maturana - biology of cognition (1970)

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BIOLOGY OF COGNITION

Humberto R. Maturana

Biological Computer Laboratory Research ReportBCL 9.0.

Urbana IL: University of Illinois, 1970.

As Reprinted in:

Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of theLiving

Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980, pp.5-58.

This Observer Web Archive Edition provides you an online version of an

important document, formatted to reflect its original appearance.

This material is presented with the gracious permission of the author(Professor Maturana).

This presentation is formatted to reflect the pagination of the paper'sreprinting in Autopoiesis and Cognition

Parenthetical notes of the form [Note X] represent editor / transcribercomments, and are not part of the original published text.

This HTML transcription (exclusive of the otherwise copyrighted material) iscopyright © 2000 Randall Whitaker.

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE PROBLEM

Maturana (1970): Biology of Cognition http://www.enolagaia.com/M70-80BoC.html#VI.

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III. COGNITIVE FUNCTION INGENERAL

THE OBSERVER

THE LIVING SYSTEM

EVOLUTION

THE COGNITIVE PROCESS

IV. COGNITIVE FUNCTION INPARTICULAR

NERVE CELLS

ARCHITECTURE

FUNCTION

REPRESENTATION

DESCRIPTION

THINKING

NATURAL LANGUAGE

MEMORY AND LEARNING

THE OBSERVER(Epistemological and Ontological

Implications)

V. PROBLEMS IN THENEUROPHYSIOLOGY OFCOGNITION

VI. CONCLUSIONS

POST SCRIPTUM

(In: Autopoiesis and Cognition)

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HUMBERTO R. MATURANA

BIOLOGY OF COGNITION

I. INTRODUCTION


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Man knows and his capacity to know depends onhis biological integrity; furthermore, he knowsthat he knows. As a basic psychological and,hence, biological function cognition guides hishandling of the universe and knowledge givescertainty to his acts; objective knowledge seemspossible and through objective knowledge theuniverse appears systematic and predictable. Yetknowledge as an experience is somethingpersonal and private that cannot be transferred,and that which one believes to be transferable,objective knowledge, must always be created bythe listener: the listener understands, andobjective knowledge appears transferred, only ifhe is prepared to understand. Thus cognition as abiological function is such that the answer to thequestion, 'What is cognition?' must arise fromunderstanding knowledge and the knowerthrough the latter's capacity to know.

Such is my endeavor.

Epistemology

The basic claim of science is objectivity: itattempts, through the application of a welldefined methodology, to make statements aboutthe universe. At the very root of this claim,however, lies its weakness: the a prioriassumption that objective knowledge constitutesa description of that which is known. Suchassumption begs the questions, 'What is it toknow?' and 'How do we know?'.

Biology

(a) The greatest hindrance in the understandingof the living organization lies in the impossibilityof accounting for it by the enumeration of itsproperties; it must be understood as a unity. Butif the organism is a unity, in what sense are itscomponent properties it parts? The organismicapproach does not answer this question, it merelyrestates it by insisting that there are elements of


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organization that subordinate each part to thewhole and make the organism

[Note 1]

[Note 1] The ungrammatical phrasing "...are its ... properties ... it parts" appears inthe original. It should, of course, read "... in what sense are its component propertiesits parts?" - Ed.


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a unity [Cf. Bertalanffy, 1960]. The questions'How does this unity arise?' and 'To what extentmust it be considered a property of theorganization of the organism, as opposed to aproperty emerging from its mode of life?' remainopen. A similar difficulty exists for theunderstanding of the functional organization ofthe nervous system, particularly if one considersthe higher functions of man. Enumeration of thetransfer functions of all nerve cells would leaveus with a list, but not with a system capable ofabstract thinking, description, andself-description. Such an approach would beg thequestion, 'How does the living organization giverise to cognition in general and to self-cognitionin particular?'

(b) Organisms are adapted to their environments,and it has appeared adequate to say of them thattheir organization represents the 'environment' inwhich they live, and that through evolution theyhave accumulated information about it, coded in


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their nervous systems. Similarly it has been saidthat the sense organs gather information aboutthe 'environment', and through learning thisinformation is coded in the nervous system [Cf.Young, 1967]. Yet this general view begs thequestions, 'What does it mean to "gatherinformation"?' and 'What is coded in the geneticand nervous systems?'.

A successful theory of cognition would answerboth the epistemological and the biologicalquestions. This I propose to do, and the purposeof this essay is to put forward a theory ofcognition that should provide an epistemologicalinsight into the phenomenon of cognition, and anadequate view of the functional organization ofthe cognizant organism that gives rise to suchphenomena as conceptual thinking, language,and self-consciousness.

In what follows I shall not offer any formaldefinitions for the various terms used, such as'cognition', 'life', or 'interaction', but I shall lettheir meaning appear through their usage. This Ishall do because I am confident that the internalconsistency of the theory will show that theseterms indeed adequately refer to the phenomenaI am trying to account for, and because I speak asan observer, and the validity of what I say at anymoment has its foundation in the validity of thewhole theory, which, I assert, explains why I cansay it. Accordingly, I expect the complete work togive foundation to each of its parts, which thusappear justified only in the perspective of thewhole.

Note: I shall be speaking of theorganism as a unity, but when I wrotethis essay I was not aware that theword unit did not always quite meanunity. Since I cannot now correct this. Ibeg the reader to bear this in mind.


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II. THE PROBLEM

(1) Cognition is a biologicalphenomenon and can only beunderstood as such; anyepistemological insight into thedomain of knowledge requires thisunderstanding.

(2) If such an insight is to beattained, two questions must beconsidered:

What is cognition as a function?

What is cognition as a process?


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III. COGNITIVE FUNCTION INGENERAL

THE OBSERVER

(1) Anything said is said by an observer. In hisdiscourse the observer speaks to anotherobserver, who could be himself; whatever appliesto the one applies to the other as well. Theobserver is a human being, that is, a livingsystem, and whatever applies to living systemsapplies also to him.

(2) The observer beholds simultaneously theentity that he considers (an organism, in ourcase) and the universe in which it lies (theorganism's environment). This allows him tointeract independently with both and to haveinteractions that are necessarily outside thedomain of interactions of the observed entity.

(3) It is an attribute of the observer to be able tointeract independently with the observed entityand with its relations; for him both are units ofinteraction (entities).

(4) For the observer an entity is an entity whenhe can describe it. To describe is to enumeratethe actual or potential interactions and relationsof the described entity. Accordingly, the observercan describe an entity only if there is at least oneother entity from which he can distinguish it andwith which he can observe it to interact or relate.This second entity that serves as a reference forthe description can be any entity, but the ultimatereference for any description is the observerhimself.

(5) The set of all interactions into which an entitycan enter is its domain of interactions. The set ofall relations (interactions through the observer)


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in which an entity can be observed is its domainof relations. This latter domain lies within thecognitive domain of the observer. An entity is anentity if it has a domain of interactions, and if thisdomain includes interactions with the observerwho can specify for it a domain of relations. Theobserver can define an entity by specifying itsdomain of interactions; thus part of an entity, agroup of entities, or their relations, can be madeunits of interactions (entities) by the observer.

(6) The observer can define himself as an entityby specifying his own domain of interactions; hecan always remain an observer of theseinteractions, which he can treat as independententities.


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(7) The observer is a living system and anunderstanding of cognition as a biologicalphenomenon must account for the observer andhis role in it.

THE LIVING SYSTEM

(1) Living systems are units of interactions; theyexist in an ambience. From a purely biologicalpoint of view they cannot be understoodindependently of that part of the ambience withwhich they interact: the niche; nor can the nichebe defined independently of the living system thatspecifies it.


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(2) Living systems as they exist on earth todayare characterized by exergonic metabolism,growth and internal molecular reproduction, allorganized in a closed causal circular process thatallows for evolutionary change in the way thecircularity is maintained, but not for the loss ofthe circularity itself. Exergonic metabolism isrequired to provide energy for the endergonicsynthesis of specific polymers (proteins, nucleicacids, lipids, polysaccharides) from thecorresponding monomers, that is, for growth andreplication; special replication procedures securethat the polymers synthesized be specific, thatthey should have the monomer sequence properto their class; specific polymers (enzymes) arerequired for the exergonic metabolism and thesynthesis of specific polymers (proteins, nucleicacids, lipids, polysaccharides) [Cf. Commoner,19651.

This circular organization constitutes ahomeostatic system whose function is to produceand maintain this very same circular organizationby determining that the components that specifyit be those whose synthesis or maintenance itsecures. Furthermore, this circular organizationdefines a living system as a unit of interactionsand is essential for its maintenance as a unit; thatwhich is not in it is external to it or does notexist. The circular organization in which thecomponents that specify it are those whosesynthesis or maintenance it secures in a mannersuch that the product of their functioning is thesame functioning organization that producesthem, is the living organization.

(3) It is the circularity of its organization thatmakes a living system a unit of interactions, andit is this circularity that it must maintain in orderto remain a living system and to retain its identitythrough different interactions. All the peculiaraspects of the different kinds of organisms aresuperimposed on this basic circularity and are


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subsequent to it, securing its continuancethrough successive interactions in an alwayschanging environment. A living system definesthrough its organization the domain of allinteractions into which it can possibly enterwithout losing its identity, and it maintains itsidentity only as long as the basic circularity thatdefines it as a unit of


interactions remains unbroken. Strictly, theidentity of a unit of interactions that otherwisechanges continuously is maintained only withrespect to the observer, for whom its character asa unit of interactions remains unchanged.

(4) Due to the circular nature of its organization aliving system has a self-referring domain ofinteractions (it is a self-referring system), and itscondition of being a unit of interactions ismaintained because its organization hasfunctional significance only in relation to themaintenance of its circularity and defines itsdomain of interactions accordingly.

(5) Living systems as units of interactionsspecified by their condition of being livingsystems cannot enter into interactions that arenot specified by their organization. Thecircularity of their organization continuouslybrings them back to the same internal state(same with respect to the cyclic process). Eachinternal state requires that certain conditions(interactions with the environment be satisfied in


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order to proceed to the next state. Thus, thecircular organization implies the prediction thatan interaction that took place once will take placeagain. If this does not happen the systemdisintegrates; if the predicted interaction doestake place, the system maintains its integrity(identity with respect to the observer) and entersinto a new prediction. In a continuously changingenvironment these predictions can only besuccessful if the environment does not change inthat which is predicted. Accordingly, thepredictions implied in the organization of theliving system are not predictions of particularevents, but of classes of interactions. Everyinteraction is a particular interaction, but everyprediction is a prediction of a class of interactionsthat is defined by those features of its elementsthat will allow the living system to retain itscircular organization after the interaction, andthus, to interact again. This makes living systemsinferential systems, and their domain ofinteractions a cognitive domain.

(6) The niche is defined by the classes ofinteractions into which an organism cam enter.The environment is defined by the classes ofinteractions into which the observer can enterand which he treats as a context for hisinteractions with the observed organism. Theobserver beholds organism and environmentsimultaneously and he considers as the niche ofthe organism that part of the environment whichhe observes to lie in its domain of interactions.Accordingly, as for the observer the nicheappears as part of the environment, for theobserved organism the niche constitutes its entiredomain of interactions, and as such it cannot bepart of the environment that lies exclusively inthe cognitive domain of the observer. Niche andenvironment, then, intersect only to the extentthat the observer (including instruments) and theorganism have comparable organizations, buteven then


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there are always parts of the environment that liebeyond any possibility of intersection with thedomain of interactions of the organism, and thereare parts of the niche that lie beyond anypossibility of intersection with the domain ofinteractions of the observer. Thus for every livingsystem its organization implies a prediction of aniche, and the niche thus predicted as a domainof classes of interactions constitutes its entirecognitive reality. If an organism interacts in amanner not prescribed by its organization, it doesso as something different from the unit ofinteractions defined by its basic circularity, andthis interaction remains outside its cognitivedomain, although it may well lie within thecognitive domain of the observer.

(7) Every unit of interactions can participate ininteractions relevant to other, moreencompassing units of interactions. If in doingthis a living system does not lose its identity, itsniche may evolve to be contained by the largerunit of interactions and thus be subservient to it.If this larger unit of interactions is (or becomes)in turn also a self-referring system in which itscomponents (themselves self-referring systems)are subservient to its maintenance as a unit ofinteractions, then it must itself be (or become)subservient to the maintenance of the circularorganization of its components. Thus, a particularself-referring system may have the circularorganization of a living system or partake


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functionally of the circular organization of itscomponents, or both. The society of bees (thehoney producing bees) is an example of a thirdorder self-referring system of this kind; it has acircular organization superimposed on the secondorder self-referring systems that are the bees,which in turn have a circular organizationsuperimposed on the first order living systemsthat are the cells; all three systems with theirdomains of interactions are subordinated both tothe maintenance of themselves and to themaintenance of the others.

