of a smaller area were constructedbefore (Figure 3) and after (Figure 4) the event (March 6and September 27, 1999, respectively), utilizing anexisting topographical map together with SPOT images.

3. Enlarged SPOT images at the site of failure of theShih-kang dam after and before event (Figures 5 and 6,

Figure 1 (left). SPOT image of a 25 km x 25 km area 50 km south ofTai-Chung before the event (distance approximate). Figure 2 (right).Landslide areas identified after the event.

14

ground failure. It might be well advised to design,construct, and retrofit tower foundations with this inmind.

2. Enhanced measures of seismic protection, includ-ing base isolation, for generating plant equipment,switchyards and substations appear to be equallyimportant.

3. A systems analysis capability should be developedfor both pre-event estimation of seismic reliability oftransmission and distribution networks, and socioeco-nomic decision support to optimize post-event recov-ery and restoration processes.

While item 1 above would be an interesting jointproject for the immediate future, the current MCEER-NCREE collaborative research is already addressingitems 2 and 3.

Figure 2. 161 KV electric power transmission system.

A full-color version of this publication is available viaMCEER’s web site at http://mceer.buffalo.edu. Theweb site also features numerous photographs of thearea taken by the reconnaissance team. Links toother sites containing information about the earth-quake are provided.

RESPONSE


respectively). In the center of Figure 5, the bottom ofthe man-made lake behind the Shih-kang dam is shownexposed due to the discharge of water from the lakethrough the water gates damaged by the earthquake,while the lake bed was covered by water before theearthquake as shown in Figure 6.

The MCEER-NCREE team also visited the Office ofthe National Science & Technology Program for HazardMitigation on October 6, 1999 and met with ProfessorC. L. Yen, Program Director and Professor C. H. Sun,Group Leader of Information Systems, who briefed theteam on their effort in supporting the search and rescueas well as emergency response activities. The effortconsisted of utilizing their GPS-compatible GIScapability visualizing the seismic damage experi-enced in each focused area. This capability made itpossible for Professor Yen’s office to produce such amap as in Figure 7 where a GIS map combined with

Figure 3 and 4. 3-D images of a landslide area near Tsao-Lin before(left) and after (right) the event.

Figure 5 and 6. Images of Shih-kang Dam area after(top) and before (bottom) the event.

15

post-earthquake aerial photos of the damaged build-ings is shown. This is an important capability to effi-ciently provide the near ground truth verificationneeded under emergency conditions in near real-time.The same capability also makes it possible to fuse GISand aerial photos to make the needed geographicalinformation more complete with the aerial photosprovided by the Council of Agriculture, Taiwan.


RECOVERYThe following recommendations are made relevant

to short-term actions for recovery and restoration:

1. Stereoscopic aerial photos taken by the Council ofAgriculture should be acquired throughout the af-fected area in order to establish the near ground truthbefore demolishing or restoring damaged structures.

2. Before and after SAR images from ERS Satelliteshould be obtained from the Center for Space andRemote Sensing Research for severely damagedareas to validate their usefulness for the analysispertinent to the earthquake disaster assessment.

3. Most importantly, collaborative research to enhancethe present state-of-the-art of HAZ Taiwan should beinitiated between MCEER-NCREE as a joint effort withDr. Chen’s and Dr. Yen’s programs. MCEER has a longhistory of cutting edge research on and implementa-tion of pre-event damage assessment and post-eventresponse, recovery and restoration. In particular, useof advanced technologies such as GIS, GPS, andsatellite/airborne optical and SAR imagery, has beenextensively studied at MCEER in the context of earth-quake disaster mitigation. The proposed collaborativeeffort will establish a milestone in directing the tradi-tional earthquake engineering into the age of the newmillennium.

Figure 7. GIS map and aerial photos.


ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONSby Stephanie E. Chang

F rom an economic standpoint, the “921” earth-quake is a major disaster that has not onlycaused serious damage to the economy of central

Taiwan but will have national repercussions as well. Thedisaster region includes five cities and counties incentral Taiwan, of which Nantou and Taichung countiesand Taichung city were most severely hit. This regionaccounts for nearly five million people, or one-fourth ofTaiwan’s population. It spans urban areas (Taichung)as well as remote mountainous regions and numerousrural towns. Power outage lasting for 1-2 weeksaffected a much broader area, including most of centraland northern Taiwan (where much of the industrialactivity, as well as Taipei city, are located). In the areasof heaviest damage, agriculture and agriculturalprocessing (e.g., tea), tourism, and wine production areimportant economic sectors. All of these suffered majordamage to facilities. The destruction of housing stockand large displacement of population will also hindereconomic recovery. Taiwan had not experienced adisaster of this scale in recent memory.

OBSERVATIONSAs of this writing, government and other agencies

are still in the process of gathering data on the extent ofdamage caused by the earthquake. Early estimates ofloss varied substantially, from NT $100 billion (US $3.1billion) to NT $1 trillion (US $31 billion), the latter beingequivalent to 10% of gross domestic product (GDP)and including both damage and business interruption.The most recent estimate is a total economic loss of NT$250 billion (US $7.8 billion). Repairs to transportationand communications infrastructure are reported atabout NT $10 billion (US $31 million).

The disaster is widely anticipated to have a notice-able but not severe impact on the national economy.The central government anticipated that 1999 GDPgrowth would be dampened to 5.5%, as compared to apre-disaster forecast of 5.74%. Much of the expectedGDP loss appears to derive from the business interrup-tion caused by electric power outage to central andnorthern Taiwan, rather than directly from damage tostructures. The Taiwan Stock Exchange was closed forone week. Over 400 large companies on the StockExchange reported total structural and equipmentdamage of NT $1.9 billion (US $59 million), goodsinventory loss of NT $2.1 billion (US $66 million), andsales loss of NT $7.9 billion (US $247 million). For these

companies, at least, business interruption losses vastlyoutweighed the cost to repair or replace damage.However, it is unclear how much of the sales loss canbe made up through overtime production.

One of the most significant economic issues arisingfrom the disaster has been the impact of electric poweroutage on high-tech industries at the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park in northwestern Taiwan, oftenreferred to as the country’s “Silicon Valley.” Taiwan isthe fourth largest supplier of semiconductors in theworld, accounting for 12% of world production andproviding components for many large computermanufacturers in the U.S. The electronics industry,including semiconductors, makes up one-third ofTaiwan’s exports, and exports are a main driver of thenational economy. Power outage caused approxi-mately 10 days’ worth of production stoppage atHsinchu and other industrial parks. This outage wouldhave been longer had Taipower not instituted powerrationing schemes that gave priority to the industrialpark at Hsinchu, along with hospitals and other criticalfacilities. As it was, speculation of ensuing computercomponents shortages led some overseas companiessuch as Hewlett-Packard to anticipate slight revenuelosses. Global prices for some types of chips esca-lated. Industrial park management at Hsinchu esti-mated that the earthquake caused up to NT $10 billion(US $313 million) in loss to businesses at the park.

Perhaps the most important economic issue in themedium-term pertains to reconstruction finance.Taiwan, having little experience with major naturaldisasters, did not have a reconstruction financingsystem or policy in place before the earthquake. Onlysome 1% of property owners subscribed to earthquakeinsurance, which is tied to fire insurance coverage.Latest estimates indicate about NT $15.4 billion (US$480 million) in property insurance claims to date. Inthe aftermath of the disaster, the government has beenstruggling to determine appropriate financial supportmechanisms, and announcements have been revisedseveral times.

The latest package consists of a combination ofgrants and loans. Table 1 summarizes relief grants thatare being offered by the central government to thedisaster victims.

Low-interest (3%) and no-interest loans with a 20-year term are being offered to households and busi-nesses for reconstruction. The government plans tofinance these measures by drawing from the postalsavings deposit system, issuing new bonds, anddiverting proceeds from a special lottery which hadbeen planned to seed the new national pensionsystem. Owners of homes that had been partially orcompletely destroyed are eligible to purchase public

16


housing on favorable terms, although this scheme iscontroversial in Taipei, where public housing is much indemand. In addition, the central government has beennegotiating with commercial banks to urge them toforgive outstanding mortgages on damaged property.While highly contentious, it now appears that the bankshave agreed to take over the mortgage debts for thosepersons who plan to rebuild in the same location; forothers, they will defer the repayment schedule by fiveyears. It is likely that the banking sector will suffersubstantial losses as a result of the disaster. Theagricultural credit cooperatives, which had alreadyfaced some financial difficulties before the earthquake,are in a particularly dire situation.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONSA number of preliminary conclusions can be made

regarding economic issues in the restoration process:

• In this disaster, the geographic and sectoral scope ofeconomic disruption vastly exceeded that of directproperty and human loss, largely due to lengthy electricpower outage to northern Taiwan.

• Prioritization schemes for electric power restorationare possible and can be used to give priority to criticaleconomic sectors and/or facilities.

• The counties and townships hardest hit by thedisaster will require several years and substantialgovernment assistance to recover.

• Reconstruction financing is a contentious issue and itappears that the banking industry may suffer substan-tial losses.

• Earthquake insurance will provide a minimal sourceof reconstruction finance.

• This disaster has demonstrated the need for pre-disaster planning and policy development with respectto issues of disaster relief, reconstruction finance,mitigation, and reconstruction prioritization.