EVOLUTION

(1) Evolutionary change in living systems is theresult of that aspect of their circular organizationwhich secures the maintenance of their basiccircularity, allowing in each reproductive step forchanges in the way this circularity is maintained.Reproduction and evolution are not essential forthe living organization, but they have beenessential for the historical transformation of thecognitive domains of the living systems on earth.

(2) For a change to occur in the domain ofinteractions of a unit of interactions without itslosing its identity with respect to the observer itmust suffer an internal change. Conversely, if aninternal change occurs in a unit of


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interactions, without its losing its identity, itsdomain of interactions changes. A living systemsuffers an internal change without loss of identityif the predictions brought forth by the internalchange are predictions which do not interferewith its fundamental circular organization. Asystem changes only if its domain of interactionschanges.

(3) After reproduction the new unit ofinteractions has the same domain of interactionsas the parental one only if it has the sameorganization. Conversely, the new unit ofinteractions has a different domain of interactionsonly if its organization is different, and hence,implies different predictions about the niche.

(4) Predictions about the niche are inferencesabout classes of interactions. Consequently,particular interactions which areindistinguishable for an organism may bedifferent for an observer if he has a differentcognitive domain and can describe them asdifferent elements of a class defined by theconduct of the organism. The same applies tointeractions that are identical for the organismbut different for (have different effects) itsdifferent internal parts. Such interactions mayresult in different modifications of the internalstates of the organism and, hence, determinedifferent paths of change in its domain ofinteractions without loss of identity. Thesechanges may bring about the production ofoffspring having domains of interactions differentfrom the parental ones. If this is the case and anew system thus produced predicts a niche thatcannot be actualized, it disintegrates; otherwiseit maintains its identity and a new cycle begins.

(5) What changes from generation to generationin the evolution of living systems are thoseaspects of their organization which aresubservient to the maintenance of their basic


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circularity but do not determine it, and whichallow them to retain their identity throughinteractions; that is, what changes is the way inwhich the basic circularity is maintained, and notthis basic circularity in itself. The manner inwhich a living system is compounded as a unit ofinteractions, whether by a single basic unit, orthrough the aggregation of numerous such units(themselves living systems) that togetherconstitute a larger one (multicellular organisms),or still through the aggregation of theircompound units that form self-referring systemsof even higher order (insect societies, nations) isof no significance; what evolves is always a unitof interactions defined by the way in which itmaintains its identity. The evolution of the livingsystems is the evolution of the niches of the unitsof interactions defined by their self-referringcircular organization, hence, the evolution of thecognitive domains.


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THE COGNITIVE PROCESS

(1) A cognitive system is a system whoseorganization defines a domain of interactions inwhich it can act with relevance to themaintenance of itself, and the process ofcognition is the actual (inductive) acting orbehaving in this domain. Living systems arecognitive systems, and living as a process is aprocess of cognition. This statement is valid forall organisms, with and without a nervous system.


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(2) If a living system enters into a cognitiveinteraction, its internal state is changed in amanner relevant to its maintenance, and it entersinto a new interaction without loss of its identity.In an organism without a nervous system (or itsfunctional equivalent) its interactions are of achemical or physical nature (a molecule isabsorbed and an enzymatic process is initiated; aphoton is captured and a step in photosynthesis iscarried out). For such an organism the relationsholding between the physical events remainoutside its domain of interactions. The nervoussystem enlarges the domain of interactions of theorganism by making its internal states alsomodifiable in a relevant manner by 'purerelations', not only by physical events; theobserver sees that the sensors of an animal (say,a cat) are modified by light, and that the animal(the cat) is modified by a visible entity (say, abird). The sensors change through physicalinteractions: the absorption of light quanta; theanimal is modified through its interactions withthe relations that hold between the activatedsensors that absorbed the light quanta at thesensory surface. The nervous system expands thecognitive domain of the living system by makingpossible interactions with 'pure relations'; it doesnot create cognition.

(3) Although the nervous system expands thedomain of interactions of the organism bybringing into this domain interactions with 'purerelations', the function of the nervous system issubservient to the necessary circularity of theliving organization.

(4) The nervous system, by expanding the domainof interactions of the organism, has transformedthe unit of interactions and has subjected actingand interacting in the domain of 'pure relations'to the process of evolution. As a consequence,there are organisms that include as a subset oftheir possible interactions, interactions with their


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own internal states (as states resulting fromexternal and internal interactions) as if they wereindependent entities, generating the apparentparadox of including their cognitive domainwithin their cognitive domain. In us this paradoxis resolved by what we call 'abstract thinking',another expansion of the cognitive domain.


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(5) Furthermore, the expansion of the cognitivedomain into the domain of 'pure relations' bymeans of a nervous system allows fornon-physical interactions between organismssuch that the interacting organisms orient eachother toward interactions within their respectivecognitive domains. Herein lies the basis forcommunication: the orienting behavior becomes arepresentation of the interactions toward which itorients, and a unit of interactions in its ownterms. But this very process generates anotherapparent paradox: there are organisms thatgenerate representations of their owninteractions by specifying entities with whichthey interact as if they belonged to anindependent domain, while as representationsthey only map their own interactions. In us thisparadox is resolved simultaneously in two ways:

(a) We become observers throughrecursively generating representations ofour interactions, and by interacting withseveral representations simultaneously wegenerate relations with the representationsof which we can then interact and repeat


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this process recursively, thus remaining in adomain of interactions always larger thanthat of the representations.

(b) We become self-conscious throughself-observation; by making descriptions ofourselves (representations), and byinteracting with our descriptions we candescribe ourselves describing ourselves, inan endless recursive process.


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IV. COGNITIVE FUNCTION INPARTICULAR

NERVE CELLS

(1) The neuron is the anatomical unit of thenervous system because it is a cell, and as such itis an independent integrated self-referringmetabolic and genetic unit (a living systemindeed).

(2) Anatomically and functionally a neuron isformed by a collector area (dendrites, and insome cases, also the cell body and part of theaxon) united via a distributive element (the axon,and in some cases, also the cell body and maindendrites), capable of conducting propagatedspikes to an effector area formed by the terminalbranching of the axon. The functional state of thecollector area depends on both its internal state(reference state) and on the state of activity ofthe effector areas synapsing on it.


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Correspondingly, the state of activity of theeffector area depends on both the train ofimpulses generated at the correspondingcollector area and on the pre-synaptic andnon-synaptic interactions with distributiveelements and other effector areas that may takeplace in the neuropil and in the immediatevicinity of the next collector areas. This is trueeven in the case of amacrine cells, in which thecollector and effector areas may be intermingled.The distributive element determines where theeffector exerts its influence.

(3) Whether one or two branches of a bifurcatingaxon are invaded by a nerve impulse propagatingalong it depends on their relative diameter andon the state of polarization of their membranes attheir origin in the bifurcation zone. As a result,the pattern of effector activity, that is, the patternof branch invasion which a train of impulsesdetermines in the branches of the distributionelement and effector area of a neuron, depends(i) on the spike internal distribution of the train ofimpulses, which determines the time that theaxonal membrane at the branching zone has forrecovery before the arrival of the next spike, and(ii) on the non synaptic influences which, in theform of local water and ion movements caused bythe electric activity of neighboring elements, mayproduce diameter and polarization changes at thebranching zones, and thus modify the invisibilityof the branches by the arriving spikes.

(4) At any moment the state of activity of a nervecell, as represented by


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the pattern of impulses traveling along itsdistributive element, is a function of the spatio-temporal configuration of its input, as determinedby the relative activity holding between theafferent neurons, that modulates the referencestate proper of the collector area. It is known thatin many neurons the recurrence of a givenafferent spatio-temporal configuration results inthe recurrence of the same state of activity,independently of the way in which such a spatio-temporal configuration is generated [Cf.Maturana and Frenk, 1963; Morrell, 1967]. [Thisis so in the understanding that two states ofactivity in a given cell are the 'same' (equivalent)if they belong to the same class, as defined by thepattern of impulses that they generate, and notbecause they are a one-to-one mapping of eachother.] Also, the spatio-temporal configuration ofthe input to a neuron that causes in it therecurrence of a given state of activity is a class ofafferent influences defined by a pattern in therelations holding between the active afferentsand the collector; a given class of responses iselicited by a given class of afferent influences.

(5) For every nerve cell, at any moment, itstransfer function at its collector area is awell-defined deterministic process [Cf. Segundoand Perkel, 1969]. Many neurons have severaltransfer functions, and different classes ofafferent influences change their activitydifferently, causing them to generate differentclasses of activity in their effector areas. Becauseevery nerve cell participates in the generation ofthe spatio-temporal configuration of afferentinfluences on the other nerve cells, all their statesof activity must be considered as significant fortheir next states of activity. Thus there are twoaspects to consider with respect to the activity ofany given neuron: (i) its genesis, which must be


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considered in reference to the neuron itself andto the afferents to it; (ii) its participation in thegeneration of activity in other neurons for whichit is an afferent influence, which must beconsidered in reference to those other neurons.In both cases the interactions between theneurons involved are strictly deterministic,although what is cause in one is not necessarilycause in another.

(6) The nerve impulses that travel along thedistributive element originate at the point wherethis element emerges from the collector area.Each nerve impulse is the result of the state ofexcitation of the collector area at a given moment(as determined by the spatio-temporalconfiguration of the afferent excitatory andinhibitory influences acting upon it, and on itsown internal generating mechanisms, if any) thatspreads reaching a given threshold at the point ofemergence of the distributor. Excitatory andinhibitory influences, however, do notsuperimpose linearly; their relative


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participation in determining the production ofnerve impulses, and hence, the state of activity ofthe neuron, depends on their relative spatialdistribution on the collector area. Inhibitionworks by shunting off the spreading excitatoryprocesses; as a result the relative contributions ofa point of excitation and a point of inhibition inthe generation of a nerve impulse depend onwhere, on the collector, they stand with respect


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to each other and with respect to the point ofemergence of the distributive element. Excitationand inhibition must be seen as integral parts inthe definition of the spatio-temporal configurationof afferent influences, not as independentprocesses. The shape of the collector area (itsgeometry) determines the class or classes ofspatio-temporal configurations of afferentinfluences to which the cell responds.

(7) The neuropil is the site where the distributiveelements and effector areas of many differentneurons intermingle with each other and with thecollector areas of the post-synaptic cells. Herenon-synaptic interactions take place betweenneighboring elements which may cause in eachother, as a result of the local movements of waterand ions produced by their independent electricalactivity, changes in diameter and polarization attheir branching points. Depending on the timeconstant of these local changes, and on thecapacity of the axons to homeostatically maintaintheir diameter at the new values, the pattern ofbranch invasion produced in a given effector areaby a given train of impulses may be modified in amore or less permanent manner by thesenon-synaptic interactions. Something singularmay happen during synaptic concomitances atthe collector areas if synapses also affect eachother non-synaptically, due to their spatialcontiguity, causing each other more or lesspermanent changes in size (increase or decrease)and polarization (with the corresponding changesin effectiveness) as a result of their independentelectrical activities. Thus, the neuropil may haveto be seen as constituting a plastic systemthrough which acquired self-addressing states ofactivity attain their functional significance as theybecome specified by the non-synaptic andsynaptic concomitances generated by theinteractions of the organism. It is not therepetition of the same state of activity which cancause neuronal changes of behavioralsignificance subordinated to the evolving domain


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of interactions of an organism, but rather it is theoccurrence of local concomitant states of activityproduced by seemingly unrelated interactionswhich can cause such subordinated changes inthe reactive capacity of neurons.

(8) It follows that one should expect in asignificant number of neurons, which may vary indifferent classes of animals according to theorganization of their different neuropils, acontinuous change in their transfer functions


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(from collector to effector area), or in thecircumstances under which they are activated, asa result of the past history of the organism.However, for the understanding of the functionalorganization of the nervous system it is necessaryto consider that nerve cells respond at anymoment with definite transfer functions to classesof afferent spatio-temporal configurations in theirinput, generating definite states of effectoractivity, and not to particular afferent states.Furthermore:

(a) Any interaction is represented in thenervous system by the sequence of states ofrelative neuronal activity leading to theconduct which it generates; this conductshould be repeatable to the extent that theinteraction (sequence of states of relativeactivity) is reproducible, that is, as long asthe historical transformation of the nervoussystem (learning) does not make it


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impossible.

(b) The nervous system always functions inthe present, and it can only be understood asa system functioning in the present. Thepresent is the time interval necessary for aninteraction to take place; past, future andtime exist only for the observer. Althoughmany nerve cells may change continuously,their mode of operation and their pasthistory can explain to the observer how theirpresent mode of operation was reached, butnot how it is realized now, or what theirpresent participation in the determination ofbehavior is.