RECOVERYBased on the author’s observations and discus-

sions with professionals in Taiwan, the following short-term restoration strategies and research needs areidentified:

• Promote use of information technology to supportrestoration decision-making — It appears that thereexists a major gap in terms of a reliable data collectionsystem for disaster damage and loss. The resultinglack of credible loss estimates could only causeconfusion as to how much, where, and what kinds ofdisaster assistance are needed. New informationtechnologies, such as the web-GIS disaster decision-support system being developed by the Office of theNational Science & Technology Program for HazardsMitigation, can potentially serve a critical role in central-izing and disseminating information about the disaster.An exchange of experience and ideas with the U.S.(and Japan) could be mutually beneficial in this regard.

• Identify particularly vulnerable and critical eco-nomic sectors, and develop special strategies forthem — If potential bottleneck sectors in the economicrecovery are identified and special assistance pro-vided, overall recovery may be hastened.

• Conduct research on electric power outage andassociated economic impact to Hsinchu Scienceand Industrial Park — Taiwan’s experience could bevery instructive to the U.S. in terms of understandingthe vulnerability of high-tech industries, the economicconsequences of electric power outage, and possibili-ties for strategically prioritizing power restoration toreduce economic loss. Research on this questionwould have to be conducted quickly, before informationdisappears.

• Conduct research on societal and economicimpact and needs with reference to the current largesurvey being sponsored by NCREE — Researchersin Taiwan are mobilizing a large survey effort to collectsocial and economic data on this disaster. The surveyis scheduled to be completed in November 1999.Potentially fruitful exchanges may be made with disas-ter researchers in the U.S. on survey design, findings,and transferable lessons.

Sources: This brief report is based on numerous media sources from9/21/99-10/8/99 (including the Asian Wall Street Journal, China News,Far East Economic Review, Financial Times, New York Times, TaiwanNews, Taipei Times, and Wall Street Journal), as well as informationfrom the National Fire Administration and discussions with academicresearchers and professors. An exchange rate of US $1 = NT $32was used in this report.

foyrogetaCnoitasnepmoC

)$TN(noitasnepmoC )$SU(noitasnepmoC

ylimaffohtaeDrebmem

noillim1 003,13

yrujnisuoireS 000,002 052,6

yletelpmoCesuohdeyortsed

000,002 052,6

yllaitraPesuohdeyortsed

000,001 001,3

yraropmeTdeenretlehs

rognisuohyraropmeTydisbustner000,3$TN

htnomrepnosreprep

rognisuohyraropmeTydisbustner49$SU

htnomrepnosreprep

Table 1. Government disaster relief grants program.

Source: Executive Yuan of Taiwan government (9/28/99)

17


18

EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANDSHORT-TERM RESTORATIONby Paul J. Flores and James D. Goltz

The social-economic consequences from Septem-ber 21, 1999 earthquake were significant.According to Taiwan government sources, more

than 2,350 persons were killed, over 8,700 wereinjured, of which approximately 1,000 required hospi-talization, 4,540 had to be rescued from rubble anddebris, and over 100,000 were displaced from theirhomes.

As compared to some other recent events like the1995 Kobe and 1994 Northridge earthquakes, wherethe damage was highly concentrated, the effects fromthe 921 earthquake were widespread, covering anarea of about 50 kilometers long and 20 kilometerswide. A five county area including the City ofTaichung experienced the greatest damage andcasualties. The widespread nature of the damage andthe extensive disruption to the island’s transportationsystem, made the emergency response to the disasterextremely difficult. These same factors will alsopresent some significant challenges for thegovernment’s short-term restoration of efforts.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE OBSERVATIONSTaiwan did not have large-scale disaster response

or recovery plans in place at the time the earthquakeoccurred. The responsibility for the management ofmost emergencies affecting Taiwan is assigned to theNational Fire Administration (NFA), Interior Ministry. TheNFA did have in place emergency plans and programs,but their focus is on fire and flood incidents, the moretypical disasters affecting Taiwan. Events of this size donot seem to have presented any major problems in thepast so the need for special plans to effectively managea catastrophic earthquake disaster seems to have beenoverlooked. Nevertheless, the government’s overallemergency response to the 921 earthquake seems tohave been expeditious, but to a large extent impro-vised.

The government’s utilization of Taiwan’s extensiveseismographic network greatly contributed to theexpedient emergency response. Taiwan has a sophisti-cated digital seismic network with real-time informationcapability much like the network now being developedin California under the TriNet project. This system hasbeen in place since 1996 and is operated and main-tained by the Seismology Center of Taiwan’s Central

Weather Bureau (CWB). The mainshock magnitude,location and strong motion data for the 921 earthquakewere determined and communicated via paging, faxand the internet (e-mail, www and FTP servers) in 102seconds after the event origin time.

Receipt of rapid information from the networkplayed a key role in early situation assessment at thenational government level. The Director of the Na-tional Fire Administration, part of the Ministry of theInterior, is a recipient of information from the CWB,communicated by pager. Upon notification that theearthquake was over magnitude 7 and located incentral Taiwan, ministry officials assembled at theNational Fire Headquarters at 2:30 a.m. The firstpriority of the gathered ministers was to addressdisruption to the telecommunication systems, primarilydue to extensive electrical power outages, and landtransportation, due to the collapse of several majorbridges and landslides, since these disruptions weregreatly impeding the government’s initial emergencyresponse efforts. The following are other emergency

response observations. Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustratesome aspects of this response.

Urban Search and Rescue

Search and rescue activities were intense duringthe first seven days of the disaster and were accom-plished by a number of agencies, organizations andindividuals. The first to respond with rescue andrecovery operations were residents of the impactedcommunities and victims themselves who accom-plished rescues prior to the arrival of organized teams.Organized search and rescue teams included orga-nized volunteers and local fire agency personnel in thehours immediately following the earthquake. Upon mo-bilization of the armed forces in the afternoon of 9-21,

Source: Tomohidi Atsumi, Osaka University

Figure 1. Stadium in Taichung City was used as anemergency staging area.


19

units joined existing search and rescue teams in theaffected counties. Within 24 hours, internationalsearch and rescue teams representing 21 countriesarrived and were assigned to locations by the NationalFire Administration.

Shelter and Mass Care

The number of locations where victims foundshelter is as difficult to assess in this earthquake asthe number of people displaced from their homes.Agencies of government including cities and countygovernments established shelters, as did the army.These shelters were located at schools and otherpublic buildings in the disaster areas and wereserviced by local government agencies and volun-tary organizations. Services included securityprovided by local police and army units, mealsprepared by volunteers and sanitary facilities, medi-cal care, counseling and other services provided bygovernment agencies and volunteers. There were

also numerous unofficial tent encampments in openspaces, public parks, parking lots and in front ofhomes and residential buildings damaged in theearthquake (as well as undamaged homes).

Emergency Medical

On September 26, the Department of Healthannounced a six-month response medical program byestablishing a medical services bureau in each of the27 townships designated as damaged areas. Underthe plan, one medical institution per township (e.g.,medical center, military hospital or one of the localhealth authorities) was given responsibility for provid-ing or coordinating medical services. The servicesprovided include medical care and information gather-ing on diseases found in the designated area.

SHORT-TERM RESTORATION OBSERVATIONSOnce life-saving operations, such as search and

rescue and emergency medical services, are wellunderway the next major item of business for thegovernment is the setting of priorities for short-termrestoration activities and initiating on-going communi-cations with impacted citizens. The ROC seemed tohave established priorities very quickly, and in awidely circulated public information poster, thesepriorities were presented to the public.

What seemed to be lacking were specific detailson how these priorities were to be implemented. OnOctober 5, 1999, a “Five Year Reconstruction Plan”was announced. The plan is divided into threephases:• Phase 1) between the beginning of October andthe end of November 1999, reconstruction plans willbe developed for the five county disaster area;

• Phase 2) between December 1999 and February2000, the reconstruction plans will be finalized andreconstruction units established;

• Phase 3) during March 2000 and September 2004,the reconstruction plans will be implemented.

Taiwan’s lack of experience in managing largedisasters and the non-existence of disaster assistanceprograms prior to the 921 earthquake, will mostcertainly prolong the recovery effort. Already, thecentral government seemed to be experiencing majorcoordination problems between its ministries and otherlevels of government. An organizational structure thatfully integrates the rebuilding plans and efforts of allgovernment agencies and volunteer organization willneed to be established.

The following are additional observations on short-term restoration activities:


Figure 3. Tents such as these provided immediate shelterfor the displaced population.


Figure 2. Urban search and rescue operations dominatedthe initial emergency response.


Temporary Route Recovery

A number of major transportation routes weredisrupted to due to bridge collapses or landslides.The government moved very fast in providing tempo-

rary alternative routes to maintain linkages betweenpopulations centers and minimize the disruption tothe movement people and goods.

Temporary Housing

The government seemed to have legitimateconcerns about the length of time the shelter andmass care centers established by the armed forcesand/or volunteer groups can be adequately sus-tained. It is recognized that some form of temporaryhousing will need to be provided. Japan has alreadypromised to donate 2,000 prefabricated houses,used during the post-Kobe earthquake reconstruc-tion, to help with this need. While the government isplanning to provide temporary housing, it has reser-vations on whether the displaced population will takeadvantage of this resource. An alternative beingexplored is the utilization of a high number of vacanthousing units under government ownership.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONSA few preliminary conclusions can be made

regarding Taiwan’s emergency response and short-term restoration activities.

• The utilization of the Weather Bureau’s extensivearray of seismographic stations contributed to thegovernment’s expedient emergency response byproviding immediate information on the magnitudeand location of the 921 earthquake. On the otherhand, other information derived from the networks,such as ground motion maps, could have also aidedgovernment officials in estimating damage and socialimpacts.

• The government’s immediate response to theearthquake would have been more effective if it wasguided by pre-existing emergency plans that werewell understood and exercised. The military’s appar-ently effective response was due to its highly disci-plined command and control system. Civil agenciesmust also have such structured plans to guide theiractions during a major disaster.