(c) Any behavior is defined through asequence of states in the receptor surfaces(external and internal) that satisfy its director indirect subordination to the maintenanceof the basic circularity of the living system.Since the nervous system is continuouslychanging through experience, what occurswhen the observer sees a given behaviorreenacted is a sequence of interactions thatsatisfy this subordination independently ofthe neuronal process which generated them.The more complex the domain ofinteractions of an organism, the moreindirect is this subordination (an adequatemode of behavior subordinated to another),but not the less strict.

(d) An organism is a unit to the extent thatits conduct results in the maintenance of itsbasic circularity (and hence identity), andtwo modes of conduct are equivalent if theysatisfy the same class of requirements forthis maintenance. For this reason anorganism, as a self-regulated homeostaticorganization, does not require a constantbehavior in its deterministic componentelements (in this case, neurons) if theirchanges become specified through the


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generation of conduct, and sameness ofconduct is defined with respect to anobserver or a function that must be satisfied.


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Thus although at any moment every neuronfunctions deterministically with a definitetransfer function, and generates a definitepattern of activity in its effector area, the transferfunctions and the patterns of effector activity inmany of them may change from one moment toanother and the organism still will give rise towhat the observer would call 'the same behavior'.The converse is also the case, and through whatthe observer would call 'different behaviors' theorganism may satisfy its subordination to thesame aspect of the maintenance of its basiccircularity.

(9) From these notions it is apparent that theneuron cannot be considered as the functionalunit of the nervous system; no neuron can have afixed functional role in the generation of conductif it must be continuously changing itsparticipation in it. For the same reason a fixedcollection of cells also cannot be considered as afunctional unit of the nervous system. Onlyconduct itself can be considered as the functionalunit of the nervous system.

(10) If nerve cells respond to classes of afferentconfigurations and not to particular afferentstates, they must necessarily treat as equivalent


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particular afferent configurations that arisethrough interactions which for the observer areotherwise unrelated.

ARCHITECTURE

(1) In any given nervous system the greatmajority (and perhaps the totality) of its neuronscan be assigned to well-defined morphologicalclasses, each characterized by a given pattern ofdistribution of the collector and effector areas ofits elements. As a result, the elements of thesame class hold similar relations with each otherand with other classes of neurons; the shapes ofthe nerve cells (collector area, distributiveelement, and effector area) specify theirconnectivity. These shapes are geneticallydetermined and have been attained throughevolution; the whole architecture of the brain isgenetically determined and has been attainedthrough evolution. The following implications aresignificant for the understanding of the nervoussystem:

(a) There is a necessary genetic variability inthe shape of nerve cells as well as avariability that results from interactions ofthe organism with independent eventsduring its development. The functionalorganization of the nervous system must besuch as to tolerate this double variability.

(b) Due to the genetic and somatic variabilityno two nervous systems of animals of thesame species (particularly if they have manycells) are identical, and they resemble eachother only to the extent that they are


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organized according to the same generalpattern. It is the organization defining theclass, and not any particular connectivity,which determines the mode of functioning ofany given kind of nervous system.

(2) The shapes of nerve cells and their packingare such that there is in general a greatoverlapping in the collector and effector areas ofneurons of the same class. Also, the spatialdistribution and the interconnections betweendifferent classes of neurons is such that anyparticular part of the nervous system is in generalsimultaneously related to many other parts; theparts interconnected, however, differ in differentspecies, and as a result these have differentinteracting capabilities.

(3) The organism ends at the boundary that itsself-referring organization defines in themaintenance of its identity. At this boundarythere are sensors (the sensory surfaces) throughwhich the organism interacts in the domain ofrelations and effectors (the effector surfaces)through which the nervous system modifies theposture of the organism in this domain. Thesensory surfaces are in general constituted bycollections of sensory elements (cells) withsimilar, though not identical, properties (classesof properties) which in their mode of interactionwith the nervous system share the characteristicsof neurons in general. As a result whenever theorganism enters into an interaction within thephysical domain of interactions of the sensors, asa rule not one but many sensory elements areexcited. The effectors are also multifarious anddiffer from each other in the manner in whichthey change the receptor surfaces of the


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organism during the interactions: action alwaysleads to a change in the state of activity of thereceptor surfaces.

(4) The architectural organization of the nervoussystem is subordinated to the order of thesensory and effector surfaces. This subordinationhas two aspects: (i) the receptor and effectorsurfaces project to the central nervous systemretaining their proper topological relations; (ii)the topological relations specified by the receptorand effector surfaces in their projectionconstitute the basis for all the architectural orderof the central nervous system. As a consequence,this architectural organization constitutes asystem that interconnects these surfaces in amanner that permits the occurrence of certainconcomitances of activity and not others in thedifferent neuropils, and thus secures well-definedfunctional relations between these surfaces,specifying how they modify each other. Truism:the nervous system cannot give rise to a conductthat implies the concomitance of states of activityfor which there is no anatomical basis. As a resultof its architectural organization every point in thecentral nervous system constitutes an anatomical


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localization with respect to the possibility ofestablishing certain functional concomitances.From this it follows that any localized lesion inthe nervous system must necessarily interfere ina localized manner with the possibility ofsynthesizing some specific conduct (state of


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neural activity).

FUNCTION

(1) The way the nervous system functions isbound to its anatomical organization. Thefunctioning of the nervous system has twoaspects: one which refers to the domain ofinteractions defined by the nervous system(relations in general); the other which refers tothe particular part of that domain used by a givenspecies (particular classes of relations): Differentspecies interact with different sets of relations(have different niches).

(2) The nervous system only interacts withrelations. However, since the functioning of thenervous system is anatomy bound, theseinteractions are necessarily mediated by physicalinteractions; for an animal to discriminate objectsvisually the receptors in its eyes must absorblight quanta and be activated; yet, the objectsthat the animal sees are determined not by thequantity of light absorbed, but by the relationsholding between the receptor-induced states ofactivity within the retina, in a manner determinedby the connectivity of its various types of cells.Therefore, the nervous system defines throughthe relative weights of the patterns ofinteractions of its various components, bothinnate and acquired through experience, whichrelations will modify it at any given interaction[Cf. Maturana, 1965]. Or, in general, theorganization and structure of a living system (itsnervous system included) define in it a 'point ofview', a bias or posture from the perspective ofwhich it interacts determining at any instant thepossible relations accessible to its nervoussystem. Moreover, since the domain ofinteractions of the organism is defined by itsstructure, and since this structure implies aprediction of a niche, the relations with which the


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nervous system interacts are defined by thisprediction and arise in the domain of interactionsof the organism.

(3) Due to the properties of neurons, and due tothe architecture of the nervous system,interactions within the nervous system give riseto activity in aggregates of cells. Also, for thesame reasons, any given cell may assume thesame state of activity under many differentcircumstances of interactions of the organism.Thus, under no circumstances is it possible toassociate the activity of any particular cell withany particular interaction of the living


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system. When any particular interaction takesplace at the level of the sensors, the relationsaccessible to the nervous system are given at thislevel in a certain state of relative activity of thesensing elements and not in the state of activityof any particular one [Cf. Maturana Uribe, andFrenk, 1968]. At the same time, althoughoperational localizations can be established in thenervous system [Cf. Geschwind, 1965], theselocalizations are to be viewed in terms of areaswhere certain modalities of interactionsconverge, and not as localizations of faculties orfunctions. As a result of the mode of organizationof the nervous system that I have emphasized,localized lesions should produce discretefunctional deficiencies by impeding theconvergence of activities necessary for thesynthesis of a particular conduct (state of


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activity). The anatomical and functionalorganization of the nervous system secures thesynthesis of behavior, not a representation of theworld; hence, it is only with the synthesis ofbehavior that one cam interfere. The nervoussystem is localized in terms of the organism'ssurfaces of interaction but not in terms ofrepresentations of the interactions it cangenerate.

REPRESENTATION

(1) The fundamental anatomical and functionalorganization of the nervous system is basicallyuniform; the same functions and operations(excitation, inhibition, lateral interaction,recursive inhibition, etc.) are performed in itsvarious parts, although in different contexts, andintegrated in different manners. A partialdestruction of the nervous system does not alterthis basic uniformity, and, although the parts leftuntouched cannot do the same things that thewhole did, they appear in their mode ofoperations identical to the untouched whole. Tothe observer, once the boundary of the sensors ispassed, the nervous system, as a mode oforganization, seems to begin at any arbitrarypoint that he may choose to consider; the answerto the question, 'What is the input to the nervoussystem?' depends entirely on the chosen point ofobservation. This basic uniformity of organizationcan best be expressed by saying: all that isaccessible to the nervous system at any point arestates of relative activity holding between nervecells, and all that to which any given state ofrelative activity can give rise are further states ofrelative activity in other nerve cells by formingthose states of relative activity to which theyrespond. The effector neurons are not anexception to this since they, by causing aneffector activity and generating an interaction,cause a change in the state of relative activity of


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the receptor elements at the receptor surfaces.This has a fundamental consequence: unless theyimply


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their origin (through concomitant events, theirlocations, or through the consequences of thenew interactions which they originate) there is nopossible distinction between internally andexternally generated states of nervous activity.

(2) The relations with which the nervous systeminteracts are relations given by the physicalinteractions of the organism, and, hence, dependon its anatomical organization. For the observerthe organism interacts with a given entity that hecan describe in his cognitive domain. Yet, whatmodifies the nervous system of the observedorganism are the changes in activity of the nervecells associated with the sensing elements,changes that henceforth constitute anembodiment of the relations that arise throughthe interaction. These relations are not those thatthe observer can describe as holding betweencomponent properties of the entity in hiscognitive domain; they are relations generated inthe interaction itself and depend on both thestructural organization of the organism and theproperties of the universe that match the domainof interactions that this organization defines.Whenever such a relation recurs at the sensorysurface, the same state of relative activity arisesamong the neurons in contact with the sensingelements. Two interactions that produce the same


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state of relative activity are identical for thenervous system, no matter how different theymay be in the cognitive domain of the observer.

(3) Every relation is embodied in a state ofrelative activity of nerve cells, but also everystate of relative activity acts to modify therelative activity of other nerve cells. Thus,relations through their embodiment in states ofrelative activity become units of internalinteractions and generate additional relations,again embodied in states of relative activitywhich in turn may also become units of internalinteractions, and so on, recursively.

(4) If an external interaction takes place, thestate of activity of the nervous system is modifiedby the change in relative activity of the neurons,which in close association with the sensingelements embody the relations given in theinteraction. Accordingly, that which the differentstates of activity thus generated can be said torepresent are the relations given at the sensorysurfaces by the interaction of the organism, andnot an independent medium, least of all adescription of an environment necessarily madein terms of entities that lie exclusively in thecognitive domain of the observer.

If an internal interaction takes place, the state ofactivity of the nervous system is modified by oneof its own substates of relative activity thatembodies one set of relations. However, thatwhich the new state of relative activity representsis the relations given in the internal interactionand not an independent set of relations or theirdescription, in terms of some kind of


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entities, such as thoughts, that lie only within thecognitive domain of the observer.

(5) The classes of relations that can be embodiedhave been defined (i) through the evolution of thegeneral structural organization of the organism,and particularly, of the sensors, that has definedthe classes of relation that are accessible to thenervous system; and (ii) through the evolution ofa particular organization of the nervous systemthat defines for each class of animals (species)the specific mode of how these relations generatea behavior relevant to their maintenance.

(6) For any class of relations, the particularrelations given as a result of a present interactionare embodied in a set of particular states ofactivity occurring in the present. This is the caseindependently of the history of the system.However, the relevance of the behavior generatedby those states of activity for the maintenance ofthe living system is a function of history, and maydepend both on the evolutionary history of thespecies and on the past experiences of theorganism as an individual. In the first case Iwould speak of instinctive behavior, and in thesecond case of learned behavior. The descriptionof learning in terms of past and present behaviorlies in the cognitive domain of the observer; theorganism always behaves in the present. Theobserver, however, by interacting withdescriptions that he generates can treatinteractions which do not recur as if they were inthe present. This apparent paradox is resolved bygenerating the notion of time, past, present, andfuture, as a new expansion of the domain ofinteractions. Whenever an interaction takes placewhich is an element of a class experienced for the


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first time, it is sufficient that the state of activitywhich it generates be followed by the suppressionof a peculiar concomitant internal state of activity(that is apparent in what the observer calls theemotion of anxiety or uncertainty) for theorganism to experience the recurrence of aninteraction of the same class, which takes placewithout such a concomitant state, as not new (inthe sense that it can generate an establishedconduct as is apparent in the absence of anxiety)and, hence known. Any experience withoutanxiety can be described as known, and thusserve as a basis for the functional notion of time.

(7) There is no difference in the nature of theembodiment of the relations generated througheither external or internal interactions; both aresets of states of neuronal activity that can be saidto represent the interactions. In a nervous systemcapable of interacting with some of its owninternal states as if they were independententities, there are two consequences:

(a) The distinction between externally andinternally generated inter-


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actions can only arise through aconcomitance of events that indicates thesource (sensory surface or not) of the stateof activity caused by them, or through theoutcome of new interactions which theyinitiate. A nervous system that is capable oftreating its internally generated states of


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activity as different from its externallygenerated states, that is, of distinguishingtheir origin, is capable of abstract thinking.

(b) The nervous system can interact with therepresentations of its interactions (andhence, of the organism) in an endlessrecursive manner.

(8) Four comments:

(a) Notions such as embodiment ofrepresentation express the correspondencethat the observer sees between relations, orsets of relations, and different states ofactivity of the nervous system, and, as such,lie in his cognitive domain. They describethe functional organization of the nervoussystem in the cognitive domain of theobserver, and point to the ability of thenervous system to treat some of its ownstates as independent entities with which itcan interact, but they do not characterizethe nature of the functional subordination ofthe nervous system to its own states. Thissubordination is that of a functionally closed,state determined, ultrastable system,modulated by interactions [Cf. Ashby, 1960].

(b) The closed nature of the functionalorganization of the nervous system is aconsequence of the self-referring domain ofinteractions of the living organization; everychange of state of the organism must bringforth another change of state, and so on,recursively, always maintaining its basiccircularity. Anatomically and functionally thenervous system is organized to maintainconstant certain relations between thereceptor and effector surfaces of theorganism, which can only in that way retainits identity as it moves through its domain ofinteractions. Thus all conduct, as controlledthrough the nervous system, must


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(necessarily, due to the latter's architecturalorganization) lead through changes in theeffector surfaces to specific changes in thereceptor surfaces that in turn must generatechanges in the effector surfaces that again ...and so on, recursively. Conduct is thus afunctional continuum that gives unity to thelife of the organism through itstransformations in the latter's self-referringdomain of interactions. The evolutionarysubordination of the architecture of thecentral nervous system to the topology of thesensory and effector surfaces appears as anobvious necessity.

(c) The ability of the nervous system tointeract with its own internal


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states, as if these were independent entities,enters these internal states as modulatingfactors in the continuum of behavior. Thisrequires an anatomical and functionalinternal reflection so that the internalorganization of the nervous system canproject itself onto itself retaining itsmorphological and functional topologicalrelations, as the receptor and effectorsurfaces do in their own projection. Thisseems to have acquired an autonomousevolutionary course with the development ofthe neo-cortex in mammals, which arises asa center of internal anatomical projection,and whose evolution in this line is


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accompanied by an increased dependency ofthe organism on its own states of nervousactivity.

(d) The closed nature of the functionalorganization of the nervous system (openonly to modulations through interactions) isparticularly evident in systematicobservations that explicitly show thesubordination of conduct to the correlationof activity between the receptor and effectorsurfaces [Cf. Held and Hein, 1963] .Experiments such as those of Held and Heinshow that a cat does not learn to control itsenvironment visually if raised in darknessand carried about only passively, by anothercat, when under light. From theseobservations, it is apparent that the 'visualhandling' of an environment is no handlingof an environment, but the establishment ofa set of correlations between effector(muscular) and receptor (proprioceptor andvisual) surfaces, such that a particular statein the receptor surfaces may cause aparticular state in the effector surfaces thatbrings forth a new state in the receptorsurfaces ... and so on. Behavior is like aninstrumental flight in which the effectors(engines, flaps, etc.) vary their state tomaintain constant, or to change, thereadings of the sensing instrumentsaccording to a specified sequence ofvariations, which either is fixed (specifiedthrough evolution) or can be varied duringthe flight as a result of the state of the flight(learning). The same is apparent in theexperiments with innate perception of depth[Cf. Gibson, 1950] that show that there is aninnate system of correlations betweencertain states of the receptor and effectorsurfaces. The reference to a pre-establishedperception of depth is a description that liesin the cognitive domain of the observer, andas such only alludes to relations, through the


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observer, between elements that lie in hiscognitive domain; but, as a process, thisinnate behavior obviously corresponds toone of optimization of sensory states.

DESCRIPTION

(1) A living system, due to its circularorganization, is an inductive system


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and functions always in a predictive manner:what happened once will occur again. Itsorganization, (genetic and otherwise) isconservative and repeats only that which works.For this same reason living systems are historicalsystems; the relevance of a given conduct ormode of behavior is always determined in thepast. The goal state (in the language of theobserver) that controls the development of anorganism is, except for mutations, determined bythe genome of the parent organism. The same istrue for behavior in general; the present state isalways specified from the previous state thatrestricts the field of possible modulations byindependent concomitances. If a given state ofrelative activity in the nerve cells originates agiven behavior, a recurrence of the 'same state' ofrelative activity should give rise to the 'samebehavior' no matter how the recurrenceoriginates. The relevance of such a behavior isdetermined by the significance that it has for the


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maintenance of the living organization, and it isin relation to this relevance that any subsequentbehaviors are the same. With the expansion of thecognitive domain during evolution, the types ofbehavior have changed as well as how theirrelevance is implemented; different kinds ofbehavior are relevant to the maintenance of thebasic circularity of the living organizationthrough different domains of interactions, andhence, different fields of causal relations.

(2) Since the niche of an organism is the set of allclasses of interactions into which it can enter, andthe observer beholds the organism in anenvironment that he defines, for him any one ofthe organism's behaviors appears as anactualization of the niche, that is, as a first orderdescription of the environment (henceforthdenoted by a capital D: Description) ThisDescription, however, is a description in terms ofbehavior (interactions) of the observed organism,not of representations of environmental states,and the relation between behavior and niche liesexclusively in the cognitive domain of theobserver.

(3) An organism can modify the behavior ofanother organism in two basic ways:

(a) By interaction with it in a manner thatdirects both organisms toward each other insuch a way that the ensuing behavior of eachof them depends strictly on the followingbehavior of the other, e.g.: courtship andfight. A chain of interlocked behavior canthus be generated by the two organisms.

(b) By orienting the behavior of the otherorganism to some part of its domain ofinteractions different from the presentinteraction, but comparable to theorientation of that of the orienting organism.This can take place only if the domains ofinteractions of the two organisms are widely


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coincident; in


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this case no interlocked chain of behavior iselicited because the subsequent conduct ofthe two organisms depends on the outcomeof independent, although parallel,interactions.

In the first case it can be said that the twoorganisms interact; in the second case that theycommunicate. The second case is the basis forany linguistic behavior; the first organismgenerates (as is apparent for the observer) aDescription of its niche that, in addition to its ownsignificance as a behavior (within the cognitivedomain of the first organism, and independentlyof it), orients the second organism within itscognitive domain to an interaction from whichensues a conduct parallel to that of the first one,but unrelated to it. The conduct thus elicited bythe orienting behavior is denotative: it points to afeature of the environment that the secondorganism encounters in its niche and Describesby the appropriate conduct, and that he can treatas an independent entity. The orienting behavioris, for the observer, a second order description(henceforth denoted by italics: description) thatrepresents that which he considers it to denote.By contrast, the orienting behavior of the firstorganism is connotative for the second one, andimplies for it an interaction within its cognitivedomain which, if actualized, originates a behaviorthat Describes a particular aspect of its niche;


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that which an orienting behavior connotes is afunction of the cognitive domain of the orientee,not the orienter.

(4)In an orienting interaction the behavior of thefirst organism, as a communicative descriptioncauses in the nervous system of the second one aspecific state of activity; this state of activityembodies the relations generated in theinteraction and represents the behavior of thesecond organism (Description of its niche)connoted by the orienting behavior of the firstone. This representation, as a state of neuronalactivity, can in principle be treated by thenervous system as a unit of interactions, and thesecond organism, if capable of doing so, can thusinteract with representations of its ownDescriptions of its niche as if these wereindependent entities. This generates yet anotherdomain of interactions (and hence, anotherdimension in the cognitive domain), the domain ofinteractions with representations of behavior(interactions), orienting interactions included, asif these representations were independententities within the niche: the linguistic domain.

(5) If an organism can generate a communicativedescription and then interact with its own state ofactivity that represents this description,generating another such description that orientstowards this representation ..., the process can inprinciple be carried on in a potentially infiniterecursive


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manner, and the organism becomes an observer:it generates discourse as a domain of interactionswith representations of communicativedescriptions (orienting behaviors).

Furthermore: if such an observer throughorienting behavior can orient himself towardshimself, and then generate communicativedescriptions that orient him towards hisdescription of this self-orientation, he can, bydoing so recursively, describe himself describinghimself ... endlessly. Thus discourse throughcommunicative description originates theapparent paradox of self-description:self-consciousness, a new domain of interactions.

(6) A nervous system capable of recursivelyinteracting with its own states as if these wereindependent entities can do so regardless of howthese states are generated, and in principle canrepeat these recursive interactions endlessly. Itsonly limitation lies in the need that theprogressive transformation of its actual andpotential behavior, which in such a system is anecessary concomitant to behavior itself, bedirectly or indirectly subservient to the basiccircularity of the living organization. Thelinguistic domain, the observer andself-consciousness are each possible because theyresult as different domains of interactions of thenervous system with its own states incircumstances in which these states representdifferent modalities of interactions of theorganism.

THINKING

(1) I consider that in a state-determined nervoussystem, the neurophysiological process thatconsist in its interacting with some of its owninternal states as if these were independent


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entities corresponds to what we call thinking.Such internal states of nervous activity, otherwisesimilar to other states of nervous activity thatparticipate in the specification of behavior, as inreflex mechanisms, cause conduct by determiningspecific changes of state in the nervous system.Thinking thus conceived, and reflex mechanisms,are both neurophysiological processes throughwhich behavior emerges in a deterministicmanner; they differ, however, in that in a reflexaction we can, in our description trace a chain ofnervous interactions that begins with a specificstate of activity at the sensory surfaces; while inthinking, the chain of nervous interactions thatleads to a given conduct (change in the effectorsurfaces) begins with a distinguishable state ofactivity of the nervous system itself, whicheverway it may have originated. Accordingly, thinkingis a mode of operation of the nervous system thatreflects functionally its internal anatomicalprojection (possibly multiply) onto itself.


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(2) The process of thinking as characterizedabove is necessarily independent of language.That this is so even for what we call 'abstractthinking' in man is apparent from theobservations of humans with split brains [Cf.Gazzaniga, Bogen and Sperry, 1965]. Theseobservations show that the inability of thenon-speaking hemisphere to speak does notpreclude in it operations that the observer wouldcall abstract thinking, and that the lack oflanguage only implies that it cannot generate


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discourse. When we talk about concepts or ideaswe describe our interactions with representationsof our descriptions, and we think through ouroperation in the linguistic domain. The difficultyarises from our considering thinking through ourdescription of it in terms or concepts as if it weresomething peculiar to man, and in some wayisomorphic with the notions embodied in thedescriptions, instead of attending to thefunctional process that makes these descriptionspossible.

NATURAL LANGUAGE

(1) Linguistic behavior is orienting behavior; itorients the orientee within his cognitive domainto interactions that are independent of the natureof the orienting interactions themselves. To theextent that the part of its cognitive domaintoward which the orientee is thus oriented is notgenetically determined and becomes specifiedthrough interactions, one organism can inprinciple orient another to any part of itscognitive domain by means of arbitrary modes ofconduct also specified through interactions.However, only if the domains of interactions ofthe two organisms are to some extentcomparable, are such consensual orientinginteractions possible and are the two organismsable to develop some conventional, but specific,system of communicative descriptions to orienteach other to cooperative classes of interactionsthat are relevant for both.

(2) The understanding of the evolutionary originof natural languages requires the recognition inthem of a basic biological function which,properly selected, could originate them. So farthis understanding has been impossible becauselanguage has been considered as a denotativesymbolic system for the transmission ofinformation. In fact, if such were the biological


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function of language, its evolutionary originwould demand the pre-existence of the functionof denotation as necessary to develop thesymbolic system for the transmission ofinformation, but this function is the very onewhose evolutionary origin should be explained.Conversely, if it is recognized that language isconnotative and not denotative and that itsfunction is to orient the orientee within hiscognitive domain, and not to point to independententities, it


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becomes apparent that learned orientinginteractions embody a function of non-linguisticorigin that, under a selective pressure forrecursive application, can originate throughevolution the system of cooperative consensualinteractions between organisms that is naturallanguage. Particular orienting interactions, likeany other learned conduct, arise from thesubstitution of one type of interaction for anotheras a cause for a given behavior, and their originas a function of the general learning capacity ofthe nervous system is completely independent ofthe complexities of the system of cooperativeinteractions to which their recursive applicationgives rise. Widespread among animals other thanman-orienting interactions are particularlyevident in primates, in which it is easy to see howthe audible and visible behavior of one individualorients others within their respective cognitivedomains [Cf. Jay, 1968], and in dolphins whichseem to have evolved a rich and efficient system


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of auditive cooperative interactions [Cf. Lilly,1967]. In accordance with all this I maintain thatlearned orienting interactions, coupled with somemode of behavior that allowed for an independentrecursive expansion of the domain of interactionsof the organism, such as social life [Cf. Gardnerand Gardner, 1969] and/or tool making and use,must have offered a selective basis for theevolution of the orienting behavior that inhominids led to our present-day languages.