• The reconstruction of destroyed residential andcommercial property will challenge a governmentthat has had little experience in managing large scaledisasters. The tendency will be to rebuild quickly atthe expense of constructing safer structures, improv-ing the urban environment, and providing for amplecommunity participation. This tendency is notspecific to Taiwan and is prevalent in any majordisaster anywhere in the world. An important factorin this process will be the provision of temporaryhousing and commercial space.

• The government’s emergency route recoveryprogram was expeditious and effective in maintainingkey transportation links and minimizing disruption tothe movement of people and goods.


RECOVERY1. The experience from the 921 earthquake hashopefully raised the awareness of government officialsand the general public of the social and economicimpacts that large earthquakes can cause. Certainly,there is more concern now for a similar damagingearthquake that could impact Taipei. There is a greatneed for all levels of government in Taiwan to institution-alize earthquake preparedness and mitigation pro-grams. The development of emergency responseplans and disaster assistance programs needs to begiven high priority.

2. The application of real-time seismic information andthe utilization of new technologies such as loss estima-tion and GIS was already being pursued by universities,the National Center for Research on EarthquakeEngineering, the National Science and TechnologyProgram for Hazards Mitigation and other institutions.These efforts need to be accelerated and furtherresearch in the loss estimation should be high priority.

3. The almost nonexistent insurance coverage ofresidential and commercial properties has put most ofthe recovery financing burden on the government andlending institutions. The government needs to seriouslylook into expanding the role of insurance in disasterfinancing. Research on this issue should be given veryhigh priority.

4. Financing the rebuilding of commercial and residen-tial properties poses the greatest challenge to thegovernment and lending institutions. Financing pro-grams will need to be well thought out since these willmost likely serve as the basis for the governmentdisaster assistance programs that will need to beinstitutionalized as part of an overall disaster prepared-ness program.

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The government’s utilization ofTaiwan’s extensive seismographicnetwork greatly contributed to theexpedient emergency response.


OBSERVATIONS AND IDEAS FORTHE FUTUREby George C. Lee and Chin-Hsiang Loh

The 921 earthquake offers a chance to learn from“real world experience.” Many issues related toearthquake engineering, from both the research

and practical sides, have been addressed in othersections of this report co-authored by investigators fromboth NCREE and MCEER. Several reconnaissanceteams have also issued technical observation reports (forexample, the NSF-supported team, the EERI team, andothers). In this section, the authors reflect on their ob-servations of the damage from the 921 earthquake andits affect on the local people, their community and gov-ernment infrastructure and the level of public knowledgeon issues of earthquake hazard preparedness. Otherreconnaissance reports have paid special attention toearthquake engineering research opportunities and theimportance of long-term professional practice dealingwith the physical world. The following observations aremade from the total perspective involving human,institutional, and physical infrastructure systems forwhich post-event actions may begin. They are offeredfor the public and the government as Taiwan facesrestoration challenges following the 921 earthquake.

OBSERVATIONS1. If the epicenter of the 921 earthquake had beenlocated just 50 miles either North or South of theTaichung/Nantou area, the devastation to Taiwan’seconomy and quality of life would have been muchworse. To the North, the high-tech industrial park in Hsin-Chu and the political and economic center Taipei wouldhave been struck; to the South, the center of heavyindustry and manufacturing KaoHsiung could have beendestroyed or seriously damaged. Eventually, these areaswill be hit with a major earthquake. The opportunityexists today to carry out careful loss estimation and riskassessment studies for these areas. Ground motion,geotechnical and structural design information all exist insufficient quantities to conduct credible analyses ofpossible earthquake scenarios. These results couldhave a significant impact on the general public, electedofficials and other decision-makers and stakeholders inTaiwan. Many individuals and organizations have gainedfinancially from the booming real estate market of thepast several decades – these groups will surely besupportive of such studies while the 921 earthquake isfresh in the population’s collective memory. This type ofstudy would allow for some quantification of the vulner-ability of critical regions in Taiwan and could serve as thefocus for a sustained effort in public education.

2. There is an immediate need for reliable methods ofevaluating the extent of damage to a structure so thatproper decisions can be made with regard to retrofit/repair/replacement of the structure. More than 7,000damaged buildings (unconfirmed) remain standing inand around the epicenter and they all need criticalassessment of the damage sustained. This is a signifi-cant opportunity to begin accumulating the knowledge

about “building damage” by developing an “expertsystem” or standardized system of measures for non-destructive building evaluation. Of high priority is theevaluation of essential infrastructure buildings such ascommand centers, hospitals, manufacturing complexesand critical lifeline systems such as water, electricalpower networks and bridges. An additional researcheffort to explore advanced technologies for deploymentand implementation of emergency response, communi-cation and rescue is also appropriate at this point, basedon the lessons learned. There are many other long-termresearch opportunities in earthquake engineering thatwill not be addressed in this article.