(3) Behavior (function) depends on theanatomical organization (structure) of the livingsystem, hence anatomy and conduct cannotlegitimately be separated and the evolution ofbehavior is the evolution of anatomy and viceversa; anatomy provides the basis for behaviorand hence for its variability; behavior providesthe ground for the action of natural selection andhence for the historical anatomicaltransformations of the organism. Structure andfunction are, however, both relative to theperspective of interactions of the system andcannot be considered independently of theconditions that define it as a unit of interactions,for what is from one perspective a unit ofinteractions, from another may only be acomponent of a larger one, or may be severalindependent units. It is the dynamics of thisprocess of individuation, as an historical processin which every state of a changing system canbecome a unit of interactions if the propercircumstances are given, what makes theevolution of living systems a deterministicprocess of necessarily increasing complication.Thus, in the evolution of language, naturalselection, by acting upon orienting behavior as afunction that if enhanced strongly increases thecooperation between social animals, has led toanatomical transformations which provide thebasis for the increased complexity of theorienting conduct and the diversity of theinteractions toward which man can be oriented inhis


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cognitive domain. The complexity of the orientingconduct has increased through an increase in thecomplexity and variety of motor behavior,particularly through vocalization and tool making.The diversity of the interactions toward whichman can be oriented has increased through aconcomitant expansion of the internal projectionof the brain onto itself, by means of newinterconnections between different cortical areas(as compared with other primates), betweencortical areas and subcortical nuclei [Cf.Geschwind, 1964], and possibly also betweendifferent cortical layers and cellular systemswithin the cortex itself.

(4) So long as language is considered to bedenotative it will be necessary to look at it as ameans for the transmission of information, as ifsomething were transmitted from organism toorganism, in a manner such that the domain ofuncertainties of the 'receiver' should be reducedaccording to the specifications of the 'sender'.However, when it is recognized that language isconnotative and not denotative, and that itsfunction is to orient the orientee within hiscognitive domain without regard for the cognitivedomain of the orienter, it becomes apparent thatthere is no transmission of information throughlanguage. It behooves the orientee, as a result ofan independent internal operation upon his ownstate, to choose where to orient his cognitivedomain; the choice is caused by the 'message',


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but the orientation thus produced is independentof what the 'message' represents for the orienter.In a strict sense then, there is no transfer ofthought from the speaker to his interlocutor; thelistener creates information by reducing hisuncertainty through his interactions in hiscognitive domain. Consensus arises only throughcooperative interactions in which the resultingbehavior of each organism becomes subservientto the maintenance of both. An observerbeholding a communicative interaction betweentwo organisms who have already developed aconsensual linguistic domain, can describe theinteraction as denotative; for him, a message(sign) appears as denoting the object which theconduct of the orientee Describes (specifies), andthe conduct of the orientee appears determinedby the message. However, because the outcomeof the interaction is determined in the cognitivedomain of the orientee regardless of thesignificance of the message in the cognitivedomain of the orienter, the denotative function ofthe message lies only in the cognitive domain ofthe observer and not in the operativeeffectiveness of the communicative interaction.The cooperative conduct that may developbetween the interacting organisms from thesecommunicative interactions is a secondaryprocess independent of their operativeeffectiveness. If it appears acceptable to talkabout transmission of information in ordinaryparlance, this is so


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because the speaker tacitly assumes the listenerto be identical with him and hence as having thesame cognitive domain which he has (whichnever is the case), marveling when a'misunderstanding' arises. Such an approach isvalid, for man created systems of communicationwhere the identity of sender and receiver isimplicitly or explicitly specified by the designer,and a message, unless disturbed duringtransmission, necessarily selects at the receptionthe same set of states that it represents at theemission, but not for natural languages.

(5) It behooves the interlocutor to choose whereto orient in his cognitive domain as a result of alinguistic interaction. Since the mechanism ofchoice, as in every neuronal process, is state-dependent, the state of activity from which thechoice (new state of neuronal activity) must ariserestricts the possible choices and constitutes areference background in the orientee. The sameis valid for the speaker; the state of activity fromwhich his communicative description (linguisticutterance) arises constitutes the referencebackground that specifies his choice. All theinteractions that independently specify thereference background of each interlocutorconstitute the context in which a given linguisticinteraction takes place. Every linguisticinteraction is thus necessarily context-dependent,and this dependency is strictly deterministic forboth orienter and orientee, notwithstanding thedifferent backgrounds of the two processes. It isonly for the observer that there is any ambiguityin a linguistic interaction that he observes; this isbecause he has no access to the context in whichit occurs. The sentence, 'They are flying planes,'is unambiguous for both interlocutors, regardlessof the subsequent behavior which it originates ineach of them; for the observer, however, whowants to predict the course of the ensuinginteractions, it is ambiguous.


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(6) If one considers linguistic interactions asorienting interactions it is apparent that it is notpossible to separate, functionally, semantics andsyntax, however separable they may seem in theirdescription by the observer. This is true for tworeasons:

(a) A sequence of communicativedescriptions (words in our case) must beexpected to cause in the orientee a sequenceof successive orientations in his cognitivedomain, each arising from the state left bythe previous one. 'They are flying planes'clearly illustrates this; each successive wordorients the listener to a particularinteraction in his cognitive domain that isrelevant in a particular manner (apparent inthe conduct it generates) that depends onthe previous orientation. The fact that itseems that the observer can more easilydescribe the word are (or any word) byreferring to its grammatical and


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lexical functions, rather than by specifyingthe nature of the orientation that it causes(in terms of conduct or interactions), shouldnot obscure the problem. The observerspeaks, and any explanation of the word arethat he may give lies in the descriptivedomain, while the orientation caused by theword itself, as a change of state of thelistener, is an internal interaction in his


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cognitive domain.

(b) An entire series of communicativedescriptions can itself be a communicativedescription: the whole sequence oncecompleted may orient the listener from theperspective of the state to which thesequence itself has led him. The limit to suchcomplications lies exclusively in the capacityof the nervous system to discriminatebetween its own discriminable internalstates, and to interact with them as if withindependent entities.

(7) Linguistic behavior is an historical process ofcontinuous orientation. As such, the new state inwhich the system finds itself after a linguisticinteraction emerges from the linguistic behavior.The rules of syntax and generative grammar [Cf.Chomsky, 1968] refer to regularities that theobserver sees in the linguistic behavior (as hewould see in any behavior) which, arising fromthe functional organization of the system, specifythe interactions that are possible at any givenmoment. Such rules, as rules, lie exclusively inthe cognitive domain of the observer, in the realmof descriptions, because the transitions fromstate to state as internal processes in any systemare unrelated to the nature of the interactions towhich they give rise. Any correlation betweendifferent domains of interactions lies exclusivelyin the cognitive domain of the observer, asrelations emerging from his simultaneousinteractions with both.

(8) The coordinated states of neuronal activitywhich specify a conduct as a series of effectorand receptor states whose significance arises in aconsensual domain, does not differ in itsneurophysiological generation from othercoordinated states of neuronal activity whichspecify other conducts of innate or acquiredsignificance (walking, flying, playing a musicalinstrument). Thus, however complex the motor


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and sensory coordinations of speech may be, thepeculiarity of linguistic behavior does not lie inthe complexity or nature of the series of effectorand receptor states that constitute it, but in therelevance that such behavior acquires for themaintenance of the basic circularity of theinteracting organisms through the developmentof the consensual domain of orientinginteractions. Speaking, walking, or music-makingdo not differ in the nature of the coordinatedneuronal processes which specify them but in thesub-domains of interactions in which they acquiretheir relevance.


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(9) Orienting behavior in an organism with anervous system capable of interacting recursivelywith its own states expands its cognitive domainby enabling it to interact recursively withdescriptions of its interactions. As a result:

(a) Natural language has emerged as a newdomain of interaction in which the organismis modified by its descriptions of itsinteractions, as they become embodied instates of activity of its nervous system,subjecting its evolution to its interactions inthe domains of observation andself-consciousness.

(b) Natural language is necessarilygenerative because it results from therecursive application of the same operation(as a neurophysiological process) on the


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results of this application.

(c) New sequences of orienting interactions(new sentences) within the consensualdomain are necessarily understandable bythe interlocutor (orient him), because eachone of their components has definiteorienting functions as a member of theconsensual domain that it contributes todefine.

MEMORY AND LEARNING

(1) Learning as a process consists in thetransformation through experience of thebehavior of an organism in a manner that isdirectly or indirectly subservient to themaintenance of its basic circularity. Due to thestate determined organization of the livingsystem in general, and of the nervous system inparticular, this transformation is an historicalprocess such that each mode of behaviorconstitutes the basis over which a new behaviordevelops, either through changes in the possiblestates that may arise in it as a result of aninteraction, or through changes in the transitionrules from state to state. The organism is thus ina continuous process of becoming that isspecified through an endless sequence ofinteractions with independent entities that selectits changes of state but do not specify them.

(2) Learning occurs in a manner such that, for theobserver, the learned behavior of the organismappears justified from the past, through theincorporation of a representation of theenvironment that acts, modifying its presentbehavior by recall; notwithstanding this, thesystem itself functions in the present, and for itlearning occurs as an atemporal process oftransformation. An organism cannot determine inadvance when to change and when not to changeduring its flow of experience, nor can it


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determine in


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advance which is the optimal functional state thatit must reach; both the advantage of anyparticular behavior and the mode of behavioritself can only be determined a posteriori, as aresult of the actual behaving of the organismsubservient to the maintenance of its basiccircularity.

(3) The learning nervous system is a deterministicsystem with a relativistic self-regulatingorganization that defines its domain ofinteractions in terms of the states of neuronalactivity that it maintains constant, both internallyand at its sensory surfaces, and that specifiesthese states at any moment through itsfunctioning, and through the learning (historicaltransformation) itself. Consequently, it must beable to undergo a continuous transformation,both in the states it maintains constant, and inthe way it attains them, so that every interactionin which new classes of concomitances occureffectively modifies it (learning curves) in onedirection or the other. Since this transformationmust occur as a continuous process of becomingwithout the previous specification of an end state,the final specification and optimization of a newbehavior can only arise through the cumulativeeffect of many equally directed interactions, eachof which selects, from the domain of structuralchanges possible to the nervous system in itsstructural dynamism, that which at that moment


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is congruent with its continued operationsubservient to the basic circularity of theorganism. Otherwise the organism disintegrates.

(4) The analysis of the nervous system madeearlier indicated that the states of neuronalactivity that arise in it through each interactionembody the relations given in the interaction, andnot representations of the niche or theenvironment as the observer would describethem. This analysis also indicated thatfunctionally such embodiments constitutechanges in the reactivity of the nervous system,as a system closed on itself, to the modulatinginfluences of further interactions. Consequentlywhat the observer calls 'recall' and 'memory'cannot be a process through which the organismconfronts each new experience with a storedrepresentation of the niche before making adecision, but the expression of a modified systemcapable of synthesizing a new behavior relevantto its present state of activity.

(5) It is known that many neurons change theirtransfer functions as a result of the differentconcomitances of activity that occur in theneuropils of their collector and effector areas.Although it is not known what these changes are(development of new synapses or changes in theirsize, membrane changes, or changes in thepattern of spike invasion at the branching pointsof the axons), it can be expected from therelativistic organization of the nervous systemthat they should result in local morphological andfunctional changes that do not represent anyparticular interaction, but which permanentlyalter


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the reactivity of the system. This anatomical andfunctional transformation of the nervous systemmust necessarily be occurring continuously aschanges that the cells are able to stabilize with apermanency that lasts until the next modification,which can occur in any direction with respect tothe previous one, or that subside by themselvesafter a certain number of interactions, but whichare being locally triggered and selected throughthe actual concomitances of activity taking placein the neuropil itself.

(6) All changes in the nervous system duringlearning must occur without interference with itscontinued functioning as a self-regulating system;the unity that the observer sees in a living systemthroughout its continuous transformation is astrictly functional one. Accordingly, what appearsconstant for the observer when he ascertains thatthe same behavior is reenacted on a differentoccasion, is a set of relations that he defines ascharacterizing it, regardless of any change in theneurophysiological process through which it isattained, or any other unconsidered aspect of theconduct itself. Learning, as a relation betweensuccessive different modes of conduct of anorganism such that the present conduct appearsas a transformation of a past conduct arising fromthe recall of a specifiable past event, lies in thecognitive domain of the observer as a descriptionof his ordered experiences. Likewise, memory asan allusion to a representation in the learningorganism of its past experiences, is also adescription by the observer of his orderedinteractions with the observed organism; memoryas a storage of representations of theenvironment to be used on different occasions in


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recall does not exist as a neurophysiologicalfunction.

(7) It is sufficient for a system to change its stateafter an interaction in a manner such thatwhenever a similar interaction recurs someinternally determined concomitant state does notrecur, although the same overt behavior isreenacted for it to treat two otherwise equivalentinteractions as different elements of the sameclass. Such a peculiar state could be described asrepresenting the emotional connotation ofuncertainty which, present whenever a class ofinteractions is experienced for the first time, issuppressed after such an experience; the absenceof such a concomitant state would sufficehenceforth to treat differently (as known) allrecurrent interactions of the same class. Imaintain that modifications of this sort in thereactivity of the nervous system constitute thebasis for the unidirectional ordering ofexperiences in a living system through'recognition' without any storage ofrepresentations of the niche. First interactionsthat by error of the system are not accompaniedby the above mentioned concomitant internalstate (emotional connotation of uncertainty)would be treated as if known, as


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occurs in the déjà vu. Conversely, interferencewith the suppression of the concomitant state ofactivity corresponding to this emotionalconnotation would result in the treatment of any


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recurrent interaction as if new (loss of recentmemory).

(8) If such a system is capable of discourse, it willgenerate the temporal domain through theascription of a unidirectional order to itsexperiences as they differ in their emotionalconnotations, and although it will continue tofunction in the present as an atemporal system, itwill interact through its descriptions in thetemporal domain. Past, present, and future, andtime in general belong exclusively to thecognitive domain of the observer.

THE OBSERVER

Epistemological and OntologicalImplications

(1) The cognitive domain is the entire domain ofinteractions of the organism. The cognitivedomain can be enlarged if new modes ofinteractions are generated. Instruments enlargeour cognitive domain.

(2) The possibility of enlargement of the cognitivedomain is unlimited; it is a historical process. Ourbrain, the brain of the observer, has specializedduring evolution as an instrument for thediscrimination of relations, both internally andexternally generated relations, but relationsgiven through and by interactions and embodiedin the states of relative activity of its neurons.Furthermore, this occurs under circumstances inwhich the discriminations between states ofrelative activity - that for an observer representthe interactions of the organism, for the nervoussystem, that operate as a closed network -constitute only changes of relations of activitythat arise between its components while itgenerates the internal and the sensory motorcorrelations that the states of the organismselect. This has two aspects: one refers to the


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functional organization of the nerve cells which,with their responses, discriminate betweendifferent states of relative activity impinging uponthem; the other refers to the ability of thenervous system, as a neuronal organization, todiscriminate between its own states as these aredistinguished and specified by the further statesof activity that they generate. From this capacityof the nervous system to interact discriminatelywith its own states in a continuous process of selftransformation, regardless of how these statesare generated, behavior emerges as a continuumof self-referred functional transformation. Wecannot say in absolute terms what constitutes aninput to our nervous system (the nervous systemof the observer), because every


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one of its states can be its input and can modify itas an interacting unit. We can say that everyinternal interaction changes us because itmodifies our internal state, changing our postureor perspective (as a functional state) from whichwe enter into a new interaction. As a result newrelations are necessarily created in eachinteraction and, embodied in new states ofactivity, we interact with them in a process thatrepeats itself as a historical and unlimitedtransformation.

(3) The observer generates a spoken descriptionof his cognitive domain (which includes hisinteractions with and through instruments).Whatever description he makes, however, that


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description corresponds to a set of permittedstates of relative activity in his nervous systemembodying the relations given in his interactions.These permitted states of relative activity andthose recursively generated by them are madepossible by the anatomical and functionalorganization of the nervous system through itscapacity to interact with its own states. Thenervous system in turn has evolved as a systemstructurally and functionally subservient to thebasic circularity of the living organization, andhence, embodies an inescapable logic: that logicwhich allows for a match between theorganization of the living system and theinteractions into which it can enter without losingits identity.

(4) The observer can describe a system that givesrise to a system that can describe, hence, to anobserver. A spoken explanation is a paraphrase, adescription of the synthesis of that which is to beexplained; the observer explains the observer. Aspoken explanation, however, lies in the domainof discourse. Only a full reproduction is a fullexplanation.

(5) The domain of discourse is a closed domain,and it is not possible to step outside of it throughdiscourse. Because the domain of discourse is aclosed domain it is possible to make the followingontological statement: the logic of the descriptionis the logic of the describing (living) system (andhis cognitive domain).

(6) This logic demands a substratum for theoccurrence of the discourse. We cannot talk aboutthis substratum in absolute terms, however,because we would have to describe it, and adescription is a set of interactions into which thedescriber and the listener can enter, and theirdiscourse about these interactions will be anotherset of descriptive interactions that will remain inthe same domain. Thus, although this substratumis required for epistemological reasons, nothing


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can be said about it other than what is meant inthe ontological statement above.

(7) We as observers live in a domain of discourseinteracting with descriptions of our descriptionsin a recursive manner, and thus continuouslygenerate


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new elements of interaction. As living systems,however, we are closed systems modulated byinteractions through which we defineindependent entities whose only reality lies in theinteractions that specify them (their Description).

(8) For epistemological reasons we can say: thereare properties which are manifold and remainconstant through interactions. The invariance ofproperties through interactions provides afunctional origin to entities or units ofinteractions; since entities are generated throughthe interactions that define them (properties),entities with different classes of propertiesgenerate independent domains of interactions: noreductionism is possible.


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V. PROBLEMS IN THENEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF COGNITION

(1) The observer can always remain in a domainof interactions encompassing his owninteractions; he has a nervous system capable ofinteracting with its own states, which, by doingso in a functional context that defines thesestates as representations of the interactions fromwhich they arise, allows him to interactrecursively with representations of hisinteractions. This is possible because due to thegeneral mode of organization of the nervoussystem there is no intrinsic difference between itsinternally and externally generated states ofactivity, and because each one of its specificstates of activity is specifiable only in reference toother states of activity of the system itself.

(2) An organism with a nervous system capable ofinteracting with its own states is capable ofdescriptions and of being an observer if its statesarise from learned orienting interactions in aconsensual domain: it can describe its describing[Cf. Gardner and Gardner, 1969]. Throughdescribing itself in a recursive manner, such anorganism becomes a self-observing system thatgenerates the domain of self-consciousness as adomain of self-observation. Self-consciousnessthen is not a neurophysiological phenomenon, itis a consensual phenomenon emerging in anindependent domain of interactions fromself-orienting behavior and lies entirely in thelinguistic domain. The implications are twofold:

(a) The linguistic domain as a domain oforienting behavior requires at least twointeracting organisms with comparabledomains of interactions, so that acooperative system of consensual


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interactions may be developed in which theemerging conduct of the two organisms isrelevant for both. The specifiability throughlearning of the orienting interactions allowsfor a purely consensual (cultural) evolutionin this domain, without it necessarilyinvolving any further evolution of thenervous system; for this reason the linguisticdomain in general, and the domain ofself-consciousness in particular, are, inprinciple, independent of the biologicalsubstratum that generates them. However,in the actual becoming of the living systemthis independence is incomplete, on the onehand because the anatomical andneurophysiological organization of the brain,by determining the actual possibilities ofconfluence of different states of activity in it,specifies both the domain of possible


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interactions of the organism with relationsand the complexity of the patterns oforienting interactions that it can distinguish,and on the other hand because thenecessary subservience of the linguisticdomain to the maintenance of the basiccircularity of the organism through thegeneration of modes of behavior that directlyor indirectly satisfy it limits the type ofconduct that the organism can have withoutan immediate or eventual disintegration, or,of course, reduced rate of reproduction.Consequently, then, although the purely


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consensual aspects of the cultural evolutionare independent of a simultaneous evolutionof the nervous system, those aspects of thecultural evolution which depend on thepossibility of establishing new classes ofconcomitances of activity in the nervoussystem, and generate new relations betweenotherwise independent domains, are notthus independent. Accordingly, once acultural domain is established, thesubsequent evolution of the nervous systemis necessarily subordinated to it in themeasure that it determines the functionalvalidity of the new kinds of concomitances ofactivity that may arise in the nervous systemthrough genetic variability.

(b) Since self-consciousness and thelinguistic domain in general are notneurophysiological phenomena, it isimpossible to account for them in terms ofexcitation, inhibition, networks, coding, orwhatever else is the stuff of neurophysiology.In fact, the linguistic domain is fullyexplained only by showing how it emergesfrom the recursive application of orientinginteractions on the results of theirapplications without being restricted as adomain by the neurophysiologicalsubstratum; what indeed is the problem isthe need to account in purely physiologicalterms, without reference to meaning, for thesynthesis of behavior in general, and for thesynthesis of orienting behavior in particular.Accordingly, the fundamental quest in thisrespect should be to understand and explain

(i) how does the nervous systeminteract with its own states and ismodified by them as if they wereindependent entities?

(ii) how are these states specifiedneurophysiologically if they are defined


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by their own effectiveness in bringingforth certain internal or sensory statesin the system?

(iii) how is a given effector performancesynthesized that is defined by therelative states of activity that itgenerates in the sensory surfaces andin the system itself? ; and

(iv) how do the double or triple internalanatomical projections


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of the nervous system onto itselfdetermine its capacity to single outsome of its own states and interact withthem independently?.

(3) At any moment each nerve cell responds in adeterministic manner, and according to welldefined transfer functions to classes of spatio-temporal activity caused at its collector area bythe afferent influences impinging upon it; thisoccurs independently of how these afferentinfluences arise. This mode of cellular operationconstitutes the basis for an associative process inwhich, whenever a given state of activity isproduced in the nervous system, all neurons forwhich this state generates the proper classes ofafferent influences enter into activity. Associationthus conceived neurophysiologically is aninevitable process that calls into activity all cells


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that can be activated at any moment by a givenstate of the nervous system. No consideration ofmeaning enters into such a notion, sincemeaning, as a description by the observer, refersto the relevance that a mode of behavior has inthe maintenance of the basic circularity of theorganism as a consequence of self-regulation, andnot in the mechanisms of the genesis of conduct.Association in terms of representations related bymeaning lies in the cognitive domain of theobserver exclusively. The nervous system is asystem that functions maintaining constantcertain states of relative activity, both internallyand at the sensory surfaces, with reference onlyto some of its other states of relative activity. Inthis context the following considerations about itsfunctional organization are significant:

(a) The nervous system can be described asa system that has evolved to specialize in thediscrimination between states of neuronalrelative activity (particularly in man) each ofwhich is defined by the behavior itgenerates. This is valid for innate andlearned behavior in circumstances in whichevery behavior is defined either by a set ofstates of activity maintained constant, or bytheir path of variation, both internally and atthe sensory surfaces.

(b) The basic connectivity of the nervoussystem, and the original reactive capacity ofthe nerve cells, with which any animal isendowed by development, secures a basicpattern of flow for the nervous activityoriginating at any point in it. Thus,development specifies and determines bothan initial repertoire of behavior over whichall new conduct is built in a historicalprocess of transformation, and an initialstructurally specified set of possibleassociations that changes in an integratedmanner with the historical transformation ofbehavior [Cf. Lorenz, 1966].


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(c) Any modification of the transfer functionof a nerve cell, resulting


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from new concomitances of activity, occursmodifying a preexisting behavior in a systemthat operates through maintaining invariantits definitory internal relations. In fact, anylocal change that would lead to the synthesisof a modified conduct by the organism, mustbe immediately accompanied by otherchanges arising through the adjustmentsthat this must undergo in the process ofmaintaining constant its internal relationsunder its changed behavior. This is why it isthe immediate relevance of a conduct for themaintenance of the organism in the presentwhich at any moment selects the changesthat take place during learning, and not thepossible value of the conduct for futureaction.

(d) It is apparent that the nervous systemcannot determine in advance theconcomitances of activity under which itshould change in a permanent manner; for itto satisfy future needs of the organism, itmust operate under non-predictive changescontinuously selected by the concomitancesof activity arising in it. For this the nervoussystem must be capable of successfuloperation under the continuoustransformation of its capacity to synthesizebehavior, which necessarily results from a


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continuous change of the neurophysiologicalconcomitances that determine the effectivespatio-temporal configuration of activityimpinging on the collector areas of itscomponent neurons. Accordingly, it wouldseem of fundamental importance for thefunctional transformation of the system thatmany of its neurons should be able tochange their relative participation in thesynthesis of behavior as elements ofdifferent states of relative neuronal activity,independently of whether or not this isaccompanied by any change in their transferfunctions. In these circumstances the actualproblem for the successful operation of thenervous system is the generation at anymoment of the optimal configuration ofactivity necessary to synthesize a givenbehavior. However, since this continuoustransformation of the functional capacity ofthe nervous system necessarily occurs undercontinuously successful behavior, suchoptimization requires no other specificationthan its attainment through the convergingtransformation of behavior itself.