3. The current emergency management and restorationorganizational structure was swiftly and rapidly estab-lished immediately after the earthquake. It should bereplaced gradually by a long-term institutional infrastruc-ture which involves agencies at all government levelsconcerning all types of hazards. But beyond a simpleblock diagram of the hierarchy, such a system requiresthoughtful implementation. One very important elementis the appointment of the proper individuals at keypositions in the various agencies (an Emergency Re-sponse Corps - the ERC). In an emergency situation,these individuals of the ERC are the connecting nodes ofthe system of agencies. They must be well versed inand loyal to the overall strategic and tactical aims of thesystem because they may be called upon to makedecisions on short notice without the ability to consulteither their superiors or their subordinates. Theseindividuals would need to meet regularly, say twice ayear, to review the emergency operating plan, and toupdate their coordinated efforts in mitigation and emer-gency preparedness, including training and practice foremergency professionals. An institutional infrastructurefor multiple hazard mitigation and response may beorganized differently consistent with a country’s ownsystem and culture. The system in the United States(Congressional hearings and actions, the NEHRPagencies, the lead agency FEMA and its regional office,

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The opportunity exists today to carryout careful loss estimation and riskassessment studies.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHYby Laura Taddeo

The following bibliography is a selected listing ofitems available through the University at Buffalo librar-ies. The list provides an overview of available materialsand is meant to be a starting point for further reading.Additional materials can be obtained by contacting theMCEER Information Service.

OVERVIEWS“Historical Earthquakes and the Seismograms in Taiwan,” byPao Hua Lee in Historical Seismograms and Earthquakes ofthe World. San Diego: Academic Press, Inc, 1988.

“Seismic Zoning on Ground Motions in Taiwan Area” by Chin-Hsiung Loh and Wen-Yu Jean in Seismic Behavior of Groundand Geotechnical Structures. Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema,1997, pages 71-79.

“Seimic Hazard and Uncertainty Analysis of the Taiwan Area,”by Chin-Hsiung Loh and Fwu-Shing Baw in Soil Dynamicsand Earthquake Engineering, volume 11, number 8, 1992,pages 497-508.

“Some Aspects of Seismicity in Taiwan Region,” by Jeen-HwaWang, Y-Ben Tsai, and Kou-Cheng Chen in Proceedings ofthe CCNAA-AIT Joint Seminar on Research for MultipleHazards Mitigation; National Cheng-Kung University,January 16-19, 1984. Edited by Leon Ru-Liang Wang andMaw Shyong Sheu. Tainan, Taiwan: National Cheng-KungUniversity, 1984, pages 562-580.

Catalogue of the Earthquakes in Taiwan from 1604-1988,Technical Report IES-R-661 by S.N. Cheng and Y.T. Yeh.Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of Earth Sciences, Academia Sinica.

STUDIES ON PREVIOUS EARTHQUAKES“The 16 September 1994 earthquake in the Taiwan Strait andits Tectonic Implications,” by Honn Kao and Francis T. Wu inTAO: Terrestrial, Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences,volume 7, issue 1, March 1996, pages 13-29.

Northern Taiwan Earthquake, November 15, 1986: An EQEBrief, February 1987, by Hai-Chow Lee. San Francisco: EQEIncorporated, 1987.

“A Study on the Great Eastern Taiwan Earthquakes of 1951 andthe Distribution of Great Earthquakes in Taiwan,” by Cheh-Yi Suin Bulletin of the International Institute of Seismology andEarthquake Engineering, volume 21, 1985, pages 177-194.

CODES/ZONING“Seismic Hazard in Taiwan,” by Yeong Tein Yeh and Chin-Hsiung Loh in Practice of Earthquake Hazard Assessment.Denver, Colorado: International Association of Seismology andPhysics of the Earth’s Interior (IASPEI), 1993, pages 231-238.

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etc. and how they function) can be used as a startingpoint for development.

In general, a functioning institutional infrastructuresystem is much more difficult to establish than to recon-struct the physical infrastructure system. The latter maybe targeted to complete in three or five years if resourcesare available. Emergency response and short-termactions require a top-down approach. But for long termre-establishment, the top-down approach must becoupled with the bottom-up efforts of the participation ofa well-educated public. The government must considerthe current emergency management organizationalstructure as the beginning of a sustained pursuit, not asa one-shot event. One action to enhance the bottom-upeffort is to define the responsibilities of elected districtadministrators (county executives, town supervisors,etc.) to maintain inventory of the physical environment inthe district and be knowledgeable of the issues makingthe district more resilient.