(e) Since the nervous system is an inferentialsystem, that is, since it functions as if anystate that occurred once will occur again, asignificant feature of its organization mustbe its necessary and continuoustransformation as a function of the newconcomitances of activity occurring in it.This functional requirement could besatisfied, for example, if any new localconcomitance of activity in the neuropilschanges the nerve cells in a deterministicand specific manner which does notrepresent any entity or event, but whichmodifies the neurophysiologicalcircumstances under which the


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corresponding post-synaptic neurons areactivated. Such can occur if the probabilityof spike invasion at the branching points ofthe afferent axons in the neuropils ispermanently modified in one direction oranother by the coincident novel activity inthe neighboring structures, which, in theabsence of synaptic interactions, cause,through local currents, local processes ofgrowth or ungrowth in the branching zonesof these axons. If this were the case fourthings would occur:

(i) The state of the nervous systemwould change, and hence, also itsconduct, according to the newconcomitances of activity produced inthe neuropils through its differentinteractions.

(ii) Each state of activity of the system(as a state of relative neuronal activity)would be defined by the concomitancesof activity in the neuropil that generateit, such that if they recur, it recurs.

(iii) Each new functional state of theneuropils would necessarily constitutethe basis for their further modification,in such a manner that theirmorphological and functionalorganization would be under continuoushistorical transformation.


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(iv) These changes in the neuropilswould change the participation of thedifferent neurons in the synthesis ofbehavior, independently of whether ornot there are also changes in theirtransfer functions, by changing thecircumstances of their activation.Accordingly, if an interaction (asdescribed by the observer) recurs, nopast conduct could be strictly reenactedby the organism, but this would have tosynthesize a new adequate behaviorthat generates, in the context of itspresent interaction and in a mannerthat became specified through itsstructural transformation along itshistory of interactions, the internal andsensory motor correlations thatmaintain its identity.

(4) Learning is not a process of accumulation ofrepresentations of the environment; it is acontinuous process of transformation of behaviorthrough continuous change in the capacity of thenervous system to synthesize it. Recall does notdepend on the indefinite retention of a structuralinvariant that represents an entity (an idea,image, or symbol), but on the functional ability ofthe system to create, when certain recurrentconditions are given, a behavior that satisfies therecurrent demands or that the observer wouldclass as a reenacting of a previous one. As aconsequence, the quest in the study of thelearning process must answer two basicquestions:

'What changes can a neuronundergo (in any of its componentparts) which it can maintainconstant for a certain time, and


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which modify in a definite manner itspossible participation in differentconfigurations of relative neuronalactivity?'; and

'What organization of the nervoussystem would permit continuouschanges in the relative activity of itsanatomical components, as a result ofdifferent concomitances in their activity,and still permit the synthesis of aconduct that is defined only by thestates of relative neuronal activity thatit generates, and not by the componentsused?'.

(5) The nervous system is a strictly deterministicsystem whose structure specifies the possiblemodes of conduct that may emerge (besynthesized) from its functioning in a manner thatvaries according to the species, and the reactiveperspective from which these modes of conductmay emerge. The reactive perspective, which theobserver would call the emotional tone, does notspecify a particular conduct, but determines thenature (aggressive, fearful, timid, etc.) of thecourse of the interaction [Cf. Kilmer, McCullochand Blum, 1968]. Changes during development,maturation, hormonal action, drugs, or learning,do not modify the deterministic character of thisorganization but change the capacity that thesystem has at any moment to synthesize behavior.


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Furthermore, although any conduct or functionalstate always arises through a process of historicaltransformation from pre-existing modes ofconduct or functional states, the nervous systemfunctions in the present, and past history doesnot participate as an operant neurophysiologicalfactor in the synthesis of conduct; nor doesmeaning, the relevance that a particular mode ofconduct has, participate in it either. Time andmeaning are effective factors in the linguisticdomain, but as relational entities do not haveneurophysiological correlates in the operation ofthe nervous system. Nor is the functional unity ofthe nervous system attained through a specificfeature of its organization, but emerges from thefunctioning of its components (whatever thesemay be), each one to its own accord, undercircumstances that define the ensemble as a unitof interactions in a particular domain [Cf.Lindauer, 1967, as an example in a socialorganism], and has no reality independent ofthese circumstances. Thus there is no peculiarneurophysiological process that could be shownto be responsible for this unity and to explain it.Furthermore, in a strict sense, although thenervous system has anatomical components itdoes not have functional parts since anymutilation leaves a functioning unit, withdifferent properties as expressed by its possibleinteractions, but a unit in the correspondingdomain. It appears incomplete only for theobserver who beholds it as an entity from theperspective of


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what he thinks it should be. Each component ofthe nervous system that the observer describes isdefined in the domain of interactions of hisobservations, and as such is alien to the systemwhich it is supposed to integrate. Every functionhas a structure which embodies it and makes itpossible, but this structure is defined by thefunction in the domain of its operation as a set ofrelations between elements also defined in thisdomain. Neurons are the anatomical units of thenervous system, but are not the structuralelements of its functioning. The structuralelements of the functioning nervous system havenot yet been defined, and it will probably beapparent when they are defined that they must beexpressed in terms of invariants of relativeactivities between neurons, in some mannerembodied in invariants of relations ofinterconnections, and not in terms of separateanatomical entities. In manmade systems thisconceptual difficulty has not been so apparentbecause the system of relations (the theory) thatintegrates the parts that the describer (theobserver) defines is provided by him, and isspecified in his domain of interactions; as aconsequence, these relations appear so obviousto the observer that he treats them as arisingfrom the observation of the parts, and deludeshimself, denying that he provides theunformulated theory that embodies the structureof the system which he projects onto them. In aself-referring system like a living system thesituation is different: the observer can only makea description of his interactions with parts that hedefines through interactions, but these parts liein his cognitive domain only. Unless he explicitlyor implicitly provides a theory that embodies therelational structure of the system, andconceptually supersedes his description of thecomponents, he can never understand it.Accordingly, the full explanation of theorganization of the nervous system (and of the


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organism) will not arise from any particularobservation or detailed description andenumeration of its parts, but rather like anyexplanation, from the synthesis, conceptual orconcrete, of a system that does what the nervoussystem (or the organism) does.


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VI. CONCLUSIONS

The aim set forth in the introduction has beenaccomplished. Through the description of theself-referring circular organization of the livingsystem, and through the analysis of the domainsof interactions that such an organizationspecifies, I have shown the emergence of aself-referring system capable of makingdescriptions and of generating, through orientinginteractions with other, similar, systems and withitself, both a consensual linguistic domain and adomain of self-consciousness, that is: I haveshown the emergence of the observer. This resultalone satisfies the fundamental demand put forthat the outset: 'The observer is a living system andany understanding of cognition as a biologicalphenomenon must account for the observer andhis role in it', and proves the validity of thisanalysis.

Although the answers to the various questionsposed in the introduction and the fundamentalimplications of the analysis are to be found in thetext itself to the extent that the theory adequatelyfounds its whole development, there are several


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conclusions that I would like to state explicitly:

(i) The living organization is a circularorganization which secures the productionor maintenance of the components thatspecify it in such a manner that the productof their functioning is the very sameorganization that produces them.Accordingly, a living system is anhomeostatic system whose homeostaticorganization has its own organization as thevariable that it maintains constant throughthe production and functioning of thecomponents that specify it, and is defined asa unit of interactions by this veryorganization. It follows that living systemsare a subclass of the class of circular andhomeostatic systems. Also, it is apparentthat the components referred to abovecannot be specified as parts of the livingsystem by the observer who can onlysubdivide a system in parts that he definesthrough his interactions, and which,necessarily, lie exclusively in his cognitivedomain and are operationally determined byhis mode of analysis. Furthermore, therelations through which the observer claimsthat these parts constitute a unitary systemare relations that arise only through him byhis simultaneous interactions with the partsand the intact system, and, hence, belongexclusively to his cognitive domain. Thus,although the observer can decompose


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a living system into parts that he defines, thedescription of these parts does not andcannot represent a living system. Inprinciple a part should be definable throughits relations within the unit that itcontributes to form by its operation andinteractions with other parts; this, however,cannot be attained because the analysis of aunit into parts by the observer destroys thevery relations that would be significant fortheir characterization as effectivecomponents of the unit. Furthermore, theserelations cannot be recovered through adescription which lies in the cognitivedomain of the observer and reflects only hisinteractions with the new units that hecreates through his analysis. Accordingly, ina strict sense a unit does not have parts, anda unit is a unit only to the extent that it has adomain of interactions that defines it asdifferent from that with respect to which it isa unit, and can be referred to only, as doneabove with the living system, bycharacterizing its organization through thedomain of interactions which specify thisdistinction. In this context, the notion ofcomponent is necessary only forepistemological reasons in order to refer tothe genesis of the organization of the unitthrough our description, but this use doesnot reflect the nature of its composition.

(ii) For every living system its particular caseof self referring circular organizationspecifies a closed domain of interactions thatis its cognitive domain, and no interaction ispossible for it which is not prescribed by thisorganization. Accordingly, for every livingsystem the process of cognition consists inthe creation of a field of behavior through itsactual conduct in its dosed domain ofinteractions, and not in the apprehension or


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the description of an independent universe.Our cognitive process (the cognitive processof the observer) differs from the cognitiveprocesses of other organisms only in thekinds of interactions into which we canenter, such as linguistic interactions, and notin the nature of the cognitive process itself.In this strictly subject-dependent creativeprocess, inductive inference is a necessaryfunction (mode of conduct) that emerges asa result of the self-referring circularorganization which treats every interactionand the internal state that it generates as ifit were to be repeated, and as if an elementof a class. Hence, functionally, for a livingsystem every experience is the experience ofa general case, and it is the particular case,not the general one, which requires manyindependent experiences in order that it bespecified through the intersection of variousclasses of interactions. Consequently,although due to the historical transformationthey have caused in organisms, or in theirnervous systems, past interactionsdetermine the inductive inferences thatthese make in the present, they do notparticipate in the inductive process


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itself. Inductive inference as a structuralproperty of the living organization and of thethinking process, is independent of history,or of the relations between past and presentthat belong only to the domain of the


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observer.

(iii) Linguistic interactions orient the listenerwithin his cognitive domain, but do notspecify the course of his ensuing conduct.The basic function of language as a systemof orienting behavior is not the transmissionof information or the description of anindependent universe about which we cantalk, but the creation of a consensual domainof behavior between linguisticallyinteracting systems through thedevelopment of a cooperative domain ofinteractions.

(iv) Through language we interact in adomain of descriptions within which wenecessarily remain even when we makeassertions about the universe or about ourknowledge of it. This domain is bothbounded and infinite; bounded becauseeverything we say is a description, andinfinite because every descriptionconstitutes in us the basis for new orientinginteractions, and hence, for newdescriptions. From this process of recursiveapplication of descriptionsself-consciousness emerges as a newphenomenon in a domain of self-description,with no other neurophysiological substratumthan the neurophysiological substratum oforienting behavior itself. The domain ofself-consciousness as a domain of recursiveself-descriptions is thus also bounded andinfinite.

(v) A living system is not a goal-directedsystem; it is, like the nervous system, astable state-determined and strictlydeterministic system closed on itself andmodulated by interactions not specifiedthrough its conduct. These modulations,however, are apparent as modulations onlyfor the observer who beholds the organism


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or the nervous system externally, from hisown conceptual (descriptive) perspective, aslying in an environment and as elements inhis domain of interactions. Contrariwise, forthe functioning of the self-referring systemitself all that there is is the sequence of itsown self-subservient states. If thisdistinction is not made, one is liable to failby including in the explanation of theorganism and the nervous system features ofinteractions (descriptions) that belongexclusively to the cognitive domain of theobserver.

(vi) It is tempting to talk about the nervoussystem as one would talk about a stablesystem with input. This I reject because itmisses entirely the point by introducing thedistortion of our participation as observersinto the explanation of systems whoseorganization must be understood as entirely


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self-referring. What occurs in a living systemis analogous to what occurs in aninstrumental night where the pilot does nothave access to the outside world and mustfunction only as a controller of the valuesshown in his flight instruments. His task is tosecure a path of variations in the readings ofhis instruments, either according to aprescribed plan, or to one that becomesspecified by these readings. When the pilotsteps out of the plane he is bewildered by


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the congratulations of his friends on accountof the perfect flight and landing that heperformed in absolute darkness. He isperplexed because to his knowledge all thathe did at any moment was to maintain thereadings of his instruments within certainspecified limits, a task which is in no wayrepresented by the description that hisfriends (observers) make of his conduct.

In terms of their functional organizationliving systems do not have inputs andoutputs, although under perturbations theymaintain constant their set states, and it isonly in our descriptions, when we includethem as parts of larger systems which wedefine, that we can say that they do. Whenwe adopt this descriptive approach in ouranalysis of the living organization we cannotbut subordinate our understanding of it tonotions valid only for man-made (allo-referring) systems, where indeed input andoutput functions are all important throughthe purposeful design of their role in thelarger systems in which they are included,and this is misleading. In the organization ofthe living systems the role of the effectorsurfaces is only to maintain constant the setstates of the receptor surfaces, not to actupon an environment, no matter howadequate such a description may seem to befor the analysis of adaptation, or otherprocesses; a grasp of this is fundamental forthe understanding of the organization ofliving systems.

(vii) The cognitive domain of the observer isbounded but unlimited; he can in an endlessrecursive manner interact withrepresentations of his interactions andgenerate through himself relations betweenotherwise independent domains. Theserelations are novelties which, arisingthrough the observer, have no other (and no


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less) effectiveness than that given to themby his behavior. Thus, he both creates(invents) relations and generates (specifies)the world (domain of interactions) in whichhe lives by continuously expanding hiscognitive domain through recursivedescriptions and representations of hisinteractions. The new, then, is a necessaryresult of the historical organization of theobserver that makes of every attained statethe starting point for the specification of thenext one, which thus cannot be a strictrepetition of any previous state; creativity isthe cultural expression of this unavoidablefeature.


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(viii) The logic of the description and, hence,of behavior in general is, necessarily, thelogic of the describing system; givenbehavior as a referential and deterministicsequence of states of nervous activity inwhich each state determines the next onewithin the same frame of reference, nocontradiction can possibly arise in it as longas the latter remains unchanged byintercurrent interactions. If a change in theframe of reference takes place while a givenbehavior develops, a new one appears, suchthat the states following the change aredetermined with respect to it. If the newsequence of states (behavior) appears to anobserver as contradicting the previous ones,this is so because he provides an


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independent and constant frame ofreference in relation to which the successivesequences of states (behaviors) arecontradictory. Such contradiction, however,lies exclusively in the cognitive domain ofthe observer, or of whatever provides theindependent constant frame of reference.Contradictions (inconsistencies) then, do notarise in the generation of behavior butpertain to a domain in which the differentbehaviors acquire their significance byconfronting an encompassing frame ofreference through the interactions of theorganism. Accordingly, thinking anddiscourse as modes of behavior arenecessarily logically consistent in theirgeneration, and that which the observercalls rational in them because they appear asconcatenations of non-contradictorysequence dependent descriptions, is anexpression of this necessary logicalconsistency. It follows that inconsistencies(irrationalities) in thinking and discourse asthey appear to the observer arise fromcontextual changes in the circumstancesthat generate them while the independentframe of reference provided by the observerremains unchanged.

(ix) Due to the nature of the cognitiveprocess and the function of the linguisticinteractions, we cannot say anything aboutthat which is independent of us and withwhich we cannot interact; to do that wouldimply a description and a description as amode of conduct represents only relationsgiven in interactions. Because the logic ofthe description is the same as the logic ofthe describing system we can assert theepistemological need for a substratum forthe interactions to occur, but we cannotcharacterize this substratum in terms ofproperties independent of the observer.From this it follows that reality as a universe


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of independent entities about which we cantalk is, necessarily, a fiction of the purelydescriptive domain, and that we should infact apply the notion of reality to this verydomain of descriptions in which we, thedescribing system, interact with ourdescriptions as if with independent entities.This change in the notion of reality must beproperly understood. We are used to talkingabout reality orienting each other through


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linguistic interactions to what we deem aresensory experiences of concrete entities, butwhich have turned out to be, as are thoughtsand descriptions, states of relative activitybetween neurons that generate newdescriptions. The question, 'What is theobject of knowledge?' becomes meaningless.There is no object of knowledge. To know isto be able to operate adequately in anindividual or cooperative situation. Wecannot speak about the substratum in whichour cognitive behavior is given, and aboutthat of which we cannot speak, we mustremain silent, as indicated by Wittgenstein.This silence, however, does not mean that wefall into solipsism or any sort ofmetaphysical idealism. It means that werecognize that we, as thinking systems, livein a domain of descriptions, as has alreadybeen indicated by Berkeley, and that throughdescriptions we can indefinitely increase thecomplexity of our cognitive domain. Our


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view of the universe and of the questions weask must change accordingly. Furthermore,this re-emergence of reality as a domain ofdescriptions does not contradictdeterminism and predictability in thedifferent domains of interactions; on thecontrary, it gives them foundation byshowing that they are a necessaryconsequence of the isomorphism betweenthe logic of the description and the logic ofthe describing system. It also shows thatdeterminism and predictability are valid onlywithin the field of this isomorphism; that is,they are valid only for the interactions thatdefine a domain.

(x) The genetic and nervous systems are saidto code information about the environmentand to represent it in their functionalorganization. This is untenable; the geneticand nervous systems code processes thatspecify series of transformations from initialstates, which can be decoded only throughtheir actual implementation, not descriptionsthat the observer makes of an environmentwhich lies exclusively in his cognitivedomain [Cf. Bernal, 1965]. The following isan illustration of the problem:

Let us suppose that we want to build twohouses. For such a purpose we hire twogroups of thirteen workers each. We nameone of the workers of the first group as thegroup leader and give him a book whichcontains all the plans of the house showingin a standard way the layout of walls, waterpipes, electric connections, windows, etc.,plus several views in perspective of thefinished house. The workers study the plansand under the guidance of the leaderconstruct the house, approximatingcontinuously the final state prescribed bythe description. In the second group we donot name a leader, we only arrange the


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workers in a starting line in the field andgive each of them a book, the same book forall, containing only neighborhood in-


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structions. These instructions do not containwords such as house, pipes, or windows, nordo they contain drawings or plans of thehouse to be constructed; they contain onlyinstructions of what a worker should do inthe different positions and in the differentrelations in which he finds himself as hisposition and relations change.

Although these books are all identical theworkers read and apply differentinstructions because they start fromdifferent positions and follow different pathsof change. The end result in both cases isthe same, namely, a house. The workers ofthe first group, however, constructsomething whose final appearance theyknow all the time, while the workers of thesecond group have no views of what they arebuilding, nor do they need to have obtainedthem even when they are finished. For theobserver both groups are building a house,and he knows it from the start, but the housethat the second group builds lies only in hiscognitive domain; the house built by the firstgroup, however, is also in the cognitivedomains of the workers. The coding isobviously different in the two cases. In fact,the instructions contained in the book given


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to the first group clearly code the house asthe observer would describe it, and thedecoding task of the workers consists inpurposefully doing things that willapproximate to the construction of thedescribed final state; this is why the housemust be in their cognitive domain. In thesecond case, the instructions contained ineach one of the thirteen identical books donot code a house. They code a process thatconstitutes a path of changing relationshipswhich, if carried through under certainconditions, results in a system with a domainof interactions which has no intrinsicrelationship with the beholding observer.That the observer should call this system ahouse is a feature of his cognitive domain,not of the system itself. In the first case thecoding is isomorphic with a description ofthe house by the observer, and in factconstitutes a representation of it; in thesecond case it is not. The first case is typicalof the way in which the observer codes thesystems that he builds; the secondcorresponds to the way that the genome andnervous system constitute codes for theorganism and for behavior, respectively, andone would never find in these codes anyisomorphism with the description that theobserver would make of the resultantsystems with which he interacts. In whatsense could one then say that the geneticand nervous systems code information aboutthe environment? The notion of informationrefers to the observer's degree ofuncertainty in his behavior within a domainof alternatives defined by him, hence thenotion of information only applies within hiscognitive domain. Accordingly, what onecould at most say is that the genetic andnervous systems generate informationthrough their


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self-specification when witnessed by theobserver as if in their progressiveself-decoding into growth and behavior.

(xi) There are different domains ofinteractions, and these different domainscannot explain each other because it is notpossible to generate the phenomena of onedomain with the elements of another; oneremains in the same domain. One domainmay generate the elements of anotherdomain, but not its phenomenology, which ineach domain is specified by the interactionsof its elements, and the elements of adomain become defined only through thedomain that they generate. Any nexusbetween different domains is provided by theobserver who can interact as if with a singleentity with the conjoined states of nervousactivity generated in his brain by hisconcomitant interactions in several domains,or with independent descriptions of theseinteractions. Through these concomitantinteractions in different domains (or withseveral descriptions within the descriptivedomain) the observer generates relationsbetween different domains (or betweendifferent descriptions) as states of neuronalactivity that in him lead to definite modes ofconduct (descriptions) that represent theseconjoined interactions as singularindependent entities. The number and kindsof relations the observer can generate in thismanner is potentially infinite due to his


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recursive interactions with descriptions.Thus, relations, as states of neuronal activityarising from the concurrent interactions ofthe observer in different domains (physicaland relational) constitute the elements of anew domain in which the observer interactsas a thinking system, but do not reduce onephenomenological domain into another. It isthe simultaneous logical isomorphism of thenew element (relations) with their sourcesystems through their mode of origin (classintersection) that gives the new domain thusgenerated (descriptions) its explanatorycapacity. An explanation is always areproduction, either a concrete one throughthe synthesis of an equivalent physicalsystem, or a conceptual one through adescription from which emerges a systemlogically isomorphic to the original one, butnever a reduction of one phenomenologicaldomain into another. An adequateunderstanding of this irreducibility isessential for the comprehension of thebiological phenomena, the consensualdomains that living systems generate' andtheir conjoined evolution.

Many conclusions about self-consciousness andknowledge which arise from this mode of analysishave been proposed in one way or another byscientists and philosophers from their intuitiveunderstanding, but never, to my knowledge, withan adequate biological and epistemologicalfoundation. This I have done through thedistinction between what pertains to the domain


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of the observer, and what pertains to the domainof the organism, and through carrying to theirultimate consequences the implications of thecircular self-referring organization of the livingsystems: the implications of the functionallyclosed nature of the relativistic organization ofthe nervous system as a system under continuoustransformation determined by relations ofneuronal activity without the system everstepping outside itself; and the implications of thenon-informative orienting function of linguisticinteractions. It is only after this has been donethat the functional complexity of the living andlinguistically interacting system can be properlygrasped without its being concealed through suchmagic words as consciousness, symbolization, orinformation. Most of the detailed work is yet to bedone, of course, but the fundamental first step ofdefining the perspective from which to look hashere been taken. As a final remark, one could saywhat appears to be another paradox, but whichpoints to the conceptual problem:

Living systems in general, and theirnervous system in particular, are notmade to handle a medium, although ithas been through the evolution of theirhandling of their medium that they havebecome what they are, such that we cansay what we can say about them.


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POST SCRIPTUM

No scientific work should be done withoutrecognizing its ethical implications; in the presentcase the following deserve special attention:

(i) Man is a deterministic and relativisticself-referring autonomous system whose lifeacquires its peculiar dimension throughself-consciousness; ethic and morality ariseas commentaries that he makes on hisbehavior through self-observation. He livesin a continuously changing domain ofdescriptions that he generates throughrecursive interactions within that domain,and which has no other constant element inits historical transformation than hismaintained identity as an interacting system.That is, man changes and lives in a changingframe of reference in a world continuouslycreated and transformed by him. Successfulinteractions directly or indirectlysubservient to the maintenance of his livingorganization constitute his only final sourceof reference for valid behavior within thedomain of descriptions, and, hence, fortruth; but, since living systems areself-referential systems, any final frame ofreference is, necessarily, relative.Accordingly, no absolute system of values ispossible and all truth and falsehood in thecultural domain are necessarily relative.

(ii) Language does not transmit informationand its functional role is the creation of acooperative domain of interactions betweenspeakers through the development of acommon frame of reference, although eachspeaker acts exclusively within his cognitivedomain where all ultimate truth iscontingent to personal experience. Since aframe of reference is defined by the classes


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of choices which it specifies, linguisticbehavior cannot but be rational, that is,determined by relations of necessity withinthe frame of reference within which itdevelops. Consequently, no one can ever berationally convinced of a truth which he didnot have already implicitly in his ultimatebody of beliefs.

(iii) Man is a rational animal that constructshis rational systems as all rational systemsare constructed, that is, based on arbitrarilyaccepted truths (premises); being himself arelativistic self-referring deterministicsystem this cannot be otherwise. But if onlya relative, arbitrarily chosen system ofreference is possible, the unavoidable task ofman as a self-conscious animal that can bean observer of its own cognitive processes isto explicitly choose a


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frame of reference for his system of values.This task he has always avoided by resortingto god as an absolute source of truth, or toself-delusion through reason, which can beused to justify anything by confusing theframes of reference and arguing in onedomain with relations valid in another. Theultimate truth on which a man bases hisrational conduct is necessarily subordinatedto his personal experience and appears as anact of choice expressing a preference thatcannot be transferred rationally; accordingly,


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the alternative to reason, as a source for auniversal system of values, is aestheticseduction in favor of a frame of referencespecifically designed to comply with hisdesires (and not his needs) and defining thefunctions to be satisfied by the world(cultural and material) in which he wants tolive.

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