4. One of the most pressing issues in short-term restora-tion is that of construction quality. This has always beenan ill-defined factor that makes the evaluation of existingdamaged facilities more difficult. It also becomes afactor of importance in the time immediately following anearthquake, as reconstruction begins. Other issues suchas public education, research, institutional effectivenessand building code improvements are longer term efforts.However, working with the real estate and constructionindustry can and should begin immediately with therestoration efforts. A workshop might be organized toreview the current practice in building inspections (seeitem 2 above) and construction monitoring. Additionalguidelines or recommendations would be issued asnecessary. Building inspection and construction qualityassurance should be examined from the overall perspec-tive of planning, design, construction, decision-makingprocesses (in the case of public works) and cost.

5. The short- and long-term research needs identified bythe 921 earthquake indicate that most of the researchprograms of MCEER and NCREE, particularly thoseinvolving current and potential joint MCEER-NCREEresearch efforts in loss estimation and risk assessment,in developing retrofit strategies for critical facilities (waterand electric power networks, medical facilities andbridges) and in application of advanced technologies instructural response mitigation and emergency responsescan benefit from the real world experience of the 921earthquake, and at the same time make a contribution tothe state-of-the-art of earthquake engineering practiceboth in Taiwan and U.S. We look forward to a successstory resulting from this center-to-center cooperationenhanced by the 921 earthquake.

This article is an excerpt from a longer paper entitled “Some Humanand Institutional Perspectives of the 921 Earthquake in Taiwan: LessonsLearned.” The entire paper is on MCEER’s web site at http://mceer.buffalo.edu.


“Taiwan,” by Yohchia Chen and Julius P. Wong in InternationalHandbook of Earthquake Engineering: Codes, Programs, andExamples. New York: Chapman & Hall, 1994, pages 447-453.

SEISMOLOGY/GEOLOGY/GEOTECHNICAL ISSUESAn Introduction to the Active Faults of Taiwan by Hui-Cheng Chang, et al. Taipei, Taiwan: Central Geological Survey,MOEA, 1998.

“Large Earthquakes and Crustal Deformation Near Taiwan,” bySilvio K. Pezzopane and Steven G. Wesnousky in Journal ofGeophysical Research, volume 94, number, B6, June 10,1989, pages 7250-7264.

“Seismotectonics of Taiwan,” by Y. B. Tsai. Tectonophysics,volume 125, issue 1-3, 1986, pages 16-37.

“Source Geometry and Slip Distribution of the April 21, 1935Hsinchu-Taichung, Taiwan Earthquake,” by Bor-Shouh Huangand Yeong Tein Yeh in Tectonophysics, volume 210, number1/2, August 30, 1992, pages 77-90.

“Focal Mechanisms of Recent Large Earthquakes and the Natureof Faulting in the Longitudinal Valley of Eastern Taiwan,” byFrancis T. Wu, et al. in Proceedings of the Geological Societyof China, volume 32, number 2, April 1989, pages 157-177.

LIFELINES/BRIDGES/BUILDINGS“Seismic Assessment and Renovation Study for HighwayBridges,” by C.C. Chern, et al. in Structural Engineering inNatural Hazards Mitigation: Proceedings of PapersPresented at the Structures Congress ’93; Irvine,California, April 19-21, 1993. Edited by A.H-S. Ang and R.Villaverde. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers,1993, pages 881-886.

“A Knowledge-Based Design System for the Design ofFreeway and Highway Bridges in Taiwan,” by Chen-ChengChen, Ching-Churn Chern and Chen-Ji Chen in Proceedingsof the International Workshop on Civil InfrastructureSystems: Application of Intelligent Sysytems andAdvanced Materials on Bridge Systems; National TaiwanUniversity, January 10-12, 1994. (NCEER-94-0019). Buffalo,New York: National Center for Earthquake EngineeringResearch, July 1994, pages 205-214.

“Bridge Planning, Design Philosophy and Expectations in theTaiwan Area National Expressway,” by C.H. Kuo and C. F. Leein Proceedings of the International Workshop on CivilInfrastructure Systems: Application of Intelligent Sysytemsand Advanced Materials on Bridge Systems; NationalTaiwan University, January 10-12, 1994. (NCEER-94-0019).Buffalo, New York: National Center for Earthquake EngineeringResearch, July 1994, pages 29-47.

“Seismic Behavior of Yuansan Freeway Bridge in Taipei,” byChing-Churn Chern and Yue-Poa Hwang in Proceedings ofthe US-Korea Joint Seminar/Workshop on CriticalEngineering System; Seoul, Korea, May 11-15, 1987. Editedby Chang-Koon Choi and Alfred H.S. Alfredo. [Publisher andplace of publication unknown], volume 1, 1987, pages 365-376.

“Seismic Hazard Analysis of Taipei Metropolitan RapidTransportation Chung-Ho Line in Taiwan,” by Hui-Mi Hsu, Kuo-Ping Chang and Jin-Tsuen Yang in Proceedings of the FifthInternational Conference of Seismic Zonation; Nice,France, October 17-19, 1995. Nantes, France: OuestEditions, 1995, volume 1, pages 366-373.

“Seismic Design of 50-Story Shin Kuan Insurance Building,” byH. M. Liao, Joseph Penzien, and Jiang-Yang Tsai inProceedings of the CCNAA-AIT Joint Seminar on Researchand Application for Multiple Hazards Mitigation; Taipei,April 11-15, 1988. Edited by Franklin Y. Cheng and Yeong TeinYeh. Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of Earth Sciences, AcademiaSinica, volume 1, April 1988, pages 399-414.

MITIGATION“The Population, Earthquake Disasters and the Problem ofReducing Earthquake Risk in the Taiwan Island,” by LiuGuangxia in Journal of Natural Disasters (Ziran ZaihaiXuebao), volume 1, number 2, April 1992, pages 94-101. (InChinese, includes English abstracts).

On the Earthquake Prevention and Emergency Responsefor the General Public in Taiwan, by Chang-Ping Chiou.Taipei: National Taiwan University, Center for EarthquakeEngineering Research, 1985.

“Design and Implementation of Earthquake Early WarningSystems in Taiwan,” by W.H.K. Lee, T.C. Shin, and T.L. Teng inProceedings of the Eleventh World Conference onEarthquake Engineering. Oxford, England: Pergamon, Disc4, 1996, paper number 2133.

WEB SITES/LINKS TO INFORMATIONNational Earthquake Information Center(NEIC): Earthquake BulletinWeb Address: http://wwwneic.cr.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/99_EVENTS/990920174719/990920174719.HTML

USGS: Reports on the ChiChi (Taiwan) EarthquakeWeb Address: http://caldera.wr.usgs.gov/

NCREE: JiJi Earthquake. (In Chinese)Web Address: http://921.ncree.gov.tw/.

EQE International: Field Investigation Team to TaiwanWeb Address: http://www.eqe.com/revamp/taipei2.htm.

EQE Reconnaissance Team in Taipei, TaiwanWeb Address: http://www.eqe.com/revamp/taipei9.htm.

GEES: The Preliminary Report of the National Science FoundationGeotechnical Earthquake Engineering ReconnaissanceWeb Address: http://rccg03.usc.edu/RecentEQ/Taiwan/LinksTW.htm.

NISEE: National Information Service for Earthquake EngineeringWeb Address: http://nisee.ce.berkeley.edu/taiwan/.

IRIS: Special Event Page - Taiwan EarthquakeWeb Address: http://www.iris.washington.edu/DOCS/taiwan.htm.

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FOR MORE INFORMATIONThe Multidisciplinary Center for EarthquakeEngineering ResearchUniversity at Buffalo, State University of New YorkRed Jacket QuadrangleBuffalo, NY 14261-0025Phone: 716/645-3391 Fax: 716/645-3399E-mail: [email protected] Wide Web Site: http://mceer.buffalo.edu

Information Servicec/o Science and Engineering Library304 Capen HallState University of New York at BuffaloBuffalo, NY 14260-2200Phone: 716/645-3377 Fax: 716/645-3379E-mail: [email protected]

MCEER CONTRIBUTORSGeorge C. Lee, Director, MCEER and the University at BuffaloMichel Bruneau, MCEER and the University at BuffaloIan G. Buckle, University of Nevada - RenoStephanie E. Chang, University of Washington and EQE InternationalPaul J. Flores, EQE InternationalJames D. Goltz, California Institute of Technology (as part of theEERI reconnaissance team)Thomas D. O’Rourke, Cornell UniversityMasanobu Shinozuka, University of Southern CaliforniaTsu T. Soong, University at BuffaloLaura Taddeo, MCEER Information Service

National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering NCREE CONTRIBUTORS

Chin-Hsiung Loh, Director, NCREE and National Taiwan UniversityKuo-Chun Chang, National Taiwan UniversityZhe-Jung Chen, National Central University and Center for Spaceand Remote Sensing ResearchJenn-Shin Hwang, National Taiwan University of Science andTechnology, NCREEMeei-Ling Lin, National Taiwan UniversityGee-Yu Liu, NCREEKeh-Chyuan Tsai, National Taiwan UniversityGeorge C. Yao, National Cheng Kung UniversityChin-Lien Yen, National Taiwan University, Office of NationalScience and Technology Hazard Mitigation

Headquartered at the University of Buffalo, State University of New York

University at BuffaloState University of New YorkRed Jacket QuadrangleBox 610025Buffalo, New York 14261

PRODUCTION STAFFJane Stoyle, EditorJenna L. Tyson, CompositionHector Velasco, IllustrationWilliam Wittrock, Graphic Design

Some of the material reported herein is based upon work supported inwhole or in part by the National Science Foundation, the State of NewYork, the Federal Highway Administration of the U.S. Department ofTransportation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and othersponsors. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommenda-tions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and donot necessarily reflect the views of MCEER or its sponsors.

mceer/ncree response: preliminary report on the 921 taiwan

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